Pictures and Passions in Plato

It is generally held that Plato’s Republic gave ethical theory its first and most influential philosophical formulation of the division between reason and the passions. If we look closely at the Republic, however, one half of that division is surprisingly hard to find.

Elsewhere in the dialogues Plato groups together, and opposes to rational calculation, a set of states that any modern philosopher would recognize as paradigm passions: anger, fear, pleasure, pain, lust, eros, and the like. At some points he even refers to them as pathê or pathêmata, the Greek roots of our ‘passions’. When we turn to the Republic, we see that these states are the definitive traits of the non-rational parts of the soul, explaining their distinctive characters, their inferiority to the rational part, and the necessity of keeping them under rational control. (Indeed, each non-rational part is named for its characteristic passion, the appetitive part (epithumetikon) for appetite (epithumia) and the spirited part (thumoeides) for anger or “spirited emotion” (thumos).)

Yet there appears to be a serious obstacle to regarding the Republic’s non-rational parts of the soul as the seats of what later philosophers call the passions. The problem is not simply that the dialogue divides these states between the appetitive and the spirited parts of the soul, suggesting that they might have no fundamental features in common. More worrisomely, it assigns some of them – desire, pleasure, and even eros – to all three

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1 See Protagoras 352b-c, Phaedo 83b-84a, and three passages I discuss below, Timaeus 69c and Philebus 40e and 47e.
2 See especially Timaeus 69c-d, quoted below (pathêmata) and Phaedo 83c (paschein, to suffer: the verbal root of pathos). For the use of the terms to refer to one or another member of the group, see e.g. Phaedrus 252b and 265b and Gorgias 481d on eros, and Philebus 32a and passim on pleasure and pain.
parts of the soul, including the rational part, the very part that we supposed to be contrasted with the passionate parts.³

Perhaps, then, it is anachronistic to look to Plato for the distinction between reason and passion, and to regard the non-rational parts of the soul in the Republic as the seat of the passions. Perhaps Plato had the insight that there are forces in the soul opposing reason, but left it to others – most notably Aristotle, in the Rhetoric – to develop a theory that identifies those forces as a class and shows what they have in common: a theory of the passions.

The aim of this paper is to show that Plato does after all have a theory of the passions, and in fact one that closely anticipates what Aristotle offers in the Rhetoric. Plato has an implicit account which unifies anger, fear, appetite, and the other desires, pleasures and emotions of the non-rational parts of the soul, and which marks them as fundamentally different from (and inferior to) the desires, pleasures and emotions of the rational part. We find the account most clearly outside the Republic, in passages in the Philebus and Timaeus; nonetheless the account is compatible with, and indeed a natural development or elaboration of, the Republic’s characterization of the desires, pleasures and emotions of the non-rational parts of the soul. Thus it is correct after all to regard the Republic’s view that there are non-rational parts of the soul as it is generally regarded: as entailing that there is a miscellaneous but fundamentally similar set of psychological forces that direct many of our actions, and can oppose reason or be guided by it; as the view that there is a division in the human soul between reason and the passions.

³ See e.g. 580d on desires and pleasures, and 485b and 490b on eros.
I. Aristotle’s Passions

I am going to work backwards, beginning with Aristotle’s account of passions in the Rhetoric. I want to show that here, as so often, Aristotle takes on ideas from his teacher, making systematic and elaborate what Plato leaves at the level of suggestion and metaphor, and thus that we can use the account of the passions we find fairly explicit in Aristotle to help us recognize and understand one implicit in Plato. What I have to say about Aristotle’s view is not new, and I will not spend much time discussing or defending it: my aim is to use an established (although somewhat contentious) interpretation of Aristotle to argue for a new reading of Plato.

The Rhetoric offers one general definition of the passions:

The passions (pathē) are those things on account of which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their discernments (krisēs), and which are attended by (hois hepetai) pain and pleasure; for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites.

(Rhetoric 1378a19-22)

We learn much more about what all passions have in common, however, from the individual definitions that follow. Here is a representative sample:

Things hoped for [are pleasurable] that, when present, appear (phainetai) to confer great delights or benefits and to benefit without giving pain.

(1370b7-9)

Anger is desire, accompanied by pain, for revenge for an apparent (phainomenēn) slight.

(1378a30-31)

Fear is a pain or disturbance arising from the appearance (phantasias) of a destructive or painful future evil.

(1382a21-22)
Confident expectation of safety is accompanied by the appearance \((phantasias)\) of it as being close, while fearful things are absent or far off.

\(1383a17-19\)

Pity is a pain taken in an apparent \((phainomenoi)\) evil, destructive or painful, befalling one who does not deserve it.

\(1385b13-14\)

There are some notable differences between these definitions: fear and pity are identified with pains, for example, while anger is merely “accompanied by” \((meta)\) pain, and passions in the general definition are “attended by” pleasure and pain; confident expectation is accompanied by an appearance, while fear arises from an appearance, and anger and pity have something apparent as their objects. While these differences may reflect indeterminacy in Aristotle’s view, the definitions have enough in common to justify us in inferring from them – as various scholars have done – a unified account of the passions as a class, as follows:

1. Passions essentially involve pleasures and pains.
2. They are responses to quasi-perceptual appearances \((phantasiai)\) of their objects.
3. These appearances represent the objects as good or bad: they are evaluative appearances.

Passions are, in sum, pleasant or painful responses to evaluative appearances. These responses are belief-like (i.e. they have contents like “safety is near”), but they are not full-fledged rational judgments. Indeed, they cannot be, for they belong to the non-reasoning part of the soul.\(^4\) Instead, they are exercises of a lower cognitive faculty

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\(^4\) See e.g. *EN* 1105b21-23 and 1106b16 with 1103a3ff and 1111b1.
responsive only to quasi-perceptual appearances, the faculty Aristotle calls *phantasia*, “imagination” or appearance-reception.

I will not argue for this interpretation here: good defense and discussion are offered by recent work on the *Rhetoric*. The most controversial claim is (2). Some protest that Aristotle’s talk of appearance is broad or loose: he does not mean that passions are exercises of our faculty for quasi-perception (*phantasia*), but in fact thinks they involve rational belief. There is, however, excellent textual evidence that the talk of appearance is narrow and technical – that Aristotle is characterizing the passions as involving the exercise of *phantasia*, which he describes in the *de Anima* and other psychological works as operative in perceptual illusions, dreams, memory, and other quasi-perceptual activities.

In the next sections I argue that Plato develops an implicit account of the passions, in the *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, which anticipates all of (1)-(3).

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7 The continuities I show below between Aristotle’s definitions of the passions and what we find in Plato should count in its favor of this reading. For extensive arguments that *phantasia* in the technical sense is at issue, see especially Achtenberg and Nieuwenberg. Another important issue I will not discuss here: the way I interpret them, both Aristotle’s and Plato’s views of the passions have much in common with the Stoic view, with the crucial difference that on the Stoic view all passions are rational. This is not the place to go into the details of the Stoic view, but those familiar with it will recognize similarities, and I think these continuities between the three views count in favor of my interpretations. For discussions of proto-Stoicism in these views of the passions, see Striker (on Aristotle) and Gill, “Galen versus Chrysippus on the Tripartite Psyche in *Timaeus* 69-72” (on the *Timaeus*).

8 In finding antecedents of Aristotle’s *phantasia* in the passages discussed below from the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* I am in agreement with Lorenz, *The brute Within*, which offers thorough and persuasive arguments in support of that view. The main addition I make is the idea that the cognition involved in these passages is evaluative, and thus passion-constituting.
II. Pictures and passions in the Philebus

There is one passage from Plato which has been recognized to offer a theory of the passions: *Philebus* 47d ff, which defines “anger and fear and longing and sorrow and erôs and jealousy and malice and however many other such things there are” (47e1-2) as mixtures of pleasure and pain that the soul experiences “without the body” (47d5-9).\(^9\) The *Philebus*, notably, makes no explicit distinctions between rational and non-rational parts of the soul, nor rational and non-rational desires and emotions. Dialogues that do make such distinctions, however, place the group of states listed at 47e firmly on the nonrational side;\(^10\) this suggests that, despite the lack of indication of how to relate its psychology to that of the *Republic* or *Timaeus*, the *Philebus* can illuminate what those dialogues classify as the desires and emotions of the non-rational parts of the soul.

The passage at hand, however, does not tell us very much about these states. Socrates offers a detailed account of only one: malice, which he characterizes as pleasure in bad things that happen to people close to us (48b11-12). He begs off going through the rest of the cases (50d-e), so we are not told what unifies the passions as a class. Are *all* mixed psychic pleasures passions? And is this their only essential characteristic, or are there other important conditions on what counts as a passion?

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\(^9\) Translations from the *Philebus* are loosely based on those of Frede. I take the point of the last clause to be not that passions have no bodily component, but rather that these mixed pleasures are not triggered by bodily replenishments or depletions; this is what distinguishes them from states like the hungry person’s pleasurable anticipation of eating, discussed earlier in the dialogue.

\(^10\) See especially *Republic* 603c-605c: this passage, just like *Philebus* 47d ff, focuses on passions induced in the audience by comedies and tragedies. Erôs does show up on the rational side in the *Republic*, as I mentioned in the introduction, but it is for the most part treated as non-rational (it is the tyrannical appetite in *Republic* IX, and one of the main *pathêmata* distinctive of the non-rational parts of the soul at *Timaeus* 69d). I will return to the subject of rational desires, pleasures and emotions in the final section.
What has not been widely recognized is that an earlier passage of the *Philebus* has already offered a fuller account of the passions, an account compatible with this one but more detailed and more unifying. The passage I have in mind is 37e-40e, where Socrates gives an argument that pleasures can be false. The passage is mostly concerned with hope, which it defines as a pleasure of anticipation which may be true or false, and it has received an enormous amount of attention as a discussion of false pleasure. At the end of the discussion, however, Socrates takes himself to have established that not only hopes but also “fears, angers (*thumón*), and all things of that sort” can be false (40e2-4). This suggests that the passage aims to give an account of all the states Plato mentions at 47e, and thus that we should take its analysis of hope to offer a pattern that applies to other passions as well. When we do, we will find something very close to what we have seen in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

First, by presenting its account of hope as relevant to all the passions, the passage implicitly defines the passions as pleasures or pains; this is confirmed by the explicit definition at 47d-e. So here we have a strong version of (1) in Aristotle’s theory: passions *are* pleasures and/or pains.

The present passage, moreover, goes far beyond 47d ff in filling in details about these pleasures and pains. It begins by connecting them closely with beliefs, *doxai* (37e10-11): they “come to be with” beliefs. (I think that this is intentionally vague: for now Plato wants to leave open the relation between passions and beliefs.) A common, and compelling, interpretation holds that Plato is here claiming that pleasures like hope must have something like propositional content. They are a species of propositional
attitude: pleasures *that* such-and-such is the case.\(^{11}\) When Socrates goes on to describe belief-formation as the process of memory and perception “inscribing words (*logous*) in our soul” (39a1-3), and adds that when these words concern the future they *are* hopes (40a6-7), he seems to be identifying being hopeful – that is, experiencing the particular kind of pleasure that is hope – with the entertaining or acceptance of certain propositions. (The identification of the *logoi* as hopes leaves plenty of room for confusion, but I take Plato’s thought to be that hope the passion, the feeling or state of being hopeful, is the entertaining of *a hope* – a proposition (*logos*) to the effect that, e.g., one will soon get a lot of gold.)

If this is right, then the *Philebus* puts forth a version of what is nowadays called a cognitivist view of passions: a passion is a judgment that something is the case.\(^{12}\) I think it should be beyond dispute that Plato was a cognitivist about passions from first to last. To take the clearest cases, consider the *Protagoras*’ definition of fear as an “advance-belief” (*prosdokia*, often translated ‘expectation’) about a future evil (*Protagoras* 358d5-6), and the *Laws*’ very similar definitions of fear, confidence and hope (*elpis*)\(^{13}\) as beliefs

\(^{11}\) See Penner, “False Anticipatory Pleasures: *Philebus* 36a3-41a6,” *Phronesis* 15, 1970, 166-78, which introduces the view that some pleasures are propositional attitudes, and Frede, “Rumpelstiltskin’s Pleasures: True and False Pleasures in Plato’s *Philebus,*” which uses that idea to show that at least some pleasures depend on one’s taking their objects under certain descriptions. The propositional attitude view is attractive as an interpretation of the passage because it allows Socrates to show – as he aims to do in the passage as a whole – that pleasures and pains can be literally true and false. If certain pleasures and pains are themselves attitudes toward propositions (rather than e.g. brute feelings), this claim looks much more promising.

\(^{12}\) To this extent it is similar to the Stoic view of passions. Modern-day cognitivists include Solomon and Nussbaum; the latter calls her own view neo-Stoic.

\(^{13}\) *Elpis* is the word translated as ‘hope’ in our *Philebus* passage; in the *Laws*, however, the Stranger distinguishes between *elpides* for things good and for things bad, and so ‘anticipation’ would be a better translation.
(doxai, Laws 644c9-d1). (Several entries in the Platonic “Definitions” lend further support by suggesting that such cognitivism was standard doctrine in the Academy.)

On the most straightforward version of cognitivism, passions are simply to be identified with beliefs: hope, for example, is a belief that something good will happen. The Philebus, as I understand it, offers a nuanced version of this view, by putting conditions on what the beliefs that constitute passions must be like. In doing so, I will argue, it reconciles Plato’s cognitivism about passions with Aristotle’s view that passions are exercises not of our faculty for rational judgment, but rather of our faculty of phantasia.

The first condition is that the beliefs must ultimately derive from perception. (They derive from memory and perception (38b12), memory has earlier been defined as “the preservation of perception” (34a10).) Indeed, 38b implies that all beliefs arise in this way: “is it not memory and perception that lead to belief?” (cf. 39a). Is Socrates relying on the claim of e.g. Republic V that all belief is about perceptibles? Arguably yes, but it will serve our purposes as well to assume that he is instead implicitly restricting the discussion to beliefs that can constitute passions, holding that these at least must be about objects of perception. This looks reasonable: we get angry and hopeful and jealous about particular, worldly objects and events, not Forms or numbers.15 (There is more to be said here; I return to the general links between passions and perceptions in section IV.)

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14 See fear, consternation (ekplēxis) and shame, all involving expectation of something bad (415e4-8, 416a9), and hope, “the expectation of good” (416a21).
15 Rational desires can have Forms as their objects: see e.g. the philosopher’s erōs for the Forms at Republic 490b. As I am using the term, however – following Aristotle and, I am arguing, Plato – ‘passions’ refers only to states of the non-rational parts.
Next comes a crucial detail. Socrates began by characterizing the formation of belief as the inner writing of *logoi* (39a); now he adds:

There is another craftsman at work in our souls at the same time...A painter who, after the scribe, provides pictures (*eikonas*) of the words in the soul...[This happens] whenever a person takes away (*apagagón*) the things believed and stated from sight or any other sense-perception and then somehow sees in himself the pictures of the things believed and stated.

(39b3-c1)

The beliefs that constitute passions are accompanied by inner images (*eikones*, 39c1, 4; *zógraphêmata*, 39d7; *phantasmata ezógraphêmata*, 40a9). What does Plato have in mind here? One question is, does this happen whenever the belief is a perceptual one, or are the illustrated beliefs a narrower class?16 In either case, he is pointing to something logically separable from acquiring a belief based on perception. Something extra happens, whether sometimes or always: we get a sensory representation along with the belief. This is based on the belief (the painter comes *after* the scribe, 39b6), and corresponds to it as an illustration does to the appropriate words: the picture, that is, inherits the representational content of the words. In these cases, one has not only a belief about the external world, but also a vivid impression, a mental image. Let us say that in these cases one has an “illustrated belief”.

Socrates and Protarchus agree that such beliefs arise in connection with things past, present and future (39c-d). An illustrated belief of something past (*qua* past) would be a vivid memory; one of something future (*qua* future) a vivid expectation. One of something present would evidently be a vivid imagining of something presently occuring.

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16 Part of the vagueness is due to the ambiguity of *apagagón*: it could mean “receives,” in which case this happens with all perceptual beliefs, or it could mean “abstracts,” which implies some special extra mental effort.
This last is particularly odd. It cannot be that perception itself is mediated by internal images, because the pictures come after the perceptually-based beliefs. Why then does Plato posit “illustrations” even of beliefs about the present?

I propose the following: Plato wants to identify the kind of belief that can constitute a passion, and his idea is that passions involve not just representations of the world (bare logoi, propositions), but vivid, quasi-perceptual representations. While Socrates first identifies hopes both with logoi and with pictures (at 39e-40a), and never details the different roles of the two, the emphasis switches at 40a-b to pictures alone. The implication is that pictures are always involved in passions: for a logos in our soul to provoke a passion, it must be illustrated. Thus Plato is describing passions not simply as what we ordinarily think of as propositional attitudes, but as what we might more informatively call pictorial attitudes.17

This is a nice point, one missed by straightforward cognitivist accounts. The idea is that when I am moved to anger or fear or excitement by some memory of the past, reflection on the present, or anticipation of the future, the object or event at issue cannot be one I am abstractly contemplating but must be one I am (as we would say) imagining. Contrast the thought “I am mortal, and thus will some day die” with the vivid imagining of one’s death, or the thought “My spouse might be cheating on me” with the vivid imagining of a tryst taking place right now behind one’s back: it is at least plausible that only the imaginings will provoke sorrow, fear, anxiety, anger, and the like. This is also, I would argue, part of what Aristotle has in mind when he attributes emotions to the

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17 This might be just what Penner has in mind when he says that the Philebus treats pleasure as a propositional attitude, for he equates this with the claim that it treats pleasure as “a kind of perceiving that” (“False Anticipatory Pleasures: Philebus 36a3-41a6,” 171-72).
workings of *phantasia* rather than rational thought. At any rate, we now see that the *Philebus* gives us the equivalent of Aristotle’s (2): passions involve quasi-perceptual appearances of their objects.

There may nevertheless seem to be a crucial difference between the two accounts: on the interpretation I gave of Aristotle’s account, passions involve a kind of cognition that belongs to a non-rational part of the soul and is sub-doxastic, while on the *Philebus*’ account passions are *doxai*, albeit of a special kind. But is the cognition at issue in our *Philebus* passage really rational, cognition of the kind Aristotle would call *doxa* rather than *phantasia*? There is a significant reason for doubting that it is, which comes out when we try to map the *Philebus*’ account of passions onto the divided soul psychology we find in other dialogues.

There are two ways to attempt this. First, we might suppose that the *logoi* belong to the rational part of the soul and only the images to the non-rational.\(^{18}\) This would mean, since Plato identifies both the *logoi* and the pictures as hopes (and by extension other passions), that the rational part’s hopes (etc.) are *logos*-based beliefs, while the non-rational parts’ are image-based cognitions of the kind Aristotle would call *phantasiai*. This would suffice to show that there is some continuity between the *Philebus*’ account of passions and Aristotle’s, but in fact I think the similarity is stronger. Dialogues that do distinguish parts of the soul attribute the *Philebus*’ passions to the non-rational parts alone. Meanwhile, our *Philebus* passage rather casually identifies passions with *logoi* and pictures interchangeably, as if there were no significant psychological difference

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\(^{18}\) This is the strategy of Lorenz, *The Brute Within*; he supports his argument by pointing out the strong similarity between this *Philebus* passage and *Timaeus* 71a-d, a passage on appetitive passions which I discuss below.
between them. The implication, then, is that the non-rational part is the subject of both *logos* and image. And while it may sound strange to attribute awareness of *logoi* to something non-rational, we noted above that the passage characterizes beliefs (*doxai*) as the product of “memory and perception,” so that the beliefs in question do not transcend the level of the perceptible. It is thus arguable that this passage deals entirely with the kind of cognition that the *Republic* consigns to the lower parts of the soul. (For more discussion of this idea in the *Republic*, see below.) If this is right, then the tension between the *Philebus* view and Aristotle’s is merely verbal: what Plato here calls *doxai* Aristotle would characterize as exercises of *phantasia*.

Now we are ready to consider a final detail about the passions suggested by this *Philebus* passage. This one is not explicit in the text, but is crucial to the account, and strongly implied by the one example Plato offers of an illustrated *logos*:

> Someone often envisages himself in the possession of an enormous amount of gold and a lot of pleasures as a consequence. And in addition (*kai dè kai*) he also sees an inner picture of himself (*enezógraphēmenon auton*), beside himself with delight.

(40a10-12)

It is in the viewing of such a picture that the person feels the pleasure which is his hoping. This entails that the picture must, trivially, be of a kind such as to produce pleasure (or in the case of fears, anger, and other negative emotions, pain). What does a picture have to be like to meet this condition? Consider the first clause of the description on its own, the part that precedes the “And in addition.” One could in principle imagine

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19 There are of course also the mysterious “related *pathêmata*,” (39a2), and it is in principle possible that these represent some reasoning or calculation, a contribution from the rational part of the soul, but this is sheer speculation.
oneself having lots of money and the attendant “pleasures” – that is, objects that
generally provide pleasure (courtesans and fishcakes) – and yet be utterly unmoved by
the picture, perhaps because one is depressed or anhedonic, or simply because that is not
the sort of thing one likes. So a crucial function of the second clause, “and in addition he
sees an inner picture of himself, beside himself with delight,” is to show that the picture
not only represents a scenario, but represents it as pleasant, as enjoyable. The person not
only sees himself possessing gold, but also sees this as a pleasant thing, as something that
makes him extremely happy. Seeing such a picture of oneself is not a neutral
experience: it has affective and motivational consequences.

This makes the Philebus’ definition of hope look very similar to Aristotle’s: hope
is a response to something that “appears (phainetai) to confer great delights or benefits”
(Rhetoric 1370b7-8). It also gives us the equivalent of Aristotle’s (3): passions are
responses not simply to vivid appearances of states of affairs, but to appearances of those
states of affairs as having positive or negative value – evaluative appearances. Plato does
not make explicit the distinction between representing something that is in fact pleasant
(or otherwise good), and representing it as pleasant (or otherwise good); neither, for that
matter, does Aristotle. This passage of the Philebus, however, gives us grounds to credit
Plato with being aware of the distinction, and with holding that passions are responses to

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20 I am here glossing over an important question as to whether, on Plato’s view, the pictures
always represent events as pleasant or painful, or whether (the view I favor) the pleasures and
pains we take in them – our passions – may also be responses to representations of other kinds of
value. Unfortunately there is little in the text to help us here. I conjecture that this is an artifact
of the Philebus’ silence on the issue of the parts of the soul: given the psychic division we get in
the Republic, appetitive passions would be responses to pictures of things as being pleasant and
painful, thumotic passions to pictures of things as being fine (kalon) and shameful (aischron).
Rational desires, aversions, pains and pleasures, meanwhile, would be responses to things qua
beneficial and harmful – but in this case no pictures would be involved.
representations of the latter sort. It is reasonable to attribute the same idea to Aristotle: when he says that pity, for example, is taken in an “apparent evil” (Rhetoric 1385b13-14), he surely means not that we pity people for something that (a) is in fact evil, and also (b) appears to us in some way or another, but rather that we pity them for something that appears evil.

The mention of fear, anger and “all things of that sort” at 40e encourages us to extend the Philebus’ account of hope to the other passions, although Plato does not do that work here. Feeling fear will be a painful entertaining of an illustrated logos of something as bad and about to happen; feeling anger will be a painful entertaining of an illustrated logos of something as bad done to oneself by another, and so on. Passions in general, as on Aristotle’s view, turn out to be pleasant or painful cognitions of quasi-perceptual evaluative appearances.21

III. Pictures and passions in the Timaeus

21 A note on how this interpretation of this passage of the Philebus bears on its explicit task, the demonstration that pleasures and pains can be false: on the view I have presented, to feel a passionate pleasure in x is to hold that x is good (or in some more determinate way valuable), and thus such a pleasure will be false just in case x is not good, true just in case x is good. (For a related interpretation see Harte, “The Philebus on Pleasure: the Good, the Bad and the False”.) I admit that on the straightforward reading of the passage, hopes are false if they represent something as about to happen when in fact it will not happen. But there is much to be said against the straightforward reading. Most pressingly, does Socrates really think that virtuous people often hope that they will get a lot of gold, and that these hopes are true because the gods will in fact give them lots of gold? We can make the passage fit much better with his understanding of virtue elsewhere by inferring that the difference between the hopes of the virtuous and the hopes of the vicious parallels, e.g., the difference between courageous and cowardly fears in the Protagoras (352b-360d). There the courageous fear only what is genuinely bad, while the cowardly fear what appears bad but in fact is not; here, I have suggested, virtuous people hope for what is genuinely good, while vicious people hope for what appears good but in fact is not.
The *Timaeus*, even though it contains no general definitions of the passions, is promising ground for us, for here more explicitly than anywhere else Plato both designates a group of states as *pathêmata* (a close verbal cousin of Aristotle’s *pathê*) and characterizes them as essential attributes of the non-rational parts of the soul:

Having taken the immortal origin of the soul [*nous*, the rational part], they [the lesser gods] proceeded next to encase it within a round mortal body, and to give it the entire body as its vehicle. And within the body they built another kind of soul as well, the mortal kind, which contains within it those dreadful but necessary *pathêmata*: pleasure, first of all, evil’s most powerful lure; then pains, that make us run away from what is good; besides these, boldness also and fear, foolish counselors both; then also *thumos* hard to assuage, and hope easily led astray. These they fused with unreasoning sense perception and all-venturing *erôs*, and so, as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of soul.

(69c7-d6)\(^{22}\)

This passage tells us two notable facts about the states it calls *pathêmata*. First, they belong to the “mortal” soul – the appetitive and spirited parts. Second, they are somehow bound up (“fused”) with sense-perception and *erôs*, which also belong to these parts.\(^{23}\) This is not a very elaborate account. The mention of perception, however, might seem to point loosely in the direction of the model of passions we have seen in the *Rhetoric* and *Philebus*; I want now to show that a later passage in the *Timaeus* offers an account of one particular class of passions that very closely fits that model.

\[\text{[The gods knew that the appetitive part] was not going to understand *logos*, and even if it were in one way or another to have some perception (*aisthêsis*) of some *logoi*, it would not have an innate regard for any of them, but would be much more persuaded by images and phantoms (*eidôlôn kai phantasmatôn ... psuchagôgêsoto*) night and day. The god conspired with this very tendency by}\]

\(^{22}\) Translations from the *Timaeus* are based on those by Cornford and Zeyl.
\(^{23}\) The passage also makes a third point (on which compare 42a-b): the passions are products of embodiment.
constructing a liver, a structure which he situated in the dwelling place of [the appetitive] part of the soul. He made it into something dense, smooth, bright and sweet, though also having a bitter quality, so that the force of the thoughts sent down from the mind might be imprinted upon it as upon a mirror that receives the imprints (dechomenoi tupous) and returns images (eidōla). So whenever the force of the mind’s thoughts could avail itself of a congenial portion of the liver’s bitterness and threaten it with severe command, it could then frighten this part of the soul. And by infusing the bitterness all over the liver, it could project bilious colors onto it and shrink the whole liver...causing pains and bouts of nausea. And again, whenever thought’s gentle inspiration should paint quite opposite pictures (phantasmata), its force would bring respite from the bitterness by refusing to stir up or to make contact with a nature opposite to its own. It would instead use the liver’s own natural sweetness on it and restore the whole extent of it to be straight and smooth and free, and make that portion of the soul that inhabits the region around the liver gracious and agreeable, conducting itself with moderation during the night when, seeing that it has no share in reason and understanding, it practices divination by dreams.

(Timaeus 71a3-d4)

The passage is very condensed, but we can extract from it the following account.24 The appetitive part of our souls often experiences passions like hunger, lust, and fear. As creatures equipped with a higher, rational part, we have a special ability: we can approve or disapprove of these passions, accept them or try to counteract them, let our appetitive part have its way or try to stop it. This passage details a means by which the rational part can gain control over the appetitive: it can counter existing appetitive passions by inducing new ones. If appetite is craving some base pleasure, the rational part can frighten it with the threat of painful consequences; if appetite is shrinking in fear from some noble duty, the rational part can embolden it with talk of rewards.

There is, however, a difficulty about communication. The rational part, being rational, has rational cognitions – thoughts (dianoiai) – which it would naturally communicate as rational accounts (logoi). The appetitive part of the soul, however, is not

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24 The analysis of this passage that I present here is an extended version of the one I give in my “Appearances and Calculations.” My reading of this passage has much in common with that of Lorenz 2006 (and present volume?); it differs mainly in insisting on the evaluative nature of the images in question.
responsive to *logoi*: perhaps it has no awareness of them whatsoever; certainly it will not be persuaded by them (71a). So the good gods devised a solution: they designed our bodies in such a way that the rational part’s thoughts reflect off the shiny surface of the liver, yielding images. These images, unlike *logoi*, can directly influence the appetitive part. The responses they induce, the passage strongly implies, are passions: fright, aversion, and calm, and presumably others as well. Let us consider what the passage reveals about these passions.

First, part of fear is the painful contraction of the liver, part of calmness the sweet relaxing of it. This gives us a version of (1) above: perhaps passions are not here identified with pleasures and pains, as in the *Philebus*, but they do essentially involve them.25

Second, the passage clearly implies a version of Aristotle’s (2): these passions are responses to quasi-perceptual images. Note that the constitution of the liver – smooth and dense – is just like that of the eyes, as described at 45b-c: this encourages us to take it that the images at issue here are very similar to those that play a role in sight. Moreover, we are told that liver-images also play a crucial role in dreaming (71d-72b); earlier Timaeus has described dreaming as a kind of quasi-perception, involving the same inner processes as perception (45d-46a). Here the parallel with Aristotle is striking: *phantasia*, to whose exercise the *Rhetoric* attributes passions, is also the faculty operative in dreams (see *de Insomniis* 459a18-21 and throughout).

25 Here the pleasures and pains are physical, but I think this makes for only an apparent tension with the *Philebus’* definition of passions as mixed pleasures the soul experiences “without the body” (47d). There the point was that passions like fear and the rest are psychological, in that they are not caused by bodily events like fillings or depletions; here the point is to show that psychological states like fear have physical aspects.
Third, consider the content of these passion-inducing liver-images. As we have seen, they are reflections of thoughts that the rational part wants to communicate to the appetitive. These are thoughts about what to do or avoid; in particular, they are thoughts about what is beneficial to do or avoid (see 71a1-2). If these thoughts were expressed as *logoi*, the *logoi* would be exhortations, threats, warnings, or reassurances. If thoughts can be reflected as images, we should expect to see the same phenomenon here. While some images are evaluatively neutral, others can be threats or reassurances: they can present things as good or bad, to be done or to be avoided. It is this fact that lets images stand in for *logoi* in influencing the appetitive part of the soul: the rational part cannot explain to the appetitive part why it is best to pursue or refrain from some course of action, but by means of liver-images it can bring it about that the course of action simply *looks* good or bad, the way something can look good or bad in a picture. Thus we find here an alternative to the *Philebus*’ way of expressing the idea that, as in Aristotle’s (3), the quasi-perceptual appearances that prompt passions are evaluative in nature.

These similarities aside, there may seem to be a significant difficulty in assimilating this passage to the *Philebus* view of passions. That view, I argued, is a cognitivist one: passions are beliefs. Granted, they are beliefs of a special kind: vivid entertainings of illustrated *logoi*. But on the *Timaeus* account, one might object, appetitive passions must be much more primitive, responses to pictures only, for in this dialogue Plato denies that the appetitive part can understand *logoi* (71a, quoted above), and denies that it has any share in *doxa*, belief (77b, quoted below). This would seem to show that the *Timaeus*’ account of appetitive passions cannot be a cognitivist one.
Whatever powers Plato means to be denying the appetitive part when he denies it *doxa* and the ability to understand *logoi*, however, it cannot be the ability to have contentful impressions. 71a-d shows that its passions are responses to images of *logoi*: images that present things as being a certain way. Appetitive fear is or includes the acceptance of an image that presents something as imminent and bad. If we do not want to call this acceptance a belief we can find some wider and more neutral term; I have suggested ‘cognition’. (Why does Plato resist calling it belief? 71a strongly suggests that he has in mind the appetitive part’s inability to be persuaded directly by reasoning, but I cannot defend that interpretation here.)\(^{26}\) Aristotelian *phantasia* is a prime example of contentful cognition that falls short of *doxa*; so too, I would argue, is the image-reception of the appetitive part in the *Timaeus*. Therefore we can call the Aristotelian and Timaean accounts of passions cognitivist while respecting their denial that passions involve full-fledged rational judgments.

This is not to say that there are no important differences between the *Timaeus’* view of appetitive passions and the *Philebus’* account of hope, fear, anger and the rest. Perhaps Plato is loose enough with his use of *doxa* and *logos* that we need not posit any substantive difference between the accounts, but perhaps the *Timaeus’* appetitive passions are indeed more cognitively primitive than the *Philebus’* illustrated beliefs. I hope to have shown, however, that in either case the views are similar enough to count as two expressions or versions of an underlying view of the passions as cognitions of quasi-perceptual, evaluative appearances. I suggest that the best explanation of the differences

\(^{26}\) If I am right then Plato is again anticipating Aristotle, who grants animals contentful discernment or cognition (*krisis*) in the forms of perception and *phantasia*, but denies them *doxa* precisely on the grounds that *doxa* must be the result of persuasion through *logos* (*de Anima* 429a19-24)
is as follows: while Plato was committed to this broadly cognitivist view of passions throughout the dialogues, he experimented with different accounts of the cognitive capacities of the non-rational parts of the soul, or (and?) with different views of the cognitive demands of grasping *logoi* and forming *doxai*.

Thus far I have confined my discussion of the *Timaeus* to the account implied by a single passage’s discussion of a single species of passion, rationally-induced appetitive passions. Can we extend that account to cover all the passions belonging to the non-rational (“mortal”) parts? The *Timaeus* says nothing explicit on this question, but there is reason to think that we can.

Let us begin with ordinary appetitive desires, ones that arise not through the mediation of reason but instead in direct response to external objects: hunger at the sight or smell of tasty food, lust at the sight of a beautiful body, and so on. My argument about these has only two steps.

One: the *Timaeus’* account of rationally-induced appetitive passions implies that passions involve evaluative cognition, awareness of things as to-be-gone-for or to-be-avoided, good or bad. This is in keeping with the account of passions we found in the *Philebus*, and also with other instances of Plato’s cognitivism: the *Protagoras*, as we

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27 For an argument that Plato narrowed his use of *doxa* from the *Republic* to the *Timaeus*, without changing his view of the cognitive powers of the appetitive part of the soul, see Lorenz, *The Brute Within*.

28 The *Timaeus* gives no account of such passions, and one might conclude from this that there are none – that on the *Timaeus’* view, all appetitive passions must be mediated by reason – but this would surely be a mistake. First, we know that plants have some appetitive passions (appetites, pleasures and pains (77b)), even though they lack a rational part altogether; presumably the same applies to animals. Second, consider the newly embodied soul, i.e. (on most interpretations) the soul of a newborn: here *nous* is completely lacking (44a-b), but passions immediately present (42a). Third, consider the claim that when a person is experiencing intense pleasure (a paradigmatic appetitive passion), reasoning is paralyzed (86c). All these entail that one can have appetitive passions without any input from the rational part of the soul. (The second consideration also applies to spirited passions, although in this case too we get an explicit account only of rationally-induced passions (at 70a-c).)
have seen, defines fear as an expectation of some evil, the *Laws* as the expectation of pain. (The argument I gave above about Aristotle’s definition of pity applies to these definitions as well: they are most charitably interpreted as saying that we fear what we expect as painful or bad.) Given this view, even when the appetitive part feels a passion without the guidance of the rational part it must be having an evaluative cognition, e.g. a cognition to the effect that the food is tasty or the body beautiful.

Two: in a passage I have mentioned, the *Timaeus* claims that the appetitive part “has no share at all of belief (*doxa*) or reasoning (*logismos*) or understanding (*nous*), but instead of perception (*aisthésis*)” (77b5-6); thus the cognition involved in appetitive passion can only be perception or quasi-perception. In keeping with 71a-d, the appetitive part cannot believe or reason or understand that something is the case (e.g., that a course of action is bad), but can only perceive that it is so. (Indeed, 71a seems to tell us that the only way for appetite to be moved – the only way for it to experience a passion – is via some sort of image: it is “persuaded night and day by images and phantoms,” and by these alone. We might even speculate that in the case of ordinary appetitive passions, external perceptible objects (the food one hungers for, the water one thirsts for) themselves produce images on the liver.)

As to the passions of the spirited part, the text gives us insufficient resources to determine whether or not they fit our account. What we do have confirms that they involve evaluative cognition: in the one example Plato gives of a spirited passion, spirit gets angry at a report from the rational part that “some unjust act is being done” (70b3-4), which suggests that its anger involves the awareness of something as bad (wrong, unjust). The kind of cognition involved is, however, less clear. Plato strongly implies that both
parts of the mortal soul exercise perception (see 69c-d, quoted at the beginning of this section, and 61c-d, discussed below), but he never explicitly restricts spirit to perception in the way he does with appetite at 77b. This leaves open the possibility that spirited passions involve some higher form of cognition, perhaps doxa. This might seem to imply a departure from the Philebus, where passions the Timaeus (and Republic) would count as spirited get grouped with other passions as involving images. On the other hand, the Timaeus distinguishes sharply between rational thought (noësis meta logou) on the one hand, and “belief with perception” (doxa met’ aisthēseōs) on the other (28a1-3); because spirit is a mortal, non-intellectual part, we may surmise that even if it is capable of belief its beliefs are tightly bound up with perception, and may even be like the “illustrated beliefs” of the Philebus.

IV. Passions and the non-rational soul

The Philebus and the Timaeus give us strong evidence, then, that Plato held a proto-Aristotelian account of some desires and emotions; they also indicate, if inconclusively, that he means this account to extend to all the desires and emotions of the non-rational

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29 69c-d could be read as listing perception as an ingredient that will be housed in one or the other division of the mortal soul (with 77b-c settling the in favor of appetite), but Plato lists perception along with erōs as two elements that are “fused” (sugkerasameno) with all the rest, and this implies that these two features belong to both parts of the mortal soul.

30 This is arguably implied by the description of a spirited passion cited above: spirit gets angry when “a logos is announced” (tou logou paraggeilantos, 70b3-4), which may entail that spirit can directly grasp the logos without the mediation of images.

31 Timaeus never delineates the respective roles of belief and perception in “grasping” what becomes (although he does distinguish between the two, in saying that the appetitive part has perception but not belief (77b). Given Plato’s similar looseness in the Republic, where the lower half of the line is sometimes referred to as the visible realm, sometimes as the opinable, the object of doxa (compare e.g. 509d with 510a), it is a fair guess that his claim is something like the following: we access the realm of becoming through perception, which can give rise to beliefs, and beliefs have no other source, i.e. all beliefs are perceptual. Compare the implication that all beliefs are derived from perception at Philebus 38b.
parts of the soul. In this final section I want to show that this account of the passions is not a free-standing bit of psychologizing. Two features of the account reveal it to be not only compatible with, but a natural extension or elaboration of, Plato’s general characterization of the non-rational parts of the soul, both in the *Timaeus* and in the dialogue whose treatment of these parts is best known, the *Republic.*

First, we have seen that Plato is a cognitivist about emotions and desires. He thinks that to be afraid or lusty is to cognize something as being some way or another. (In particular, I have argued, he thinks that it is to cognize it as being good or bad.) If the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul are the sources of desires and emotions, and if desires and emotions are cognitions, it follows that cognition is not a privilege reserved for the rational part; instead, each part is a cognizer. This fits very well with the characterization of the parts of the soul in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus,* where they can communicate with one another, persuade and be persuaded by one another, and agree or disagree with one another on important subjects.

This last point is crucial, for it allows Plato to meet an important objection to the cognitivist view of passions: that one can fear something while believing it to be safe, or be angry about something while believing it fair. If we take the *Philebus/Timaeus* account in isolation it looks vulnerable to this objection, but when we place that account in the context of Plato’s tripartite psychology, the problem disappears. To be in one of

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32 For much fuller discussion of the *Republic’s* views of non-rational cognition, non-rational motivation, and the connections between them, see my “Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Division of the Soul.” In that paper I argue that the defining feature of the non-rational parts of the soul is their unreflective acceptance of appearances. This explains why these parts are the seat of sense-perception, both veridical and illusory. It also explains their passions, as follows: pleasure, honor and the like appear good, and so parts of the soul that cannot reason beyond appearances unreflectively accept that they are good, and desire them.
these conflicted states is to have one’s rational part believing one thing, and one’s appetitive or spirited part the opposite.

One might protest this extension of the Timaeus/Philebus account on the grounds that those dialogues give no indication of how one’s passionate image-cognition could diverge from one’s rational logos-cognition. In the Timaeus passage (71a-d), the images that influence the appetitive part are copies of reason’s thoughts. In the Philebus, meanwhile, the images are copies of the scribe’s logoi; this similarity to the Timaeus passage does seem to suggest that, despite my arguments above to the contrary, the logoi belong to the rational part of the soul and only the images to the non-rational. This would entail that non-rational passions are always modeled on rational beliefs.

If this is right, then Plato has a problem: because it is a crucial part of his view that passions can conflict with rational judgments, he cannot consistently hold that the non-rational parts’ passions are always reflections of the rational part’s judgments. Given that he has a cognitivist view of passions, he ought to think that passionate cognition can conflict with rational cognition, and thus that passionate cognition is to a significant degree independent of rational cognition.

Here I propose that we help Plato by turning to Aristotle. On the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory that I have relied on here, passions belong to the non-rational part of the soul and involve a form of cognition belonging to that part: phantasia. Phantasia is independent of rational cognition: a creature who lacks thought or reasoning (a non-human animal) can have fully-formed phantasai, and a creature who does have rational
cognition (a person) can have phantasias even when her rational part is inoperative. For this reason, in rational creatures phantasia can disagree with rational judgment – and not only about matters of fact (e.g. the size of the sun), but also about matters of value (e.g. the goodness of pleasure). Given this independence, passions can conflict with rational judgments – one can, for example, have an appetite for a pleasure one judges bad – without the cognitive character of passions being impugned.

I propose that we offer this part of Aristotle’s theory to Plato, either as an explicit version of what we should charitably judge to be implicit in Plato’s view or as an implication of his views that he should have recognized even if in fact he did not. Doing so will render Plato’s proto-Aristotelian, cognitivist view of the passions a good fit with his presentation of the lower parts of the soul as the sources of reason-independent cognition.

Now we can turn to the second feature of the Timaeus/Philebus account of passions that makes it a good fit with Plato’s general presentation of the non-rational parts of the soul: its construal of passionate cognition as image-based. In Republic 10, Plato strongly implies that the lower parts of the soul are image-responsive: they are not only affected but in fact strongly influenced or persuaded both by the visual images involved in optical illusions and visual art and by the poetic images involved in tragedies and the works of Homer. This is supported by the Timaeus’ characterization of the appetitive part as being “persuaded night and day by images and phantoms;” given the

33 “Animals do many things in accord with phantasias, some because they have no intellect (nous), i.e. beasts, some because intellect is sometimes covered over by passion (pathos) or diseases or sleep, i.e. people” (de Anima 429a5-8).
34 For the sun case, see de Insomnitis 460b16-20, for the pleasure case see Eudemian Ethics 1235b26-29. I discuss the parallels between these cases in my “Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion in Aristotle”.
35 I argue for this reading of Republic 10 in my “Appearances and Calculations.”
Timaeus’ metaphysics, on which all perceptible objects are mere images and phantoms, ontologically dependent copies of imperceptible Forms, it is also supported by the dialogue’s characterization of both non-rational parts as perceivers.36

Thus both dialogues characterizes the lower parts of the soul in a way consistent with the proto-Aristotelian account of their passions: these parts of the soul are generally aware of and responsive to mere images and appearances. But why would Plato hold this view? Because he is drawing a sharp contrast between reasoning about things and simply going with how things appear. The lower parts of the soul do not respond to explanations or arguments or accounts: they respond only to how things look, how things strike them. We saw in the Philebus that the logoi that provoke passions must be accompanied by images because passions involve vivid imagination rather than abstract reasoning; in attributing passions to the lower parts of the soul, Plato is characterizing these parts as imaginers rather than reasoners. They have no patience for, nor perhaps even understanding of, arguments, for they are too impulsive, too ready to judge by appearances, and too cognitively limited to search beyond them.37 The notion of evaluative appearances we developed above ensures that this epistemic fact has ethical

36 For the non-rational parts as perceivers see 69c-d, 77b, and the claim that the entire mortal part of the soul “cannot be adequately spoken about in separation from perceptual properties” (61c7-d2), which implies that these parts are essentially perceivers. For the characterization of perceptibles as mere images and phantoms, even more explicit in the Timaeus than in the Republic, see especially 28b-29b and 52c. The consequent similarity between ordinary perception and what we would more readily recognize as image-perception is emphasized by striking verbal parallels between the passage in which Timaeus describes perceptibles as copies of Forms imprinted on a Receptacle (48c-52d) and the passage on liver-images that we have seen above: an ordinary physical object is, like a liver-image, a perceptible copy of an intelligible original, imprinted on a receptive medium.

37 As Posidonius puts it, in what looks like an allusion to Timaeus 71a, “How could anyone activate the irrational by means of reason, unless he set before it a picture like a perceptual impression? Thus some people have their appetite roused by a description, and when someone vividly tells them to flee the approaching lion, they are frightened without having seen it.” (Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines 5.6.25-31 (Posidonious fragment 162), trans. Long and Sedley).
import: the lower parts of the soul go for what looks good or pleasant or honorable or to-be-pursued, rather than reasoning out what is best.

To return to the problem we began with in the introduction, this account of non-rational passions ensures that the rational part of the soul can experience desires and pleasures without any real threat to the identification of the non-rational parts of the soul as the seats of the passions. Rational desires, pleasures, erōs, and the like will be constituted by cognition that is not image-based but rational, cognition of the kind Aristotle would call full-fledged doxa, belief (or, in the best souls, by knowledge). The rational part goes for learning, for example, not because learning quasi-perceptually appears good, but because it reasons that it is so.

One final point: the Philebus/Timaeus account of passions is consistent with the general presentation of the non-rational parts of the soul in the Republic and Timaeus as image-responsive, but it also goes beyond it. When we say that the lower parts of the soul respond to how things look or appear, we have not yet said anything about the psychological mechanism of being-appeared-to. In introducing the painter’s pictures in the Philebus and the liver-images in the Timaeus, Plato is, I submit, working out a theory of the psychology of appearances. One can—and Plato often does—loosely speak of things appearing in various ways to people where this implies no special, quasi-perceptual psychological state: to say that x appears F to S may simply mean that S thinks or sees some reason to think that x is F. There is also, however, a narrower use on which to say that x appears F to S implies nothing about S’s rational beliefs, but rather about how things perceptually or quasi-perceptually strike S.38 When this latter kind of

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38 These two senses of ‘appearance’ correspond roughly to what are sometimes called the epistemic and non-epistemic senses of the word, with a crucial caveat: on the Republic’s view a
appearing is at issue, Plato implies in our *Timaeus* and *Philebus* passages, for x to appear F to S is for S to have an inner representation – an inner image, an inner appearance – of x as F. Thus we can say not simply that getting lots of gold appears delightful to the hopeful person, but that the hopeful person has an inner appearance (*phantasma*) of getting lots of gold as delightful.

Aristotle develops this kind of theory in detail in *de Anima* III.3. He isolates a strict sense of ‘appearance,’ the perceptual, non-belief-entailing sense. He illustrates it with an example straight from our *Philebus* passage: one sees something in the distance and is not sure whether or not it is a man, and so says “it appears to be a man”. In these cases, he says, what is at work is neither ordinary perception nor rational belief (*doxa*), but our faculty of *phantasia*. This faculty, moreover, works by way of inner images: it is “the faculty in virtue of which we say that some *phantasma* arises for us (428a1-2; cf. *De insomniis* 460b18), where a *phantasma* is an inner state of the agent, an affection of the sensory system (see especially *De insomniis* II). Here once again, then, we find Aristotle following Plato, and showing us more clearly what is there to be found in Plato once we know to look for it.39

**Works Cited**


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