1. *Topics*’ categories vs. *Categories*’ categories

In the first sentence of *Topics* I.9, Aristotle proposes to determine the γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν. These are the ten categories he is going to discuss in this chapter. He seems to think of them as genera classifying items which are referred to as κατηγορίαι. What are these items? Commentators tend to agree that they are either predications or predicates.¹ In the first case, the categories would classify items such as ‘Socrates is white’ or ‘man is animal’. In the second case, they would classify terms such as ‘white’ or ‘animal’ which are able to serve as predicates of predications. The two options need not be incompatible with each other, for the categories might provide a classification both of predicates and of predications. At any rate, we should like to determine the criteria by which the categories manage to classify either predicates or predications or both.

In the second sentence of *Topics* I.9, Aristotle lists ten categories: essence (τί ἐστι), quantity, quality, relation and so on. There is only one other complete enumeration of ten categories in the Aristotelian corpus, which is found in chapter four of the *Categories*: substance (οὐσία), quantity, quality and so on. Unlike *Topics* I.9, chapters four and five of the *Categories* provide a clear answer to the question of which of the items under consideration belong to the first category and which not. The first category, the category of substance, includes exactly all substantial individuals such as Socrates and their species and genera such as man and animal; all other items belong to one of the non-substance categories.² This rule of the *Categories* has had an important influence

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¹ For instance, Frede (1981), 5–9, prefers the first option, while Ebert (1985), 114–123, prefers the latter.
² Cf. especially *Cat*. 5 2029–306.
on the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of categories in general, found in several writings of the Aristotelian corpus. It may therefore be appropriate to compare the account of categories in *Topics* I.9 with that of the *Categories*. For convenience, let us refer to the categories of the *Topics* as T-categories, and to those of the *Categories* as C-categories.

There is a remarkable difference between the two lists of categories. While the labels of the remaining nine categories are the same, the first T-category is referred to as essence (τί ἐστι), whereas the first C-category is referred to as substance (οὐσία). Since Alexander, many commentators have neglected this difference as a merely terminological one. They have taken τί ἐστι to be a synonym for οὐσία, thus identifying the first T-category with the C-category of substance.\(^3\) However, this view leads to difficulties in interpreting Aristotle's discussion of τί ἐστι in the remainder of *Topics* I.9. The first difficulty occurs in the following statement:

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\text{ὁ τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνων ὅτε μὲν οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ὅτε δὲ ποσόν, ὅτε δὲ ποιόν, ὅτε δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ κατηγοριὰν.}
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(*Top.* I.9 103b27–29)

The grammatical subject of the verb σημαίνει is the article ὁ unaccompanied by a noun. Traditionally, this article is taken to refer to a person.\(^4\) In the preceding sentence, the grammatical subject of the same verb σημαίνει does not refer to a person but to propositions (προτάσεις).\(^5\) A few lines below, the grammatical subject of σημαίνει refers either to predications or to terms that are able to serve as predicates of predications.\(^6\) In order to avoid this variation in the use of σημαίνει, some translators render the article ὁ as 'the expression,' understanding λόγος as the missing noun.\(^7\) However, λόγος or another suitable noun does not play any prominent role in *Topics* I.9 and hence is unlikely to be intended by the article. We shall therefore prefer to stick to the traditional interpretation (although all of my main points will be compatible with the non-traditional interpretation).

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\(^3\) For instance, Alexander in *Top.* 65.14–19 and 66.26; Waitz (1846), 47; Arpe (1938), 11–14; Bocheński (1956), 63; Ackrill (1963), 79; Kapp (1968), 225; Mansion (1968), 198f.; Kahn (1978), 237; Oehler (1986), 245f.; Irwin (1988), 502; Smith (1997), 75.


\(^5\) 103b25–27.


\(^7\) Smith (1997), 8 and 180; Wagner & Rapp (2004), 55.
When somebody, then, signifies essence (ὅ τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνον), she may be signifying (σημαίνει) substance, quantity, quality or one of the other categories. In the second part of this statement, the verb σημαίνει is combined with a list of categories whose first three members are substance, quantity, quality. This list may plausibly be understood as a list of C-categories.\(^8\) If this is correct, then τί ἐστι cannot refer to the C-category of substance in this passage (given that an instance of signifying the C-category of substance cannot at the same time be an instance of signifying any other C-category). The same is true of the remaining five occurrences of τί ἐστι in Topics I.9.\(^9\) Thus, the traditional interpretation holds that the phrase τί ἐστι is used in two different senses in Topics I.9: at the beginning (103\(b\)22 and 103\(b\)26) it is used in the sense of substance, in the remainder it is used in a different sense.

On the other hand, several commentators prefer to avoid this unpalatable equivocation by assuming that τί ἐστι is not used in the sense of substance at the beginning of Topics I.9.\(^10\) Let me pursue this idea that the first T-category, the T-category of τί ἐστι, and the C-category of substance are two different things. They are different inasmuch as an instance of signifying the first T-category may be an instance of signifying any C-category whatsoever, and may thereby fail to be an instance of signifying the first C-category. This suggests that even if T- and C-categories are viewed as classifying items of the same kind, the first T-category and the first C-category are not coextensional: if both lists of categories are viewed as classifying predicates (or predications), some predicates (or predications) belonging to the T-category of essence do not belong to the C-category of substance but to another C-category. If so, then also some predicates (or predications) belonging to some of the nine non-substance C-categories do not belong to any of the nine non-essence T-categories (given that T-categories are mutually exclusive).

This, then, is the picture suggested by Aristotle’s statement in 103\(b\)27–29 – the statement that an instance of signifying the T-category of essence may be an instance of signifying any C-category. The statement is followed by two clauses, both of which start with the conjunction γάρ.\(^11\) I wish to argue that these two clauses together provide a justification and explanation of the statement. The

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8 Malcolm (1981), 665; Ebert (1985), 132. As a consequence, we must accept that κατηγοριών refers to T-categories in 103\(b\)25, and to C-categories in 103\(b\)29.
9 103\(b\)30, 32, 34, 37, 38.
11 103\(b\)29–35 and 103\(b\)35–39.
first γάρ clause alone cannot achieve this. The reason is that it does not contain the phrase τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν, which is an important part of the statement. Instead, it contains the phrase τί ἐστι λέγειν, which uses another verb, and omits the definite article τό. Syntactically, the definite article turns the question τί ἐστι into a noun. Thus, the first phrase can be translated as 'signifying the what-it-is', that is, 'signifying essence'. In the second phrase, on the other hand, τί ἐστι is not part of a noun, but functions as an indirect question: 'saying what (it, that is, the subject of the predication under consideration) is'.

The first γάρ clause consists of three examples each one of which displays the same pattern:

οταν μὲν γάρ ἐκκειμένον ἄνθρωπον φη τὸ ἐκκειμένον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἢ ζων, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ οὕσιν σημαίνει ὀταν δὲ χρώματος λευκοῦ ἐκκειμένου φη τὸ ἐκκειμένον λευκὸν εἶναι ἢ χρώμα, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ ποιὸν σημαίνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἔαν πιθανόν μεγέθους ἐκκειμένου φη τὸ ἐκκειμένον πιθανὸν εἶναι μέγεθος, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ ποσὸν σημαίνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

(Top. I.9 103b29–35)

The grammatical subject of this clause is still the article referring, presumably, to a person: somebody stating (φη) of man that it is man or animal says (λέγει) what it is and signifies (σημαίνει) substance. Somebody stating of white colour that it is white or colour says what it is and signifies quality. And somebody stating of foot-long length that it is foot-long length says what it is and signifies quantity.

What kind of predication does Aristotle have in mind here? Does he mean predications such as ‘man is animal’, where ‘man’ is a general term standing for a species of animal? Or does he mean predications such as ‘this man is animal’, where ‘this man’ is a singular term standing for an individual man such as Socrates? The phrase τὸ ἐκκειμένον might seem to suggest that Aristotle has in mind singular terms or individuals rather than general terms or universals. However, it is not straightforward to determine the force of that phrase in the three examples. The phrase does indicate that something is set out as an example, but it is less clear whether the thing set out is a singular term/individual or a general term/universal. In any event, Aristotle tends not to make a clear distinction between singular and general terms. Thus, it is difficult to decide whether Aristotle has in mind singular terms or general terms in the

12 The verb ἐκκεῖσθαι can be applied to general terms (ὅροι) such as 'health' and 'illness' (APr. I.34 48b8).
three examples. Similarly, Aristotle does not tend to make a clear distinction between terms, being linguistic items, and the objects for which they stand, being non-linguistic items.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, it is also difficult to decide whether Aristotle has in mind (singular or general) terms or non-linguistic objects (individuals or universals).

We do not need to settle these questions here. Rather, one may argue that the T-categories are meant to apply to a wide range of predications including both predications whose subject is a singular term (or individual) and predications whose subject is a general term (or universal). At the beginning of Topics I.9, Aristotle established a close relationship between T-categories and what is known as the four predicables: genus (including differentia), definition, proprium and accident. He claimed that every proposition expressing one of the predicables signifies one of the T-categories.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, Aristotle established in Topics I.8 that every proposition expresses one of the predicables. It follows that every proposition, and hence every predication, signifies one of the T-categories, whether the subject is a general term (or universal) or a singular term (or individual).

Let us now return to the question of how the three examples contribute to justifying the statement that an instance of signifying the T-category of essence may be an instance of signifying any C-category. The first example is introduced as an instance of signifying substance, the second as an instance of signifying quality, and the third as an instance of signifying quantity. Thus, each of the examples may be taken to be an instance of signifying the C-categories of substance, quality and quantity respectively; and analogous examples may be given for the remaining seven C-categories.

However, none of the three examples is introduced as an instance of signifying the T-category of essence (τὸ τί ἐστὶ σημαίνειν). Instead, they are introduced as an instance of saying what it is (τί ἐστὶ λέγειν). The phrase ‘saying what it is’ should not be presupposed to involve a direct statement concerning the T-category of essence. The literal meaning of the phrase is that the predicate of the predication under consideration is predicated essentially of the subject. To be more precise, by predication I mean true predications in the sense of the predicables: a predicate is predicated of a subject if and only if it is a

\textsuperscript{13} In general, Aristotle does not draw a sharp distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic kinds of predications, predicates or subjects; Frede (1981), 9; Malcolm (1981), 667; Ebert (1985), 118f.; Barnes (2007), 115–121.

\textsuperscript{14} 103\textsuperscript{b}23–27.
genus, differentia, definition, proprium or accident of the subject. According to the theory of predicables, a predicate is predicated essentially of a subject if and only if it is a genus, differentia or definition of the subject.15 With this in mind, the phrase ‘saying what it is’ states that the predicate is a genus, differentia or definition of the subject. Hence this phrase concerns the predicables rather than the T-categories. To be sure, the fact that a predicate is predicated essentially of a subject should be relevant, in a certain way, to the question of whether the subject, the predicate or the whole predication is an instance of signifying the T-category of essence. However, Aristotle has not yet specified exactly how the T-category of essence is related to the predicables. I intend to show that he achieves this in the second γάρ clause, to which we now turn.

2. Topics’ categories vs. predicables

The second γάρ clause consists of two parts. In this section we shall be concerned with the first part, leaving the second part to Section 4. The first part is:

εκαστὸν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν τε αὐτὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγηται ἐὰν τε τὸ γένος περὶ τούτου, τί ἐστι σημαίνει;

(Top. I.9 103b35–37)

Firstly, let us consider the phrase εκαστὸν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων. What does it refer to? Several commentators take it to refer to terms such as ‘animal’, ‘color’ or ‘foot-long length’ mentioned in the three preceding examples.16 Others render the phrase as ‘any of these predications’ or ‘any of these categories’.17 In this case, however, it would seem more natural for Aristotle to use the feminine pronoun εκάστη, referring to κατηγορία, instead of the neuter pronoun εκαστὸν. Hence the first interpretation seems to me to be preferable.18

Secondly, consider the phrase τί ἐστι σημαίνει at the end of the passage. It is similar to the phrase τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνον (103b27f) in the statement for which the two γάρ clauses provide an explanation. The only difference is that it

15 Top. I.8 103b6–19.
16 For instance, Rolfoes (1948), 12; Forster (1960), 295; Mansion (1968), 198; Dancy (1975a), 124; Ebert (1985), 127 and 132f.
17 For instance, Brunschwig (1967), 13; Smith (1997), 8 and 74; Wagner and Rapp (2004), 56.
18 For further arguments against rendering εκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων as ‘any of these predications’, cf. Ebert (1985), 133.
does not contain the definite article τό. However, we shall not consider the lack of the definite article as significant, but take the two phrases to have the same meaning: signifying the T-category of essence.19

The grammatical subject of the phrase τό τι ἐστὶ σημαίνων in 103b27f., indicated by the article δ, presumably refers to a person. What is the grammatical subject of τι ἐστὶ σημαίνει in our passage in 103b37? From the linguistic point of view, it is natural to take the grammatical subject to be the phrase έκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. If this is correct, our passage states that if certain conditions are met, a term such as ‘animal’, ‘color’ or ‘foot-long length’ signifies the T-category of essence.

What does it mean that a term signifies the T-category of essence? To answer this question, it may be helpful to have a look at chapter four of the Categories, where C-categories are introduced as follows: ‘Of things said without any combination, each signifies (σημαίνει) either substance or quantity or quality etc.’ Inasmuch as C-categories are viewed as classifying things said without any combination, this means that each of those things belongs to one C-category. Each of them, that is, is a member of one C-category. Thus, the verb ‘signify’ indicates membership in a C-category. This use of ‘signify’ is common in Aristotle’s writings. When appealing to (some version of) his theory of categories, Aristotle often says that each of the items under consideration signifies (σημαίνει) one of the categories.20 Each of those items, that is, is a member of one category.

In the same way, the phrase τί ἐστὶ σημαίνει in 103b37 may be understood as indicating that a term belongs to the T-category of essence. Similarly, a predication or a proposition may signify, or belong to, one of the T- or C-categories in virtue of the fact that its predicate term belongs to that category. And a person may signify one of the T- or C-categories by using such terms, predications or propositions in an appropriate way (for instance, by uttering a proposition belonging to that category). This, I suggest, is the meaning of the verb ‘signify’ throughout the whole of Topics I.9: it basically indicates that a term, predication or proposition is a member of a T- or C-category.

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19 In fact, some MSS have the definite article τό before the two occurrences of τί ἐστὶ in 103b37 and 103b38. The editions of Ross (1958) and Brunschwig (1967) differ as to the number and the identity of the MSS which have these two articles.
20 E.g., Met. Δ.7 1017b25f., 28 1024b13f., Ζ.4 1030b11f, N.2 1089b7–9, GC I.3 319b12f., Apo. I.22 83b14f., EE I.8 1217b27f. Similar passages where σημαίνει is used in connection with some list of categories include Top. Δ.2 122b16f., SE 22 178b7f., 178b39, 178b28, 179b2, Met. B.6 1003b8f., Apo. I.24 85b20f.
If this is correct, then the first part of the second γάρ clause states that if certain conditions are met, a term belongs to the T-category of essence. Thus, it provides a criterion, that is, a sufficient condition, for belonging to the T-category of essence. The criterion appeals to the notion of a genus and, thereby, to the predicables. Given that the phrase ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων is the grammatical subject of the main clause in our passage, it is natural to take it also to be the grammatical subject of the subordinate ἔαν clause. If so, the criterion reads: a term belongs to the T-category of essence if it is predicated of itself or if its genus is predicated of it. Remarkably, the property of belonging to the T-category of essence is attributed to the subject, not to the predicate, of a genus predication.

This interpretation is based on the assumption that the phrase τί ἔστι σημαίνειν, unlike the phrase τί ἔστι λέγειν, indicates membership in the T-category of essence. On the other hand, many commentators have tended to understand the phrase τί ἔστι σημαίνει in the first part of the second γάρ clause (103b37) in the predicables' sense of τί ἔστι λέγειν, i.e., in the sense of saying what the subject of the predication is. However, this property cannot be attributed to the subject of a genus predication; for the predicate says what the subject is, not vice versa.

In order to avoid this difficulty, commentators have construed the Greek of our passage in such a way that the property of τί ἔστι σημαίνειν is not attributed to the subject of the genus predication. In general, such interpretations deny that the main and the subordinate clause of the passage share the same grammatical subject.21 Linguistically, however, the most natural

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21 There are two strategies of achieving this. According to one of them, ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων is not the grammatical subject of the main clause but an absolute adverbial phrase (von Kirchmann 1882, 11; Rolfes 1948, 12; Dancy 1975a, 124; Irwin 1988, 506; de Rijk 2002, 487; Evans 2006, 141). In this case, we are free to supply a suitable grammatical subject for the main clause: for each such term (or: for each such predication, or: in each case), if it is said of itself or if its genus is said of it, the (predicate of the) predication (or the person making the predication) signifies what the subject of the predication is. The first word in this paraphrase is the preposition 'for', not the conjunction. The problem with this is that the Greek ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων does not contain a preposition.

According to the other strategy, ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων is the grammatical subject of the main clause but not of the subordinate clause (Brunschwig 1967, 13; Mansion 1968, 198; Ebert 1985, 127 and 132f; Smith 1997, 8; Wagner & Rapp 2004, 56). A problem for this interpretation is that the pronoun αὐτό (103b36) in the subordinate ἔαν clause is typically anaphoric. Thus, it is typically unable
way of construing the Greek is to take the main clause and the subordinate clause to have the same grammatical subject, namely, ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων.22 This yields a meaningful interpretation if τί ἐστι σημαίνειν is understood as indicating membership in the first T-category. For nothing prevents the subject of a genus predication from belonging to the first T-category, and from doing so in virtue of its being the subject of a genus predication.

This brings us to an important difference between the predicables on the one hand and T- and C-categories on the other. The classification given by the predicables is intrinsically relational. It is only applicable, that is, to predicates related to a certain subject in a given predication. A predicate can be a genus, differentia, definition, proprium or accident only of a given subject.23 Just as one and the same term may function as the predicate of a predication and as the subject of another predication,24 so one and the same term may, in principle, have the function of different predicables relative to different subjects. For example, one and the same term may be a proprium of 'animal' while being an accident of 'horse.' Or a term may be predicated essentially as a differentia of a subject while being predicated non-essentially as an accident of another subject.25 Thus, the property of being a genus of x cannot be applied to the subject of a given predication. More generally, the same is true of the property of saying what x is, i.e., being predicated essentially of x.

By contrast, T- and C-categories can be viewed as non-relational. That is to say, a term belongs to a category simpliciter, not relative to another term, or

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22 Authors accepting this reading include Forster (1960), 295; Barnes (1984), 172.
24 Cf., e.g., Barnes (2007), 109–123.
relative to the context of a given predication.\textsuperscript{26} As a consequence, the property of belonging to a certain category can be attributed to both the subject and the predicate of a given predication. Now, Aristotle says that any term belongs to the T-category of essence if (ēáv) it is predicated of itself or if a genus is predicated of it, and that it does not belong to the T-category of essence if (ēáv) it is predicated 'of another' (103\textsuperscript{b}35–39). Given that T-categories are non-relational, this should not be understood in such a way that one and the same term may belong to the first T-category in the context of certain predications, whereas it may fail to do so in the context of other predications. Instead, I propose the adoption of what might be called an existential interpretation of Aristotle's criterion for belonging to the first T-category: a term belongs to the first T-category if there is a predication in which it is predicated of itself or in which a genus is predicated of it. This can be called an existential interpretation because the free contextual parameter referring to predications is, as it were, bound by an existential quantifier: 'if there is a predication in which…'

The existential quantifier is applied to a disjunction: '…in which it is predicated of itself or in which a genus is predicated of it.' This disjunction bears an obvious relationship to the three examples given in the first γάρ clause. These may be interpreted in such a way that in the first example, 'man' is predicated of itself and the genus 'animal' is predicated of it; in the second example, 'white' is predicated of itself and the genus 'colour' is predicated of it; finally, 'foot-long length' is predicated of itself (the genus predication is omitted in the last example).\textsuperscript{27} As noted earlier, it is not clear whether the subject of these predications is a singular term such as 'this man' or a general term such as 'man'. In the first example, for instance, it is not clear whether the self-predication is of the form 'this man is man' or 'man is man'. At any rate, Aristotle takes both the self-predication and the genus predication to say what the subject is. That is, both the self-predication and the genus predication are taken to be essential predications. Accordingly, the same should be true of the disjunction in Aristotle's criterion for belonging to the first T-category.

Alexander suggests to view the self-predication in this criterion as a predication of a definition (ὁπισιμός) of its definiendum.\textsuperscript{28} According to

\textsuperscript{26} Ebert (1985), 117–126; Primavesi (1996), 89. In what follows, I shall accept that both T- and C-categories are non-relational, although it may also be worth exploring relational interpretations of T- and C-categories.

\textsuperscript{27} Unless we accept Prantl's (1855), 193, suggestion to insert ἦ after εἶναι in 103\textsuperscript{b}34.

\textsuperscript{28} Alexander in Top. 67.8–11.
Topics I.7, definitions are identical with their definienda in the strongest sense of numerical sameness.\textsuperscript{29} Hence, Aristotle can plausibly be taken to regard essential predications in which a definiens is predicated of a definiendum as self-predications.\textsuperscript{30} With this in mind, the two disjuncts of the criterion for belonging to the T-category of essence correspond to two predicables that are predicated essentially of their subject: definition and genus. Aristotle does not mention differentiae, the third predicable which is predicated essentially of its subject. Part of the reason may be that differentiae are often not regarded as a fifth member in the list of predicables in its own right; rather, they are understood to be included under the heading of genera.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, Aristotle speaks of four, not five, predicables in the first sentence of Topics I.9.

At any rate, given what I have called the existential interpretation of the criterion, it would be superfluous to mention differentiae. For it is plausible to assume that a term is the subject of some differentia predication if and only if it is the subject of some definition predication.\textsuperscript{32} Given this assumption, Aristotle's criterion will be tantamount to being the subject of some predication in which the predicate is a definition, genus or differentia of the subject. That is, the criterion will be tantamount to being the subject of some essential predication. Thus, the T-category of essence includes all terms which are the subject of some essential predication. To put it succinctly, the T-category of essence includes all terms which possess an essence. This is the main proposal of this paper.

It is not unreasonable to take the first part of the second γάρ clause to provide not only a sufficient condition for belonging to the T-category of essence, but a definition of the extension of the T-category of essence. In this case, it would provide both a sufficient and a necessary condition for belonging to the T-category of essence. That is to say, a term would belong to the T-category of essence if and only if it is the subject of some essential predication. All of what follows will be compatible with this strong reading. Nevertheless, the main proposal of this paper is confined to the weaker, the sufficient reason

\textsuperscript{29} Top. I.7 103a23–27.

\textsuperscript{30} In Top. V.5 135b9–12, Aristotle claims that in every self-predication the predicate is a definition (ὁρος) of the subject.

\textsuperscript{31} Top. I.4 101b17–19.

\textsuperscript{32} Every definition consists of a genus and several differentiae (Top. I.8 103b15f.). Thus, every subject of a definition predication is also the subject of a differentia predication. Moreover, it is plausible to assume that any differentia of a subject is part of a definition of that subject. If so, every subject of a differentia predication is also the subject of a definition predication.
reading; a term belongs to the T-category of essence if it is the subject of some essential predication.

This condition may also be met by singular terms such as ‘Socrates’ which stand for a substantial individual, or by singular terms such as ‘the whiteness of Socrates’ which stand for a non-substantial individual. Several commentators have argued that only C-categories, but not T-categories, include singular terms or individuals.\(^{35}\) Part of the reason is the view that singular terms, at least those belonging to the C-category of substance, cannot serve as the predicate of proper predications.\(^{34}\) That may or may not be true for the notion of predication employed in *Topics* I.9. At any rate, the criterion of possessing an essence does not require a term to be capable of functioning as the predicate of predications. Thus, singular terms are, according to the interpretation proposed here, not excluded from belonging to the T-category of essence.

I should like to add a remark on *Metaphysics* Z. In *Metaphysics* Z.4 and Z.5, Aristotle tends to think that only terms belonging to the C-category of substance possess a definition or an essence in a proper and unqualified way.\(^{35}\) If non-substance terms are not taken to possess an essence, the T-category of essence would indeed be restricted to the C-category of substance.\(^{36}\) This is not true for the *Topics*, however, where non-substance terms such as ‘((this) white colour’ and ‘((this) foot-long length’ are admitted as subjects of essential predications in the same way as substance terms such as ‘((this) man’.

We are now in a position to return to the question posed above: how do the two γάρ clauses\(^{37}\) justify and explain the statement that an instance of signifying the first T-category may be an instance of signifying any C-category? The first γάρ clause introduces a person who signifies each one of the C-categories. She does so by uttering a proposition where both the predicate and the subject belong to the C-category under consideration. In each proposition uttered by her, the predicate is predicated essentially of the subject. Expressed in terms of λέγειν instead of σημαίνειν, this fact concerns the predicables rather than the T-categories.

In the second γάρ clause, Aristotle provides the missing link back to the T-categories. He states that if a term is the subject of some essential predication,\(^{38}\)

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\(^{34}\) Cf. *Cat*. 2 1\(^{3}\)3–6, *APr*. I.27 43\(^{3}\)32–36; cf. also *Cat*. 5 3\(^{3}\)36f. and Ebert (1985), 122.

\(^{35}\) *Met*. Z.4 1030\(^{3}\)17–27, 5 1031\(^{4}\)f.


\(^{37}\) 103\(^{3}\)29–35 and 103\(^{3}\)35–39.

\(^{38}\) This condition, concerning the predicables, is expressed in terms of λέγειν (103\(^{3}\)36).
then it belongs to the T-category of essence. Thus, in each proposition uttered by the person, the subject belongs to the T-category of essence. It follows that for every C-category, there is a term belonging both to that C-category and to the T-category of essence. These terms may be regarded as instances of signifying both the T-category of essence and the C-category to which they belong. Thus, an instance of signifying the T-category of essence may be an instance of signifying any C-category. Accordingly, a person may signify the T-category of essence while signifying any C-category by using such terms in a proposition in an appropriate way.

3. The status of differentiae in the Topics

Before turning, in Section 4, to the second part of the second γάρ clause, let us pause for a moment and consider an application of the results obtained so far. I intend to show how these results can be used to solve a problem concerning the status of differentiae in the Topics.

Let me start by briefly discussing two ways of characterizing the T-category of essence that differ from that proposed above. I have argued that the T-category of essence is characterized by the criterion of being the subject, not the predicate, of some essential predication. This may come as a surprise, for it would seem natural to expect that the criterion should be based on indicating the essence of other terms rather than on possessing an essence. This view is held by several commentators. M. Frede, for instance, has proposed what might be called an existential predicate-based criterion: a term belongs to the first T-category if it is the predicate of some essential predication. Ebert, on the other hand, seems to prefer a universally quantified predicate-based criterion: a term belongs to the first T-category if every predication in which it occurs as a predicate is an essential predication. In other words: if it is predicated essentially of every term of which it is predicated.

39 According to this interpretation, it does not follow that the predicate belongs to the T-category of essence, although this may of course be the case, as a matter of fact.
40 For instance, Frede (1981), 9; Malcolm (1981), 666; Ebert (1985), 125.
41 This is how I understand Frede's (1981), 9, characterization of the first T-category as including those terms 'one could refer to in an answer to the question what something is essentially'.
42 This is how I understand Ebert's (1985), 125, characterization of the first T-category as including those terms that indicate an essential feature of every possible subject ('an jedem möglichen Subjekt').
I do not wish to deny that the universally quantified predicate-based criterion provides a sufficient and perhaps also necessary condition for belonging to the first T-category. It may well be true, as a matter of fact, that a term belongs to the T-category of essence if and only if it is predicated essentially of every term of which it is predicated. Also, this or a similar principle may well be part of the reason why the T-category of essence is so called. Nevertheless, it is important to see that there is no evidence of Aristotle's adopting that criterion as a characterization of the first T-category in *Topics* I.9. Nor is there evidence of his adopting the existential predicate-based criterion as a characterization of the first T-category. Moreover, the existential predicate-based criterion does not seem to me to provide a sufficient condition for belonging to the first T-category. That is to say, there are terms which meet this criterion but do not belong to the first T-category. I wish to argue that this is the case with differentiae.

In a number of passages, Aristotle treats differentiae as qualities (ποιόν, ποιότης); for instance:

\[ \ddot{\eta} \ \mu\varepsilon \ \delta\iota\varsigma \varphi\sigma\rho\alpha \ \pi\omega\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\eta \ \tau\omicron\upsilon \ \gamma\epsilon\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \ \dot{\alpha} \varepsilon \ \sigma\mu\mu\alpha\acute{i} \epsilon \iota \ \]  

*(Top. IV.6 128*²²f.)*

\[ \ddot{\delta} \kappa\epsilon \acirc{th} \ \dot{\eta} \ \delta\iota\varsigma \varphi\sigma\rho\alpha \ \pi\omega\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\eta \ \pi\omicron\iota\omicron\nu \ \tau\omicron\upsilon \ \dot{s} \mu\mu\alpha\acute{i} \epsilon \iota \ \]  

*(Top. VI.6 144*²²f.)*

In both passages the verb 'signify' (σμαίνειν) is used. As argued earlier, this verb in connection with a C- or T-category indicates membership in that category. Accordingly, the two passages may be understood as stating that differentiae belong to the C-category of quality, or to the T-category of quality, or to both. The view on differentiae proposed in this paper accepts the strongest, third option. However, this view is meant to apply only to differentiae of substance terms. We shall not take into account differentiae of non-substance terms, as there is little explicit discussion of these in the *Topics*.

It is natural to assume that T-categories are mutually exclusive, and that the same is also true of C-categories. If so, then differentiae must not belong to any other C- or T-category than that of quality. In particular, they should not belong, firstly, to the C-category of substance and, secondly, to the T-category of essence. The first consequence agrees with a passage in *Categories* 5 where Aristotle compares substance items on the one hand and differentiae on the

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other, thus implying that differentiae are not substance items.\textsuperscript{44} The second consequence is confirmed by a passage from the \textit{Topics}:\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ σημαίνει τί ἐστιν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιὸν τι}

\textit{(Top. IV.2 122\textsuperscript{b}16f.)}

Consider the phrase \textit{σημαίνει τί ἐστιν}. In \textit{Topics I.9}, we took this to indicate membership in the first T-category. Thus, the passage just quoted may be understood as stating that differentiae do not belong to the T-category of essence, but to the T- (and/or C-)category of quality. If this is correct, then according to the criterion for belonging to the first T-category proposed above, differentiae must not be the subject of any essential predication. That is, they must not possess an essence.\textsuperscript{46}

On the other hand, differentiae are part of the definition of their subject, and are therefore predicated essentially of it.\textsuperscript{47} This is what Aristotle means when he says that differentiae are predicated in the essence (\textit{ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι}): 

\textit{κατηγορεῖται δὲ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τὰ γένη καὶ αἱ διαφοραί}

\textit{(Top. VII.3 153\textsuperscript{a}17f.)}

\textit{ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ διαφοραί κατηγοροῦνται}

\textit{(Top. VII.5 154\textsuperscript{a}27f.)}

These two statements are sometimes taken to be incompatible with the statement from \textit{Topics IV.2}, according to which differentiae lack the property of

\textsuperscript{44} Cat. 5 3\textsuperscript{a}21f. This passage is traditionally taken to imply that differentiae do not belong to the C-category of substance (Philoponus in \textit{Cat.} 66.26f.; Ackrill 1963, 85; Dancy 1975b, 350; Granger 1984, 5; Morrison 1992, 25). Several commentators assume that differentiae of substance terms do not belong to the C-category of substance (for instance, Simplicius in \textit{Cat.} 98.7–9; Brunschwig 1986, 154; Morrison 1992, 25; Bäck 2000, 151f.). Others take differentiae of substance terms to be substance terms (Alexander in \textit{Top.} 65.30–66.1; Furth 1988, 21; Irwin 1988, 64f). Aristotle may be seen to hold this view in \textit{Metaphysics} Z.12 1038\textsuperscript{a}18–26. I am not concerned here with Aristotle’s account of differentiae in the \textit{Metaphysics} nor with that in the \textit{Categories} but confine myself to that of the \textit{Topics}.

\textsuperscript{45} Similarly, \textit{Top. VI.6} 144\textsuperscript{a}15–18; cf. the discussion of this passage in note 52 below.

\textsuperscript{46} This is not to deny that for every differentia (for instance, ‘two-footed’) there may be a corresponding term (for instance, ‘two-footedness’) that possesses an essence. This may explain the fact that Aristotle sometimes speaks of a definition of differentiae (\textit{Top. VI.11–12} 149\textsuperscript{a}25–33, Cat. 5 3\textsuperscript{a}25–28).

\textsuperscript{47} Cf. for instance \textit{Top. I.8} 103\textsuperscript{a}14–16, \textit{VI.6} 143\textsuperscript{b}19f., VII.3 153\textsuperscript{b}14f.
signifying essence. The incompatibility disappears when taking into account that this statement relates to the T-categories whereas the other two relate to the predicables. The statement from IV.2 contains the verb σημαίνει, which is often used by Aristotle to indicate membership in a category. The other two statements contain the phrase κατηγορεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, which is used to refer to essential genus predications in the explanation of the predicables in Topics I.5. This phrase states that differentiae are predicated essentially of their subjects as well as genera, but it does not involve any direct statement as to which T-category differentiae belong to.

Thus, the apparent inconsistency between Aristotle's statements can be resolved. This is not possible if we take what I have called the existential predicate-based criterion to provide a sufficient condition for belonging to the first T-category. For in that case, every term predicated essentially of some term would belong to the first T-category. Hence, every term that is a differentia of some term would belong to the first T-category.

I should like to add a remark on the difference between differentiae and genera. With respect to the two fundamenta divisionis on which the predicables are based in Topics I.8, differentiae behave exactly like genera: both are predicated essentially of the subject, and neither of them counterpredicates with the subject. From the point of view of the predicables, there is no relevant difference between differentiae and genera. Aristotle's theory of C- and T-categories, on the other hand, is able to distinguish differentiae from genera. As argued above, differentiae of substance terms do not belong to the C-category of substance. On the other hand, Aristotle asserts that genera of substance terms belong to the C-category of substance. Moreover, as argued above, differentiae of substance terms do not belong to the T-category of essence. Genera of substance terms, on the other hand, may well be considered to do so. In fact, Aristotle states in Topics VI.5 that genera are meant to signify essence (τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαινεῖν). These differences

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49 Top. I.5 102a32f; similarly APo. II.4 91b15–23.
50 Top. I.8 103b12–16.
51 Top. IV.1 120b36–121a9; for this difference between genera and differentiae, cf. Brunschwig (1986), 154.
52 Top. VI.5 142a27. This difference between genera and differentia is confirmed by a passage from Top. VI.6 where Aristotle assumes that ἔξις is a genus of ἀρετή while ἀγαθὸν is a differentia of ἀρετή (144a15f). Then he goes on to say: ἦ μὲν ἔξις τί ἐστι σημαινεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν οὐ τί ἔστιν ἀλλὰ ποῖον
between genera and differentiae may also account for Aristotle's statement that genera reveal the essence of the subject to a higher degree than differentiae.\footnote{144ι17f. This is one of the few passages where the phrase τι ἔστι σημαίνειν is accompanied by a nominative phrase (ἡ ἀρετή) functioning as the grammatical subject of the indirect question τι ἔστι. At any rate, the property of τι ἔστι σημαίνειν (ἡ ἀρετή) is attributed to the genus ἔξις but not to the differentia ἀγαθόν.}

\section*{4. Non-essence T-categories}

In this section we shall conclude our close reading of Topics I.9 by examining the second part of the second γάρ clause. While the first part of the second γάρ clause specifies a criterion for belonging to the T-category of essence, the second part specifies a criterion for belonging to the remaining nine, the non-essence T-categories:\footnote{I assume that the grammatical subject of both the main and the subordinate clause is the same as in the first part of the second γάρ clause (103\textsuperscript{b}35–37), namely, ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων. Also, I assume that the phrase ἄλλα ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ τίνα τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορίων in 103\textsuperscript{b}38f. refers primarily to the nine non-essence T-categories rather than to the nine non-substance C-categories. For only the former make up the natural complement to the first T-category referred to by the phrase οὐ τι ἔστι σημαίνει in 103\textsuperscript{b}38. At any rate, as we shall see, belonging to a non-essence T-category implies belonging to the corresponding non-substance C-category.}

\begin{quote}

\textit{(Top. I.9 103b37–39)}

\end{quote}

If a term is predicated of 'another', then it does not belong to the T-category of essence, but to one of the remaining T-categories. Presumably, the criterion of being predicated of 'another' does not mean that a term is predicated of a numerically distinct term. For this should also be true for many terms that do not belong to a non-essence T-category. Since Alexander, the criterion has been understood as requiring that a term be predicated of a term belonging to another C-category.\footnote{Alexander in Top. 67.11–15; Granger (1984), 6; de Rijk (2002), 486; similarly Smith (1997), 8 and 76.} Let us adopt this interpretation and consider some of its consequences. Again, we will adopt an existential interpretation of the criterion: a term belongs to one of the non-essence T-categories if it is the predicate of some cross-C-categorial predication.
Firstly, let us consider differentiae of substance terms. These are predicated essentially of a substance term but do not themselves belong to the C-category of substance. Thus, the criterion requires them to belong to one of the nine non-essence T-categories. This fits the above account of differentiae according to which these do not belong to the T-category of essence.\(^5^6\) It follows that a differentia of a substance term cannot be the subject of any essential predication. In general, given the mutual exclusiveness of T-categories, no term which is the subject of some essential predication can be the predicate of any cross-C-categorial predication.\(^5^7\)

Secondly, let us consider substance terms. Intuitively, these would be unlikely to belong to one of the nine non-essence T-categories of quantity, quality and so on. If so, they must fail to meet the criterion of being predicated of ‘another’ term, that is, of a non-substance term. Indeed, there are some passages in Aristotle’s writings suggesting that substance terms cannot be predicated of another underlying subject (κατ’ ἄλλον λέγεσϑαι ὑποκειμένου).\(^5^8\) As Alexander points out, one may object that there are so-called unnatural predications such as ‘this white (thing) is a man’.\(^5^9\) In such predications, one may argue, substance terms are in some way predicated of non-substance terms. If such predications are admitted in Topics I.9, substance terms might be taken to belong to a non-essence T-category. Aristotle does not specify the kind of predication he is referring to in his criterion of being predicated of ‘another’. If we do not want substance terms to belong to any non-essence T-category, we would like to assume that the criterion is not intended to include unnatural predications.

If so, then every substance term belongs to the T-category of essence\(^6^0\) (provided that T-categories are exhaustive). Conversely, every term belonging to a non-essence T-category belongs to a non-substance C-category (provided that T-categories are mutually exclusive and C-categories are exhaustive).

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\(^5^6\) I do not follow Alexander (in Top. 66.4–15, 67.14–17), who holds the view that there are no essential cross-C-categorial predications.

\(^5^7\) This result can be strengthened if the criterion for belonging to the T-category of essence and the criterion for belonging to a non-essence T-category are taken to provide a necessary as well as sufficient condition. In that case, given that T-categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, any term is the predicate of some cross-C-categorial predication if and only if it is not the subject of any essential predication.

\(^5^8\) Phys. I.7 190\(^b\)36, APo. I.4 73\(^b\)5–8, 22 83\(^b\)24–32.

\(^5^9\) Alexander in Top. 67.20–22.

\(^6^0\) This view is held by Ebert (1985), 134.
Presumably, it belongs to the C-category with the same label (quantity, quality, and so on) as the non-essence T-category to which it belongs. If the criterion for belonging to the T-category of essence is taken to provide a necessary as well as sufficient condition, every substance term meets this criterion. In that case, every substance term is the subject of some essential predication, whether a self-predication, a genus predication or a differentia predication.

The situation is different with regard to non-substance terms. Some of them may belong to the T-category of essence, while others belong to one of the remaining T-categories. Every non-substance term predicated of some term belonging to another C-category belongs to one of the non-essence T-categories. Particularly, this is true of non-substance terms predicated of a substance term. For example, if the non-substance term ‘white’ is predicated of the substance term ‘snow’, then it belongs to a non-essence T-category. Presumably, such non-substance terms belong to the T-category with the same label as the C-category to which they belong. For example, if the term ‘white’ is predicated of ‘snow’ and belongs to the C-category of quality, it also belongs to the T-category of quality.

On the other hand, every non-substance term that is the subject of some essential predication belongs to the T-category of essence. For example, if ‘colour’ is predicated essentially of the non-substance term ‘white’, then ‘white’ belongs to the T-category of essence. Now, we have assumed that T-categories are non-relational, i.e., that a term belongs to a T-category simpliciter, not relative to another term, or relative to the context of a given predication. Moreover, we have assumed that T-categories are mutually exclusive. As a result, the term ‘white’ of which ‘colour’ is predicated essentially and the term ‘white’ which is predicated of ‘snow’ must be two different terms.\(^{61}\)

This distinction between the two terms ‘white’ is not relevant to C-categories. For the sake of comparison, C-categories may be viewed as classifying terms of the same kind as those classified by T-categories. However, C-categories may also be viewed as classifying terms whose criterion of identity is such that the two terms ‘white’ are one and the same term.\(^{62}\) If so, then one and

\(^{61}\) On the other hand, if T-categories are taken to be relational, one might say that one and the same term ‘white’ belongs to the first T-category in contexts such as ‘white is colour’, whereas it belongs to the T-category of quality in contexts such as ‘snow is white’.

\(^{62}\) This difference between T- and C-categories may be part of the general impression that the items classified by T-categories are of a more linguistic nature than those classified by C-categories.
the same term may be the subject of an essential predication and the predicate of a cross-C-categorial predication. When Aristotle, in *Topics* V.5, states that every term is predicated essentially of itself,65 he may be taken to have in mind such a criterion of identity. This statement is not true, however, with respect to the criterion of identity of terms which is presupposed by the interpretation of T-categories pursued here. Only the term ‘white’ which belongs to the first T-category, not that belonging to the T-category of quality, can be predicated essentially of itself. Thus, (at least some) non-substance terms come in pairs: while both members of the pair belong to the same non-substance C-category, one of them belongs to the T-category of essence and the other to a non-essence T-category.

In some cases, Greek natural language allows Aristotle to indicate such pairs by paronymic pairs of words sharing a common lexical root; for instance, ‘whiteness’ vs. ‘white’. Aristotle holds that only terms such as ‘white’ and ‘just’ can be said (λέγεσθαι) of substance terms such as ‘man’, but not ‘whiteness’ or ‘justice’.66 For we may say that man is white, but not that man is whiteness. This may be taken to suggest that ‘white’ and ‘just’ meet the criterion for belonging to a non-essence T-category, while ‘whiteness’ and ‘justice’ do not. Instead, terms such as ‘whiteness’ or ‘justice’ are the subject of essential predications, thereby meeting the criterion for belonging to the first T-category. For instance, both ‘good’ and ‘virtue’ are genera of, hence predicated essentially of, ‘justice’.67

In *Topics* III.1, Aristotle points out that only ‘justice’ is a species of the genus ‘good’, but not ‘(the) just’.68 This may be taken to suggest that ‘(the) just’ does not possess a genus, thereby failing to possess an essence.69 If so, then it does not belong to the first T-category.

The picture which has been emerging can be illustrated as follows:

65 *Top.* V.5 135ρ10–12. This passage is taken to state that every term is predicated essentially of itself by Barnes (1970), 151.
66 *Cat.* 10 12414f., *Met.* Θ.7 104930–34.
67 *Top.* III.1 116ι24, *Cat.* 11 14422f.
69 Aristotle makes a similar point in *Metaphysics* Z.6 1031b22–28. According to this passage, items such as ‘white’ are ambiguous in that they may signify either the accident itself (‘whiteness’) or a substance item of which they are predicated (‘man’ or ‘white man’). He goes on to say that in the first use (corresponding to ‘justice’), ‘white’ is identical with its essence. We may infer that, in this use, ‘white’ possesses an essence. In the second use (corresponding to ‘(the) just’), Aristotle claims, ‘white’ is not identical with its essence. We may infer that, in this use, ‘white’ does not possess an essence in a proper sense.
C-categories (Categories 4)

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T-categories (Topics I.9)

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<th>relation</th>
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A similar description of the extension of C- and T-categories has already been suggested by some commentators. They have argued that the first T-category includes substance terms such as 'man' and non-substantial abstract nouns such as 'colour', whereas the remaining nine T-categories include non-substantial paronyms such as 'coloured'.\(^68\) As far as this picture of the extension of C- and T-categories is concerned, this paper does not claim originality. Rather, its contribution consists in a fresh account of how, that is, by what criteria, the extension of the T-categories is determined, especially the extension of the first T-category. Although this account is not entirely straightforward, I hope to have shown that it has the merit of being closely based on the text of \textit{Topics} I.9, and of making sense of what Aristotle says about differentiae in the \textit{Topics}.\(^69\)

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\(^68\) Malcolm (1981), 666; Ebert (1985), 125f and 137f.

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