Immigration and Right-Wing Populism in Europe:

Bridging Gaps in the Literature to Better Understand

an Important and Timely Political Phenomenon

by

Ian Kaufman

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Program in International Relations

New York University

May 2020

_____

Professor Mehmet Tabak

_____

Professor Shinasi Rama

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the relationship between immigration and increasing support for right-wing populism in Europe. It builds on the general literature that studies the impact of immigration on this phenomenon and on a paper by Rodrik and Mukand studying the political economy of regime changes (2019). I look at the relationship between changes in electoral support for right-wing populist parties in Europe and changes in fertility rates and foreign-born proportions. I analyze these variables in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. When looking at the data over time I find that there were periods where increased support for right-wing populist parties followed decreases in fertility rates and increases in foreign-born proportions. I run a multiple variable OLS regression on the dataset and I do not find statistically significant results. I conclude that there might be a relationship between immigration and right-wing populism in Europe but that this is not the only causal variable driving this political phenomenon. I suggest combining the immigration and socioeconomic approaches to studying this phenomenon to gain a better understanding of the drivers of right-wing populism in Europe. Future research might study how immigration affects the provision of public goods and how this affects support for right-wing populism while thinking of new ways to measure backing for these movements.

Keywords: Populism, Radical Right-Wing Movements, Right-Wing Populism, European Right, Immigration

Table of Contents

List of Figures

1) Introduction

Right-wing populist movements in Europe used to operate on the political fringe but this has changed in recent decades. European politics since the end of the Second World War had mostly been dominated by "conservatives and Christian democrats, socialists and social democrats, and liberals" (Mudde 2007, p. 1). The main newcomers are green and populist right-wing parties, and the latter have emerged primarily since the 1980's (Mudde 2007, pp. 1-2). It is interesting to think about why populist right-wing parties have started to emerge at this stage in the post-war era and what the consequences of this phenomenon might be.

Populism and right-wing populism are terms that may take on different meanings and it is important to define these concepts within the context of this thesis. Studying populism and right-wing populism without working definitions reduces the potential insight gained from such investigations. Additionally, individuals sometimes weaponize these terms to discredit movements or thinkers. Thus, it is important to clearly classify these terms at the outset of my thesis.

I define populism and right-wing populism based on the ideas put forth by Mudde and Kaltwasser in *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (2017). These individuals have spent considerable time researching populism and I have found that this book elegantly summarizes some of their most important writings on populism. They present a thoughtful study of right-wing variants of populism and their approach aligns with the conceptualizations of right-wing found in important works within the relevant literature.

I will not define right-wing politics due to the scope of this thesis and the complexity of this term. Like populism, the term right-wing means different things to different individuals and it can also be weaponized. Furthermore, the debate on what is and isn't right-wing politics is extensive. Thus, the question arises of whether my study of right-wing populism can be meaningful without defining right-wing politics itself. My contribution is valid because I am using definitions of right-wing populism proposed by established academics. Furthermore, as will be elaborated below, I strongly feel that I am left-wing politics. The absence of left-wing

thinking does not define right-wing ideology but I feel that it is fairly evident that the groups that I study fall into the realm of right-wing politics.

In defining a complex notion such as populism it helps to understand what it is opposed to or what it is not. Indeed, Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that populism need not be a "normative" term and that it can be defined in a scholarly way that can yield insights about modern politics (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 6). Importantly, they position populism within and in opposition to liberal democracy (Ibid., p. 2). Critically, populism is opposed to a pluralist view of politics, one in which "society is divided into a broad variety of partly overlapping social groups with different ideas and social groups" (Ibid., p. 8). Knowing what populism is not, it is then easier to frame what it is which us useful for studying European populism in the social sciences.

I use Mudde and Kaltwasser's theory of populism defined by three key components. Populism claims political legitimacy in representing "the people", this can mean the people as the sovereign or the nation, and it is a key component of populist movements (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, pp. 8-10). Populism juxtaposes "the people" with "the elite". This can be any kind of elite but they are always framed as being immoral and blameworthy for the ills of society (Ibid., pp. 12-13). Finally, populist movements and politicians enforce the "general will" of "the people" to counter "the elite" or the societal issues caused by "the elite" (Ibid., pp. 16-17). It is important to remember that this is not a strict formulation of populism, but rather an ideological and discursive frame that facilitates the study of political movements.

Populism can take on a right-wing variant and there are specific examples from Europe in recent times. For Mudde and Kaltwasser, "adherence to left or right politics is [not] something that defines populism" and populist movements can take on either of these philosophies (2017, p. 9). They present examples of various contemporary right-wing populist movements including factions of the Republican Party in the United States, Attack in Bulgaria, and Jobbik in Hungary (Ibid., pp. 14-16). Furthermore, Dennison & Geddes identify right-wing populist movements in several European Union member states (2019). These have inspired the data collection in this thesis and this is elaborated in later sections. In brief, populism can mold

itself to right-wing ideals, and there is a broad literature supporting the notion that right-wing populism is a real political phenomenon.

Having defined populism and right-wing populism it is key problematize the emergence of these movements in Europe and elsewhere. My main motivation for studying right-wing populism is to better understand what I feel is a dangerous sociopolitical force. Right-wing populism can harm individuals and states on a domestic and international level and the nuance between these arenas is important. Furthermore, there are individuals who see populism as a force for good in modern politics. I present these arguments and explain why they do not disqualify my assumption that right-wing populism is a destructive force.

Right-wing populism can have very negative impacts on a domestic level. European right-wing populism, resurgent after nearly half a century, poses a threat to minority groups and we know this from studying history. Historically, populism within liberal democracies has been conceptualized as an offshoot of fascism working the bounds of democratic institutions (Finchelstein 2018, p. 15). Crucially, this implies that populism can take on an authoritarian form that can easily threaten the rights of minorities (Ibid., p.16). Thus, one of the great threats of modern right-wing populist movements is that they may turn xenophobic rhetoric into practice at the expense of minority groups.

These movements in Europe also threaten to disrupt international organizations, and global political and economic structures. Politically, the rise of right-wing populism could lead to the disintegration or neutralization of supranational political bodies key to international cooperation such as the European Union (Podobnick et al. 2017, p. 10). This could result in economic disruptions throughout the Eurozone which would have serious negative consequences throughout the global economy (Ibid.). The potential global impact of rising right-wing populism in Europe is complex and the downside risks are numerous.

This thesis works with what I refer to as the "new wave of right-wing populism" in Europe. This refers to right-wing populist movements that have emerged since the 1980's. Some of these parties are not very new at all but what groups them is that they have emerged from the post-war centrist status quo (Mudde 2007). It is important to consider then that some

of the movements like AfD in Germany and Vox in Spain are far newer than older movements such as Front National in France. Indeed, the novelty of some of these movements is an inspiration for focusing on the relationship between right-wing populism and immigration in this thesis.

It is important to consider the counterarguments that populist movements can have positive effects, notably on liberal democratic systems. Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that populism can: mobilize marginalized groups, "improve the responsiveness of the political system", and "increase democratic accountability" (2017, p. 83). Mouffe also argues that populism can been used to strengthen democratic systems when it takes on a left-wing variant that opposes right-wing populism (2018). Thus, the main proponents of the benefits of populism argue that these movements can strengthen weakened democratic systems. Importantly, there is a lack of academic support for this in the case of right-wing populism.

Thus, my argument is that right-wing populism is a universally harmful phenomenon. It is clear that right-wing populism in Europe shows disdain for minority and immigrant groups across countries (Rydgren & Arzheimer 2018). There is also little proof that this "new wave right-wing populism" has strengthened democratic systems in any meaningful way like Mouffe, and Mudde & Kaltwasser suggest. Thus, this thesis studies right-wing populism with the understanding that it can limit democratization and destabilize international cooperation while also threatening the civil rights and wellbeing of minority groups.

This thesis aims to better understand why right-wing populist movements are emerging in Europe. Knowledge of European history in the 19th and early 20th century is helpful but insufficient in this endeavor. Thus, academics have recently made a considerable effort to study right-wing populism in its newest variant. This, in part, stems from a desire to avoid the calamities of the 1930s and 1940s (Rydgren & Arzheimer 2018, p. 143). It is also driven by new developments in right-wing populism in Europe compared to previous iterations (Ibid.). The relatively newfound interest in this topic has yielded a large body of literature spanning various disciplines and approaches.

There are many different approaches to the study of right-wing populism in the political science literature. Indeed, this broad body of knowledge expands our understanding of this phenomenon but sometimes the different viewpoints talk past one another. This complicates the goal of finding casual relationships when studying contemporary right-wing populism in Europe. Thus, one goal of this thesis is to bridge intellectual gaps by bring authors with differing opinions into dialogue with one another.

I categorize the literature reviewed in this thesis based on common themes. There may be disagreement on the categories I have chosen or how I have sorted the works. I do not claim to have created a perfect catalogue of political science works on right-wing populism. The value of grouping the literature in this way lies in the insights that emerge. I find that there are gaps between these approaches and that these present opportunities to advance our knowledge of right-wing populism.

This thesis reviews what I conceptualize to be the immigration, political, and socioeconomic approaches to European right-wing populism in the literature. Works from what I call the political approach are embodied by a focus on the formal and informal political structures found within countries. The works from the socioeconomic approach all focus on predicting support for right-wing populism based on economic trends or social categorizations. The immigration approach focuses on the link between increased immigration and increased support for right-wing populism. Importantly, there were overlaps in works between the approaches and discovering this is an important finding of this thesis.

Each approach to the topic of right-wing populism shows limitations. I find that what I classify as political approaches often fail to yield tangible independent variables while making errant predictions. In turn, the socioeconomic approach yields valuable insights but fails to explain the most recent right-wing populist surges in Spain and Germany. The immigration approach provides an independent variable that can more easily be studied while showing potential in explaining the more recent waves of right-wing populism in Europe. Importantly, the immigration approach also has limitations and this will be discussed in more detail in the thesis.

Important aspects of the socioeconomic approach come very close to the diagnosis of the immigration approach. Studying the socioeconomic causes of right-wing populism in Europe is particularly popular but I feel that this does approach does not fully explain the phenomenon. Importantly, the socioeconomic approach to right-wing populism in Europe makes a convincing argument up to a point. The claim that the socioeconomic dislocations of globalization have contributed to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe is empirically and theoretically valid. Yet this approach fails to explain the rise of AfD in Germany and Vox in Spain. These right-wing populist parties emerged well after the onset of economic globalization but soon after the influx of refugees into Europe from Africa and Western Asia (Dilling 2018, p. 84, Vampa 2020, p. 1). This gives credence to the notion that immigration is impacting right-wing populism in Europe. Importantly however, the immigration approach is limited in being able to explain the rise of right-wing populism in countries with low rates of immigration.

I do not build on the political approach in studying right-wing populism and it is important to consider arguments that may arise. Some might argue that the political structure of parties and countries is critical in understanding political movements. This is clearly an important part of the study of any political movement. However, the fact that right-wing populist movements have emerged in countries with varying political structures, and that these movements have different organizational structures themselves, means that we must look at other trends or criteria that are common in the environments where right-wing populist movements have emerged.

The research aim of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on right-wing populism by studying immigration which is an underrepresented and timely causal factor. I will analyze the relationship between increased immigration and right-wing populism in Europe. The research question guiding this thesis is the following one. How, and to what extent do increases in immigration drive support for right-wing populist movements in Europe? I will argue that this relationship is complex and multifaceted, and that studying this question will contribute to a better understanding of the causes of right-wing populism in Europe.

The empirical approach of this thesis is inspired by the work of Rodrik and Mukand (2019). This work aims to explain why countries are more likely to adopt a political structure resembling "electoral democracy" than "liberal democracy" (Ibid.). A key difference between the former and the latter is the provision, or lack, of civil rights for minority groups by the state. Rodrik and Mukand present a theoretical game where society transitions away from an ideal type resembling older style autocracies to one that may be democratic or authoritarian. I use their model to better understand how and why a society might go from protecting the civil rights of minorities to not doing while linking this to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe.

Rodrik and Mukand's model provides an interesting prediction linking demographic changes and support for political movements that might limit civil rights. Under certain assumptions, there will be an incentive for the majority group and the elites in a society to prefer a system with limited civil rights as the majority group shrinks as a societal percentage relative to a minority group. In the real world the model might predict that right-wing populist groups would receive more support as immigration increases, assuming this decreases the societal proportion of the majority. Thus, Rodrik and Mukand's model guides the analytical portion of this thesis which fits within the immigration approach to right-wing populism.

The data is taken from various European countries and their respective right-wing populist parties. The dependent variable is the change in electoral support for right-wing populist parties between election years in the lower chamber of the respective parliament. The independent variables are the percentage of society that is foreign born, and the fertility rate. The countries studied are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom. The demographic data was taken from the OECD and the electoral data was compiled from various political databases.

I present the data for each country over time while also regressing the dependent variable on the independent variables using a simple multiple OLS regression. Visualizing the data for each country over time displays interesting trends. The prediction from Rodrik and Mukand's model is visible for some periods in most countries but the opposite is true at other times. I believe this suggests that Rodrik and Mukand's prediction explains some part of the rise

of right-wing populism in Europe but that other factors are clearly at play as well. The regression suggests the opposite of the prediction from Rodrik and Mukand's model but the results are not statistically significant.

The empirical portion of this thesis is limited by the number of observations available to be studied which is the product of two problems. Firstly, there I was not able to gather enough immigration data for other relevant European countries that would be interesting to study such as Italy or Poland. Secondly, my measurement of support for right-wing populist movements is limited by the fact that elections do not occur often and that some of these movement have recently emerged. Thus, the dataset I use is limited and the number of observations is relatively small.

Numerous improvements can be made to engage in a more comprehensive study of right-wing populism in Europe. First, I could find a different way to measure support for right-wing populism that would yield more observations and allow me to study additional countries in the dataset. Second, I could find a different way to measure changes in immigration that would yield more observations and enlarge the dataset. These are important next steps to take in studying the relationship between immigration and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe.

One important contribution made in this thesis is the identification of a gap in the literature studying right-wing populism in Europe. The socioeconomic approach makes a convincing and comprehensive argument that effectively explains the rise of right-wing populism until the rise of AfD in Germany and Vox in Spain. In turn, the immigration approach sheds light on these cases but is limited in circumstances where right-wing populism emerged from countries that have a lower foreign-born proportion of the population. I conclude that each approach alone is limited in predicting the rise of right-wing populism.

Thus, another important contribution is my suggestion of linking the immigration and the socioeconomic approach. This makes sense because each approach has some predictive capacity but is limited in certain cases. Additionally, it makes conceptual sense that demographic changes stemming from immigration could impact socioeconomic factors if, for instance, this meant less welfare would be given to majority native groups. I find that the gap

between the approaches is an invitation to conceptualize and investigate the relationship between immigration and socioeconomics in countries where right-wing populism has gained support.

This thesis continues with a literature review section surveying different approaches to studying the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. Following that I present the data and research design followed by a findings and discussion section. The thesis ends with a conclusion section that summarizes the thesis and discusses potential next steps in this line of research.

2) Literature Review: Different Approaches to Studying the Rise of Right-Wing Populist Movements in Europe?

This section reviews different approaches to studying the drivers of right-wing populist movements in Europe. Studying this phenomenon is important because these movements present a challenge the centrist status quo that has dominated European politics in the postwar era. Serious economic and political disruptions could emerge on an international scale if European right-wing populist movements attain political power (Podobnick et al 2017, p. 10).

There is a large and diverse body of literature studying this political phenomenon. In the literature review I split the works into three different approaches. There is the political approach, the socioeconomic approach, and the immigration approach. These are not formal schools of thought and I divide them in this way due to similarities that I found in the literature. Each approach studies similar causal variables internally if not the same one. Each approach also prioritizes a certain explanation of what drives the rise of right-wing populism. One might argue that these classifications are insufficient in their formality and possibly ambiguous. I believe that separating the literature in this fashion helps to catalogue thinking on right-wing populism, it also serves to find gaps in thinking about right-wing populism.

I will summarize and analyze key works from each approach while presenting an argument for the strongest approach. This section is broken down into thematically organized subsections followed by a concluding subsection and an analysis of the implications for my

methodology. I analyze the merits and shortcomings of each approach in the respective subsection and this serves to compare each philosophy on a larger scale.

I argue that studying the link between immigration and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe is the most convincing approach. The immigration approach is the strongest because it presents a quantifiable independent variable and it covers the weaknesses of the socioeconomic approach. Importantly, the immigration approach to right-wing populism may not do a good job of explaining the rise of these movements in countries where the foreign-born proportion of the population is relatively lower. Still, with the rise of right-wing populism in Germany and Spain it seems like an interesting approach that may shed light on the dynamics driving right-wing populism.

The political approach to this topic is interesting but limited. It focuses excessively on the environments in which right-wing populist parties emerge as opposed to the reasons why they gain support. The works in what I call the political approach lack a tangible independent variable of study which is something that the immigration approach provides. The political approach provides a narrative background explaining how these movements gain support without convincingly explaining why. The political approach is worth studying because it contextualizes the rise of right-wing populism in Europe even if it is not the best theoretical avenue for further research.

The socioeconomic approach is also interesting in that it presents a coherent narrative and a tangible independent variable. However, it lacks the ability to explain the rise of right-wing populism in countries such as Spain and Germany, where socioeconomic disruptions have been occurring for several decades before the rise of right-wing populism. The fact that right-wing populist movements emerged in these countries after the migrant crisis suggests that the immigration approach might cover the blind spots of the socioeconomic approach.

This literature review makes an important contribution in finding gaps in the relevant literature. I suggest that the immigration approach may illuminate the causes of right-wing populism in cases where the socioeconomic approach cannot and vice-versa. Here it is important to consider once again that these are not specific schools of thought and that they

are groupings made on my discretion. Nevertheless, identifying gaps between different scholarly works on the rise of right-wing populism is productive because new research can aim to bridge these divides.

Additionally, this section serves to ground my thesis within an academic discussion while narrowing down the causal variable to be studied. This thesis aims to contribute to the scholarship on the relationship between the rise of right-wing populism and immigration into Europe with the latter being the proposed causal variable. Thus, this review serves to narrow my approach to the study of right-wing populism while clarifying how I aim to contribute to this academic discussion.

2.1) The Political Approach

In this subsection I review the literature studying the political determinants of right-wing populism in Europe. Authors employing this philosophy often apply structural, agential, or supply vs. demand frameworks in studying the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. Each work that I review in this section falls short in one of three ways. Some of the authors have made unsuccessful predictions. Others discuss right-wing populism in Europe without presenting a causal variable to study. The rest identify aspects of political movements that are necessary but insufficient to predict the rise of right-wing populism. Nevertheless, an understanding of this academic approach to the study of European right-wing populism is helpful in developing a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. Ultimately, this approach is limited in its predictive capabilities while also being difficult to replicate or improve upon.

Zaslove argues that the electoral success of right-wing populist parties in Europe is determined by their ability to remain politically engaged outside of government, control their policy agenda, and maintain party organization (2012, p. 421). Zaslove focuses on three successes and one failure case of right-wing populist parties emerging in Europe. His failure case is Austria but the Austrian Freedom Party has grown more popular since the publication of the paper. While Zaslove presents independent variables that can be replicated, his argument has limited predictive capability due to its failure in forecasting Austrian political trends.

In his survey of European politics, Greven argues that right-wing populist movements have found electoral success by providing a "protest vote" for citizens. Greven suggests that "working-class support of right-wing populism might at this point be more an expression of protest" given that the economic policies of these parties do not align with traditional worker interests (2016, p. 6). This argument is limited however because working-class voters have supported conservative economic policies in the past (Arzheimer 2013, p. 3). Thus, the argument that right-wing populist movements are driven by protest votes is limited by Greven's economic evidence.

In studying the supply and demand for populism in Europe, Kattago argues that an agential approach is important in understanding the rise of the right-wing variant (2019). To Kattago, a "charismatic leader" is crucial for the success of right-wing populist movements because they "voice [the] concerns" of voters and mobilize political support (2019, pp. 1, 28). However, left-wing and non-populist movements have had charismatic leaders in the past, as in the case of Hugo Chávez (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, pp. 9, 64). While a charismatic leader may be a necessary component of right-wing populism, it is insufficient in explaining or predicting this phenomenon.

Van Kessel focuses on the agency of populist right-wing parties in Europe, thus taking a supply side approach to this analysis (2013). The author argues that successful right-wing populist parties must have persuasive leaders, progressively moderated rhetoric over time, an anti-establishment image once in power, and must be internally cohesive (2013, p. 180). The counterargument to Van Kessel is the same as the one to Kattago's work. Non-populist or non-right-wing movements have displayed these characteristics, so while necessary, they are insufficient in explaining increased support for right-wing populism in Europe.

Halikiopolou also studies the agency of populist right-wing parties in Europe in the context of the supply side of populism (2019). In studying the AfD in Germany and the FN in France she concludes that "that the adoption of a predominantly civic nationalist rhetoric" broadly legitimizes the political appeal of these right-wing populist movements (Halikipolou 2019, p. 1). Thus, Halikiopolou explains how these movements can capture larger swaths of

political support than might be otherwise thought. This sheds light on the political strategies of right-wing populist movements but ultimately does not identify a causal variable.

Erlingsson et al. study the impact of party organization on support for right-wing populist movements (2012). Focusing on the supply side of populism, they find that support for the Sweden Democrats fared better in elections when they had "a local organizational presence in Swedish municipalities" (Erlingson et al 2012, p. 817). They make a valid empirical argument in that supply side factors determined the success of the Sweden Democrats. While valid in the Swedish case, they do not replicate this study in other countries and this limits the paper.

Having analyzed the political literature on the rise of right-wing populism in Europe I find that the works display one of three shortcomings. Zaslove (2012), Halikopolou (2019), and Erlingsson et al. (2012) have either made predictions that aren't supported by newer data or have failed to present a causal variable in the study of right-wing populism in Europe. In turn, Greven (2016), Kattago (2019), and Van Kessel (2013) identify drivers across various right-wing populist movements but these variables can also be applied to left-wing and non-populist movements and lack predictive potential.

2.2) The Socioeconomic Approach

In this subsection I review important contributions to the literature on the socioeconomic causes of right-wing populism in Europe. These works focus on the economic disruptions of globalization or the socioeconomic predictors of right-wing votes. These papers present a coherent and interesting narrative in thinking about how macroeconomic and sociological trends have affected populist right-wing voters. This academic approach has limited predictive capability because these factors were present in Europe for some time before rise of right-wing populist movements. Additionally, while right-wing populist movements might overperform in some sectors of society, they do not have a monopoly on any given demographic group

Arzheimer and Carter argue that socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, and economic status are strong predictors of extremist right-wing votes (2006). They find that "being male, young...and a manual worker significantly raised the probability" of supporting

"the extreme right" (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, p. 439). The authors do not explain why these sociodemographic groups vote for the radical right and it is important to consider that populist right-wing movements are not exclusively supported by these groups. For example, right-wing populism in Eastern Europe tends to find more support from older voters (Greven 2016, p.6). Thus, this paper is limited in explaining the causal factors of right-wing populism in Europe.

Capelos and Katsanidou take a novel approach by presenting a framework linking support for right-wing populist movements in Europe to opposition to economic change. For Capelos and Katsanidou, globalization activates "conservation values and an aversion to what is new" and drives support for right-wing populism (2018, p. 1272). This paper lacks an ability to explain the rise of right-wing populist groups in Spain and Germany emerging decades after the start of economic disruptions stemming from globalization. The AfD, a German radical right-wing party, and Vox, a Spanish right-wing populist party, both emerged decades after the start of "globalization" (Dilling 2018, p. 84, Vampa 2020, p. 1). Thus, these "conservation values" seem limited in their ability to predict support for right-wing populism.

Gidron and Hall study the increase in support for right-wing populism amongst working class men in the United States and Europe (2017). They argue that discomfort with economic changes has contributed to the rise of right-wing populism. While conceding that socioeconomic factors are not the only drivers, they argue that "long term economic and cultural developments might combine to impinge on partisan choices" (Gidron and Hall 2017, p. 77). The counterargument to Gidron and Hall's work is like the one for Capelos and Katsanidou. There are several cases in Europe where right-wing populist movements began to gain support when economic dislocations from globalization had been present for some time.

Rodrik ultimately argues that the underlying driver of modern populism, whether right or left-wing, is socioeconomic in nature (2018, p. 25). He suggests that the factors contributing to support for populism are tied to economic disruptions caused by globalization (Ibid., p. 13). Rodrik concedes the importance of identity cleavages in the case of right-wing populism but still finds economics to be the main cause of populist movements at large (2018). The same issue is found with Rodrik's work as with Gidron and Hall's, and Capelos and Katsanidou's.

I claim that the socioeconomic approaches to right-wing populism suffer from one of two shortcomings. In the case of Arzheimer and Carter (2006), the authors argue that certain demographic traits predict right-wing populist voting patterns. However, right-wing populist groups do not have a political monopoly on young, male, manual workers. Thus, the claim that these sociodemographic factors drive support for right-wing populism is unconvincing. In turn, Capelos and Katsanidou (2018), Gidron and Hall (2017), and Rodrik (2018) all argue that economic disruptions stemming from globalization are the key drivers of right-wing populism. This approach fails to explain the rise of right-wing populism in countries such as Germany and Spain where right-wing populism arose well after the emergence of these disruption and shortly after the migrant crisis.

2.3) The Immigration Approach

In this subsection I review important contributions to the literature studying the causal impact of immigration on support for right-wing populism in Europe. There is an important debate within this body on whether supporters of right-wing populism are xenophobic or if they prioritize immigration issues. I avoid taking sides in this debate and argue that there is considerable value in approaching the topic of right-wing populism with regards to immigration to Europe. Indeed, it is outside the research scope of this thesis to determine how people perceive immigration. It is crucial however to consider the potentially important causal relationship between immigration and support for right-wing populism in Europe.

Backlund and Jungar argue that populist right-wing parties in Europe better represent the anti-immigration and anti-EU views of voters than their social views (2020). Using survey data, the paper analyzes party-voter congruence in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. One might interpret the findings to support the notion that populist right-wing parties are driven by protest votes more so than anti-immigrant sentiment. I believe the findings imply that populist right wing voters mobilize against immigration to such an extent that they are willing to compromise their social preferences.

Dennison and Geddes argue that increased support for right-wing anti-immigration parties in Europe is due to the rising salience of immigration issues rather than opposition to immigration outright (2019). They conclude that "the vote share of anti-immigration parties rises and falls…with the salience of immigration" (Dennison and Geddes 2019, p. 115). Regardless of how supporters of right-wing populism perceive immigration, it is an important finding that immigration is correlated with the rise of populist right-wing movements in Europe.

Like Dennison and Geddes, Grindheim argues that the salience of immigration is an important factor in the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe (2019, p. 769). To him this is tied to the notion that right-wing populist parties are conduits for protest votes. Importantly however, immigration salience is key because it is one of the protest grievances (Grindheim 2019). Like in the previous article, the issue of salience is irrelevant to our research question. What is valuable here is the finding that immigration is in some way tied to the rise of right-wing populism.

Ivarsflaten approaches the link between immigration and right-wing populism by employing a grievance mobilization model (2008). The author argues that immigration directly caused increased support for right-wing populism because it "was consistently mobilized by all successful populist right parties" in the European cases that she studied (Ivarsflaten 2008, p. 19). This finding is important because it directly links immigration grievances with right-wing populism. This work is convincing because it studies immigration as a causal factor around the time that right-wing populist parties began to gain support.

Podobnick et al. also approach the relationship between immigration and right-wing populism by studying immigration stocks and flows. They share the finding that the increase in right-wing populist support has outpaced the increase in immigration in their countries of study (Podobnick, et al. 2017, p. 1). Thus, their work argues that outright opposition to immigration is linked to increased support for right wing populist parties in Europe (2017). This source is convincing because it studies immigration trends and support for right-wing populist in a convincing time period much like Ivarsflaten.

In a more recent work, Arzheimer explains the importance of immigration when studying the rise of right-wing populism in Europe (Rydgren & Arzheimer 2018). Importantly, he argues that future research should accept that "radical right mobilization is now the rule rather than the exception" (Ibid., p. 1). After surveying the literature on right-wing populism Arzheimer concludes that "there can be very little doubt" about immigration "contributing to radical right support" (Ibid., p. 17). Arzheimer's argument is convincing because he evaluates various approaches to studying right wing populism in different contexts and provides a comprehensive analysis.

While avoiding the debate on how immigration is perceived, I argue that this approach makes a valid link between immigration and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. Backlund and Jungar (2020), Dennison and Geddes (2019), Grindheim (2019), Ivarsflaten (2008), and Podobnick et al. (2017) clearly present a dynamic in which right-wing populist support increases after or as a result of increased immigration. In his most recent work studying the rise of right-wing populism, Arzheimer concludes that immigration is central to this phenomenon (Rydrgren & Arzheimer 2018). This is fundamental given that Arzheimer is well versed in the literature on right-wing populism and that this work surveyed a plethora of different academic approaches studying this trend. The immigration approach is more relevant than the political one given that it presents a tangible causal variable and it also compensates for the logical gap presented by the socioeconomic approach to right-wing populism.

It is important to consider the limitations of the immigration approach in studying the rise of right-wing populism. Some countries, such as Hungary for instance, have a significantly lower foreign-born proportion of the population compared to other countries in the European Union (OECD 2018). Hungary is also governed by what academics consider to be right-wing populist party in Jobbik (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). Thus, there are cases where the immigration approach seems to be limited in predicting right-wing populism. Like in the case of the socioeconomic approach, I have identified a gap in the literature which is a valuable finding.

2.4) Immigration over Politics and Socioeconomics

This section has established the approach that my thesis will build on in studying the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. I have provided an overview of the political, economic, and immigration approaches in the study of right-wing populism. I have highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each while making the argument for following the immigration approach.

The immigration approach to the study of right-wing populism provides a quantifiable independent variable while filling in an important gap in the socioeconomic approach. The political approaches to right-wing populism often lack a clear explanatory variable while making predictions that did not materialize. The socioeconomic approach presents an interesting and coherent narrative in the study of right-wing populism. Nevertheless, the independent variable in this approach, economic change, fails to explain the rise of right-wing populism in cases such as Spain and Germany. Thus, the strengths of the immigration approach to right-wing populism cover key theoretical and empirical blind spots in the socioeconomic and political approaches.

This section has made an important contribution in identifying theoretical gaps in the literature. The socioeconomic approach fails to explain right-wing populism in Germany and Spain where economic globalization would have had disruptive effects well before the rise of AfD and Vox. The immigration approach is limited in explaining cases such as Hungary where the foreign-born population is relatively low compared to other European countries. This finding, combined with my empirical results, leads me to the conclusion that future research should aim to bridge the gap between the socioeconomic and immigration approach.

I believe that studying the link between immigration and right-wing populism is valid even though this approach is limited in some cases. I posit that building off the immigration approach to right-wing populism can shed light on the newest iterations of right-wing populism, such as those in Germany and Spain. Even if those insights can't inform the study of right-wing populism in countries like Hungary, it would contribute to the overall understanding of a complex phenomenon.

This thesis will analyze demographic data to better understand the relationship between immigration and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. In this way, it builds on the

academic foundation laid by the immigration approach while aiming to add to the literature. The model inspiring my analysis is presented in the next section, as well as the data and the cases that will be studied.

3) Data and Research Design

This section presents the research design that will be used in the empirical section of my thesis while explaining the theoretical underpinnings. I first explain the model put forward by Rodrik and Mukand in *The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy* and explain (2019). Then I illuminate how I will test the predictions of the model empirically and what data will be used. Finally, I discuss why I selected the countries and parties that are studied in this thesis.

I leverage a key prediction from the model presented *The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy* to provide a practical and theoretical explanation for my methodology (Rodrik and Mukand 2019). Their paper aims to explain why the political structure popularly understood liberal democracy is not more prevalent throughout the world. Under certain assumptions, their model suggests that voters from majority groups will prefer political structures that limit civil rights when minority populations are growing. Thus, I aim to test this dynamic using demographic and electoral data from various European countries. In this process I present a simple multiple variable OLS regression model based on Rodrik and Mukand's work that aims to test the relationship between immigration and increased support for right-wing populism in Europe.

Rodrik and Mukand's model has an important implication that is consistent with the dynamic identified by the immigration approach to right-wing populism. Here, increased immigration might correspond to a decrease in the societal proportion of a majority group. When this happens in what they call a liberal democracy, and under certain conditions, their model predicts that societies could begin to limit civil rights for minority groups. I believe that the real-world equivalent of this dynamic is one where increased support for anti-immigrant right-wing populist movements results from increased immigration. Thus, Rodrik and Mukand's model is a useful theoretical and empirical tool for thinking about the relationship between immigration and right-wing populism.

3.1) An Overview of Rodrik and Mukand's Model

Rodrik and Mukand develop "a taxonomy of political regimes" in The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy where society is broken down into three groups (2019, p. 1). An economic elite that owns more than half of economic output before taxes, a majority group comprising over half the non-elite population, and a minority group that comprises the rest of society. These groups are divided by two societal cleavages. The income cleavage separates the elite from the rest of society on economic terms and the identity cleavage distinguishes the majority from the minority due to ideological, ethnic, religious, or other differences. Importantly, the elite and the majority can share an identity, which is often the case in the countries that I study in the next section.

The model considers three kinds of rights: property rights, political rights, and civil rights. In turn, it uses utility functions for each group to present a game played by all three. It shows how an autocratic society can transition to different types of democratic or non-democratic political systems depending on different cleavages, different probabilities of non-elites mounting successful revolutions, ex ante economic inequality, public goods preferences, and the need, or lack thereof, for the majority to ally with the minority to change the status quo government.

The utility functions are built for each group based on combinations of the following variables: pre-tax income, relative income distribution, the deadweight loss of redistribution, the proportion of the non-elite population that is the majority group, and the preferred and observed level of some public good provided by the state. Using the model, their paper shows how it is more likely for a society transitioning away from an autocratic system to adopt a democratic system that does not respect civil rights for minorities than one that does (Rodrik and Mukand 2019).

Rodrik and Mukand aim to explain the prevalence of democratic systems that lack broad civil rights. However, this thesis focuses on how their model can help explain the relationship between perceived demographic decline and a transition from a democratic system protecting all three aforementioned rights to one that does not protect civil rights. In other words, the

empirical section of this thesis applies their model to "liberal democracies" facing increased immigration and rising support for right-wing populist movements.

Unlike the game presented by Rodrik and Mukand, this thesis starts with a society where the state protects property, civil, and political rights. I also assume that there is a considerable amount of economic inequality and that the elite share an identity with the majority. Importantly, this thesis assumes that the majority and the elite have sufficient political power to force a transition to a political system where civil rights may be neglected. As is shown later, these conditions are critical for having the model predict a shift to "illiberal" democracy from "liberal" democracy when the minority group is growing.

This section studies Rodrik and Mukand's model to understand how they explain the erosion of civil rights for minority groups when the minority population grows and the majority population shrinks. With an understanding of this trend, I present a theoretical justification for studying the relationship between immigration and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. The following sections dig deeper into the model and explain the mechanical process by which the majority and the elite are incentivized to limit civil rights for minority groups when the latter are growing as a relative proportion of society.

3.2) Model Description

This section defines and explains the model and variables within it to facilitate an understanding of the equations derived from the model's setup. The lower-case upsilon represents the utility or payoff for a certain group in a certain setting. The subscripts reflect the societal groups: e for elites, b for the minority group, and a for the majority group. The superscripts LD stands for Liberal Democracy and ED stands for Electoral Democracy. Liberal Democracy represents a system where property rights, political rights, and civil rights are protected by the state. Electoral Democracy reflects a system where only political and property rights are protected. The deadweight loss parameter for redistribution by the state is represented by γ. Economic inequality is modeled by α, which reflects the elites' pre-transfer income and $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$. Importantly, the non-elite share of pre-transfer income is $(1 - \alpha)$. The public good that is provided by the state

is represented by $\bar{\theta}$ when there is a liberal democracy, θ_e is the preferred public good of the elite, θ_b is the preferred public good of the minority, and θ_a is the preferred public good of the majority. Importantly, when $\theta_e = \theta_a$ and $\theta_e \gg \theta_b$, the elite and the majority share an identity and there is an identity cleavage between the elites and the majority, and the minority.

It is important to consider how the political voice of the minority group is diminished in an electoral democracy compared to a liberal democracy within the model. In a liberal democracy $\bar{\theta} = n + (1-n)\theta_b$ where n is the proportion of the non-elite population that is in the majority group and (1– n) is the proportion that is in the minority group. Thus, the public good provided by the state in a liberal democracy is a function of the relative size of the majority group. This implies that "the type of public good provided lies somewhere between the ideal types of the majority and minority" in a liberal democracy (Rodrik and Mukand, 2019, 15). Additionally, in an electoral democracy the majority group sets the public good to the quantity of their choice which is θ_a. θ_b represents the civil rights component of the public good because a minority group would always want to have protection guaranteed by the state and the model assumes the majority is at best indifferent about this.

Because minorities have a say in political processes in liberal democracies, their societal proportion directly affects how "much" civil rights are provided to them. Herein lies the relevance of the model to the research question of my thesis. As the relative size of the majority falls, the public good changes in a liberal democracy according to the desires of the minority. When there is an electoral democracy the majority sets the public good to their preferred level ignoring the preferences of the minority. Below I study how this dynamic might incentivize a societal transition from a liberal democracy to an electoral democracy and the relevant utility functions are presented in the following figure.

$$u_e^{LD} = \alpha - \frac{(2\alpha - 1)\alpha}{(2 - \bar{\theta})\gamma} + \frac{3 - 2\bar{\theta} - |\theta_e - \bar{\theta}|\alpha^2}{2\gamma(2 - \bar{\theta})^2}. \qquad u_a^{LD} = (1 - \alpha) + \frac{\alpha^2}{2\gamma(2 - \bar{\theta})}.$$

$$u_b^{LD} = (1 - \alpha) + [\frac{3 - 3\bar{\theta} + \theta_b}{(2 - \bar{\theta})}]\frac{\alpha^2}{2\gamma(2 - \bar{\theta})}. \qquad u_a^{ED} = (1 - \alpha) + \frac{1}{2\gamma}\alpha^2,$$

$$u_e^{ED} = \alpha - (2\alpha - 1)\frac{\alpha}{\gamma} + \frac{\theta_e}{2\gamma}\alpha^2;$$

$$u_b^{ED} = (1 - \alpha) + \frac{\theta_b}{2\gamma}\alpha^2.$$

Fig. 1 – Equations (1)

3.3) Model Predictions

I aim to understand how a decreasing societal proportion of the majority group might affect utilities for the majority and the elites when inequality is moderately high and there is an identity cleavage. First, I fix the deadweight loss parameter at γ = 2 like Rodrik and Mukand (2019, 21). I represent a large identity cleavage by setting θ_b = 0.1 and θ_e = θ_a = 1, also like Rodrik and Mukand (Ibid.). I then assume an inequality value where α = 0.7. These model specifications imply that the provision of public goods in a liberal democracy will be determined by $\bar{\theta} = n + (1 - n)\theta_b$ = n + 0.1 − 0.1n = 0.9n + 0.1. This yields the utility functions presented in the box below. The corresponding utilities are also presented with respect to n in the graph under it. Importantly, the public good, and thus the utility is fixed in an electoral democracy yielding constant utility. I ignore the utility for the minority groups because of the previous assumption that the majority and the elite have enough political power to make political changes on their own.

$$\mu_e^{LD} = (0.7) - \frac{0.98}{(4.2 - 1.8n)} + \frac{1.6 - |1.1 - 0.9n|(0.49)}{4(2.1 - 0.9n)^2} \quad \mu_a^{LD} = (0.3) + \frac{0.49}{(8.4 - 3.6n)} \quad \mu_e^{ED} = 0.682 \quad \mu_a^{ED} = 0.4225$$

Fig. 2 – Equations (2)

Fig. 3 – Utility Graph

Under these conditions, the model predicts that the majority will always prefer an electoral democracy and that the elites will prefer an electoral democracy for smaller values of n when there is a shared identity, there is an identity cleavage with the minority, and inequality is relatively high. Thus, the majority will always prefer a political system with restricted civil rights for the minority group, and the elite will also have this preference when they share an identity with the majority and they are a smaller proportion of society. Applying the model to modern politics fits well with the prediction of the immigration approach, that increased migrant inflows have an impact on increased support for right-wing populist movements. This is a static analysis of the model but it intuitively tells us that the perception of demographic decline for the majority could incentivize the move from a society that protects civil rights to one that does not.

The societal proportions of the majority and the minority groups is a critical factor affecting the provision of the public good in this model. As n falls in a liberal democracy, the public good gets closer to the preference of the minority. At the same time, it moves away from the preference of the majority, and the elite when they share an identity. This captures the notion that minority groups have a political voice in liberal democracies and that this is

30

exercised in the determination of the public good provided. Intuitively, when the minority grows they will be able to attain more of the public good that they want, which in this case is civil rights. Importantly, when the minority group does not have a political voice and there is an identity cleavage, the public good is decided by the majority and thus civil rights can be restricted according to the preference of the majority group.

Using the same parameter specification as the example above we can explore how the provided public good changes when the majority proportion falls or will be perceived to fall in each period by some value δ. In this case, as the share of the majority in society evolves through time to some distant period k then $\bar{\theta} = n\delta^k + \theta_b - \theta_b n\delta^k \rightarrow \bar{\theta} \sim \theta_b$

Period 1 $\bar{\theta}$	Period 2 $\bar{\theta}$	Period 3 $\bar{\theta}$	Period 4 $\bar{\theta}$
$\bar{\theta}$ $= n + (1 - n)\theta_b$	$\bar{\theta} = n\delta + (1 - n\delta)\theta_b$	$\bar{\theta}$ $= n\delta^2 + (1 - n\delta^2)\theta_b$	$\bar{\theta} = n\delta^3 + (1 - n\delta^3)\theta_b$

Thus:

Period 1 $\bar{\theta}$	Period 2 $\bar{\theta}$	Period 3 $\bar{\theta}$	Period 4 $\bar{\theta}$
$\bar{\theta}$ $= n + \theta_b - \theta_b n$	$\bar{\theta} = n\delta + \theta_b - \theta_b n\delta$	$\bar{\theta} = n\delta^2 + \theta_b - \theta_b n\delta^2$	$\bar{\theta} = n\delta^3 + \theta_b - \theta_b n\delta^3$

Fig. 4 – Public Good Over Time

As the societal share of the majority group falls, the supplied public good tends to the one that the minority prefers. In this scenario, the minority becomes the new majority and sets the provision of the public good to their preferred level. Using the model in this way helps us think about the preferences of each group in a liberal democracy versus an electoral democracy when the majority group is shrinking. Given the identity cleavage, the shrinking of the majority group would result in a less preferable public good for the majority compared to when the majority had a larger societal proportion or to the alternative in an electoral democracy.

Thus, given our assumptions, the model predicts that the majority group in a society will always prefer an "electoral democracy" over a "liberal democracy" and that the elite will prefer "electoral democracy" as the majority proportion falls. In the real world this would mean that when the majority group is falling as a share of society, both them and the elites would prefer to limit civil rights. In this paper, the "electoral democracy" represents a political structure where the civil rights of minority groups are unprotected. In turn, "liberal democracy" represents a political system where the civil rights of minority groups are protected, and where they are more protected as they grow as a proportion of society. In practice, this could represent a European country reacting to increased immigration and demographic decline by turning to right-wing populism. This idea will be studied more closely in the following sections of my thesis.

It is interesting to consider the public good within Rodrik and Mukand's model in different contexts. The majority ultimately prefer an "electoral democracy" over a "liberal democracy" when they fall as a proportion of the population because they have less control over the public good. In this model the public good represents the provision of civil rights in the case of the preferences of the minority. I believe that it could also be thought of as public goods provided by the state more generally.

Reconceptualizing the public good within Rodrik and Mukand's model in socioeconomic terms could bridge gaps in the literature and bring new insights. While I test the public good purely in relation to civil rights for minorities, public goods could represent provisions from the state more generally. Perhaps the public good could be thought of as welfare spending or general economic support from the state. This perspective would be interesting because it would link immigration to socioeconomic variables. I do not explore this in this thesis, but it could be a path to illuminate the gaps in the literature that I have found.

3.4) Data and Regression

This thesis will test the prediction extrapolated from Rodrik and Mukand's model that a fall in the proportion in the majority population will incentivize the majority to choose electoral

democracy. In practice this means that voters might support populist right-wing groups that aim to limit immigration or reduce civil rights for minority groups. In this subsection I will present my methodological approach to studying this phenomenon and the data that I will use.

The votes received by right-wing populist parties will serve as a proxy for the societal preference of electoral democracy over liberal democracy as these parties generally aim to limit immigration and restrict the rights of immigrants. Dennison and Geddes consider the following movements to be populist right-wing parties and I will use their electoral histories this section (Dennison and Geddes 2019). They are Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austria), Vlaams Belang formerly known as Vlaams Blok (Belgium), Dansk Folkpartei (Denmark), Rassemblement national formerly known as Front National (France), Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei formerly known as Aktiounskomitee fir Demokratie an Rentengerechtigkeet (Luxembourg), voor Vrijheid en Democratie formerly known as Partij voor de Vrijheid (Netherlands), Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden) and Brexit Party formerly known as the United Kingdom Independence Party or UKIP (United Kingdom).

The variables that I study are key in evaluating the prediction of Rodrik and Mukand's model that a fall in the relative societal proportion of the majority group lead to increased support for illiberal parties. The dependent variable in the regression will be the change in vote share for the aforementioned right-wing populist parties in parliamentary or lower house elections from one election year to the next. The independent variables will be the changes in fertility rate and the foreign-born population percentage between election years. The two independent variables relate directly to the concept of a changing proportion of majority populations.

I prepare some descriptive graphs to show trends in the variables over time and run a regression to better understand the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The graphs show how the demographic trends change over time in each country relative to the vote share of the populist right-wing parties being studied. The econometric analysis is a multivariable OLS regression on the observations for all countries. This exercise

aims to understand how demographic changes in these European countries relate to changes in right-wing populist support in elections.

4) Findings and Discussion

This section presents the findings, studies how they might illuminate the research question, and then compares them to the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model. Thus, this part of the thesis establishes how my findings might contribute to the literature as well as the predictive capability of Rodrik and Mukand's model. I present general trends in the data, then show the results of my regression, present limitations, and conclude by discussing potential improvements for further research.

I first visualize the dependent and independent variables over time to illuminate trends. This is a useful exercise that illustrates patterns that might be lost in the regression analysis. It shows interesting tendencies across the countries being studied and illustrates the dynamics of the variables that are important to my study of Rodrik and Mukand's model. I show that there are some consistent trends between countries over time and that the model has some amount of predictive capability. This finding is nuanced and presents a pathway for further research.

I then present and interpret the findings from the regression that I ran. The regression suggests that there is no statistically significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables within my dataset. The relationship that is found runs counter to the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model. This does little to answer the research question but provides valuable clues for how to improve future research.

The main limitation of the analysis lies in the dataset, specifically the limited number of observations and how I measured support for right-wing populism. The lack of data, and how I measure political support inherently limits the number of cases that I can study and reduces the number of observations available. This bottleneck in the data clearly inhibits the quality and comprehensiveness of the analysis.

With this understanding, I present potential improvements for future investigations of this phenomenon. Finding an alternative measure of support for populism could increase the number of cases to study and thus the number of observations. Using opinion or survey data I could achieve this while also getting more data for the dependent variable. Indeed, finding alternate measures and better demographic data would expand our dataset and strengthen the analysis.

The finding that the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model are only sometimes observed has led me to the second important contribution made by this thesis. It would be interesting for future studies to test whether socioeconomic factors drove the increase for right-wing populism in the periods where immigration apparently did not. Additionally, it would be interesting to study how immigration and socioeconomic variables interact in these situations. Taking further inspiration from Rodrik and Mukand's model, I propose linking immigration to socioeconomics by thinking about how immigration reduces per capita public goods spending such as welfare.

While limited in some ways, the findings provide some amount of support to Rodrik and Mukand's predictions and provide a pathway for improving future research on demographics and right-wing populism. Rodrik and Mukand's model predicted the relationship between demographic factors and right-wing populism in certain instances. Importantly, this exercise has inspired a potential pathway for linking socioeconomic and immigration approaches to the study of right-wing populism.

**4.1) Political and Demographic Trends Over Time**

This subsection presents a basic analysis of the independent and dependent variables being studied over time. Thus, the graphs represent the electoral proportion captured by the right-wing populist party being studied in every country, the fertility rate in the country, and the proportion of individuals born in another country. Vote share and foreign-born percentage are represented on the left vertical axis and the secondary axis corresponds to the fertility rate.

This exercise is useful for thinking about how the variables change over time and how real-world data supports or refutes the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model. While the regression looks at changes between election years, a visual inspection of the data invites us to think about trends over time. This serves as a complement to the regression which focuses the relationship between changes in the independent and dependent variables.

This subsection follows an explicit structure. A graph is presented showing the variables over time along with an analysis of the trends and how they relate to the prediction of Rodrik and Mukand's model. The end of the section analyzes the information and describes interesting trends relevant to our research question and methodology.

Austria:

The Austrian political and demographic data somewhat contradicts the prediction from Rodrik and Mukand's model. The vote share captured by the FPO (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) showed an increasing trend post-2002 after falling since 1999. The foreign-born proportion and the fertility rate steadily increased in this time period. Rodrik and Mukand's model would predict the rise in FPO support with the increase in the foreing born population after 2002. However, the contrary trend with regards to the Austrian feritlity rate remains a puzzle.


(OECD 2017, OECD 2018, Alvarez-Rivera 2019)

Fig. 5 – Graph Austria

Belgium:

The trends in the Belgian political and demographic data contradict the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model. The vote share capture by Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) increased from 1999 to 2007 before falling drastically. The foreign-born percentage increased over this time period and the fertility rate increased from the late 1990's until 2008 before steadily falling. Rodrik and Mukand's model predicts the increased support for Flemish Interest while the foreign-born population was rising, but it doesn't explain why support fell as the foreign-born population continued to increase. The vote share of Flemish Interest also began to fall with a decline in the Belgian fertility rate which goes against what Rodrik and Mukand's model would predict.


(OECD 2017, OECD 2018, Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata 2020)

Fig. 6 – Graph Belgium

Denmark:

The Danish political and demographic data show no clear pattern of support or rejection for the prediction of Rodrik and Mukand's model. The vote share captured by the Dansk Folkpartei increased from the late 1990's to the mid 2000's before declining. The foreign-born percentage

rose in this time period and the fertility rate increased until roughly 2008 when it began to decline. Rodrik and Mukand's model predicts the concurrent rise of the foreign-born percentage and the increase in vote share for Dansk Folkspartei through the mid 2000's. However, the model suggests that the vote share would not decrease as foreign-born percentage continued to increase after this. The fertility rate demonstrates volatile change over time and it is difficult to see a clear relationship between this and support for Dansk Folkspartei.


(OECD 2017, OECD 2018, Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata 2020, BBC 2015, Overgaard 2019)

Fig. 7 – Graph Denmark

Luxembourg:

The demographic and political data from Luxembourg runs counter to the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model. The vote share captured by the Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (ADR) steadily declined from the late 1990's onwards. The foreign-born rate increased steadily in this time period, and the fertility rate showed a slight decrease over time. Rodrik and Mukand's model would predict support for the ADR to increase as fertility fell and foreign-born population increased but the opposite occurred.

Luxembourgish Political and Demographic Trends

(OECD 2017, OECD 2018, Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata 2020, IFES 2013, IFES 2018)

Fig. 8 – Graph Luxembourg

Netherlands:

The Dutch political and demographic data mostly displays trends predicted by Rodrik and Mukand's model. The vote share captured by the Party For Freedom (PFF) increased from 1998-2003, fell in 2006, and then rose considerably through the 2012 elections. The foreign-born population showed a steady increase over the time period while the fertility rate fluctuated considerably. The increases in support for the PFF are predicted by Rodrik and Mukand's model given the increases in the foreign-born population and the declines in the fertility rate. However, the model does not explain why the PFF lost support in 2006 when the fertility rate was falling and the foreign-born population continued to increase.

Dutch Political and Demographic Trends

(OECD 2017, OECD 2018, Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata 2020)

Fig. 9 – Graph Netherlands

Sweden:

The Swedish political and demographic data partially reflects the trends predicted by Rodrik and Mukand's model. The share of the vote captured by the Sweden Democrats increased considerably after 2006. The foreign-born percentage of the population steadily increased from 2000 onwards and the fertility rate increased until 2010 when it began to decline. Rodrik and Mukand's model would predict the increased support for the Sweden Democrats as the foreign-born population increased and as the fertility rate began to decline after 2010.

Swedish Political and Demographic Trends

(OECD 2017, OECD 2018, IFES 2019)

Fig. 10 – Graph Sweden

United Kingdom:

The political and demographic data of the United Kingdom partially reflects the trends predicted by Rodrik and Mukand's model. Support for UKIP increased from the late 1990's until 2010 when it began to decline. The foreign-born proportion of the population steadily increased in this time period and the fertility rate decreased through the early 2000's, then increased until roughly 2010 and started to fall gain. Rodrik and Mukand's model predicts the initial rise in UKIP support with the increase in foreign born percentage but the reverse relationship with the fertility rate is not predicted by the model.

U.K. Political and Demographic Trends

(OECD 2017, OECD 2018, IFES 2019)

Fig. 11 – Graph United Kingdom

France:

The French political and demographic data do not clearly display the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model. Support for Front National varied over time as did the French fertility rate while the foreign-born proportion of French society steadily increased in this time period. There is no clear relationship between votes for Front National and the other demographic variables so it is difficult to analyze the prediction of Rodrik and Mukand's model.

French Political and Demographic Data

(OECD 2017, OECD 2018, IFES 2019, Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata 2020)

Fig. 12 – Graph France

I find some important patterns across countries over time. The trend of foreign-born proportion increased in every single country even though it periodically decreased for some countries. Fertility rates clearly increased over the time period in Austria and decreased in Luxembourg while fluctuating considerably in the other countries in study. Support for right-wing populism was strictly increasing in Sweden, strictly decreasing in Luxembourg, and varied over time in all other countries.

The predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model was directly supported by these trends in three of the cases. Support for the Sweden Democrats increased as the foreign-born proportion increased and as fertility rates fell, which is what the model would predict. In Belgium and Luxembourg, support for right-wing populist movements increased with the increase in foreign-born proportion and as fertility rates fell which runs counter to the predictions of the model.

In some cases, the rise in support for right-wing populism followed only one of the independent variables. In the case of Austria, support for the FPO increased as foreign-born proportion rose but also as fertility rose. This leads to the question of whether the foreign-born proportion variable is more related to the relative size of the majority group than general fertility rates. Thus, The Austrian case suggests that we might look at demographic variables individually for their impact on right-wing populist support.

There are also the "ambivalent" cases in which the relationship between demographic factors and support for right wing populism trended according to Rodrik and Mukand's model for some stretches and the opposite way in others. In the case of Denmark, support for the Dansk Folkpartei increased for a period with increasing foreign-born proportion but later fell when this independent variable continued to increase. In the Netherlands, support for right-wing populism rose at times with increasing foreign-born proportions and fell while this trend continued. In the United Kingdom and France, support for right-wing populism similarly varied with the demographic trends at different points in time.

These "ambivalent" cases are interesting because they invite us to look more carefully at the relationship between demographic changes and right-wing populism. The data suggests that Rodrik and Mukand's model is correct at least some of the time. Thus, there might be another variable that contributes to this dynamic between demographic changes and support for right-wing populism. Perhaps, demographic decline of the majority group is necessary but insufficient to predict the rise of right-wing populist groups.

I feel that the socioeconomic approach to studying right-wing populism could be combined with the immigration approach. If we think of the public good from an economic perspective then it would be possible to link immigration to socioeconomic variables. Perhaps majority voters think about their claims to welfare or economic support for the state when thinking about voting for right-wing populist movements. This would be very interesting and worth exploring, it also might explain why Rodrik and Mukand's model explained the trends in this section in some cases but not in others.

4.2) Regression Results

The regression presented goes against the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model and the results are not statistically significant. I present the findings in this subsection and discuss their implication for my research question. This exercise has failed to demonstrate a link between demographic changes and increased support for right-wing populism at a statistically significant level.

I regress the changes in vote share for the right-wing populist parties between election years on the changes in fertility rate and proportion of foreign-born population between election years. I ran a multivariable OLS regression using data from the countries and parties discussed above. Given the limitations in the data, I had 31 observations to work with.

The regression does not suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In this model, changes in the foreign-born population and fertility rates between election years only explain 11% of the variation in

changes in right-wing populist support between election years. The model predicts a 1.2 percentage point decrease in right-wing populist support when the foreign-born proportion increases by 1%. The model also predicts that support for right-wing populism will increase by 0.477 percentage points when the fertility rate increases by 1%. Neither of these findings is statistically significant at relevant levels.

The findings go against the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model and do not prove a relationship between immigration and right-wing populism. Their model predicts that support for right-wing populism would increase with increases in the foreign-born population and decreases in fertility rates. The regression run on the dataset suggests the opposite and these findings are not statistically significant. Thus, this analysis has not demonstrated a clear relationship between demographic changes and right-wing populism in Europe.

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	=	31
					F(2, 28)	=	1.81
Model	.014436678	2	.007218339		Prob > F	=	0.1822
Residual	.111634292	28	.003986939		R-squared	=	0.1145
					Adj R-squared	=	0.0513
Total	.12607097	30	.004202366		Root MSE	=	.06314

populistpar~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
foreignborn~e	-1.204688	.9301062	-1.30	0.206	-3.109924	.7005483
fertilitych~e	.4773919	.4428073	1.08	0.290	-.4296578	1.384442
_cons	.0258961	.0166121	1.56	0.130	-.0081322	.0599244

Fig. 13 – Regression Output

4.3) Limitations and Improvements

The main limitation of the dataset is the number of observations as well as the measurement of support for right-wing populist movements. The limitation in observations is due to the lack of demographic and election data available. The limitation in measuring support for right-wing

movements comes from the fact that electoral data is the best indicator and that many countries have only recently witnessed the rise of right-wing populism. If these issues were resolved then I would have access to more observations and independent variables and would have a better measurement of support for right-wing populism in Europe.

Consistent demographic data is difficult to acquire except for in a handful of countries and this reduces the number of cases I can study. The countries in study were the only ones that had the pertinent demographic data. Even this data was limited as it is hard to find consistent demographic data from before the 1990s. Indeed, these limitations meant that interesting cases such as Hungary, Spain, Greece, and others could not be analyzed. If I had access to better demographic data I could study more independent variables and other countries that have seen the rise of right-wing populism.

Electoral data at the parliamentary level is scarce as elections do not occur often and this limits the number of observations that I have access to. Most if not all of the countries I have analyzed have seen right-wing parties receive electoral support only since the 1990s. Elections happen every few years so electoral data over three decades is scarce for the number of countries that I have studied. Indeed, if more European countries had regular demographic data, then the electoral data would increase in size and I would have more observations.

Some countries have seen the rise of right-wing populist movements with electoral support very recently. It is difficult to study the relationship between demographic trends and right-wing populism when the dependent variable is so new. Examples of this phenomenon can be found in Spain or Germany, countries that have recently seen the rise of the AfD and Vox and this limits the number of cases to be studied. If I were able to analyze Germany and Spain, as well as other countries, I might have a better understanding of the relationship between demographic changes and right-wing populism in Europe.

While some of these limitations cannot be improved due to a lack of data, some improvements can be made. Inherently, the number of cases and thus observations that I can study is limited by electoral data and the quality of demographic data. An alternative to electoral data would be to analyze opinion polls or other ways of measuring support for right-

wing populism. This would increase the amount of data I would have for the dependent variable, yet the independent variables would be constrained by access to demographic data.

The results of the regression suggest that another factor is contributing to increased support for right-wing populism and a different approach to Rodrik and Mukand's model could provide insight. It would be key here to consider the public good in socioeconomic terms and not just with regards to immigration and civil rights. This would provide other independent variables to study such as welfare per capita, the perception of declining state funded support, etc… While the regression showed inconclusive results in answering my research question, a different approach to Rodrik and Mukand's model could improve future research.

A new approach built off the findings in this thesis would require a rethink of theoretical and methodological processes. First it would be important to think about how immigration tangibly affects the provision of welfare or state spending to majority groups. This would ideally yield new independent variables to study in future research. It would also be important to think about the public good in a new light within the framework of Rodrik and Mukand's model. This would inform the theoretical aspect and refine thinking about the links between immigration and socioeconomic variables such as welfare and state economic spending.

5) Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to study what I think is a key factor driving the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. Indeed, I attempted to answer the question of how, and to what extent increases in immigration drive support for right-wing populist movements in Europe. This avenue of research was inspired by a concern for the domestic and international impacts of rising right-wing populism in Europe. This section concludes the thesis by situating my research in the literature, discussing my findings and their relevance, and suggesting new avenues for further research.

I chose to study the rise of right-wing populism in Europe as it relates to immigration because this approach has inherent strengths and it complements other approaches. The

political approach to right-wing populism in Europe is interesting but it has made faulty predictions and it fails to provide a causal variable to study. The socioeconomic approach presents a theoretically and empirically valid explanation for the rise of right-wing populism in Europe but it fails to explain this phenomenon in Germany and Spain. In turn, the immigration approach provides a useful causal variable to study while addressing the shortcomings of the socioeconomic explanations of the rise of European right-wing populism.

I chose the immigration approach with an understanding that it might not explain all cases of right-wing populism. Right-wing populist movements have received considerable support in places with low foreign-born populations and here the impact of immigration is likely less. Even though the results from the regression were not statistically significant, I still feel that studying immigration in relation to right-wing populism makes sense from a theoretical perspective especially in the cases of AfD and Vox. Importantly, the findings from this thesis might inspire future research to tie the immigration approach to the socioeconomic approach.

Rodrik and Mukand's model provided a theoretical framework for thinking about the impact of demographic changes on the provision of civil rights in a democratic society. While they used the model to explain transitions to democracy from autocracy, I found that their framework provides useful insights for thinking about immigration and right-wing populism in Europe today. Under certain assumptions, I showed that the model predicts the reduction of civil rights for minority groups when the societal proportion of majority groups falls or looks like it will fall in the future. Thus, I built off of Rodrik and Mukand's model in the empirical portion of this thesis to study the relationship between immigration (representing the decline of the majority population) and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe (representing the restriction of civil rights for minorities).

I provided a basic analysis of the data along with a regression of the relevant variables and found some interesting insights. In studying the variables over time I found that the predictions of Rodrik and Mukand's model came to be true in certain periods in almost every country that was studied. The simple multiple variable OLS regression that I ran suggested a contrary relationship to the one that Rodrik and Mukand's model predicted although the

findings were not statistically significant. Importantly, the regression was limited by small dataset yielding few observations to be studied.

This exercise yielded valuable insights even though the findings did not confirm that increased immigration leads to right-wing populism in Europe. The predicted relationship between foreign-born population and fertility rates, and rising support for right-wing populism over time suggests that there might be a relationship between the dependent and independent variables. More importantly, finding the reverse trend in the regression suggests that other factors are at play and this will be useful to think about in future research. While the regression did not yield statistically significant results, studying the limitations of my dataset and methodology has resulted in potentially fruitful future improvements.

This exercise has been useful because it may serve to link the socioeconomic and immigration approaches to right-wing populism in Europe. The socioeconomic approach has failed to predict the recent rise of right-wing populism in Germany and Spain that emerged after an influx of refugees from Western Asia and Africa. Furthermore, I firmly believe that immigration is not the only driver of right-wing populism in Europe. There is no data to suggest this and conceptually there are no good arguments for this. However, I strongly believe that a combination of the socioeconomic and the immigration approach to this phenomenon could yield valuable insights in the study of right-wing populism in Europe.

If right-wing populism in Europe is driven by both socioeconomic and demographic factors then it would be important to consider both at the same time. Perhaps the economic dislocations of globalization were a key driver of right-wing populism for a time in certain countries. However, it seems likely that increased immigration into Europe is adding a causal factor to this phenomenon which will only complicate the study of right-wing populism. Like any political movement, right-wing populism is not a monolith and does not exist in a vacuum. Thus, I feel that it is important to rethink traditional approaches to the study of right-wing populism in Europe, perhaps by combining the socioeconomic and the immigration approach.

Rodrik and Mukand's model is a valuable resource in thinking about the multiple factors contributing to right-wing populism in Europe. While the decrease of the majority population

contributes to the preference for mitigated civil rights in the model, there is a key socioeconomic component in-between. The decrease in the societal proportion of the majority means that they have less control over the public good and this incentivizes a shift towards reducing civil rights. Thus, one part of the story might relate to immigration which relates to n in the model. However, the change in the public good clearly relates to socioeconomic processes in a society. Thus, Rodrik and Mukand provide an important pathway for linking these two approaches in studying the rise of right-wing populism in Europe.

Thus, future research on right-wing populism in Europe could benefit from thinking about immigration and socioeconomic factors at the same time. It will be important to clarify how immigration affects public good provision to understand more specific variables to be studied. This presents an opportunity to bridge the two approaches and advance the study of right-wing populism in Europe. Indeed, just as politics does not occur in a vacuum, demographics and socioeconomic trends are linked. Thus, by combining the two approaches we are likely to get a more dynamic and realistic understanding of what is causing the rise of right-wing populism in Europe.

Even though this thesis has failed to illuminate a clear relationship between immigration and right-wing populism in Europe, it has yielded valuable next steps for thinking about this political phenomenon. It will be important to investigate how immigration affects socioeconomic trends, whether by affecting public goods or otherwise, and to clearly explain this process so that it may be studied. Furthermore, it will be important to increase the number of observations in the dataset. This will be achieved by finding better immigration data for longer periods of time and/or finding more consistent data for support of right-wing populism. Indeed, this last task will require creativity and the use of different sources including surveys and election results from additional political bodies.

The first contribution made by this thesis was identifying a gap in the literature. I divided the literature into political, socioeconomic, and immigration approaches because of trends that I felt were common to each philosophy. This yielded two important gaps in the literature. First, the socioeconomic approach fails to explain the rise of right-wing populist movements in

countries like Spain and Germany where the economic dislocations of globalization likely existed for some time. Second, the immigration approach fails to explain the rise of right-wing populism in countries such as Hungary or Poland where immigration has remained low. These findings could guide scholars and future research to further develop theories of right-wing populism based exclusively on immigration or socioeconomic variables.

The second contribution made by this thesis is the suggestion that immigration and socioeconomic factors might both explain the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. I found that there might be a link between immigration and support for right-wing populism in some periods of time but not in others. Furthermore, we might reconceptualize the public good in Rodirk and Mukand's model to represent socioeconomic variables and not just civil rights. I suggest combining immigration and socioeconomic variables in future research while making an effort to tie the theory behind both of these approaches. In this way, future research might present a more comprehensive explanation of how and why right-wing populist movements gain political support.

Bibliography

1. Alvarez-Rivera, M., (2019). Federal Elections in Austria - Elections to the Nationalrat (National Council). [online]. Election Resources on the Internet. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://electionresources.org/at/

2. Arzheimer, K(1,2)., (2013). Working-class parties 2.0?: Competition between centre-left and extreme right parties, Taylor and Francis, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edselc &AN=edselc.2-52.0-84905942748&site=eds-live>

3. Arzheimer, K & Carter, E 2006, 'Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success', European Journal of Political Research, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 419–443, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&A N=20620738&site=eds-live>.

4. Backlund, A., and A.-C. Jungar. 2020. 'Populist Radical Right Party-Voter Policy Representation in Western Europe' 2019, Representation, no. 4, p. 393, viewed 14 April 2020,<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e dsswe&AN=edsswe.oai.DiVA.org.sh.39356&site=eds-live>.

5. BBC., (2015). Denmark election: Anti-EU Danish Peoples Party gets big boost. [online]. *BBC*. [Viewed 15 February 20202]. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33199488

6. Capelos, T., & Katsanidou, A. (2018). 'Reactionary Politics: Explaining the Psychological Roots of Anti Preferences in European Integration and Immigration Debates', POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 1271–1288, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswss &AN=000453026600005&site=eds-live>.

7. Dennison, J., & Geddes, A. (2019). 'A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe', Political Quarterly, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 107–116, viewed 14 April 2020,

<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hus&AN=135445450&site=eds-live>.

8. Dilling, M. (2018). 'TWO OF THE SAME KIND? The Rise of the AfD and its Implications for the CDU/CSU', German Politics & Society, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 84–104, viewed 14 April 2020,<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=129732213&site=eds-live>.

9. Erlingsson, G. Ó., Loxbo, K., & Öhrvall, R. (2012). 'Anti-Immigrant Parties, Local Presence and Electoral Success', Local Government Studies, vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 817–839, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hus&AN=85163870&site=eds-live>.

10. Finchelstein, F. (2019). From fascism to populism in history, University of California Press.

11. Greven, Thomas. 2016. "The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective." *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, May, 2016. https://www.fesdc.org/news-list/e/the-rise-of-right-wing-populism-in-europe-and-the-united-states/

12. Grindheim, J. E. (2019). 'Why Right-Leaning Populism has Grown in the Most Advanced Liberal Democracies of Europe', POLITICAL QUARTERLY, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswss&AN=000490062400001&site=eds-live>.

13. Gidron, N., & Hall, P. A. (2017). 'The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 68, pp. S57–S84, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=126113873&site=eds-live>.

14. Halikiopoulou, D. (2019). 'Right-wing Populism as a Nationalist Vision of Legitimating Collective Choice: A Supply-side Perspective', International Spectator, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 35–49, viewed 14 April 2020,

<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edselc
&AN=edselc.2-52.0-85065201882&site=eds-live>.

15. IFES., (2013). Election for Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies: October 20,2013 [online]. *ElectionGuide*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/1674/

16. IFES., (2014). Election for Belgian Chamber of Representatives: May 25, 2014. *ElectionGuide*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2404/

17. IFES., (2018). Election for Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies: October 14, 2018 [online]. *ElectionGuide*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2633/

18. IFES., (2019). France [online]. *ElectionGuide*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/75/

19. IFES., (2019). Kingdom of Sweden [online]. *ElectionGuide*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/206/

20. IFES. (2019). United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [online]. *ElectionGuide*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/225/

21. Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). 'What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases', COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, no. 1, p. 3, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsbl&
AN=RN220802600&site=eds-live>.

22. Kattago, Alice. (2019). The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Contemporary Europe. 10.13140/RG.2.2.33963.39208.

23. Mudde, C., (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&
AN=206624&site=eds-live>.

24. Mudde, C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction online edn, Very Short Introductions online, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001, accessed 12 Mar. 2020.

25. Mouffe, C. (2018). For a left populism, Verso, viewed 14 April 2020, <http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=brd&AN=131829732&site=eds-live>.

26. Overgaard, S. (2019). In Denmark's Election, a Shift To The Left - Unlike In Much of Europe [online]. *NPR*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: https://www.npr.org/2019/06/07/730286066/in-denmarks-election-a-shift-to-the-left-unlike-in-much-of-europe

27. Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata. Dataset: Belgium: Parliamentary Elections 1991-2010 [online]. *European Election Database*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FDEPA2009_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FDEPA2009_Display_C1&top=yes

28. Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata. Dataset: Denmark: Parliamentary Elections 1990-2007 [online]. *European Election Database*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FDEPA2009_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FDEPA2009_Display_C1&top=yes

29. Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata. Dataset: France: Presidential Election 2012 [online]. *European Election Database*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FFRPR2012&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FFRPR2012_C1&top=yes%20/

30. Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata. Dataset: Luxembourg: Parliamentary Election 1994-2009 [online]. *European Election Database*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from: http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fStudy/L

UPA2009_Display&node=0&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fCu
be/LUPA2009_Display_C1&top=yes

31. Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata. Dataset: Netherlands: Parliamentary Election 1994-
2012 [online]. *European Election Database*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available from:
http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A8
0%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FDEPA2009_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F12
9.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FDEPA2009_Display_C1&top=yes

32. OECD Data. (2017). Fertility Rates [online]. *OECD*. [Viewed 15 February 2020]. Available
from: https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm

33. OECD Data. (2018). Foreign-Born Population [online]. *OECD*. [Viewed 15 February 2020].
Available from: https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm#indicator-chart

34. Podobnik, B. (1,2,3,4,5), Stanley, H. E. (1), Jusup, M. (6), & Kovac, D. (7,8,9). (2017).
'Predicting the rise of EU right-wing populism in response to unbalanced immigration',
Complexity, vol. 2017, viewed 14 April 2020,
<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edselc
&AN=edselc.2-52.0-85028453970&site=eds-live>.

35. Rodrik, D. (2018). 'Populism and the economics of globalization', Journal of International
Business Policy, vol. 1, no. 1–2, p. 12, viewed 14 April 2020,
<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edo&A
N=ejs45049466&site=eds-live>.

36. Rodrik, D & Mukand, S., (2019). 'The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy', *The
Economic Journal*, Forthcoming.

37. Rydgren, J., & Arzheimer, K. (2018). Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right. In
The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. : Oxford University Press. Retrieved 25 Feb.
2020, from
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.001.0001
/oxfordhb-9780190274559-e-8

38. Vampa, D. (2020). 'Competing forms of populism and territorial politics: the cases of Vox
and Podemos in Spain', JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES, viewed 14

April 2020,

<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswss&AN=000515419100001&site=eds-live>.

39. Van Kessel, S. (2013). 'A Matter of Supply and Demand : The Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Three European Countries', Government and Opposition, vol. 48, no. 2, p. 175, viewed 14 April 2020,

<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.26347392&site=eds-live>.

40. Zaslove, A. (2012). 'The populist radical right in government: The structure and agency of success and failure', COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 421–448, viewed 14 April 2020,

<http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswss&AN=000308032500003&site=eds-live>.