The Problem of Possibilia

Are there, in addition to the various actual objects that make up the world, various possible objects? Are there merely possible people, for example, or merely possible electrons, or even merely possible kinds?

We certainly talk as if there were such things. Given a particular sperm and egg, I may wonder whether that particular child which would result from their union would have blue eyes. But if the sperm and egg are never in fact brought together, then there is no actual object that my thought is about. Or again, in the semantics for modal logic we presuppose an ontology of possibilia twice over. For first, we countenance various possible worlds, in addition to the actual world; and second, each of these worlds is taken to be endowed with its own domain of objects. These will be the actual objects of the world in question, but they need not be actual simpliciter, i.e., actual objects of our world. What are we to make of such discourse? There are four options: (i) the discourse is taken to be unintelligible; (ii) it is taken to be intelligible but nonfactual, i.e. as not in the business of stating facts; (iii) it is taken to be factual but reducible to discourse involving no reference to possibilia; (iv) it is taken to be both factual and irreducible. These options range from a full-blooded form of actualism at one extreme to a full-blooded form of possibilism at the other. The two intermediate positions are possibilist in that they accept the intelligibility of possibilist discourse but actualist in that they attempt to dispense with its prima facie commitment to possibilia. All four positions have found advocates in the literature. Quine, in his less irenic moments, favours option (i); Forbes ([85], p. 94) advocates option (ii), at least for certain parts of possibilist discourse; many philosophers, including Adams [74] and myself, opt for (iii); while Lewis [86] and Stalnaker [75] have endorsed versions of (iv), that differ in how full-blooded they take the possible objects to be.

My focus in the present article is on the third option. I wish to see to what extent reference to possibilia might be understood in other terms. Can we regard talk of possibilia as a mere facon de parler, perhaps somewhat in the same manner as

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1 Cf Gupta ([80], 20, n.15).

2 See Kripke [63] for a standard exposition of the semantics.

3 See Fine [01] for a general discussion of what these various options amount to.
talk of the average man or of infinitesimals?\(^4\) I shall not be
concerned to argue directly against any of the other options.
However, any argument for the viability of (iii) is indirectly
an argument against the plausibility of these other options.
For (iv), especially in its more extreme forms, offends against
what Russell has called our 'robust sense of reality', (i)
offends against our even more robust sense of what is
intelligible, while (ii) offends against our somewhat less
robust sense of what is factual. It is therefore preferable to
go with the third option, if we possibly can.

§1 Problems with Proxy Reduction

The most obvious way to make sense of possibilist discourse
is in terms of surrogates or proxies. With each possibilium \(x\)
is associated another entity \(x'\), acceptable to the actualist,
and any statement \(\phi(a, b, \ldots)\) about the possibilia \(a, b, \ldots\) is
then understood in terms of a corresponding statement \(\phi'(a', b',
\ldots)\) about the associated entities \(a', b', \ldots\). As a model for
such a reduction, we may take the logicist-style reduction of
numbers to sets: each number is associated with a
'representative' set, and a statement about numbers is then
understood in terms of a corresponding statement about the
associated sets.\(^5\)

But what is the relationship between a possibilium and its
surrogate? For which entities are the possibilia traded in?
The simplest view on the matter is that the relationship is one
of identity; each entity is traded in for itself. But such a
'reduction', if it may be called that, is always available to
us. And so how can it serve to alleviate ontological qualms in
any particular case? The answer is that the significance of
such a reduction must lie in the way the entities are described.
We have a domain of entities that is characterized in
problematic terms. It is then shown how each entity from this
domain is identical to an entity from a domain that is
characterized in relatively unproblematic terms; and doubts
about the entities, qua members of the problematic domain, are
thereby laid to rest. A physicalist's doubts about the
ontological status of mental events, for example, might be put
to rest in this way if he comes to believe that every mental
event is in fact a physical event.

Is a similar kind of view available to the actualist? Can
he maintain that possibilia are really just \(Y\)'s, for some
actualistically acceptable description \(Y\) (i.e. for some

\(^4\) As should be clear from Fine [01], the viability of any
reduction will also depend upon its success in accounting for
our understanding of modal discourse and our knowledge of modal
truth. See Peacocke [01] for a broader discussion along these
lines.

\(^5\) For more on the general approach, see Quine ([64], [69]).
description that makes no reference to merely possible objects)? After all, the possible winners of a race consist of the actual losers. So could not something similar be true in the case of possibilia? Could not every possible X be identical to an actual Y, for some actualistically acceptable description Y?

It seems to me that no view of this sort can be correct. Suppose, to fix our ideas, that it is maintained that every (merely) possible person is identical to an actual property—one perhaps that specifies its 'essence'. Consider now a possible person. Then it is possibly a person. But no property is possibly a person and no possible person is identical to a property: for there is a possibility for the one, viz. that of being a person, which is not a possibility for the other.

A similar difficulty besets many other identification of this sort that have been proposed. Possible states of affairs, for example, have often been taken to be propositions. But this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs. Or again, Stalnaker ([76], 230) and Plantinga ([74], 44) have suggested that we might think of a possible world as a way the world might have been. But a possible world is possibly the world, just as a possible person is possibly a person, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world, just as no way I might have been is possibly me. Thus it is not just that the actual world is not a way things might be, as emphasized by Stalnaker ([76], 228) and van Inwagen ([80], 407); no possible world is such a way either.

Whatever the merits of reduction via identity in other contexts, it is of no avail here. If there is to be a proxy reduction, it had better be achieved by means of proxies that are distinct from the possibilia themselves.

But again, an obvious solution suggests itself. For why not 'identify' each possible world with a proposition that is true in that world alone (or, if we wish to pick out a particular proposition, with the conjunction of all propositions that are true in the world)? And why not identify each possible object with a property that is necessarily borne by that object alone (or with the conjunction of all properties that are necessarily borne by the individual)? Each possibilium, be it world or object, is in effect identified with a description by which it might be specified.6

The main difficulty with this proposal is that there can be no assurance, from an actualist point of view, that distinct possible objects or worlds can be identified with distinct

6 A view of this sort was originally proposed by Prior ([77], chap. 2), though only for the case of worlds. Essentially the same account was later given by Adams ([74], 204). The extension to possible individuals was proposed by Fine [77] and possibly by Plantinga [76] (though not if his disclaimers in [85], 330-332 are to be trusted).
surrogates. Let us provide a simple illustration of the difficulty. Suppose there is some radioactive material in the actual world $w_0$ that just happens not to emit any particles from a certain time on but that might have emitted two particles of the same type at that time. These two particles, call them $\alpha$ and $\beta$, are presumably merely possible; they are not identical to any actual particles. And it is plausible to suppose that there is no actualistically acceptable means by which they might be distinguished. Of course, there is a possible world $w_1$ in which $\alpha$ is distinguished by one trajectory and $\beta$ another. But if there is such a world, then there is presumably another world $w_2$ just like it in which the trajectories are interchanged. For what is so special about $\alpha$ as opposed to $\beta$ that it is destined to have the one trajectory rather than the other? Thus we will be as unable to distinguish between the worlds as we are to distinguish between the particles themselves.

If we pretend that $w_1$ and $w_2$ and the actual world $w_0$ are the only worlds that there are, then we might depict the scenario as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{\(w_0\):} & \quad * \quad * \\
\text{\(w_1\):} & \quad * \quad * \quad / \quad \alpha \\
\text{\(w_1\):} & \quad * \quad * \quad \downarrow \quad \beta \\
\text{\(w_2\):} & \quad * \quad * \quad / \quad \beta \\
\end{align*}
\]

Here, in this miniature 'pluriverse', the worlds $w_1$ and $w_2$ are actualistically indiscernible, as are the particles $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Given that there is no actualistically acceptable means by which the particles or worlds might be distinguished, they will be associated with the very same surrogates, since any actualistically acceptable means of associating them with distinct surrogates would provide us with an actualistically acceptable means of distinguishing between the particles or worlds themselves; and given that this is so, the reduction must fail, since it will not even be capable of representing the fact that the particles or worlds are distinct.

Another kind of problem case arises from the possibility of there being indiscernible individuals within a world. Imagine

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7 We might even suppose that there were convincing scientific reasons for allowing both possibilities in determining the probability of emission.
a universe of eternal recurrence (with respect to both past and future) in which a Messiah appears in every epoch. There are then infinitely many possible Messiahs; and, given that there are only finitely many actual individuals who could be Messiahs, then infinitely many of these Messiahs will be mere possibilia; and presumably each of them will be actualistically indiscernible from the others.

A third kind of case arises from the possibility of there being indiscernible natural properties or kinds. There are two subcases here, just as in the case of individuals, depending upon whether the indiscernibilities are intra-world or inter-world. Pure cases of inter-world indiscernibility might always be disputed on the grounds that the identity of a kind, in these cases, is to be tied to role. Thus given that the kinds are indiscernible in their respective worlds, their roles will be the same and hence the kinds themselves must be the same. However, intra-world cases are not so readily disposed of. Suppose, for example, that there are two fundamental kinds of matter in the universe, positive and negative, governed by such laws as: like matter attracts; unlike matter repels. The two kinds of matter would then have completely symmetric roles and so as long as they are 'alien' kinds, not of this world, there would again appear to be no actualistically acceptable way in which they might be distinguished.

There are two main responses to these arguments. One is to dispute the possibilities upon which they are based. It has sometimes been denied, for example, that there can be worlds that are qualitatively, or actualistically, alike and yet differ merely in the identity of the individuals that they contain; and, under such views, there would only be one possibility for α and β depicted by w₁ and w₂ in the picture above, not two. But there is something unsatisfactory about making the reduction dependent upon such views - both because they are controversial and because we wish to explain what sense might be given to possibilist discourse by someone who did not accept them. It would be preferable, if at all feasible, to provide a reduction which was free from any substantive assumption about what was or was not possible.

The second response to the cases is to accept the putative possibilities and yet deny that they involve genuine actualist indiscernibilities. Despite our claims to the contrary, it will be maintained that the particles or the Messiahs or the kinds of matter can be actualistically distinguished after all. For let

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8 See Bricker ([87], 349-53), Lewis ([86], 158-65) and McMichael [83] for examples of this sort.

9 As on the views of Swoyer [82] and Shoemaker ([80], [98]).

10 Eg., by Lewis ([86], 4.4) and Adams [81].
x be any given possible object. Then associated with this object will be a certain identity property, the property of being identical to x. But in contrast to the object x itself, this property - like all properties - will exist necessarily. It will therefore be an actual object; and so we may use it, in an actualistically acceptable way, to distinguish x from all other objects.\(^{11}\) (Of course, when x itself is a property or the like, we may proceed directly, by this line of reasoning, to the conclusion that it necessarily exists.)

One way of dealing with this response is to deny the claims of necessary existence upon which it depends. The property of being identical to Socrates, it might be countered, can only exist when Socrates exists; and the kind positive matter can only exist in a world in which there is positive matter.\(^{12}\) But there is, I believe, a more fundamental objection to be made. Let us suppose that an actualist comes to the view that (necessarily) properties necessarily exist. Should the properties that he previously took to be problematic because they were merely possible now be regarded as unproblematic? I think not. Rather, they should still be taken to be problematic, though for reasons that no longer turn on their being merely possible.

For a more fundamental way to understand the actualist's position is that he objects to the idea that general possibilities might be the source of a distinctive ontology of objects that instantiate those possibilities. Consider the possibility that there is a talking donkey (◊ƎxPx). The possibilist will claim that it follows from this possibility that there really is an object, possible if not actual, that instantiates it; there is an object, that is to say, that is possibly a talking donkey (Ǝx◊Px). The actualist will deny that there need be any such object (except as a mere facon de parler) and, in general, he will be suspicious of any object whose existence would appear to depend upon its being the instantiator in this way of a general possibility.

But the identity properties of merely possible objects and the alien kinds are just of this sort. It is only because of the possibility of there being an identity property for such and such a possibilium and it is only because of the possibility of there being a kind which plays such and such a role that we are led to believe that there are such properties or kinds. Without the belief in the general possibilities, we would have no reason to believe that there were such things. On this understanding of what lies behind the actualist's position, then, he will remain suspicious of these properties and kinds on account of their possibilist origins, even though he accepts that they

\(^{11}\) See Plantinga [76].

\(^{12}\) Fine ([77], §4) and McMichael ([83a], 60-61) develop objections along these lines.
exist. He will think of them, like other problematic existents, of standing in need of analysis in terms of existents of another sort.\footnote{A related objection is made in Fine ([85], §2) and an altogether different objection to the necessary existence of alien properties is developed by Lewis ([86], 160-1).}

§2 The Possibility of Proxy Reduction

As a result of these difficulties, many philosophers have given up on the idea of proxy reduction; and, indeed, the difficulties in the particular reduction proposed above might appear to extend to any reduction whatever. For consider again our miniature pluriverse with its three worlds \( w_0, w_1, w_2 \) and its two particles \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \); and suppose that \( a \) represents \( \alpha \) and \( b \) goes proxy for, \( \alpha \). Then it must also represent \( \beta \). For a must be an actual object (or, at least, actualistically acceptable); and so, if it failed to represent \( \beta \), we could distinguish between \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) in an actualistically acceptable manner, since \( \alpha \) would have the property of being represented by a while \( \beta \) would not. This therefore suggests that it will in general be impossible to obtain a unique proxy for each possible individual and that any acceptable form of proxy reduction must therefore fail.

Uniqueness of proxies is not, however, necessary for a proxy reduction to succeed.\footnote{Contrary to what the criticisms in Lewis ([86], 158 & 163-4) might appear to suggest.} We may reduce three-dimensional Euclidean geometry to real analysis by identifying each point with a triple of real numbers. But the identification is far from unique. Indeed, any given point might be associated with any given triple. But the ambiguity will not matter as long as it does not result in any ambiguity in truth-value of the sentences to be reduced. This therefore suggests that we may let \( a \) represent \( \alpha \) and \( b \) represent \( \beta \) under one scheme of representation as long as we are also prepared to allow that \( a \) represents \( \beta \) and \( b \) represents \( \alpha \) under another. The previous difficulty then disappears since, given the symmetric nature of the representations (which cannot themselves be actualistically distinguished), we will be left with no way to distinguish between \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \).\footnote{Curiously, similar difficulties arise in understanding Cantor's account of cardinal numbers as sets of units (Fine [98a]).}

A problem remains, however. For a similar story should be told about \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \). There will be two proxies, say \( w \) and \( v \), that indifferently represent \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \) or \( w_2 \) and \( w_1 \). Suppose now that we pick on a particular scheme of representation, say that in which \( a \) represents \( \alpha \), \( b \) represents \( \beta \), \( w \) represents \( w_1 \), and \( v \) represents \( w_2 \). Then how are we to determine which paths for a
and b are to be assigned in w? Whatever we say, the paths assigned in v must be the reverse. But there seems to be no basis for taking the paths to go one way rather than the other. Thus even when we pick on a particular scheme of representation, there appear to be irresolvable indeterminacies in how it is to be applied.

In order to solve this further difficulty, we must somehow 'coordinate' the representation of individuals and worlds. Let me indicate one way in which this might be done. Let us suppose that we use the distinct actual entities \( w_1, w_2, \ldots \) as proxies for the possible worlds and the distinct actual entities \( i_1, i_2, \ldots \) as proxies for the merely possible individuals. Then coordination may be achieved by means of a proxy-pluriverse. This consists of the class \( W \) of world-proxies, the class \( I \) of individual-proxies, and a class of proxy relationships, where each proxy relationship is of the form \( <w, R, i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n> \), for \( w \) a proxy-world, \( R \) an (actual) \( n \)-adic relation, and \( i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n \) proxy-individuals. Intuitively, a proxy relationship indicates that the relation \( R \) holds of the possible individuals represented by \( i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n \) in the possible world represented by \( w \). Thus a proxy-pluriverse represents how the pluriverse might be; it provides an explicit tabulation, via the proxies, of the relationships that hold of the possible individuals in each of the worlds.

A proxy pluriverse will not in general be 'realistic'; it will not represent the way the pluriverse really is. How then are such proxy pluriverses to be singled out? In order to answer this question, let us suppose that we are given a well-ordering \( i_1, i_2, \ldots \) of all the proxy-individuals; and let us say that the proxy-world \( w \) of the proxy-pluriverse is realized by a corresponding well-ordering of individuals \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \) if \( R \) holds of \( x_{k_1}, x_{k_2}, \ldots, x_{k_n} \) just in case \( <w, R, i_{k_1}, i_{k_2}, \ldots, i_{k_n}> \) is a proxy-relationship of the proxy pluriverse. Thus a proxy-world will be realized by an assignment of individuals to proxy-individuals (\( x_1 \) to \( i_1 \), \( x_2 \) to \( i_2 \), \( \ldots \) ) if it correctly represents the relations that hold among those individuals. So, for example, it will represent \( R \)'s holding of \( x_1, x_2 \) (via the proxy-relationship \( <w, R, i_1, i_2> \)) just in case \( R \) does hold of \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \). A proxy-pluriverse may now be said to be realistic (under a given well-ordering of its proxy-individuals) if possibly there

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\(^{16}\) The basic idea behind the method is presented in Fine ([77], 148) and a related approach has been developed by Sider ([01], §5).

\(^{17}\) We shall suppose that distinct proxy-worlds enter into different relationships - so that if \( w \neq v \) then there is a relation \( R \) and proxy-individuals \( i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n \) which are such that \( <w, R, i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n> \) is a proxy relationship within the proxy pluriverse while \( <v, R, i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n> \) is not, or vice versa.
is an \( x_1 \), possibly there is an \( x_2 \), ... such that:

(i) each \( x_i \) is distinct from \( a_i, a_2, \ldots \), where \( a_1, a_2, \ldots \) is a list of all the actual individuals;

(ii) \( x_j \) and \( x_k \) are distinct for \( j \neq k \);

(iii) necessarily any individual is identical to \( a_1 \) or \( a_2 \) or ...
 or to \( x_1 \) or \( x_2 \) or ...

(iv) each proxy-world is possibly realized by \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \);

(v) it is necessary that some proxy-world is realized by \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \).

Clauses (i)-(iii) say that \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \) are pairwise distinct and together constitute the domain of possibilia; clause (iv) says that each of the proxy-worlds represents a genuine possibility (under the given assignment of individuals to proxy-individuals); and clause (v) says that the proxy-worlds exhaust the genuine possibilities.\(^{18}\)

Given a realistic proxy-pluriverse, we may then quantify over the proxy-worlds and the proxy-individuals as if they were the possible worlds and the possible individuals of the real pluriverse. Thus instead of saying that \( R \) holds of certain possible individuals in a given possible world, we may say that \(<w, R, i, j>\) is a proxy-relationship within the given proxy-pluriverse. There will of course be many realistic pluraliverses (and many ways of ordering their proxy-individuals). But the ambiguity will not matter, since different realistic pluraliverses are isomorphic and hence will yield the same truth-value for any given possibilist claim.

The resulting reduction is highly inelegant. It requires enormous expressive resources in order to capture a relatively modest extension in expressive power. For whether a given proxy-pluriverse is realistic depends upon the truth of the infinitary proposition given by the clauses (i)-(v) above. And so, in stating any given reduction, we must either possess the means to express this infinitary proposition, in which case the language of the reduction must itself be infinitary, or we must possess the means to refer to this proposition (or to a corresponding sentence), in which case the language of the reduction must be capable of describing the structure and semantics of an infinitary language or ontology of propositions.

But there is a more serious problem. For how can we be sure that there is a realistic proxy-pluriverse? The problem is essentially one of cardinality. For in order for a proxy-pluriverse to be realistic there must possibly be an \( x_1 \), possibly be an \( x_2 \), ... such that \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \) are all the possible individuals that there are. There must therefore be as many variables '\( x_1 \)', '\( x_2 \)', ... - or operators 'possibly an \( x_1 \)', 'possibly an \( x_2 \)', ... - as there are possible objects. But suppose there are \( c \) such operators, for some cardinal number \( c \). It is then arguable that there could be a greater, infinite

\(^{18}\) A similar modal description of the pluriverse is given in Fine ([77], 147).
number \(d\) of possibilia. For there could be a possible world that contained \(d\) 'parallel' universes, each with its own particles; and since there are presumably only finitely many actual particles (and since, necessarily, each particle is necessarily a particle), at least \(d\) of these particles from the parallel universes will be nonactual.

There are perhaps ways in which this latter problem can be solved.\(^{15}\) But a general form of the cardinality worry remains. For if a proxy-reduction is to succeed, there must be a one-one correspondence between the possible individuals and worlds of the pluriverse, one the one side, and the objects of the actual world, on the other. (Or perhaps we should say, more cautiously, between the possible individuals and worlds of the pluriverse and the objects of some possible world, since one might carry out the reduction from the perspective of some possible world, viewed as actual, rather than from the perspective of the actual world itself.)

But is such an assumption reasonable? Will there be a world within the pluriverse of the same 'size' as the pluriverse itself? This is a difficult question (and of some interest in itself). But I am inclined to think the answer is 'no'. For there is a puzzle whose solution appears to require that we give the assumption up.\(^{20}\) I shall state the puzzle for the case of 'communicating egos', though there are other forms it might take.

We imagine ourselves attempting to ascertain how many possible Cartesian egos there are. Now even if there are no actual Cartesian egos, there could be one. That is:

(1) There is at least one possible ego.

It is also plausible that:

(2) Given any possible world containing one or more egos, there is a possible world in which those egos exist and in which, for any subclass of those egos, there is an ego which is in telepathic communication with just those of the given egos that are members of the subclass.

Finally, we may wish to maintain that:

(3) Given any class of possible egos, there is some possible world in which they all exist.

\(^{15}\) One solution, suggested in Fine ([77],148), is to use so-called 'quasi-classes' to set up a one-one correspondence between the possibilia and the actualia (a great gain in elegance and simplicity is thereby also achieved). Quasi-classes are the possibilist counterpart of plural quantification (in the sense of Boolos [84]) and were introduced, along with the general idea of plural quantification, in Fine ([77], 146-7).

\(^{20}\) Some related arguments, based on diagonal considerations, have been discussed by Forrest and Armstrong [84], Bringsjord [85], Menzel [86a], and Kaplan [95].
Although each of these assumptions is individually plausible, together they are inconsistent. For from (3) (letting the class be the class of all possible egos), it follows that:

(4) There is a possible world (call it Descartes' world) in which all possible egos exist.
From (1), it follows that:
(5) Descartes' world contains some egos.
And from (2), it follows that:
(6) Given any possible world which contains some egos, there is a possible world which contains more egos, since in the world with telepathic communication there will be more communicating egos than egos with which they communicate. But (4) and (6) are incompatible with one another, since there can be no possible world which contains more egos than the class of them all. What are we to say? Which of the assumptions (1) - (3) should be given up? It is natural to suppose that it should be (3). But we would like this principle for the most part to be true. And if we ask what is it about the class of all possible egos that prevents them from all existing, the only acceptable answer would appear to be that the class is too large. In other words, the domains of each possible world will be subject to a 'limitation of size'; and even though the pluriverse may be capable of exceeding this size, the worlds within the pluriverse will not be. Each such world will possess an 'actual' or 'actualizable' infinity of objects and be incapable of accommodating the 'potential' infinity of possible objects that belong to the pluriverse as a whole.\(^21\) But if this is our motivation for rejecting the possible existence of all possible egos, then we are obliged to conclude that there are more possible egos than there are objects in any possible world, since it is only this that prevents them all from possibly existing. If this is right, then the assumption that there could be as many actuals as possibles is untenable and the whole idea of a proxy reduction should be abandoned.\(^22\) But even if it is not right and another solution to the puzzle be discovered, there is still something unsatisfactory, for the reasons already given, about having the adequacy of the reduction depend upon such

\(^{21}\) This is a distinction that may be easier for the actualist rather than for the possibilist to maintain. For the actualist may argue that just as there is no perspective (one transcending all ordinals) from which the class of all sets is given, so there is no perspective (one transcending all possible worlds) from which the class of all possibilia is given. (In this connection, see Menzel ([86a], [86b]) and Grim [86]).

\(^{22}\) There is a related problem over cardinality in representing Fregean abstracts as sets within the cumulative hierarchy (Fine [98b]).
substantive metaphysical views; and it would be desirable if some other way of of reducing possibilist discourse could be found.

§3 Reduction without Proxies

It is important to bear in mind that a reduction need not proceed via proxies. The mother of all reductions, Russell's theory of descriptions, cannot readily be regarded as one in which entity gives way to entity and another example, more pertinent to our present concerns, is that in which quantification over pairs is replaced by quantification pairs. Instead of saying 'there is a pair x such that ...', one says 'there is an x₁ and an x₂ such that ...'. Here there is no single entity that goes proxy for a pair. Many philosophers seem to have followed Lewis ([86], 141) in supposing that they must either go with proxy reduction ('ersatzism') or accept possible worlds realism. But this is a false dilemma. For as I have indicated in previous work²³, it is possible to provide a straightforward nonproxy reduction of possibilist discourse.

The basic idea is to to take modality as primitive and to treat the possibilist quantifier 'there is a possible object x' as equivalent to 'possibly there is an object x' - where the second quantifier (in the scope of the possibility operator) is actualist, ranging in each world over the actual objects of that world. Thus to say that there is a possible object that is possibly a talking donkey is to say that possibly there is an object that is possibly a talking donkey.

Unfortunately, the above method does not work in all cases. To say that there is a possible object that is not actual is not to say that possibly there is an (actual) object that is not actual, since the the latter claim is necessarily false while the former claim is presumably true. The method must therefore be modified. The difficulty is that the possibility operator takes us to another world, whereas we wish to evaluate the statement governed by the possibilist quantifier in the original world. We therefore need some device to take us back to the original world. There are various ways in which this might be done, but let me here present just one. Back-reference is to be achieved, in the most direct and straightforward manner, by means of reference to the actual world. Thus to say that there is a possible object that is not actual will be to say that the actual world is such that it is possible that there is an object whose non-existence is compatible with that world being actual. And, in general, to say that some possible object φ's is to say that the actual world is such that it is possible that there is an object whose φ-ing is compatible with that

²³ Beginning with Fine ([77], 130-9). A comparison with the standard proxy reduction is made in Fine ([85], 180-3) and some technical details can be found in Fine ([79], [81], [82]).
world being actual.

Of course, this reduction requires reference to the actual world. But such reference is not objectionable to the actualist as such, for his complaint is against the possibles of a given kind - whether they be worlds or individuals - and not against the kinds themselves.

The reduction of possible worlds is now merely the special case of the reduction of possible individuals in which the individuals are taken to be the worlds. Thus to say 'for some possible world' will be to say 'possibly for some (actual) world' in the simplest case; and back-reference can be achieved in the general case in the same way as before. (Thus worlds will now play a double role, as the objects of quantification and as the means for securing back-reference).

Of course, we do not get rid of the world on this approach - merely, possible worlds. But the problem for the actualist is not with the actual world, but with possible entities, whether they be worlds or of some other kind. If we also wish to get rid of the actual world and treat it as a special kind of fact, say, or proposition, then this is something that might be tacked onto the present reduction but is of no concern to the actualist as such.

The beauty of the method is that it does not require any addition to the ontology. Quantification over possibilia, be they worlds or individuals, is eliminated in favour of the corresponding quantification over actualia. There is a direct trade between the the ontology of possibilia, on the one hand, and the ideology of modality, on the other. Moreover, the assumptions upon which the reduction depends are minimal. It need only be assumed that:

1. necessarily there is a world; and
2. necessarily, for any world and true proposition, the truth of the proposition is implied by the existence of the world.

Once these assumptions are granted, the adequacy of the reduction is guaranteed.

The main difficulty with this approach is that it is not clear how it is to be extended to quantification over sets of possibles (Fine [77], 145). We could try to understand such quantification as quantification over possible sets. But a possible set can only consist of compossibles, i.e. of objects that can possibly all exist, whereas we should also allow for quantification over all sets of noncompossible objects.

A uniform solution to this problem is available in the case of any proxy reduction, since a set of the objects from the class of objects to be reduced can always be identified with the set of their proxies; and it would be desirable if a uniform

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24 If we wish to take care of questions concerning the identity of worlds, then it should also be assumed that there is necessarily at most one world.
solution could also be obtained in the case of any nonproxy reduction. One possibility here is to treat quantification over sets as a certain form of plural quantification. To say that there is a set \( X \) is to say, in effect, that there are certain individuals \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \); and to say that \( x \in X \) is to say, in effect, that \( x \) is one of the individuals \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \). Let us be a little more precise. Suppose that we are somehow equipped with an understanding of a first-order language \( L_1 \) in which the quantifiers range over what we shall please to call individuals; and let it be granted that our understanding extends, in principle, to sentences of infinitary length (we could equally well work with propositions rather than sentences). Suppose that we now introduce a quantifier \( \exists X \) over sets of individuals; and consider any sentence \( \phi \) of the resulting language. We wish to extend the truth-predicate to the resulting language, though without quantifying over sets. This may be done inductively on the logical complexity of the sentence to which the truth-predicate is applied. The clauses in the case of the truth-functional connective and the quantifier \( \exists x \) over individuals are straightforward. And so that leaves sentences of the form \( \exists X \phi \). Intuitively, we wish to say that such a sentence is true iff an argument is true, but we have no straightforward way of saying what an instance is. What we may do instead is to find a first-order counterpart of an instance. This may be obtained in two steps. First we replace each free occurrence of the set-variable 'X' in \( \phi \) by a term \( \{x_1, x_2, \ldots \} \) with a given number of distinct new variables \( x_1', x_2', \ldots \) (sets give way to individuals); and then we replace each atomic subformula \( x \in \{x_1, x_2, \ldots \} \) in the resulting formula by \( x = x_1 \lor x = x_2 \lor \ldots \). (membership gives way to identity), and similarly for all other atomic subformula involving \( \{x_1, x_2, \ldots \} \). Let the resulting sentence be \( \phi' \). Then an instance of \( \exists X \phi \) is a sentence of the form \( \exists x_1, x_2, \ldots \phi' \).

We thereby obtain truth-conditions for a language \( L_2 \) with variables for both individuals and sets of individuals. The method can be extended to a language \( L_3 \) with quantifiers that range over sets of 'rank' \( \leq 2 \), i.e. over sets whose members are either individuals or sets of individuals; and the construction may then be continued into the transfinite. We thereby obtain truth-conditions for a language \( L_\alpha \) of arbitrary order \( \alpha \); and so, as long as we are able to identify the sets we wish to quantify over as those whose rank is less than a given ordinal \( \alpha \), we are in a position to account for quantification over such sets in terms of our understanding of the base language.

This reduction does not allow us to eliminate reference to sets altogether, since the definition of truth requires the full

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25 Atomic formulas of the form \( \{x_1, x_2, \ldots \} \in x, x \in y \) and \( x = \{x_1, x_2, \ldots \} \) are replaced by \( _1 \); and \( X = Y \) is treated as definitionally equivalent to \( \forall x (x \in X \iff x \in Y) \). Special provision should be made for the null class.
Fictionalism

We have argued against any proxy reduction of the possible to the actual and in favour of a certain form of nonproxy reduction. But are there any other acceptable forms of nonproxy reduction?

One candidate is the modal fictionalism of Rosen [90].

The possibilist wishes to assert:

\[ (e) \text{ possibly there are talking donkeys iff there is a possible world in which donkeys talk.} \]

And, in general, where \( \phi \) is a modal claim and \( \phi' \) is its possibilist translation, the possibilist will maintain:

\[ (E) \phi \iff \phi' \]

But, given that he accepts the possibility of talking donkeys and other such modal claims, he is thereby committed to a plethora of possible worlds. The fictionalist, by contrast, will think of the possibilist's views of the pluriverse as constituting a fiction and will therefore replace \( (e) \) with:

\[ (e') \text{ possibly there are talking donkeys iff it is true according to the fictional account of the pluriverse that there is some possible world in which there are talking donkeys;} \]

and, more generally, he will replace \( (E) \) with:

\[ (E') \phi \iff \text{it is true in PW that } \phi', \]

where PW is the fictional account of the pluriverse. In this way, he can take advantage of the possible world semantics for modal discourse without committing himself to its ontology. In making the transition from ordinary modal claims to their possibilist translation, we enter a fictional realm of possible

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26 Indeed, it also requires that we be able to treat the domain of sets in the object-language as a set within the meta-language. But this set-theoretic 'ascent' is something which one might argue is always available to us.

27 The idea behind this reduction derives from Goedel's reconstruction of Russell's no-class theory in [90], 132.

28 A related form of fictionalism, to which similar criticisms apply, is that of Armstrong [89]. An altogether different approach, which I shall not discuss, is that of Forbes ([85], 89-95). The view is critically examined in Cresswell ([90], 47-62) and Chihara ([98], chap. 4).
worlds and their inhabitants, according to the fictionalist, rather than one that is genuinely there.

The view, as stated, would appear to fall flat on its face. For on any account of the fiction PW that might reasonably be proposed, there will presumably be possibilist translations $\phi^\ast$ of modal claims $\phi$ whose truth-value is not settled within PW. Perhaps $\phi^\ast$ is the claim that there is a possible world in which there are more than $N_1$, individuals. It is not then implausible to suppose that:

(I) it is not true in PW that some possible world contains more than $N_1$, individuals and it is not true in PW that every possible world contains at most $N_1$, individuals.

But, from the modified equivalence $(E')$ above and the first part of (I), it follows that it is not possible that there are more than $N_1$, individuals and, from $(E')$ and the second part of (I), it follows that it is not necessary that there are at most $N_1$, individuals. And this is a contradiction.

In the face of this difficulty, Rosen ([90], 341-3) has suggested that modal claims $\phi$ like the one above should be taken to be indeterminate, i.e., to be neither true nor false. But this is of no help in avoiding the contradiction unless principle $(E')$ is somehow modified. Presumably, the intent is that it should take the form:

$(E'')$ it is true that $\phi$ iff it is true in PW that $\phi^\ast$, where 'it is true that' is an operator that converts an indeterminate statement into one that is false. But the scope of the view is now seriously compromised, for we lack any account of what it is in general for a modal statement $\phi$ to hold. Where $\phi$ is indeterminate, we would like there to be a possibilist or quasi-possibilist translation that is correspondingly indeterminate. But the fictionalist is unable to provide any such translation, since $\phi^\ast$ and 'In PW, $\phi^\ast$' are both false. Thus the fictionalist is unable adequately to represent the question 'Is it possible that there are more than $N_1$, individuals?'. He can only provide a question to which the answer is 'No', whereas we want a question to which the answer is neither 'Yes' nor 'No'.

Numerous other difficulties for the view have been raised. Three that strike me as especially serious are as follows. First, the account depends upon a problematic notion of what it is to be true in a fiction. For can we understand this notion in the required way without already presupposing an understanding of modality? Second, it is not clear how to specify an adequate fiction PW, one that will deliver the right truth-values, without already presupposing the truth of the modal statements whose truth-conditions are in question. Third, the account does not adequately represent the content of modal

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29 See Rosen ([90], [93], [95]), Brock [93], Noonan [94], Divers [95], Hale [95], Nolan [96], Chihara [98], and Sider [00].
claims even should it get their truth-value right. To make the controversial claim that things are necessarily spatio-temporally connected is not to claim that it is true in a fiction, in which every possible world is taken to be spatio-temporally connected, that every possible world is spatio-temporally connected, even should the claim be true. (To some extent, these difficulties are interdependent. We might solve the first difficulty, for example, by taking truth-in-a-fiction to be strict logical implication, but the second difficulty then becomes more acute).

From our own point of view, Rosen's fictionalism involves a large element of overkill. For it attempts to get rid of the ordinary modal idioms in addition to the ontology of possible worlds and individuals. But suppose we are happy with the modal idioms and merely wish to rid ourselves of possibilia. A much more satisfactory form of fictionalism can then be maintained. For we can take the possible worlds semantics itself to constitute a fiction. Thus among the basic postulates of the fiction will be the following:

(i) A statement is true iff it is true in the actual world;
(ii) Possibly A is true in a world iff A is true in some world;
(iii) Something φ's is true in a world w iff some individual of w φ's in w.

We also import all truths into the fiction as long as their quantifiers are restricted to what is actual.30

There are three major differences between our fictionalism and Rosen's. First, instead of telling a metaphysical story about the constitution of the pluriverse, as with Rosen's account, our fiction tells a semantical story about the connection of the pluriverse with the modal facts. Second, truth-in-a-fiction is not a new substantive notion for us; it is simply logical implication (in the strict sense). Third, the connection between modal and possibilist claims is reconceived. Instead of modifying the original equivalence (E) to (E') (or to (E'')), we modify it to: (E'') it is true in the fiction that (φ iff φ').

Thus the original equivalence (E) is itself taken to be assertible within the given fiction and reasoning can proceed within the fiction as if we were bona fide possibilists.

It is clear, in the light of these differences, that our account is not subject to the difficulties mentioned above. Since we do not insist upon (E'), the difficulty over indeterminacy does not arise. But should the actualist statement φ be true, there is no difficulty in showing that φ is true in the fiction. For (φ iff φ') will be true in the fiction by the semantical postulates, φ will be true in the

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30 This corresponds to Rosen's 'encyclopedia' ([90], 335). We need the restriction to prevent the importation of something like 'everything is actual'.
fiction by importation, and so \( \phi' \) will be true in the fiction as a logical consequence. Thus \( (E') \) will never fail when \( \phi \) is either true or false; and there will be no unwanted gaps. Since the imported modal truths may be used in this way to deliver the correct possibilist consequences, there is no special difficulty in providing an adequate noncircular account of what the fiction is. Finally, there will be no difficulty over according the correct content to modal claims, since no attempt is made to ascribe a content to them. Our aim is simply to adopt a fictionalist simulacrum of possibilist discourse.  

The new form of fictionalism is analogous to if-then-ism in the philosophy of mathematics\(^{12}\) and is not without its attractions. It is still subject to difficulties, however. For we have substantive views about the nature of possible worlds - we do not think of them as mere ciphers. We are inclined to think, for example, that no two worlds can be exactly alike or that what is true at a world cannot be different from what it is. These views should not, of course, be understood as being literally true of how things are for the fictionalist, since he does not believe in many worlds, but it should be possible for him to understand them as being true of how things are in the fiction. Thus he should take it to be true in the fiction that no two worlds are exactly alike or that what is true in a world cannot be different from what it is. However, under the most natural construal of what the fiction is, these various questions concerning the content of the fiction will not be settled one way or the other. The worlds serve merely as pegs upon which to hang the modal truths and nothing beyond their serving this structural role need be said about their nature. So the view will suffer from a problem of incompleteness after all, not with respect to ordinary modal claims but with respect to the superstructure of worlds within which they are embedded.

How might this incompleteness be repaired? There are two main options. The first is to add postulates to the fiction that explicitly describe the nature of the worlds. Thus there may be a postulate stipulating that no two worlds are exactly alike. But we then face a variant of the third of the objections listed above. For to claim, in the intended sense, that no two worlds are exactly alike is not to claim that this is true in a fiction in which it has been stipulated to hold. The other option is to have these various claims follow from actualist modal truths in much the same way that the existence of worlds with talking donkeys follows from the possibility that donkeys talk. Thus suppose we take it to be true that

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\(^{11}\) I might note that the objections made by Brock [93] and Hale [95] are also inapplicable to the present version of fictionalism.

\(^{12}\) As characterized in §3 of Putnam [67], for example.
necessarily for any (actual) world w and necessarily for any distinct world v there is some elementary fact holding in v but not in w (or vice versa). Then the rest of the fiction might be so set up that, once this modal truth is imported into the fiction, the desired possibilist truth concerning the discernibility of distinct worlds will follow. But in this case, the fictionalism does no work for, given that our actualist modal language already contains quantification over worlds, possibilist quantification over worlds and individuals will be definable in the manner of our own reduction. Thus fictionalism of the supra-modal sort is either inadequate or redundant. 33

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