Crispin Wright

Crispin Wright (M.A., Ph.D., Cambridge; B.Phil., D.Litt., Oxford) specializes in the philosophies of language and mathematics, metaphysics and epistemology. In addition to his duties at NYU, he is Professor of Philosophical Research at the University of Stirling and Regius Professor of Logic Emeritus at the University of Aberdeen. He has taught at Columbia, Michigan, Princeton, St. Andrews, where he was the first Wardlaw University Professor and founded the research center, Arché, and Aberdeen where he held the Regius Chair of Logic and was Director of the Northern Institute of Philosophy. His books include Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (Harvard 1980); Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (Humanities Press 1983); Truth and Objectivity (Harvard 1992); Realism Meaning and Truth (2nd. edition Blackwell 1993); The Reason's Proper Study (with Bob Hale, Oxford 2001), Rails to Infinity (Harvard 2001), and Saving the Differences (Harvard 2003). Two collections of his papers, The Riddle of Vagueness and Imploding the Demon, are currently in preparation for publication by Oxford University Press.

philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology

Fellow of the British Academy, of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

• On the Characterisation of Borderline Cases (PDF)
• The Perils of Dogmatism (PDF)
  
• On Quantifying into Predicate Position (PDF)
  
• Rule Following without Reasons (PDF)
  
• New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility (PDF)
  
• Relativism about Truth Itself (PDF)
  
• Comment on McDowell on Disjunctivism (PDF)
  
• Wang's Paradox (PDF)
  

• A Plurality of Pluralisms (PDF)
  
• (With B. Hale) The Metaontology of Abstraction (PDF)
  
• (With B. Hale) Focus Restored: Comment on John MacFarlane’s “Double Vision: Two Questions about the Neo-Fregean Programme” (PDF)
  
• Fear of Relativism? (Comment on Boghossian) (PDF)
  
• The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness (PDF)
  
• McKinsey One More Time (PDF)
  
• Internal—External: Doxastic norms and the defusing of sceptical paradox (PDF)
  
• Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge (PDF)
  
• (With S. Moruzzi) Trumping Assessments and the Aristotelian Future (PDF)
  

• Whence the Paradox? Axiom V and Indefinite Extensibility (PDF)
  
• The Pain of Rejection, the Sweetness of Revenge: Comment on Mark Richard’s When Truth Gives Out (PDF)
  
• Reflections on François Recanati’s, “Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it comes from” (PDF)