



International Relations PhD Core: International Political Economy

Spring 2021

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Course Description: Interests, Domestic Institutions, International Organizations

This is the core PhD course in International Political Economy. Our focus throughout the course is, within each issue area, to identify the relevant groups and their preferences – interests – and then explore how these interests interact within domestic political institutions and international organizations. Our goal is to build and test theory regarding the emergent policies that regulate and facilitate the observable cross border flows of goods, capital, finance and money. We are also interested in how domestic politics affects, and is affected by the structure and function of international organizations.

I have focused the reading list on the politics of international trade, investment and monetary policy, debt and immigration – all issue areas in which there is currently some political conflict across the developed and developing world. There are, of course, many other important areas, such as environment, terrorism, human rights, etc., that have been excluded in this version of the course outline – they seem less salient in the current moment. The readings are however likely to change as a function of the research interests of the members of the class, so please offer some recommendations of the material/issue areas that you would like us to cover.

Requirements for the course:

- Class Participation
 - Like any graduate seminar, our model of learning is a collaborative one. Informed, active participation in seminar is therefore a requirement of the course. All students are expected to engage in, and remain engaged in throughout the class meeting, our discussions. Active participation requires that you read carefully prior to seminar; take notes on your reading; and arrive prepared to discuss and participate.
 - Please keep in mind that our classroom meeting environment – whether that environment is in-person or virtual – should be one that is professional and inclusive. To the extent that we take issue with someone's argument, we focus our criticism on specific claims and logic, rather than on an individual. We also are mindful that good discussion involves both listening and speaking; we are careful not to interrupt or talk over one another, as well as to be sure that all have an opportunity to participate.
 - In the realm of virtual meetings, all participants are expected to (a) mute their audio on arrival to the call, and to keep audio off unless speaking (this cuts down on background noise); (b) keep video on throughout the call.
- Leading the Discussion
 - Students will be assigned readings and topics for which they will be responsible for leading the discussion.
 - While there are many papers on the list, only a subset will be assigned for presentation and discussion.
 - We will assign readings to presenters in the first meeting of class.
 - These presentations, and the attendant discussion should take no longer than 30 minutes. So plan for about 12 minutes of actual presentation with the rest of the time in discussion.
 - The use of slides is encouraged. Things to include in the presentation:
 - What is the core claim
 - Theory and evidence
 - Evaluations, critiques
 - Opportunities for extension or new research.

- Research Proposal and Presentation
 - Students are required to write a detailed research proposal (or a full paper). The proposal should be written with an eye towards potentially developing it into a full-fledged 2nd year paper, and/or the basis for a publishable paper in a top journal. Please consult with me on the topic and the paper as it develops.
 - Students will present their research proposal/paper at the end of the semester in class.
- Referee Report
 - I will circulate a paper that has been submitted to *Economics & Politics*, and students will write a mock referee report.
 - We will discuss the components of a good report in class, at some point.

Seminar: Thursday 12noon – 2pm. Via Zoom.
<https://nyu.zoom.us/j/96115211013>
[Import the calendar:](#)

Office Hours: By appointment. Ping me: peter.rosendorff@nyu.edu

Reading List / Outline

1. January 28 Introduction: Interests, Interactions, and Institutions.
Assignment of readings to presenters.

All background:

Rosendorff, Akin, Arias and Deniz. 2015. "Domestic Politics of Trade Policy," in *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (eds.) Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Son.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0089>

Hiscox, Michael J. 2001. Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. *International Organization*. 55(1):1-46. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078596>

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review*. 81(4): 1121-37. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1962581>

2. February 4 International Trade – Interests: Class, Industry and Electoral Systems
Perhaps one from each group below.

I. Class/Sector

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale," *American Economic Review* 84: 833-850.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118033>, but GPO below is a simpler version.

K. Gawande, P. Krishna, and M. Olarreaga. 2009. "What Governments maximize and Why: A View from Trade," *International Organization* 63: 491-532. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090171>

Stephanie Rickard, "Electoral Systems and Trade," in *Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade* Ed. Lisa Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) http://personal.lse.ac.uk/RICKARD/Chapter_15.pdf, with Evans below.

Carolyn L. Evans. 2009. "A Protectionist Bias In Majoritarian Politics: An Empirical Investigation," *Economics & Politics*, 21(2):278-307. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00346.x>

Wolfgang Mayer. 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation" *American Economic Review*, 74(5): 970-985.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198412%2974%3A5%3C970%3AETF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P>

II: Firms

In Song Kim. 2017. "Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization," *American Political Science Review* 111(1):1-20. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000654>

Iain Osgood. 2017. "The Breakdown of Industrial Opposition to Trade: Firms, Product Variety and Reciprocal Liberalization," *World Politics* 69(1):184-231. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887116000174>

Stephen Weymouth, Leonardo Baccini and Pablo Pinto. 2017. "The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-level Evidence" *International Organization* 71(2): 373-395. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831700011X>

Helen Milner, Iain Osgood, Dustin Tingley, Thomas Bernauer, In Song Kim, and Gabriele Spilker 2016 The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters: Survey Evidence on Firms and Trade Policy, *Journal of Politics* 79(1):133-152.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/687207>

III: Individuals

- Erica Owen and Noel P. Johnston. 2017. "Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment," *International Organization* 71(4): 665-699. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000339>
- Walter, Stephanie. 2017. "Globalization and the demand-side of politics: How globalization shapes labor market risk perceptions and policy preferences." *Political Science Research and Methods*. 5(1):55-80
<https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.64>
- Andy Baker. 2005. "Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy," *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4):924-938. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00164.x>
- Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences." *Journal of International Economics* 54 (2):267-292. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996\(00\)00094-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(00)00094-5)
- Mansfield, Edward D and Diana C Mutz. 2009. "Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety." *International Organization* 63(03):425-457. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090158>
- Guisinger, A. (2009) 'Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?' *International Organization*, 63(3):533-557. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090183>
- Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade." *International Organization*. 60(2):469-498. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060140>
- Milner, Helen V and Dustin H Tingley. 2011. "Who supports global economic engagement? The sources of preferences in American foreign economic policy." *International Organization* 65(1):37-68. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000317>

3. February 11 Domestic Institutions/Politics

- David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States. *American Economic Review* 103 (6):2121-68. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2121> with electoral consequences, below.
- David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2016. "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure." *NBER Working Paper* No. 22637 <https://www.nber.org/papers/w22637.pdf>
- Wibbels, E. and J.S. Ahlquist. 2011. "Development, Trade, and Social Insurance." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(1),125-149. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00638.x> with
- Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix. 2002. "Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness." *International Organization*. 56(2):229-262. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802320005478>
- Bryan Schonfeld. "Trading Places, Trading Platforms: The Geography of Realignment." Forthcoming *International Organization*, [Here](#). Perhaps together with
- Douglas A. Irwin and Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley," *The Journal of Law and Economics* 42(2): 643-674. <https://doi.org/10.1086/467437>
- James Feigenbaum and Andrew Hall. 2015. "How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks: Evidence from Chinese Import Competition," *Journal of Politics* 77(4):1012-1030. <https://doi.org/10.1086/682151>
- J. Bradford Jensen, Dennis Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth, 2017. "Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on U.S. Presidential Voting," *International Organization* 71(3):423-457. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000194>

Margalit, Yotam. 2011. "Costly Jobs: Trade-Related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections." *American Political Science Review* 105 (1): 169-188. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41480833>.

4. February 18 Legislative Day

5. February 25 The Anti-Globalization Backlash

Bisbee, James and B. Peter Rosendorff, 2021. "Shocking the Vulnerable." [Here](#).

Ballard Rosa, Cameron, Amalie Jensen and Kenneth Scheve. 2019. "Economic Decline, Social Identity and Authoritarian Values in the US", [Here](#)

Baccini, Leonardo, Mattie Guidi, Arlo Poletti and Aydin Yildirim. 2018. "Trade Liberalization and Labor Market Institutions", [Here](#)

Meir Alkon. 2017. "Local Sociotropism: How Community Variation in Trade Exposures Affects Voter Preferences." [Here](#).

6. March 4 International Institutions

Gilligan, Michael J. and Leslie Johns. 2013. "Formal Models of International Institutions". *Annual Review of Political Science*. 14. (background). <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-043010-095828>

Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT." *American Economic Review*. 89(1): 215-48. <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/pdf/doi/10.1257/aer.89.1.215> (background)

Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation. *International Organization*" 52:269-306 <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898753162820>, with Blaydes, Lisa. 2004. Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC. *International Organization*. 58:213-237. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582012>

Hollyer, James and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2012. "Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession", *International Studies Quarterly* 56(4):748-764 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00750.x> with Arias, Eric, Hollyer, James and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2018. "Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness and Bilateral Investment Treaties", *American Journal of Political Science*. 62(4): 905-921 <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12383>

Mansfield, E., H. Milner and B.P. Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," *International Organization* 56(3):477-514. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199863>

McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments". *International Organization*. 54:809-24. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551370>

Johns, Leslie, 2014. [Depth versus Rigidity in the Design of International Trade Agreements](#) *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 26 (3): 468-495.

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures" *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(3): 574-601. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199806%29106%3A3%3C574%3ATVOTAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q>

7. March 11 Exit from IOs

Borzyskowski, I. von, & Vabulas, F. 2019. "Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?" *The Review of International Organizations*, 14(2), 335-366. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09352-2>

Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. 2018. "Global Competition and Brexit". *American Political Science Review*, 112(2):201–218. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000685>

Julia Gray. 2018. "Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(1): 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx086> with

Haftel, Yoram Z. and Alexander Thompson. 2018. "When do states renegotiate investment agreements? The impact of arbitration." *Review of International Organizations* 13(1):25-48. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9276-1>

Benjamin Daßler (LMU Munich), Tim Heinkelmann-Wild (LMU Munich). [International Authority, Democracies, and Exit from International Organizations](#).

8. March 18 Investment/Supply Chains

Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960– 2000." *International Organization* 60(4):811-846. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060279> and
Beazer, Quentin and Daniel Blake. 2018. "The Conditional Nature of Political Risk: How Home Institutions Influence the Location of Foreign Direct Investment." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(2): 470-485. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12344>

Tomashevskiy, Andreiy. 2017. "Investing in Violence: Foreign Direct Investment and Coups in Authoritarian Regimes." *The Journal of Politics* 79(2): 409-423. <https://doi.org/10.1086/688356>

Johns, Leslie and Rachel Wellhausen. 2016. "Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment." *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 31-51. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541500057X>

Malesky, Edmund and Layna Mosley. 2018. "Chains of Love? Global Production and the Firm-Level Diffusion of Labor Standards." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(3): 712-728. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12370>

Osgood, Iain. 2018. "Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 72(2): 455-484. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831800005X>

Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn and Stephen Weymouth. 2015. "The Influence of Firm Global Supply Chains and Foreign Currency Undervaluations on US Trade Disputes." *International Organization*, 69(4): 913-947. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000247>

Pinto, Pablo M., and Santiago M. Pinto. 2008. "The Politics of Investment Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment." *Economics & Politics* 20(2):216-54. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00330.x>

Sonal Pandya. 2016. "Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: Globalized Production in the Twenty-First Century," *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:455-475" <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051214-101237>

9. March 25 Migration/Immigration

Peters, Margaret. 2015. "Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration Policy in the Era of Globalization." *World Politics* 67 (1): 114-54. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000331>

Bermeo, S., & Leblang, D. (2015). "Migration and Foreign Aid". *International Organization*, 69(3), 627-657. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000119> and

Dreher, Fuchs and Langlotz (2018). "The Effects of Foreign Aid on Refugee Flows" CESifo Working Paper No. 6885. [Here](#).

Facchini, Giovanni, Anna Maria Mayda, and Prachi Mishra. 2011. "Do Interest Groups affect US Immigration Policy?" *Journal of International Economics* 85(1): 114-128. <http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.princeton.edu/10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.05.006>

Mayda, Anna M. 2006. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 88(3): 510–530. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40043013>

Hanson, Gordon, Kenneth F. Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. "Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies." *Economics and Politics* 19(1): 1–33. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00300.x>

Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133-145. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646696>

10. April 1 Trade and Democratization

Eichengreen, Barry and David Leblang. 2008. "Democracy and Globalization." *Economics & Politics* 20: 289-334 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00329.x>

Mansfield, E. D., and Pevehouse, J. C. 2006. "Democratization and International Organizations." *International Organization*, 60(01). <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830606005X>

Zissimos, Ben. 2017. "A theory of trade policy under dictatorship and democratization." *Journal of International Economics* 109: 85-101. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.08.007> and

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2005. "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth." *American Economic Review* 95(3). <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/pdf/doi/10.1257/0002828054201305>

Jha, Saumitra. Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia. *American Political Science Review*, 107(4):806-832. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000464>

Ahlquist, J.S. and Wibbels, E. 2012. "Riding the Wave: World Trade and Factor-Based Models of Democratization." *American Journal of Political Science* 56: 447-464. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00572.x>

Sebastian Galiani, Gustavo Torrens. 2014. "Autocracy, democracy and trade policy." *Journal of International Economics* 93(1):173-193. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.11.011>.

Milner, Helen V and Bumba Mukherjee. 2009. "Democratization and Economic Globalization." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:131-181 <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.110507.114722>

11. April 8 Politics of Sovereign Debt ✓

Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries*. Princeton University Press, p. 1- 37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sdm3>

Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition." *International Organization* 57(1): 3–42. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303571065> with Beaulieu, Emily, Gary W. Cox and Sebastian Saiegh, 2012. "Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage." *International Organization* 6(4): 709-738. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23279976>

Brooks, Sarah M., Raphael de Cunha and Layna Mosley. 2015. "Categories, Creditworthiness and Contagion: How Investors' Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(3): 587–601, <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12173>

Ballard-Rosa C, Mosley L and Wellhausen RL (2019). Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions, and Global Capital Cycles. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000455>

Jeremy Bulow; Kenneth Rogoff. 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt" *Journal of Political Economy*, 97(1): 155-178. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198902%2997%3A1%3C155%3AACRMOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V>

Stasavage, D. 2007. "Cities, Constitutions and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785." *International Organization*, 61(3):489-525. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830707018X>

Layna Mosley. 2000. "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States." *International Organization* 54(4):737-74. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551352>

Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default." *Journal of Economic Literature* 47(3): 651–698. <https://10.1257/jel.47.3.651>

Bodea, Cristina and Raymond Hicks. 2018. "Sovereign Credit Ratings and Central Banks: Why Do Analysts Pay Attention to Institutions?" *Economics & Politics* 30:340–365. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12113>

Bunte, Jonas. 2018. *Raise the Debt: How Developing Countries Choose their Creditors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (manuscript, pp. 1-90). Website.

12. April 15 Financial, Currency and Banking Crises ✓

Stefanie Walter, "Crisis Politics in Europe: Why Austerity Is Easier to Implement in Some Countries Than in Others," *Comparative Political Studies*, 47, no. 7 (2016) <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010414015617967>

Broz, J. L. 2005. "Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues." *American Journal of Political Science*, 49 (3), 479-96. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00137.x>

Mark Copelovitch. 2010. "Master or Servant? Common Agency, Preference Heterogeneity, and the Political Economy of IMF Lending". *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49-77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00577.x>

Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2014. Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes. *American Economic Review*, 104(5): 50-55. <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/pdf/doi/10.1257/aer.104.5.50>

13. April 22 Foreign Aid

Milner, Helen V., and Dustin H. Tingley. 2010. "The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid". *Economics & Politics* 22 (2) : 200–232. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00356.x>

Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Brad Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. 2018. "Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa." *International Studies Quarterly* 62 (1): 182–94. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx052>

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2009. "A Political Economy of Aid." *International Organization* 63 (2): 309–40. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090109>

Axel Dreher, Valentin F. Lang, B. Peter Rosendorff, James Raymond Vreeland. 2019. "Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis." [Here](#).

Ahmed, Faisal Z. 2012. "The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival" *American Political Science Review* 106(1):146-165. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000475>

14&15. April 29 & May 6

Paper Presentations

Other Topics:

UN Security Council

IMF

Capital Mobility/Controls/Crises

Human Rights

Remittances

International Courts/WTO Dispute

Settlement

Debt Crises

Trade and Conflict

Environment/Energy

Reform

Terrorism

Labor Rights/Standards

Development

Size of Nations/Dissolution