

Cold War, Cold State


by

Brandon T. Olson


A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts Program in International Relations

New York University

May 2019



John Fousek, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor



Muserref Yetim, Ph.D.
Thesis Seminar Instructor

© Brandon T. Olson !

All Rights Reserved, 2019 !

TABLE OF CONTENTS !

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS		iii !
ABSTRACT		iv !
CHAPTER I	Introduction: Latin American States in the Cold War Context	1 !
CHAPTER II	A Theory on Latin American State Formation	4 !
CHAPTER III	The Unrecognized Dilemma of the Good Neighbor Era	21 !
CHAPTER IV	Securing Democracy through Dictatorships	32 !
CHAPTER V	Securing Democracy through Development	48 !
CHAPTER VI	Conclusion: Reexamining the Foundations of State Formation	55 !
BIBLIOGRAPHY		57 !

amenable to communist subversion existed in many regions of the world.⁸ In Latin America, concern over Soviet domination collided with domestic political movements seeking economic and social progress. The U.S. viewed Latin America's "revolution in rising expectations" as a precursor to communist insurrection.⁹ The inability to distinguish civil unrest from communist threats produced a binary view of Latin America's nonaligned political groups: capitalist or communist, ally or adversary.¹⁰

Latin America's importance as a "zone of global transformation" is often overlooked in Cold War academic research.¹¹ The region's political instability appears mild when compared to the incessant violence, mass atrocities, revanchist tendencies, and the destructive capacity of states in other parts of the world. In reality, the absence of international conflict indicates institutional weakness, not stability or benevolence.¹² This scarcity of interstate violence concealed the strategic implications of the humanitarian tragedy unfolding within Latin America's poorly administered states and across its geographically isolated regions. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. argued that: "If the possessing classes of Latin America made the middle-class revolution impossible, they will make a workers-and-peasants revolution inevitable."¹³ The 1959 Cuban Revolution and the subsequent arrival of nuclear capable, Soviet R-12 and SS-4 ballistic missiles illustrates Schlesinger's point.¹⁴ U.S. foreign policy's failure to understand and address the rising aspirations that motivated more assertive, nonaligned political movements came to

⁸ Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 345. !

⁹ Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 24. !

¹⁰ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 358. !

¹¹ Martin Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *The American Political Science Review* (September 1966), 616; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 249. !

¹² Miguel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, ! 2002), 9-10.

¹³ Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File* (New York: The New Press, 2013), 3. !

¹⁴ Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton & ! Company, 1997), loc 4895. !

represent “the principle intellectual problem” for policymakers determined to block communist influence in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵

Latin American states reside at the heart of this problem. Domestic political movements, competing international ideologies, and the inimitable force of U.S. hegemony all vied for influence over the conduct and composition of Latin American states. Charles Tilly’s theory on coercion, capital, and European state formation provides an unexpected source of clarity for questions surrounding the origins of Latin America’s political instability. Tilly’s theory makes state institutions the starting point and common denominator for understanding the development of geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions.¹⁶ It avoids didactic modeling and embraces a deep analysis that combines historic chronology with sociology to best explain the forces driving observable patterns in history.¹⁷ In the Cold War context, this theoretical approach illuminates the perils of political engineering and the unintended consequences produced by a U.S. foreign policy in pursuit of hemispheric solidarity.¹⁸

With insights from Tilly’s theory on state formation, this thesis will show how good intentions surrounding U.S.-Latin American relations devolved into a series of guarded interests.¹⁹ Chapter II, *A Theory on Latin American State Formation*, explores how structural realism, dependency theory, and modernization theory influenced the perception and approach of U.S. foreign policy in Western Hemisphere. The chapter concludes with an adaptation of Tilly’s theory and its importance for understanding the process of state formation in Latin American. Chapter III, *The Unrecognized Dilemma of the Good Neighbor Era*, shows the challenges

¹⁵ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 358. !

¹⁶ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), ix. !

¹⁷ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 279. !

¹⁸ Paul Drake, “From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932,” In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, edited by ! Abraham Lowenthal, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 3.

¹⁹ Stephen Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 63. !

anarchy, and chronic revolution.”²⁴ U.S. officials, academics, journalists, and private citizens have documented the destabilizing effects of Latin America’s inequality and internecine violence with remarkable consistency. In their own words and from their own experiences, President-elect Herbert Hoover (1928), Harry Dexter White (1938), Nelson Rockefeller (1941), George Kennan (1950), Louis Halle (1950), Milton Eisenhower (1953 & 1958), Richard Nixon (1958), Walt Rostow (1960), Lincoln Gordon (1963), and President John F. Kennedy (1963) all concluded that decrepit economic realities precipitated political instability in Latin American states.²⁵ U.S. diplomatic posts also provided thoughtful assessments and diligent reporting on these conditions, but the transformation of eloquent prose into effective foreign policy never occurred.

The end of World War II brought new urgency to this problem. As U.S.-Soviet competition intensified, the Global South’s post-colonial independence movements opened new fronts in a superpower contest of interests and ideologies.²⁶ Emerging states that supplied natural resources, political legitimacy, and strategic outposts moved from the periphery to the center of the conflict.²⁷ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles testified before Congress that: “In the old days we used to be able to let South America go through the wringer of bad times, and then when times would get better it was right where it was ... now, when you put it through the wringer, it comes out red.”²⁸ Conventional analysis of U.S.-Latin American relations during the Cold War

²⁴ Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 205.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 290; David Green, *The Containment of Latin America* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971) 46-50; George Kennan, “Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department to the Secretary of State,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Volume II: The United Nations & The Western Hemisphere*, by Office of the Historian, (Washington: Department of State, 2018), 1768-1833; Louis Halle, “On A Certain Impatience With Latin America,” *Foreign Affairs*, (July 1950), 555-579; David Jervis, “The Kissinger Report and Its Predecessors,” *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, (1988), 73-86; Richard Nixon, *Six Crises* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962); Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Lincoln Gordon, *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); John F. Kennedy, “Toast of the President and President Paz at a Luncheon at the Bolivian Embassy,” *The American Presidency Project* (October 23, 1963).

²⁶ Jason Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” *Diplomatic History*, (November 2006), 869.

²⁷ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, loc 2622; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 198-199.

²⁸ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 31.

uses political and economic considerations to illuminate causality.²⁹ The logic of this approach is clear, but it fails to explain the intransigent nature of Latin America's destabilizing socioeconomic conditions. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, development, covert action, and modernization all proved to be inadequate mechanisms for promoting good governance, placating social revolution, and securing U.S. interests in the region.

A number of theories emerged to address U.S. foreign policy's inability to produce stable, prosperous, and democratic states across Latin America.³⁰ Structural realists focused on the threat of state conflict from U.S-Soviet competition.³¹ They believed that international relations best determined political conditions within the states, and that military power best determined outcomes in international relations.³² The U.S. used military assistance programs to bolster Latin American allies and promote a favorable balance of power in the Western Hemisphere.³³ These programs intended to contain the malign effects of expanding Soviet influence.³⁴ When U.S. hegemony made conventional Soviet military incursions improbable, Latin America's large standing armies evolved to "specialize in internal control."³⁵ These "garrison states" made the armed forces an indispensable political actor for landowners and elites seeking to retain power.³⁶ Military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and in states across the Caribbean basin proved to be just as draconian, corrupt, and ineffective as their authoritarian counterparts behind the Iron Curtain.³⁷ Efforts to check Soviet aggression and

²⁹ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, xiii; Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 3. !

³⁰ Drake, "From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932," In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, 7. !

³¹ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1989), 373. !

³² Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 192. !

³³ Kennedy *Ibid.*, 376. NSC 56-1, 5-6. !

³⁴ Mark Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 158. !

³⁵ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 333-334; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, & A.D. 990-1992*, 207. !

³⁶ Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), !

10. !

³⁷ Javier Galván, *Latin American Dictators of the 20th Century* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc., 2013), 10-12. !

suppress internal sedition left many Latin Americans with the impression that there was more to fear from U.S.-backed interventions than there was from communism.³⁸

Modernization theory offered technocratic solutions to Latin American states threatened by communist infiltration. Supporters of Modernization theory believed that state development followed a uniform, sequential progression.³⁹ They viewed the region's cultural composition and history to be irrelevant.⁴⁰ Modernization theorists argued that economic growth served as the catalyst for political and social change. Free-market, democratic societies rested at the apex of this growth process, representing the ultimate stage in development.⁴¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, Walt Rostow, Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond, Samuel Huntington and other modernization proponents correctly identified a correlation between democratic states and prosperity, but the development of inclusive economic and political institutions required more than expert planning or scrupulous replication.⁴² Well before the Kennedy administration's "best and brightest" set to work on the Alliance for Progress, it became clear that a coherent state formation model did not exist in Latin America.⁴³

The European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshall Plan, succeeded where the Alliance for Progress failed because Western Europe already possessed the strong institutional foundations required to reconstruct its decimated post-war states.⁴⁴ Latin America lacked commensurate levels of political organization, institutional cohesion, and economic development. This made their populations unwilling to accept the obligatory burdens essential

³⁸ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, 151. !

³⁹ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto*, 1. !

⁴⁰ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 26. !

⁴¹ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto*, 2; Acemoglu and Robinson *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, & Prosperity, and Poverty*, 443; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 194. !

⁴² Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, 132; Acemoglu and Robinson *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of & Prosperity, and Poverty*, 443-444; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 25. !

⁴³ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, 133; Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 106; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 25. !

⁴⁴ Gordon, *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress*, 101. !

for state formation.⁴⁵ Latin American states found themselves divided between an elite, landowning political class and an impoverished peasant majority. Alliance for Progress planners estimated that 10 percent of the population owned 90 percent of the arable land.⁴⁶ In Bolivia, three tin barons controlled 80 percent of the country's mineral exports.⁴⁷ Latin American oligarchs favored aggrandizement over political power. This deprived states a critical source of support.⁴⁸ Harsh conditions endured by the ostracized and uneducated poor further eroded state legitimacy across the region's numerous ungoverned spaces. In general, Latin Americans of all classes disassociated their welfare from the wellbeing of the state.⁴⁹

U.S. technocrats aimed to guide Latin America through peaceful reforms and avoid more violent revolutions.⁵⁰ President Kennedy noted that "If the only alternatives for the people of Latin America are the status quo or communism, then they will inevitable choose communism."⁵¹ Modernization theory's "stages of growth" offered a credible alternative to the determined logic of communist class struggle, but Latin American states never developed the economic preconditions for "take off," and development forecasts fell short of inflated expectations.⁵² Democracy and free trade guided U.S. efforts, but this commitment to "new regionalism" proved incapable of penetrating the world's most unequal society.⁵³ The Alliance for Progress prioritized economic growth over organic state formation because U.S. policymakers assumed that "all good things go together."⁵⁴ Critics questioned the prescriptive

⁴⁵ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 106. !

⁴⁶ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, 137. !

⁴⁷ Glen Dorn, *The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy* (University Park: ! Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011) 22.

⁴⁸ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 165. !

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 271. !

⁵⁰ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 26. !

⁵¹ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, 134. !

⁵² Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto*, 164; *Ibid.*, 6. !

⁵³ Horwitz and Bagley, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Context*, 187; Michael Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin & America's Soul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), loc 141. !

⁵⁴ Acemoglu and Robinson *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, 78; Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the & United States, and the World*, 141. !

nature of this “expert technical assistance” and its naïve “illusion of omnipotence.”⁵⁵ The absence of accepted national identities or legitimate political authorities undermined U.S. development efforts and made Latin America’s internal divisions ripe for Soviet exploitation.⁵⁶ The absence of inclusive democratic systems represented a major impediment to the region’s socioeconomic development.⁵⁷

Dependency theory attributed more cynical motivations to U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. This prominent theory combines elements of Marxism and structuralism to explain the state’s impoverished condition.⁵⁸ In *Open Veins of Latin America*, Eduardo Galeano writes that “underdevelopment in Latin America is a consequence of development elsewhere, that we Latin Americans are poor because the ground we tread is rich.”⁵⁹ Latin American economists and political activists used dependency theory to connect the region’s colonial origins to the continued prevalence of lucrative foreign interests and investments in the modern era.⁶⁰ Dependency proponents argued that a more sophisticated form of economic exploitation and control replaced the classic colonial powers that shaped the Global South.”⁶¹

Maladroit interventions and development programs provided South American dissidents with ample opportunity to foment outrage and misinformation. Standard Oil affiliates, the Rockefeller Foundation, the United Fruit Company, and the Ford Foundation came to symbolize “Yankee imperialism’s” oppressive global power.⁶² Dependency theory captures some essential

⁵⁵ Stephen Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism,” in *Kennedy’s Quest for & Victory*, by Thomas Patterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 112.

⁵⁶ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 266; Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan Linz, *Democracy in & Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1999), 4. !

⁵⁷ Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul*, loc 186. !

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, loc 577; Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 13. !

⁵⁹ Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997), 267. !

⁶⁰ Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul*, loc 612. !

⁶¹ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 129; Thomas Mathews, “The Caribbean Kaleidoscope,” *Current & History* (January 1965), 32. !

⁶² Kepa Artaraz, *Bolivia: Refounding the Nation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 145; Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America: Five & Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent*, 6; Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 & (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 10; Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul*, loc 1198. !

truths, but its basic tenets are viewed as an oversimplified, inaccurate, and conspiratorial narrative against international commerce.⁶³ Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan Linz find “little support” for dependency theory’s ultimate conclusions. They acknowledge the significant influence of international actors in Latin America but argue that the “internal structures and actions” of states provide more convincing explanations.⁶⁴ Greg Grandin faults dependency theory for deemphasizing “the importance that claims to citizenship and national inclusion had for peasants and workers.” In Grandin’s view, dependency scholars treated marginalized populations as an incapable, unsophisticated monolithic block.⁶⁵ Even Galeano now considers his classic work on “the contemporary structure of plunder” to be a mistake.⁶⁶

Dependency theory’s “system-driven” account of North-South asymmetry places the limited power of Latin American states in an important geopolitical context, but it does not address the relationship between the institutional capacity of states and their destabilizing levels of poverty.⁶⁷ Merle Kling’s theory on power and political instability narrows this gap. Kling argues that the land tenure system, a legacy from the Spanish empire, established rigid economic boundaries that evolved into political inflexibility. The elites who controlled these highly concentrated land holdings enjoyed significant autonomy. Commodity markets, not governments, influenced these agrarian elites. In 1953, South America produced 85 percent of the world’s coffee exports and U.S. markets consumed 75 percent of all coffee produced. Kling asserts that “domestic proprietors of coffee plantations cannot be immune to the pressures from their principal export market.”⁶⁸ Similar market conditions influenced the owners of Cuban

⁶³ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 71; Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul*, loc ! 649. !

⁶⁴ Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, 57. !

⁶⁵ Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 178. !

⁶⁶ Larry Rohter, “Author Changes His Mind on 70s Manifesto,” *The New York Times* (May 23, 2014). !

⁶⁷ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 25; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 9-10; ! Acemoglu and Robinson *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, 67. !

⁶⁸ Kling, “Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America,” In *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?*, 84-85. !

sugar, Chilean copper, and Venezuelan oil. Through position, not power, Latin American governments served as internationally recognized intermediaries for these transactions. This authority made the state a coveted source of affluence.⁶⁹

To the extent policymakers and scholars explored state power, they often focused on “how the walls came tumbling down” without first considering the influences that shape Latin American states.⁷⁰ U.S. officials embraced policies designed to strengthen vulnerable governments and develop their capacity without examining the soundness of their institutional foundations.⁷¹ This frustrated U.S. efforts and discredited development schemes designed to engineer social “modernity” in accordance with blueprints from Washington.⁷² Increasing apprehension over Soviet subversion resulted in U.S. policies that vacillated between benevolence and belligerence. Fear induced realpolitik assessments that justified the use of authoritarian means to achieve anti-communist ends.⁷³ Senator Joseph McCarthy decried efforts to accommodate democracies struggling with post-colonial nationalism. He stated that: “We must not fight under the leadership of perfumed, dilettante diplomats. We cannot fight successfully under the leadership of those who are either half loyal or disloyal to what we are fighting for.”⁷⁴ The inability to balance deterrence with development proved detrimental to U.S. strategic interests in the region. Anti-communist neurosis and the desire for immediate results amplified this disequilibrium. It produced a capricious rationale that imagined “all is lost whenever ... all is not won.”⁷⁵

⁶⁹ Ibid., 92. !

⁷⁰ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 14. !

⁷¹ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, loc 2442; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 11. !

⁷² Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 386; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 192-194. !

⁷³ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, loc 2487. !

⁷⁴ Ibid., loc 2584. !

⁷⁵ Louis Halle., 567-568. !

The structural realists and modernization theorists who shaped U.S. foreign policy between 1953 and 1963 all viewed democratic states as essential for securing the Western Hemisphere's southern approach.⁷⁶ This consensus reflected policy recommendations first made by NSC 68 in 1950. It called on U.S. policymakers to confront communism with patience and firmness.⁷⁷ NSC 68 argued that a free society relied on the "strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it."⁷⁸ Fear of communist encroachment tested the veracity of this statement. While NSC 68 described freedom as "the most contagious idea in history," it also acknowledged that in the age of atomic warfare "the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable."⁷⁹ Firmness appeared to take precedence over patience.

Walt Rostow wrote that: "Democracy itself, when it works is an extraordinary exercise in the balance between imposed discipline, self-discipline, and private expression."⁸⁰ Rostow believed modernization could accelerate the positive effects of democratic state formation, but he also conceded that at the most basic level states must conquer their own obstacles to democratic governance. U.S.-Soviet competition restricted essential aspects of this organic growth process. The U.S. needed free market, democratic allies and it expected Latin American states to comply. In 1950, Louis Halle, an influential member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, discerningly noted that: "Democracy is not an absolute condition, to be assumed by a people as one puts on an overcoat."⁸¹ Despite this tacit understanding, development specialists tried to manufacture democracy and national security hawks tried to enforce it. The Eisenhower and

⁷⁶ Gordon, *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress*, 112. (Cite Eisenhower in Rabe) & NSC 68 Long Telegram !

⁷⁷ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 41. !

⁷⁸ NSC 68: *United States Objective and Programs for National Security*, 7. !

⁷⁹ NSC 68: *United States Objective and Programs for National Security*, 8-9. !

⁸⁰ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto*, 164. !

⁸¹ Louis Halle, "On A Certain Impatience With Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1950), 568. !

Kennedy administrations viewed Latin American states with circumspect optimism, but their “democratic idealism” faded with the pervasive threat of communist confrontation.⁸² Latin America’s complicated history and the Cold War’s contemporary uncertainty combined to make these regional developments ripe for misunderstanding.

In this context, Charles Tilly’s theory on coercion, capital and European state formation provides a unique framework for examining U.S. foreign policy and its influence on Latin American states. It unravels the enigma of democratic state formation and provides an innovative perspective on the U.S. struggle to make the Western Hemisphere “safe for democracy.”⁸³ The Cold War that spilled over into Latin America embodied more than U.S.-Soviet strategic posturing; it represented an ideological struggle for the future of European state modernity.⁸⁴ The Western model is relevant because in the 18th and 19th centuries the structure of disparate state organizations converged to reflect similar institutional characteristics.⁸⁵ The city-states, empires, federations, and kingdoms of sixteenth century Europe possessed more institutional diversity than the numerous post-colonial states seeking United Nations membership and acceptance after the Second World War.⁸⁶ While many nonaligned, post-colonial states desired a “third way,” the institutional lineage of the European state system limited the reality of these political aspirations. In Latin America and across the Global South, communism and capitalism represented the only viable options for delivering socioeconomic progress and modernity.⁸⁷

⁸² Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 15. !

⁸³ Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present*, 421-422; Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: & The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 121-123. !

⁸⁴ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, loc 245. !

⁸⁵ George Sørensen, “War and State-Making: Why Doesn’t It Work in the Third World?” *Security Dialogue* (September 2011), 342; Tilly, ! *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 195; Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul*, loc 507. !

⁸⁶ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 195; Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the & Present*, 280-281. !

⁸⁷ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, loc 205; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 193. !

In Europe, Tilly's theory links the gradual convergence of polities to national states with ! the various modes of capital and methods of coercion rulers used to consolidate power. European nobility defended their interests through coercive means and supported them with capital. The use of organized armed forces allowed rulers to expand their control and solidify gains.⁸⁸ Elite competition unintentionally extended political participation beyond the noble class.⁸⁹ As a state's power and territory grew, so did the requirements to sustain a dominant coercive force structure. Sophisticated bureaucracies developed to administer the state's growing demands.⁹⁰ States managed these growing obligations by extracting "essential resources" from their territorial possessions and the people who resided within them. The expropriation of weapons, supplies, soldiers, and financial backing all carried a cost that provided resource owners with leverage. European aristocrats desired direct rule of their territories, but the state's popular demands made absolute, authoritarian systems unfeasible.⁹¹

As armed conflict grew in scope and lethality, states used credit to finance the prohibitive costs of war. In turn, merchants and urban elites relied on the state's coercive power to protect their trade and commercial interests. Europe's major urban centers developed at strategic points along global trade routes. Capital concentrated in these cities to exploit the efficiencies of commercial and population density. The growing connection between urban and rural communities created an interdependent relationship that made the distinct attributes of each indispensable to the other. The developing commercialization between cities and rural communities made it possible for states to circumvent contentious intermediaries and implement more efficient tax systems.⁹² States found that taxation better preserved the sources of future

⁸⁸ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 14-17. !

⁸⁹ Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, 14.

⁹⁰ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 20. !

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 25. !

⁹² *Ibid.*, 86-89. !

revenue, and citizens found tax payments less disruptive than the direct seizure of their property. These monetized connections enabled the rapid mobilization of capital and coercive resources across a state's territory.

Incessant warfare expanded governing structures and transformed territorial holdings into nation-states. These states grew in proportion to the increasing complexity and lethality of armed conflict. Through this process states diminished in number but increased in aggregate power. Ancillary governing functions emerged to meet the demands of these more sophisticated institutions. The adjudication of internal disputes and the regulation of goods and services preserved the extractive infrastructure states needed for war.⁹³ Pensions, veteran's benefits, and public education represented just some of the services states used to preserve military readiness and placate the demands of a better informed, more assertive citizenry.⁹⁴ These programs revolutionized the role of government by converting unimagined state functions into indispensable services.⁹⁵ The subtle transformation from "reactive" to "proactive repression" mollified civil unrest and built national unity.⁹⁶

Latin American states emerged in a different context. They did not grow into their territorial possessions but materialized from fragments of the Spanish empire. This prevented the formative influences of capital and coercion from taking their incremental effects. Where European state formation transformed its national boundaries, "weak central power and external economic direction" became the defining characteristics of Latin America's fixed political landscape.⁹⁷ The continent's international boundaries experienced few changes in the post-colonial era because states inherited a limited ability to consolidate power within their

⁹³ Ibid., 96-97. !

⁹⁴ Ibid., 102. !

⁹⁵ Ibid., 122. !

⁹⁶ Ibid., 115. !

⁹⁷ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 165. !

“sovereign” territories. This also made them incapable of projecting influence abroad.⁹⁸ Latin American governments found the cost of warmaking prohibitive because it did not develop in proportion to their capacity for statemaking. The lingering effects of colonial demarcation forced these inchoate governments to not only contend with political infighting, but also the influence of foreign powers.⁹⁹

The overextended condition of many Latin American governments removed the existential threat of warfare, but the coercive structures that subjugated people and extracted resources remained.¹⁰⁰ The international system that developed after World War II also imposed greater costs on weak states contemplating belligerent transnational actions. When Nicaragua threatened to invade Costa Rica in 1955, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) lobbied U.S. officials and the State Department intervened on Costa Rica’s behalf. The AFL’s efforts halted a potential military conflict.¹⁰¹ International organizations, multinational corporations, and the accepted governing norms of the European state system secured political boundaries by “synthesizing” national interests into Pan American values.¹⁰²

Between 1889 and 1954, states in the Western Hemisphere conducted 10 inter-American meetings to establish frameworks for political, military, and economic agreements.¹⁰³ In 1948, the U.S. joined with 20 other nations in the Western Hemisphere to form the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS promoted an intra-hemispheric dialogue that advanced regional solidarity while preserving the territorial integrity of member states.¹⁰⁴ The elite owners of Latin American capital found these conditions advantageous. Caudillos, a generic Spanish

⁹⁸ Ibid., 25. !

⁹⁹ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 194-195. !

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 199; Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 157. !

¹⁰¹ Robert Alexander, “New Directions: The United States and Latin America,” *Current History* (February 1962), 66. !

¹⁰² Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 182; Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of the U.S. Policy Toward & Latin America*, 290; Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present*, 416. !

¹⁰³ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 161. !

¹⁰⁴ *The Organization of American States* (accessed April 5, 2018), <http://www.oas.org>. !

term for authoritarian rulers, continued the oppressive traditions of colonialism within mining and farming communities across the continent. Their interests were secured from internal government interference and the threat of neighboring states.¹⁰⁵

In Europe, warfare compelled the owners of capital to seek the state's coercive protection. In Latin America, governments replaced unwilling or inaccessible sources of domestic capital with foreign investors. This proclivity for outside working capital resulted in opaque financial agreements that favored international lenders and decapitalized national coffers. The abundance of coercive force and the dearth of capital alternatives inhibited citizen bargaining and made Latin American states susceptible to domestic instability and foreign exploitation.¹⁰⁶ Latin American societies developed coercive and capital mechanisms without the glue of national unity. In the rapidly changing post-colonial era, states found it impossible to advance their domestic interests without credible institutions or accepted national identities.¹⁰⁷

As Latin American states gained international legitimacy in the late 1940s, their domestic support and internal stability faltered.¹⁰⁸ The post-colonial influences of "internal" and "external" state formation shaped these divergent views of Latin American states.¹⁰⁹ Where governments failed to expand institutional capacity through political legitimacy, the volatile powder keg of revolutionary fervor ignited. Governing incumbents countered acts of sedition with military force and political repression.¹¹⁰ Between 1940 and 1965, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua,

¹⁰⁵ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 156-158; Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz, *Democracy in Developing & Countries: Latin America*, 11. !

¹⁰⁶ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 206-207; Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 10-12. !

¹⁰⁷ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 28-29; Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz, *Democracy in Developing & Countries: Latin America*, 14; Acemoglu and Robinson *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, 73-79; Tilly, ! *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 19 !

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 203. !

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 195. !

¹¹⁰ Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, 16. !

Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela experienced over 50 military coups or illegal seizures of power.¹¹¹ In states where the armed forces willingly relinquished control to civilian authorities, 70 percent relapsed into military intervention. Howard Wiarda described coups in Latin America as “constant, ongoing, and ubiquitous.”¹¹²

Undercapitalized and over militarized Latin American states found themselves unable to handle the rapid economic and social changes associated with the modern era. In Colombia, discontent with land reform and private property rights descended into a brutal civil war from 1946 to 1953 known as La Violencia, over 200,000 people died.¹¹³ Between 1941 and 1951, Bolivia endured nine undemocratic seizures of power.¹¹⁴ This struggle to develop a pluralist civic society ended with a national revolution. In 1952, armed miners and farmers surrounded La Paz, the country’s capital, and seized the presidential palace.¹¹⁵ U.S. anxiety increased with Latin America’s growing political unrest. Over the next 12 years, “Bolivia became the largest recipient of per capita U.S. foreign aid in Latin America” and by 1957 the U.S. was financing one-third of the Bolivian government’s budget.¹¹⁶ By the 1960s, U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia exceeded \$730 million.

These efforts stabilized the anemic institutions of allied governments, but their ability to deliver socioeconomic progress proved ephemeral. Two-thirds of Colombians continued to subsist outside of the formal economy and land reform initiatives made little progress.¹¹⁷ U.S. policymakers struggled to balance strategic interests with the demands of vociferous

¹¹¹ Horwitz and Bagley, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Context* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 112; Needler, “Political ! Development and Military Intervention in Latin America,” *The American Political Science Review*, 617. !

¹¹² Robert Dix, “Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America,” *Armed Forces & Society* (Spring 1994), 439. !

¹¹³ Mary Roldán, *Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946-1953* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), loc 183. !

¹¹⁴ Kling, “Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America,” In *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?*, 79; Tilly, *Coercion, & Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 201. !

¹¹⁵ Xavier Albó, “The Long Memory of Ethnicity in Bolivia and Some Temporary Oscillations” in *Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present*, by John Crabtree & Laurence Whitehead (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 29-30; Stephen Cote, *Oil and Nation: A & History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector* (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2016), 129. !

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 133. !

¹¹⁷ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 159. !

revolutionary movements.¹¹⁸ Reform also eluded states where nationalist coalitions attained power. For all of the political instability and internal violence that occurred, the conduct and character of Latin American governments remained unchanged. Latin Americans described these endemic conditions as *continuismo*.¹¹⁹ As the Cold War began, the *noblesse oblige* of the Good Neighbor era came to an end. The U.S. needed a new approach and more effective policies to counter its eroding network of allies in the Western Hemisphere.¹²⁰

At its core, the European state system provided protection in exchange for patronage.¹²¹ As competition with the Soviet Union intensified, U.S. policymakers offered a similar arrangement to Latin American states. The U.S. viewed democratic republics as essential for securing hemispheric solidarity against the Soviets.¹²² In 1954, President Eisenhower's NSC published a classified document describing the policy measures and courses of action necessary to build the Western Hemisphere's unity. It stated that, "Latin American governments are under intense domestic political pressure" to address widespread poverty and rising nationalism. The NSC proposed that U.S. government provide political, military and economic assistance to "safeguard and strengthen the security of the Hemisphere."¹²³

The governing systems of Latin American states appeared similar to their U.S. and European counterparts, but this institutional façade concealed important political distinctions linked to the region's shared colonial heritage.¹²⁴ Latin America's governing institutions formed without popular participation and most of the continent's population remained invisible to the

¹¹⁸ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 34-35; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 202-203. !

¹¹⁹ Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," In *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?*, 80-81. !

¹²⁰ Halle, "On A Certain Impatience With Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, 579. !

¹²¹ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 107-108. !

¹²² Westad, *The Global Cold War*, loc 346; Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 19. !

¹²³ "Document 12, NSC 5432-1: Statement of Policy by the National Security Council," In *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, & Volume IV: The American Republics*, edited by Office of the Historian, (Washington: Department of State, 2018) 297-299. !

¹²⁴ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 107-108. !

state. U.S. policymakers failed to recognize the significance of this development.¹²⁵ They treated Latin American states as the product of an exceptional European design, not the residual governing structures of an imploded colonial empire.¹²⁶ These experiences show that the various outcomes and unintended consequences of state formation are magnified further when a system developed in Europe is adopted by necessity to another part of the world.

U.S. hegemony introduced even more factors into Latin America's state formation process. Diplomacy, trade, economic development, military assistance, and covert action all served as legitimate policy instruments. Between 1953 and 1963, the U.S. leveraged the full range of these resources in its fight against communism. In Latin America, these attempts at intervention appeared to increase domestic instability.¹²⁷ In Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador, political violence and communist guerrillas challenged U.S. influence. These movements remained a persistent threat to Central American governments throughout the Cold War.¹²⁸ By applying Tilly's state formation theory to Latin America during this period in Cold War history, a deeper understanding of U.S. foreign policy, and its effect on allies and adversaries can be established. This new theoretical context will not unlock the "black box" of state formation, but it may facilitate a more thoughtful approach to future decision making.¹²⁹ By expanding upon the known drivers of the European state formation process, we can "sharpen our sense" of what is important, what is distinct, and what is changing within Latin American states.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 208. !

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 25-26; Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 23-25. !

¹²⁷ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 207. !

¹²⁸ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 186. !

¹²⁹ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 106. !

¹³⁰ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 196. !

policy were inextricably linked.¹³⁶ President Wilson characterized this unique blend of public and private interests as “intelligent team work” that advanced U.S. foreign policy, but the belligerent nature of these initiatives produced the opposite effect.¹³⁷ Frequent U.S. interventions strained interhemispheric relations and precipitated anti-American sentiments.¹³⁸

In 1928, President-elect Hoover traveled across Latin America to repair a faltering U.S. image and call for a more benevolent future. Hoover wrote that “unless we displayed an entirely different attitude, we should never dispel the suspicions and fears of the Colossus of the North.”¹³⁹ President Franklin Delano Roosevelt expanded upon these sentiments. FDR used the Good Neighbor Policy to establish “a new and better standard in international relations.”¹⁴⁰ This replaced a history of unilateral interventions with an inter-American dialogue and multilateral cooperation. The Good Neighbor Policy facilitated critical partnerships during World War II and later it set the tone for the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) at the 1948 Bogotá Conference.¹⁴¹

In the late 1930s, German nationals associated with the Nazi party demonstrated their pervasive Latin American influence through commercial, social, and political organizations.¹⁴² At the time, half of all Latin American states hosted German military advisors.¹⁴³ To counter Nazi propaganda and subversion, FDR established the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA). Under the leadership of Nelson Rockefeller, the OCIAA coordinated cultural exchange programs, supervised cooperative economic initiatives, and managed an extensive public information campaign across print, radio, and motion picture

¹³⁶ Ibid., 59. !

¹³⁷ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of the U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 209. !

¹³⁸ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 148. !

¹³⁹ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of the U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 290. !

¹⁴⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View,” *Foreign Affairs* (1928), 584. !

¹⁴¹ Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), x. !

¹⁴² Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of the U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 308. !

¹⁴³ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 76. !

outlets.¹⁴⁴ In a White House briefing four months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Rockefeller linked Latin America's inadequate healthcare, education, and infrastructure to U.S. national security.¹⁴⁵ Polling suggested that the American public also feared the Axis powers' prevailing influence in the Western Hemisphere.

In his 1941 State of the Union address, FDR noted that, "the invasion of this hemisphere would not be by landing regular troops ... strategic points would be occupied by secret agents and their dupes and a great number of them are already here, and in Latin America." Critics in the State Department dismissed the OCIAA's development assistance programs as "harebrained schemes" and they characterized its members as "communist fellow travelers."¹⁴⁶ Despite skepticism from more traditional foreign policy circles, Nelson Rockefeller's 1944 promotion to Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs appeared to vindicated the OCIAA's embrace of cultural and economic diplomacy.¹⁴⁷ The OCIAA's perceptive information campaigns and development assistance initiatives established a new and consequential paradigm for U.S.-Latin American relations.¹⁴⁸

During World War II, Argentina tested the Good Neighbor era's limits and Latin American dictators capitalized on U.S. concerns through obsequious displays of solidarity. In 1938, Harry Dexter White, a Treasury Department official, first expressed concern over Washington's apathetic approach towards fascism in Latin America. He argued for economic assistance to countries like Argentina and Bolivia so that "no American nation need surrender any fraction of its sovereign freedom to maintain its economic welfare."¹⁴⁹ Neutrality in World

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 82-83. !

¹⁴⁵ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 308. !

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 309. !

¹⁴⁷ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 161. !

¹⁴⁸ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 10. !

¹⁴⁹ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 46-47. !

War I generated immense profits for exporters of Argentine commodities. Now, after the ! bombing of U.S. islands in the Pacific, Argentina possessed little incentive to terminate its lucrative trading relationships with either Germany or Great Britain.¹⁵⁰

Unlike Bolivia, a Lend-Lease recipient and the principal source of non-ferrous metals for the U.S. defense industrial base, the Roosevelt administration did not have significant political or economic leverage over Argentina.¹⁵¹ U.S. diplomats convinced many Latin American states to recall their ambassadors from Buenos Aires, but the Argentine government remained defiant and the dispute persisted.¹⁵² Concern within U.S. foreign policy circles mounted when disenchanted U.S. allies, to include Great Britain, started viewing the dispute as an Argentine-U.S. problem and not a destabilizing challenge for allies across region. In the era of fixed national boundaries, Argentina's junta did not represent an overt military threat to its neighbors, but Secretary of State Cordell Hull worried that this confrontation might encourage other American republics to question U.S. leadership.¹⁵³

While Argentina resisted U.S. foreign policy, the dictatorships of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua embraced a different tactic to advance their national interests. These dictatorships unequivocally supported the U.S., and in the wartime interest of realpolitik, the Roosevelt administration overlooked practices that contradicted the enumerated values of the *Four Freedoms* speech.¹⁵⁴ Jorge Ubico, a caudillo who ruled Guatemala, declared war on Japan immediately after the attacks on Pearl Harbor. Ubico welcomed the U.S. to his country for strategic basing and even allowed

¹⁵⁰ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 312. !

¹⁵¹ Dorn, *The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy*, 27. !

¹⁵² Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 160. !

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 161. !

¹⁵⁴ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 12. !

Guatemala's military academy to be commanded by a U.S. officer.¹⁵⁵ When Nicaragua's dictator, Anastasio Somoza, decided to retire in 1947 he asked U.S. ambassador William Warren and the State Department to nominate his successor. The U.S. declined this offer. Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden informed Nicaragua's ambassador to the U.S. that "we believe the best way to practice democracy is to practice it ... If leftist or anti-American elements should become active, well, that was only a part of the difficult progress toward the democratic goal."¹⁵⁶

U.S. officials remained divided over the appropriate disposition and direction of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.¹⁵⁷ Since the Monroe Doctrine's inception in 1823, each successive U.S. presidential administration had articulated a new, quixotic vision for the Western Hemisphere. The approach of these policies evolved with American preeminence, but the Monroe Doctrine's core suspicion of extra hemispheric actors remained fixed in place.¹⁵⁸ As international cooperation captured the zeitgeist of the post-war 1940s, U.S. policymakers found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the competing benefits of a closed hemisphere and an open world. These conflicting objectives presented U.S. foreign policy with an ugly dilemma.¹⁵⁹

The U.S. embraced a liberal international order supported by multilateral institutions. It envisioned these institutions being filled with strong and reliable allies, but U.S. policymakers soon discovered these two attributes to be incompatible. The "positive longings" of national self-determination built strong states, but radical nationalist movements could also empower Latin American governments with the temerity to challenge or undermine U.S. interests.¹⁶⁰ Marxism and communism, the "dangerous scions of liberalism," could not be allowed to encroach on U.S.

¹⁵⁵ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 4. !

¹⁵⁶ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 326. !

¹⁵⁷ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 135. !

¹⁵⁸ Horwitz and Bagley, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Context*, 182; McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The & American Encounter with the World Since 1776*, 58-59. !

¹⁵⁹ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 291-292. !

¹⁶⁰ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, loc 489; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 116-117. !

hegemony.¹⁶¹ Strong, independent nations offered a credible deterrent against large-scale armed conflict, but this threat appeared implausible in the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, weak states offered reliable support for U.S. foreign policy in the international arena.¹⁶² The Monroe Doctrine established a precedent that made hemispheric security a U.S. prerogative. The U.S. did not require military assistance in Latin America, but it desired political and economic partners.

Strained inter-American relations and eroding support for American leadership at the end of World War II appeared to move in relation to the growing geopolitical autonomy of Latin American states. In 1944, the U.S. offended Latin American leaders by blocking their participation in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. This rejection of regional allies signaled the growing U.S. aversion towards independent Latin American voices.¹⁶³ At the Chapultepec Conference, conflicts over Argentina and the future of hemispheric security revealed further cracks in U.S.-Latin American relations.¹⁶⁴ Since Latin American states represented 20 of the 49 participants at the pending United Nations Conference in San Francisco, the U.S. needed to forge consensus and renew solidarity within the Western Hemisphere.¹⁶⁵ The U.S. sought rapprochement with Argentina under the proviso that it purge all “remaining Axis influences.”¹⁶⁶ Argentina’s deteriorating economic conditions and the inevitable defeat of Nazi Germany forced it to comply. On January 25, 1944, Argentina cited Axis espionage and the betrayal of its hospitality, as the impetus for severed diplomatic relations with the German government.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶¹ Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War*, 16. !

¹⁶² Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 296. !

¹⁶³ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 166. !

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 207. !

¹⁶⁵ *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945), 30-54. !

¹⁶⁶ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 166. !

¹⁶⁷ Arnaldo Cortesi, “Buenos Aires Acts: Decision on Severe Step Against Nazi to be Announced Today,” *The New York Times* (January 25, 1944). !

With its voting block and links to strategic commodities secured, U.S. interest in Good Neighbor policies dissipated and Latin American dictatorships proliferated.¹⁶⁸ The increasing threats posed by the Soviet Union and China diverted the preponderance of U.S. resources to Europe and Asia. Adolf Berle, the State Department's top expert on Latin America, observed that, "[M]en who know the hemisphere and love it are few, and those who are known by the hemisphere and loved by it are fewer still."¹⁶⁹ The OAS provided the Western Hemisphere with a symbolic forum for addressing regional challenges through multilateral cooperation, but many Latin American leaders found these initiatives to be superficial or inadequate.¹⁷⁰

In 1950, President Truman's National Security Council produced new recommendations for Inter-American military collaboration. The NSC called for closer defense partnerships with Latin American allies and for the expanded presence of U.S. military training and equipping missions across the South American continent.¹⁷¹ The U.S. focused this expanded military capacity on the threat of Soviet subversion. NSC 56-2 assessed that "communists in Latin America have the capability of severely weakening any war effort of the United States by interfering with the source and transit of strategic materials, by damaging vital installations and by fomenting unrest and instability."¹⁷² By enlisting the OAS and Latin American states in the global fight against Soviet domination, U.S. foreign policy connected the Monroe Doctrine's aversion to foreign interference with the Truman Doctrine's desire to contain the Soviet Union.¹⁷³ Latin America's authoritarian regimes proved to be the most willing and reliable U.S.

¹⁶⁸ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 128. !

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 121. !

¹⁷⁰ Horwitz and Bagley, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Context*, 184-186. !

¹⁷¹ NSC 56/2: *U.S. Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration*, 1-2. !

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 5-6. !

¹⁷³ Horwitz and Bagley, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Context*, 185; Kennan, "Memorandum by the Counselor of the ! Department to the Secretary of State," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Volume II: The United Nations & The Western & Hemisphere*, 1788. !

partners in this endeavor.¹⁷⁴ U.S. policymakers found it easier to address the narrow interests of authoritarian governments over more cantankerous, less predictable democracies.¹⁷⁵ In exchange for U.S. assistance, these dictatorships and military juntas suppressed revolutionary movements and promoted a political equilibrium amenable to U.S. foreign policy objectives.¹⁷⁶

The political oppression intended to ameliorate the Western Hemisphere's immediate security challenges soon evolved into an accepted norm.¹⁷⁷ Dean Acheson, President Truman's secretary of state, later advised, "[d]o nothing to offend the dictators; they are the only people we can depend on."¹⁷⁸ This harsh calculation summarized a prevailing geopolitical sentiment that endured from FDR through the Eisenhower administration. U.S. policymakers also came to view their encounters with fascism as a harbinger for Latin America's emerging "Red Scare." The U.S. ambassador in Brazil cabled that "Soviet policy is approximating German policy: exploit any center of thought or action which may make trouble." The following day, February 22, 1946, George Kennan sent the State Department his assessment on the sources of Soviet conduct.¹⁷⁹ U.S. interventions before the Second World War attenuated faith in the OAS and its purported values. For Latin America's growing nationalist movements, U.S. actions in the post-war period destroyed any remaining legitimacy.¹⁸⁰

Latin American states continued to grapple with extreme inequality and a "revolution of rising expectations."¹⁸¹ The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana in Peru, Venezuela's Acción Democrática, Mexico's Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Autentico in Cuba, Salvador

¹⁷⁴ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 291. !

¹⁷⁵ Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," In *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?*, 92-93. !

¹⁷⁶ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 292. !

¹⁷⁷ Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War*, 8. !

¹⁷⁸ Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), ! 236. !

¹⁷⁹ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 334-335. !

¹⁸⁰ Paul Holbo, "Cold War Drift in Latin America," *Current History* (February 1963), 68. !

¹⁸¹ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 354. !

Allende's Partido Socialista in Chile, Gaitanista Liberals in Colombia, and the Peronist movement in Argentina all emerged between the Great Depression and the end of World War II.¹⁸² Rising expectations and the promise of industrial modernization spurred urban migration.¹⁸³ The uninhabited hills surrounding the capital cities of Bogotá, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, and Rio de Janeiro filled with haphazard structures and informal migrant communities.¹⁸⁴ This urban blight provided foreign visitors, local residents, and political leaders with an immutable, cycloramic depictions of squalor. Visceral images of poverty gave new salience to the outcasts of Latin American society.¹⁸⁵ Demand for economic development spread nationalist sentiments within Latin America's small, but influential middle class. This group did not share the land-holding oligarchy's affinity for the status quo, but they also desired more international engagement than indigenous groups with no attachment to the state.¹⁸⁶ Military interventions increased with rising levels of social mobilization as control over capital resources and landholding grew more precarious. Even in countries with improving economic conditions, military coups and political violence persisted as groups scrambled for the spoils of political power.¹⁸⁷

While these political movements possessed divergent views on the optimal role of government within their respective countries, they all regarded the U.S.-led international order with innate suspicion. U.S. officials in turn viewed these independence movements as part of a Soviet inspired "international communist conspiracy."¹⁸⁸ John Foster Dulles warned that this "hatred of the Yankee" resembled China's incipient communist movement in the mid-1930s.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸² Glenn Dorn, *The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy* (University Park: ! Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 18; David Green, *The Containment of Latin America* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 187. !

¹⁸³ Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul*, loc 200. !

¹⁸⁴ *Rio de Janeiro served as Brazil's capital from 1763 until 1960*. David Baldussi, "Brasília, 50 Years as the Capital," *The Rio Times* (January ! 12, 2010).

¹⁸⁵ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 202-203. !

¹⁸⁶ Alexander, "New Directions: The United States and Latin America," *Current History*, 67. !

¹⁸⁷ Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *The American Political Science Review*, 617-619. !

¹⁸⁸ Stephen Rabe, "Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism" in *Kennedy's Quest for & Victory*, by Thomas Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 107-108. !

¹⁸⁹ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 29. !

Latin America's incumbent powerbrokers and elite landowners leveraged this perception to secure their own domestic interests. Latin American populist movements clearly espoused socialist principles, but the majority did not identify as communists or officially support the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁰

In 1947, the State Department estimated that Communist Party membership in Latin America comprised "one quarter of one percent" of the region's population.¹⁹¹ By 1950, George Kennan assessed that in "no Latin American country, with the possible exception of Guatemala, does there seem to be any serious likelihood that the communists might acquire the strength to come to power." Kennan also observed that "most of the people who go by the name communist in Latin America are a somewhat different species than in Europe."¹⁹² Still, democratic governments in Latin America were forced to manage a precarious balance between popular political pressures, polemic radicals, and U.S. foreign policy imperatives.¹⁹³ If an incumbent administration failed to placate these competing influences, they risked losing power. By not fully appreciating this nuanced reality, U.S. policymakers conflated verifiable facts with theoretical speculation on communist subversion. This flawed perspective transformed political movements for economic and social reform into an international Soviet conspiracy.¹⁹⁴ Laurence Whitehead argued that U.S. officials with limited knowledge or interest in the region "were particularly prone to misleading simplification and prejudicial labeling."¹⁹⁵ The U.S. failed to see

¹⁹⁰ Fredrick Pike, *FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 300. !

¹⁹¹ *U.S. Policy Regarding Anti-Communist Measures Which Could Be Planned and Carried Out Within the Inter-American System*, Department of State, 5. !

¹⁹² Kennan, "Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department to the Secretary of State," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Volume & II: The United Nations & The Western Hemisphere*, 1780-1782. !

¹⁹³ *NSC 144/1: U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America*, (Washington: National Security Council, 1953), 4. !

¹⁹⁴ Office of the Historian, "Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting, February 26, 1954," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Volume IV & The American Republics*, 487. !

¹⁹⁵ Laurence Whitehead, "Bolivia since 1930" in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, by Leslie Bethell, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 120. !

these “communist” sympathies as a product of Latin America’s destitute condition, not a Soviet inspired ideology.¹⁹⁶

In 1952, following military coups in Cuba and Venezuela, Costa Rica and Guatemala represented the last democratic governments in the Caribbean Basin.¹⁹⁷ The threat posed by communist adversaries in other part of the world “tempered” U.S. patience with independence movements and it reduced U.S. support for apathetic governments.¹⁹⁸ Latin American states countered extra-hemispheric communist influence by shifting their focus inward. Authoritarian governments banned Marxist propaganda, communist parties, and their affiliated labor organizations.¹⁹⁹ Germán Arciniegas, a Colombian journalist and historian, noted that: “The dictators describe as Communist all those who do not support them. According to General Odría, the people of Peru are Communists.”²⁰⁰

Efforts to contain political instability through direct and indirect means produced mounting costs for the credibility of U.S. foreign policy.²⁰¹ The Good Neighbor era’s diplomatic and economic development initiatives failed to satiate the cult of revolution that permeated Latin America’s nationalist movements. The zeal and reverence for nineteenth century revolutionary figures like Simón Bolívar, Benito Juárez, Bernardo O’Higgins, and José de San Martín reflected an instinctive desire to forge a shared history and national identity independent of foreign influence.²⁰² U.S. economic assistance could not develop these intrinsic qualities and dictatorships could not suppress political discontent in perpetuity. Good Neighbor policies failed to convince Latin America’s revolutionary movements that U.S. interests were synonymous with

¹⁹⁶ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 52. !

¹⁹⁷ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 223. !

¹⁹⁸ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, loc 2433. !

¹⁹⁹ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 126. !

²⁰⁰ Holbo, “Cold War Drift in Latin America,” *Current History*, 67. !

²⁰¹ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 291-292. !

²⁰² Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 205 & 215. !

South America convinced some governments that the U.S. simply used its neighbors during “a ! time of crisis.”²⁰⁹ During the Korean War the U.S. petitioned Latin American states for support, but only Colombia sent troops. Brazil’s foreign minister explained that, “Brazil’s present situation would be different and our cooperation in the present emergency could probably be greater,” if Washington “elaborated a recovery plan for Latin America.”²¹⁰ The Eisenhower administration feared Soviet exploitation of these faltering trade and security ties. To better assess the situation, President Eisenhower dispatched his brother and most trusted advisor, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, on a ten-country tour.²¹¹

Much like Rockefeller’s assessment in 1941, Dr. Eisenhower’s report in 1953 captured the desperate socioeconomic conditions driving “tremendous social ferment” in the region.²¹² *U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America* (NSC 144-1), operationalized Dr. Eisenhower’s findings, but with only modest support for enhanced political, economic, information, and military assistance programs.²¹³ Like President Truman, the Eisenhower administration viewed private capital as the primary mechanism for economic development in the Western Hemisphere.²¹⁴ In the summer of 1953 the Eisenhower administration commissioned Operation Solarium, a detailed review of its anti-Soviet strategy. Study groups convened at the National War College to assess the effectiveness three policy options: a continuation of containment, increased nuclear deterrence, or the liberation / “roll back” of expanding Soviet influence. Policymakers emerged from Solarium with *New Look*, a fiscally responsible hybrid of containment, deterrence, and liberation.²¹⁵

²⁰⁹ *The New York Times*, “Summary of Dr. Eisenhower’s Report on United States and Latin American Relations.” (November 22, 1953). !

²¹⁰ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 16-17. !

²¹¹ *NSC 144/1: U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America*, 2. !

²¹² David Jervis, “The Kissinger Report and Its Predecessors,” *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* (1988), 74. !

²¹³ *NSC 144/1: U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America*, 4. !

²¹⁴ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 333. !

²¹⁵ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 161-162. !

President Eisenhower wanted to prevent a “Soviet beachhead” from forming in the Western Hemisphere. Even if no diplomatic or military relations existed between the Árbenz government and the Kremlin, Guatemala’s populist reforms, inchoate communist party, and close proximity to strategic infrastructure made it appear to be a susceptible Soviet target.²¹⁶ Louis Halle, a member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, dissented from conventional views held on conditions in Guatemala. Halle equated U.S. insecurity in Central America to a frightened elephant shaking at the sight of a mouse.²¹⁷ While both the State Department and intelligence community assessed that Guatemalan communists posed no military threat, the Eisenhower administration viewed subversion in the country as a “crucial test” of U.S. leadership and hemispheric solidarity.²¹⁸

Eisenhower grounded his concern in the understanding that the Soviets would exploit any opportunity to undermine U.S. legitimacy in the Western Hemisphere. The American public, prominent editorial pages, foreign policy academics, and the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly supported President Eisenhower’s position.²¹⁹ Walter McDougall captures growing anxiety over the communist threat by noting that: “The Truman Doctrine passed the Senate by a margin of 3 to 1, the Marshall Plan by 4 to 1, NATO by 6 to 1, and the public approved the Korean intervention by 10 to 1.”²²⁰ In the summer of 1953, President Eisenhower approved planning for Operation Success (PBSUCCESS).²²¹ The operation embraced *New Look’s* strategic asymmetry with plans for covert action and psychological warfare.²²² In theory, this clandestine approach

²¹⁶ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 18.

²¹⁷ Louis Halle, “Document 457, Our Guatemalan Policy,” In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Volume IV The American Republics*, by ! Office of the Historian (Washington: U.S. State Department, 2018), 3323.

²¹⁸ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 20. !

²¹⁹ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 248. !

²²⁰ McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*, 166.

²²¹ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 243. !

²²² Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 163. !

preserved public U.S. commitments to nonintervention and prevented populist groups from ! further galvanizing support with a David versus Goliath narrative.²²³

Guatemala epitomized the social inequality, rampant poverty, and weak institutions that crippled development in many Latin American states. Over half the country's population subsisted as seasonal agrarian labor with an annual income equivalent to \$70 U.S. dollars. Guatemala's life expectancy hovered around 40 years and its infant mortality rate exceeded 50 percent. The Guatemalan people also suffered from the second highest illiteracy rate in Latin America.²²⁴ These domestic conditions and the dominance of U.S. business interests within the Guatemalan economy made it a lightning rod for anti-American political movements. The U.S.-based United Fruit Company served as the country's largest landowner and its largest employer. United Fruit's subsidiaries, International Railways of Central America (IRCA) and the Tropical Radio and Telegraph Company, dominated commercial transportation and communications. IRCA controlled 95 percent of Guatemala's railroads and after 1930, United Fruit assumed responsibility for the country's postal service.²²⁵ The significance of United Fruit's monopoly is amplified by the fact that no roads connected the country's capital, Guatemala City, to its principal port, Puerto Barrios. This deep water harbor handled 60 percent of Guatemala's exports.²²⁶ Guatemalans described United Fruit as "el pulpo" (the octopus), due to this extensive reach and power.²²⁷

In 1952 Guatemala's democratically elected president, Jacobo Árbenz, implemented an aggressive land redistribution project and lifted a ban on the Communist Party's political

²²³ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 19. !

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 26-27. !

²²⁵ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 129-130. !

²²⁶ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 87. !

²²⁷ Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul*, loc 1310. !

participation.²²⁸ Guatemala supported a Soviet initiative to recognize communist China at the U.N. and it became a prominent “safe haven” for Marxists fleeing political persecution in other Latin American countries.²²⁹ Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, an itinerant Argentine revolutionary, first established his connections to Fidel Castro’s 26th of July movement while attempting to “stimulate popular resistance” in Guatemala.²³⁰ The U.S. welcomed some of Guatemala’s political and economic reforms but when added together they indicated a path away from the U.S. and into the Soviet sphere of influence.²³¹ José Manuel Fortuny, a devout communist and senior advisor to President Árbenz later noted: “They would have overthrown us even if we had grown no bananas.”²³²

At the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, any remnants of hope for the Good Neighbor era unraveled as two distinct views on the future of OAS cooperation emerged.²³³ Latin American delegations prioritized economic development, reduced U.S. trade barriers, and commodity price stability.²³⁴ The U.S. wanted to prevent communist encroachment on the American Republics.²³⁵ Prior to the Caracas Conference, Assistant Secretary of State Cabot argued that the absence of U.S. economic assistance, not Soviet machinations, represented principal driver of Latin America’s discontent.²³⁶ Assistant Secretary Cabot’s observation echoed the preponderance of U.S. government studies, assessments, and reports that identified economic development as the essential component for regional stability. Like its predecessors, the Eisenhower administration acknowledged this fact and then proceeded to address Inter-American

²²⁸ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 174. !

²²⁹ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 8-10. !

²³⁰ Henry Ryan, *The Fall of Che Guevara: A story of Soldiers, Spies, and Diplomats* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14; Fidel Castro ! and Ignacio Ramonet, *My Life*, translated by Andrew Hurley, (New York: Scribner, 2007), 172. !

²³¹ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 10. !

²³² Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 7. !

²³³ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 267. !

²³⁴ Office of the Historian, “Document 77, Memorandum of Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the National Security Council,” In *Foreign & Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Volume IV The American Republics*, 497. !

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 492-493. !

²³⁶ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 40. !

challenges through other means. U.S. foreign policy's short institutional memory made learning from these past experiences dubious.

After “very severe arm twisting,” the U.S. won support for an ersatz version of its anti-communist resolution.²³⁷ Latin America's dictatorships provided 12 of the 17 affirmative votes.²³⁸ Argentina and Mexico abstained, while Guatemala represented the only vote of dissent.²³⁹ At the Caracas Conference, recalcitrant OAS members demonstrated the limits of their anti-communist cooperation, and the U.S. sacrificed its benevolent image for a superficial statement of solidarity. Foreign Minister Luís Padilla Nervo explained Mexico's ambivalent position by noting that, “we were going through economic and social reform, a revolution, and if at that moment you had called a meeting of the American States to judge us, probable we would have been found guilty of some subjection to foreign influences.”²⁴⁰ After the Caracas conference, President Árbenz concluded that an invasion of his country was imminent and the U.S. determined that any future action against Guatemala should be covert and unilateral.²⁴¹ Piero Gleijeses writes that “there is no convenient villain” to blame for the events leading up to the U.S. intervention in Guatemala, “but rather a complex interplay of imperial hubris, security concerns, and economic interests.”²⁴² The stage for an unnecessary confrontation was set.

In April 1954, the U.S. discovered a 2,000 ton small arms shipment traveling from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet satellite state, to Puerto Barrios in Guatemala. More weapons appeared to be on the way. In May, social unrest in Guatemala spread across its border to United Fruit plantations in Honduras. The U.S. embassy in Tegucigalpa suspected the workers revolt

²³⁷ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 276. !

²³⁸ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 39. !

²³⁹ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 275. !

²⁴⁰ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 52. !

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 51. !

²⁴² Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 7. !

emanated from a communist-backed labor union in Guatemala.²⁴³ In response to these developments, Honduras and Nicaragua signed mutual security treaties with the U.S. This paved the way for future U.S. military assistance designed to guard against “the extension of Soviet Colonialism.”²⁴⁴ On June 17, U.S.-backed rebels crossed into Guatemala in accordance with the operational designs of PBSUCCESS.²⁴⁵ Soon after, the Guatemalan army dissolved and President Árbenz resigned from office. The Eisenhower administration viewed Árbenz’s rapid capitulation as a successful check on communist encroachment in the Western Hemisphere.²⁴⁶ Covert action proved to be an effective instrument for regime change, but the pernicious socioeconomic factors that threatened regional stability remained. To many Latin American governments, the events surrounding Guatemalan coup signaled a return to the repudiated policies that predated the Good Neighbor era.²⁴⁷

In the spring of 1958 Vice President Richard Nixon embarked on a tour of South America. The trip’s objective was to recognize the democratic election of Argentina’s Arturo Frondizi Ercoli and disabuse the notion that the U.S. favored Latin American dictatorships.²⁴⁸ Vice President Nixon’s itinerary soon expanded to include Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. Democratic governments had just returned to power in Peru and Venezuela.²⁴⁹ In private meetings with Vice President Nixon, heads of state reiterated the need for U.S. economic support and development assistance. Vitriolic mobs used a different approach to communicate a similar message. The Vice President later wrote that, “No journey

²⁴³ Halle, “Document 457, Our Guatemalan Policy,” In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Volume IV The American Republics*, by Office of the Historian, 3309-3310.

²⁴⁴ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 297-298. !

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 320. !

²⁴⁶ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 26-27. !

²⁴⁷ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 77. !

²⁴⁸ Richard Nixon, *Six Crises* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962), 183-184. !

²⁴⁹ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 100-101. !

ever started out in a less exciting way and ended more dramatically.”²⁵⁰ By the time Nixon arrived in Venezuela, anti-American demonstrations reached a violent crescendo. Some Eisenhower cabinet members attributed this mob violence to a Soviet inspired plot, but a subsequent CIA investigation found no evidence to support this assertion. The CIA Director, Allen Dulles, concluded that “there would be trouble in Latin America even if there were no Communists.”²⁵¹

The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee described Vice President Nixon’s trip as “a symbolic explosion no less startling in its impact on the nation than the first sputnik.”²⁵² More than any previous report or intelligence estimate, newsreel footage of protestors spitting on the Vice President and assaulting his motorcade provided an unvarnished appraisal of U.S.-Latin American relations. The Good Neighbor era established a U.S.-led international regime designed to enhance state sovereignty and encourage multilateral consultations.²⁵³ These policies intended to advance U.S. national interests but they were predicated on a tacit reciprocity that promoted inter-American solidarity.²⁵⁴ Democracy diluted the power of Latin American elites and diminished their ability to reliably support strategic U.S. objectives. By the spring of 1958, the Good Neighbor era had died and left both the U.S. and its Latin American partners disillusioned. Democratic governance and economic development produced unforeseen outcomes that challenged basic assumptions about the benevolent influences of state formation.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁰ Nixon, *Six Crises*, 187. !

²⁵¹ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 102. !

²⁵² *The New York Times*, “A New Hemispheric Policy,” August 15, 1958, 20. !

²⁵³ Stephen Krasner defines an **international regime** as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around & which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory & History*, 150.

²⁵⁴ Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 193. !

²⁵⁵ Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War*, 8. !

President Eisenhower found it alarming that communists continued to “identify themselves and their purposes” with emerging nationalist trends and movements.²⁵⁶ The Eisenhower administration recognized that U.S. foreign policy required more flexibility to address the incompatible influences of weak states and strong nations. Going forward, the U.S. planned to address Latin America’s “pervasive anarchy” through better coordination of its economic and military foreign policy instruments.²⁵⁷ U.S. policymakers reversed course on several key economic proposals they opposed at the Caracas conference. The U.S. expanded Export-Import Bank loan authority to seven billion dollars, doubled the World Bank’s lending capacity, agreed to commodity price negotiations, and supported initiatives to forge a common market for South America.²⁵⁸ The Eisenhower administration also established the Inter-American Development Bank.²⁵⁹ The bank’s Social Progress Fund targeted education, healthcare, and agriculture projects neglected by other forms of investment capital.²⁶⁰ These economic and development incentives aimed to “channel” legitimate nationalist discontent in a free market, anti-communist direction.²⁶¹ If this approach failed, the U.S. could always default to allied dictators willing to impose stability with force.²⁶² Anti-communist political solidarity remained the overarching goal.

On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement ousted the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba.²⁶³ Castro rode to victory in the streets of Havana on a tank given to the Batista regime by the U.S government. These unexpected developments became the first test

²⁵⁶ Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” *Diplomatic & History*, 877. !

²⁵⁷ Green, *The Containment of Latin America*, 17. !

²⁵⁸ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 354. !

²⁵⁹ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 11. !

²⁶⁰ Horwitz and Bagley, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Context*, 63. !

²⁶¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 194. !

²⁶² Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 354. !

²⁶³ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 189.

of the Eisenhower administration's dual-track strategy for countering Latin America's revolutionary movements.²⁶⁴ In the revolution's early days the U.S did not view Castro as a threat, but as a "positive challenge" for changing conditions in Cuba.²⁶⁵ The Batista government's oppressive tactics, corrupt practices, and deplorable human rights record alienated broad sections of Cuban society and pushed them into the arms of the revolution.²⁶⁶ Many middle and upper class Cubans viewed Castro as a welcome change to the graft and extortion they experienced under Batista.²⁶⁷ The U.S. had also grown weary of Batista and sympathetic to the plight of the Cuban people. It wanted to limit the reputational damage this close association would have on broader U.S.-Latin American relations across the region.²⁶⁸ The Eisenhower administration set its apprehension aside and dismissed Castro's anti-American rhetoric as a part of Cuba's reform process.²⁶⁹

In April 1959, Castro conducted an 11 day, six city tour of North America at the invitation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.²⁷⁰ The new Cuban Prime Minister traveled as a private citizen, but his itinerary reflected the political calculations of an ambitious "revolutionary project" unfolding deep within the U.S. sphere of influence.²⁷¹ Castro met with Vice President Nixon, Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Large, enthusiastic crowds attended Castro's speeches in New York City's Central Park and at three prominent

²⁶⁴ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 355. !

²⁶⁵ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 115; Parker, "Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the ! Reperiodization of the Postwar Era," *Diplomatic History*, 871. !

²⁶⁶ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964*, loc145. !

²⁶⁷ *NIE 85/2-60: The Situation in Cuba* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, June 14, 1960), 3. !

²⁶⁸ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 120-121. !

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 123. !

²⁷⁰ Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964* (New York: W.W. Norton & ! Company, 1997), loc179.

²⁷¹ William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana & !* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 14. !

universities.²⁷² While in New York, Castro also agreed to a secret meeting with U.S. intelligence officials. The CIA briefed Castro in Spanish on subversive communist operations within Cuba. The Cuban communist party supported Batista until his demise appeared inevitable.²⁷³ They now represented a growing block of political influence within the country.²⁷⁴ Castro acknowledged this threat to the Cuban revolution but reassured all present that “he can handle Communists.”²⁷⁵

Castro’s public relations blitz produced ambivalent reactions and many unanswered questions. Dew Pearson’s *Washington Merry-Go-Round* cited a speech on March 23, 1959, where Castro proclaimed, “Should there be a war between the United States and Russia, Cuba would be neutral.”²⁷⁶ In private meetings one month later, Castro repeatedly assured U.S. officials that “Cuba would remain in the western camp” and against the Soviet Union. The State Department found Castro to be frank, sincere, and eager to reassure the United States, but its report also cautioned that “Castro remains an enigma.”²⁷⁷ While *The Guardian* described the olive drab revolutionary as a “picturesque paradox,” Castro appeared to understand that ideological contradictions and political inconsistencies matter very little to people deprived of the most basic human necessities.²⁷⁸

Across his numerous engagements Castro did remain consistent on one key point, his belief that destitute conditions perpetuate Latin America’s political flirtation with communism.²⁷⁹ In a prescient cable sent on December 18, 1958, two weeks before the Batista government’s collapse, the CIA’s Havana Station Chief recommended opening a dialogue with

²⁷² Ibid., 15. !

²⁷³ NIE 80/90-61: *Latin American Reactions to Developments in and with Respect to Cuba* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, July 18, 1961), 3.

²⁷⁴ LeoGrande and Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana*, 21. !

²⁷⁵ *Meeting with Fidel Castro*, Briefing, (Washington: CIA Historical Review Program, May 6, 1959), 2-3. !

²⁷⁶ Drew Pearson, “What’s Castro’s Stand on Russia?” *The Washington Merry-Go-Round* (April 17, 1959). !

²⁷⁷ Christian Herter, “Unofficial Visit of Prime Minister Castro of Cuba to Washington – A Tentative Evaluation,” *In Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960 Volume VI: Cuba*, by Office of the Historian, (Washington: Department of State, 2018), 1386.

²⁷⁸ *The Guardian*, “Fidel Castro Visits Washington,” April 17, 1959. !

²⁷⁹ *Meeting with Fidel Castro*, CIA Historical Review Program, 3-4. !

Castro's 26th of July Movement. The cable noted that, "Regardless of how we may feel about Castro and his movement, both will be important political forces for a long time to come."²⁸⁰ Cuba represented the second largest amount of U.S. foreign direct investment in Latin America and the U.S. sugar quota subsidized the island nation's principle export. Private U.S. investors held significant stakes in Cuban tourism, oil refineries, and infrastructure.²⁸¹ U.S. policymakers believed that these implicit advantages enhanced diplomatic leverage over a revolutionary movement focused on delivering economic and social reforms. The logic followed that mutual U.S.-Cuban interest in economic development made rapprochement a viable possibility. Ultimately, suspicion and pride nullified any shared interests and prevented an amical relationship from coming to fruition. Castro feared appearing as a U.S. "supplicant" and he abhorred U.S. lectures on the dangers of communism.²⁸² Castro later observed that: "The United States had dominated us too long. The Cuban revolution was determined to end that domination."²⁸³ To sceptics on both sides, this rupture always seemed inevitable.

By July of 1959, three months after Castro returned from his U.S. tour, Washington determined the Cuban Revolution's "unorthodox politics" to be incompatible with U.S. objectives.²⁸⁴ A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on deteriorating U.S.-Cuban relations noted that: "It is difficult, and in most respects academic to try, to distinguish the policy and actions of the Castro regime from those which would be expected of a government under actual Communist control."²⁸⁵ The Cuban government aggressively implemented its promise for land

²⁸⁰ Jack Pfeiffer, "Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies Volume III," In *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, by CIA History Staff ! (Washington: Historic Review Program, 1979), 12.

²⁸¹ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 120; Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964*, loc ! 206. !

²⁸² LeoGrande and Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana*, 21. !

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 41. !

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 21-23; Roy Rubottom, "Document 535, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary ! of State," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume VI: Cuba*, by Office of the Historian, (Washington: Department of State, 2018), 2672.

²⁸⁵ *NIE 85/2-60: The Situation in Cuba* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, June 14, 1960), 1-2. !

reform under a new organization, the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). Castro used the INRA to establish state-controlled industries and transform private companies into production cooperatives. The INRA, which later evolved into the Ministry of Industry, became the principal vehicle for redistributing national income, expropriating private assets, and increasing state control over the Cuban economy.²⁸⁶

Castro's popularity and messianic persona constrained multilateral action within the OAS and made it difficult for Latin American leaders to openly criticize events unfolding in Cuba. These leaders feared provoking social unrest and riots within their own countries.²⁸⁷ The U.S. also worried about Latin American allies susceptible to the dangerous bandwagon mentality forming among other nationalist movements intent on replicating the Cuban experience.²⁸⁸ The Cuban government's ability to persist in the face of U.S. opposition made Havana a "mecca for revolutionary inspiration."²⁸⁹ During its first year in power, Cuba provided political propaganda and materiel support to dissident groups plotting the overthrow of dictatorships in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.²⁹⁰ The U.S. attempted to moderate the Cuban revolution with economic accommodations, but it could no longer allow its forbearance to be interpreted as weakness.²⁹¹ U.S. ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, raised the point that: "The U.S. can win wars, but the question is can we win revolutions?"²⁹²

Where the U.S. sensed danger, Nikita Khrushchev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, detected opportunity. After visiting the U.S. in the fall of 1959, Khrushchev approved a

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 7; Castro and Ramonet, *My Life*, 247-248. !

²⁸⁷ *NIE 85/2-60: The Situation in Cuba*, 1; *NIE 80/90-61: Latin American Reactions to Developments in and with Respect to Cuba*, 2; Grow, *U.S. & Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 33. !

²⁸⁸ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 16. !

²⁸⁹ *NIE 80/90-61: Latin American Reactions to Developments in and with Respect to Cuba*, 3.

²⁹⁰ *Castro's Campaign Against Dictatorships*, NSC Briefing, (Washington: CIA Historical Review Program, March 17, 1959). !

²⁹¹ Rubottom, "Document 535, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary of State," In ! *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume VI: Cuba*, 2672. !

²⁹² Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 193. !

secret Cuban request for Warsaw Pact weapons. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised against this course of action, but to Khrushchev the situation in Cuba appeared “too important, and unusual, a phenomenon ... for the Soviets to deny it assistance.”²⁹³ Stalin once denounced Latin America as “the obedient army of the United States.”²⁹⁴ Now, the Kremlin hoped to augment its limited capability in South America with like-minded partners in the Cuban Revolution. The Soviets proved adept at exploiting nationalism in other parts of the world and Cuba offered a unique opening to obstruct inter-hemispheric solidarity and damage U.S. credibility.²⁹⁵ By the late 1950s, the Soviet Union represented less than one percent of Latin American trade.²⁹⁶ The Kremlin’s diplomatic presence across the region was equally insignificant with only three operational embassies.²⁹⁷ Cuba provided the Communist Block with a base of operations within the Western Hemisphere. It also presented the Soviets with an opportunity to break Latin America’s reliance on U.S. capital and trade.²⁹⁸

In 1960, under threat of U.S. sanctions, the Soviet Union and Cuba signed an agreement to exchange oil for sugar. When U.S. owned refineries refused to process imported Soviet oil, the Cuban government seized facilities owned by Standard Oil, Texaco, and British-Dutch Shell.²⁹⁹ Private investors realized a one billion dollars loss from Cuba’s confiscation of property and assets.³⁰⁰ The U.S. government responded with an economic embargo on all exports to Cuba. Food and medicine remained exempt.³⁰¹ The Soviet Union used trade as an innocuous form of support for Cuba, but once the Kremlin determined the danger of U.S. intervention to be

²⁹³ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964*, loc 564. !

²⁹⁴ Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul*, loc 1336. !

²⁹⁵ NSC 5902: *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, (Washington: National Security Council, January 30, 1959), 4. !

²⁹⁶ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 115. !

²⁹⁷ Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 134; Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul*, loc 1336. !

²⁹⁸ Robert Evanson, “Soviet Political Uses of Trade with Latin America,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Summer 1985), ! 100. !

²⁹⁹ LeoGrande and Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana*, 35-36. !

³⁰⁰ Evanson, “Soviet Political Uses of Trade with Latin America,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 101. !

³⁰¹ LeoGrande and Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana*, 36. !

irrevocable, it proceeded with calculated political and military support.³⁰² In response to growing tensions over the situation in Cuba, Khrushchev publicly announced on July 9, 1960, that: “Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire should the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to start intervention against Cuba ... we have rockets which can land precisely in a preset square target 13,000 kilometers away.”³⁰³

By establishing Cuba as a proxy in the Western Hemisphere, the Soviets exposed a significant gap in U.S. national security strategy. Before World War II, geography and industrial capacity offered the U.S. ample time and space to address unambiguous threats as they materialized outside the Western Hemisphere. In a post-war world defined by superpower competition and atomic weapons, if policymakers waited for a threat to become apparent, they risked being too late to mount an effective response. The U.S. nuclear arsenal deterred conventional forms of aggression, but U.S. strategy proved ineffective at managing the grey area between total war and total peace.³⁰⁴ Communist support for national liberation movements enabled Soviet influence to usurp U.S. interests without crossing thresholds both sides believed would trigger direct military conflict.³⁰⁵

The devastating effect of nuclear weapons decreased the probability of their use and few threats justified a nuclear response. Atomic brinkmanship made limited warfare through proxy forces a critical foreign policy instrument. Limited warfare and subversive activities allowed hostile actors to mask their intent and obfuscate political and economic objectives.³⁰⁶ These tactics avoided the direct seizure of territory and focused on attaining a favorable balance of

³⁰² Evanson, “Soviet Political Uses of Trade with Latin America,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 102. !

³⁰³ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964*, loc 1215. !

³⁰⁴ Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 8-11. !

³⁰⁵ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, 195-197*. !

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 195. !

power by manipulating developments within other sovereign states.³⁰⁷ Once achieved, the cost of action against this “political and military nibbling” often outweighed the risk of intervention.³⁰⁸

President Eisenhower recognized this as a possible outcome for U.S. foreign policy in Cuba. The difficulty of removing Castro increased the longer he remained in power. Cuba’s growing diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union compounded the situation’s gravity.³⁰⁹ On March 16, 1960, the Eisenhower administration authorized a covert action program against Castro’s government. The program followed four lines of operation: it developed an opposition movement outside Cuba, orchestrated a propaganda campaign, built an intelligence network on the island, and created a paramilitary force for future guerilla operations.³¹⁰ The U.S. intended to upend the “staying power” of Soviet-inspired nationalism by taking decisive action with counterrevolutionary forces.³¹¹ This strategy exceeded expectations in Guatemala and the CIA convinced policymakers that it could replicate this success again in Cuba.³¹²

The U.S. also worked to counter communist influence in Cuba through the OAS. In August 1960, the OAS issued a joint statement condemning Soviet actions within the American republics and in 1961 it expelled Cuba for embracing principles incompatible with the inter-American system.³¹³ Cuban attempts to export social revolution and armed resistance unnerved neighboring Latin American states.³¹⁴ To prevent Castro’s revolutionary influence from destabilizing other states in the region, the Eisenhower administration embraced a Brazilian plan to accelerate socioeconomic development through land reform and improved housing.³¹⁵ The

³⁰⁷ Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 9. !

³⁰⁸ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 195. !

³⁰⁹ *NIE 85/2-60: The Situation in Cuba*. !

³¹⁰ 5412 Committee, “A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime,” In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume VI: & Cuba*, by Office of the Historian, (Washington: Department of State, 2018), 2390-2394. !

³¹¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 197-198. !

³¹² Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 372. !

³¹³ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 190-191. !

³¹⁴ Ryan, *The Fall of Che Guevara*, 5-9. !

³¹⁵ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 356. !

Eisenhower administrations use of covert action and its embrace of anti-poverty development programs represented the antecedents of more concerted U.S. foreign policy effort to keep the Western Hemisphere free of communist influence.

Two distinct forces shaped Latin American states between 1945 and 1960. Within South American countries, nationalist movements transformed themselves from pariahs into coveted sources of political power and at the international level, the stakes of Cold War competition moved Latin American governments from afterthoughts to central foreign policy considerations. The external influences of the bipolar state system and internal political movements represented key elements in Latin America's post-war state formation process.³¹⁶ From 1958 to 1961, ten Latin American military dictatorships collapsed. The complexity of independent political movements operating within an interdependent international environment required a creative U.S. foreign policy that moved beyond anti-communist measures to address Latin America's socioeconomic revolution.³¹⁷ This brought new opportunities and challenges for Latin American citizens, their states, and the superpowers vying for influence in the regional.

CHAPTER V – Securing Democracy through Development

John F. Kennedy severely criticized the Eisenhower administration's handling of Cuba. In a speech given during the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy rhetorically asked Vice President Nixon, "If you can't stand up to Castro, how can you be expected to stand up to Khrushchev?"³¹⁸ Kennedy made cogent, well-articulated arguments but his assessment of the situation mirrored Eisenhower's concerns on communist influence and its ability to exploit the

³¹⁶ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 197-198. !

³¹⁷ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 11. !

³¹⁸ Edward Folliard, "Kennedy Asks Nixon Explain Cuba Disaster," *The Washington Post* (October 16, 1960), A16. !

impoverished condition of many Latin American states.³¹⁹ Eisenhower's *New Look* aimed to provide the U.S. with an asymmetric advantage over the Soviets, but the Cuban revolution demonstrated the vulnerability of asymmetry through indirect aggression. The limited measures that advanced communist wars of national liberation constrained the most effective U.S. policy options. In response, the Kennedy administration replaced *New Look* with *Flexible Response*. This modified approach utilized conventional and unconventional foreign policy instruments to combat the "debilitating pressures" Soviet "crisis-mongering" imposed on the free world.³²⁰

In 1961, President Kennedy challenged nations across the Western Hemisphere to go further and unite behind an ambitious plan that would "demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved within a framework of democratic institutions."³²¹ As signatories to the Charter of Punta del Este, the U.S. and 20 other Latin American states embraced a "multilateral inter-American development initiative" that became known as the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance focused on long-standing U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region: political stability and economic prosperity.³²² It reflected the tenets of *Flexible Response* by combining high-minded aspirations with the evolving strategic imperatives of containment.³²³

The Kennedy administration wanted to prevent another Cuban revolution. After a meeting with Khrushchev in the summer of 1961, President Kennedy concluded that Soviet support for "wars of national liberation" represented a front for indirect communist invasion. Citing communist theory, the President noted that, "a small group of disciplined Communists

³¹⁹ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 356. !

³²⁰ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 231-233. !

³²¹ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 202. !

³²² *Ibid.*, 203. !

³²³ Tony Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s," In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, by Abraham Lowenthal, ! (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 76. !

could exploit discontent and misery in a country where the average income may be \$60 or \$70 a year, and seize control, therefore, of an entire country without Communist troops ever crossing any international border.”³²⁴ Communists within the Cuban revolution masked their political affiliation as a resistance movement against the Batista regime’s oppression. Then, they incrementally gained control of the Cuban government.³²⁵ The U.S. worried about Cuba being used to project Soviet influence across the Western Hemisphere, but the Kennedy administration also considered the broader implications for other Cold War flashpoints like Taiwan and Berlin. Dean Rusk, President Kennedy’s Secretary of State, argued that U.S. acquiescence in Cuba set a dangerous precedent that encouraged Chinese and Soviet aggression in other parts of the world.³²⁶

Rusk’s concern over symbolism, deterrence, and U.S. credibility did not represent a novel foreign policy concept, but the Alliance for Progress did offer a new approach to Latin America’s perennial struggle with economic and political instability. Since the emergence of Dollar Diplomacy in the early twentieth century, U.S. policymakers supported the notion that material prosperity produced political tranquility.³²⁷ This theory presumed that Latin American states simply required a capital infusion to transcend the historic challenges that impeded their development. Guided by this assumption, U.S. foreign policy failed to realize its vision for a hemispheric network of democratic republics. This theory on capital investment represented a fundamental misunderstanding of how Latin America’s socioeconomic structures connected to its insular political institutions.³²⁸ In effect, U.S. foreign policy averted short-term crises at the

³²⁴ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 20-21. !

³²⁵ Smith, “The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s,” In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, 76. !

³²⁶ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964*, loc 4236; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 22. !

³²⁷ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 357. !

³²⁸ Smith, “The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s,” In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, 78-79. !

expense of its enduring strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere. In a letter to President Kennedy, Adolf Berle, Chairman of the President's Task Force on Latin America, wrote that: "The present struggle will not be won, and can be lost by opportunist support of transitory power-holders or forces whose objectives are basically hostile to the peoples they dominate."³²⁹

The Alliance for Progress built upon Berle's assessment and shifted the burden of development from private investment to loan guarantees and aid financed through the U.S. government.³³⁰ The Kennedy administration attempted to embrace Latin America's emerging middle class without ostracizing the "familiar friends" that supported Washington in the past.³³¹ In 1961, President Kennedy traveled to Bogotá, Colombia, to promote his Alliance for Progress initiative. Enthusiastic crowds lined the streets and welcomed the U.S. delegation. This warm reception made a stark contrast to the acrimonious greeting experienced by Vice President Nixon just three years before. Colombia's President, Lleras Camargo, explained to Kennedy that, "They think you're on their side against the oligarchs – and I hope you keep it that way."³³² The Kennedy administration hoped to encourage this perception, but not all revolutionary movements proved to be compatible with U.S. interests. These groups seized on any indication of U.S. reticence as evidence that the U.S. only cared for Latin America's elite.³³³

The Alliance for Progress invested in housing, healthcare, and education, but land reform represented its most consequential and controversial development initiative.³³⁴ Through land reform, the U.S. sought to extend economic and political participation to marginalized segments of Latin American society. Alliance for Progress administrators viewed land reform and its

³²⁹ Adolf Berle, "Document 16, Letter From the Chairman of the Task Force on Latin America to President Kennedy," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Volume XII: American Republics*, by Office of the Historian, (Washington: Department of State, 2018), 196. !

³³⁰ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, 357. !

³³¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 220; Rabe, *The Most & Dangerous Area in the World*, 20-21. !

³³² Richard Goodwin, "Our Stake in a Big Awakening," *Life* (April 14, 1967), 83. !

³³³ *Ibid.* !

³³⁴ Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s," In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, 72. !

ancillary socioeconomic benefits as an essential step for building process for social cohesion and viable democratic institutions.³³⁵ While U.S. policymakers recognized land reform's potential benefits, concern over agricultural production output and communist exploitation prevented this initiative from ever expanding beyond symbolic rhetoric. A joint assessment by the Defense Department and the State Department also concluded that Alliance for Progress reforms could "weaken, rather than strengthen the fabric of society."³³⁶ The Kennedy administration feared that land reform measures could inadvertently assist the underground communist networks plotting to destabilize agrarian communities.³³⁷ Che Guevara's observations on the Alliance for Progress intentionally stoked concern about land reform programs being coopted by communist subversion. In a *Life* magazine article by Richard Goodwin, Guevara stated that, "by encouraging the forces of change and the desires of the masses, you might set loose forces beyond your control, ending in a revolution which would be your enemy."³³⁸ The marginal impact made by Alliance for Progress programs demonstrated the significant challenges that distinguished economic growth from economic development initiatives.³³⁹ The U.S. needed to meet rising expectations if it wanted to be viewed as an ally in Latin America's campaign for social progress, but more importunately U.S. policymakers could not permit another Cuban Revolution.

Where foreign assistance failed to encourage progressive reforms, the Kennedy administration remained committed to the containment of communism by other means. The death of Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican Republic's pro-U.S. dictator, illustrated the Kennedy administrations pragmatic view. While contemplating the outcomes and foreign policy implications for the island nation adjacent to Cuba, President Kennedy noted that: "There are

³³⁵ Gordon, *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress*, 102. !

³³⁶ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 128. !

³³⁷ Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s," In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, 79-80. !

³³⁸ Goodwin, "Our Stake in a Big Awakening," *Life*, 83. !

³³⁹ Gordon, *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress*, 101. !

three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third."³⁴⁰ Counterinsurgency doctrine provided the Kennedy administrations with a critical means for advancing its *Flexible Response* strategy. It realigned a military assistance program of questionable utility with more germane tasks that promoted Latin America's political stability.³⁴¹

Since the Truman administration, the U.S. used hemispheric defense to justify Congressional appropriations that trained and equipped Latin American militaries. Before the Cuban Revolution, these initiatives trained over 500 Cuban officers and provided Batista's armed forces with \$16 million in materiel support. Castro's guerilla movement demonstrated the inadequacy of this approach. The Kennedy administration ended the charade of hemispheric defense, but it continued to provide armored vehicles, aircraft, and other heavy weapons systems to "cultivate diplomatic relations."³⁴² U.S. policymakers refocused the preponderance of their overseas military assistance to internal security programs. These programs expanded the U.S. government's global surveillance capability by augmenting its capacity to monitor insurgent communist activity.³⁴³ Lucian Pye, Walt Rostow, and other modernization theorists within the Kennedy administration, also argued that enhanced security cooperation with Latin American states complemented development efforts undertaken by the Alliance for Progress. The Kennedy administration embraced the "modernizing military" concept and it explored policy options for

³⁴⁰ Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s," In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, 81. !

³⁴¹ McGeorge Bundy, "Document 56, National Security Action Memorandum," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Volume & VIII: National Security Policy*, by Office of the Historian, (Washington: Department of State, 2018), 392-393; Chester Clifton, "Document 18, ! Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Volume III: National Security & Policy*, 245-249. !

³⁴² Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 126. !

³⁴³ U. Alexis Johnson, "Memorandum From the Chairman of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) to President Kennedy," In *Foreign & Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Volume VIII: National Security Policy*, 1250.

deploying military forces in support of public works construction, communications, agriculture, health, and sanitation.³⁴⁴

As the focus of U.S.-Soviet competition shifted from direct confrontation to the domain of ideological opposition, both superpowers sought unconventional means to signal their inherent power and prestige.³⁴⁵ In Latin America, the U.S. attempted to achieve this objective by inculcating liberal values through democratic state formation. Anticommunist solidarity eluded the elaborate designs of the Alliance for Progress and the military precision promised by counterinsurgency proponents. Weak social and political institutions prevented Latin American states from capitalizing on the opportunities offered by this foreign assistance.³⁴⁶ Simultaneous efforts to develop democratic institutions and contain communist insurrections produced incompatible outcomes in a region where the U.S. was accustomed to getting its way.

The Alliance for Progress promoted long-term stability at the expense of elite Latin American powerbrokers allied with the anti-communist cause. At the same time, U.S.-backed counterinsurgency operations pursued short-term security interests that undermined efforts to promote trusted democratic institutions.³⁴⁷ While the success of these disparate initiatives proved to be as varied as the Latin American states they supported, it became clear during the Kennedy administration that progress could not be an externally manufactured process. If U.S. foreign policy intended to secure the Western Hemisphere with democratic polities, it would have to reexamine the foundations of Latin American state formation and support democratic practices that developed credible institutions from within.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁴Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 128; Bundy, "National Security Action Memorandum No. 119," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Volume VIII: National Security Policy*, 682. !

³⁴⁵ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 237; Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 194. !

³⁴⁶ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 138. !

³⁴⁷ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 144. !

³⁴⁸ Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy," In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, 216.

security. With its historic “margin of safety” in the Western Hemisphere receding, the U.S. prioritized security interests over egalitarian institutions.³⁵⁵ In 1950, George Kennan traveled across Latin America and made a classified assessment of the region’s political climate. Kennan reported to the Secretary of state that: “Where the concepts and traditions of popular government are too weak to absorb successfully the intensity of the communist attack, then we must concede that harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer.”³⁵⁶

The changing relationships between Latin American citizens, their states, and the international community appeared as an ominous challenge to U.S. national security interests during the Cold War. U.S. policymakers recognized the influences of political and social instability, but they proved incapable of discerning how these unfortunate conditions connected to the process of Latin American state formation.³⁵⁷ The inability to separate internal political aspirations from external Soviet subversion resulted in a U.S. foreign policy that favored hemispheric solidarity over the socioeconomic dynamics that promoted domestic stability.³⁵⁸ The Cuban Revolution and Soviet support for wars of national liberation made clear that internal political discord presented a tremendous opportunity for communist organizations intent on undermining U.S. influence in the region.³⁵⁹ It is essential for U.S. policymakers to understand the forces driving Latin America’s state formation process. This knowledge will enable more enlightened foreign policy decisions and build the collaborative hemispheric relationships the U.S. has long identified as a vital national interest.

³⁵⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), 8. !

³⁵⁶ Kennan, "Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department to the Secretary of State," In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Volume & II: The United Nations & The Western Hemisphere*, 1790. !

³⁵⁷ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, 193. !

³⁵⁸ Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, 268. !

³⁵⁹ Williams, *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations Theory and History*, 254-255. !

- Herter, Christian. "Unofficial Visit of Prime Minister Castro of Cuba to Washington - A Tentative Evaluation." In *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960 Volume VI: Cuba*, by Office of the Historian, 1384-1388. Washington: Department of State, 2018.
- Johnson, U. Alexis. "Memorandum From the Charimand of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) to President Kennedy." In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Volume VIII: National Security Policy*, by Office of the Historian, 1249-1257. Washington: Department of State, 2018.
- Kennan, George. "Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department to the Secretary of State." In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Volume II: The United Nations & The Western Hemisphere*, by Office of the Historian, 1768-1833. Washington: Department of State, 2018.
- Kennedy, John F. "Toast of the President and President Paz at a Luncheon at the Bolivian Embassy." *The American Presidency Project*. October 23, 1963. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9489>.
- Meeting with Fidel Castro*. Briefing, Washington: CIA Historical Review Program, May 6, 1959.
- NIE 80/90-61: Latin American Reactions to Developments In and with Respect to Cuba*. Washington : Central Intelligence Agency, July 18, 1961.
- NIE 85/2-60: The Situation in Cuba*. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, June 14, 1960.
- NSC 144/1: U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America*. Washington: National Security Council, November 20, 1953.
- NSC 56/2: U.S. Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration*. Washington: National Security Council, May 18, 1950.
- NSC 5902: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*. Washington: National Security Council, January 30, 1959.
- NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*. Washington: National Security Council, April 7, 1950.
- Pearson, Drew. "What's Castro's Stand on Russia?" *The Washington Merry-Go-Round*, April 17, 1959.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View." *Foreign Affairs*, 1928: 573-586.

Rubottom, Roy. "Document 535, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary of State." In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume VI: Cuba*, by Office of the Historian, 2672-2678. Washington: Department of State, 2018.

The Guardian. "Fidel Castro Visits Washington." April 17, 1959.

The New York Times. "A New Hemispheric Policy." August 15, 1958: 20.

The New York Times. "Summary of Dr. Eisenhower's Report on United States and Latin American Relations." November 22, 1953.

The Organization of American States. n.d. www.oas.org (accessed April 5, 2018).

Truman, Harry S. "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress." *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy*. March 12, 1947. <https://www.avalon.law.yale.edu> (accessed October 6, 2018).

U.S. Policy Regarding Anti-Communist Measures Which Could Be Planned and Carried Out Within the Inter-American System. Washington: Department of State, June 28, 1948.

Secondary Sources:

Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

—. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. New York: Crown Publishers, 2012.

Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Albo, Xavier. "The Long Memory of Ethnicity in Bolivia and Some Temporary Oscillations." In *Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present*, by John Crabtree, & Laurence Whitehead. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008.

Alexander, Robert. "New Directions: The United States and Latin America." *Current History*, February 1962.

Artaraz, Kepa. *Bolivia: Refounding the Nation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Baldussi, Davi. "Brasilia, 50 Years as the Capital." *The Rio Times*, January 12, 2010.

- Bethell, Leslie. "From the Second World War to the Cold War: 1944-1954." In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, by Abraham Lowenthal, 41-70. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
- Bethell, Leslie, and Ian Roxborough. "The Impact of the Cold War on Latin America." In *The Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, by Melvin Leffler, & David Painter, 299-316. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Centeno, Miguel. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
- Cote, Stephen. *Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia's Petroleum Sector*. Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2016.
- Desch, Michael. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, . *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1999.
- Dix, Robert. "Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America." *Armed Forces & Society*, Spring 1994: 439-456.
- Dorn, Glenn. *The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011.
- Drake, Paul. "From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932." In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, by Abraham Lowenthal, 3-40. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
- Evanson, Robert. "Sovite Political Uses of Trade with Latin America." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Summer 1985: 99-126.
- Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Galeano, Eduardo. *Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997.
- Gleijeses, Piero. *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Goodwin, Richard. "Our Stake in a Big Awakening." *Life*, April 14, 1967.

- Gordon, Lincoln. *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Grandin, Greg. *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Green, David. *The Containment of Latin America*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.
- Grow, Michael. *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008.
- Halle, Louis. "On A Certain Impatience With Latin America." *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950: 555-579.
- Holbo, Paul. "Cold War Drift in Latin America." *Current History*, February 1963.
- Horwitz, Betty, and Bruce Bagley. *Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Context*. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Jervis, David. "The Kissinger Report and Its Predecessors." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 1988: 73-86.
- Kennan, George. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs*, 1947: 566-582.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Random House Inc., 1989.
- Kissinger, Henry. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957.
- . *World Order*. New York: Penguin Press, 2014.
- Kling, Merle. "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America." In *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?*, edited by James Petras, & Maurice Zeitlin. Greenwich: Fawcett Publication Inc., 1968.
- Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File*. New York: The New Press, 2013.
- Leffler, Melvyn. "The Cold War: What Do We Now Know?" *The American Historical Review*, April 1999: 501-524.

- LeoGrande, William, and Peter Kornbluh. *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015.
- Lippmann, Walter. *The Stakes of Diplomacy*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
- Lowenthal, Abraham, ed. *Exportin Democracy: The United States and Latin America*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
- Mathews, Thomas. "The Caribbean Kaleidoscope." *Current History*, January 1965.
- Mazower, Mark. *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present*. New York: Penguin Books, 2013.
- McDougall, Walter. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997.
- Needler, Martin. "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America." *The American Political Science Review*, September 1966.
- Nixon, Richard. *Six Crises*. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962.
- Olson, Mancur. *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
- Parker, Jason. "Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era." *Diplomatic History*, November 2006: 867-892.
- Pfeiffer, Jack. "Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies Volume III." In *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, by CIA History Staff. Washington: Historical Review Program, 1979.
- Pike, Fredrick. *FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995.
- Rabe, Stephen. "Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism." In *Kennedy's Quest for Victory*, by Thomas Paterson, 105-122. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- . *Eisenhower and Latin America*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
- . *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
- Reid, Michael. *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

- Robinson, William. *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Rohter, Larry. "Author Changes His Mind on 70s Manifesto." *The New York Times*, May 23, 2014.
- Roldan, Mary. *Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia 1946-1953*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.
- Rostow, Walt. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Ryan, Henry. *The Fall of Che Guevara: A Story of Soldiers, Spies, and Diplomats*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Schneider, Ronald. "The U.S. in Latin America." *Current History*, January 1965.
- Schultz, Lars. *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Smith, Peter. *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Smith, Tony. "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s." In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, by Abraham Lowenthal, 71-89. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
- Sorensen, George. "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World?" *Security Dialogue*, September 2001.
- Taylor, Brian, and Roxana Botea. "Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World." *International Studies Review*, 2008: 27-56.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1992.
- Tommasi, Mariano, and Carlos Scartascini. "How (Not) to Produce Effective Policies?: Institutions and Policymaking in Latin America." In *The Oxford Handbook of Latin American Political Economy*, by Javier Santiso, & JI\$ó;Z("óff Dayton-Johnson. New York : Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Westad, Odd. *The Global Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Whitehead, Laurence. "Bolivia since 1930." In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, by Leslie Bethell, 509-583. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Whitehead, Laurence. "The Imposition of Democracy." In *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, by Abraham Lowenthal, 216-242. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

Williams, Mark. *Understanding U.S. Latin American Relations: Theory and History*. New York: Routledge, 2012.