Ella Williamson
The Obligated Individual: Faulkner in the Fifties
After he was awarded the 1949 Nobel Prize in Literature, the US Southern novelist William Faulkner (1897-1962) fashioned for himself a new reputation marked by a distinctly rhetorical writing style, a newly public presence, and careful affiliations with academic, government, and media institutions. Critics generally regard the fiction published during this period as an aesthetic blunder and the liberal humanism expressed in public remarks like the 1950 Nobel address and the 1955 Nagano Seminar as a propagandizing idealism at odds with problematic elements of the writer’s Southern ideological heritage apparent in his comments on the Civil Rights movement and especially in his 1956 interview with Russell Howe. This thesis proposes a contemporary way of reading this phase of Faulkner’s career by emphasizing the philosophical project beneath the writer’s aesthetic practice and historical context. My approach combines Existentialism, the work of culture theorists like Stephen Greenblatt and Kwame Anthony Appiah, and the moral criticism of early critics to reveal how Faulkner used philosophy in service of overcoming his own ideological patterns of thinking. Chapter 1 surveys the definitive authorial worldview Faulkner established from his public platform in the fifties. I make use of the standing relationship between Faulkner and continental philosophy, borrowing theoretical notions from thinkers like Simone Weil, Simone de Beauvoir, and Iris Murdoch to more fully articulate what the writer means by “soul” and “environment.” Chapter 2 begins an examination of the development of this worldview across his career by showing the suspicion of the individual characteristic of his early work. I turn to Absalom, Absalom! (1936) as the most sophisticated representation of a model of personhood which subordinates the individual’s free choice to their historical context; through an attention to the text at the level of the word, I locate in the Sutpen story a basic ethical imperative to adequately recognize the full humanity of any other person. Then, I show how Faulkner eventually accepts the basic tenets of liberal individualism in his late fiction by tempering a traditional ideology of freedom with discourses of human obligations and the individual’s rootedness in history and society. In Chapter 3, I find in Requiem for a Nun (1951) a program for redeeming the individual by overcoming the spirit of revenge towards an attitude of forgiveness and endurance. Finally, Chapter 4 looks to A Fable (1954), the climax of the writer’s philosophical project, for the fullest rendering of his redeemed model of individualism. I argue that this epic Passion Week allegory uses myth to establish the free individual as a site of irreducible value and emphasize the primacy of one’s duty to other human beings above contingent duties to family or nation. Ultimately, I characterize the Faulkner of the fifties as a writer profoundly concerned with the relationship between art and public discourse, using his fiction to manipulate the US cultural imagination and rehabilitate its ideology of freedom with a restored emphasis on human responsibility.