Abstract: Dissidents face a fundamental tension when coordinating mobilization against a repressive regime. Dissidents benefit from making coordination public: this increases the spread of the call, and thus increases the potential size of mobilization. But public calls are also heard by the regime, giving the security apparatus advanced knowledge of, and improved ability to, violently stifle mobilization. How, then, do dissidents coordinate collective action under repressive environments? Looking at Sudan's 2018-19 uprising, I find that, on the surface, it appeared that mobilization was publicly coordinated by a social movement organization (SMO). Yet some dissidents independently used the SMO's widespread calls to organize simultaneous collective action away from the main protest sites, intentionally deviating from centrally organized calls to confuse and distract the security forces. This "coordinated dis-coordination" reduced regime repression, and resulted in a situation in which the key SMO ostensibly leading the protests did not in fact directly coordinate most protest activities.