The Unicity of *There* and the Definiteness Effect

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1.

English sentences such as:

(1) There are ghosts.

are often called ‘existential sentences’ and are characterized by the presence of an
‘expletive’ subject *there* that is in some relation to its postverbal ‘associate’, here *ghosts*.
Such existential sentences are subject to a well-known ‘definiteness effect’, which in
some cases is very strong, in particular with unstressed definite pronouns. One
relevant contrast is:

(2) One wonders if it really exists.
(3) *One wonders if there really exists it.

An unstressed *it* can be the preverbal subject of *exists* as in (2), but cannot be the
postverbal associate in (3).

The strength of this definiteness effect with unstressed pronouns is found even in so-
called ‘list’-sentences, where the definiteness effect seems otherwise to be suspended.
For example, as a follow-up to *Who can we get to help us?*, one can have:

(4) Well, there’s John.
despite the fact that simple proper names normally act as definites. In the right context,
one can also have:

(5) Well, there’s him.

if *him* is stressed. Whereas if that pronoun is unstressed, the result is unacceptable:

(6) *Well, there’s ‘im.
(7) *Well, there is ‘im.

whether or not *is* is reduced.

I will return very briefly later to the suspension of the definiteness effect in list
contexts. For now, let me focus on the contrast between (2) vs. (3), which bears on the
proper formulation of a potential universal spoken of by Szabolcsi (1994, 182) in the
following terms:

(8) the semantic universal that existential verbs only combine with indefinite
noun phrases

This is essentially the definiteness effect elevated to universal status. Taking the
definiteness effect to be universally valid is plausible and desirable, but the formulation
in (8) cannot be exactly right, given the acceptability of (2), in which *exists* itself
combines with definite unstressed *it*.

What the contrast within English between (2) and (3) suggests is that (8) be
reformulated as:

(9) When cooccurring with expletive *there* (or a counterpart of it in other
languages), existential verbs only combine with indefinite noun phrases.
(This reformulation of the definiteness effect as a universal also drops the term
‘semantic’ from (8).)
In further support of (9) over (8), we can note some contrasts that are quite clear even with lexical DPs, for example in the context of a treasure hunt where the participants are getting discouraged:

(10) The treasure definitely exists, so keep looking.
(11) *There definitely exists the treasure, so keep looking.

and similarly:

(12) That the planets exist is obvious.
(13) *That there exist the planets is obvious.

A point about other languages is in order. The counterpart of expletive *there referred to in (9) may in some languages (e.g. Danish) resemble English *there in occupying subject position. In others, as Burzio (1986, 148) noted for Italian *ci, there may be an element that is a good match for *there in many respects, except for position, in that Italian *ci (‘there’) ends up in an object clitic position rather than in an ordinary subject position. Like Italian in this respect are French and Catalan, with object clitics *y and *hi, respectively. A third group of languages may have, instead, a silent counterpart of *there. For the Romance family, this is arguably the case for Spanish (except perhaps for the present tense, with -y), for Portuguese and for Romanian.

The preceding paragraph takes it for granted that all languages will have individuable existential sentences that show a clear definiteness effect, at least with unstressed pronouns. In those languages, at least in those sentences, there will be a silent counterpart of *there if there is not an overt one. (No silent counterpart of *there would be necessary in a language that showed no definiteness effect at all.)

Abbott (1993, 41), in approaching the definiteness effect from the perspective of pragmatics, claims that “the function of existential sentences is to draw the addressee’s attention to the existence and/or location of the entity or entities denoted by the focus NP” (where ‘focus NP’ corresponds to ‘associate’ as used above). As in the earlier discussion of Szabolcsi (1994), it seems clear that Abbott has in mind existential sentences with *there, not all existential sentences, in particular not those that are like (2), (10) or (12). The question that pragmatics alone cannot answer, though, is why it is exactly existential sentences with *there that are associated with the specific pragmatic function that they appear to be associated with.

Why, then, is there a definiteness effect in certain existential sentences, and why does it correlate with the presence of expletive *there (and its counterparts in other languages)?

2.

To answer this last question, I think we have to ask what is in ways a more basic one, i.e. what is the status of the expletive *there in question? It is often taken to be the case that expletive *there is:*

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2Cf. also Freeze (1992, 568).
3In agreement with Chomsky (1995, 154).
4On how to bring out the definiteness effect in Italian, see Belletti (1988, 9). The analysis to be developed here will not need to bring in her use of partitive Case. How closely Finnish partitive corresponds to French (sub-DP) de-NP as discussed in Kayne (1981, 95ff.) remains to be determined.
(14) i) uninterpretable (i.e. contributes nothing to the interpretation of sentences in which it occurs)
   ii) externally merged in a relatively high Spec position
In agreement with Moro (1997; 2000, 125), Sabel (2000), Choe (2006), and Deal (2009),
I will take (ii) to be false, and will therefore look for a more natural source for expletive there.

That leads in turn to the general question of homophones, which the language faculty clearly tolerates in some cases. A few examples from (my) English are:

(15) one/won; two/to; four/for; eight/ate; red/read(past tense); sew/so
The two elements of each pair of homophones arguably have in common only their phonological realization. In each of these pairs, the two elements have distinct spellings. An often cited example with identical spelling is:

(16) bank/bank
with one being the bank of a river, the other a financial institution. Whether these two really have nothing whatsoever in common (apart from their phonology and apart from both being nouns) is not quite as clear, it seems to me, as it is in (15). Be that as it may, if we take (English-type) orthography to reflect a set of informal linguistic hypotheses, it becomes tempting to put forth the following conjecture (at least for English):

(17) If X and Y are functional elements and are homophones, then X and Y cannot have the same spelling.

Let us now consider the case of there/there, where one is the expletive at issue, and the other what we think of as locative there. If (17) is correct, then it follows that these two instances of there cannot be homophones (since they have the same spelling and are both functional elements). In which case they must have more in common than their phonology (a conclusion that is difficult to reconcile with the idea that one of them is an uninterpretable expletive). But if there and there are not homophones, then the most appealing hypothesis is surely that they are identical (in particular in how they externally merge), and that there is only one there in English.

This leads to the only at first glance implausible conclusion that in a sentence like:

(18) There is a problem there.
there are two instance of the same there. In fact, if we don’t mind mixing registers a bit for the purposes of exposition, and if we take therefore to be there + for(e) (cf. for that reason), we can construct a single sentence with four apparently distinct theres, one example being:

(19) Therefore, there’s a problem there in that there paper of yours.

6Who provides many more relevant references.
7For a pair like their/there, if there is a common morpheme th-, we can take there to be a pair of homophones -eir/-ere.
8I am grateful to Thomas Leu for insightful discussion bearing on this question.

It may be, thinking of Chomsky and Halle (1968, 69, 184n), that distinct orthography correlates with distinct underlying phonology.

For the purposes of this paper, I set aside the important question of idioms.
in which the last *there* is what Bernstein (1997) called a demonstrative reinforcer, seen in the following paradigm, in non-standard English:

(20) that there dog; this here dog; them there dogs; these here dogs
Yet if (17) is correct, no two instances of *there* can be homophones, and (19) must contain four instances of the same *there*.9 (The *there* that Bernstein called a ‘demonstrative reinforcer’ I will henceforth call ‘deictic’, since I will be suggesting that it needn’t always cooccur with a demonstrative.)

3.

Before going on to spell out more in detail how all these instances of *there* can be, despite appearances, the same element, let me briefly note the effect of the word ‘functional’ in (17), which is to in fact allow for homophones with identical orthography if at least one of the pair is part of the non-functional (truly lexical) part of the lexicon, for example in the following pair (assuming *see* to be lexical):

(21) saw/saw (past tense of *see*, instrument for cutting wood)
i.e. (17) allows these two instances of *saw* to be true homophones despite the common orthography.

On a different tack, the question arises as to whether the X and Y of (17) are to be taken to be words or morphemes or, plausibly, either words10 or single morphemes. If we interpret (17) to cover morphemes, too, we arrive at cases like:

(22) un-/un-
where one is the negative prefix of, for example, *unintelligent* and the other the reversative prefix of, for example, *unpack*. If these two instances of *un-* fall under (17), they cannot be homophones and must, as in the discussion of *there*, be identical, i.e. there must be just one prefix *un*-.11 This has some plausibility, insofar as *unpack* has a negative component. The syntactic environment of these two instances of *un-* would of course be different, including the possible presence of different silent elements.

Less plausible for the extension of (17) to prefixes would appear at first to be:

(23) in-/in-
where one is the negative prefix seen in *intolerable* and the other the preposition-related *in-* of *incision* (cf. *excise*). On the other hand, there’s the question whether the notion ‘same spelling’ in (17) should be sensitive to the fact that negative *in-* has a variant *il-* seen in *illegal* and a variant *ir-* seen in *irreducible*, while the prepositional *in-* prefix does not.

As far as suffixes are concerned, we might think of:

(24) -er/-er
where one is the comparative suffix and the other the agentive one. Here identification of the two does seem implausible; whether this is compatible with the strongest possible interpretation of (17) will depend on whether (17) can ‘see’ the difference that holds

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9Unless we were to countenance (arguably less restrictive) recourse to ‘overlapping interpretations’ of *there* in a way that would recall Wood and Marantz (to appear).
10*There* itself is almost certainly (at least) bimorphemic, if we compare it to *where* and then compare the pair *there/where* to the pair *then/when*.
11The -*n* of which may well be a separate morpheme identical to the negative *n-* of *not, n’t, no, never.*
between comparative and agentive -er with respect to the syllable structure of what -er attaches to.\footnote{And/or comparative -er might actually be bimorphemic, as suggested by more (and perhaps fore), with the -e- in comparatives then identical to the -e- of superlatives, whose morphemic status, separate from superlative -st, is suggested by most, least, first, last, best, worst.}

Additional consequences of (17), if (17) is taken to cover morphemes within larger words, would be that all instances of -ing that are pronounced the same are the same element,\footnote{And similarly for -ion, despite the process vs. result ambiguity, which might involve silent EVENT vs. silent RESULT.} that past tense -ed and past participial -ed are the same,\footnote{As argued by Solà (1994).} that verbal -s and plural -s are the same,\footnote{Relevant here is Postma’s (1993) proposal that English verbal -s is a reflexive.} and that (if apostrophes are to be ignored) possessive -s is the same as these two.\footnote{The execution of this last idea might be that plural -s occurs in a possessive structure with a silent noun SET, i.e. books would be as in:

i) book ’s SET with three books looking like:

ii) [three book] ’s SET akin to:

iii) a set of three books

On SET, see Kayne (2006).} In addition, we would almost certainly expect that comparative less, as in less time, and the suffixal -less of timeless are the same, again despite appearances.\footnote{A link between them might well pass through the similarity between the following two sentences:

i) We have less time than we used to have.

ii) ?We are without the (amount of) time that we used to have.

An example of a problem for this general approach as extended to subword morphemes might be English -en, which seems to be a past participle morpheme in, say, bitten, but an inchoative/causative morpheme in blacken. (Yet the two never seem to cooccur.)

A non-problem, on the other hand, is:

iii) atop a mountain

since the preposition-like a- of atop arguably lacks the -n of the indefinite article.

The phonological identity in French between prepositional en (‘in’) and pronominal clitic en (‘thereof’) mentioned by Pollock (1998, note 5) may suggest that the clitic itself corresponds to an adpositional counterpart of the of of English thereof; for relevant discussion, see Kayne (2004, sect. 3).}

4.

Returning to there, we can distinguish, in (19), the following subtypes of there:

(25) i) expletive there

ii) locative there
iii) the there of therefore, akin to thereby, thereof
iv) deictic there

Along the lines of Kayne (2004), let me take locative there to be related to deictic there as follows. There is strong parallelism in the following:

(26) We went there yesterday.
(27) We went to that there place yesterday. (non-standard)
that is to be expressed by taking there in (26) to be the one visible piece of a larger phrase (capitals will be used to indicate silent elements):

(28) we went TO THAT there PLACE yesterday

The to, that and place seen in (27) are also present in (26), except that in (26) they are not pronounced. The there of (26) is not at all locative per se. Rather the there of (26) simply is the deictic there, embedded in a locative PP most of whose pieces are silent. (The term ‘locative there’ is henceforth to be understood only in this manner.)

Similarly, the there of therefore should be linked to the deictic there of (non-standard) for that there reason, with therefore then reflecting a larger phrase:

(29) THAT there REASON for(e)

in which there has been leftward (phrasal) movement of there past for(e) in essentially the mode of van Riemsdijk (1978). The there of thereby arguably has WAY in place of REASON. The there of now archaic (for me) thereof is accompanied by THING:

(30) They have spoken thereof. (archaic)
(31) they have spoken THAT there THING of

Summing up, both locative there and the there of therefore, thereby, thereof are instances of deictic there embedded within a larger PP of one sort or another whose other nominal pieces are silent.

5.

That leaves expletive there. For it to reduce to deictic there it must be locally associated with some noun (or noun phrase). Thus in an ordinary sentence such as:

(32) There were books on the table.
there cannot be merged by itself into a sentential Spec position; it must first merge with some N(P). In (32) there appear to be two candidates, books and table, but in the general case the latter, i.e. table, is not a viable candidate, as shown by:

(33) There were books on this table.
(34) There were books here.

In (33), table is accompanied by this, which is otherwise sharply incompatible with there:

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18Cf. Katz and Postal’s (1964, 128) proposal to analyze where as parallel to (at) what place, but with place deleted (and somewhat similarly for there).
19Note that in:
i) There’s a place that I would like to show you
there is the expletive one and is not locative, since there is no locative PP present. The phrasal character of this movement aligns with Barrie and Mathieu’s (2016) analysis of noun-incorporation as phrasal movement. For more details on how the movement(s) take place and on the licensing of the silent elements accompanying there, see Kayne (2004).
In (34), there is a silent noun \textit{PLACE}, but also \textit{here}, which precludes any plausible source for \textit{there}, given:

\begin{equation}
*\text{this here there place}; *\text{this there here place}; *\text{that here there place}; *\text{that there here place}
\end{equation}

I conclude that in all of (32)-(34), \textit{there} must initially merge with \textit{books}.\footnote{This proposal has something in common with that of Sabel (2000); also with Chomsky’s (1995, 156) idea that the associate LF-adopts to \textit{there}.}

That expletive \textit{there} can do so is suggested by:

\begin{equation}
*\text{them there books}; \text{these here books} \quad \text{(both non-standard; \textit{them} is non-standard for \textit{those})}
\end{equation}

in which case we should think of, say, (32) as having a derivation containing as a substage:

\begin{equation}
*\text{were [there books] on the table}
\end{equation}

This conclusion leads in turn to the question of:

\begin{align*}
\text{(37) \quad Them there things ain’t no good. \quad \text{(non-standard)} } \\
\text{(40) \quad *There things ain’t no good.}
\end{align*}

The fact is that, within a DP, deictic \textit{there} can normally only occur if accompanied by a demonstrative (non-standard \textit{them}, in (39)). There is thus an apparent conflict with the occurrence in (32)/(38) of deictic \textit{there} with no demonstrative \textit{those/them} present. (Put another way, how can we distinguish (32) from (40)?)

There is evidence from Hebrew that this challenge is less onerous that it might appear to be. Ordinary Hebrew demonstratives have the property that (as in a number of languages) they cooccur with the definite article:

\begin{equation}
\text{ha-yalda ha-zot} \quad \text{('the girl the dem.')}
\end{equation}

Yet Hebrew also crucially allows, according to Sichel (2001, chap. 1, note 6):

\begin{equation}
\text{yalda zot}
\end{equation}

with no definite article, yet with the same demonstrative element. In addition, while (41) as a direct object would be preceded by the morpheme \textit{et} that normally precedes definite direct objects, (42) would not be. Sichel concludes that (42) is an instance of a demonstrative that is not definite.

The parallel with English is imperfect. Yet it has some force, I think. In Hebrew the demonstrative can sometimes (with interpretive consequences) do without the definite article. In English the deictic can sometimes (arguably with interpretive consequences) do without the demonstrative. Thus Hebrew indirectly increases the plausibility of taking English expletive \textit{there} to be the same \textit{there} as the DP-internal deictic one.

There remains the more specific question of (40) vs. (32) (repeated here):

\begin{equation}
*\text{There were books on the table.}
\end{equation}

If \textit{there} in (43) originates within a phrase ‘[there books]’, why can a phrase of that form not successfully appear in examples like (40)? Here I would like to take advantage of a point made by Szabolcsi (1994, sect. 5) concerning Hungarian possessives, i.e.
concerning the Hungarian counterparts of English definite *our friend* and indefinite *a friend of ours*. Szabolcsi shows that in the case of the definite possessive DP in Hungarian, the possessor may or may not be extracted from within that DP. Whereas when the containing DP is indefinite the possessor must be extracted.\(^{23}\)

Transposing freely to deictic *there*, we have:\(^{24}\)

(44) If deictic *there* is (minimally) embedded within an indefinite DP, then that DP must be split apart by movement.

Part of the derivation of (43) might now be illustrated as in:

(45) were [there books] on the table --> there were [<there> books] on the table

In (45) expletive *there* (= deictic *there*) reaches its sentential Spec position as the result of extraction from within the DP that is often called its ‘associate’. Given that there is ultimately only one *there*, this DP-internal source must be the only source available for expletive *there*.

Alternatively, the derivation of (43) might involve remnant movement, along the following (simplified) lines:\(^{25}\)

(46) [there books] on the table --> raising of ‘books’\(^{26}\)

books [there <books>] on the table --> merger of V

were books [there <books>] on the table --> remnant movement

[there <books>] were books <[there <books>]> on the table

In what follows I will prefer (46) to (45).

6.

\(^{23}\)Kayne’s (1993, sect. 1.2) proposal concerning of moves in that direction for English *a friend of his*.

\(^{24}\)As in the Hungarian case, a question arises as to why such extraction/splitting is obligatory.

The label DP is being used for convenience, the essential point being that *there* starts out within the associate, whatever the exact label. The associate can be complex, as in:

i) There are books you need to read on the table

Similar in one way to the text analysis is Basilico’s (1997) taking expletive *there* to start as sister to a small clause.

*There* itself may well be definite, as suggested by its initial *th-*, yet its presence must not make the containing DP definite. This may reinforce the idea that deictic *there* originates in a relative clause - for discussion, see Kayne (2008, sect. 5).

\(^{25}\)Cf. Androutsopoulou (1997) on the use of remnant movement in the splitting apart of noun and adjective in Greek. The remant movement step in the text derivation must not violate Rizzi’s (1990) Relativized Minimality. Allowing for changes in theory, the text proposal has a point in common with Safir’s (1987, 84) chain relation, and with Deal’s (2009, 286) non-movement Agree relation, though the text proposal expresses the relevant relation in terms of movement from within the associate, and takes expletive *there* to be deictic *there*.

\(^{26}\)Possibly, this initial movement of *books* could be assimilated to Koster’s (1994, 262) proposal for movement into Spec,PredP.
We are now in a position to return to the definiteness effect, the clearest instance of which, as discussed earlier, involves unstressed (anaphoric) pronouns, as in:  

(47) One wonders if it really exists.
(48) *One wonders if there really exists it.

By previous discussion, there in (48) must originate within the associate DP, which in (48) is it. Just as the associate started out in (43)/(45)/(46) as *[there books]*, so then must it start out in (48) as *[there it]*. But this is not a plausibly well-formed DP, given:  

(49) They don’t want that there dog in their yard. (non-standard)
(50) *They don’t want that there it in their yard.

If this is correct, i.e. if deictic there cannot combine with (an unstressed pronoun such as) it in the way that it can combine with a noun like dog, then we have the beginning of an account of the definiteness effect.

More than that, we can now see why the definiteness effect comes into play in (48) but not in (47), even though (47), too, is an existential sentence. The reason is that the definiteness effect has specifically to do with when exactly expletive/deictic there has a well-formed source. Since there is no there in (47), there is no definiteness effect there, either.

However, as mentioned toward the beginning of this paper, there are also clear cases of the definiteness effect with lexical nouns preceded by the definite article, as in the following, in the context of a treasure hunt (where the participants are getting discouraged):

(51) The treasure definitely exists, so keep looking.

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27This is presumably true even in languages that are otherwise freer than English with respect to the definiteness effect. The unstressed pronouns in question are those that correspond to the entire associate, not just to part of it. Not at issue, then, are cases like Italian:

i) Ce ne sono due. (*there of-them are two*)

in which object clitic ne corresponds to only a subpart of the associate, and similarly, I suspect, for Spanish:

ii) Los hay. (*them there-is*)

with an analysis based on the presence of a silent element akin to SOME, but with no of.

On differing sensitivity to definiteness in two dialects of Catalan, see Rigau (2005, 792); similarly, for two varieties of Spanish, Longa et al. (1998, 13).

The incompatibility of expletive there with an unstressed pronoun associate might be related to Pollock’s (1998, 318) discussion of the incompatibility of en and le originating from within the same DP.

In the Italian example:

iii) Una sorella, ce l’ha anche Gianni (*a sister, there it has also G’ = ‘J has a sister, too’)

expletive ce/ci must originate with ‘una sorella’ rather than with unstressed pronominal ‘l(a)’.

28Though languages that are freer than English with respect to modified pronouns will need to be taken into account; cf. Hestvik (1992).

29Not even a silent one, and similarly for (64), (66) and (68) below.
(52) *There definitely exists the treasure, so keep looking.
The account suggested for (48) (in terms of (50)) does not carry over to (52).
Something more general is needed (that may ultimately include (48), too). Pursuing the
key idea that expletive there (= deictic there) must originate within the associate, we
conclude that in (52) there would have to originate within the phrase the treasure:
(53) definitely exists [the there treasure]
The question is why, starting from (53), we cannot reach (52).
The answer cannot simply be that (52) contains an extra determiner (the) as
compared with (43), since some overt determiners are compatible with expletive there,
i.e. some determiners, the weak ones (in Milsark's (1977) terms), trigger no definiteness
effect violation, while others (the strong ones, in his terms), do:
(54) There were three/many/several/no/some books on the table.
The determiners in (54) are all fine with expletive there. A generalization of the
derivation in (46) for these (weak) determiners would (using some, but similarly for the
others) look like:
(55) [there some books] on the table --> raising of 'some books'
some books [there <some books>] on the table --> merger of V
were some books [there <some books>] on the table --> remnant movement
[there <some books>] were some books <[there <some books>]> on the table
We are now in a position to return to the question why (52), with overt determiner
the, cannot be derived using a derivation parallel to (55). From the current perspective,
the answer must be that the in (52) cannot occupy the same position relative to deictic
there as some and the other weak determiners. Some and the others can, as illustrated
in (55), occur between there and the noun. For the numerals, many and several, this
positioning finds support in:
(56) them there three/?many/?several books (non-standard)
For some and no (and for any), we find different behavior (for reasons that remain to be
elucidated):
(57) *them there some/no/any books
The contrast between (56) and (57) recalls:
(58) the three/many/several books that we were reading
vs.:
(59) *the some/no/any books (that we were reading)
In other words, deictic there in (56)/(57) patterns with the itself, suggesting (though not
implying) that the and deictic there cannot cooccur at all. But if so, then there can be no
derivation parallel to (55) in which the replaces some, in which case (52) is not
derivable, given present assumptions.
Of course deictic there does cooccur with that (and with plural demonstrative them in
non-standard English), so the preceding discussion needs to be sharpened if we are to
account for definiteness effects with that, as in (again in the context of a treasure hunt
(where the participants are getting discouraged)):
(60) That treasure definitely exists, so keep looking.
(61) *There definitely exists that treasure, so keep looking.
To my ear, with this kind of anaphoric that, there is a clear definiteness effect. The
question is, could (61) incorrectly have been derived via a derivation that would track
(55), given that that and there are mutually compatible:
(62) That there book ain’t no good. (non-standard)
The answer is no, the reason being that, for (55) to proceed smoothly, some books must, in the first step of (55), be a subconstituent of '[there some books]'. By transposition, to derive (61) we would need '[there that treasure]' (with that treasure a subconstituent), which has the opposite order from the well-formed (62):³⁰

(63) *There that book ain't no good.

Now if the ill-formedness of (63) indicates that '[there that N]' is never available, it follows that it is not possible to substitute that for some in (55), in which case (61) is excluded as desired.

Summing up, the definiteness effect found in sentences with expletive there reflects the fact that certain determiners interfere with the derivation illustrated in (55) that in effect takes deictic there and makes it look like what we call expletive there.³¹

7.

Let me now return to instances of the definiteness effect with the. We have seen earlier:

(64) The treasure definitely exists, so keep looking.
(65) *There definitely exists the treasure, so keep looking.

and similarly:

(66) That the planets exist is obvious.
(67) *That there exist the planets is obvious.

To these we can add (in the context of We have a cat and a dog. We know where the dog is, but...):³²

(68) We’re not sure which room the cat is in.
(69) *We’re not sure which room there’s the cat in.

On the other hand, well-known exceptions to the definiteness effect with the have been brought forth. For example, Abbott (1993, 45) cites:

(70) There is the most beautiful house for sale in the next block!

In the discussion immediately following (59) I suggested that the reason for the ill-formedness of sentences like (65), (67) and (69) lies in the incompatibility, within the associate, between the and there. (In particular one cannot have ‘[there the books]’ parallel to the possible ‘[there some books]’.) At that point it was unnecessary to note that this is (not surprisingly) a local incompatibility, in the familiar sense that the can perfectly well appear embedded more deeply within the associate, in examples like:

³⁰Afrikaans becomes relevant here in ways that I will not pursue - cf. Kayne (2004, sect. 2.1) and Leu (2015, 19).

³¹An alternative ‘manner of interference’ to the one given in the text might attempt to bring in Guéron’s (1980, 666) Name Constraint or Fiengo and Higginbotham’s (1981, 402) Specificity Condition.

³²Extraction from a position following/below the associate sharpens judgments, as noted in Belletti (1988, 11-12) for Italian.
(71) There were photographs of the sun on the wall.

(72) There were books by the physicist Mary Smith on the table.

At an early stage in the derivation of these, the associate would have the form ‘[there photographs of the sun]’, ‘[there books by the physicist Mary Smith]’, with no problem arising, i.e. no conflict between *there* and the more deeply embedded *the*.

With examples like these at hand, a proposal that comes to mind is to relate (70) to:

(73) There is a house of the most beautiful kind for sale in the next block!

by postulating for (70) a silent noun KIND, with (70) then best thought of as:

(74) there is [the most beautiful KIND] house for sale...

The indicated constituent structure has the effect that *the* is too embedded to clash with *there*. The associate will be as in:

(75) [ there [ the most beautiful KIND ] house ]

with ‘the most beautiful KIND’ a complex modifier. In (75) *there* and *the* find themselves at two different levels of DP and do not conflict.

In the same vein, consider the sensible interpretation of:

(76) J has the same eyes as his mother.

which is almost certainly to be related to:

(77) J has eyes of the same kind as his mother’s.

suggesting that (76) should be taken to include:

(78) [ the same KIND ] eyes

much as in (75), apart from the presence of *there*.

The silent KIND that underpins the compatibility of (70) with the definiteness effect is further found in:

(79) We’ll be having three different wines tonight.

with the analysis:

(80) three different wine KIND s

in which the apparent plurality of the mass noun wine is attributed to the plurality of KIND, in which case wine does not need to be ‘shifted’ to a count noun.

We can note in passing that there also exists evidence for a silent INSTANCE, in sentences like:

(81) The ball hit John in the nose, which is an important part of the human body. The non-restrictive relative in this example takes as antecedent *the nose* in what seems to be a generic sense.

Yet we simultaneously understand the nose in question to be John’s. Sense can be made of this paradox if we take (81) to be something like:

(82) the ball hit John in HIS INSTANCE OF the HUMAN nose, which...

8.

As (64)-(69) indicate, the definiteness effect correlates in English with the presence of *there*; it is not a property of existential sentences per se. Another pair of examples of the same general type is:

(83) The funny thing is, the majority of linguists used to be available for telephone interviews.

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The funny thing is, there used to be the majority of linguists available for telephone interviews. Here there is no KIND and the conflicts, within the associate, with there. As expected, if the is replaced by a, the conflict disappears:

(85) The funny thing is, there used to be a majority of linguists available for telephone interviews.

Very much like (83) vs. (84) is the pair:

(86) Most linguists used to be available for telephone interviews.

(87) *There used to be most linguists available for telephone interviews.

Going back to Milsark (1977, 21), it has been known that most triggers the definiteness effect. From the present perspective, it is natural to express the strong similarity between most and the majority by taking (86) to be as in:

(88) THE most PART linguists...

with most accompanied by silent THE and silent PART, thinking of the fact that the French counterpart of most is la plupart (‘the most/more part’). In this way, the definiteness effect seen with most in (87) reduces to the definiteness effect that holds with the, with there in (87) incompatible with this THE. Alternatively (in part), thinking of the fuller French phrase la plupart des linguistes (‘the most/more part of-the linguists’, (88) should be replaced by:

(89) [THE most PART] THE linguists

with the second (generic) THE the one that is incompatible with deictic/expletive there. There is, to my ear, a contrast between (87) and the relatively acceptable:

(90) Where did there used to be the most syntacticians?

The reason for this contrast lies in part, I think, in the fact that (90) is to be grouped with (70) in containing a silent noun (though a different one from the one in (70)) that provides the constituent structure necessary to avoid a definiteness effect violation:

(91) [ the most NUMBER ] syntacticians

with the associate in (90) then starting out as in:

(92) [ there [ the most NUMBER ] syntacticians ]

in which there is no generic THE in the way there is in (89).

Moving from most to all, we can see that there exist some clear definiteness effects with all, too:

(93) These days, all linguists are available for interviews.

(94) *These days, there are all linguists available for interviews.

Thinking of Longobardi (1994), we can readily take these, too, to contain a silent (generic) THE that in (94) conflicts with there internal to the associate DP. With overt the, there are some also clear definiteness effects (as in a context like John has lots of cats and lots of dogs...):

(95) Right now, all the cats are in the kitchen.

(96) *Right now, there are all the cats in the kitchen.

And similarly for Italian, as noted by Belletti (1988, note 16). On silent PART, cf. Tsai’s (1994, 24n) suggestion (based on one by Lisa Cheng) that The whole house has burnt down should be read as All parts of the house...; cf. also Moltmann (1997).

On NUMBER, see Kayne (2002a; 2005; 2007).
Again, we can attribute the definiteness effect here to *the* (rather than directly to *all* itself).

As is well-known, going back to Milsark’s (1977, 6) work, the definiteness effect is also found with *every*. A clear case for me is:

(97) Is somebody/anybody/nobody/everybody home?

(98) Is there somebody/anybody/nobody/*everybody* home?

Either *every* here is directly incompatible with the presence within the associate (*everybody*) of *there*, or there is a silent THE that is.\(^{38}\) As is also well-known, there are other sentences with both *every* and *there* that are fine, e.g. from Abbott (1993, 45):

(99) There is every reason to be suspicious.

This kind of sentence may fall under earlier discussion, if the structure contains as a subpart:\(^{39}\)

(100) [*every KIND*] reason

Arguably falling under the definiteness effect, too, is the absence of a wide scope reading for *three books* in:\(^{40}\)

(101) There must be three books on the table.

From the present perspective, a wide scope (‘specific’) reading of *three books* must in general require the presence of a ‘specific’ D (a more general D than the one restricted to definites), covert in English but arguably overt in Gungbe - Aboh (2004, chap. 3).

That D must, in English and more generally, be incompatible with expletive/deictic *there* in the same way as definite *the* itself.\(^{41}\)

9.

The definiteness effect is apparently lifted in so-called ‘list’ contexts, e.g.:

(102) What should we read? Well, there’s the book on the table.

(103) Who can we invite? Well, there’s John.

Perhaps the definites here are actually embedded within hidden indefinites, so that (103), say, is to be understood as:

\[^{38}\] And similarly for *each* in Milsark’s (1977, 6):

i) *There was each package inspected*

as well as for the (unavailable) universal-like interpretation of his (p.8):

ii) There are koala bears in Australia

and for the restriction seen in:

iii) *There are linguists intelligent.

which he (pp.11-16) assimilates to the definiteness effect.

\[^{39}\] And/or cf. Postma and Rooryck (1996).


\[^{41}\] The ill-formedness of (i) can similarly be taken to reflect the presence of a covert definite or specific D (required by the presence of *all*):

i) *There will all be three books on the table.

The ill-formedness of (ii) (v. Chomsky (1995, 275)) might be related to this:

ii) *There seem to each other to be five people here.

More needs to be said about examples like:

iii) There’s a certain person I want you to introduce me to

from Guéron (1980, note 57)., in which there must not be such a blocking D.
One might wonder why English bothers at all with expletive *there* (= deictic *there* raised, as a remnant, to subject position), and similarly in part for other languages. Sentences with expletive *there* as subject contain an ‘associate’ that must be, not only indefinite, but also, as (101) shows, non-specific. (The term ‘definiteness effect’ is therefore imperfect.) This inversely recalls the fact that some languages prohibit non-specific subjects.\(^{42}\)

In other words, sentences with expletive *there* might be a ‘response’ to the impossibility of non-specific subjects,\(^{43}\) insofar as expletive *there* sentences provide a way for languages to allow arguments to be non-specific that would otherwise be expected to raise to subject position, with expletive *there* itself (or the remnant phrase containing it) fulfilling an EPP(-like) role.

This way of understanding the existence of expletive *there* would be maximally strong if the following held universally:

(105) Non-specific subjects are prohibited.

which doesn’t seem to be the case, given that English appears to readily allow non-specific subjects:

(106) A solution to this problem must exist.

(107) Somebody had better be there when we arrive.

Yet non-specific indefinite subjects have unexpected properties, as discussed by Sauerland and Elbourne (2002, 297), who state that sentences like:

(108) How likely to win is an Austrian?

lack the non-specific reading for *an Austrian* that is available in:

(109) An Austrian is likely to win.

Sauerland and Elbourne take this to reflect a restriction on (total) scope reconstruction that goes back to work by Barss (1986).

The contrast in interpretation between (108) and (109) would seem, though, to be related to similar facts concerning idiom chunks that don’t fall under the usual notion of scope:

(110) Headway is likely to be made.

(111) *How likely to be made is headway?*

as well as to comparable facts concerning inverse copula sentences:

\(^{42}\)Cf., for example, Cheng and Sybesma (2005) and Huang et al. (2009, 294).

\(^{43}\)This is close to a point made by Deal (2009, 313-314); what follows attempts to go even further.

A more technical difference is that the present proposal takes the associate to never remain in its external merge position, contrary to Deal’s position on ‘inside verbals’; cf. the proposal in Kayne (2010) to the effect that ‘all DP arguments must move at least once’. Diesing (1992) and Mahajan (1992) might then be interpreted as showing only that indefinites necessarily end up lower than definites, perhaps in a way related to focus being lower than topic, as in Jayaseelan (2001); cf. also Koster’s (1994) distinction between movement of definites to Spec,AgrOP and movement of indefinites to Spec,PredP.
(112) The winner is likely to be Mary.
(113) *How likely to be Mary is the winner?
That these facts are all related is reinforced by the fact that (for me) there is
improvement in the unacceptable examples if the relevant DP/NP is replaced by a
pronoun. Clearly better than (113) is:
(114) ?How likely to be Mary is it?
Similarly the following allows a non-specific interpretation more readily than (108):
(115) How likely to win is one, in your opinion?
The improvement is slighter in the idiom case, but I have the judgment:
(116) ??How likely to be made is it?
Chomsky’s (1993, 39) discussion of idioms, if generalized to headway in sentences
like (110), would have headway necessarily interpreted in a position lower than its
visible one, i.e. in its pre-movement position following made. A variant of his idea would
have headway raising to subject position not by itself but as part of a larger remnant
phrase that includes a silent copy of made, as in (the simplified):44
(117) [ <made> headway ] was made < <made> headway >
Made raises, then the phrase containing the silent copy of made plus headway raises
past made to subject position (perhaps in successive cyclic fashion). A similar
derivation for inverse copula sentences like (112) would have Mary raising out of the
small clause, followed by remnant movement of the whole small clause (in a way partly
like Moro (1997)):
(118) [ <Mary> the winner ] was Mary < <Mary> the winner>
In both cases, then, the subject would be a remnant phrase that is larger than the visible
headway or the winner. My proposal for (109), in the non-specific reading of the
subject, is a parallel one. Rather than the subject being non-specific an Austrian, the
subject is rather a remnant phrase, as in the sketchy:45
(119) [ <win> an Austrian ] will win < <win> an Austrian>
The general suggestion, then, is that what seem to be non-specific subjects in
English (and in some other languages) are remnant phrases of which the non-specific
indefinite is a proper subpart. If so, then (105) is tenable and we can in fact understand
the existence of sentences with expletive there as another means by which the
language faculty can accommodate non-specific subject-like arguments without
violating (105).
If (105) is correct, then expletive there, or rather the remnant phrase containing it,
must not count as non-specific.46 A question arises as to how large a remnant phrase
there is in subject position in sentences with expletive there such as:
(120) There are books on the table.
Up until now, I have been assuming [‘there <books>’]. Possibly the remnant phrase is
larger than that (containing a silent copy of the verb, too), given that expletive there (=
deictic there) acts like (108)-(116):47

44The agreement in Tabs were being kept on them might involve a combination of Agree
with pied-piping.
45The landing site of this remnant phrase might be distinct from that of referential
subjects, as in É.Kiss (1996).
(121) There is likely to be another demonstration.
(122) *?How likely to be another demonstration is there?

11.
A question not usually asked is why English has an expletive *there* but no expletive *here* (instead, or in addition).48 If it did, we would have, alongside (or instead of):

(123) There’s something wrong, isn’t there?
sentences like:

(124) *Here’s something wrong, isn’t here?
which are not possible, even though English does allow sentence-initial *here* in cases like:

(125) Here’s your book.
in which *here* is likely not in subject position and in any case is not parallel to expletive *there*.

The question why there is no expletive *here* parallel to expletive *there* seems to me to be essentially like the question why there is no complementizer *this* parallel to (or instead of) complementizer *that*. The answer given to the complementizer question in Kayne (2008; 2010) was in part:

(126) i) What we think of as complementizer *that* is really a relative pronoun.
ii) What we think of as a relative pronoun is really a (stranded) determiner
iii) Complementizer *that* is a stranded demonstrative determiner

This answer continued as:

(127) i) This is necessarily associated with a first person morpheme
ii) That is not necessarily associated with any person morpheme
iii) The stranding that plays a role in the derivation of complementizer *that*
is blocked by the (first) person morpheme associated with *this*

Hence, *this* cannot appear as a complementizer.

The derivation of expletive *there* proposed earlier, for example in (46), repeated here:

(128) [there books] on the table --> raising of ‘books’
books [there <books>] on the table --> merger of V
were books [there <books>] on the table --> remnant movement
[there <books>] were books [{there <books}>] on the table

involves, in the transition from the first line to the second line, the stranding of *there* by the raising of the NP *books*. Generalizing (127), we have:

(129) i) Here is necessarily associated with a first person morpheme
ii) There is not necessarily associated with any person morpheme
iii) The stranding that plays a role in the derivation of expletive *there* is blocked by the (first) person morpheme associated with *here*

48Cardinaletti (1997, note 3) gives an answer to the parallel question concerning German (and similarly for Icelandic) sentence-initial-only *es*, proposing, in a way akin to what I’m proposing here for *there*, that it does not externally merge into Spec,CP.
If so, we have an account of why there is no expletive *here*.\footnote{Similarly, I suspect, the first person morpheme associated with *here* will play a role in accounting for the fact that no Romance language (as far as I know) has a *here/there* distinction in its object clitics.}

We can note in passing that this account depends on the remnant movement approach to expletive *there*. If *there* were subextracted by itself from '[there books]', it would not be easy to see why a parallel derivation with *here* could not have been available.

The approach to expletive *there* that I have been pursuing, in which expletive *there* necessarily originates DP-internally as a particular case of deictic *there*, also provides a ready account of the fact that English has no expletive *then* instead of or in addition to expletive *there*:

\(\text{(130)}\) *Then’s something wrong, isn’t then?*

The reason is that there is no DP-internal deictic *then* parallel to DP-internal deictic *there*:\footnote{Possibly, this kind of consideration extends to gender, e.g. to the fact that French has m.sg. *il* as an expletive subject clitic, but not f.sg. *elle* (apart from the agreement configurations discussed in Kayne and Pollock (2010; 2014)), thinking of Ferrari’s (2005) proposal that feminine gender (in Italian) involves an extra morpheme as compared with masculine gender.}

\(\text{(131)}\) That there thing ain’t no good. (non-standard)
\(\text{(132)}\) *That then thing ain’t no good.*

English also lacks an expletive *that* that would parallel expletive *there*:

\(\text{(133)}\) Are there any mistakes in your paper?
\(\text{(134)}\) *Are that any mistakes in your paper?*

Similarly:

\(\text{(135)}\) There’s nobody here.
\(\text{(136)}\) *That’s nobody here.*

despite English allowing subject *that* in other types of sentences. From the present perspective, the absence of expletive *that* parallel to expletive *there* can be attributed (as with *here*, though not in exactly the same way) to a blocking effect of *that* (vs. *there*) on the extraction indicated in the first two lines of (128). Put another way, those first two lines could not be transposed to:

\(\text{(137)}\) [that books] on the table \(\rightarrow\) raising of ‘books’
\hspace{1cm} books [that <books>] on the table

the reason arguably being the same as that responsible for the cases in which *that* induces a definiteness effect, as discussed starting with (61).

\footnote{On why this might be so, see Kayne (2008, sect. 9).}
On the other hand, expletive *there* can be ‘replaced’ by an expletive *it* in some varieties of English,\(^{51}\) though I think the term ‘replace’ gives the wrong impression, as suggested by French, whose counterpart of:

(138) There is a book on the table.

is:

(139) Il y a un livre sur la table. (‘it there has a book on the table’)

in which there are two visible ‘expletives’, *il* and *y*. Burzio (1986, 148) had noted that Italian object clitic *ci* is, apart from its object clitic status, a good match for English expletive *there* in existential sentences. It is virtually certain that the same holds for French *y*, i.e. that the *y* of (139) is a good match for English expletive *there* in (138) apart from the object clitic vs. subject difference. In which case the subject clitic *il* in (138) must have some other status.\(^{52}\) Whatever that status is,\(^{53}\) it seems plausible to take the expletive *it* of some varieties of English to match this French *il*, rather than to match French *y* or standard English *there*. (If so, then varieties of English with expletive *it* in existential sentences will in all likelihood have a silent counterpart of *there* in such sentences.)

12.

In standard English, the verb in a sentence with expletive *there* seems to agree directly with the associate:

(140) There are/*is* books on the table.

However, the present analysis has *there* as a remnant that includes a silent copy of the associate, as seen in the last line of (128), repeated here:

(141) [there <books>] were books <[there <books>] on the table

If the number features of this silent copy are visible to agreement, then the agreement seen in (140) may just be ordinary subject-verb agreement, without downward movement-less agreement being necessary, at least not there.\(^{54}\)

As Henry and Cottell (2007, 286-7) note,\(^{55}\) Belfast English has optionality of agreement, e.g. in:

(142) There has/have been several people arrested.

(143) There has/have several people been arrested.

Possibly, Belfast English allows the number features of the silent copy within the remnant subject to be ignored. And/or there might be a link to the fact that Belfast English agreement differs in other ways from that of standard English, as discussed by Henry (1995, chap. 2).

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\(^{51}\)See Freeze (1992, 575) and references cited there.

\(^{52}\)One needs to ask why French (and the same for other Romance subject clitic languages) has no *there*-like subject clitic. This may be related to Freeze’s (1992, 574) observation that English is exceptional (though nb. Danish, as mentioned above) in having its expletive *there* in subject position.

\(^{53}\)For discussion, as well as for discussion of the *be/have* difference, see Kayne (2008, sects. 11, 13).

\(^{54}\)On downward agreement, see Chomsky (2001). For a critical view, see Koopman (2003).

\(^{55}\)I am grateful to Danfeng Wu for bringing this paper to my attention.
Henry and Cottell (2007, 297) go on to note (cf. Chomsky (1995, 384)) that many speakers of English (in what for me is only (very) colloquial English) accept:

(144) There’s lots of books on the table.

without accepting:

(145) *There is lots of books on the table.
(146) *There was lots of books on the table.

This recalls comparable facts, in equally colloquial English, in non-existential, non-definiteness-effect sentences with where, as noted by Dixon (1977):

(147) Where’s the lions?
(148) *Where is the lions?

Nathan (1981) adds examples with other wh--phrases:

(149) How’s the horses?
(150) When’s the races?
(151) What’s the games?

Why ‘s acts differently from is in all these cases (whose range indicates that the type of agreement seen in (144) is not intrinsically linked to expletive there) for this set of speakers remains to be understood.\(^{56}\)

Nathan (1981) also notes that the plural in question must, in all the relevant cases, follow ‘s, as in the following contrast (my examples):

(152) ?Where’s all the children?
(153) *All the children’s in the kitchen.

This recalls Greenberg’s (1966) Universal 33:

(154) When verbal number agreement is suspended in an order-sensitive way, it’s always when the verb precedes the NP.

as well as many other agreement facts, though not all, for reasons that remain to be fully understood.

I conclude that the non-standard agreement facts of (142)-(153) are compatible with the present analysis,\(^{57}\) which takes expletive there to originate as a deictic there

\(^{56}\)There might be a link to the possible identity of verbal -s and possessive ‘s mentioned in note 16.

\(^{57}\)As opposed to Henry & Cottell (2007, 293), who took the optional agreement in Belfast English to go against Sabel’s (2000) “stranding analysis” (which the present one resembles in part).

In taking expletive there to originate within the ‘associate’, this analysis also has something in common with Kayne’s (1972, 90) analysis of French subject clitic doubling, which could also (anachronistically) be called a ‘big DP’ analysis. French subject clitic doubling is pursued by Kayne and Pollock (2010; 2014); there are also points in common with Collins and Postal (2012); for an extension to pro-drop, see Pollock (1998, 311). Whether agreement morphemes themselves could be integrated into a ‘big DP’-cum-stranding picture remains to be seen.

Deal (2009, note 31) observes that a ‘big-DP’ account of the sort being developed here must address the question of “supersize DPs” that might allow more than one expletive there per associate. Such ‘supersize DPs’ are probably needed for pronouns in Kayne (2002b) and might be appropriate for:

i) ?There looks like there’s a problem here.
contained in a phrase later moved to subject position as a remnant.

13. From the perspective of this analysis, the question alluded to earlier of the interpretability of expletive there must be related to the question of how exactly DP-internal deictic there is interpreted,\(^{58}\) e.g. in (non-standard) that there book, and more specifically how deictic there is interpreted when unaccompanied by that (keeping in mind, from (129), that deictic there is, or at least can be, more ‘neutral’ than deictic here, insofar as here is always associated with a person morpheme, while there is not). From this perspective, it seems unlikely that expletive there is entirely uninterpretable, as it was taken to be in Chomsky (1995, 154).\(^{59}\)

14. In (my) colloquial English, expletive there occurs only with be. Although the following are perfectly possible in some register(s) of English, they are for me impossible in colloquial English:\(^{60}\)

(155) There exist solutions to all these problems.

(156) There have arrived several letters for you.

In this respect, my colloquial English is like both standard Italian and standard French, whose counterparts of expletive there (ci and y, respectively) are limited to existentials with be (in Italian) and with have (in French).\(^{61}\)

As for why be is singled out by Italian and colloquial English, it may be that be is associated with less structure than any other verb. If we consider the schematic derivation given earlier:

(157) [there books] on the table --> raising of ‘books’
books [there <books>] on the table --> merger of V
were books [there <books>] on the table --> remnant movement
[there <books>] were books [there <books>] on the table

It might be that the landing site needed for the first movement step is unavailable in these languages except with be.

Such an account would have something significant in common with Deal’s (2009) fine-grained account of the contrast between (155)/(156) and sentences like:

\(^{58}\)Relevant here is the question whether DP-internal deictic there originates within a relative clause - cf. Kayne (2008, sect. 5) - and the question whether deictic there is accompanied DP-internally by a P (cf. note 22).

\(^{59}\)Close to Chomsky is Groat’s (1995) taking expletive there to be interpreted as ‘null’.

\(^{60}\)As opposed to:

(i) There they go.

like:

(ii) Here they come.

which do not involve expletive there, despite having some special properties.

\(^{61}\)In Italian, expletive ci is also found with possessive have - for discussion, see Kayne (2008) - in which case the definiteness effect does not seem to hold consistently, for reasons to be discovered. How much various idiomatic instances of ci (and of y) have in common with the expletive ones remains to be determined.
(158) *There melted lots of ice yesterday.
Deal takes this contrast to depend on the presence in (158) (vs. the absence in (155)/(156)) of “a CAUSE head...whose syntax requires an event argument in Spec,vP”.\(^{62}\) with that argument preventing expletive there, which for Deal is normally externally merged in Spec,vP, from appearing.

The analysis developed in this paper differs sharply from Deal’s in having expletive there (= deictic there) externally merged, not in Spec,vP, but rather DP-internally. Yet Deal’s idea could be taken over into the present analysis by saying that the remnant movement step in the last part of (157) must target Spec,vP (before expletive there moves on higher). It would remain to be understood why (my) colloquial English disallows even (155)/(156), why French and Italian disallow counterparts of (155)/(156) with an overt expletive y or ci, and especially why Piedmontese expletive object clitic ye, which looks like a good counterpart of expletive there, is found more widely, occurring as it does, according to Burzio (1986, 123), with all unaccusatives, including in cases like (158).\(^{63}\)

The remnant movement step that takes ‘[there <books>]’ past ‘books’ in (157) is subject to another constraint that is likely to fall under Deal’s idea or my variation on it, as illustrated in:

(159) *We bought there some books yesterday.
which is (not good, for word order reasons, with locative there and) sharply unacceptable with expletive there. It may well be that the entire object phrase itself must occupy Spec,vP at some point in the derivation (as is widely assumed to be the case for transitive objects), leaving no space for the remnant containing expletive there.

This point carries over directly to a different type of example:

(160) *We showed there our book to some students yesterday.
which, again, is sharply unacceptable with expletive there. As in the preceding paragraph, this can be attributed to the presence of a direct object, even though the potential source of there is the prepositional object. If unergatives with prepositional objects necessarily have a silent direct object that must occupy Spec,vP,\(^{64}\) then the same holds of:

(161) *We will allude there to some problems in our talk.
which is impossibly with expletive there.

Perhaps related to (161) is:\(^{65}\)

(162) *There seemed to some people that we were right.
That the embedded CP could be acting as a direct object may be supported by the fact that in French it can be ‘pronominalized’ by object clitic le:

(163) Il le semble. (‘it it seems’)
Somewhat different from the preceding is a question raised by the following contrast:

(164) Is there a problem with this analysis?
(165) *Is a problem there with this analysis?

The derivation of (164) will track that of (157). The question is why the associate a problem cannot skip over expletive there, yielding (165). A possible answer is that to move to subject position the associate would have to pass through Spec,vP, thereby interfering with there's access to that position. Quite different is a question posed by:

(166) There was rain last week.

(167) *There rained last week.

From the present perspective, it may be that the presence of expletive (=deictic) there within the DP containing rain interferes with the incorporation of nominal rain necessary for the derivation of:

(168) It rained last week.

if Hale and Keyser (1993; 2002) are on the right track. As for the mode of interference, it might be that prior to ‘incorporation’, (the remnant containing) rain must move through Spec,vP.

In what for me is only non-colloquial English, it is sometimes possible to have expletive there cooccurring with an object and a post-VP subject, as in:

(169) There reached his ear the sound of voices and laughter.

Adapting ideas of Deal’s (2009, 315), I take this type of expletive there sentence not to involve there being in or passing through Spec,vP, and to involve VP-fronting. Without the VP-fronting, we would have a type of sentence that is impossible in standard English (colloquial or not), though productively possible in Belfast English, as discussed by Henry and Cottell (2007), e.g.:

(170) There shouldn’t anybody say that.

Whether this difference between Belfast English and standard English correlates with other differences remains to be seen.

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66 English does not allow this with an adjective:
   i) *There was hot last week.
   whereas Danish seems to, according to Allan et al. (1995, 161). Similarly, with impersonal passives, English disallows:
   ii) *There was danced last week.
   as opposed to Danish, as well as to Dutch, according to Safir (1987, 78). The unacceptability of (i) and (ii) in English can be attributed to there having no (indefinite DP) source. Why exactly Danish der and Dutch er are freer remains to be understood.
67 Alternatively, there might be a link, given the th- of there, to the exclusion of the in compounds:
   i) They’re real (*the) Bronx-lovers.
   In:
   ii) There’s been a lot of snowing this year.
   the associate must be a lot of snowing, rather than snow itself.
68 Example adapted from Curme (1977, vol. II, 5).
To judge by the examples that Henry and Cottell (2007) provide, Belfast English sentences like (170) show a definiteness effect, whereas Deal (2009, 314) takes sentences like (169) not to. In fact, (169) itself has a the and one can also think of:

(171) There walked into the room the very person we had been talking about the day before.

On the other hand, thinking of the discussion of (75) above, it might be that the in (169) and (171) does not c-command the DP-internal deictic there in its pre-movement position. If so, then the expletive there of (169) and (171) can be treated exactly as that of 'core' sentences such as:

(172) There's a book on the table.

15. Conclusion

If we take the identity in form between expletive there and various other instances of there (not only locative there, but also deictic there and the there of thereby) not to be accidental, we are led to the conclusion that expletive there originates DP-internally as an instance of deictic there (as in non-standard that there book) and that the definiteness effect plays out entirely DP-internally as a conflict between deictic there and certain determiners.

References:


69 Although indefinites are restricted to quantified ones in a way that doesn't hold in standard English - see Henry and Cottell (2007, 280).


