

# POL-GA 1551: Comparative Politics of Developing Countries New York University, Spring 2021

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Time: Wednesdays, 2:00-3:50

Location: <https://nyu.zoom.us/j/92378453113>

## 1. Course Description

This seminar aims to introduce students to some of the central topics, concepts, and questions in the field of comparative politics, with an emphasis on topics outside the scope of “developed” or “advanced” democracies. The course is designed to familiarize students with the field as it stands today, and will focus on relatively recent contributions. This course does not pretend to cover the most important, “seminal” or “foundational” articles and books in the field. We will focus on the “frontier” of research being done on the politics of developing countries by political scientists, economists and scholars from other disciplines. The most important goal of the course is to stimulate students curiosity, to give a broad overview of the range of methodological approaches that can be used to tackle challenging questions, and to motivate students to identify areas where there is potential for making a contribution to the discipline. However, students specially interested in comparative politics should become familiar with the more classical, foundational articles and books throughout their Ph.D. program.

We will not focus on any specific region of the world, and the course will not be structured around area studies. Rather, throughout the semester, we will analyze substantive topics that are central to the current debates in comparative politics, including: the importance and origins of institutions, democratic and authoritarian regimes, the role of the state, political representation and accountability, violence, social and political change, survival of democracy.

## 2. Course Requirements

**Class participation:** This course is organized as a weekly seminar. The class is designed to be highly participatory. It is essential that students come to class fully prepared to discuss the required weekly readings.

**Discussion memos:** On the day before the seminar, students must submit one page memo with discussion questions on that week’s readings. The memo must be concise and straight to the point: list the set of questions that follow from your reading of a particular paper. The memo is not an essay and should be written sharply, preferably using bullet-points. The reading memos are to be submitted

through NYU classes by 4PM on Tuesday prior to the class. We will circulate the comments among the class participants by 6PM on Tuesday so that we can all prepare for the discussion.

**Paper reviews:** The seminars will be structured around the in-depth discussion of two/three papers per session. Students will be assigned to write referee reports on the papers marked with two asterisks. In addition to briefly summarizing the paper (in one paragraph), the review should evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the paper, critically assess its overall contribution, and propose how the paper could be made better and outline further questions that follow from that paper. We will then have an open discussion and discuss potential avenues for future research. The number of discussions per student during the semester will depend on the number of students enrolled. At the start of the semester, we will randomly assign students to review papers, but you will have a week to voluntarily redistribute the papers among yourselves.

**Research paper:** Students must also submit a research proposal on April 26th. This must be a concrete proposal on a research paper. It should include a motivation and contribution to the literature, data sources and empirical strategy. These research proposals will be circulated among all class participants. During the last 2 sessions of the semester, we will all discuss each proposal and provide feedback.

The distribution of grading is as follows:

- In-class participation: 25 %
- Discussion memos: 25 %
- Referee reports: 25 %
- Research proposal 25 %.

### 3. Readings

All readings marked with a “(\*)” or a “(\*\*)” are required and you should read them carefully. Your weekly one-page memo will be based on these readings. Each reading marked with a “(\*\*)” will be reviewed by one students. Students are encouraged to bring particular readings of interest to our attention, and to make suggestions of any kind about the syllabus. We may adjust the syllabus and the required readings throughout the semester.

#### Week 1: Feb 3 - Theory and Method in Comparative Politics

- William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. Big Data, Causal Inference, and Formal Theory: Contradictory Trends in Political Science?: Introduction. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 48 (1):65–70, 2015 (\*)
- Angus Deaton. Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(2):424–455, 2010 (\*)
- John D Huber. Is Theory Getting Lost in the “Identification Revolution”? *Newsletter of the Political Economy Section of the American Political Science Association*, 2013. URL <http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/is-theory-getting-lost-in-the-identification-revolution/> (\*)

Additional Readings:

- Adam Przeworski. Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible? In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, chapter 6. Oxford University Press, New York, 2007
- Susan C Stokes. A Defense of Observational Research. In *Field Experiments and their critics: Essays on the Uses and Abuses of Experimentation in the Social Sciences*, pages 33–57. Yale University Press New Haven, 2014

## Week 2: February 10 - Institutions, History, and Development

- Douglass North. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, Chs. 1-3, p. 1-26 (\*)
- Avner Greif and David Laitin. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. *The American political science review*, 98(4), 2004 (\*)
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1369–1401, 2001 (\*\*)
- Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou. Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development. *Econometrica*, 81(1), 2013 (\*\*)

Additional Readings:

- Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press, 2000
- Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer. History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. *American Economic Review*, 95(4):1190–1213, 2005
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long Run Growth. In Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, editors, *Handbook of Economic Growth*, chapter 6. 2005
- Nathan Nunn. The Importance of History for Economic Development. *Annual Review of Economics*, 1(1):65–92, 2009
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4):1231–1294, 2002
- Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(2):131–165, 2004
- John H. Coatsworth. Structures, Endowments, and Institutions in the Economic History of Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 40(3):126–144, 2005

- Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World. *Journal of Economic History*, 65(4):891–921, 2005
- Alexander Gerschenkron. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1962
- Elise Huillery. History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(2):176–215, 2009
- Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou. National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(1):151–213, 2014

### Week 3: February 17 - Origins of Democracy

- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006 (Chapters 1, 2 and 6) (\*)
- Ben W Ansell and David J Samuels. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach*. Cambridge University Press, 2014 (Chapters 1 and 2) (\*)
- Jacob Gerner Hariri. The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood. *American Political Science Review*, 106:471–494, 2012 (\*\*)
- Léonard Wantchékon and Omar Garcia-Ponce. Critical Junctures: Independence Movements and Democracy in Africa. 2013 (\*\*)

#### Additional Readings:

- Seymour M. Lipset. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 53:69–105, 1959
- Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico. Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s “Age of Reform”. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(2):707–765, 2004
- Humberto Llavador and Robert J. Oxoby. Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3):1155–1189, 2005
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. Income and Democracy. *American Economic Review*, 98(3):808–42, 2008
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 56(8):1043–1058, 2009
- Barbara Geddes. What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2(1):115–144, 1999
- Seymour M. Lipset. *Political man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981 (First published in 1960)
- Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press, 1968

- Samuel P. Huntington. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991
- Barrington Moore. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Beacon Press, 1966
- Daniel Treisman. Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4):927–942, 2015

#### Week 4: February 24 – Autocracy

- Roger B Myerson. The autocrat’s credibility problem and foundations of the constitutional state. *American Political Science Review*, 102(01):125–139, 2008 (\*)
- Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(11):1279–1301, 2007(\*)
- Patrick Francois, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. How is power shared in africa? *Econometrica*, 83(2):465–503, 2015 (\*\*)
- Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney. The Feudal Revolution and Europe’s Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World Before 1500 ce. *American Political Science Review*, 107(1):16–34, 2013 (\*\*)

#### Additional Readings:

- Carles Boix and Milan W Svobik. The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(02):300–316, 2013
- Carl Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew K Brzezinski. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965
- Gordon Tullock. *Autocracy*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987
- Jennifer Gandhi. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, 2008
- Milan W. Svobik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012
- Barbara Geddes. Authoritarian breakdown. Manuscript. Department of Political Science, UCLA, 2004
- Beatriz Magaloni. Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41, 2008
- Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu. Making Autocracy Work. In Elhanan Helpman, editor, *Institutions and Economic Performance*. Harvard University Press, 2008
- Zhaotian Luo and Arturas Rozenas. Ruling the ruling coalition: An informational theory of authoritarian governance. *Working Paper*, 2018b
- Milan W. Svobik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012
- James R Hollyer, James Raymond Vreeland, and B Peter Rosendorff. *Transparency, Democracy, and Autocracy: Economic Transparency and Political (In) Stability*. Cambridge University Press, 2018

## Week 5: March 3 – Hybrid Regimes

- Guillermo A O'Donnell. Horizontal accountability in new democracies. *Journal of democracy*, 9(3):112–126, 1998 (\*)
- Beatriz Magaloni. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, 2006 (Intro) (\*)
- Monica Martinez-Bravo. The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia. *American Economic Review*, 104(4):1244–87, April 2014 (\*\*)
- Miguel R. Rueda. Small aggregates, big manipulation: Vote buying enforcement and collective monitoring. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(1):163–177, 2017(\*\*)

### Additional readings:

- Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010
- Jason Brownlee. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007
- Lisa Blaydes. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011
- Arturas Rozenas. Office insecurity and electoral manipulation. *Journal of Politics*, 78(1): 232–248, 2016
- Zhaotian Luo and Arturas Rozenas. The election monitor's curse. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1):148–160, 2018a
- Ruben Enikolopov, Vasily Korovkin, Maria Petrova, Konstantin Sonin, and Alexei Zakharov. Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in russian parliamentary elections. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 110(2):448–452, 2013
- Scott Gehlbach and Alberto Simpser. Electoral manipulation as bureaucratic control. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(1):212–224, 2015
- Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar. Elections Under Authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:403–422, 2009
- Michael K Miller. Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(6), 2015
- Adam Przeworski, Gonzalo Rivero, and Tianyang Xi. Elections as a conflict processing mechanism. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 39:235–248, 2015
- Alberto Simpser. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013
- Timothy Frye, John O Reuter, and David Szakonyi. Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace. *World Politics*, 66(2):195–228, 2014

- Jennifer Gandhi and Elvin Ong. Committed or conditional democrats? opposition dynamics in electoral autocracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(4):948–963, 2019
- Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler. Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament. *American Political Science Review*, 104:482–502, 2010

### Week 6: March 10 – The State

- Charles Tilly. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge University Press, 1985 (\*)
- Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, and Zvika Neeman. Geography, Transparency, and Institutions. *American Political Science Review*, 111(3):622–636, 2017 (\*\*)
- Raul Sanchez de la Sierra. On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo. *Journal of Political Economy*, forthcoming (\*\*)

#### Additional Readings:

- James C. Scott. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press, 2009
- Jeffrey Herbst. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press, 2000 (Read Chapters 1, 2 and 5)
- Peter Evans. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton University Press, 1995 (†)
- Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos. The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 11:5–44, 2013
- Daron Acemoglu, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson. State Capacity and Development: A Network Approach. *The American Economic Review*, 105(8):2364–2409, 2015
- Melissa Dell, Nathan Lane, and Pablo Querubin. The Historical State, Local Collective Action and Economic Development in Vietnam. Unpublished Manuscript, 2017
- Charles Tilly. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992*. Blackwell, 1990
- James A. Robinson. States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey Herbst: A Review Essay. *Journal of Economic Literature*, XL:510–519, 2002
- Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. *American Economic Review*, 99(4):1218–44, 2009
- Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. *Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters*. Princeton University Press, 2011
- James C. Scott. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale University Press, 1999

- James Fenske. Ecology, trade, and states in pre-colonial africa. *forthcoming Journal of the European Economic Association*
- Edward Gibson. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries. *World Politics*, 58, 2005
- Daron Acemoglu. Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 52:1199–1226, 2005
- Jenny Guardado. Office-selling, corruption, and long-term development in peru. *American Political Science Review*, 112(4):971–995, 2018

### **Week 7: March 17 – Bureaucracy**

- John D Huber and Nolan McCarty. Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform. *American Political Science Review*, 98(3):481–494, 2004 (\*)
- Thomas B Pepinsky, Jan H Pierskalla, and Audrey Sacks. Bureaucracy and service delivery. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20:249–268, 2017 (\*)
- Ting Chen and James Kai-sing Kung. Busting the “princelings”: The campaign against corruption in china’s primary land market. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(1):185–226, 2019 (\*\*)
- Sarah Brierley. Unprincipled principals: Co-opted bureaucrats and corruption in ghana. *American Journal of Political Science*, 2019(\*\*)

Additional readings:

- Avinash K Dixit. Democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy. *Journal of Globalization and Development*, 1(1), 2010
- Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. Dictators and their viziers: Endogenizing the loyalty–competence trade-off. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 9(5):903–930, 2011
- Junyan Jiang. Making bureaucracy work: Patronage networks, performance incentives, and economic development in china. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4):982–999, 2018
- Jidong Chen, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu. Sources of authoritarian responsiveness: A field experiment in china. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(2):383–400, 2016
- Ying Bai and Ruixue Jia. Elite recruitment and political stability: The impact of the abolition of china’s civil service exam. *Econometrica*, 84(2):677–733, 2016
- J David Brown, John S Earle, and Scott Gehlbach. Helping hand or grabbing hand? state bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness. *American Political Science Review*, 103(2):264–283, 2009
- Alisha C Holland. Forbearance. *American Political Science Review*, 110(2):232–246, 2016
- Rikhil R Bhavnani and Alexander Lee. Does affirmative action worsen bureaucratic performance? evidence from the indian administrative service. *American Journal of Political Science*, 2019



## Week 8: March 24 - Representation and Accountability

- G Bingham Powell Jr. Political representation in comparative politics. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 7:273–296, 2004 (\*)
- Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443, 2004 (\*\*)
- Erik Meyersson. Islamic rule and the empowerment of the poor and pious. *Econometrica*, 82(1):229–269, 2014 (\*\*)

### Additional Readings:

- George Kwaku Oforu. Do fairer elections increase the responsiveness of politicians? *American Political Science Review*, 113(4):963–979, 2019
- Rikhil R. Bhavani. Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India. *American Political Science Review*, 103:23–35, 2009
- Diana Z. OBrien and Johanna Rickne. Gender quotas and women’s political leadership. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1):112–126, 2016
- Julien Labonne, Sahar Parsa, and Pablo Querubin. Political Dynasties, Term Limits and Female Political Empowerment: Evidence from the Philippines. Unpublished Manuscript, 2016
- Jean-Marie Baland and James A. Robinson. Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile. *American Economic Review*, 98(5):1737–65, 2008
- Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padro-i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China. Unpublished Manuscript, 2013a
- Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padro-i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. Political Reform in China: Elections, Public Goods and Income Distribution. Unpublished Manuscript, 2013b
- Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. Empowering Women through Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. *American Political Science Review*, 107:540–557, 2013
- Rory Truex. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China*. Cambridge University Press, 2016
- Ramya Parthasarathy, Vijayendra Rao, and Nethra Palaniswamy. Deliberative democracy in an unequal world: A text-as-data study of south india’s village assemblies. *American Political Science Review*, 113(3):623–640, 2019

## Week 9: March 31 - Violence

- Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4):563–595, 10 2004 (\*)
- Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas B Pepinsky, and Stathis N Kalyvas. Aerial bombing and counterinsurgency in the vietnam war. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):201–218, 2011 (\*)

- Gareth Nellis, Niloufer Siddiqui, et al. Secular party rule and religious violence in pakistan. *American political science review*, 112(1):49–67, 2018 (\*\*)
- Oeindrila Dube and Juan Vargas. Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4):1384–1421, 2013 (\*\*)

Additional Readings:

- Stathis N. Kalyvas. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006
- Adam Scharpf and Christian Gläsel. Why underachievers dominate secret police organizations: Evidence from autocratic argentina. *American Journal of Political Science*, 2019
- Michael J. Reese, Keven G. Ruby, and Robert A. Pape. Days of action or restraint? how the islamic calendar impacts violence. *American Political Science Review*, 111(3):439–459, 2017
- Jeffrey S Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg. Deadly communities: Local political milieus and the persecution of jews in occupied poland. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(3):259–283, 2011
- Sheena Chestnut Greitens. *Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2016
- Daniel W Hill and Zachary M Jones. An empirical evaluation of explanations for state repression. *American Political Science Review*, 108(03):661–687, 2014
- Evgeny Finkel. The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust. *American Political Science Review*, 109(02):339–353, 2015
- Arturas Rozenas and Yuri Zhukov. Mass repression and political loyalty: Evidence from stalin’s ‘terror by hunger’. *American Political Science Review*, 2019
- Arturas Rozenas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri M. Zhukov. The political legacy of violence: The long-term impact of stalin’s repression in ukraine. *Journal of Politics*, 79(4):1147–1161, 2017
- S. P. Harish and Andrew T. Little. The Political Violence Cycle. *American Political Science Review*, 111(2):237–255, 2017
- Melissa Dell and Pablo Querubin. Nation building through foreign intervention: Evidence from discontinuities in military strategies. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(2):701–764, 2018
- Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou. The long-run effects of the scramble for africa. *American Economic Review*, 106(7):1802–48, July 2016
- Oeindrila Dube and Juan Vargas. Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4):1384–1421, 2013
- Lauren E Young. The psychology of state repression: Fear and dissent decisions in zimbabwe. *American Political Science Review*, 113(1):140–155, 2019
- Anselm Hager, Krzysztof Krakowski, and Max Schaub. Ethnic riots and prosocial behavior: Evidence from kyrgyzstan. *American Political Science Review*, 113(4):1029–1044, 2019

## Week 10: April 7 – Information

- Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts. How the chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument. *American Political Science Review*, 111(3):484–501, 2017 (\*)
- Georgy Egorov, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin. Why resource-poor dictators allow freer media: A theory and evidence from panel data. *American Political Science Review*, 103(4):645, 2009 (\*\*)
- Yuyu Chen and David Y Yang. The impact of media censorship: 1984 or brave new world? *American economic review*, 109(6):2294–2332, 2019 (\*\*)

### Additional Readings:

- Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman. How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015
- Maja Adena, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. Radio and the rise of the nazis in prewar germany. *Quarterly journal of Economics*, 130(4):1885–1939, 2015
- Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. Media and political persuasion: Evidence from russia. *The American Economic Review*, 101(7):3253–3285, 2011
- Haifeng Huang. Propaganda as signaling. *Comparative Politics*, 47(4):419–437, 2015a
- Haifeng Huang. International knowledge and domestic evaluations in a changing society: The case of china. *American Political Science Review*, 109(3):613–634, 2015b
- Arturas Rozenas and Denis Stukal. How autocrats manipulate economic news: Evidence from russia’s state-controlled television. *Journal of Politics*, 81(3):982–996, 2019
- Leonid Peisakhin and Arturas Rozenas. Electoral effects of biased media: Russian television in ukraine. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3):535–550, 2018
- Chris Edmond. Information manipulation, coordination, and regime change. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4):1422–1458, 2013
- Jeremy L Wallace. Juking the stats? authoritarian information problems in china. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(1):11–29, 2016
- Peter Lorentzen. China’s strategic censorship. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2):402–414, 2014
- Jidong Chen and Yiqing Xu. Information manipulation and reform in authoritarian regimes. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 5(1):163–178, 2017
- Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts. How the chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument. *American Political Science Review*, 111(3):484–501, 2017
- Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat. Handcuffs for the grabbing hand? media capture and government accountability. *The American Economic Review*, 96(3):720–736, 2006

- Christian Gläbel and Katrin Paula. Sometimes less is more: Censorship, news falsification, and disapproval in 1989 east germany. *American Journal of Political Science*, 2019
- Scott Gehlbach and Konstantin Sonin. Government control of the media. *Journal of Public Economics*, 118(October):163–171, 2014
- Holger Lutz Kern and Jens Hainmueller. Opium for the masses: How foreign media can stabilize authoritarian regimes. *Political Analysis*, 17(4):377–399, 2009
- Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts. How censorship in china allows government criticism but silences collective expression. *American Political Science Review*, 107(02):326–343, 2013
- William R Hobbs and Margaret E Roberts. How sudden censorship can increase access to information. *American Political Science Review*, 112(3):621–636, 2018

### Week 11: April 14 – Social and Political Change

- Timur Kuran. Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991 (\*)
- Davide Cantoni, David Y Yang, Noam Yuchtman, and Y Jane Zhang. Protests as strategic games: experimental evidence from hong kong’s antiauthoritarian movement. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(2):1021–1077, 2019 (\*\*)
- Leonardo Bursztyn, Georgy Egorov, and Stefano Fiorin. From extreme to mainstream: How social norms unravel. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017 (\*\*)

Additional readings:

- Hannah Arendt. *On Revolution*. Viking Press, 1963
- Charles Tilly. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Addison-Wesley, 1978
- James DeNardo. *Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion*. Princeton University Press, 2014
- Herbert P Kitschelt. Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. *British journal of political science*, 16(1):57–85, 1986
- Susanne Lohmann. Collective action cascades: An informational rationale for the power in numbers. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 14(5):655–684, 2000
- Henry E. Hale. Regime Cycles. Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Russia. *World Politics*, 58:133–65, 2005
- Elisabeth Jean Wood. *Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador*. Cambridge University Press, 2003
- Mehdi Shadmehr and Dan Bernhardt. Collective action with uncertain payoffs: Coordination, public signals and punishment dilemmas. *American Political Science Review*, 105(4):829–51, 2011

- Peter Lorentzen. Regularizing rioting: Permitting public protest in an authoritarian regime. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8(2):127–158, 2013
- Adam Meirowitz and Joshua A Tucker. People power or a one-shot deal? a dynamic model of protest. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(2):478–490, 2013
- Mark R Beissinger. *Nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002
- Joshua Tucker. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535–551, 2007
- Paul Castaneda Dower, Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach, and Steven Nafziger. Collective action and representation in autocracies: Evidence from russia’s great reforms. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1):125–147, 2018
- Stathis N Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher. How “free” is free riding in civil wars?: Violence, insurgency, and the collective action problem. *World politics*, 59(2):177–216, 2007

### **Week 12: April 28 - Vulnerabilities of Democracy**

- Barry R Weingast. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law. *American political science review*, 91(2):245–263, 1997 (\*)
- Milan W. Svobik. When polarization trumps civic virtue: Partisan conflict and the subversion of democracy by incumbents. *Working paper*, 2017 (\*\*)
- Ernesto Dal Bo, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne. Economic losers and political winners: Sweden’s radical right. Working Paper, 2019. URL [https://eml.berkeley.edu/~ffinan/Finan\\_SwedenDemocrats.pdf](https://eml.berkeley.edu/~ffinan/Finan_SwedenDemocrats.pdf) (\*\*)

Additional readings:

- Milan Svobik. Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation. *American Political Science Review*, 102(02):153–68, 2008
- Ko Maeda. Two modes of democratic breakdown: A competing risks analysis of democratic durability. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(4):1129–1143, 2010
- Matt Singer. Delegating away democracy: How good representation and policy successes can undermine democratic legitimacy. *Comparative Political Studies*, forthcoming
- Jose A. Cheibub. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007
- Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman. Inequality and regime change: Democratic transitions and the stability of democratic rule. *American Political Science Review*, 106(03):495–516, 2012

### **Week 13: April 30 - Discussion of Research Proposals I**

### **Week 14: May 7 - Discussion of Research Proposals II**