Abstract:
The widespread presence of criminal organizations in strong states presents a theoretical and empirical puzzle. How do criminal organizations — widely believed to thrive in weak states — expand to states with strong capacity? I argue that criminal groups expand where they can strike agreements with local actors for the provision of illegal resources they control, and that this service is particularly useful in strong states, where illegality is riskier. Using a novel measure of mafia presence, I show that (1) increases in demand for unskilled labor, and in criminals’ capacity to fill it by exploiting migrants allowed southern Italian mafias to expand to the north, and that (2) mafia expansion gave a persistent electoral advantage to political parties collaborating with them. Organized crime expansion relied on deals with economic and political actors needing to keep illegal transactions hidden from the state – a service critical in strong state contexts
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