Virtual Department Colloquium: Caspar Hare (MIT)

"Pleasing the Crowd Within"

Abstract:

Some metaphysicians tell us that in the near vicinity of every person there are many further person-like things, with slightly different mereological, temporal or modal properties. So, for example, in the near vicinity of David Attenborough there is Hairless David Attenborough. Hairless David Attenborough is just like David Attenborough except in this respect: David Attenborough’s hair is part of David Attenborough, but not part of Hairless David Attenborough. Suppose they are right. Does this have any bearing on what we ought to believe about ordinary matters (matters seemingly unrelated to mereology) and do in ordinary contexts? I say it does, though not for the reasons you might think.

Registration is free but required. Please register on our Zoom registration page by March 5th at 9:00am.

The Philosophy Department provides reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities. Requests for accommodations should be submitted to philosophy@nyu.edu at least two weeks before the event.