

lich zu machen (S. 291ff). Erst eine «Balance von Nähe und Distanz zu den Charakteren ermöglicht es, daß die Rezipienten mit ihnen mitleiden können, ohne selber vom Leid erfaßt zu werden» (S. 307).

Mit der Würdigung des Mitleids als Mittels für die Kontingenzbewältigung, die G. anhand der Schlußszene der *Ilias* demonstriert, findet auch der zweite Hauptteil seiner Untersuchungen einen schönen Abschluß, und mit der gewonnenen Überzeugung, daß «die Griechen Kontingenz (überwanden), indem sie in der Rezeption der *Ilias* zu Erzählern wurden» (S. 310), leitet G. schlüssig zu einem kleinen Ausblick auf die Rezeption dieses faszinierenden Werks über (Kap. VII 2, S. 318–329), wobei als Ausgangspunkt zunächst nochmals der «geschichtliche Hintergrund» der *Ilias* beleuchtet wird (Kap. VII 1, S. 312ff), wovon hier schon die Rede war. Mit der aus der Perspektive des Verf. verheißenen Aussicht, «auf der hier verwendeten phänomenologischen und narratologischen Grundlage weitere nichthistoriographische Geschichtsbilder zu untersuchen» (S. 329), ist dann auch das Kapitel «Ausblick» würdig beschlossen.

G. hat sein Werk sorgfältig gearbeitet und aufgebaut. Das gilt auch für Register und Bibliographie. Seine Text-Interpretationen sind anschaulich. Die Erarbeitung des methodischen Instrumentariums wird penibel dokumentiert. Regelmäßig erfolgende Zusammenfassungen sollen den argumentativen Fortgang der Arbeit deutlich und nachvollziehbar machen. Das intensive Bemühen, Validität und Relevanz bestimmter geschichtstheoretischer Überlegungen und narratologischer Theorien am Beispiel der *Ilias* zu demonstrieren, führt aber auch zu Redundanzen. Auch stellt das Buch die imponierende Belesenheit seines Verf. bisweilen stärker heraus, als es zur argumentativen Entwicklung der leitenden Gedanken nötig wäre. Auf der anderen Seite bietet es auf oft knappem Raum eine stupende Fülle an Information zu unterschiedlichsten Forschungsaspekten, von diversen 'realhistorischen' Fragen wie der nach dem Bezug der Dichtung zur mykenischen Welt (S. 166ff) bis zur Frage der Anwendbarkeit von N. Luhmanns «Bestimmung der 'Kontingenzformel Gott'» auf die homerischen Götter (S. 287). So kann das Buch auch Benutzern und Benutzerinnen dienstbar sein, die ihre Lektüre auf einzelne Aspekte beschränken wollen und sich über die Register und das detaillierte Inhaltsverzeichnis ihren Weg suchen. Sein höherer Anspruch freilich richtet sich darauf, die Leserschaft in einen Zirkel einzubinden, in dem anhand einer *Ilias*-Interpretation die Reflexion auf das Phänomen der Geschichtlichkeit in ihrer eigenen Geschichtlichkeit und damit als Vollzug von Geschichtlichkeit erfaßt wird (vgl. dazu S. 323f).

Innsbruck

Reinhold Bichler

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**Jonathan Barnes:** *Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic.* Oxford: Oxford UP 2007. 551 S. 40 £.

This book covers a wide range of topics in ancient logic. It offers an in-depth examination of numerous passages from ancient texts, quoted always both in Greek or Latin and with accompanying English translation. The authors discussed include Aristotle, Chrysippus, Alexander and Galen, but also later commentators and ancient grammarians. The logical rigour and historical sensitivity

which J. Barnes (JB) displays in interpreting ancient texts and relating them to each other are impressive throughout. His concise, direct, and witty style makes even subtle logical points easy to grasp. You will not find many books that give such a vivid impression of the whole field of ancient logic, combining acuteness and comprehensive knowledge with an engaging presentation.

Based upon the 2004 John Locke Lectures given by JB in Oxford, the book retains the informal style of the Lectures. No knowledge of logic is presupposed. There is no scholarly apparatus of footnotes, and no bibliography. Nonetheless, there are plenty of implicit references to modern scholarly literature, and sometimes the reader may find it helpful if these were made explicit. The six lectures do not build upon each other; and as such, they can be read separately.

The first lecture, 'Truth', is about Chrysippus' thesis that every assertible is either true or false. Unlike the modern Principle of Bivalence, Chrysippus' thesis works with timed truth-values: assertibles are true or false at a certain time. JB determines the exact role that time plays in Chrysippus' thesis, and relates the thesis to ancient discussions about fatalism and causal determinism. We know from Cicero that Chrysippus made every effort to defend his thesis. Although there is no record of how he did so, JB proposes to tackle this question (1 and 64). He does so (80–3) by referring to a Stoic argument, reported by Simplicius, which establishes a principle of bivalence by means of a law of excluded middle and two principles of deflation.<sup>1</sup> However, any attempt to ascribe that argument to Chrysippus must remain speculative.

The second lecture, 'Predicates and Subjects', investigates Aristotle's conception of predication in the context of ancient commentators and grammarians. JB compares the grammatical distinction between names and verbs on one hand and the logical distinction between subjects and predicates on the other (93–113). He goes on to work out the implications of Aristotle's view that any term which can function as the predicate in a proposition can also function as the subject in another proposition, and vice versa (113–123). JB distinguishes the four styles of predication, A, E, I and O, that occur in Aristotle's assertoric syllogistic (139–42). He argues that singular predications such as 'Socrates is white' can be regarded as universal affirmative A-predications (154–67).

Aristotle's syllogistic is based upon Barbara, that is the transitivity of A-predication. Surprisingly, JB (144–54) argues that the transitivity of A-predication «was officially rejected by a large part of the ancient tradition» (144) including Aristotle himself. He justifies this claim by a passage from Aristotle's *Categories* (2a19–34) concerning items which are in a subject (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι): in some cases nothing prevents the name of such items from being predicated of a subject although it is impossible for their definition (λόγος) to be predicated of it. For example, while the item white is in a subject, namely a body, and the name of white is predicated of this subject, the definition of white is not predicated of that subject. JB regards this as «the false thesis of the *Categories* according to which A-predication is not in general transitive» (154). Now, one may or may not agree

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<sup>1</sup> These two principles are: it is true (or false) at a given time that so-and-so if and only if it holds (or does not hold) at that time that so-and-so (72). Their nature and status is not entirely clear. On the one hand, JB says that «they were accepted by Plato, by Aristotle, by Epicurus, by the Stoics; and no doubt by everyone else» (72); on the other hand he says about the principle of deflation for falseness: «it's a racing cert that the Epicureans rejected – or would have rejected – [it]» (91).

with JB's view that what Aristotle says in the passage from the *Categories* is «infelicitous» and «cannot possibly be true» (147–9). But in any event, there is, I think, no reason to share JB's assumption that that passage makes a statement about A-predication. Aristotle holds that if an item is in a primary substance (e.g., Socrates), then it is also in its species and genera (e.g., man and animal)<sup>1</sup> – an inference which is not valid for A-predication. Thus, the predicative relation of being in a subject is rather different from A-predication. All ancient texts adduced by JB in his discussion of the transitivity of A-predication are concerned with the two predicative relations of the *Categories*: being in a subject and being predicated of a subject. All of them agree that the latter relation is transitive while transitivity may fail when other kinds of predications are involved. But none of them explicitly denies the transitivity of A-predication. Although JB acknowledges this fact (154), he offers no reason to believe that A-predication is at issue in those ancient texts.

The third lecture, 'What is a Connector', differs from the others in that it is primarily concerned with ancient grammarians, especially with Apollonius Dyscolus. JB approaches the grammarians from a philosophical and logical point of view, seeking answers to questions such as: what kind of items do connectors connect? How exactly do connectors differ from adverbs and pronouns? Do they have meaning or sense? How many connectors are there in multiple connections of the form '... and ... and ... and ...'? What is a syllogistic connector? In many cases the conclusion of JB's thorough examination is negative, as the ancient grammarians do not provide a coherent and satisfactory answer to the questions he poses to them (196–9, 215–6, 240–2, 255–9). The impatient reader interested in positive accounts of ancient logic might wish to skip this lecture.

The fourth lecture, 'Forms of Argument', is about the notion of logical form. Though raising issues not discussed by ancient logicians (276, 296, 359), JB offers a compelling attempt to discover the implicit presuppositions about logical form in ancient texts. He compares different ancient strategies of specifying the logical form of syllogisms (286–321), and provides a microscopic analysis of the use in ancient logical texts of schematic letters and numerals that function as what might be called placeholders (322–359). One of JB's theses is that one and the same concrete syllogism (that is, one and the same concrete argument) may possess more than one syllogistic form (264–274). For instance, one and the same concrete syllogism may possess the syllogistic form of both Aristotle's *Barbara* and the first unproved of *Chrysippus*.

JB admits that most ancient texts seem to provide clear evidence against this thesis (272). The only ancient evidence adduced by JB in support of his thesis are three passages from Galen such as the following: ἔστι δὲ καὶ χωρὶς ἐλέγχου τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐξ εὐθείας ποιεῖσθαι διττῶς συλλογιζομένοις, ὑποθετικῶς τε καὶ κατηγορικῶς (*De semine* IV, 609). JB comments: «one thing is plain: Galen supposes himself to be offering a single probative argument – an argument which is now done in predicative guise and now in hypothetical» (271). If this was correct, then Aristotle's remark ἔστι δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου καὶ τῷ ἐκθέσθαι ποιεῖν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν (*APr.* 28a22–3) would have to be taken to imply that one and the same argument, that is, one and the same συλλογισμός, can possess the form of both an indirect deduction and a direct ecthetic deduction. One may doubt whether Aristotle accepted such a notion of a συλλογισμός, and whether the singular phrase τὴν

<sup>1</sup> *Cat.* 3a4–6; cf. for instance, J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 84; M. Frede, *Individuen bei Aristoteles, Antike und Abendland* 24, 1978, 16–39, pp. 21 and 28; F. A. Lewis, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991, pp. 64 and 76.

ἀπόδειξιν should be pressed so as to serve as the basis of JB's far-reaching interpretation. Rather, Galen and Aristotle may be saying that two different arguments can function as a proof of the item in question.

The fifth lecture, 'The Science of Logic', deals with the question of how syllogisms are justified. In the case of Aristotle's syllogistic, imperfect syllogisms are justified by perfect syllogisms and certain deduction rules (362–369). JB examines the status of perfect syllogisms (369–386). He follows Alexander's account according to which Aristotle's perfect syllogisms are meant to be justified by what is known as the *dictum de omni et de nullo* (386–419). After having discussed several problems of this view, JB concludes that, *pace* Aristotle, no syllogism and no conversion rule is perfect, not even Barbara (417–419). While this might not appear to be a satisfying interpretation of Aristotle's notion of a perfect syllogism, any future research on the complicated issue of perfection will have to take into account JB's arguments. The rest of the fifth lecture discusses what has been called Galen's metatheorem, stating that syllogisms are valid in virtue of certain axioms corresponding to them (419–447).

Aristotle's *dictum de omni* reads: λέγομεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ λαβεῖν [τοῦ ὑποκειμένου] καθ' οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεγθήσεται (*APr.* 24b28–30). According to what JB calls the orthodox interpretation (409), this means that a term A is A-predicated of a term B if and only if every individual x which falls under B falls under A. According to what he calls the heterodox interpretation (406–412), it means that A is A-predicated of B if and only if A is A-predicated of every X of which B is A-predicated, with X being of the same type as A and B. JB argues that the heterodox interpretation must be rejected for two reasons (412). The first is that it is more natural to read the Greek in Aristotle's *dictum* in the orthodox way, taking μηδὲν to mean 'no individual'. I am not sure whether this argument will convince those commentators who argue that μηδὲν does not refer to individuals but to items of the same type as A and B.<sup>1</sup> Although the orthodox interpretation may seem more natural to commentators trained in Fregean logic, the Greek in Aristotle's *dictum*, I think, is rather neutral on that point. The second reason is that the heterodox interpretation is circular, as A-predication is defined or explained in terms of A-predication. However, even if it is circular, it may well be informative: according to modern standard logic, the heterodox *dictum* amounts to the statement that A-predication is reflexive and transitive. Now, the heterodox *dictum de nullo* states that A is E-predicated of B if and only if A is A-predicated of no X of which B is A-predicated. Given the reflexivity and transitivity of A-predication, the heterodox interpretation yields a logically adequate model for Aristotle's assertoric syllogistic based on a primitive relation of A-predication (I-predication is interpreted as the contradictory of E-predication, and O-predication as the contradictory of A-predication; there is no additional presupposition of existential import).

This heterodox interpretation may be helpful for understanding a notoriously difficult passage in *APr.* B 22, namely, 68a16–21. As JB points out (494), this passage assumes that a term A is A-predicated of itself, and of two terms B and C, and of no other term, while B is A-predicated of itself and of C but not of A. Thus, B is A-predicated of every term of which A is A-predicated except of A itself. JB comments: «that is worse than odd – it is incoherent» (494). It is true that it is incoherent within the orthodox interpretation (given that B is not empty, and that every set of individuals is denoted by at least one

<sup>1</sup> For instance, H. Maier, *Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles II*, Tübingen: Laupp, 1900, volume II.1, p. 13 note 1, and volume II.2, pp. 150–1; M. Mignucci, *Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, *Studies in the History of Logic*, ed. by I. Angelelli and M. Cerezo, Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1996, 1–20.

term).<sup>1</sup> However, it is not inconsistent within the heterodox interpretation in which terms are not taken to denote sets of individuals and A-predication is a primitive transitive and reflexive relation. Moreover, the passage from *APr.* B 22 violates the principle that if B is O-predicated of A (that is, if B is not A-predicated of A), then there is an X such that A is A-predicated of X and B is E-predicated of X. JB, following Łukasiewicz and Patzig, claims that this principle is valid (404–5). Again, the principle is valid within the orthodox interpretation (given that the quantification ‘there is an X’ ranges over sets of individuals or that, if it is taken to range over terms, every set of individuals is denoted by at least one term). However, it is not valid within the heterodox interpretation. As far as I can see there is no evidence of Aristotle accepting that principle; in fact, he rejects it in the passage from B 22.

How is the perfect syllogism Darii justified? Alexander’s answer invokes the *dictum de omni*: εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, τὶ τοῦ Γ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐστὶ τῷ Β· κατὰ παντός δὲ τοῦ Β τὸ Α· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶ τοῦ Β, καθ’ οὗ οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ Α· τὶ δὲ τοῦ Β ἐστὶ τὸ Γ· κατὰ τούτου ἄρα τὸ Α ῥηθήσεται (*in APr.* 60,22–25). JB’s interpretation of this argument is (404–406): the minor premiss of Darii implies that there is a Δ of which both B and Γ are A-predicated. Since A is A-predicated of B and B of Δ, it follows by Barbara that A is A-predicated of Δ. Thus, both A and Γ are A-predicated of Δ, which implies that A is I-predicated of Γ. JB holds that there is an «uncontestable reason for rejecting Alexander’s answer: it does not appeal to the *dictum* at all. To be sure, in the text we are considering Alexander quite expressly appeals to the *dictum* [...]; but in fact – and whatever he may have intended – the line of reasoning which his remarks suggest by-passes the *dictum* entirely» (406). It is true that JB’s interpretation of Alexander’s answer bypasses the *dictum*. Now, the phrase τὶ δὲ τοῦ Β ἐστὶ τὸ Γ poses a problem for any interpretation of Alexander’s argument; for this phrase seems to imply that Γ is something of B while one would expect that Δ – not Γ – is something of B. But at any rate, there is no indication of Alexander using Barbara to infer that A is said (ῥηθήσεται) of Δ. Rather, he seems to infer this conclusion from the fact that Δ is something of B and the *dictum* according to which there is nothing of B of which A is not said (ῥηθήσεται). If so, then Alexander’s appeal to the *dictum* is not superfluous, and JB’s reason for rejecting Alexander’s answer is inadequate.

The sixth lecture discusses Alexander’s utilitarian view of logic, which restricts the scope of logic to those syllogisms which are or might be useful for scientific proofs. JB argues that Aristotle’s modal syllogisms, discussed in *APr.* A 8–22, do not meet the utilitarian requirement (485–7). The reason is that, on the one hand, Aristotle’s modal syllogisms consist of modal propositions such as ‘A belongs necessarily to all B’ or ‘A belongs possibly to all B’. Scientific theorems, on the other hand, are non-modal propositions which do not contain any modal expressions. Rather, they have a certain modal status: while the theorems of many sciences such as geometry are true of necessity, the theorems of some sciences such as biology are only true for the most part. JB goes on to argue that repetitive arguments whose conclusion is identical with one of their premisses also do not meet the utilitarian requirement (487–91). In discussing the notion of repetitiveness, he attributes to Aristotle the view that every syllogism must have three

<sup>1</sup> If B is not A-predicated of A, then, according to the orthodox interpretation, there is an individual x that is a member of the set denoted by A but not of the set denoted by B. Since the set denoted by B is not empty and A is A-predicated of B, the singleton set whose only member is x is a proper subset of the set denoted by A. Thus, the term D which denotes that singleton set is different from the term A; but A is A-predicated of D while B is not A-predicated of D. This contradicts the condition that B be A-predicated of every term of which A is A-predicated except of A itself.

distinct terms (495). However, JB does not comment upon *APr.* B 15, where Aristotle accepts syllogisms with only two distinct terms, the major term being identical with the minor term (63b41–64a4, 64a23–30).

In *APost.* 77a22–25, Aristotle says that indirect proofs presuppose some version of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). JB takes this remark to mean that any indirect proof of a desired conclusion P consists of the following three steps (510): first, a contradiction is inferred from the original premisses and the hypothesis not-P. Second, the desired conclusion P is inferred. The third step contains the application of the LEM: P is inferred from P and the LEM stating that either P or not-P (which is supposed to be a repetitive inference from an exclusive disjunction and one of its disjuncts to the opposite of the other disjunct). According to JB, this is the structure of Aristotle's indirect proof of Baroco in *APr.* 27a36–b1. As JB points out (514), the third step is entirely redundant. However, one may doubt whether Aristotle intended such a superfluous application of the LEM. Rather, he may be saying that the second step presupposes some version of the LEM (cf. *APr.* 62a13–15). If so, then there is no reason to assume JB's redundant third step.

JB holds that modal syllogisms are of no use in scientific proofs (485–7). Moreover, he holds (467–8, 487) that Aristotle denied this thesis in *APr.* A 13 in a passage which distinguishes two senses of being possible: what happens for the most part and the indeterminate for which it is no more natural to happen in one way than in the opposite. According to Aristotle, there are no scientific proofs of the indeterminate whereas there are scientific proofs of what happens for the most part: ἐπιστήμη δὲ καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν μὲν ἀορίστων οὐκ ἔστι [...], τῶν δὲ πεφικτότων ἔστι (32b18–20). Does Aristotle mean scientific proofs consisting of non-modal propositions which are true for the most part, or of modal propositions such as 'A belongs possibly to all B' which are true inasmuch as the corresponding non-modal proposition is true for the most part? JB (467–8) prefers the second option, without justifying his decision and without mentioning the first option. It is true that, in general, Aristotle's modal syllogistic is concerned with modal propositions rather than the modal status of non-modal propositions. Nonetheless, there seem to me to be two reasons for preferring the first option.<sup>1</sup> First, while the passage 32b18–20 does not play any role in Aristotle's presentation of the modal syllogistic in *APr.* A 8–22, it has a parallel passage in *APost.* 87b19–27; and in *APost.*, as JB points out,<sup>2</sup> Aristotle is concerned with the modal status of non-modal propositions rather than with modal propositions. Second, the premisses and conclusions of scientific proofs must possess a certain modal status: they must either be true of necessity or true for the most part (485–486). Now, there is a clear-cut difference in modal status between the non-modal propositions 'men turn grey' and 'diggers find treasures': the first expresses something that happens for the most part, the second something that happens by chance. Thus, there is an obvious reason why only propositions of the first kind can occur in scientific proofs. On the other hand, it is less clear whether there is a difference in modal status between the modal propositions 'it is possible for men to turn grey' and 'it is possible for diggers to find a treasure'; perhaps both propositions are true of necessity. Thus, there is no obvious reason why only propositions of the first kind can occur in scientific proofs. As JB points out, there is scarcely any evidence of Aristotle intending modal syllogisms to be used in scientific proofs (468); and one may doubt whether the single passage adduced by JB, *APr.* 32b18–20, constitutes such evidence.

JB's concise style sometimes tends to be dogmatic. For instance, Alexander argues that Aristotle's justification of the conversion of E-propositions relies on the *dictum de omni et de nullo*. Patzig calls this one of the finest parts of Alexan-

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed defense of the first and rejection of the second option, cf. G. Anagnostopoulos, *Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, pp. 268–278.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle: *Posterior Analytics*, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. xxii.

der's commentary on the *Prior Analytics*,<sup>1</sup> and it is not unreasonable to believe that there is much to be said for Alexander's proposal. JB, on the other hand, claims: «In fact, Alexander's interpretation is quixotic: there is no sniff of the *dictum* in the pertinent text of the *Analytics* – and there is more than a sniff of something quite other.» (418). Unfortunately, JB does not offer any justification or further explanation of this claim. Elsewhere, JB discusses the view that in Euclid's *Elements* geometrical objects come into existence by construction. JB rejects this view as absurd without further explanation (352), although it is carefully argued by I. Mueller.<sup>2</sup>

Naturally enough, not every reader will agree with everything JB says in *Truth, etc.* Nevertheless, JB deserves to be congratulated and thanked for this profound and stimulating book.

Berlin

Marko Malink

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*Anubio, Carmen astrologicum elegiacum.* Recensuit Dirk Obbink. München/Leipzig: Saur 2006. X, 79 S., 4 Taf. (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana).

Das Bändchen vereinigt die bisher nur an verschiedenen Stellen greifbaren Fragmente des astrologischen Lehrdichters Anubion, den der Editor (O.: p. IV, ausführliche Begründung 1999, 60–62) nach dem alten Ansatz von E. Riess (1894) wieder vorsichtig in die Zeit Neros datiert, während D. Pingree (1976 und 1978) das zweite oder dritte Jahrhundert, die Zeit der ältesten Papyri, angenommen hatte. Die kurze Praefatio<sup>3</sup> verweist auf die Kommentierung der von O. selbst herausgegebenen Pap. Ox. 4503–4507 (1999), aus der die Edition erwachsen ist. Es folgen eine Bibliographie, ein 'Conspectus voluminum et codicum', neun 'Testimonia' (darunter das besonders lange T8 mit 541 Zeilen<sup>4</sup>), 'Anubionis carminis astrologici fragmenta' (F1–6: aus Buch 3, vielleicht auch Buch 4), 'Fragmenta loci incerti' (F7–14)<sup>5</sup>, 'Fragmenta incerta' (d.h. unsicher in der Zuschreibung: F15–22), 'Spuria', 'Subsidia interpretationis', ein 'Index verborum Anubionis' sowie vier Tafeln mit Abbildungen von Papyri.

Die Papyrus-Editionen werden wie in den Oxyrhynchus Papyri synoptisch als diplomatischer (links) und als lesbarer Text (rechts) gegeben. Doch auch die Lesetexte enthalten notgedrungen viel Hypothetisches, wobei mit einem «possis»

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism, transl. J. Barnes, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1968, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclid's Elements, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981, pp. 14–15 and 27–29.

<sup>3</sup> O. übernimmt (p. III,–4 und T3,16) von P. Monat die in der frankophonen Forschung vorherrschende Konjektur des Salmasius Firm. math. 3,1,2 *Moirogenesis* anstelle von *Myriogenesis*, die Überlieferung verteidigt ausführlich St. Heilen, *Hadriani genitura*. Die astrologischen Fragmente des Antigonos von Nikaia. Edition, Übersetzung und Kommentar (demnächst).

<sup>4</sup> Der Text nach D. Pingree, dessen Paragraphenzählung durch eine Zeilenzählung ersetzt wird; neue Absätze machen den Text übersichtlicher.

<sup>5</sup> Eleganter hätte es wohl gelautet 'sedis incertae'. Der lateinische Stil ist im ganzen passabel, doch p. 67,12 das Subsidium zu «F8» (gemeint ist wohl Rhetorius in F7): «De arte et vita astrologi eius tractatus, cf. [...]» – intellegat qui potuerit.