PaperLink (Coming Soon)
This paper presents a game-theoretical model that examines how interest groups in Latin America influence lawmakers to support their preferred policies. The model considers two types of quid pro quo transactions by interest groups: direct bribery of incumbents and indirect bribery of party leaders who have the power to discipline incumbents. Interactions between these two transactions allow interest groups to adapt to the political landscape. Using this framework, I discuss two potential policies that aim to increase party strength and reduce the influence of economic elites in politics: public campaign funds and efforts to increase party discipline. First, I show that public campaign funds do not necessarily reduce the capture of parties and might lead to more direct attempts to influence incumbents. Second, I show that increasing party discipline might backfire by making it easier for interest groups to capture both parties and incumbents.
For more information, visit the Department of Politics Political Economics Seminar webpage.
For more information, please contact the co-organizers: Cathy Hafer (email@example.com) and Congyi Zhou (firstname.lastname@example.org).