The Reality of New Forms of UN Peacekeeping:

High Risk Missions and Fatalities

By

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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my late father- Professor John Daniel- who guided me throughout my life in terms of understanding the international system we live in and motivated me to never accept something I disagreed with but work tirelessly to change it. He was, and still is, my mentor and the reason I entered the field of peace and security, and why I will commit the rest of my days to contributing to peaceful change in Africa.
Acknowledgement

The saying, *it takes a village*, I feel applies in the case of this thesis. Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the role of my supervisor- Dr. Patty Chang- who worked with me endlessly to produce the best possible thesis. Her commitment to the topic and this paper was far beyond what was expected of her and I am truly grateful for that. Her guidance and comments have helped shape this paper into what, I hope, is a valuable contribution to the study of United Nations peacekeeping.

Secondly, I would like to thank my thesis course supervisor- Professor Shinasi Rama- whose positive demeanor and encouraging words of support made me feel confident that I had a topic of interest and paper worthy of submission from the start.

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field which is not easily quantified. Without her support on this paper, and throughout the entire process, this paper, and my sanity, would not be here today.

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Abstract

Has United Nations (UN) peacekeeping become more dangerous? This is the question this thesis aims to address by examining the trend of fatalities of UN peacekeeping personnel in missions which use more offensive force. This thesis examines if this shift in use of force has influenced the trend of malicious act fatalities of UN peacekeepers in high-risk missions using quantitative methods. This study finds that over time there has been an upward trend in malicious act fatalities in UN peacekeeping operations even when controlling for the increase in troops overtime. Ultimately, this thesis concludes that the UN should rethink its approach to high-risk mission to ensure that it is able to guarantee the safety and security of those it deploys. If the UN is unable to adapt to the challenges it is facing, its role as a central institution bringing peace and security to the globe will be severely compromised, thereby risking the collapse of the notion of liberal institutions and the rise of a more realist approach where states act as independent beings working only to serve themselves.

Key words: United Nations Peacekeeping, Stabilization, Use of Force, Fatalities, Mali, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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List of Abbreviations

African-led International Support Mission to CAR (MISCA)
African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)
African Union (AU)
African Union- United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS)
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC)
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Association of Central African Farmers (ACP)
Central African Republic (CAR)
Central African Armed Forces (FACA)
Compliant Armed Groups (CAGs)
Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP)
Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP)
Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA)
Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS)
Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
European Union (EU)
Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)
Front de Libération du Macina (FLM)
Front for the Return to the Constitutional Order in Central Africa (FROCCA)
High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)
National Forces of Liberation (FLN)
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Renaissance of Central African Republic (FPRC)
Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs)
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
March 23 Movement (M23)
Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA)
Movement for Peace and Unity in CAR (UPC)
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
National Forces of Liberation (FLN)
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
November for Oneness and Jihad (MUJVA)
Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK)
Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs)
Stability and Reconstruction Operations and the Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia II (UNSOM II)
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
United Nations Interim Security Force in Abeyi (UNIFSA)
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
United Nations Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Operations in the DRC (MONUSCO)
United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Operations in Mali (MINUSMA)
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs)
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Chapter One: Introduction

In 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized the first stabilization mission in Haiti permitting peacekeepers to use offensive force to stabilize the country thereby changing the very nature of peacekeeping. Since then, the United Nations (UN) has authorized three more stabilization missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2010, Mali in 2013 and Central African Republic (CAR) in 2014. Yet, there is still no official definition of stabilization missions and how they differ from other UN peacekeeping operations, and no understanding of the risks and implications which rise from such missions.¹ What is known is that these missions differ in their approach to the use of force. Stabilization missions use force in an operational way, meaning beyond self-defense, with the intention to disarm, destroy and/or conquer the named spoilers of peace in the name of stabilizing a situation.² As the use of force within UN peacekeeping operations has changed, there appears to be an increase in the number of fatalities in UN peacekeeping operation. Since the first UN peacekeeping mission authorized in 1948, 3,549 peacekeepers have been killed while serving in a mission, with 53 percent occurring in the last 16 years.³ This thesis examines the trend of fatalities of UN peacekeeping personnel in missions which use more offensive force and if this shift in use of force has influenced a growing trend of more malicious act fatalities. The central argument is that as UN missions use more force to actively engage with groups in a

¹ Aditi Gorur, *Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions* (USA, Stimson, 2016).
situation where there is no peace to keep, the mission suffers more fatalities via malicious acts.  

This thesis will analyze this argument looking at UN peacekeeping missions between 01 January 1990 and 31 December 2016, using quantitative methods. In doing so, this thesis will focus on who is dying, by what cause and what the influencing factors are in order to argue that due to the forward posture of offensive force, there are higher rates of malicious act fatalities in these mission. As of 2017, there are 16 peacekeeping missions in existence: seven are robust peace operations meaning that the UNSC authorized the use of force at a tactical level, as opposed to only in cases of self-defense, and four missions are stabilization missions where the UNSC specifically authorizes the neutralization of spoilers to the peace process. In this thesis, offensive force is defined as force used beyond self-defense to disarm, destroy or neutralize a group. Tactical force is referred to as responsive force used to protect oneself or the mandate of the missions when attacked or threatened. As mentioned above, there is no official definition of stabilization within the UN. Thus, this paper adopts de Coning et al’s definition of the

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4 Fatalities are classed into four types: illness, accident, malicious act and other, as per the DPKO fatalities breakdown. Malicious act fatalities are classified as fatalities suffered through intentional, hostile acts. A thorough definition is provided in chapter three.

5 A robust peacekeeping mission is a mission which permits troops to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians for instance. These missions differ from traditional peacekeeping missions as the latter strictly limits the use of force to self-defense. These missions, however, do not permit the use of force at an operational level. This means that these missions cannot employ force in the pursuit of operational objectives but only at the tactical level to uphold the mandate. The peacekeeping force is defensive in that it is protecting itself and civilians but it is not offensively engaging with groups. Examples of robust UN peacekeeping operations are: UNAMID, UNMIK, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNMIL and UNIFIL.

6 Examples of UN stabilization missions include: MINUSTHA, MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA.


8 Ibid.
concept: “a stabilization mission is a mission which has utilized a political strategy to stabilize a situation via targeting and neutralizing specific groups.”

These missions have been mandated to operate where there is no peace to keep or to engage robustly with armed groups. In these missions, peacekeepers often take sides and use offensive force to engage proactively in conflict.

In unpacking this argument, this thesis will, firstly, consider all peacekeeping missions as a whole and then analyze three stabilization missions: the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Operations in the DRC (MONUSCO), the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Operations in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Operations in Mali (MINUSMA) - to look at specific reasons why offensive missions are seeing increased trends of fatalities. This thesis concludes by emphasizing the vital need for the international community to rethink its approach to the future of peace operations and the debates around the use of force.

Therefore, the research questions are the following:

**Research Question 1**: Has the number of fatalities changed over the past decades?

**Research Question 2**: If so, what is the trend? Does this trend hold true for malicious acts as well as total fatalities?

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Research Question 3: Does the type of peacekeeping missions affect fatalities due to malicious acts?

Research Question 4: If so, what are the factors influencing UN fatalities rates? Who dies, when, and why?

The hypotheses of the research are the following:

Hypothesis 1: There is an upward trend in malicious act fatalities in UN peace operations over time.

Hypothesis 2: The more robust the mandate of a mission is, the higher the percent of UN personnel fatalities due to malicious acts in that mission.

Hypothesis 3: There is a higher proportion of malicious act fatalities of troops based in African than other locations.

Hypothesis 4: The number of fatalities is associated with the number of troops in peacekeeping operation.

Null Hypothesis: There is no relationship between the changing mandates of peace operations and fatalities via malicious acts.

Analytical framework

In regards to the broader realm of international relations, understanding the changing dynamics of conflict permits us to better understand how to prevent growing security concerns and assist in providing long-lasting positive peace. As an analytical framework, this thesis draws on the theory of institutional liberalism, which argues that states are the main actors in the international systems but that this system is characterized by
interdependence and it is international institutions, such as the UN, which facilitate cooperation among states. Institutional liberalism does not deny the realist assumption that the international system is anarchic but feels its importance has been exaggerated.  

Institutional liberalism sees anarchy as a threat to cooperation and that institutions—both formal and informal—can create a non-anarchic situation through repeated interactions that encourage cooperation. States are motivated by their interests and are concerned with reputation and thus will uphold standards of behavior to maximize a good reputation. This theory provides an explanation for why states cooperate rather than attack each other and offers an alternative view to the realist view of the international system.

The UN, as a key international institution and multilateral tool, has an imperative role in creating and promoting peace and stability within the international system. Within the UN, peacekeeping is, arguably, the most visible activity and one of its most important contributions to what the UN Charter calls “maintenance of international peace and security.” The UN’s blue helmets are widely recognized across the world. Sometimes they are celebrated for interventions; more often they are criticized for lack of action or mistakes made. Regardless, they have become a global feature of multilateral crisis management. In order to solve problems multilaterally, there is a need to ensure the UN is credible and equipped to solve challenges of the 21st century. We are seeing a changing

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11 Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (USA, Norton, 1997).
12 Such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
13 Such as the Law of the Seas Convention.
nature of conflict and the rise of high-risk peace operations that are increasingly beset with complex and intertwined challenges, ranging from symmetric and asymmetric threats, organized crime and terrorism, to poor government and a lack of basic infrastructure. This thesis argues that if the UN is not able to adapt to this environment, we may be witnessing a shift in the international system where informal coalitions of the willing are the response to growing threats to stability thus weakening the entire international system to respond to threats to international peace and security. The role of the UN as a key international institution will be fundamentally compromised and we risk seeing a collapse of institutions and the rise of a more realist approach whereby states act as independent beings working only to serve themselves.

**Significance of the study**

This thesis is inspired by UN peacekeeping fatalities analysis by Marina Henke and Jair Van Der Lijn and Timo Smit who argue that despite the increase of malicious acts in missions, illness and accidents are still the central cause of fatalities and that high-risk missions, such as MINUSMA, are anomalies. However, this thesis believes that one cannot ignore the growing trend of malicious acts against peacekeepers and the shift towards more robust, forward postured peace operations. In the three years of existence,

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MINUSMA alone, for example, has lost a total of 114 peacekeepers, 63 percent of these from hostile attacks on the UN itself and these attacks show no sign of ceasing.¹⁹

By looking at aspects which have not been considered before in past studies on fatalities, including the impact of mandates, force strength as well as expanding the time frame to look at the trend until the end of 2016, this thesis contributes to the literature on fatalities in peacekeeping. Further, by tracing trends of fatalities by mission and considering the environment, training levels and differences between fatalities by nation, this thesis contributes to the discussion on how best to handle these new environments to ensure both protection of personnel, as well as the future role of the UN as the legitimate provider of peace and security. This analysis is very important for the future of peace operations for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the safety and security of UN personnel is an essential element of peacekeeping effectiveness. If Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) do not feel those they deploy will be safe, it is likely that troop contributions will decrease significantly. The UN is an international organization which does not have a standing army; it relies on troops voluntarily contributed by countries. If the UN does not have troops, it cannot intervene and if it cannot intervene, it will lose its relevance as the legitimate authority on matters of international peace and security.

Secondly, if peacekeepers are deployed but are under siege through direct attacks, they will be less likely to take risks to fulfill their tasks such as patrols through protection of civilian camps or convoys to provide humanitarian resources and support. If the

peacekeepers are unwilling to act, the UN will be unable to achieve their mandates, namely to raise the cost of the recurrence of war via deterrence.\textsuperscript{20} A UN force which is able to protect its own force against asymmetrical attacks will send a signal to potential spoilers of peace that it will react strongly if they threaten peace.\textsuperscript{21}

Thirdly, despite a consensus that malicious act fatalities against peacekeepers are a lesser concern than accidents or illness,\textsuperscript{22} the shift to direct attacks on blue helmets should be very concerning to the international community. Traffic accidents are, unfortunately, a common occurrence in many peace operations; illness should be preventable with adequate preventative measures and effective medical facilities.\textsuperscript{23} Malicious acts, however, are a serious threat to the mission and the UN as a whole. The reason being that, as countries feel less secure about sending their peacekeepers to risky missions, they will be less inclined to deploy troops. Considering the UN is an organization based on the voluntary deployment of troops by member states, if member states start to decline to deploy, the ability of the UN to act effectively and achieve its mandate will be greatly reduced.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23} This is a significant area of concern and there are studies looking at why medical support is insufficient in peace operations. For more information, see Lesley Connolly and Håvard Johansen, \textit{Medical Support for UN Peace Operations in High-Risk Environments} (New York, International Peace Institute, 2017).
Lastly, understanding what leads to UN fatalities can provide valuable insight into policy and mandate development, as well as to those responsible for force generation, and ultimately will help reduce future UN causalities and permit mission planners to rethink capabilities needed and deployment strategies. Overall, a better understanding of the risk peacekeepers face in the field will allow for a better understanding of what is needed to ensure peacekeeping operations are effective in promoting peace and reducing conflict.

**The structure of the thesis**

The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: First, an overview of the current literature on fatalities within UN peacekeeping missions will be given, followed by a chapter overviewing the methodology used in this thesis. Before the findings are unpacked, an overview of the evolution of peacekeeping will be given, tracing the trends in use of force since the first peacekeeping mission deployed in 1948. In unpacking the trends of fatalities, the total rate of fatalities is examined and placed within the broader context of the post-cold war period conflict as well as current contemporary conflict environments. This thesis then looks at the different forms of fatality incident rate, considering the trend of malicious acts in particular. This section considers the proportion of deaths caused by malicious acts from 1948 to 2016. However, a more specific focus is given to fatalities in the post-cold war period and then in the past decade to highlight a recent increased in malicious acts in stabilization missions. The main aim of this thesis is to raise awareness to the contemporary challenges facing UN peacekeeping and the dire need to ensure that missions are adequately prepared for the tasks in the new conflict environments.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

In this chapter, this thesis will unpack the literature looking at UN peacekeeping missions and fatalities, highlighting the findings, methodology and case studies used. This section will provide a context for this thesis, highlighting the gaps in the literature and how this thesis contributes to the study of fatalities within UN peacekeeping operations.

Since the first UN peacekeeping operation in 1948, more than 3,579 people have died serving the UN in the pursuit of peace in 71 peacekeeping operations. Walter Dorn argues that 1993 was the deadliest year for peacekeeping fatalities in UN history, with the operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Cambodia and other UN locations, resulting in 225 military and civilian personnel losing their lives, about half from malicious acts. The years following 1993 saw an improvement in peacekeeping fatalities with trends, especially malicious acts, dropping significantly. In 2006, another peak was seen with 107 military and civilian personnel fatalities. However, in this case, 57 percent were due to illness and Dorn argues that these numbers are less severe considering the number of peacekeepers in the field in 2006 was 10 percent greater than in 1993 and malicious act fatalities were not the primary cause of death.

Over the past two decades, with the changing nature of peace operations and more robust use of force, this trend seems to be shifting back towards an increase in fatalities and a higher proportion and number of malicious acts being seen. In 2014, 126 military

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
personnel, police and civilians receive the Dag Hammarskjöld medal - a medal awarded posthumously to those who lost their lives in 2014 while in service of the UN; in 2015 this number grew to 129. This fact has generated concern from various member states as well as the UN Secretary-General, who, in his Report on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in December 2014, raised the concern that UN peacekeeping has become an increasingly dangerous undertaking where peacekeepers are getting injured or killed because of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide bombings and rocket-propelled grenades, and some dying in helicopter crashes, artillery fire or landmines. The former US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Powers reiterated a similar sentiment when she told the Security Council in October 2014 that “peacekeepers in 21st century missions face unprecedented risks...because we are asking them... to take on more responsibility in more places and in more complex conflicts than at any time in history.” In addition, the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) stressed, throughout its final report released in June 2015, that peacekeepers are operating in progressively dangerous and hostile settings and that this is likely to increase in the future. This raises the interesting question of whether peacekeeping, overall, is becoming more dangerous.

Thus far, despite the enormous growth in research on UN peacekeeping, very few scholars have attempted to answer these questions. One reason for this lack of research is the fear that if the fatalities and risks associated with UN peacekeeping deployments are too public, the overall attractiveness of UN peacekeeping deployments and, thus UN force recruitment more generally, will decline. Many countries, in particular, wealthy Western countries, are hesitant to contribute forces to UN operations because of their perceived dangers. Secondly, UN peacekeepers have typically been regarded as safe within missions with low chance of attack, thus leaving little need to consider fatalities in UN missions. Further, due to the fact that peacekeepers were typically a protected force within a mission, the main focus of fatalities’ study has been on accidents and illnesses within peacekeeping missions. Rather, there has been significant research on peacekeeping and its effectiveness, the use of force within missions and protection of civilians, as well as where peacekeepers are sent and the implications this has. There has been very little analysis of the impact on peacekeepers themselves and the risks, as


well as the military, political and social dynamics, which peacekeepers face. However, as the nature of conflict changes, it is important to understand these risks better so as to ensure that peacekeepers are safe and counties will continue to contribute to the multinational institution.

The first study on UN peacekeeping fatalities, by Benjamin Seet and Gilbert Burhman, was a descriptive analysis of 1,559 personnel deaths during 49 UN peacekeeping missions from 1948 to 1998 based on casualty data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The authors argue that more deaths have occurred among UN peacekeeping forces in the post-cold war period (1990 – 1998) than in the 40 years of previous UN peacekeeping. The causes of death are ranked with unintentional violence accounting for the majority of deaths, followed by hostile acts and then illness. The authors argue that their findings indicate that the increase in the number of deaths among UN peacekeeping personnel since 1990 can be attributed to the increase in the number and scale of missions after the Cold War rather than the increased rate of death. Seet and Burhman ultimately conclude that in a post-Cold War setting, peacekeeping personnel have a higher risk of dying from hostile acts in missions which require more force.

James Rogers and Caroline Kennedy continued Seet and Burhman’s method of a descriptive analysis of UN peacekeeping and built on their study by analyzing 1948 –

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39 Ibid.
2012, with a specific focus on fatalities during 2003 and 2012. The study focused extensively on the different types of incidents of fatalities namely malicious acts, illnesses and accidents. The authors argue that despite the perceived increase in malicious acts, when this is put in proportion, accidents and illness should be the greatest area of concern because these forms of fatalities are easily preventable.\footnote{Benjamin Seet and Gilbert Burnham, Fatality Trends in United Nations Peace Operations, 1948 – 1998, \textit{JAMA} 284 (5) (2000).} Their study mainly focuses on the trend of traffic accidents plaguing missions between 1948 and 2012, highlighting that in the period of 2003 to 2012 there was a decrease in accidents and the authors suggest that this is due to successful reform in training of peacekeepers.\footnote{Ibid.}

The latest analysis has been by Jair Van der Lijn and Tito Smit and Marina Henke who argued that despite this changing environment, data still reflects that fatalities have not become more frequent, neither in absolute terms nor in relative terms. Van der Lijn and Smit argue, through a descriptive analysis of UN peacekeeping fatalities between 1990 and July 2015, that the rate of fatalities among uniformed personnel in UN peace operations has steadily decreased in relative terms since the 1990s. Van der Lijn and Smit further argue that while the number of hostile deaths has increased in recent years, this is actually due to the high number of fatalities in MINUSMA, which has been declared one of the most deadly UN peacekeeping operations.\footnote{Marina Henke, \textit{Has UN Peacekeeping Become More Deadly? Analyzing Trends in UN Fatalities} (New York, International Peace Institute, 2016); Marina Henke, “UN Fatalities 1948 – 2015: A new dataset,” \textit{Conflict Management and Peace Science Journal} (2017).} Further, they conclude that operations have not become significantly more dangerous in terms of fatalities and that, when
excluding MINUSMA, contemporary operations are, for the most part, not suffering more losses than their predecessors.\footnote{44 Jair Van der Lijn and Timo Smit, “Peacekeepers under Threat? Fatality Trends in UN Peace Operations,” \textit{SIPRI Policy Brief} (2015).}

This thesis notes that the current levels of fatalities are lower than in the 1990s but argues that, unlike before, we are not seeing a decreasing trend following the high points, as has been seen in the 1990s. Further, this thesis believes that UN peace operation, like MINUSMA, should be examined in detail as a lesson-learning process for future peace operations where UN troops are actively engaging with terrorist groups in tough terrain and face significant challenges. With the growth of violent extremism, it seems only realistic that UN peace operations will have to engage further in these forms of operations and should be prepared.

Therefore, this thesis looks at how dangerous UN peacekeeping is by examining the trends of fatalities to see if they have increased over the past decades. And if, so what type of peacekeeping missions are seeing these fatalities, with a special interest in mission seeing high numbers of malicious acts. One of the gaps this thesis fills is that it continues the analysis of UN fatalities beyond mid-2015. Both Henke and Van der Lijn and Smit only consider up to June 2015. This is significant in that in the period up until 31 December 2016, we see a significant increase in fatalities especially malicious acts, specifically in newer missions- MINUSCA and MINUSMA.
A further gap filled by this thesis is a more in-depth analysis of the fatalities data by using a more advanced statistical methodology than other studies. It does include descriptive analysis of fatalities data but also includes regression models proving the connection between troop levels and fatalities. In addition, this thesis considers a more in-depth discussion on the variables contributing to higher malicious acts. By looking more in-depth at the issues around use of offensive force and fatalities, this paper fills an analytical gap absent from the previous studies.

**Chapter Three: Data and Methodology**

This chapter will introduce the data and methodology used to illustrate the key argument that as missions use more force to actively engage with groups in a situation where there is no peace agreement, the mission suffers more fatalities via malicious acts. If this argument holds true, we expect to see a higher number of malicious act fatalities, in ratio to overall fatalities in MONUSCO (from 2012 onwards) MINUSCA and MINUSMA than other less robust missions.

Therefore, the research questions are the following:

**Research Question 1**: Has the number of fatalities changed over the past decades?

**Research Question 2**: If so, what is the trend? Does this trend hold true for malicious acts as well as total fatalities?

**Research Question 3**: Does the type of peacekeeping missions affect fatalities due to malicious acts?
Research Question 4: If so, what are the factors influencing UN fatalities rates? Who dies, when, and why?

The hypotheses of this study are the following:

Hypothesis 1: There is an upward trend in malicious act fatalities in UN peace operations over time.

Hypothesis 2: The more robust the mandate of a mission is, the higher the percent of UN personnel fatalities due to malicious acts in that mission.

Hypothesis 3: There is a higher proportion of malicious act fatalities of troops based in African than other locations.

Hypothesis 4: The number of fatalities is associated with the number of troops in peacekeeping operation.

Null Hypothesis: There is no relationship between the changing mandates of peace operations and fatalities via malicious acts.

Research design

In order to analyze these hypotheses and answer the above research questions, this thesis will analyze UN peacekeeping missions between 1990 and 2016 quantitatively. Given that the data is a count of yearly fatalities and troop levels over time for each mission, quantitative methods were chosen as the most appropriate to identify trends in the data and compare levels between subgroups. Data for 2016 were only available on an annual basis and this thesis wanted to look at the most recent changes, therefore analysis will be based on annual figures. In order to assess a linear relationship between the explanatory
variables (time) and the dependent variable (number of fatalities per year), this thesis will initially use a Spearman’s correlation. A negative binomial model will then be used to quantify the rate of change over time. The statistical software used is STATA V.14.

**Dependent Variable:** Deployed uniformed UN peacekeeping personnel

According to the UN, there are six classifications of personnel utilized in peacekeeping missions. There are (1) military, (2) military observer, (3) police, (4) international civilian staff, and (5) national civilian staff.\(^{45}\) Due to availability of data, this thesis will look at military, police and observers.

This thesis is limiting its research to missions that have been led by the UN and does not attempt to analyze trends in missions authorized by the UN but not led by the organization in the field. In addition, this thesis is limited to missions which have a uniformed presence so will not address civilian peacebuilding or political missions which have been deployed by the UN. In other words, this thesis will consider trends within UNDPKO missions and not Department of Political Affairs (DPA) missions. Since 1948, there have been 71 missions on all five continents: 13 during the Cold War and 55 between 1988 and 2016.\(^{46}\) This thesis has only considered missions where data has been provided by DPKO. Therefore, it will consider 49 missions in total.

---


The missions considered will be those active from 01 January 1990 until 31 December 2016. The reason being there is no comparable data on missions prior to 1990.

Data used is available on the UNDPKO database and is calculated yearly by mission.

**Independent Variables:**

- Type of fatality incident;\(^{47}\)
- Type of mission mandate;\(^{48}\)
- Location of mission.\(^{49}\)

All data are provided by DPKO except for troop levels, which are provided by the Providing for Peacekeeping dataset. This data provides uniformed troops, police and observe levels from January 1990 to December 2016.

In terms of fatalities, there are four main categories responsible for death in service of the UN. These are (1) accidents, (2) illness, (3) malicious acts and (4) other.\(^{50}\)

- An accident is defined as an unexpected happening causing loss or injury which is not due to any fault or misconduct on the part of the person injured.\(^{51}\) The most prevalent form of accident in UN operation is due to traffic.

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\(^{47}\) Fatalities are classes into four types: illness, accident, malicious act and other as per the DPKO fatalities breakdown.

\(^{48}\) Type of mission will be divided into peacekeeping missions with no force, those with force but only for self-defense and missions with explicit use of force beyond self-defense/ stabilization.

\(^{49}\) This is looked at in terms of the continent where mission is located.

\(^{50}\) Other typically refers to cases of suicide.

Illness, refers to fatalities due to disease, for example Malaria, Cholera or Ebola and illness from food or animal bites. These are fatalities that are not connected directly to hostile environments.\textsuperscript{52}

A malicious act against a UN peacekeeping mission occurs as a result of “war; invasion; hostilities; acts of foreign enemies, whether war be declared or not; civil war; revolution; rebellion; insurrection; military or usurped power; riots or civil commotion; sabotage; explosion of war weapons; or terrorist activities.”\textsuperscript{53} As such, the death of a peacekeeper by malicious act can be broadly distinguished as a non-accidental or non-natural illness related death, caused through a deliberate act, by a malevolent actor.\textsuperscript{54} For instance, such an act occurred in the DRC in 2010 when “a Congolese rebel group ambushed a United Nations peacekeeping base hours before dawn ... killing at least three Indian members of the base’s force with swords and spears.”\textsuperscript{55}

The fourth category is “other” which includes incidents such as suicide.

This paper focuses on all aspects of fatalities, but specifically on accidents, illness and malicious acts. Data detailing the cause of fatalities within these three areas are used to establish trends on how UN peacekeeping fatalities occur.


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In order to eliminate the bias that missions with higher troop levels suffer from higher fatalities, this thesis will control for the number of military troops deployed by considering fatalities per 10,000 or 1,000 troops deployed.

This thesis will look at the issue of who is dying, by what cause and what are the influencing factors involved to prove that stabilization missions are seeing an upward trend of malicious act fatalities. In the discussion section, this thesis will analyze three cases- MONUSCO’s FIB in the DRC, MINUSCA in CAR and MINUSMA in Mali- to look at specific reasons why offensive missions are seeing these trends. This thesis will not include the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in the analysis of stabilization missions because its main stabilization task was from 2006 to 2007. Since 2007, the mission has focused more on the earthquake and cholera outbreak.

This thesis will rather consider the three above-mentioned missions because they have very similar mandates stipulating offensive force against named groups, but all three operate in different environments against different types of actors. The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), established in 2012, moved UN peacekeeping into a new territory with is aggressive language and advanced use of force. Similar types of robust peace operations have since been seen before, usually by regional organizations or a single state operation. The French Operation in Mali (from 2012) and CAR (from 2013) are other such cases. Chiyuki and de Coning argue that these three missions have some characteristics in common which indicate the growing notion of an understanding of a stabilization
missions.\textsuperscript{56} Firstly, all three are operational in the midst of an on-going conflict, without a political solution or settlement that has been able to bring the conflict to an end. They all aspire to the development of a stable and secure political settlement, and have core tasks, which contribute to restoring and maintaining stability and security by assisting to protect a government, and its people, from named aggressors. Further, all three work in support of, and together with, local authorities and security forces that have the central responsibility of protecting the government and its people. Lastly, all three missions are expected to use force, including offensively when mandated and where necessary to contain, neutralize and/or destroy the aggressor that pose a threat to peace.\textsuperscript{57} 

\textbf{Strengthens and weakness of this approach}

The limitations of this study lie in the limitations of access to data. All data will be taken from the UNDPKO fatalities database and the Providing for Peacekeeping database. The weakness of this data is that there are inconsistencies between the DPKO database, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data and the Henke dataset. In the SIPRI dataset, the authors excluded mission with less than 1000 troops which limited the results. The number of fatalities and numbers adjusted for troops in Henke and the SIPRI dataset are different to that of DPKO thus complicating which is the more accurate record. Another weakness of the data are the possible risks of under-reporting fatalities and a lack of clarity in terms of how fatalities are recorded. There are delays in reporting


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
and gaps in data. There is lack of clarity of location of incidents and monthly data would provide a better picture of overall trends, however, this is only available until June 2015. Since DPKO is the official UN tracker of data and includes fatalities by type until the end of 2016, this thesis has used this database.

In terms of weakness with the models selected, the number of fatalities per mission is small and variable, which makes it challenging to run some models. Although an overall model is presented, much of the analysis categorizes the data into larger subgroups such as 10-year intervals, type of mission or use of force for comparison. A further challenge will be to establish causality between mission mandate, troops and fatalities as there are many reasons and unobserved factors which influence missions.

The strengths with the data, however, is that it has been used to look at some fatality trends before with certainty and some techniques and models have been uses before, so there is an ability to compare results and see if changes are occurring.
### Descriptive statistics

#### Fatalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Accident</th>
<th></th>
<th>Illness</th>
<th></th>
<th>Malicious Acts</th>
<th></th>
<th>Other</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1959</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>985</td>
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<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Fatalities by decade by incident type (number and percentage).*\(^{58}\)

---

## Troop Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>29526</td>
<td>23590.26</td>
<td>9717</td>
<td>68865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>52911</td>
<td>19875.31</td>
<td>25588</td>
<td>80445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>84929</td>
<td>3767.885</td>
<td>80425</td>
<td>91059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52551</td>
<td>28615.71</td>
<td>9717</td>
<td>91059</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>2054</td>
<td>1229.058</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>7837</td>
<td>2341.71</td>
<td>4802</td>
<td>11511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>13289</td>
<td>677.8797</td>
<td>12291</td>
<td>14306</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7109</td>
<td>4779.332</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observers</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>1237</td>
<td>877.522</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2401</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>2125</td>
<td>447.0861</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>2680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>200.7541</td>
<td>1803</td>
<td>2329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1758</td>
<td>717.311</td>
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<td>2680</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total troops</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>32817</td>
<td>24686.07</td>
<td>10329</td>
<td>73012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>62874</td>
<td>22157.72</td>
<td>33785</td>
<td>94327</td>
</tr>
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<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>100198</td>
<td>3621.236</td>
<td>95003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61418</td>
<td>33230.37</td>
<td>10329</td>
<td>106139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Troop levels by appointment type and decade.*

---

59 Data from The International Peace Institute, “Providing for Peacekeeping Database,” last modified 31 March 2017, accessed [http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/](http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/)
### Troops and fatalities by mission location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Location</th>
<th>Military Troops</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Total Unif. person</th>
<th>Accident</th>
<th>Illness</th>
<th>Malicious</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>8235</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>9373</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>288</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>40578</td>
<td>2522</td>
<td>1462</td>
<td>43381</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>70180</td>
<td>10331</td>
<td>1685</td>
<td>81399</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>181</td>
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<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
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<td>297</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>203</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>10857</td>
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<td>276</td>
<td>12307</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>11914</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12137</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>14597</td>
<td>1467</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>16369</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3528</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3567</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>2000-2009</td>
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<td>1789</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<td></td>
<td>888</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>2596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Troops and fatalities by mission location.⁶⁰

---

Chapter Four: The Evolution in use of force within peacekeeping

Liberal institutionalism prescribes that the UN, as a key multinational institution, has a responsibility to overcome the realist ideals of self-serving states by working to ensure cooperation among states in the name of creating a peaceful international system. To do this, it is important to understand the nature of peacekeeping missions and risks facing peacekeepers. This chapter outlines the evolution of UN peacekeeping missions and the different levels of force which missions have been mandated to use. This is not a linear tracing of UN peacekeeping but an analysis of how the UN has changed its approach to mandating force over time. An understanding of these changes is central to understanding what risks are being faced on the ground and why fatalities occur.

Currently, there are 16 UN peacekeeping missions deployed across four continents. In all, 123 countries contribute personnel to those missions- a workforce of 162,900 made up of troops, police, international and local civilian staff, and UN volunteers.\(^{61}\) UN peacekeeping was invented in the late 1940s, drawing on the experiences of previous multinational operations during the inter-war years, such as the League of Nations’ multinational Saar Force deployed to supervise the Franco-German referendum in 1935.\(^{62}\) Traditionally, peacekeeping has a set of distinct tasks and activities carried out by uniformed personnel, initially soldiers but later also police. Traditional peacekeeping


forces are deployed to a war-torn area following a peace agreement with the mandate to achieve several purposes. Most notably, they seek to limit the outbreak of violent conflict that occurs in an area.\(^{63}\) Peacekeeping is guided by three central principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. UN peacekeepers require the consent of a host state to operate on its territory; they are to remain impartial in their relations with conflict actors; and they can use military force only in self-defense.\(^{64}\)

Overtime, however, UN peacekeeping operations have become larger and more ambitious, deployed to more hostile and complex conflicts than at any other time in their history. The geographies are more remote and increasingly demand multifunctional missions.\(^{65}\) Peace operations are being sent to active violent conflicts and where there is no signed peace agreement. In these cases, missions are expected to protect civilians and prevent the risk of escalation whilst peace processes are taking place. As a result, we have seen the rise of a new form of missions, which have started to challenge the roles and principles of traditional peacekeeping operations.\(^{66}\)

One such area is in relation to the use of force. The 1990s saw the UN severely criticized when, in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, the UN was not able to protect civilians due to limitations in regards to when peacekeepers could use force.\(^{67}\) Out of these experiences, the notions that peacekeepers could be permitted to use force under specific

\(^{66}\) Ibid.
\(^{67}\) Ibid.
circumstances rose. The 2000 Brahimi Report institutionalized a rationale for a broader use of force in defense of a mission mandate as well as peacekeepers themselves.68 The 2009 New Horizon’s Doctrine introduced the concept of robust peacekeeping which was defined as “a political and operational strategy to signal the intention of a UN mission to implement its mandate to deter threats to an existing peace process in the face of resistance from spoilers.”69 This entailed the use of force by peacekeeping operations, at a tactical level, with authorization from the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers who posed a risk to civilians. These extensions were designed to allow peacekeeping operations to protect themselves, to provide to the implement of the mandate or, more broadly, the peace process.70 However, it has too been argued that robust peacekeeping actually takes the UN too far and moves peace operations closer to the coercive end of the use-of-force scale.71 Such operations involve more troops than a standard operation and these troops have more military capability with significant weaponry. The rules of engagement are said to be more permissive, allowing soldiers to initiate force if necessary to carry out their duties and uphold the mandate of the mission.72 A key tenant of these missions is that they are empowered to fulfill their mandate using ‘all necessary means’ in meeting the mandate. These missions are in

contradiction to traditional peacekeeping missions which strictly limit the use of force to
self-defense.\textsuperscript{73}

These missions, however, are not permitted to use of force at an operational level or in
the pursuit of operational objectives. These missions are only permitted to utilize force at
the tactical level, meaning they can only respond to attacks but not engage offensively,
without provocation, against groups.\textsuperscript{74} Currently there are seven robust peace operations-
UNAMID,\textsuperscript{75} UNMIK,\textsuperscript{76} UNISFA,\textsuperscript{77} UNMISS,\textsuperscript{78} UNOCI,\textsuperscript{79} UNMIL\textsuperscript{80} and UNIFIL.\textsuperscript{81}

Within the shift in use of force, some missions have seen a further move to actually use
offensive force. In 2011, Côte d’Ivoire was authorized to use offensive force against
militias loyal to the incumbent President, Laurent Gbagbo.\textsuperscript{82} Although the rationale for
the use of force was preventing attacks on civilians, when the Security Council picked the
side of President Alassane Ouattara, the robust response was associated with a political
strategy that leaned on elevating use of force to a strategic or operational level, thus
indicating an incremental doctrinal shift.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{73} Chiyuki Aoi and Cedric de Coning, “Conclusion: Towards a United Nations stabilization doctrine-
stabilization as an emerging UN practice,” \textit{UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to
Stabilization, Protection and New Threats}” eds. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and John Karlsrud (New
\textsuperscript{74} Charles Hunt, “All necessary means to what ends? The unintended consequences of the ‘robust turn’ in
UN peace operations”, \textit{International Peacekeeping}, 24(1)(2017).
\textsuperscript{75} The United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur.
\textsuperscript{76} The United Nations Mission in Kosovo.
\textsuperscript{77} United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.
\textsuperscript{78} The United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{79} The United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire.
\textsuperscript{80} The United Nations Mission in Liberia.
\textsuperscript{81} The United Nations Interim Mission in Lebanon.
\textsuperscript{82} Peter Mateja, “Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma,” \textit{Global Governance}
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
Since then, we have seen four stabilization missions - MINUSTAH, MINUSCA, MONUSCO and MINUSMA- which have utilized a political strategy to stabilize a situation via targeting and neutralizing specific groups. MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was the first official stabilization mission undertaken by the UN. The mandate described MONUSCO as including “stabilization through the establishment of functional state security institution in conflict-affected areas.” Further to this, the mission had named targeted groups, which it was doing in collaboration with the Government Forces of the DRC, to neutralize using any means necessary. This mission was unique in its approach, whereby the Security Council authorized, on an exceptional basis, the FIB, to actively engage with specific groups. It showed a shift in political will where Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) were will to use force to actively engage with parties on the ground where there was no peace to keep. Since, the FIB, we have seen the notion of stabilization being employed in both CAR and Mali, though there is still no official definition within the UN of stabilization.

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84 Cedric de Coning, “Do We Need a UN Stabilization Doctrine?” Complexity 4 Peacebuilding (2014).
85 MINUSCA, MONUSCO and MINUSMA reflect a new trend in all having stabilization in their names and mandated tasks. Whilst each of these missions have their own unique features, taken together they represent a new category of UN operations, which has to do with protecting civilians and governments, or governance structures, against an aggressor(s) or general destabilization, amidst ongoing violence, while at the same time being part of a larger process that seeks a political settlement for the conflict. MINUSTAH similarly has stabilization in its name and tasks, but seems to reflect a broader use of the term that does not fit well with how the concept is used in the other three UN missions mentioned above.
This notion of a stabilization mission was not invented by the UN but drew on previous uses of the concept. The United States developed the concept of ‘Stability and Reconstruction Operations and the Counterinsurgency (COIN)’ strategy used during its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.88 The African Union (AU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) too have developed a version with ‘Peace Support Operations’ and the European Union (EU) with its own concept of ‘Crisis Management Operations.’89 Within the UN context, stabilization has mainly been about using military means to stabilize a country, thus creating the risk of a disparity between UN doctrine and current practices in UN peacekeeping.90 Within the UN context, Boutellis argues, “What UN stabilization missions have in common is that they operate in the midst of on-going conflicts and therefore have to maintain a ceasefire and support a peace process rather than simply supporting the implementation of a peace agreement.”91 Cedric de Coning claims that stabilization missions “operate in the midst of on-going conflicts.”92 Alex Bellamy and Charles Hunt also argue that “stabilization missions are intentionally directed towards countries where there is no ... peace [to keep] and therefore they operate in active conflict zones.”93

88 Aditi Gorur, Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions (USA, Stimson, 2016).
90 John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali,” Third World Quarterly, 36(1)(2015).
As has been mentioned above, there have been four stabilization missions thus far in UN peacekeeping operation- MONUSCO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA and MINUSTAH. This expanded use of force, whether tactical or operational, has brought new challenges to UN peace operations. These environments are dangerous and often areas where terrorist and violent extremist groups operate, which presents a new challenge to the UN. As with civilians, UN personnel have also become the target of retaliation by those who are negatively impacted by the robust approach. We have seen the rise of terrorist acts, which are well coordinated with devastating effects, causing more casualties and damages.  

Whereas once the blue flag was thought to be a source of protection, it has increasingly become the target of indirect attacks on UN installations by way of mortar, artillery and rockets and an increase in direct attack on UN patrols and convoys. It is this shift in peacekeeping that this thesis is interested in and whether it has in fact made peacekeeping more dangerous.

Chapter Five: The trend of UN fatalities in UN peacekeeping operations

As has been mentioned above, in order for the UN to operate as an effective multinational institution working to ensure cooperation among states, as liberal institutionalism prescribes, it is important to understand the nature of peacekeeping missions and risks facing peacekeepers. In this section, this thesis starts to unpack trends in UN fatalities. To

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95 Ibid.
begin with, this thesis will conduct an initial analysis of UN peacekeeping fatalities trends in absolute numbers across all missions from January 1948 to December 2016. This thesis then breaks this down further to look at what is causing these fatalities by looking at January 1990 to December 2016 by incident type. In both these cases, this study is not yet controlling for UN deployment numbers. There are two reasons why: firstly, it is of interest to unpack what the overall trend is, as a whole, over time and subsequently to see what impact troops have on this. It is important to understand both these aspects of fatalities developments in order to get an accurate picture of the current environment.

Next, this thesis moves on to look at specific variables such as location of the mission and type of mandate given to a mission and the impact this has on the trend of fatalities. Since this thesis is mainly interested in malicious act fatalities, most of this analysis will zoom in on malicious acts. This chapter lays the foundation to examine the hypotheses mentioned in chapter three and overall research question of whether there is an increasing trend of malicious act fatalities in stabilization missions.

**Trends in the absolute number of fatalities**

To start with, this study looks at the total incidents of fatalities between 01 January 1948 and 31 December 2016 for all UN peacekeeping missions. The UN Security Council, as stipulated by the UN Charter, has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. Since
1948, there have been 71 missions on all five continents: 13 during the Cold War and 58 between 1988 and 2016.

Graph 1 shows the total number of fatalities among all UN peacekeeping personnel since 1948. It becomes apparent from the trend line in graph 1 that there is a steady upward trend in fatalities across all missions. Looking at individual years, 1960 has a peak, 1993 another peak, after which both decrease. However, from 2000 onwards, there is a clear upward trend of fatalities. The low numbers prior to 1990 seen in graph 1, excluding 1960, are consistent with the conclusion by Seet and Burhman that the decade following the cold war holds more fatalities that the preceding 40 years.\textsuperscript{96}

To further reiterate this point, in graph 1 it can be seen that in the years of 1990 and 1999, there were a total of 768 fatalities as compared to 637 fatalities between 1948 and 1990. As has been mentioned in chapter four, 1993 was the highest year of fatalities in UN peacekeeping, with 225 personnel losing their lives, about half from malicious acts. This was the year of Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR\textsuperscript{97}), Somalia (UNOSOM II\textsuperscript{98}) and Cambodia (UNTAC\textsuperscript{99}), which all suffered significant fatalities. A year later, this continued when, in 1994, Rwanda saw the death of 10 Belgium peacekeepers that were mutilated by Hutu militias during the initial days of the 1994 genocide.\textsuperscript{100} This seemed to indicate a turning

\textsuperscript{96} Seet and Burhman ultimately conclude that in a post-Cold War setting, peacekeeping personnel have a higher risk of dying from hostile acts in missions where more force is required. For the full argument, see Benjamin Seet and Gilbert Burnham, “Fatality Trends in United Nations Peace Operations, 1948 – 1998,” JAMA 284 (5) (2000).
\textsuperscript{97} The United Nations Protection Force.
\textsuperscript{98} The United Nations Operation is Somalia.
\textsuperscript{99} The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.
point because, as can be seen from graph 1, in the years following the mid-1990s, there is a significant drop in fatalities to less than 50 per year. This holds until the 2000s, where we see an upward trend begin, which has remained steadily increasing over the past 16 years. Whilst the levels may not be as high as the highest point of 1960 or 1993, this thesis finds it significant that there is a steady climb without a decreasing point. Already, between 2010 and 2016, we have seen more fatalities than the 1990s altogether, with 843 fatalities and the decade is not yet complete.\(^{101}\) With missions such as MINUSMA, which has seen 110 fatalities in just three years of existence, the decade of 2010 to 2019 could be the most deadly in UN peacekeeping history.

Graph 1: Total incidents of fatalities for all personnel in all UN peacekeeping missions between 1948 and 2016.\(^{102}\)

\(^{101}\) See Table 1 for complete breakdown by decade.

\(^{102}\) Data from United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Database on fatalities”, Last modified 31 March 2017, accessed 10 January 2017

Total fatalities by incident type

To unpack this trend further, this thesis breaks these total incidents of fatalities into type. By doing so, a trend starts to develop in terms of the most common causes of fatalities in UN peacekeeping missions. As have been elaborated on in chapter three, there are four types of fatalities, as classified by the UNDPKO: accidents, illness, malicious act and other.\(^ {103}\) Traditionally, accidents and illness has been the main area of concern in fatalities in peace operations.\(^ {104}\) When looking at fatalities by incident type in graph 2, the first large peak is malicious acts in the early 1990s, in line with the peak of total fatalities seen in graph 1. After which, as with graph 1, this drops significantly, to almost zero in 1998. The next big peak is in 2010, where there is a peak of traffic accidents after which this type of fatality drops notably, which is inline with the argument made by Rogers and Kennedy that there was a significant drop in traffic accidents around 2010 due to increase training of UN personnel.\(^ {105}\)

When looking closer at graph 2, at first glance, it seems to reiterate the findings of previous studies by Henke and Van der Lijn and Smit that fatalities are decreasing and peacekeeping is less fatal than previous years.\(^ {106}\) However, when looking closely at the period of 2015 onwards, all forms of fatalities are decreasing except malicious act fatalities. Although these numbers are slightly lower than illnesses, malicious acts are not

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\(^ {103}\) These categories are provided by UN DPKO. See chapter three for detailed definition of each type.
decreasing as we progress into 2017. As of 31 January 2017, the UN has suffered six fatalities, 75 percent of which have been malicious acts.\textsuperscript{107}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{UN peacekeeping fatalities by incident type (01 January 1990 - 31 December 2016).}
\end{figure}

This growing trend can be seen clearly in graph 3 where there is a decreasing trend in all categories except malicious act fatalities. This indicates an interesting trend and, when examined more in-depth, it can be seen, in graph 4, that when comparing malicious acts with total fatalities of all UN peacekeeping missions in the last decade, total fatalities are on a downward trend but malicious acts are on an upward trend. Whilst the most recent


analysis of UN peacekeeping fatalities by Henke and Van der Lijn and Smit argues that malicious acts are increasing but this is purely due to one mission—MINUSMA—and when this mission is removed, malicious acts are no longer of significance.\textsuperscript{109}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graphic3.png}
\caption{Fatalities by type for all personnel in all UN peacekeeping missions between 01 January 2006 and 31 December 2016.\textsuperscript{110}}
\end{figure}

This thesis agrees with Van der Lijn and Smit that the rates are lower,\textsuperscript{111} however, this study argues that this should not be disregarded because, even though we may be seeing lower numbers than 1993, we are not seeing a downward trend as we did in the years post-1993. In 2014, we saw 126 fatalities, of which 30 percent were due to malicious acts; in 2015, there were 129 fatalities, of which 27 percent were due to malicious acts; in


2016, there were 98 fatalities in total, 37 percent of which were due to malicious acts; and thus far in 2017, 75 percent of fatalities have been due to malicious acts. Together, graphs 1 through 4 show that there is indeed an upward trend of malicious act fatalities in UN peacekeeping operations, thus confirming hypothesis one of this paper. From this, we can start to predict that, in all likelihood, we are going to see more fatalities as the years progress and these are likely to be malicious fatalities due to the nature of high-risk peacekeeping operations that the UN is pursuing.

Graph 4: Total fatalities versus malicious act fatalities for all personnel in all UN peacekeeping missions between 01 January 2006 and 31 December 2016.

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Trends in the relative number of fatalities and troop Levels

Notwithstanding the above analysis, when comparing fatalities over years, it is necessary to consider the exponential increase in troops and personnel. In other words, does the increase in troops correlate with the increase in fatalities. One might suspect that if there are more troops, there is likely to be more fatalities. Alternatively, the increasing troops could indicate an increasing force which could defend itself more against attacks. As outlined in chapter one, this is an important question to unpack for the future of UN peacekeeping operations considering the UN is an organization based on the voluntary deployment of troops by member states, and if member do not feel comfortable sending troops to UN missions, the ability of the UN to act effectively and achieve its mandate will be greatly reduced.113

Between 1990 and 2016, the number of uniformed personnel in field missions has increase, by close to 30,000 personnel, to a total of 99,034 uniformed, 16,471 civilian personnel and 1,519 UN volunteers in the field, as of 31 January 2017.114 Therefore, it would seem obvious that as troops increase there would be more fatalities purely because there are more people who could be killed, which is the premise of Seet and Burhman’s argument.115 Therefore, in order to control for this, this thesis calculated the ratio of fatalities per 10 000 troops between 1990 and 2016 and plotted this below on graph 5.

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Graph 5 showing total fatalities and malicious act fatalities per 10 000 total personnel between 01 January 1990 and 31 December 2016.\textsuperscript{116}

At first glance, the number of fatalities per 10,000 total personnel has decreased, consistently, since 2010, thus indicating, as did graph 3, that UN peacekeeping operations have become less dangerous. In the years between 1990 and 2003, recorded values of between 14 deaths per 10,000 troops and 37 per 10,000 troops were seen. This trend starts to fall in 2003, only rising to slightly above 15 per 10,000 in 2010. When looking at the number of malicious acts fatalities per 10,000 troops, the numbers are low with the peak being 17 per 10,000 in 1993, consistent with graph 1 and 2. However, as has been seen in all the previous graphs, the level of malicious act fatalities between 2014 and 2016, while low at only 4 per 10,000, are not indicating a decreasing trend. It is at this

point that Van der Lijn and Smit conclude MINUSMA is an exception with its high rate of fatalities and not a trend, and thus when it is excluded from analysis, the trend of fatalities is clearly decreasing.  

However, their criticism of the Van der Lijn and Smit study is that it only reaches to mid-2015 and, as has been seen the above analysis, from 2015 onwards, there is an increase in malicious act in both MINUSCA and MINUSMA, which is why this thesis finds the trend of malicious acts, even controlling for troops, significant.

To further prove this connection, this thesis ran a Spearman’s correlation between fatalities and troops over all years to unpack the hypothesis that as the level of troops in peacekeeping operations increase, so too does the number of fatalities. This showed a significant positive association: as troop levels increase fatalities increase. This is seen with \( r = 0.73 \) for total troops and total fatalities, which is a strong, positive correlation indicating that as troops increase, the number of fatalities increase. This can too be seen with malicious act fatalities and total troops where there is an \( r = 0.57 \), which is a moderately positive correlation indicating that as the level of troops increase, the number of malicious acts increase too but to a lesser extent that total fatalities.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Illness</th>
<th>Accidents</th>
<th>Malicious</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observers</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total troops</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Spearman’s correlation between fatalities and troops.

In order to try quantify the relationship, we ran a negative binomial looking at the association between total fatalities and malicious acts by year, and a second model to look at these relations when you control for troops. The time period considered is the last two decades: 1996 to 2016, and years are grouped into three-year groups in order to permit stronger analysis (1996 – 1998; 1999 – 2001; 2002- 2004; 2005 – 2007; 2008 – 2010; 2011 – 2013; and 2014 – 2016). This model uses an incident rate ratio (IRR) meaning it is comparing fatalities to a base fatality rate of 1996 and comparing changes in three-year intervals since 1996.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>IRR$^1$</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-98</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Ref</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ref</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Ref</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ref</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-01</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-04</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>2.2**</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.5**</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.6*</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-07</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>2.3**</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1.9*</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.3*</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-10</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>3.0**</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.0*</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-13</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>2.4**</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2.6**</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.9**</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-16</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>2.5**</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.8**</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>10.3**</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total personnel (log)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.6**</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression between total fatalities and malicious act fatalities and total adjusted troops (* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001).

From the IRR for total fatalities by group in table 5, there is clearly a double in the IRR for fatalities from 1996 to 2016 (1.2 $\rightarrow$ 2.5). This means that over the 20 years, the number of fatalities experience by UN peacekeeping operations has doubled. When we control for the increase in troops over time, we find that there is a slight increase but it is not significant. This supports Henke’s argument that the reason we see more fatalities
over time is due to the increase in troops over time. However, when we look to the second model of malicious acts, we see that the change from 1996 to 2016 is both significant and actually much higher than total fatalities (1.3 to 3.8). What is of more interest, however, is the change from 1996 to 2016 when controlling for troop levels. Note that the IRR for 1996 is 1.5 and by 2016, it is 10.3. This is a massive change indicating that even when controlling for increase in troop levels, the number of malicious acts over the past twenty years have increase by 10 times the amount, and is significant. The standard error is high at 7.2, however, this could be influenced by the variability in the year group (2014 – 2016), as it was in 2015 and 2016, as shown earlier, where we saw significant increases in malicious act fatalities.

These results, in collaboration with graphs 4 and 5, corroborate hypothesis four that there is a connection between troops and fatalities. Even when controlling for the increase in troops over time, we still find that malicious act fatalities have increase dramatically. When tested statistically, the outcomes confirm these findings as well as produce statistically significant results, thereby proving the primary assumption of this thesis that UN peacekeeping operations have become more dangerous.

**Trends in fatalities by location of missions**

To unpack hypothesis three that there are a higher proportion of malicious acts of troops based in Africa, this study started to look at the location of missions relative to which missions suffered more fatalities. In table 3 in chapter three, we outlined the breakdown

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of fatalities by troops, year and incident type. It is strikingly apparent in that table that troops deployed to Africa suffer a disproportionate amount of fatalities in comparison to other regions in terms of all forms of fatalities in terms of total numbers. However, this must be contextualized in regards to the number of troops which are in Africa to counter the argument that more troops are deployed to Africa because there are purely more troops there to kill. Table 6 below shows the adjusted rate of fatalities per 1,000 troops in order to control for the number of troops per continent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Location (by Continent)</th>
<th>Incidence rate fatalities/1000 troop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>4.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>8.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>65.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South America</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>7.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>12.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Adjusted rate of fatality by type per 1000 troop by location.\(^{119}\)

This table outlines quite clearly that when adjusting for troop levels, troops in Africa still

\(^{119}\) Data from the International Peace Institute, “Providing for Peacekeeping Database;” last modified 31 March 2017, accessed [http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/](http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/)
suffer the highest level of fatalities in every fatality category. In terms of malicious acts, despite a massive decrease from 14.94 malicious act fatalities per 1,000 troops deployed to Africa in the decade 1990 to 1999, to just 2.22 per 1,000 troops by 2010, this is still higher than the other three continents. This table shows that there are, indeed, more peacekeepers being killed by malicious acts and this holds even when controlling for troops levels, thus confirming hypothesis three.

**Trend in fatalities by peacekeeping mission and type of mandate**

What must be considered, though, is that fatalities are not evenly spread across peace operations, and those with particularly high personnel loses, can influence general trends. As has been stated before, the trends of 1993 were due to three specific missions-UNPROFOR, UNTAC and UNOSOM II. In 2012, we had the introduction of the FIB in MONUSCO which had a forward posture, offensive mandate where it could engage with spoilers of peace without provocation with the intension to destroy or disarm a group. In 2013, MINUSMA entered the field and in 2014, MINUSCA; both of which had stabilization mandates and were operating in high-risk environments. These missions which have seen high levels of fatalities expose the distinction between missions when compared to the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), which has been in existence for nearly 70 years and only suffered a mere 55 fatalities. Thus, it is important to contextualize these fatalities into operational environments and mandate tasking. For example, some missions operate in a significantly different environment and thus have a different strength and mandate than a traditional observer mission.
To unpack the impact of mandates and, thus, prove hypothesis two, this study looked at issues of use of force within a mission to differentiate between traditional (no force permitted), robust and stabilization missions. In total, there have been 17 missions, which have or have had authorization to adopt the measures of force required to fulfill their mandate.\textsuperscript{120} Of the 17 operations that have been given explicit authorization, there are three that stand out: MONUSCO in the DRC, MINUSMA in Mali and MINUSCA in CAR because of their wide-reaching authorization of offensive force for the re-establishment of order and security for the protection of civilians.\textsuperscript{121} Whilst, MINUSTAH does similarly have stabilization in its name and tasks, it rather reflects a broader use of the term which does not fit well with how the concept is used.\textsuperscript{122}

Table 7 shows the breakdown of fatalities within missions into three categories: those with no force authorized, those with force but not stabilization and stabilization missions. This table shows some interesting trends. In the decade following the Cold War, the majority of fatalities (64 percent) where found in missions with no force. In the following decade (2000 – 2009), this changes completely to 66 percent in missions with force but not stabilization missions. By 2010, 46 percent of the fatalities were in missions with force but not stabilization missions, and 45 percent of total fatalities are seen in stabilization missions, of which there are only four. This means that 91 percent of all

\textsuperscript{120} Distinctions based on information from Julia Gifra Durall, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations under Chapter VII: Exception or Practice”, Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos 2 (2013).


fatalities in the decade 2010 – 2016 are in missions that use force. Further, the fact that
the four stabilization missions hold almost as many fatalities as the 17 missions with
force but not stabilization, highlights that these missions, which are in high-risk
environments with forward posture mandates, are seeing disproportionally high numbers
of fatalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of force</th>
<th>Total fatal.</th>
<th>No force</th>
<th>Force/no stabilization</th>
<th>Force/stabilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1959</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Total fatalities in force mandated missions in three categories.\(^{123}\)

To unpack further, this thesis broke this down by incident type and looked specifically at
malicious acts. In doing so, it is interesting to note that by 2010, 53 percent of malicious
act fatalities are in the four stabilization missions, with 45 percent in missions with force.
This means that by 2010, 98 percent of malicious act fatalities are in missions with
mandates to use force in defense of the mandate or beyond.

\(^{123}\) Data from United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Database on fatalities”, Last
modified 31 March 2017, accessed 10 January 2017
Use of force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Malicious Fatalities</th>
<th>No force</th>
<th>Force/no stabilization</th>
<th>Force/stabilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1959</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Total malicious act fatalities in force mandated missions in three categories.\[^{124}\]

In order to contextualize these fatalities and consider environment, strength and mandate, we looked at which specific missions during 2010 and 2016 suffered the highest malicious act fatalities. Graph 6 shows us the top ten missions for malicious fatalities per 1,000 troops between 2010 and 2016. We see that MINUSMA has the highest malicious act fatalities per 1,000 troops by far. This is followed by UNAMID,\[^{125}\] UNIFSA,\[^{126}\] UNMISS\[^{127}\] and MINUSCA. All four stabilization missions can be found in this table and the remaining six missions all have use of force permitted, thus reiterating the findings of table 6 that the bulk of malicious act fatalities are being seen in missions with force.


\[^{125}\] The United Nations Mission in Darfur.

\[^{126}\] The United Nations Interim Security Force in Abeyi.

\[^{127}\] The United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
Altogether, table 7 and 8 and graph 6 shows that when controlling for troops and looking at mandate types illustrates hypothesis two that the more robust the mandate of a mission, the higher the percentage of malicious act fatalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top ten Mission with Malicious Acts per 1000 troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 6: Top ten missions with the highest malicious fatalities per 1000 troops (2010 – 2016).128

The remainder of this thesis will focus on three missions- MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA- all of which are seen in the top ten missions suffering high malicious act fatalities. The reason these three missions have been chosen was outlined in chapter one. As a reminder, these three missions are the only current UN peacekeeping missions which are permitted to use offensive force against names spoilers of peace in efforts to

extend state authority. All three are operating in high-risk environments and are suffering higher levels of malicious act fatalities, as has been shown in table 8. These missions typify the changing nature of conflict, suffering IED attacks, terrorism, complex rebel and terrorist groups and weak state authority. It is imperative for the UN to understand these forms of peacekeeping missions in order to remain effective as a key institution in resolving security challenges globally.

Chapter Six: The changing norm of UN peacekeeping operations:

MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA

The extension of force within three specific missions- MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade, MINUSMA and MINUSCA- has moved the UN into a precarious position where mandates have placed UN peacekeepers in situations where there are no clear parties to the conflict from whom they can seek consent. This move has complicated the status of these missions by bringing into question the impartiality of the mission and challenging whether it is actually a party to the conflict and thus a legitimate target of attack. As has been shown in chapter five, these three missions are suffering high levels of hostile attacks and malicious act fatalities. MINUSMA, the mission with the highest level of malicious act fatalities, has suffered 110 fatalities since it began in 2013.

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The majority of these deaths are from IEDs, mortar and rocket attacks, and other forms of attacks by rebel and terrorist groups. These changing environments, where the UN is directly targeted due to its presence in the country, accentuates the need for reflection on these operations and the trends and variables leading to the above proven trend in malicious act fatalities. It is vital for the UN to consider these cases to ensure that it is able to mandate missions with the appropriate means and right materials, and ensure the necessary training levels of those deployed, to guarantee both safety and effectiveness in the given locations.

Therefore, in this chapter, this thesis will look more at these three missions and draw out some of the common reasons as to why there are high fatalities rates in these missions. In doing so, this study will draw on three issues: the issues of host state consent and partiality to the conflict; type of actors involved in the conflict and troop preparedness. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to illustrate that MINUSMA is not an anomaly but the start of a shifting trend in UN peacekeeping where we are seeing higher rates of fatalities in missions with offensive force due to the complexity this force adds to a UN peacekeeping mission.

Extension of State Authority and impartiality

Impartiality is a central tenant of UN peacekeeping and has been since it was first explicitly expressed by Dag Hammarskjold in his January 1957 report on the UN

Emergency Force I. In this report, Hammarskjold argued that the use of force in a UN operation must be “impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interests of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial.” Since then, this notion of impartiality has become a central norm of peacekeeping. It prescribes how peacekeepers should behave, namely, that they should be unbiased and informed when making decisions or in taking action. In other words, peacekeeping missions should not force their will on parties and not tip the balance of power in one way or another. Peacekeepers, like other impartial actors, derive their authority from a lack of bias and the values outlined in a mission’s mandate. The notion of remaining impartial is integral to the identity of peacekeepers, to what peacekeeping is and is not, and to the values and principles that the UN seeks to project.

This impartiality, however, has been severely challenged by the recent mandates the Security Council has given to MONUSCO, MINUSCA and MINUSMA. In these cases, as has been outlined in chapter one, these missions are mandated to use offensive force against named aggressors. By doing so, the Security Council has initiated a transformation in the notion of impartiality in the roles and action of the prescribed for peacekeepers in conflict and post-conflict settings where peacekeepers are involved in the

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137 Ibid.
extension of state-authority and the disarming or neutralizing of named groups.\(^\text{138}\) As a result, the UN is seen as bias towards the government and strengthening the state authorities rather than exploring which governance system might work best in a given country.\(^\text{139}\)

In the case of Mali, MINUSMA is mandated to provide protection and support to the Malian governments against insurgent groups that have undermined its position. To these groups—al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, the November for Oneness and Jihad (MUJVA), Al Mourabitoune, Ansar Eddine, and their affiliates such as the Front de Libération du Macina (FLM)\(^\text{140}\) - MINUSMA is not seen as impartial. Rather the mission is perceived to be working to support the existing state authority and implementing the peace process, which has contributed to increased attacks on the mission.\(^\text{141}\)

Further challenges in Mali are seen where the UN is operating alongside the French Barkhane mission. MINUSMA, as a UN stabilization mission, is not mandated to engage in explicit counter-terrorism tasks. However, the small French liaison and support units, which were embedded within MINUSMA to ensure operational coordination and coherence, were expected to undertake counter-terrorism activities.\(^\text{142}\) The UN Security


\(^{139}\) Ibid.


Council imagined that the French troops would provide a parallel, but independent, counter-terrorism force with its own objectives to deal with other armed groups who had neither signed nor adhered to the Ouagadougou peace agreement.\textsuperscript{143} However, in reality, this division between Barkhane and MINUSMA has not been very clear to outside forces and resulted in MINUSMA being associated with Barkhane, and thus seen as actively aggressing against groups. This has compromised the status of the mission by making it a party to the conflict and therefore a legitimate target of attack, explaining the high numbers of attacks and fatalities within the mission, as shown in chapter 5.

In the case of the DRC, similar challenges of impartiality are seen where the mandate of the FIB established the UN as party to the conflict. This is a further challenge because, as with Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA, the FIB and MONUSCO were not separate and thus rebel groups began to target the entire mission of MONUSCO, including civilians, in retaliation for FIB operations.\textsuperscript{144} The resolution behind the FIB left little doubt as to where the Security Council positioned itself with its strong condemnation of the M23 along with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) and the National Forces of Liberation (FLN) and the Mayi Mayi groups.\textsuperscript{145} All operations against these groups were to be done as “joint operations with the [official] Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the


Congo (FARDC) thus removing any notion of independence between the mission and the government.\textsuperscript{146} In the time since the FIB deployed, MONUSCO has suffered heavy losses by both the ADF and the APCLS elements.\textsuperscript{148} Further, UN staff and buildings have been attacked by armed civilians dissatisfied with MONUSCO’s efforts to protect them from the ADF in the North Kivu areas,\textsuperscript{149} thus contributing to the increasing trend in fatalities in the mission.

In the CAR, the mandate of MINSUCA, under Security Council Resolution 2301 (2016), is explicit that MINUSCA should support “the reconciliation and political processes, the extension of state authority and the preservation of territorial integrity.”\textsuperscript{150} In addition to extending state authority, the UN has an explicit protection of civilians mandate which permits using offensive force. Prior to 2017, MINUSCA has not been seen to use very much aggressive force. However, this year, much of this changed. For example, on 13 February 2017, MINUSCA, using an attack helicopter, dispersed heavily armed militiamen in Bambari, a small town on the Ouaka River in CAR. Approximately 40 fighters from the Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central African Republic (FPRC) armed with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades gathered in the town, but UN forces intervened to prevent them carrying out the intended attack through use of active

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
aggression.\textsuperscript{151} Actions, such as this one, are clear illustration of the UN’s resolve to use force against spoilers of peace in the name of protecting civilians, and thus illustrates it perceived political positioning.

Although attacks against peacekeepers are lower in MINUSCA than MINUSMA, there are recorded incidents where the Séléka has engaged in battles with multiple other groups, including state forces, other armed groups, political and communal militias, and international forces such as those of the UN.\textsuperscript{152} As recently as 22 February 2017, MINUSCA reported that its troops on patrol were ambushed outside of Ippy in Ouaka region. During the exchange of fire with the FPRC’s coalition, four peacekeepers were wounded, including one severely. In a news release issued earlier in February, MINUSCA stressed that two factions of the ex-Séléka armed group, namely the FPRC coalition and the Movement for Peace and Unity in CAR (UPC), represent a threat for civilian populations and that UN peacekeepers will respond in case of violence.\textsuperscript{153} As a response to the growing use of force against militia groups, there has been an increase in attacks against MINUSCA, thus increasing the risk for those on the ground.\textsuperscript{154}


Ultimately, the notion of true impartiality would require peacekeepers to apply force in direct proportion to the transgression in question, and without fear or favor. This is not what we have seen in Mali, CAR and the DRC. In these cases, force has been specifically mandated, and is used only against specific groups. The major risk in losing impartiality is that peacekeepers are seen as taking sides in a conflict and thus become party to the conflict, thereby making them legitimate targets of attack. The largest challenge with the use of force is that it cannot be applied without, at the very least, potentially altering the political dynamics of the conflict, or at worst, prejudicing the political outcome. As Mats Berdal plainly states, “the robust use of force, in particular, cannot but have an impact on that political balance.”

When UN peacekeepers use force, either defensively or offensively, the threat of escalation is raised. UN-led military action may draw the mission into an escalating conflict with a hardened, passionate, and highly capable armed group; situations which the UN is neither prepared nor equipped to engage in.

**Operational Environment and actors Involved**

The UN is not designed for counter-terrorism and a 2015 review of UN peacekeeping was very clear that the UN should not be involved in counter-terrorism activities at all. However, due to the current nature of conflict and status of missions, such as

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MINUSMA, the question is becoming less of if the UN should engage but more that it is engaging in counter-terrorism activities and thus must address the challenges that accompany them. As MINUSMA’s former Force Commander, General Jean Bosco Kazura told the Security Council in 2014, “MINUSMA is in a terrorist fighting situation without an anti-terrorist mandate or adequate training, equipment, logistic or intelligence to deal with such a situation.”¹⁵⁹ The nature of the groups the UN is facing is causing extreme pressure, with attacks becoming more advanced and targeted at peacekeepers themselves. This has resulted in need to shift the use of force dynamic to a more offensive arena. This, however, only works if troops are aware of the environment and the terrain, and understand the groups involved. Without this understanding, the value and relevance of the UN greatly declines.

In DRC, as of December 2015, it is estimated that there are close to 70 active armed groups.¹⁶⁰ Not many of these groups consented to a UN presence but all are part of the wider conflict. Within the context of a UN peacekeeping mission, groups which have provided consent are perceived to support the UN and those that have not, are seen as against it. This notion of which groups have provided consent is heightened when there is constant fragmentation of insurgent groups, which complicates whom has and has not endorsed the presences of the UN.¹⁶¹ The case of the M23 in the DRC demonstrates this. The M23 entered the scene in March 2012 when several members of the former Congres


National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP) party defected and united together under the M23 movement.162 Ironically, the CNDP, which is the group the M23 originated from, did support the UN, whilst the M23 did not support the presences of the UN.163 In cases where a group disintegrates and emerges, confusion rises over who should be part of negotiations and thereby provide their consent for the UN’s presence and those that should be disarmed by force.164 The FIB’s mandate, however, already made this decision before the mission deployed by naming specific groups to engage with without consultation or evaluation of the context on the ground. By doing this, the mandate positioned the UN as targeting specific groups and thus becoming a target of those respective groups.

During the FIB’s tenure in the DRC, the contingent was seen to have had a positive impact on the security situation in parts of eastern Congo by eradicating the M23 entirely by the end of 2013.165 However, the FIB has not had as much success against the other groups. With the ADF, for example, the FIB carried out aerial bombardment, in collaboration with the Congolese army, against the ADF in attempt to degrade the group’s capabilities and to cut-off their support base in western Uganda.166 However, what the mission is overlooking is the fact that this group is part of the social fabric of the Congolese history, having been in the country for over 20 years. It is an active participant

163 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
in the vast illegal networks pillaging the timber and mineral resources, and is closely linked with parts of the Congolese military and the political establishment.\textsuperscript{167} This is also true for the FDLR, which are deeply imbedded in Congolese society and are able to draw support from local populations in terms of recruitment and resource support.\textsuperscript{168} The LRA has proven equally elusive to the military pressure of the FIB and continues to move easily between South Sudan, Uganda and CAR.\textsuperscript{169} The complex nature of these groups is beyond what the FIB is able to do with the mandate it holds as well as the resources and numbers it possess. This mismatch leaves the mission at risk of significant attack. As recently as 29 March 2017, two UN experts, who were abducted by rebel groups in central DRC, were found killed and close to 40 police officers were beheaded around the same time in the same region.\textsuperscript{170}

In addition to the challenging nature and sheer number of groups in the DRC, poor infrastructure, limited road movement and a reliance on scarce aviation assets contributes to the challenging operational area in the DRC.\textsuperscript{171} Since Security Council Resolution 1925 extended MONUSCO’s mandate in 2010, the majority of the 20,000 peacekeeping troops have been located in the east of the DRC spread over a distance of nearly 1,500 miles (see Map 1).\textsuperscript{172} Faced with this complex operating environment and spread across

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{171} The International Peace Institute, \textit{An Issue Brief: The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo} (New York, International Peace Institute, 2013).
\item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
an area the size of Western Europe, the UN has repeatedly attempted to break the cycle of violence in the country and protect civilians from attack, but with limited success.  

Further, given the size of the area of operations and number of rebel groups, the 3,000 UN troops, which make up the FIB, are too few given the area it has to cover. In addition, despite the attack helicopters provided by the South Africans, MONUSCO does not have the necessary equipment to cover such a wide landmass. If the mission is to be effective considering the number of rebel groups and land mass it monitors, it needs more capabilities, such as attack and utility helicopters, night-vision capabilities and additional information capabilities to improve situational awareness and allow timely decision-making.


174 More is provided on the troop make up of the FIB in the next section of this chapter.

In CAR, the current conflict is made so complex due to the challenging connection between religion and ethnicity in the groups involved. Currently, there are two main coalitions - the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka. The Séléka Coalition first materialized at the end of 2012, with its name rooted in the Sango word for alliance. This predominantly Muslim group, initially a splinter group from the new alliance of the CPJP, the UFDR and the largely unknown Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK) was

Map 1: Map of MONUSCO deployment as of February 2017

formed in the north of the country.\textsuperscript{177} In August 2013, a collation of Anti-Balaka reappeared consisting of former soldiers, defected members of the Séléka, Christian vigilante farmers, members of the Association of Central African Farmers (ACP), and the Front for the Return to the Constitutional Order in Central Africa (FROCCA).\textsuperscript{178} In total, over half of the Anti-Balaka activities are battles and, while over 60 percent of these battles are with the Séléka, the remaining share of the Anti-Balaka battles engage a wide range of actors, including international forces such as the African-led International Support Mission to CAR (MISCA), the French-led Operation Sangarais and the UN mission.\textsuperscript{179}

The CAR is regarded as the most dangerous country on earth due to the unpredictable nature of the conflict.\textsuperscript{180} A contributing factor to this conflict in CAR is the weak chains of command within the active rebel groups and the communal nature of conflict. The state forces have been mostly absent in preventing the recent waves of unrest, resulting in civilians being targeted, not only for strategic political reasons including terrorizing and displacing large portions of the population, but also for personal gain and material benefit by local commanders or individual elements.\textsuperscript{181} In addition, issues such as the rising armed patrols and roadblocks, reprisal killings, looting and vast human rights abuses, as well as kidnappings of international humanitarian and UN workers, have made the

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
country increasingly dangerous. These challenges, plus the rise of new rebel groups as well as the impulsive actions of groups, have put MINUSCA operations under increasing pressure.

The UN itself, as was shown earlier, has started using more force against groups in the country in the name of implementing peace. However, overall, MINUSCA has not been successful in stabilizing the country. This is connected, as with the DRC, to the large landmass, the limited infrastructure, resources and development in the country, as well as the limited equipment and capabilities of the UN itself. The mission has been there for three years but still considers itself in start-up phase due to the challenge of, firstly, having to import all goods into the country because of the limited raw material in the country, and, secondly, due to the need to bring everything by road from Cameroon which is slow, costly and unreliable. Together these issues, plus the complex religious based conflict, has resulted in a mission, which is poorly designed to meet the needs on the ground, and is struggling to survive through conditions it is neither trained nor equipped for.

In Mali, MINUSMA is similarly operating in a complex security environment, which includes asymmetric threats from identified terrorist organizations such as “AQIM, Al Mourabitoune, Ansar Eddine, and their affiliates such as the Front de Libération du

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This operational environment has significantly changed since its inception. MINUSMA is the first example of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation conducting operations in a theatre with on-going counter-terrorist operations. The UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and UNDOF were deployed in theatres where terrorist threats have been present. However, both were deployed to maintain ceasefires in interstate conflicts, whereas MINUSMA has been deployed in active support of extending state authority to areas controlled by violent extremists and terrorist groups, thus making it a main party to the conflict.

Added to this, the number and type of actors involved in Mali makes the situation multifaceted. Currently, within Mali there are three coalitions of actors: the Compliant Armed Groups (CAGs), the Platform and the non-compliant groups. The CAGs include the Malian Extremist Armed Groups and the transnational Extremist Armed Groups. The CAGs and the Platform are party to the peace agreement however, through the signing processes, have splinted and re-grouped under different names, thus raising similar challenges to those seen in the DRC with fragmented and new groups being created regularly.

The other actors involved are the Malian Extremist Armed Groups- Ansar Dine and MUJAO- and the transnational Extremist Armed Groups- AQMI and Al Murabitun.

186 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
whom are not party to the peace agreement and actively working against it. The conflict itself is motivated by the desire for an independent state. The current conflict began with a Tuareg rebellion of the Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) in January 2012. The rebels, strengthened by the return of soldiers from Qaddafi’s legions with large-scale weaponry, occupied a significant part of northern Mali, declared independence and named the area Azawad. However, this was short lived and shortly after, the AQIM and MUJAO groups, who are militarily and financially stronger and, took control from the MNLA. At the same time as this, Ansar Dine had control of Kidal, also in the North of the country.\footnote{Arthur Boutellis, “Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine?” Stability: International Journal or Security & Development 4(1) (2015).}

The desire for an independent state complicates the peace process. The groups based in the North want political and juridical recognition of the Azawad – the independent Muslin state of the North- and want adequate representation in the government based in capital of the country. As it currently stands, the groups in the North see the UN mission as working with the government to re-establishment of state authority by the Malian government throughout the country, thus reducing the power of the extremist groups in the North. Therefore, these groups target the UN so as to weaken the implementation of the peace process. The nature of the attacks on the UN are growing more complex as the conflict continues, where terrorist groups are able to pinpoint exactly where UN camps are. For example, in February 2016, the MINUSMA camp in sector North- Kidal- suffered the death of six peacekeepers and 30 injured in a complex attack on the UN compound. The attack started at 7am with mortar rockets being shot from the surrounding
mountains directly at the camp. After several minutes of mortar attacks, a car drove in through the South gate and stopped approximately 100 meters into the camp and exploded, destroying the Guinea-Bissau contingent and causing significant damage. The south gate of the camp has been broken for some time and thus has to be manually operated meaning it could not be closed with haste as the intruding car approached. The attack was both well planned and coordinated, and these forms of incident are becoming more prevalent in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu where there is a direct attack on the UN camp once every three months. ¹⁹⁰

As has been reiterated above, the mission in Mali is not designed, equipped or trained to address the rising terrorist threat in the country. The lack of necessary highly skilled personnel as well as the lack of equipment has meant that MINUSMA is neither able to sufficiently challenge the terrorist groups nor operate in the complex environment of the North of Mali. These factors, as with MINUSCA and MONSUCO, have challenged the UN’s ability to guarantee the safety of peacekeepers deployed to operate under the flag of the UN. The reality is that if the UN is going to operate in complex environments with multitudes of actors, it needs to ensure appropriate training, equipment and capabilities in order to ensure that the missions deployed are able to address the challenges on the ground. If the UN is unable to do this, countries may not be willing to deploy troops and the role of the UN, as an effective institution promoting peaceful cooperation, will be severely weakened.

Types of troops and capabilities of troops

The UN is premised upon a country’s willingness to providing troops and equipment to missions. Some countries deploy more troops whilst other deploy financially and in terms of capabilities. When the notion of high-risk operations is introduced, some TCCs are less willing to deploy troops and fundamentally disagree that the UN should be involved in these environments. In these cases, even countries with the ability to provide troops and/or equipped are unwilling to do so, thereby leaving the UN both under resources and under-equipped to deal with the current challenges it is facing.

In Mali, this has been seen where some TCCs are less willing to deploy their troops to high-risk areas due to the risks present. This has resulted in troops, which lack the support, training background and capabilities for forceful action against insurgent troops, left to defend these areas. Although 12,640 uniformed personnel have been pledged to MINUSMA, as of 31 January 2017, only 11,880 have been deployed.191 These troops, as can be seen in table 9, come from 53 different countries, 8,275 come from African TCCs and 1,131 from European TCCs.192

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Troop Contributing Country</th>
<th>Uniformed troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Netherland</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Top ten contributors to MINUSMA, as of 31 December 2016.¹⁹³

Notably only one European country is present in the top ten contributors to Mali- the Netherlands- and these troops are primarily located in strategic and coordinating roles in the MINUSMA headquarters in Bamako.¹⁹⁴ This is similarly the case with the smaller contingents from Finland, France, Norway, Sweden and the UK.¹⁹⁵ These forces are mainly deployed as special operational forces as part of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance units and as military helicopter pilots in different sectors of the

¹⁹⁴ John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali,” Third World Quarterly 36(1)(2015).
¹⁹⁵ Ibid.
missions. The Netherlands, for example, despite being within the top ten contributors to Mali, will not permit its troops to advance beyond Gao into the more dangerous parts of the country. These are similar caveats seen by Sweden, Germany and Norway. Similarly, the high-capability contributions such as the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance units and short-range Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs) are from the Netherlands and Sweden, and highly mobile Special Forces units and attack and transport helicopters from the Netherlands. These, while vital to the mission, have a limited range outside of Gao and Timbuktu due to foreign units’ limitation on deployment and lack of necessary intelligence to operate.

These forms of limitations are instituted through the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between each TCC and the UN and specify where in the mission and under what conditions a country will deploy. While all countries have national caveats, European troops are considerably more restricted in what they are allowed to do and under what conditions. Caveats are part of any international military deployment abroad and have been involved in peacekeeping operations for several years, but were not seen as a challenge until the issue of caveats restricting movement of necessary troops. As peace operations have become more dangerous and troops need to take more risks, the restrictions provided by caveats have become a severe obstacle in the effectiveness of the

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mission. Some challenges are seen where contingents refuse to follow orders or are waiting for their national authorities to confirm orders received from the UN mission’s authorities. In general, the caveat sets the level of risk a contributing country is willing to take in regards to the use of force for self-defense and defense of the mission mandate. Troops deployed in countries where contributors have great interests tend to take more risks. Conversely, where there is no national interest, it is rare to find troops prepared to take high risk on behalf of the UN. In the case of Mali, the caveats placed on European troops reflect this by restricting the movement to the troops to the North of the country thereby limiting their exposure to risk as well as their ability to actually have a valuable impact.

Due to these caveats, in Mali, it is primarily the African soldiers who are based permanently in the most dangerous areas and expected to take on the two biggest tasks of such as securing provision convoys to the Northern most region, and construction of cantonment sites for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The ability to move and maintain troops is the foundation of any military operation, but it has proven to be a considerable challenge for MINUSMA. In Kidal, for example, soldiers from Chad had been deployed for three years without a break and without adequate support and supplied from neither the Chadian government nor the UN. One of the reasons for this is that the troops MINUSMA inherited from the African-led International Support

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202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) lack the specialized training and equipment for adequate force protection, let alone more offensive measures to be able to operate in the environments.

Further, as can be seen in Map 2 below, Sector North of MINUSMA is centered in Kidal and this region is under continuous threat of attack. Jihadist groups perpetrate sporadic violence, including ambushes, kidnappings and targeted killings against rebel fighters and leaders, as well as against MINUSMA, given its political association with the Malian government. The government is only now in the process of renegotiating access to northern Mali. This not only puts considerable pressure on MINUSMA to facilitate the process of establishing a government presence in Kidal, but it also installs peacekeepers on the frontline of a fight that they are not prepared for, and may not fully comprehend. The Chadian contingent is one of the only contingents which has shown a willingness to go into direct combat with armed groups. As John Karlsrud writes, “in one incident a convoy escorted by Chadian troops was hit by a roadside bomb, resulting in a number of Chadian casualties. The normal reaction would have been to wait for back-up and medical evacuation, but the Chadian troops followed the tracks of the bombers into the desert and ended up in an ambush where they fought for a prolonged period, losing several troops, but in the end persevering and winning the battle.” These actions

207 Ibid.
208 John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali,” Third World Quarterly 36(1)(2015), page 47.
highlight a commitment to the cause but also a lack of understanding of humanitarian law and UN standards.

Map 2: MINUSMA deployment as of February 2017.\textsuperscript{209}

While MINUSMA has seen more interest from European TCCs, MINUSCA in CAR has not followed the trend. MINSUCA’s strength, as of January 2017, is 12,104 uniformed personnel, making it slightly larger in numbers than MINUSMA. These troops come from 25 different countries but only approximately 26 personnel from European TCCs, as can be seen in table 10. The Portuguese have shown more interest in MINUSCA and may

deploy more troops in 2017 making them the largest European TCC in CAR. From table 10, it is very apparent that there is a prevalence of African TCCs in the mission.

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Table 10: Top ten contributors to MINUSCA as of December 2016.\textsuperscript{210}

These troops, as can be seen in Map 3 below, are spread through sectors east, west and center, with Bangui being in the West and Bambari and Kaka Bandoro in the Center- two of the most dangerous places in the country. While MINUSCA has not seen the level of fatalities MINUSMA has, the likelihood is that this is connected more to the type of rebel and militia groups operating in the country rather than the types of troops. As has been outlined in the preceding section, the nature of the groups in CAR are primarily rebel or militia groups and not involved in terrorist activities. The challenge, though, with

\textsuperscript{210} The International Peace Institute, “Providing for Peacekeeping Database,” last modified 31 March 2017, accessed \url{http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/}
MINUSCA, has been troop preparedness and understanding of the rules of the UN. In 2016, a large portion of the DRC contingent was forced to leave MINUSCA when they failed an internal assessment. A further issue in MINUSCA is the issue of accountability for troops involved in sexual exploitation and abuse. MINUSCA, in its short existence, has received widespread accusations of abuse by peacekeepers, illustrating a lack of training or understanding of the role of the UN in a mission context.


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A further challenge in CAR, as with the other missions, is a lack of capabilities to ensure effectiveness. For example, there is a severe lack of helicopters to provide the necessary transport, medical support and logistical support to the country. MINUSCA has 11 helicopters in total, two of which are attack helicopters, in comparison to MINUMA’s 24 helicopters, seven of which are attack, and MONUSCO’s 50 helicopters. Despite the fact that MINUSCA is a younger mission, it has, as seen in table 10, drawn less attention from European TCCs but too from the advanced African TCCs such as South Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria. Both Nigeria and South Africa are relative military heavyweights and have historically served as forces for stability and have demonstrated a capability for long-term peacekeeping services. The role of South Africa in the FIB, for example, played a huge role in its success. However, their role has decreased significantly over the past two years leaving a big gap for African peacekeeping and contributing to the lack of resources within this mission.

Looking specifically at the FIB in the DRC, this brigade was a very small-specialized unit and operated under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander. It held the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups, contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC, and to make space for stabilization activities. As has been outlined above, the Security Council Resolution mandating the FIB strongly condemned the M23, FDLR, LRA “and all other armed groups and their continuing violence and abuses of human rights” - namely the


216 Ibid.
ADF and political militia groups, the Mayi Mayi and the APCLS.\textsuperscript{217} By late 2013, the FIB was instrumental in total defeat of the M23 but had a much more limited impact of the remaining rebel and militia groups.\textsuperscript{218}

The FIB itself was supported by regional heavyweights such as Uganda and South Africa, and sought to address, what it saw as, the dual failures of the government of the DRC and MONUSCO to remove rebel groups from eastern Congo. Neighboring governments felt that this area of insurgency presented a significant threat to regional stability. The brigade totaled 3,069 troops, with South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi each contributing an infantry battalion of 850 soldiers each.\textsuperscript{219} As has been mentioned above, the South African contingent is highly trained and well equipped and, in the case of the FIB, there was a clear instruction to utilize maximum force to neutralize groups and this was matched with training and capabilities.\textsuperscript{220} For example, on 4 November 2013, two South African Air Force Denel Rooivalk attack helicopters engaged with the M23, bombarding the group’s positions near Chanzu, Eastern Congo.\textsuperscript{221} In the months’ prior, the FIB conducted offensive operations against the M23 and acted as a blocking force in support of Congolese army’s efforts. This level of force within the FIB, as well as the advanced training of the contributors, especially the South Africans, definitely added to the impact.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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of the FIB in its actions against the M23. However, since the FIB, South Africa’s contribution to peacekeeping has significantly declined leaving a gap in terms of strong African peacekeeping providers.

It is apparent when looking at these three missions, that, the lack of equality in location, equipment and training of troops in a mission has a significant impact on fatalities in a high-risk operation. The role of training cannot be under-estimated and the reality is that military skills are inherently perishable and, thus, it is imperative to ensure that training is done on a continuous basis, especially when dealing with new terrain. A trained peacekeeper in the past is not a trained peacekeeper in the present, nor does a trained peacekeeper in the present indicate an available trained peacekeeper for the future. With African peacekeeping contingents, the units frequently receive training in a composite formation from multiple organizations and rounded out with individual soldiers who have never previously trained together as a collective.222 We have seen the disparity in training levels in MINUSMA where European troops have top-level equipment and training but are not deployed to the areas where they can be best utilized. As the report by the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS), “African forces are well-trained, but they lack modern weapons and equipment. They are poor, they cannot afford to buy new weapons, and they cannot equip themselves on short notice. You have countries in MINUSMA that feel that they sacrifice a lot, and then they are criticized afterwards for being incompetent.”223 The challenges with high-risk peace operations is that when more robust

mandates are seen, TCCs want to maintain more control and place more caveats on deployments. This means that certain TCCs may not deploy to high-risk areas leaving other TCCs to take the brunt which is fine if all TCCs are trained the same.224

Overall, there is a trend within UN peacekeeping to deploy more troops to mitigate a challenge, yet this is neither a sustainable nor an effective solution. The problem is more often with the tools provided and training level. In many cases, European forces have a degree of understanding on how to operate in extreme combat situations due to their experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, whereas African troops do not necessarily have this experience or training.225 Capabilities of troops need to match the mandates provided to missions. The three missions focused on in this chapter are seeing significant fatalities of peacekeepers and there is a need to provide sufficient capabilities to operate in this counter-terrorism environment.226 If the UN seeks to remain the key institution providing international peace and security on the continent, as well as remain effective in drawing opposing states together to promote stability, it must come to terms with the changing nature of conflict in which it is deploying missions. If the UN is going to remain active in high-risk peace operations, it must understand the risks of fatalities associated with these missions and ensure that missions are equipped in terms of mandate, resources, capabilities and training to address the challenges it will face on the ground. If the UN is

224 John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali,” *Third World Quarterly* 36(1)(2015).
226 Ibid.
not able to do this, it risks losing its status as the key liberal institution within the current international system.

**Chapter Seven: Conclusion**

The UN Security Council introduced a new trend of offensive missions when it authorized the first stabilization mission in 2004 in Haiti and subsequently in MONUSCO (2012), MINUSMA (2013) and MINUSCA (2014). These missions are permitted to use force in an offensive manner to neutralize, disarm or destroy specific groups. These missions are deployed where there is no peace to keep and often where there is ongoing conflict. The challenge is that these missions do not have realistic mandates, nor are matched with realistic means and resources or backed by real political will for long-term peace. Deploying where there is no peace to keep adds a complex dimension to a UN peacekeeping operation and these missions are likely to face significant obstacles, risk and fatalities.

This thesis has looked at the changing trend of the UN authorizing more stabilization missions and the impact this has had on UN peacekeeping fatalities, specifically malicious act fatalities. The central puzzle has been whether these missions, which are authorized to use offensive force, have seen a higher trend of malicious act fatalities, and if so, why is this the case.

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In line with this, this thesis had four central research questions. Firstly, looking at whether the number of fatalities changed over the past decades? Secondly, if found to be true, what is this trend and does it hold true for malicious acts as well as total fatalities? Thirdly, and most interestingly, does the type of peacekeeping mission affect the malicious act fatalities a mission suffers? And lastly, what are the central factors influencing UN fatalities rates? This thesis unpacked these questions by looking at all UN peacekeeping missions between 01 January 1990 and 31 December 2016 using both descriptive statistics and regression models, considering both absolute fatalities as well as fatalities relative to troop numbers to fully unpack the trends being seen.

This study has found several interesting findings for the future of UN peacekeeping and the relevance of the UN as a key global peace and security institution. Firstly, in line with hypothesis one, this thesis has found that there is an upward trend of malicious act fatalities in UN peace operations over time and this becomes especially prevalent when focusing on the time period of 2010 onwards. Malicious act fatalities, as compared to illnesses and accidents, are, in fact, the only form of fatality type which is increasing. This thesis notes that whilst the levels may not be as high as the highest point of 1960 or 1993, from the year 2000, there is a steady increasing trend without a decreasing point, thus far. The fatality count of this current decade (2010 to 2016) has already topped that of the 1990s, with 843 fatalities thus far. With missions such as MINUSMA, which has seen 110 fatalities in just four years of existence, the decade of 2010 to 2019 could be the most deadly in UN peacekeeping history.

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228 See Table 1 for complete breakdown by decade.
Secondly, in line with hypothesis four, when this thesis considered the exponential increase in troops and personnel and this impact on fatalities, it was found that as troops increase so too do fatalities. In measuring this, this thesis ran a Spearman's correlation between fatalities and troops overall years unpack the assumption that as the level of troops in peacekeeping operations increase so too do the number of fatalities. This showed a significant positive association: as troop levels increase fatalities increase. Looking at the malicious acts and total troops, an $r = 0.57$ was found, which is a moderately positive correlation. In order to try quantify the relationship, a negative binomial was run to analyze the association between total fatalities and adjusted troop levels over 1990 to 2016. This model found that there is, once again, a positive association between increasing malicious act fatalities and increasing troop levels. Additionally, even when controlling for troop levels, we found a significant correlation indicating that it is not the increase in troops level that is causing the higher fatality levels.

In order to unpack these results further, this study looked at the location of the missions suffering the highest level of fatalities and found that, in line with hypothesis three, that when adjusting for troop levels, troops in Africa still suffer the highest level of fatalities in every category. In terms of malicious acts, despite a massive decrease between the 1990s and the next two decades, the number of malicious act fatalities suffered in Africa are still higher than the other three continents. In order to control for the bias that the majority of UN peacekeeping operations are based in Africa, this thesis looked at fatality rates when controlling for troop levels and still found that the levels of malicious act
fatalities in Africa were significantly higher than any other location.

When moving on to analyze if these results were seen across all missions, it was found that, in line with hypothesis two, missions with a mandate to use force- robust or stabilization- suffered more malicious act fatalities and that by 2010, 92 percent of all fatalities are in missions which permit force. Out of this 92 percent, 53 percent of malicious act fatalities are seen in the four stabilization missions and 45 percent in missions which permit force. Only nine percent of malicious act fatalities are seen in missions with no force.

In order to examine more in-depth the use of offensive force, this study focused on three specific missions to unpack what factors within missions with force permitted are impacting high fatalities rates. The three cases studies selected were MINSUCA, MINUSMA and MONUCO. These cases were selected because they are the only UN peacekeeping missions with mandates to use offensive force against named spoilers of peace in the name of extending state authority. In discussing these missions, three trends were found to be of relevance. Firstly, these missions, due to their level of force against named groups, have lost their impartiality and are seen as fighting on the side of the government and thus have become party to the conflict and can be seen as legitimate targets. True impartiality would require peacekeepers to apply force in direct proportion to the transgression in question, and without fear or favor. When UN peacekeepers use force, either defensively or offensively, the threat of escalation and retaliation is raised,
thus significantly endangering the lives of those serving under the flag of the UN.  

Secondly, the troops being sent to these complex high-risk environments are not up to the challenges they see on the ground. The lack of equality in location, equipment and training of troops has a significant impact on fatalities in these high-risk operations. The role of training cannot be under-estimated and the reality is that all military skills are inherently perishable. Thus, it is imperative to ensure that training is done on a continuous basis, especially when dealing with new terrain. The challenge with high-risk peace operations is that when more robust mandates are seen, TCCs want to maintain more control and place more caveats on deployments. This means that certain TCCs may not deploy to high-risk areas leaving other TCCs to take the brunt. This trend is being seen in Mali, CAR and the DRC where African troops are suffering higher levels of attacks due to lack of training, positioning of troops and equipment levels.

Lastly, there is a trend within UN peacekeeping to deploy more troops to mitigate a challenge, yet this is neither a sustainable nor effective solution. The problem is more often with the tools provided and training level. In many cases, European forces, which have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan, have a degree of understanding to operate in extreme combat situations, whereas African troops do not have this experience or training. Capabilities of troops need to match the mandates provided to missions.

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230 John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali,” *Third World Quarterly* 36(1)(2015).

231 Stian Kjeksrud and Lotte Vermeij, “Protecting governments from insurgencies: The Democratic
MINUSMA is seeing huge fatalities of peacekeepers yet the mission does not have the mandate or capabilities to conduct counter-terrorism activities despite being target of regular terrorist attacks.232 The UN has not yet authorized a mission to conduct counter-terrorism and is reluctant to do so. However, the question is becoming less of if the UN should engage in these forms of activities but more that it is engaging in them, and thus it must ensure those it deploys are able to address the challenges being faced and ensure a level of safety and security of its personnel.

The findings of this thesis are intrinsic to the future of UN peacekeeping as well as the UN as an institution, and should be reflected upon in the creating of future peacekeeping operations in high-risks environments. This being said, there are limitations to this study in terms of the data available and the access to information on such new missions. The access to data is limited to what is publicly available and thus the accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This could be significantly improved by having primacy data or access to the raw data. Secondly, since fatalities overall are very small and there are limited variables, this does impact the results and analysis. Lastly, since this is such a new area of study and some of the missions are very young, access to analysis on the missions is limited to what is publicly available. Despite these points, this paper believes that further analysis over the next few years would prove a new trend is developing whereby malicious act

fatalities in offensive missions are increasing, thus proving that MINSUMA is not an anomaly but actually the start of a new trend in UN peacekeeping fatalities.

Ultimately, this thesis set out to look at whether UN peacekeeping has become more dangerous by unpacking if the number and trend of fatalities has changed over the past decade, and if so, what is the nature of this trend. Through a quantitative analysis of UN peacekeeping operations, this thesis found that there is a growing trend of malicious act fatalities and that the type of mission, specifically the use of force element, is connected to the type and level of fatalities. With missions such as the MONUSCO, MINUSCA and MINUSMA, it appears we are entering a new stage of peacekeeping with new levels of force and higher risk of malicious act fatalities. This cannot be confirmed until more data is received but, thus far, the trend does indicate that this decade could be the deadliest in UN peacekeeping history.

Moving forward, if the UN aims to remain an effective liberal institution working to draw states to work together rather than operate in self-interest, it must ensure it is able to both address the complex challenges being seen in current conflicts as well as guarantee the safety of those it deploys. In order to do this, the UN must reflect upon these realities of a changing trend towards more malicious act fatalities in high-risk peacekeeping operations and consider how missions can be enhanced to mitigate these trends. If the UN is unable to adapt, its role as a central institution bringing peace and security to the globe will be severely compromised and we risk seeing a collapse of institutions and the rise of a more
realist approach whereby states act as independent beings working only to serve themselves.
List of Appendices

Appendix One: Total overview of troops, fatalities and adjusted numbers

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