

examining UKIP's ubiquitous rise in British politics focussing on the nexus of social, economic, cultural and generational changes which have precipitated UKIP's rise. In doing so, the authors produce a host of additional factors other than English nationalism and Euroscepticism to explain the rise in popularity of UKIP. Firstly, the authors present the argument that UKIP's increase in national standing in British politics reflects, "the political articulation of deep divides in British society—divides that have been building for decades" (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 278). The authors suggest that UKIP's policy platform fitted with Britain's changing economic and social structures which reflected an economic and societal shift away from a manufacturing-led economy and towards a service-led economy (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 279). The authors general argument is that a generation of 'left-behind' blue-collar voters provide the basis of UKIP's support (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 279). A discussion of class structures in the UK and class-based politics would have provided a complementary discussion and a critical line of enquiry to compare whether these 'left-behind' fit into the same class. The authors go on to advance an intriguing line of argument to help elucidate why these 'left-behind' voters as the name portends, were 'left-behind' by the mainstream political parties. The authors make the point that blue-collar voters by the early 2000s shifted away from Labour (the traditional party of the working class) and rather than remain and identify with the other major political party, the Conservatives, they stopped identifying with either party altogether (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 280). The authors suggest that this was exacerbated by recent policy decisions taken by the Conservatives and Labour who refrained from engaging this 'left-behind' group and instead positioned their parties "in favour of a more economically centrist and socially liberal policy targeted at the professional and middle class voters" (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 281). Ford and Goodwin's pertinent discussion of 'left-behind' voters provide a critical mode of analysis of supporters of English nationalism and why this group of 'left-behind' voters shifted toward extreme right wing groups rather than to remain attached to traditional mainstream political parties. However, several further questions arise from this paper. Firstly, what other issues do

these 'left-behind' voters coalesce around? Secondly, what does the discovery of a 'left-behind' group of voters mean for both Brexit and English nationalism?

In an article published in the *European Journal of Political Research* (2010), Cutts et al. use the 2009 European elections as a critical study into the attitudinal drivers of extreme right support in the UK. In doing so, the authors reveal several contemporary instruments of nationalism in the UK, while broadening one's understanding of the attitudinal drivers which underpin the supporters of these fringe political parties. This article from the off-set has a units of analysis issue given its discussion of attitudinal drivers at the British-state level, rather than unpacking the United Kingdom in its distinct nationalities and regional groups. Though this article provides a limited perspective on English nationalism, it does provide an excellent account of the supporters and their motivations of what the authors define as extreme right parties (ERPs), specifically the rise of the British National Party (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011, 418).

Utilizing data obtained the 2009 European elections, the authors unpack the basis of support for the BNP. Throughout their article Cutts et al. appear to place the BNP within the nationalist psychological framework of Newman and Chadwick (Newman 1987; Chadwick 1945). Mirroring the arguments made that an essential component of the creation of a nationalist psychology is the creation of a clear 'out-group' (Newman 1987, 55), Cutts et al. argue that "racial prejudice is the strongest driver of BNP support...anti-immigrant sentiment and populist hostility to the political mainstream are also significantly correlated with BNP voting" (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011, 419). Disentangling who constitutes the supporters of the BNP, the authors reveal an interesting mixture of supporters. Their analysis suggests intriguingly for this study that the BNP finds its support situated primarily in the former industrial areas of the North of England, and made up of primarily men, older age cohorts, and members of the working class (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011, 427). The authors analysis suggests that success of the BNP stems from its recent political ability to move away from the purely racist fringe supporters towards a broader general anti-immigration sentiment bloc of voters (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin

2011, 434). The authors reveal the complexity and interconnectedness *of* attitudinal characteristics. For example, the authors describe that voters may understand the benefits of immigrants while holding the belief that Britain is unable to support the current level of immigration (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011, 428). This presents a complicating factor when determining whether English nationalism is on the rise in the UK currently by analysing the strength of party support to fringe parties given possibility that voters who align themselves with these groups may not agree entirely with the manifesto platforms of the party.

George Kassimeris and Leonie Jackson in their article, “The Ideology and Discourse of the English Defence League: ‘Not Racist, Not Violent, Just No Longer Silent’” (2015) provide an insight into the ideology of the English Defence League (EDL), a protest group or street movement which emerged in the UK in 2009 (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015, 171). The article complements the literature on the emergence of far right political parties in the UK and provides a useful distinction to fully understand why the EDL is specific in structure, form, and motivation from the BNP (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015, 171). The authors provide a useful line of enquiry distinguishing that “EDL Islamophobia is an example of (culturally) racist discourse construction” which makes it ideologically distinct from the BNP which utilizes more-encompassing anti-immigrant rhetoric (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015, 172). Through an analysis of EDL literature the authors argue that the EDL have overtly demarcated non-Muslims as an ‘in-group’ and Muslims as an ‘outgroup’ (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015, 172) providing further evidence of Newman’s theory of nationalist psychology. The authors omission of nationalism while conceptualizing the ideology behind the EDL is problematic given many of the ideological constructions the authors identify, such as anti-immigrant sentiment, and Islamophobia, would appear to fit within a nationalist framework.

English Nationalism, Referendums, and Brexit

In a study of the impact of English nationalism upon the Brexit referendum it is useful to appreciate how a referendum is used and what effects this novel form of political participation has upon an electorate. Matt Qvortrup's book, *Referendums and Ethnic Conflict* (2014), is the first to comprehensively study this political phenomenon and its relationship with ethnic conflicts. Qvortrup's work provides a brief yet critical insight into the use of referendums towards European integration and allows one to think critically about the use of a referendum in British politics to inform the outcome of whether to continue membership with the EU. Qvortrup poses the deceptively simple question: "Why are referendums on European integration held?" (Qvortrup 2014, 114). Qvortrup through a statistical analysis of referendums held, asserts that referendums are held on European integration for tactical not idealistic purposes (Qvortrup 2014, 121). Qvortrup agrees wholeheartedly with Dennis Kavanagh's remark that "the referendum had more to do with political expediency than constitutional principle or democracy" (Qvortrup 2014, 121; Kavanagh 1996, 60). Qvortrup makes the point that, "the decision to submit integration issues to referendums is not an irrational act, but a calculated decision to increase electoral support" (Qvortrup 2014, 122). This is an important tactical point to referendums, and crucially Brexit, given the decision by Prime Minister David Cameron to hold a referendum on an issue which internally divided his own party (Smith 2016). Julie Smith in a recent article entitled "David Cameron's EU renegotiation and referendum pledge: A case of déjà vu?" (2016) published in *British Politics*, examines this tactical decision by David Cameron to hold the EU referendum. Smith makes a novel comparison between the decision by David Cameron to hold a referendum, with Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1975 who similarly chose to hold a referendum on European membership (Smith 2016). Smith takes a different stance to Qvortrup, arguing that the decision by Cameron and Wilson to hold a referendum was not due to a decision to increase electoral support but instead, "reflected the two leaders' inability to hold their respective parties together on an issue of relatively low public salience but one that caused

visceral intra-party disagreements” (Smith 2016, 325). Qvortrup and Smith both converge on Kavanagh’s (1996) remark that *political expediency* is the name of the game when a government or political leader chooses to stage a referendum (Kavanagh 1996, 60). The implications of this assessment are not entirely clear in terms of English nationalism. To summarize, if the government approached the referendum and more broadly Brexit through the lens of political expediency, are the factors (which may include a growth of English nationalist sentiment) which forced the government to hold a referendum post-Brexit factored into the consequences and tactical-decision making in the forthcoming negotiation period with the European Union? Cameron’s decision to hold the referendum was based on an intra-party decision over the ‘European’ question. Instead, what has resulted is a far more expansive referendum campaign with Britain’s political economy and very identity called into question. Smith’s (2016) article also relays a crucial point regarding the referendum, the Conservative Party and the government were not aligned in the decision to hold a referendum. It was, as Smith (2016) notes, a ploy by Cameron to acquiesce to his backbenchers. Now under the premiership of Theresa May, has the government’s position *ex-post* shifted considering the Brexit referendum?

Henderson et al. in their article, “England, Englishness, and Brexit” (2016) add to the incipient literature on the impact of the Brexit referendum specifically and its relationship to England and English nationalism. Published just before the Brexit referendum was held, Henderson et al. make several interesting points regarding the state of English nationalism and the developments of Eurosceptic attitudes since the 1975 EEC referendum. The authors question when and if attitudes in England shifted towards a Eurosceptic position (Henderson et al. 2016, 190). The authors, through an analysis of 2011 Future of England Survey found that those with the strongest English identity are the most likely to hold a Eurosceptic attitude (Henderson et al. 2016, 195). The authors are somewhat limited by overlaps in survey data which interchangeably use the labels ‘British’ rather than ‘English’ to denote identity which limits the level of analysis offered (Henderson et al. 2016, 197).

To summarize, this review has highlighted that English nationalism is complex with various intersections between Euroscepticism and party identification. This study has pinpointed several foundational elements which define contemporary definitions of English nationalism, including resentment of the political class, cultural homogeneity and a distrust of outsiders, and idealized pastoral visions of England (Newman 1987, Aughey 2010). This review has underlined the importance of studying English nationalism from a variety of angles, both as an ideology and as a product of party affiliation. This study's approach to English nationalism therefore analyses English nationalism effect upon Brexit both from the perspective of related issues of identity politics, Euroscepticism, cultural and economic effects of immigration, and party politics. Furthermore, this literature review has noted that the decision to hold the referendum by David Cameron appears to be based on 'tactical' rather than ideological grounds (Qvortrup, 2014). This study seeks to go one step further to examine whether *ex-post* the referendum, the current government policy framework towards Brexit and whether it addresses key issues of English nationalists.

METHODOLOGY

This study utilizes a 'mixed-methods' approach to problematizing the analytical study of English nationalism's impact upon the Brexit referendum. Mixed-methods denotes a mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis to inform the research and analysis conducted (Creswell 2014). Michael Kenny in his book *The Politics of English Nationhood* (2014) made the following comment: "And there is a particular merit in adopting what social scientists term a 'mixed method' approach when studying a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, which acknowledges that both quantitative and qualitative sources are likely to enhance our understanding" (Kenny 2014, 79). Brexit is a complex phenomenon and the attitudinal drivers which determined why the government would choose to hold a referendum and why the

majority of the electorate voted in favour to leave the European Union warrants such an approach to be adopted.

This study will utilize a sequential explanatory approach to the mixed methods design whereby the quantitative analysis section will inform the analysis conducted in the qualitative analysis component (Creswell 2014, 135). The first section of the methodology is devoted to conceptualizing the central research question of this study. As stated previously this paper seeks to determine if English nationalism affected the voting preferences in the Brexit referendum. First, we wish to operationalize the central research question and test to the extent to which English nationalism affected voting choice in the EU referendum. Second, this paper determines if demographic factors and issues related to immigration and party politics influences the relationship between English nationalism and voting choice in the Brexit referendum.

The second section of this research design is devoted to explaining the quantitative data chosen, its purpose, utility, and methodological design. In this section, the utility of the dependent and independent variables will be discussed and how they fit into operationalizing the research question. The third section of this research design is devoted to explaining the qualitative section of this study. In doing so, this study will not the limitations in adopting such an approach and the difficulties in drawing inferences from policy documentation.

Hypotheses

As the research question seeks to determine whether English nationalism affected the voters' decision making when choosing whether to vote 'Leave' or 'Remain', conceptualizing this into a series of testable hypotheses is of the utmost importance. We can assume that if a voter has a strong sense of English national identity this will inform their voting decision. We can therefore describe the first hypothesis as follows:

H₁: Voters with a strong English national identity will vote to leave the European Union.

As the literature review on this subject has made clear, English nationalism is implicitly linked to voter perceptions on the strength of English democracy and English constitutionalism.

Therefore, we can assume that if a voter is both rational and votes according to issue voting (Hobolt 2007), then if they perceive English democracy to be weak, voters will correspondingly vote in favour of Brexit. We can hypothesize this as follows:

H_{1a}: Voters who perceive English democracy to be weak or under threat will vote to leave the European Union.

Lastly, we can hypothesize regarding English voters who do not associate with an English identity. In this regard, under an issue voting model of voters in referendums (Hobolt 2007) we can expect voters with a weak sense of English identity to vote in a referendum, according to the salience of issues and a variety of heuristics to inform their voting decision (Hobolt 2007, 152).

We can therefore hypothesize this simply as follows:

H₂: Voters with a weak sense of English identity will vote according to the political preferences of the nearest party ideologically aligned to their voting preferences.

Quantitative Section

To test our three hypotheses, secondary data analysis will be conducted from survey data taken in the British Election Study (BES) (Evans et al. 2016). This paper relies specifically on one set of survey data to test the hypotheses against. Specifically, the study will utilize Wave 8 of the 2014-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel (2016 EU Referendum Study, Daily Campaign Survey) taken in May 2016 -June 2016 just before the Brexit referendum was held, surveying 31,409 respondents. In the first regression table (Table 1), three regression analyses are analysed to determine the statistical significance between Englishness and voting intention, controlling for demographic and political-party factors. In the second regression table (Table 2), a regression analysis of the certainty of voting for a political party and the party's position on Europe is analysed are used as predictor variables to determine whether a party's political position on the

European Union affects a citizen's vote choice in the EU referendum. Summary statistics of all variables used in this section are provided in Table 1 and 2 below.

Why this data set? For its strengths, this panel survey data is particularly helpful given that it uniquely asks respondents several questions related to their perceived attitude towards English democracy and the strength of their English identity. Further, given that this data set has a weighted sample of the UK electorate this allows us to draw broader population-level observations about English voters. The data provides regional level data according to a voter's country of origin (i.e. England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) which allows this study to isolate voters who live and vote in England. This allows regression analyses to take place which specifically draw on English voters and determine their level of English identity. Moreover, the data sample asks specific questions related to the perceived strength of English democracy and the level of 'Englishness' respondents associate towards. In addition, the panel survey data asked critical question related to perceptions of immigration on the UK economy and British culture. Finally, it asked respondents to note their intended vote in the forthcoming Brexit referendum.

However, there are several problems raised by adopting this quantitative design. The data poses complications in drawing inferences of whether respondents were conditioned to consider their English identity by way of the survey question rather than it being an active determinant of their voting behaviour. Furthermore, there is a weakness in the utility of the study given the fact that this was conducted before the referendum occurred, a more robust design would include data from after the referendum had occurred.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|--------------|--------|----------|-----------|-----|------|
| euRefVote2 | 18,082 | 666.3099 | 2492.709 | 0 | 9999 |
| englishness | 20,768 | 180.9227 | 1311.385 | 1 | 9999 |
| satDemEng | 20,692 | 838.1412 | 2767.118 | 1 | 9999 |
| ptvUKIP | 1,755 | 572.5726 | 2317.781 | 0 | 9999 |
| controlImmig | 5,164 | 472.6261 | 2117.123 | 1 | 9999 |
| immigEcon | 20,768 | 590.4316 | 2349.491 | 1 | 9999 |
| immigCultu~l | 20,768 | 502.1462 | 2176.129 | 1 | 9999 |
| ageGroup | 20,768 | 4.884245 | 1.660844 | 1 | 7 |
| gender | 20,768 | 1.518394 | .4996736 | 1 | 2 |
| education | 20,768 | 12.01136 | 5.288996 | 1 | 20 |
| profile_et~y | 20,738 | 1.649098 | 2.58293 | 1 | 16 |

Table 2: Summary Statistics

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|--------------|--------|----------|-----------|-----|------|
| euRefVote2 | 18,082 | 666.3099 | 2492.709 | 0 | 9999 |
| likeCon | 20,768 | 478.4676 | 2125.571 | 0 | 9999 |
| certainty~on | 20,768 | 1790.414 | 3831.403 | 1 | 9999 |
| likeLab | 20,768 | 484.5644 | 2137.745 | 0 | 9999 |
| certaintyE~b | 20,768 | 1940.578 | 3952.397 | 1 | 9999 |
| likeLD | 20,768 | 701.9097 | 2548.13 | 0 | 9999 |
| certaintyE~D | 20,768 | 2577.397 | 4371.908 | 1 | 9999 |
| likeUKIP | 20,768 | 500.6662 | 2173.151 | 0 | 9999 |
| certainty~IP | 20,768 | 1661.801 | 3719.331 | 1 | 9999 |
| likeGrn | 20,768 | 878.9499 | 2824.881 | 0 | 9999 |
| certainty~en | 20,768 | 3249.299 | 4681.803 | 1 | 9999 |

Theoretical Description of Variables

Dependent Variable

A key dependent variable is used in the five models in the quantitative analysis section. The dependent variable is the intended voting intention in the EU referendum, coded as 'EUrefVote2' in the BES data. This variable is useful as it operationalizes our research question into a workable value, an individual's intended voting preference in the referendum. It also excluded postal votes which would skew the data improperly and produce biased observations.⁴

Indicator Variables Table 1

For the independent variables, six factors which may influence the relationship and correlation between English nationalism and the EU referendum have been chosen to regress against the dependent variable. Firstly, the key indicator variable of interest is '*Englishness*' as coded in the BES data. The categorical variable asks respondents to measure the perceived level of English identity on a scale from 'Not at all English' to 'Very Strongly English'. This allows us to test empirically the relationship between English nationalism and referendum voting choice and therefore allows us to accept or reject the hypotheses made in H₁. As the literature review has made clear, and H_{1a} seeks to test, English nationalism is interconnected with perceptions on the strength or, indeed, weakness of English democracy. Therefore, several associated indicator variables are included to ascertain the relationship between referendum voting intention and English national identity. This includes several variables related to immigration and Euroscepticism. As the literature review made clear (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013; Vines 2014; Mycock and Hayton 2014; Dennison and Goodwin 2015) Euroscepticism and English nationalism are deeply intertwined. The first additional indicator variable included in the data is a categorical variable coded as 'satDemEng' which asks respondents to rate their satisfaction with

⁴ The data is coded via Region to only include respondents who stated that they reside in England. This is essential to ensure that the data is not skewed by Welsh, Scottish, or Northern Irish respondents who also took part in the BES study.

English democracy. This will test the validity of H_{1A} . As noted in the literature review section, constitutionalism and English national identity are interconnected (Aughey 2010; Mycock and Hayton 2014). Secondly, an indicator variable is included in Table 1, coded as 'ptvUKIP' which indicates the likelihood that a voter is likely to vote for UKIP. As the literature review made note of, an aspect to English national identity is the creation of an 'out-group' (Chadwick 1945; Newman 1987). Therefore, we include indicator variables which asks respondents about their views towards immigrants to test the statistical significance of immigration to the UK and a citizen's vote choice in the referendum. Thirdly, an indicator categorical variable 'controlImmig' is included which asks respondents the question: 'How much control do you think Britain has over immigration to the UK?' Respondents are then asked to state their belief through a series of choice answers ranging from 'No control at all' to 'Complete Control.' Fourthly, an indicator variable asks respondents whether they believe immigration is good or bad for the economy. This is coded as 'immigEcon' in Table 1. Respondents are given an 8-point scale in which to respond. In the third model in Table 1, control variables are included for demographic factors. This includes age group, gender, educational attainment, and ethnicity.

Indicator Variables Table 2

The variables for Table 2 seek to determine the statistical relationship between party policy preferences and an individual's vote in the EU referendum to test $H2$. In Model 1, Table 2, indicator variables are included which asks respondents to state whether they like or dislike, the major parties of the UK on a ten-point scale from 'Strongly dislike' to 'Strongly like.' The parties included in the models are, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party, and UKIP. Regional parties such as the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru are excluded given the fact that this study is only concerned with English respondents. In addition, the BES data did not ask respondents questions related to the BNP. In Model 2, an additional indicator variable is included for each party which asks respondents to record how certain they are about the party in question's position on the EU. Respondents can reply, 'Not at

all certain,' 'Somewhat certain,' 'Very certain,' or that they do not know. This provides a great deal of explanatory power to ascertain the veracity of H₃ given the assumption that voters with limited knowledge of the European Union will vote according to the party they are ideologically aligned towards.

Qualitative Section

Through analysing quantitative data of members of the electorate before the referendum, we can formulate in policy document analysis whether the current government is adopting any of the attitudinal concerns raised by the electorate in the referendum. In doing so, this study utilizes the United Kingdom's "Exit from and New Partnership with the European Union White Paper" published on 2 February 2017 by the UK government's Department for Exiting the European Union. This document was chosen as it is the most comprehensive policy document officially released by the UK government since Brexit on the UK's future relationship with the EU and provides hints towards the government's future negotiating strategy with the EU. By reviewing the government's plans to negotiate with the European Union, inferences can be drawn determining whether the government is prioritizing aspects of membership with the European Union and whether this correlates with the preferences of the English electorate as identified in the quantitative section.

This, naturally, presents several methodological concerns. Firstly, this study is taking the results from a statistical analysis performed on survey data taken *ex-ante* the referendum and months and applying it towards a white paper commissioned and published by the government *ex-post* the referendum. This complicates the discussions since the leader of the government has subsequently changed from then-prime minister David Cameron, to prime minister Theresa May. Kenny, again provides sage advice as to the nature of survey and polling data, making the note that: "The evidence supplied by polls in general needs to be treated with considerable care, and regarded as suggestive and indicative, rather than objective and determinate" (Kenny 2014,

80). This study adopts Kenny's approach by treating the evidence presented as both 'suggestive and indicative' of trends within the electorate.

Furthermore, it must be highlighted that this white paper does have a relatively low utility for research purposes. For a document with the intended purpose of stating the UK's new relationship with the EU it is remarkably brief at 77 pages. Moreover, this paper was commissioned by the government at a time before negotiations have begun with the EU and member states respectively. It is therefore only indicative of the government's positions on policy areas rather than taken as cemented positions by the UK government.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Before estimating the models, pairwise correlations among the independent variables were studied. As Table 5 (Appendix A) demonstrates, many of the indicator variables are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. The listwise correlation between our dependent variable and Englishness is $r = 0.09$ and the listwise correlation is significant at $p < 0.01$. Going on to testing for multicollinearity through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) command does not present any evidence of multicollinearity within the set of variables in both models (Table 6 and Table 7, Appendix A). The command determines both VIF and its reciprocal ($1/VIF$). No variable has a VIF over 10 which is a general rule of thumb to indicate the presence of multicollinearity. In addition, no indicator variable value for $1/VIF$ is < 0.10 , the general rule of thumb that there may be multicollinearity present within the set of indicator variables. Therefore, to a high degree of probability, we can be sure that multicollinearity is not present within the models. To check our models for heteroscedasticity present within the data set, this study utilizes the Breusch-Pagan Test to determine whether we can reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are homoscedastic. In Figures 1 and 2, (Appendix A) tests for heteroscedasticity utilizing all indicator variables which regress the squared residuals against. The test statistic for Figure 3 is $\text{Chi}^2 = 45.80$. The test computes the p-value at 0.0000. As the p-value is smaller than 0.05 at

0.0000, the null-hypothesis should be rejected and the test suggests the significant presence of heteroscedasticity. Correcting for heteroscedasticity requires the use of robust standard errors. The same is true for the VIF test of the variables used in our second regression model, which has a $\text{Chi}^2 = 6365.29$. Therefore, in the regression analyses, all models are robustly regressed to correct for heteroscedasticity.

Survey Analysis

In the first analysis, the regression results are presented in Table 3 (see below). The key indicator (independent) variable of interest for this study is *Englishness*, which is an identity scale of one's individual level of English national identity. In Model 1, a bivariate linear regression indicates the statistical relationship between our (dependent) variable, euRefVote2, and the indicator variable Englishness. The coefficient for Englishness is positive and significant at 0.177. For each one-point increase in Englishness, referendum voting intention increases by 0.177 ($\text{euRefVote2} = 631.9 + 0.177 * \text{Englishness}$). The p-value tests the null hypothesis of whether coefficient for Englishness is statistically significant from 0. In Model 1, Englishness is statistically significant in explaining 'euRefVote2' and we can reject the null hypothesis, given that $p < 0.01$. R^2 examines the degree of variance of Y (euRefVote2) explained by X (Englishness). In the case of Englishness, explains 0.9% of the variance in voting choice in the EU referendum, holding all variables constant. The low R^2 is to be expected given that our model is trying to determine whether a single factor contributed towards an individual's voting decision. We can therefore describe the relationship as a relatively weak to moderate relationship between our indicator variable and our dependent variable. However, the model does indicate that English national identity is statistically significant, and is a component in determining an individual's vote choice for the EU referendum. This presents a moderate to strong probability that the hypothesis given H_1 is correct in its assertion that voters with a strong English national identity will vote in favour of Brexit.

In Model 2 (Table 3) further indicator variables are included in the model, to determine whether other factors associated with English identity, including satisfaction with English democracy, probability of voting for UKIP, the control of immigration, immigration's effect on the economy, immigration's effect on culture, may be correlated with the English electorate's voting decision. In the multivariate regression, our key indicator variable remains statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In the model the relationship between the indicator variable, Englishness and our dependent variable is negative with a coefficient of -0.322. For every one-point increase in Englishness, there is a decrease by 0.322 ($euRefVote2 = 567.7 - 0.322 * Englishness$). Three indicator variables included in Model 2 are not statistically significant at $p < 0.1$. This includes the level of satisfaction in English democracy, the likelihood of voting for UKIP, and the variable asking respondents to rate the level of control the UK has over immigration. Given the fact that English democracy is not significant at $p < 0.01$ level, we can assume that H_{1A} is false and there is a strong likelihood that there is no relationship between referendum voting and the perceived strength of English democracy. The indicator variable 'immigEcon' which asked respondents to rate the extent to which immigration is 'good' or 'bad' for the British economy is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ level. The variable's coefficient is positive at 0.302. For each one point increase in the indicator variable 'immigEcon', our dependent variable is expected to increase by 0.302, holding all other variables constant ($euRefVote2 = 567.7 + 0.302 * immigEcon$). Similarly, to Model 1, this model has a low R^2 value, though it has increased marginally compared to Model 1 with the inclusion of additional predictor variables to $R^2 = 0.056$. This suggests that Model 2 can explain 5.6% of the variance in the intended voting pattern in the EU referendum. This is in line with theoretical expectations given the assumption that determining a voter's set of preferences is laden with difficulties due to the multitude of issue preferences which makeup a voter's decision.

In Model 3, controls are included for demographic factors. As Model 3 indicates, English national identity after controlling for demographic factor remains statistically significant at

$p < 0.05$ level. The coefficient for Englishness has decreased slightly from Model 2 to -0.365. For each one point increase in Englishness, our dependent variable decreases by 0.365, holding all other variables constant. In Model 3, the indicator variable *immigEcon*, is similarly to Model 2, statistically significant and positive. Though, the coefficient has decreased marginally from Model 2 from 0.302 to 0.245. The variables (*satDemEng*, *ptvUKIP*, *controlImmig*) continue to be statistically insignificant. 'ImmigCultural,' the indicator variable which asks respondents to respond to immigration's effect on British culture, has become statistically significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. Including control variables for demographic factors demonstrates a statistically significant correlation between gender and our dependent variable at $p < 0.01$ level. R^2 increased significantly from Model 2. $R^2 = 0.093$, which means that the indicator variables in Model 3 explains 9.3% of the variance in our dependent variable.

Table 3: English Identity Scale and EU Referendum Voting Intention⁵

| VARIABLES | (1) Model 1 | (2) Model 2 | (3) Model 3 |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Englishness | 0.177*** (0.0136) | -0.322** (0.152) | -0.365** (0.159) |
| satDemEng | | 0.0461 (0.0657) | 0.0180 (0.0664) |
| ptvUKIP | | 0.00404 (0.0730) | -0.0200 (0.0753) |
| controllImmig | | -0.0737 (0.0791) | -0.0770 (0.0799) |
| immigEcon | | 0.302*** (0.0693) | 0.245*** (0.0748) |
| immigCultural | | 0.161 (0.0138) | 0.168* (0.0980) |
| ageGroup | | | 107.8 (87.84) |
| gender | | | 692.8*** (266.7) |
| education | | | -30.94 (25.47) |
| profile_ethnicity | | | -20.35 (41.89) |
| Constant | 631.9*** (18.64) | 567.7*** (135.3) | -622.0 (800.7) |
| Observations | 18,082 | 368 | 368 |
| R-squared | 0.009 | 0.056 | 0.093 |

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4 tests H₂. In Table 2, Model 1 a multivariate regression is conducted of an individual's view on UK political parties: The Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, and the Green Party. In addition, our key indicator variable of interest for this study *Englishness* is included in the models to determine the statistical relationship between English national identity and an individual's Brexit vote, controlling for support of political parties and political parties'

⁵ All three models are robustly regressed to control for the presence of heteroscedasticity. In addition, all data is weighted appropriately.

policy preferences on the European Union.

Table 4: Political Parties and European Union Policy Stance⁶

| VARIABLES | (1) Model 1 | (2) Model 2 |
|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Englishness | 0.0774*** (0.0190) | 0.0609*** (0.0190) |
| likeCon | 0.0549* (0.0286) | 0.0462 (0.0285) |
| certaintyEUCon | | 0.00846 (0.0113) |
| likeLab | 0.0522* (0.0293) | 0.0421 (0.0291) |
| certaintyEULab | | 0.0249** (0.0110) |
| likeLD | 0.00202 (0.0113) | -0.00943 (0.0113) |
| certaintyEULD | | 0.0116* (0.00597) |
| likeUKIP | 0.0751*** (0.0167) | 0.0544*** (0.0168) |
| certaintyEUUKIP | | 0.0407*** (0.00832) |
| likeGrn | 0.0285*** (0.00938) | 0.0137 (0.00958) |
| certaintyEUGreen | | -0.00146 (0.00429) |
| Constant | 526.9*** (13.91) | 414.4*** (14.49) |
| Observations | 29,175 | 29,175 |
| R-squared | 0.034 | 0.046 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

⁶ All data, similarly to Table 1, is set according to region. In this case, it is set according to respondents who state that they currently live in England. Since, this study's interest is in the role of English nationalism and any inclusion of other regional voters outside of England, who inappropriately skew the observations made in the data.

In Model 1, a multivariate regression portrays the statistical relationship of respondents' preferences towards these party and their intended vote in the EU referendum. Again, in Table 4 similarly to Table 3, English national identity is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. For each one-point increase in Englishness, referendum voting intention increases by 0.0774 ($euRefVote2 = 526.9 + 0.0774 * Englishness$). This further corroborates the likelihood that the hypothesis made in H_1 is correct. For the Conservatives, an individual's like or dislike of the party is not a statistically significant factor at $p < 0.1$ in explaining their intended vote in the EU referendum. For Labour, the like or dislike of the party is statistically significant and the coefficient is positive. The indicator variable 'likeLab' is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. The coefficient for 'likeLab' is 0.0522. For each one-point increase in our indicator variable, referendum voting intention increases by 0.0522, *ceteris paribus*. For the Liberal Democrats, there is no statistically significant relationship. Like Labour, the like/dislike of UKIP is statistically significant. At an alpha value of 0.01, the coefficient of 'likeUKIP' is statistically significant from 0, given that its p-value is < 0.01 . The indicator variable 'likeUKIP' is also statistically significant and positive at $p < 0.01$ level. The coefficient for 'likeUKIP' is positive at 0.0751. For every one-unit increase in the independent variable, referendum voting intention increases by 0.0751, *ceteris paribus*. For the Green Party, the indicator variable which measures an individual's like or dislike of the Green Party is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. The coefficient is 0.0285 for the indicator variables. Holding all other variables constant, a 1-unit increase in the indicator variables, referendum voting intention increases by 0.0285. $R^2 = 0.034$ which indicates that the model explains 3.4% of the variance of our dependent variables. R^2 is relatively weak and not entirely unsurprising given the number of factors which affect an individual's decision to vote for a position in a referendum.

Model 2 includes additional indicator variables controlling for an individual's perception of a party's certainty on their support or opposition for the EU broadly speaking. Similarly, to

Model 1, the indicator variable Englishness is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. This in line with expectations again increases the likelihood that the hypothesis stated in H_1 is indeed correct. The most intriguing aspect of Model 2 is the continued statistical significance of the indicator variables concerned with UKIP. The indicator variable 'likeUKIP' continues to be statistically significant and positive at $p < 0.01$ level. In addition, the new indicator variable measuring the certainty voters have on UKIP's position on the EU, is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ level. This is in line with theoretical expectations made in the literature review, which demonstrated that UKIP *raison d'être* is to ensure that the UK leaves the European Union. Including additional indicator variables has removed any statistical significance between EU referendum vote choice and support or opposition towards the Conservative Party. In addition, an individual's perception of the policy certainty the Conservative Party has towards the EU is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the perceived policy certainty of Labour on the EU is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ level.

Qualitative Analysis

As has just been determined in the quantitative section, the data suggests a statistically significant relationship between English nationalism and voting in the referendum. Moreover, this study has also pinpointed a statistically significant relationship between the perceived effect of immigration on the UK economy and voting in the referendum. In addition, the study has found that one's gender is also statistically significant factor in determining one's vote in the referendum. Utilizing a mixed-methods sequential explanatory approach, this section is devoted to analysing the current government's official white paper on its future policies towards Brexit and the European Union entitled, 'The United Kingdom's exit from and new partnership with the European Union White Paper' published by the Secretary of State for the Department for Exiting the European Union, Rt. Hon David Davis (2017). As the quantitative section confirmed there is a statistically significant relationship between English national identity and voting intention in the Brexit

referendum. The government's white paper is telling and provides a critical insight into whether the government has responded to an aspect which appears to have contributed towards the Brexit result (Davis 2017). This study argues that the government is addressing the *symptoms* of English nationalism in this white paper. The government has set forth a twelve-point plan (Davis 2017, 3), which includes the following:

1. Providing certainty and clarity;
2. Taking control of our own laws;
3. Strengthening the Union;
4. Protecting our strong historic ties with Ireland and maintaining the Common Travel Area;
5. Controlling immigration;
6. Securing rights for EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals in the EU;
7. Protecting workers' rights;
8. Ensuring free trade with European markets;
9. Securing new trade agreements with other countries;
10. Ensuring the United Kingdom remains the best place for science and innovation;
11. Cooperating in the fight against crime and terrorism; and
12. Delivering a smooth, orderly exit from the EU.

The government appears to strike a chord with the position of English nationalist's through points two, three, and five respectively. The white paper refers to England only five times in its 77-pages, providing anecdotal evidence that regional concerns of England are diminished in this policy paper. The recent separatist resurgence in Scotland and calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence from the rest of the United Kingdom provides further evidence for why the UK government would wish to diminish any appearance of regional bias (New York Times, 14 March 2017). In section 2 of the white paper the government details its plan for 'Taking Control of our own laws.' The government adopts the position in section 2.1 that:

2.1 The sovereignty of Parliament is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution. Whilst Parliament has remained sovereign throughout our membership of the EU, it has not always felt like that. The extent of EU activity relevant to the UK can be demonstrated by the fact that 1,056 EU-related documents were deposited for parliamentary scrutiny in 2016. These include proposals for EU Directives, Regulations, Decisions and Recommendations, as well as Commission delegated acts, and other

documents such as Commission Communications, Reports and Opinions submitted to the Council, Court of Auditors Reports and more.

The government does not adopt any rhetoric concerned with England. However, it does address the fears of encroachment upon UK sovereignty and the need to protect the UK's constitutional structures – which are core tenets of English nationalist ideology as noted in the literature review (Kumar 2003; Mycock and Hayton 2014). In section 2.3 the government appears to take a more direct policy towards UK law-making:

2.2 Leaving the EU will mean that our laws will be made in London, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, and will be based on the specific interests and values of the UK. In chapter 1 we set out how the Great Repeal Bill will ensure that our legislatures and courts will be the final decision makers in our country.

Notably the government refers to specific locale within the regions of the United Kingdom. By asserting that “laws will be made in London, Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Belfast” and that laws will be “based on specific interests and values” appears to suggest that regional and national concerns will be addressed in the Brexit negotiations and a post-Brexit United Kingdom. As the government has not yet entered negotiations with the European Union for withdrawal, there is a difficulty in ascertaining whether the policy positions related to constitutionalism and parliamentary sovereignty will be modified. In addition, it is unclear from what mandate the government has decided to propose these changes. There is not evidential proof in the government's white paper that English Nationalism affected this policy paper despite the strong correlation between English nationalism and voting intention as uncovered in the quantitative analysis section.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study has advanced the argument that English nationalism was a factor in the Brexit referendum. Through the statistical analysis of panel survey data from the British Election Study, research has determined the strong likelihood that English nationalism was a factor, among others, when voters cast their vote in the Brexit referendum. In addition, this study has demonstrated through the statistical analysis of policy competition among UK political parties, that UKIP's policy coherence on leaving the European Union may have contributed towards the Conservative government's decision to stage the referendum.

It is important for policy-makers within the current government to fully grasp the drivers of why the slim majority of the electorate voted 'Leave.' If policy-makers within the government enter the forthcoming Brexit negotiations with faulty assumptions as to the nature of the mandate provided via the referendum, the stance the government adopts in negotiations may not be aligned with the preferences of the electorate.

This study also has significant shortcomings which need to be highlighted. This study has demonstrated a causal association between English national identity and voting intention in the referendum. This study has not proven that English nationalism has risen in the United Kingdom. To do so, a study would need to adopt time-series data to analyse the strength of English national identity over time. Furthermore, this study utilizes data drawn from survey data taken before the referendum had taken place. A more rigorous methodology would also review panel survey taken before and after the referendum to ascertain whether there was a change in the level of English nationalist sentiment after the referendum result.

In addition, this study has made a series of qualitative observations drawn from the government's white paper on leaving the European Union. This is laden with subjectivism and not an entirely methodologically rigorous approach to determining whether the government has adopted any policies considering English nationalism. Further scholarly research is required to

fully ascertain whether the strand of English nationalism identified in this study is a demonstration of a resurgence of nationalism in England. In addition, a more expansive study would include a comparative analysis of Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish nationalism to determine whether nationalism in England was in line with nationalist identities across the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a more comprehensive study would review local differences such as the North versus South divide in England, and local differences in London. Additionally, a more wide-ranging study would also address why English support for the EU has waned since the 1975 referendum and delve further into this history.

Despite these shortcomings, there is still significant utility in the methodological approach of this study and the findings which, in short, have established that English nationalism was a factor in the decision by the electorate to vote to leave the European Union. In the models conducted by this study, strong positive associations were also found from immigration's impact on the UK economy and gender as statistically significant factors. This study also found that UKIP's policy on Europe, is robustly linked to a voter's decision to vote to leave the European Union in the referendum. The same cannot be said of the two major political parties, the Conservatives and Labour respectively. This study suggests that in the Brexit referendum English nationalism did surface, the strength of its effect among other factors however, requires further research to be determined.

APPENDIX A

Figure 1: Breusch-Pagan Test of Table 1 Variables

```
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of euRefVote2

chi2(1)      =    45.80
Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
```

Figure 2: Breusch-Pagan Test of Table 2 Variables

```
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of euRefVote2

chi2(1)      =   6365.29
Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
```

Table 5: Pairwise Correlation of Table 3 Variables

| | euRefV~2 | englis~s | satDem~g | ptvUKIP | contro~g | immigE~n | immigC~l |
|--------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| euRefVote2 | 1.0000 | | | | | | |
| englishness | 0.0967* | 1.0000 | | | | | |
| | 0.0000 | | | | | | |
| satDemEng | 0.1722* | 0.2673* | 1.0000 | | | | |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | | | | | |
| ptvUKIP | 0.1174* | 0.2547* | 0.5247* | 1.0000 | | | |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | | | | |
| controlImmig | 0.1764* | 0.3137* | 0.4582* | 0.4513* | 1.0000 | | |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | | | |
| immigEcon | 0.1793* | 0.3163* | 0.3728* | 0.2995* | 0.4058* | 1.0000 | |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | | |
| immigCultu~l | 0.1792* | 0.3520* | 0.4377* | 0.3852* | 0.4528* | 0.7144* | 1.0000 |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| ageGroup | -0.0439* | -0.1243* | -0.2004* | -0.1418* | -0.1546* | -0.1187* | -0.1380* |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| gender | 0.0828* | 0.0252* | 0.1317* | 0.0902* | 0.0706* | 0.0685* | 0.0690* |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0003 | 0.0000 | 0.0002 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| education | -0.0170* | 0.0184* | -0.0358* | -0.0637* | 0.0107 | -0.0013 | -0.0246* |
| | 0.0220 | 0.0080 | 0.0000 | 0.0076 | 0.4403 | 0.8527 | 0.0004 |
| profile_et~y | 0.0380* | 0.1153* | 0.0691* | 0.1180* | 0.0648* | 0.0584* | 0.0609* |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |

| | ageGroup | gender | educat~n | profil~y |
|--------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| ageGroup | 1.0000 | | | |
| gender | -0.0621* | 1.0000 | | |
| | 0.0000 | | | |
| education | -0.1665* | -0.0134 | 1.0000 | |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0535 | | |
| profile_et~y | -0.1248* | -0.0214* | 0.0829* | 1.0000 |
| | 0.0000 | 0.0021 | 0.0000 | |

Table 6: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|--------------|-------------|-----------------|
| immigCultu~l | 2.03 | 0.491511 |
| englishness | 1.68 | 0.594194 |
| satDemEng | 1.67 | 0.599386 |
| controlImmig | 1.65 | 0.606082 |
| ptvUKIP | 1.64 | 0.610521 |
| immigEcon | 1.62 | 0.618601 |
| ageGroup | 1.20 | 0.831763 |
| profile_et~y | 1.10 | 0.909898 |
| gender | 1.10 | 0.912192 |
| education | 1.10 | 0.912249 |
| Mean VIF | 1.48 | |

Table 7: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test for Multicollinearity

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|--------------|-------------|-----------------|
| likeLab | 7.76 | 0.128863 |
| likeCon | 7.39 | 0.135278 |
| certaintyE~b | 6.45 | 0.155001 |
| certainty~on | 5.81 | 0.172242 |
| certaintyE~D | 3.69 | 0.271291 |
| certainty~IP | 3.52 | 0.283691 |
| likeLD | 2.99 | 0.334594 |
| likeUKIP | 2.74 | 0.364679 |
| certainty~en | 2.52 | 0.397290 |
| likeGrn | 2.13 | 0.468390 |
| englishness | 1.10 | 0.912820 |
| Mean VIF | 4.19 | |

Table 8: Pairwise Correlation of Table 4 Variables

| | euRefV~2 | englis~s | likeCon | certa~on | likeLab | certain~b | likeLD |
|-------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| euRefVote2 | 1.0000 | | | | | | |
| englishness | 0.0883* 0.0000 | 1.0000 | | | | | |
| likeCon | 0.1653* 0.0000 | 0.2521* 0.0000 | 1.0000 | | | | |
| certainy~on | 0.1667* 0.0000 | 0.1806* 0.0000 | 0.3855* 0.0000 | 1.0000 | | | |
| likeLab | 0.1656* 0.0000 | 0.2533* 0.0000 | 0.9220* 0.0000 | 0.3797* 0.0000 | 1.0000 | | |
| certainyE~b | 0.1681* 0.0000 | 0.1699* 0.0000 | 0.3663* 0.0000 | 0.8950* 0.0000 | 0.3703* 0.0000 | 1.0000 | |
| likeLD | 0.1437* 0.0000 | 0.2301* 0.0000 | 0.7753* 0.0000 | 0.3562* 0.0000 | 0.7836* 0.0000 | 0.3474* 0.0000 | 1.0000 |
| certainyE~D | 0.1484* 0.0000 | 0.1475* 0.0000 | 0.3066* 0.0000 | 0.7420* 0.0000 | 0.3082* 0.0000 | 0.7885* 0.0000 | 0.3354* 0.0000 |
| likeUKIP | 0.1637* 0.0000 | 0.2509* 0.0000 | 0.7084* 0.0000 | 0.3705* 0.0000 | 0.7044* 0.0000 | 0.3588* 0.0000 | 0.6316* 0.0000 |
| certainy~IP | 0.1735* 0.0000 | 0.1808* 0.0000 | 0.3813* 0.0000 | 0.8107* 0.0000 | 0.3834* 0.0000 | 0.8038* 0.0000 | 0.3538* 0.0000 |
| likeGrn | 0.1414* 0.0000 | 0.2030* 0.0000 | 0.5893* 0.0000 | 0.3409* 0.0000 | 0.5919* 0.0000 | 0.3428* 0.0000 | 0.5760* 0.0000 |
| certainy~en | 0.1261* 0.0000 | 0.1250* 0.0000 | 0.2638* 0.0000 | 0.6283* 0.0000 | 0.2664* 0.0000 | 0.6690* 0.0000 | 0.2772* 0.0000 |

| | certain~D | likeUKIP | certain~IP | likeGrn | certain~en |
|-------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------|
| certainyE~D | 1.0000 | | | | |
| likeUKIP | 0.3092* 0.0000 | 1.0000 | | | |
| certainy~IP | 0.7121* 0.0000 | 0.4041* 0.0000 | 1.0000 | | |
| likeGrn | 0.3295* 0.0000 | 0.6754* 0.0000 | 0.3616* 0.0000 | 1.0000 | |
| certainy~en | 0.7563* 0.0000 | 0.2692* 0.0000 | 0.6242* 0.0000 | 0.3382* 0.0000 | 1.0000 |

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