

## Steven J. Brams

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### *Personal*

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Marital Status: Married, two children

### *Education*

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, B.S. in Politics, Economics, and Science, 1962  
Northwestern University, Ph.D. in Political Science, 1966

### *Professional Experience*

Professor, Dept. of Politics, New York University, 1976- (Acting Chair, 1987-88);  
Associate Professor, 1973-76; Assistant Professor, 1969-73  
Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Syracuse University, 1967-69  
Research Associate, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1965-67  
Executive Trainee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summer 1963  
Program Analyst, Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health, Summer 1962

### *Visiting Appointments*

Russell Sage Foundation Visiting Scholar, 1998-99  
Yale University, Spring 1991, Fall 1981, Spring 1977  
University of Haifa, Fall 1984  
University of California, Irvine, Winter-Spring 1979  
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 1978  
University of Pennsylvania, Fall 1978, Fall 1977, Spring 1972  
University of Rochester, 1972-73, Fall 1971, 1968-69, Spring 1967  
University of Michigan, 1969-70

### *Awards*

#### Grants

Templeton Foundation, "Randomness and Divine Providence: Game-Theoretic Perspectives" (with Christina Pawlowitsch), 2013-2015  
NYU Research Challenge Fund, 2002  
National Science Foundation, 1968-70 (with M. K. O'Leary), 1970-71, 1973, 1974-75,

1980-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-91  
 U.S. Institute of Peace, 1988-89  
 Sloan Foundation, 1986-89  
 U.S.–Israel Binational Science Foundation (with D. S. Felsenthal and Z. Maoz), 1985-88  
 Ford Foundation (with W. J. Baumol and D. Fischer), 1984-85  
 Social Science Research Council, Summer 1968

#### Fellowships

Game Theory Society, 2018  
 Public Choice Society Fellow, 1998  
 American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow, 1992  
 Guggenheim Fellowship, 1986-87  
 Social Science Research Council Research Training Fellowship, 1964-65

#### Offices and Honors

Honorary Doctorate, Ripon College, Ripon, WI, 2013  
 Elinor Ostrom Prize for best paper published in the *Journal of Theoretical Politics* in 2012 (with D. Marc Kilgour)  
 Susan Strange Award (lifetime achievement), International Studies Association, 2002  
 APSA Delegate, AAAS Section on Social, Economic and Political Sciences (K), 1983-86  
 Consortium Council, Modules and Monographs in Undergraduate Mathematics and Its Applications Project (UMAP), 1980-83; UMPA National Steering Committee, 1976-80  
 Editorial Boards: *Homo Oeconomicus*, 2009-  
     *Springer Series in Game Theory*, 2008-  
     *Texts in Logic and Games*, 2008-  
     *International Studies Quarterly*, 1999-2003  
     *Rationality and Society*, 1999-  
     *Scientiae Mathematicae*, 1998-  
     *Mathematica Japonica*, 1998-  
     *Control and Cybernetics*, 1993-  
     *Group Decision and Negotiation*, 1991-  
     *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1988-  
     *Theory and Decision*, 1982-  
     *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 1980-  
     *Journal of Politics*, 1968-73, 1978-82, 1991-  
     *Journal of Behavioral Decisionmaking*, 1987-90  
     *Public Choice*, 1973-90, 2003-  
     *American Political Science Review*, 1978-82

#### Conference and Workshop Directorships

Co-director, Dagstuhl (Germany) Seminar on Fair Division, June 24-29, 2007  
 Co-director, Oberwolfach (Germany) Workshop on the Analysis and Design of Electoral Systems, March 7-13, 2004  
 Director, Summer Faculty Workshops on Mathematical Modeling in Political Science, 1986-89 (sponsored by Sloan Foundation)  
 Co-director, International Conference on Applied Game Theory, Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS), Vienna, June 12-15, 1978 (sponsored by IAS)  
 Director, Workshop on Mathematical Models of Political Campaigns, University of

Rochester, June 4-15, 1973 (sponsored by National Science Foundation)

*Professional Societies and Offices Held*

American Association for the Advancement of Science  
 American Economics Association  
 American Political Science Association  
 Center for Economic Design  
 Game Theory Society—Council, 2004-2007  
 International Studies Association  
 Mathematical Association of America  
 Peace Science Society (International)—President, 1990-91  
 Policy Studies Organization  
 Public Choice Society—President, 2004-2006  
 Research Centre for Political Processes (Russian Academy of Sciences)  
 Society for Judgment and Decision Making  
 Society for Social Choice and Welfare—Council, 2004-2005

*U.S. Patents*

With Alan D. Taylor, *Computer-Based Method for the Fair Division of Ownership of Goods*, #5983205, granted 11/9/99; licensed by NYU to Fair Outcomes, Inc. Boston, MA.

With James F. Ring, *System for Valuing and Transferring Interest in Property or Other Goods*, granted 10/25/11; licensed by NYU to Fair Outcomes, Inc., Boston, MA.

**Books**

1. *Game Theory and Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1975. Rev. ed., 2004 (Dover).
2. *Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science*. New York: Free Press, 1976.
3. *The Presidential Election Game*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978. Rev. ed., 2008 (A K Peters).
4. Co-edited with A. Schotter and G. Schwödiauer, *Applied Game Theory: Proceedings of a Conference*, Vienna, 1978. Würzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, 1979.
5. *Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980. Rev. ed., 2003 (MIT Press). Japanese and Russian translations, 2006.
6. Co-edited with William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., *Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models*, vol. 2. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983.

7. Co-authored with Peter C. Fishburn, *Approval Voting*. Cambridge, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer).
8. *Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer).
9. *Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.
10. *Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985. Reprinted by Academic Press, 1989.
11. Co-authored with D. Marc Kilgour, *Game Theory and National Security*. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Spanish translation, 1989.
12. *Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration*. New York: Routledge, 1990. Rev. ed., 2003.
13. *Theory of Moves*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
14. Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, *Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
15. Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, *The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Japanese, Portuguese, and Spanish translations, 2000; Chinese, Korean, and Russian translations, 2002.
16. *Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
17. Co-edited with William V. Gehrlein and Fred S. Roberts. *The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn*. Berlin: Springer, 2009.
18. *Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011.
19. *Divine Games: Game Theory and the Undecidability of a Superior Being*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018.

### **Articles and Professional Papers**

1966

1. "A Generalized Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Behavioral Science* 10 (October): 487-488.
2. "Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System," *Peace Research Society (International): Papers* 6 (Vienna Conference,

1966): 143-164.

3. "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review* 60 (December): 880-898.

#### 1967

4. With Chadwick F. Alger, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," *World Politics* 19 (July): 646-663.

#### 1968

5. "A Note on the Cosmopolitanism of World Regions," *Journal of Peace Science* 5: 87-95.
6. "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems," *American Political Science Review* 67 (June): 461-475. Reprinted in Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, R. Harrison Wagner (eds.), *Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research*. New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 346-359.
7. "DECOMP: A Computer Program for the Condensation of a Directed Graph and the Hierarchical Ordering of Its Strong Components," *Behavioral Science* 13 (July): 344-345.

#### 1969

8. "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, 2d ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 583-599.
9. "The Search for Structural Order in the International System: Some Models and Preliminary Results," *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (September): 254-280.

#### 1970

10. With Michael K. O'Leary, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June): 449-470.
11. "The APSA and Minority Representation," *PS* 3 (Summer): 321-335.

#### 1971

12. With Michael K. O'Leary, "PROVOTE: A Computer Program for the Probabilistic Analysis of Voting Bodies," *Behavioral Science* 16 (May-June): 261-263.
13. With Michael K. O'Leary, "Comment on Mayer's 'A Note on an Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies'" (#10 above), *American Political Science Review* 65 (September): 766.

#### 1972

14. With William H. Riker, "Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies," in James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd (eds.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VI*. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, pp. 79-124.
15. "A Cost/Benefit Analysis of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies," in Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (eds.), *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, pp. 101-124.

#### 1973

16. "Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship between Postulated Goals and Derived

Behavior,” in Cornelius P. Cotter (ed.), *Political Science Annual IV: An International Review*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, pp. 3-40.

17. With Morton D. Davis, “Models of Resource Allocation in Presidential Campaigning: Implications for Democratic Representation,” in L. Papayanopoulos (ed.), *Democratic Representation and Apportionment: Quantitative Methods, Measures, and Criteria, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 219: 105-123.
18. “The Paradox of Vote Trading,” *American Political Science Review* 67 (December): 1235-1274. Abbreviated version reprinted in Lawrence M. Friedman and Stewart Macaulay, *Law and the Behavioral Sciences*, 2d ed. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1977, pp. 49-50.

#### 1974

19. With John Heilman, “When to Join a Coalition, and with How Many Others, Depends on What You Expect the Outcome to Be,” *Public Choice* 16 (Spring): 11-25.
20. With Morton D. Davis, “The 3/2’s Rule in Presidential Campaigning,” *American Political Science Review* 68 (March): 113-134. Reprinted in *The Electoral College and Direct Election*, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Congress, First Session, 1977, pp. 515-537.
21. With William H. Riker, “Communications” (on #18 above), *American Political Science Review* 68 (December): 1688-89, 1692.

#### 1975

22. With José E. Garriga-Picó, “Bandwagons in Coalition Formation: The 2/3’s Rule,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 18 (March/April): 472-496. Reprinted in Barbara Hinckley (ed.), *Coalitions and Time: Cross-Disciplinary Studies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976, pp. 34-58.
23. “Paradoxes in Politics: A Perspective on the Methods of Political Inquiry,” *DEA [Division of Education Affairs] News* 5 (Spring): 8-9.
24. “Newcomb’s Problem and Prisoners’ Dilemma,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19 (December): 596-611.
25. With Morton D. Davis, “Comment on ‘Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College’” (on #20 above), *American Political Science Review* 69 (March): 155-156.

#### 1976

26. With Paul J. Affuso, “Power and Size: A New Paradox,” *Theory and Decision* 7 (March): 29-56.
27. With Morton D. Davis, “A Game-Theory Approach to Jury Selection,” *Trial* 12 (December): 47-49.

#### 1977

28. “When Is It Advantageous to Cast a Negative Vote?” in R. Henn and O. Moeschlin (eds.), *Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems* 141: 564-572.
29. “Comments,” in John V. Gillespie and Dina A. Zinnes (eds.), *Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research*. New York: Praeger, pp. 167, 421.

30. With Douglas Muzzio, "Game Theory and the White House Tapes Case," *Trial* 13 (May): 48-53.
31. "Deception in 2 x 2 Games," *Journal of Peace Science* 2 (Spring): 171-203.
32. "The Network Television Game: There May Be No Best Schedule," *Interfaces* 7 (August): 102-109. Reprinted in *UMAP Journal* 1 (1980): 104-114.
33. With Frank C. Zagare, "Deception in Simple Voting Games," *Social Science Research* 6 (September): 257-272.
34. With Douglas Muzzio, "Unanimity in the Supreme Court: A Game-Theoretic Explanation of the Decision in the White House Tapes Case," *Public Choice* 32 (Winter) 67-83.

#### 1978

35. With Mark Lake, "Power and Satisfaction in a Representative Democracy," in Peter C. Ordeshook (ed.), *Game Theory and Political Science*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 529-562.
36. "Applying Game Theory to Antitrust Litigation," *Jurimetrics Journal* 18 (Summer): 320-327.
37. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting," *American Political Science Review* 72 (September): 831-847.
38. With Morton D. Davis, "Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges," *Operations Research* 26, no. 6 (November-December): 966-991.
39. "Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign," *American Political Science Review* 72 (December): 1362-1364.
40. "The N-Prisoners' Dilemma: Another Solution," *American Political Science Review* 72 (December): 1365-1366.

#### 1979

41. With Philip D. Straffin, Jr., "Prisoners' Dilemma and Professional Sports Drafts," *American Mathematical Monthly* 86 (February): 80-88.
42. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin Jr., "The Geometry of the Arms Race," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (December): 567-588.
43. "Alternatives for Increasing Voter Participation," in Stuart Langton (ed.), *Citizen Participation Perspectives: Proceedings of the National Conference on Citizen Participation*. Medford, MA: Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs, pp. 235-238.
44. "Approval Voting: A Practical Reform for Multicandidate Elections," *National Civic Review* 68 (November): 549-553.
45. "Faith Versus Rationality in the Bible: Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Sacrifice in the Old Testament," in S. J. Brams, A. Schotter, and G. Schwödianer (eds.), *Applied Game Theory: Proceedings of a Conference, Vienna, 1978*. Würzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, pp. 430-445.
46. "But They Say He Won the Primary," *New York Times*, November 27, p. A23 (Op-Ed page).
47. "Reply to 'Comment on Brams and Fishburn'" (on #37 above) *American Political Science Review* 73 (June): 552.

#### 1980

48. "Approval Voting in N.H." *Concord (N.H.) Monitor*, January 9, p. 16 (Guest Editorial).
49. "Baker Could Have Survived N.H.," *Concord (N.H.) Monitor*, March 8, p. 9.
50. "Approval Voting in Multicandidate Elections," *Policy Studies Journal* 9 (Autumn): 102-108.
51. With Morton D. Davis, "Rejoinder" (on #38 above), *Operations Research* 28 (July-August 1980): 1024-1025.
52. Letter (on #44 above), *National Civic Review* 69 (May 1980): 247.

### 1981

53. "Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God's Omniscience," *Mathematics Magazine* 53 (November): 277-282.
54. "One Candidate, One Vote: A New Approach to the Electoral Process," *Archway: The Magazine of Arts & Science at New York University* 2 (Winter): 10-14. Reprinted in *Citizen Participation* 4 (November-December 1982): 11, 14.
55. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting, Condorcet's Principle, and Runoff Elections," *Public Choice* 36: 89-114.
56. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Efficacy, Power and Equity under Approval Voting," *Public Choice* 37: 425-434.
57. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Reconstructing Voting Processes: The 1976 House Majority Leader Election under Present and Alternative Rules," *Political Methodology* 7: 95-108.
58. With Donald Wittman, "Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2 x 2 Games," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 6 (Fall): 39-62.
59. With Frank C. Zagare, "Double Deception: Two against One in Three-Person Games," *Theory and Decision* 13 (March): 81-90.
60. "Biblical Politics." *News for Teachers of Political Science* 29 (Spring): 1, 4.
61. "A Game Theorist Looks at God," *Humanistic Judaism* (Fall): 29-45.

### 1982

62. "Approval Voting: One Candidate, One Vote," in Bernard Grofman *et al.* (eds.), *Representation and Redistricting Issues of the 1980s*. Lexington, MA: Lexington, pp. 137-142.
63. With Philip D. Straffin, Jr., "The Entry Problem in a Political Race," in Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), *Political Equilibrium*. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, pp. 181-195.
64. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., "Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body," in Manfred J. Holler (ed.), *Power, Voting, and Voting Power*. Würzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, pp. 239-255.
65. "The AMS Nomination Procedure Is Vulnerable to 'Truncation of Preferences,'" *Notices of the American Mathematical Society* 29 (February): 136-138.
66. "A Resolution of the Paradox of Omniscience," in Michael Bradie and Kenneth Sayre (eds.), *Reason and Decision*, Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy, III. Bowling Green, OH: Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, pp. 17-30.
67. "Is This Any Way to Elect a President?" in Robert S. Hirschfield (ed.), *Selection/Election: A Forum on the American Presidency*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine, pp. 173-177.

68. With Barbara J. Heil, "Approval Voting: How to Improve DC's Crazy Elections," *DC Gazette* 13 (May): 2-4.
69. "Omniscience and Omnipotence: How They May Help—or Hurt—in a Game," *Inquiry* 25 (June): 217-231.
70. "Strategic Information and Voting Behavior," *Society* 19 (September/October): 4-11.
71. With Marek P. Hessel, "Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games," *Behavioral Science* 27 (October): 393-401.
72. With Morton D. Davis, "Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries," *Mathematical Social Sciences* 3 (December): 373-388.
73. "Belief in God: A Game-Theoretic Paradox," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 13: 121-129.
74. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Election," *Electoral Studies* 1: 39-62.

### 1983

75. With Marek P. Hessel, "Staying Power in Sequential Games," *Theory and Decision* 15 (September): 277-302.
76. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Paradoxes of Preferential Voting," *Mathematics Magazine* 56 (September): 207-214.
77. "God and Games: A Mathematical Look at Superior Beings," *University: Academic Affairs at New York University* 2 (May): 4-5, 8.
78. With Samuel Merrill, III, "Equilibrium Strategies in Final-Offer Arbitration: There Is No Median Convergence," *Management Science* 29, no. 8 (August): 927-941.
79. "Approval Voting: A Better Way to Elect a President?" *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences: Science and Public Policy III* 403: 111-120.
80. "Superior Being, Their Powers, and the Problem of Evil: Can This Be Mathematics?" *UMAP Journal* 4 (September): 265-283.
81. With Peter C. Fishburn, "America's Unfair Elections," *The Sciences* 23 (November/December): 28-34. Reprinted in *Eastern Airlines's Review* (February 1984): 27-34.
82. "Comparison Voting," in Steven J. Brams, William F. Lucas, and Philip D. Straffin, Jr. (eds.), *Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models*, vol. 2 New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 32-65.
83. "Run Jess Jackson, but under Approval Voting," *PS: Politics and Political Science*, 16, no 4 (Fall): 711-712.

### 1984

84. With Peter C. Fishburn, "A Careful Look at 'Another Look at Approval Voting,'" *Polity* 17 (September): 135-143.
85. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Some Logical Defects of the Single Transferable Vote," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*. New York: Praeger, pp. 147-151.
86. With Peter C. Fishburn, "A Note on Variable-Size Legislatures to Achieve Proportional Representation," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*. New York: Praeger, pp. 175-177.
87. "Run Jesse Jackson, But Under Approval Voting," *PS* 16 (Fall): 711-712.

88. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Manipulability of Voting by Sincere Truncation of Preferences," *Public Choice* 44: 397-410.
89. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures," *Social Choice and Welfare* 1: 397-410.
90. With Marek P. Hessel, "Threat Power in Sequential Games," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (March): 23-44.
91. With Peter C. Fishburn, "The Electoral Innovation Debate: Prospects for Approval Voting," *Creativity and Innovation Network* 10 (January-March): 21-27.
92. "Making Presidential Elections Less Front-Loaded," *Presidency Research Group Newsletter* 6 (Spring): 9-11.
93. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Reply" (on #79 above), *The Sciences* (July/August): 4-5.
94. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., "A Reply to 'Detection and Disarmament'" (on #42 above), *American Political Science Review* 78 (June): 495-496.

### 1985

95. With Samuel Merrill, III, "Response to Rabow" (on #76 above), *Management Science* 31 (March): 375-376.
96. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Comment on 'The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting'" and "Rejoinder to Niemi," *American Political Science Review* 79 (September): 816-819.
97. With Paul J. Affuso, "New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of Ministers," *Electoral Studies* 4 (August): 135-139; "Addendum," *Electoral Studies* 4 (December): 290.
98. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Optimal Deterrence," *Social Philosophy & Policy* 3 (Autumn): 118-135. Reprinted in Ellen Frankel Paul *et al.* (eds.), *Nuclear Rights/Nuclear Wrongs*. London: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 118-135; and Newton Garver and Peter H. Hare (eds.), *Naturalism and Rationality*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986, pp. 241-262.
99. With D. Marc Kilgour, "The Path to Stable Deterrence," in Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward (eds.), *Dynamic Models of International Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 11-25. Reprinted in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare (eds.), *Exploring the Stability of Deterrence*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987, pp. 107-122.

### 1986

100. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Rational Deescalation," in Doayne Farmer *et al.* (eds.), *Evolution, Games, and Learning: Models of Adaptation in Machines and Nature*, *Physica D* 22: 337-350.
101. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," in Rudolf Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, and John D. Kettelle (eds.), *Modelling and Analysis in Arms Control*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 337-350.
102. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational?" *PS* 19 (Summer): 645-651.
103. With Samuel Merrill, III, "Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination Is Best," *Management Science* 32, no. 10 (October): 1346-1355.
104. With Dan S. Felsenthal and Zeev Maoz, "New Chairman Paradoxes," in Andreas Diekmann and Peter Mitter (eds.), *Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays*

- in Honor of Anatol Rapoport*. Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, pp. 243-256.
105. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting," *TWA Ambassador* (November): 17-18.
106. "New, Improved Final-Offer Arbitration," *New York Times*, August 9, p. 22.

### 1987

107. With Morton D. Davis, "The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," in Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Richard L. Merritt, and Dina A. Zinnes (eds.), *Interaction and Communication in Global Politics*. London: Sage, pp. 141-161.
108. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting," in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.) *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, p. 27.
109. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Verification and Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," in Allan M. Din (ed.), *Arms and Artificial Intelligence: Weapon and Arms Control Applications of Advanced Computing*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 193-213.
110. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Optimal Threats," *Operations Research* 35 (July-August): 524-536.
111. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 81 (September): 833-850.
112. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational, and Will Star Wars Help?" *Analyse und Kritik* 9 (October): 62-74. Reprinted in *Journal of International Affairs* 4 (Spring): 15-21; and Douglas P. Lackey (ed.), *Ethics and Strategic Defense*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 138-147.
113. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (December): 547-572.

### 1988

114. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (March): 3-28.
115. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 21 (Spring): 277-284.
116. "MAA Elections Produce Decisive Winners," *Focus: The Newsletter of the Mathematical Association of America* 8 (May-June): 1-2.
117. With Peter C. Fishburn and Samuel Merrill, III, "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen" and "Rejoinder," *Public Choice* 59 (November): 121-131, 149.
118. With D. Marc Kilgour, "National Security Games," *Synthese* 76 (July): 185-200.
119. "Vote Early and Often," *New York Newsday*, March 28, p. 50.
120. With D. Marc Kilgour, "From Deterrence to Defense: The Strategic Implication of SDI," *Mathematical and Computer Modelling* 11: 683-688.
121. With Dan S. Felsenthal and Zeev Maoz, "Chairman Paradoxes under Approval Voting," in Gerald Eberlein and Hal Berghel (eds.), *Theory and Decision: Essays in Honor of Werner Leinfellner*. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, pp. 223-233.

### 1989

122. With Rudolf Avenhaus, John Fichtner, and D. Marc Kilgour, "The Probability of

- Nuclear War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 26 (February): 91-99.
123. “Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Co-Equal?” in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman (eds.), *The Federalist Papers: The New Institutionalism and the Old*. New York: Agathon, pp. 125-141.
  124. With Paul J. Affuso and D. Marc Kilgour, “Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Paul Brace, Christine Harrington, and Gary King (eds.), *The Presidency in American Politics*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 55-74.
  125. “Arbitrary Mishmash” (in Hebrew), *Ha’aretz*, August 8, p. 15.
  126. “They Will Want to Lose” (in Hebrew), *Ha’aretz*, November 18, p. 15.

#### 1990

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