"Trust, Anger, Resentment: On Blame and the Economy of Disesteem"
Abstract:
Blame is naturally understood in terms of reactive attitudes such as resentment. These attitudes, in turn, are responsive to reasons, i.e. considerations that make them fitting or appropriate. It seems to follow that the conditions of blame are in place whenever a person has been wronged by another—just as it is appropriate to withdraw trust whenever someone has betrayed the confidence we had invested in them. But this analogy between resentment and the withdrawal of trust neglects the affective dimension of blame, its connection to anger.
I argue that angry disapprobation functions as a form of social pressure that helps to incentivize compliance with basic interpersonal norms. In experiencing reactive attitudes, we understand ourselves to be participating in a natural economy of disesteem, a system that seems crucial to the emergence of stable cooperative relations between people. The significance of this affective dimension of blame comes into clear focus when we reflect on the role of anger and resentment within the context of a personal relationship: these attitudes do not merely register transparently the existence of independent reasons to adjust our behavior toward another person; they have emotional weight in their own right, as factors that come between us and the agent who has wronged us.
States of this kind can be managed in different ways, as the example of forgiveness shows: in forgiving someone, we decline to attach significance to affective states that are nevertheless appropriate, given the behavior of the party whose behavior is forgiven. I suggest, in conclusion, that the question of how affective states of this kind are to be managed provides a point of entry for the application of practical norms of various kinds to the assessment of the reactive attitudes, including norms of prudence and moral norms of fairness.
reactive attitudes, including norms of prudence and moral norms of fairness.appropriate, given the behavior of the party whose behavior is forgiven. I suggest, inagent who has wronged us.dimension of blame comes into clear focus when we reflect on the role of anger and resentmentof trust neglects the affective dimension of blame, its connection to anger.Blame is naturally understood in terms of reactive attitudes such as resentment. These attitudes,
in turn, are responsive to reasons, i.e. considerations that make them fitting or appropriate. It
seems to follow that the conditions of blame are in place whenever a person has been wronged
by another—just as it is appropriate to withdraw trust whenever someone has betrayed the
confidence we had invested in them. But this analogy between resentment and the withdrawal
of trust neglects the affective dimension of blame, its connection to anger.
I argue that angry disapprobation functions as a form of social pressure that helps to incentivize
compliance with basic interpersonal norms. In experiencing reactive attitudes, we understand
ourselves to be participating in a natural economy of disesteem, a system that seems crucial to
the emergence of stable cooperative relations between people. The significance of this affective
dimension of blame comes into clear focus when we reflect on the role of anger and resentment
within the context of a personal relationship: these attitudes do not merely register
transparently the existence of independent reasons to adjust our behavior toward another
person; they have emotional weight in their own right, as factors that come between us and the
agent who has wronged us.
States of this kind can be managed in different ways, as the example of forgiveness shows: in
forgiving someone, we decline to attach significance to affective states that are nevertheless
appropriate, given the behavior of the party whose behavior is forgiven. I suggest, in
conclusion, that the question of how affective states of this kind are to be managed provides a
point of entry for the application of practical norms of various kinds to the assessment of the
reactive attitudes, including norms of prudence and moral norms of fairness.
Blame is naturally understood in terms of reactive attitudes such as resentment. These attitudes,
in turn, are responsive to reasons, i.e. considerations that make them fitting or appropriate. It
seems to follow that the conditions of blame are in place whenever a person has been wronged
by another—just as it is appropriate to withdraw trust whenever someone has betrayed the
confidence we had invested in them. But this analogy between resentment and the withdrawal
of trust neglects the affective dimension of blame, its connection to anger.
I argue that angry disapprobation functions as a form of social pressure that helps to incentivize
compliance with basic interpersonal norms. In experiencing reactive attitudes, we understand
ourselves to be participating in a natural economy of disesteem, a system that seems crucial to
the emergence of stable cooperative relations between people. The significance of this affective
dimension of blame comes into clear focus when we reflect on the role of anger and resentment
within the context of a personal relationship: these attitudes do not merely register
transparently the existence of independent reasons to adjust our behavior toward another
person; they have emotional weight in their own right, as factors that come between us and the
agent who has wronged us.
States of this kind can be managed in different ways, as the example of forgiveness shows: in
forgiving someone, we decline to attach significance to affective states that are nevertheless
appropriate, given the behavior of the party whose behavior is forgiven. I suggest, in
conclusion, that the question of how affective states of this kind are to be managed provides a
point of entry for the application of practical norms of various kinds to the assessment of the
reactive attitudes, including norms of prudence and moral norms of fairness.
Blame is naturally understood in terms of reactive attitudes such as resentment. These attitudes,
in turn, are responsive to reasons, i.e. considerations that make them fitting or appropriate. It
seems to follow that the conditions of blame are in place whenever a person has been wronged
by another—just as it is appropriate to withdraw trust whenever someone has betrayed the
confidence we had invested in them. But this analogy between resentment and the withdrawal
of trust neglects the affective dimension of blame, its connection to anger.
I argue that angry disapprobation functions as a form of social pressure that helps to incentivize
compliance with basic interpersonal norms. In experiencing reactive attitudes, we understand
ourselves to be participating in a natural economy of disesteem, a system that seems crucial to
the emergence of stable cooperative relations between people. The significance of this affective
dimension of blame comes into clear focus when we reflect on the role of anger and resentment
within the context of a personal relationship: these attitudes do not merely register
transparently the existence of independent reasons to adjust our behavior toward another
person; they have emotional weight in their own right, as factors that come between us and the
agent who has wronged us.
States of this kind can be managed in different ways, as the example of forgiveness shows: in
forgiving someone, we decline to attach significance to affective states that are nevertheless
appropriate, given the behavior of the party whose behavior is forgiven. I suggest, in
conclusion, that the question of how affective states of this kind are to be managed provides a
point of entry for the application of practical norms of various kinds to the assessment of the
reactive attitudes, including norms of prudence and moral norms of fairness.
Blame is naturally understood in terms of reactive attitudes such as resentment. These attitudes,
in turn, are responsive to reasons, i.e. considerations that make them fitting or appropriate. It
seems to follow that the conditions of blame are in place whenever a person has been wronged
by another—just as it is appropriate to withdraw trust whenever someone has betrayed the
confidence we had invested in them. But this analogy between resentment and the withdrawal
of trust neglects the affective dimension of blame, its connection to anger.
I argue that angry disapprobation functions as a form of social pressure that helps to incentivize
compliance with basic interpersonal norms. In experiencing reactive attitudes, we understand
ourselves to be participating in a natural economy of disesteem, a system that seems crucial to
the emergence of stable cooperative relations between people. The significance of this affective
dimension of blame comes into clear focus when we reflect on the role of anger and resentment
within the context of a personal relationship: these attitudes do not merely register
transparently the existence of independent reasons to adjust our behavior toward another
person; they have emotional weight in their own right, as factors that come between us and the
agent who has wronged us.
States of this kind can be managed in different ways, as the example of forgiveness shows: in
forgiving someone, we decline to attach significance to affective states that are nevertheless
appropriate, given the behavior of the party whose behavior is forgiven. I suggest, in
conclusion, that the question of how affective states of this kind are to be managed provides a
point of entry for the application of practical norms of various kinds to the assessment of the
reactive attitudes, including norms of prudence and moral norms of fairness.
Blame is naturally understood in terms of reactive attitudes such as resentment. These attitudes,
in turn, are responsive to reasons, i.e. considerations that make them fitting or appropriate. It
seems to follow that the conditions of blame are in place whenever a person has been wronged
by another—just as it is appropriate to withdraw trust whenever someone has betrayed the
confidence we had invested in them. But this analogy between resentment and the withdrawal
of trust neglects the affective dimension of blame, its connection to anger.
I argue that angry disapprobation functions as a form of social pressure that helps to incentivize
compliance with basic interpersonal norms. In experiencing reactive attitudes, we understand
ourselves to be participating in a natural economy of disesteem, a system that seems crucial to
the emergence of stable cooperative relations between people. The significance of this affective
dimension of blame comes into clear focus when we reflect on the role of anger and resentment
within the context of a personal relationship: these attitudes do not merely register
transparently the existence of independent reasons to adjust our behavior toward another
person; they have emotional weight in their own right, as factors that come between us and the
agent who has wronged us.
States of this kind can be managed in different ways, as the example of forgiveness shows: in
forgiving someone, we decline to attach significance to affective states that are nevertheless
appropriate, given the behavior of the party whose behavior is forgiven. I suggest, in
conclusion, that the question of how affective states of this kind are to be managed provides a
point of entry for the application of practical norms of various kinds to the assessment of the
reactive attitudes, including norms of prudence and moral norms of fairness.