Hartry Field

Ph.D. 1972 (philosophy), M.A. 1968 (philosophy), Harvard;
B.A. 1967 (mathematics), Wisconsin.

Hartry Field (B.A., Wisconsin; M.A., Ph. D. Harvard), Silver Professor of Philosophy and University Professor, specializes in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of science. He has had fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation. He is the author of Science Without Numbers (Blackwell 1980), which won the Lakatos Prize, of (Blackwell 1989), and of Truth and the Absence of Fact (Oxford 2001). Current interests include objectivity and indeterminacy, a priori knowledge, causation, and the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes.

• "Do We Have a Determinate Conception of Finiteness and Natural Number?", in Matthias Schirn, ed., Philosophy of Mathematics Today (Oxford University Press 1998), pp. 99–129.
• "Which Undecidable Mathematical Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values?", in H. Garth Dales and Gianluigi Oliveri, ed., Truth in Mathematics (Oxford University Press 1998), pp. 291–310.
• "Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects", in S. Laurence and C. Macdonald, eds., Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (Basil Blackwell 1998), pp. 387–403.
• "Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy", The Monist, April 1998, vol. 81, pp. 253–73.
• "Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic", Philosophical Studies, 1998, vol. 92, pp. 1–24.
• "Deflating the Conservativeness Argument", The Journal of Philosophy, 1999, (pp. 533–40).
• "A Prioricity as an Evaluative Notion", in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, eds., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford University Press 2000), pp. 117–49.
• "Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle", Nous, 2000, pp. 1–30.
• "Causation in a Physical World (PDF)," in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman, eds., Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford University Press 2003).
• "Mathematical Undecidables, Metaphysical Realism and Equivalent Descriptions (PDF)," in Auxier, Anderson and Hahn, eds., The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam (Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court) 2015, pp. 145-72.
• "Saving the Truth Schema from Paradox", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2002, pp. 1–27.
• "A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes (PDF)," Journal of Philosophical Logic, April 2003, pp. 139–77.
• "Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False? (PDF)", in Beall and Armour-Garb, eds., Deflationism and Paradox (Oxford University Press 2004), pp. 23–40.
• "The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness (PDF)", in Beall and Glanzberg, eds., Liars and Heaps (Oxford University Press 2003), pp. 262–311.
• "No Fact of the Matter (PDF)", in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2003, pp. 457–480.
• "The Consistency of the Naive Theory of Properties (PDF)", The Philosophical Quarterly, January 2004, pp. 78–104.
• "Recent Debates about the A Priori (PDF)", in Gendler and Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Oxford University Press 2005), pp. 69–88.
• Contributions to symposium on Truth and the Absence of Fact (Precis of book and responses to Gupta and Martinez-Fernandez, Loewer, and McGee), Philosophical Studies (May 2005), pp. 41–44 and 105–28.
• "Variations on a Theme by Yablo (PDF)", in Beall and Armour-Garb, eds., Deflationism and Paradox (Oxford University Press 2004), pp. 53–74.
• "Maudlin's Truth and Paradox (PDF)", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2006), pp. 713–20.
• "Vagueness, Partial Belief and Logic (PDF)", in G. Ostertag, ed., Meanings and Other Things: Essays on Stephen Schiffer (Oxford 2016), pp. 172-189.
  
• "Compositional Principles versus Schematic Reasoning", The Monist (2006), pp. 9–27.
• "Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge", in JC Beall ed. The Liar's Revenge (Oxford 2007), pp. 78–144.
• "Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency (PDF)", Mind 2006, pp. 567–605.
• "This Magic Moment: Horwich on the Boundaries of Vague Terms (PDF)", forthcoming in Dietz and Moruzzi, eds., Cuts and Clouds: Essays in the Nature and Logic of Vagueness (Oxford).
• "Epistemology Without Metaphysics (PDF)", Philosophical Studies 2009, vol. 143, 249–90.
• "What is the Normative Role of Logic (PDF)", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 2009, vol 83, 251–68.
• "Pluralism in Logic (PDF)", Review of Symbolic Logic 2009, vol. 2, 342–59.
• "What is Logical Validity? (PDF)" in Colin Caret and Ole Hjortland, eds., Foundations of Logical Consequence (Oxford University Press) 2015, pp. 33-70.
  
• "Naive Truth And Restricted Quantification: Saving Truth A Whole Lot Better (PDF)", Review of Symbolic Logic 2014, vol. 7, 147-91.
• "Disarming a Paradox of Validity (PDF)", in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2017, pp. 1-58.
• "Prospects for a Naïve Theory of Classes (PDF)", co-authored with Harvey Lederman and Tore Fjetland Ogaard. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2017: vol 58, pp. 461-506.
  
• "Indicative Conditionals, Restricted Quantifiers, and Naive Truth (PDF)", in Review of Symbolic Logic 2016, pp. 181-208.
  
•  "Egocentric Content (PDF)", Nous 2017, vol 51, pp. 521-546.
  
•  "Properties, Propositions and Conditionals (PDF)", forthcoming in Australasian Philosophical Review.
• "Paraconsistent or Paracomplete?".  Forthcoming in Thomas Ferguson, Hitoshi Omori and Can Baskent, eds., Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency, (Springer)
  
• "Epistemology From an Evaluativist Perspective", Philosopher's Imprint 2018.
• “A ‘Naturalistic’ Take on Epistemology”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 2019.
• “The Power of Naive Truth (PDF)" forthcoming in the Review of Symbolic Logic.