

GA 1550:
Comparative Politics of Industrialized Democracies
Fall 2017
Wed 12.30-1.50pm (Field Lunch)
Wed 2-4pm (Class)
Room 217, 19 West 4th

This course is designed to help students develop an appreciation of what it takes to generate high-quality research and writing in a particular area of comparative politics: the politics of representative government in advanced industrialized democracies. To facilitate this, we will read and discuss published work in four categories, beginning with voters and their preferences, then moving to electoral systems and their effects, legislatures and how they function, and factors influencing governance. These categories represent just a sample of topics that have received sustained attention by comparative politics scholars and are by no means exhaustive. Nor are they mutually exclusive: one of the goals of the course is to encourage students to consider how conclusions drawn in one area of research might influence the questions asked and answers offered in another.

Within each of these four categories, we will read a mix of work that has had a large impact on the field or can be considered at the frontier. Again, time constraints prevent us from reading all or even most of the work that can be said to fall into these categories. However, the main objective of the course is not to memorize the substantive conclusions emanating from this work but to better understand the processes through which the authors drew their conclusions. By reading and critiquing a sample of high-quality work in these four broad categories, the course aims to equip students with the foundational knowledge and analytical skills required to come up with their own research questions, craft their own contributions, implement their own cutting-edge empirical analysis, and ultimately produce papers publishable in top comparative politics journals.

To this end, three required readings have been assigned each week. Students are expected to read these articles carefully ahead of time and come to class prepared to discuss them. More information about what is required of students during class is described below. In addition, an integral part of the course is the Field Lunch in Comparative Politics, which will meet at 12.30 pm on most of the same days that the class meets. The Lunch will feature a research presentation by a scholar of comparative politics. Please consult the syllabus for the schedule of Speakers, who vary in terms of career stage and hail from both NYU and other universities. You are also expected to attend these Field Lunches, read the Speaker's paper ahead of time, serve as Discussant for one of these presentations, and contribute to the discussion each week. Every effort has been made to integrate the research presentations into the subjects covered in class that week. Class will meet right after the Lunch, from 2-4pm.

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Course Requirements:

1. Participation (20%)

Your participation is an integral part of this course. You are expected to come to the Field Lunch having already read the paper, which will be posted on the course website approximately a week ahead of time. You are also expected to come to class each week having read the required readings ahead of time, which will also be posted on the course website. During both the Lunch and the class, you are expected to contribute to the discussion in a way that demonstrates you have read the material and given serious thought to it. In addition, you will serve as Discussant for one of the research presentations. In the weeks in which you have written a referee report on one of the readings, you are also expected to prepare a brief presentation (of no more than 15 minutes) with slides on that reading in class. If you must miss a session for illness or another legitimate reason, please inform us ahead of time. We may ask you to submit a page of written notes on the assigned material for that week.

2. Three Referee Reports (30%)

The second requirement of this course are the three referee reports you are expected to write, each pertaining to a reading in a different week. You will thus write referee reports in three different weeks, one of which has to be completed by the week of November 6. Your referee reports will be due on the Monday of the week in which we are discussing that particular article in class (for example, if you are reviewing an article that we are scheduled to discuss on Wednesday September 20, your referee report will be due to me on Monday September 18). You may submit these to us by email (please send it to both of us).

In your referee report, you will be asked to treat the article as if it had been submitted to a journal and you have been asked to review it. You will need to read it very thoroughly and you may also need to acquaint yourself with other literature in that area. Your report should evaluate the contribution of the paper and the methodological rigor with which the goals it set were achieved. You will need to assess the paper's weaknesses (whether in contribution, substance, or methodological rigor) and decide whether you believe the author should be offered the opportunity to address those weaknesses or they constitute a hurdle too large to overcome. In composing your report, it may be useful to consult referee instructions issued by general comparative politics journals.

We will divide up the readings in the first session (September 6). Thus, please come to this session with at least six articles in different weeks that you would be happy to write a referee

report for. If you cannot attend this session, please email me ahead of time with at least six articles that you would be happy reviewing.

3. Final Paper (50%)

You will also write a final research paper on one of the topics covered, broadly construed. The key requirement is that the paper adopt the “comparative method”: that is, it should not be a purely theoretical paper, nor should it describe a single political system or be based on a single case. You should view your paper as the first draft of something that could, after much more time and effort has been expended on it, become a published paper of comparable quality to any one of the articles we have read. You should set yourselves the highest standards and find a topic upon which you are prepared to make a substantial investment of time, effort and creative energy. This paper is not intended as a tiresome hoop through which you have to jump, but as an integral part of the portfolio of work you will develop during your time as a graduate student.

Finding a precise, relevant, challenging, yet feasible substantive question is one of the most difficult tasks facing any political scientist. You ought to start thinking about your final paper immediately, guided by your substantive interests, intuitions and background knowledge as well as the talents you can bring to bear on the work, all of which you should exploit to the fullest extent. Questions will emerge on your agenda as you read other people’s work with a critical eye, always looking for theoretical and empirical weaknesses, always alert to ways in which arguments could be better constructed, or empirical evidence better collected, marshaled and analyzed.

Your paper’s structure should conform to current standards in the field. To this end, it must contain the following six sections:

- (a) Motivation: why is answering your question important?
- (b) Background/context: have other people already tried to answer this question? If so, what theories have they drawn on, what answers have they given, and why are those answers invalid or incomplete?
- (c) Theoretical expectations/hypotheses: describe your own theoretical approach. Use this to deduce precise empirical observations or hypotheses that can be tested with data.
- (d) Data: consider the kind of data that would provide the very best test of your hypotheses, if you had access to it. If such data are unavailable (as is usually the case), consider whether other data sets could provide a credible test of your hypotheses. If no suitable data exists, specify a feasible research project that would gather the required evidence.
- (e) Method/analysis: draw clear inferences about what your data tell you about your hypotheses and thus about the research question that motivates your project.
- (f) Conclusion: What conclusions have you been able to draw from your research? Under what conditions might your conclusions not be warranted? What relevance do your conclusions hold for existing work in the field? Has your research raised new questions for others to answer?

Your paper should not exceed 25 pages double-spaced. It is due to us via email on December 13 and will count for 50% of your grade. In preparation for this, you will also submit a 500-word paper prospectus to us via email on November 13. In this, you will describe the question you will try to answer in your paper, explain why this question is important, and sketch out your answers to (b) through (d) above. There will be a substantial penalty for late work, so please place these dates on your calendar and treat them as fixed. Please consult the [NYU Citation Guide](#) for information about the referencing style you will need to use, which is the Chicago author-date system, and for general information on how to properly cite sources.

Grade Breakdown:

Participation	20%
Three Referee Reports	30%
Final paper	50%

Important Dates:

Class Begins	September 6
Field Lunch Begins	September 13
(At Least) One Referee Report Due	Week Beginning November 6
Break due to Thanksgiving	Wednesday, November 22
Paper Prospectus Due	November 13
Final Lunch and Class	December 6
Final Paper Due	December 13

COURSE OUTLINE

September 6: Introduction

This is an organizational meeting. We will cover the goals of the course; assign discussants for the Lunches; and assign readings for the referee reports. Please come with at least six readings pertaining to four different weeks that you would be happy to provide a referee report for. There is no assigned reading.

PART I: VOTERS AND THEIR PREFERENCES

September 13: Policy Preferences

Special Session: instead of a Field Lunch, we are going to go through the process that resulted in the acceptance of a comparative politics paper in a top journal, paying particular attention to the referee reports and authors' responses to these. In preparation, please read all the files in the folder entitled "Laver Crowdsourcing" on the course website.

Orit Kedar. When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections. *American Political Science Review*, 99:185–99, 2005.

Lawrence Ezrow and Georgios Xezonakis. Citizen satisfaction with democracy and parties policy offerings. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(9):1152–1178, 2011.

Torben Iversen and David Soskice. Information, inequality, and mass polarization. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(13):1781–1813, 2015.

[Maria presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Stuart Elaine Macdonald, George Rabinowitz, and Ola Listhaug. On Attempting to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model: Sometimes the Patient Just Can't Be Helped. *The Journal of Politics*, 60(3):653–90, 1998.

Stephen A. Jessee. Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election. *American Political Science Review*, 103(1):59–81, 2009.

James F. Adams, Samuel Merrill, and Bernard Grofman. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

Raymond M. Duch, Jeff B. May, and David A. Armstrong II. Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies. *The American Political Science Review*, 104(4):698–719, 2010.

James Adams, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. Is Anybody Listening? Evidence That Voters Do Not Respond to European Parties' Policy Statements During Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):370–382, 2011.

Michael Tomz and Robert P Van Houweling. Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3), 2008.

Eric Belanger and Bonnie D. Meguid. Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice. *Electoral Studies*, 27:477–491, 2008.

September 20: Valence

Field Lunch: “Tournaments, Prizes, and Political Support: Explaining LDP Dominance in Japanese House of Representatives Elections, 1980-2012”, Amy Catalinac, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Alastair Smith (NYU).[Discussant: Kyuwon]

Tim Groseclose. A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(3):862–86, 2001.

[Francis presenting]

Michael Clark and Debra Leiter. Does the Ideological Dispersion of Parties Mediate the Electoral Impact of Valence? A Cross-National Study of Party Support in Nine Western European Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(2):171–202, 2013.

[Athena presenting]

Walter J. Stone and Elizabeth N. Simas. Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2):371–388, 2010.

[Anna presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder. Valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election models. *Public Choice*, 103:327–36, 2000.

Norman Schofield. A Valence Model of Political Competition in Britain: 1992-1997. *Electoral Studies*, 24(3):347–370, 2005.

Michael Clark. Valence and electoral outcomes in Western Europe, 1976-1998. *Electoral Studies*, 28():111–122, 2009.

September 27: Components in the Calculus of Voting

Field Lunch: “How Autocrats Manipulate Economic News: Evidence from Russia’s State-Controlled Television”, Arturas Rozenas and Denis Stukal, NYU. [Discussant: Trellice]

Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson. Assessing the Magnitude of the Economic Vote Over Time and Across Nations. *Electoral Studies*, 25:528–547, 2006.

[Felipe presenting]

Michael Tomz and Robert P Van Houweling. The Electoral Implications of Candidate Ambiguity. *American Political Science Review*, 103(1), 2009.

[Sophie presenting]

Kathleen Bawn and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. Government versus Opposition at the Polls: How Governing Status Affects the Impact of Policy Positions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(2):433–446, 2012.

[Athena presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

James Lo, Sven-Oliver Proksch, and Jonathan B. Slapin. Ideological Clarity in Multiparty Competition: A New Measure and Test Using Election Manifestos. *British Journal of Political Science*, pages 1–20, 2014.

Mark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress. Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3), 2012.

Susan C. Stokes. Public Opinion and Market Reforms: The Limits of Economic Voting. *Comparative Political Studies*, 29:499–519, 1996.

G Bingham Powell Jr and Guy D Whitten. A Cross-national Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 391–414, 1993.

Joshua Tucker. *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic, 1990-1999*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.

PART II: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR EFFECTS

October 4: On Election Campaigns

Field Lunch: “Sons and Lovers: Political Stability in China and Europe before the Great Divergence”, Yuhua Wang, Harvard University. [Discussant: Sophie]

Gary W. Cox. Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(4):903–935, 1990.

[Anna presenting]

John Carey and Matthew Shugart. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14:417–39, 1995.

Amy Catalinac. Positioning Under Alternative Electoral Systems: Evidence From Japanese Candidate Election Manifestos. *American Political Science Review*, forthcoming, 2017.

Background and supplementary reading:

Burt L. Monroe and Amanda G. Rose. Electoral Systems and Unimagined Consequences: Partisan Effects of Districted Proportional Representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1):67–89, 2002.

Maurice Duverger. *Political Parties*. Wiley, New York, 1954.

Gary W. Cox. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1997.

Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. Routledge, London, UK, 2006.

B. Grofman and A. Lijphart. *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*. Agathon Press, New York, 1986.

Lawrence Ezrow. Parties' Policy Programmes and the Dog that Didn't Bark: No Evidence that Proportional Systems Promote Extreme Party Positioning. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(3):479–497, 2008.

John Huber. Measuring ethnic voting: Do proportional electoral laws politicize ethnicity? *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(4):986–1001, 2012.

Jay K. Dow. Party-System Extremism in Majoritarian and Proportional Electoral Systems. *British Journal of Political Science*, 41(2):341–361, 2011.

October 11: On Public Policy

Field Lunch: “Exclusion by Elections: Inequality, Ethnic Identity, and Democracy”, John Huber, Columbia University. [Discussant: Tine]

Torben Iversen and David Soskice. Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):165–81, 2006.

[Felipe presenting]

Jessica Fortin-Rittberger and Berthold Rittberger. Do electoral rules matter? Explaining national differences in women's representation in the European Parliament. *European Union Politics*, 15(4):496–520, 2014.

[Athena presenting]

Frances Rosenbluth and Ross Schaap. The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation. *International Organization*, 57(2):307–336, 2003.

[Maria presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Arend Lijphart. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in thirty-six Countries*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999.

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. *Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy*. MIT Press, 2002.

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Robert Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno. Electoral Systems and the Composition of Public Spending. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117:609–57, 2002.

Miriam Golden. Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy. *British Journal of Political Science*, 33:189–212, 2003.

Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. Electoral Rules, Government Spending, and Parliamentary Democracy. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2:155–18, 2007.

Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico. The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives. *The American Economic Review*, 91(1):225–239, March 2001.

Frank C. Thames and Martin S. Edwards. Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. Mixed-Member Majoritarian and Mixed-Member Proportional Systems and Government Expenditures. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(7):905–927, 2006.

October 18: Endogeneity of Electoral Systems

Field Lunch: “Electoral Misconduct and Democratic Stability: Voting in Imperial and Weimar Germany”, Volha Charnysh (Princeton University) and Daniel Ziblatt (Harvard). [Discussant: Francis]

Carles Boix. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3):609–24, 1999.

[Tine presenting]

Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. *The American Political Science Review*, 101(3):373–91, 2007.

[Trellace presenting]

Kenneth Benoit and Jacqueline Hayden. Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland’s Electoral System, 1989-2001. *The Journal of Politics*, 66(2):396–427, 2004.

[Sophie presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Andre Blais, Agnieszka Dobrzynska, and Indridi H. Indridason. To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(1):182–90, 2005.

Kenneth Mori McElwain. Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(1):32–47, 2008.

October 25: Mobilization and Turnout

Field Lunch: “Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors”, Maria Cerrari, NYU. [Discussant: Aaron]

Gary Cox, Jon Fiva, and Daniel M. Smith. The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(4), 2016.

[Trellace presenting]

Andrew C. Eggers. Proportionality and Turnout: Evidence From French Municipalities. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(2):135–167, 2014.

[Francis presenting]

Kentaro Fukumoto and Yusaku Horiuchi. Making Outsiders’ Votes Count: Detecting Electoral Fraud through a Natural Experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3):586–603, 2011.

[Felipe presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Kentaro Fukumoto and Yusaku Horiuchi. Identifying the effect of mobilization on voter turnout through a natural experiment. *Electoral Studies*, 44:192–202, 2014.

PART III: LEGISLATIVE POLITICS

November 1: Parties

Field Lunch: “The Effects of Supranational Integration on Political Extremism and Party-System Polarization”, Hande Mutlu-Eren, NYU and Columbia. [Discussant: Anna]

James M. Snyder and Michael M. Ting. An Informational Rationale for Political Parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1):90–110, 2002.

[Sophie presenting]

John M. Carey. Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):92–107, 2007.

[Anna presenting]

Christopher Kam, W. T. Bianco, I. Sened, and R. Smyth. Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament. *American Political Science Review*, 104(2):289–306, 2010.

[Kyuwon presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Christopher J. Kam. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009.

Daniel Diermeier and Razvan Vlailcu. Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures. *American Political Science Review*, 105(2):359–80, 2011.

November 8: Legislatures

Field Lunch: “Origins of Early Democracy”, Ali Ahmed and David Stasavage, NYU.
[Discussant: Felipe]

Of the three papers assigned for today, we are going to go through the process that resulted in the acceptance of the first one, paying particular attention to the referee reports and authors’ responses to these. In preparation, please read all the files in the folder entitled “Laver Benoit Arithmetic” on the course website.

Michael Laver and Kenneth Benoit. The Basic Arithmetic of Legislative Decisions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2):275–291, 2015.

Torun Dewan and Arthur Spirling. Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 105(2):337–58, 2011.

[Tine presenting]

Tanya Bagashka and Jennifer Hayes Clark. Electoral Rules and Legislative Particularism: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures. *American Political Science Review*, 110(3):441–56, 2016.

[Kyuwon presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Shane Martin. Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(3):339–61, 2011.

Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins. *Legislative Leviathan. Party Government in the House*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2nd edition, 2007.

Ko Maeda. Determinants of opposition fragmentation: Parliamentary rules and opposition strategies. *Party Politics*, 21(5):763–74, 2015.

PART IV: GOVERNANCE

November 15: Cabinet Formation and Duration

Field Lunch: “Democracy in Crisis”, Adam Przeworski (NYU). [Discussant: Maria]

Lanny W. Martin and Randolph T. Stevenson. The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation. *American Political Science Review*, 104(3):503–18, 2010.

[Tine presenting]

John D. Huber and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 102(2):169–80, 2008.

[Aaron presenting]

Daniel Diermeier and Randolph T. Stevenson. Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events. *American Political Science Review*, 94(3):627–40, 2000.

[Trellace presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle. *Making and Breaking Government*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Michael Laver. Models of government formation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1):1–25, 1998.

Kaare Strom, Wolfgang C. Muller, and Torbjorn Bergman, editors. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

David P. Baron. A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems. *American Political Science Review*, 85(1):137164, 1991.

Josh Cutler, Scott De Marchi, Max Gallop, Florian M. Hollenbach, Michael Laver, and Matthias Orłowski. Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46:31–43, 2014.

Samuel Berlinski, Torun Dewan, and Keith Dowding. The Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(2):559–571, 2010.

Zeev Maoz and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments, 1945–98. *British Journal of Political Science*, 40(4):805–33, 2010.

Tomoko Matsumoto and Michael J. Laver. Public opinion feedback between elections, and stability of single-party majority governments. *Electoral Studies*, 40:308–14, 2015.

November 29: Delegation and Policymaking

Field Lunch: “Institutional Foundations of Coalition Governance”, Mik Laver and Tiberiu Dragu (NYU). [Discussant: Athena]

Lanny M. Martin and George Vanberg. Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy, and the Coalition Compromise. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):979–96, 2014.

[Aaron presenting]

Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox. Shadowing Ministers: Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(2):220–236, 2012.

[Maria presenting]

George Tsebelis. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(3):289–325, 1995.

[Francis presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Philip Keefer and David Stasavage. The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. *American Political Science Review*, 97(3):407–423, 2003.

December 6: Portfolio Allocation

Field Lunch: not scheduled

Paul V. Warwick and James N. Druckman. The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45:635–65, 2006.

Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox. The Logic of Gamson’s Law: Pre-Election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2):300–13, 2007.

[Aaron presenting]

Robert J. Pekkanen, Benjamin Nyblade, and Ellis S. Krauss. The Logic of Ministerial Selection: Electoral System and Cabinet Appointments in Japan. *Social Science Japan Journal*, 17(1):3–22, 2014.

[Kyuwon presenting]

Background and supplementary reading:

Michael Laver and Norman Schofield. *Multiparty Government: the Politics of Coalition in Europe*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1998.
