



Historian

2015-2016

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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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NEW YORK, NY 10012

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VOLUME 57, SPRING 2016

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From The Editors

We would like to thank all of those who supported and contributed to the fifty-seventh edition of New York University's *Historian*. We could not uphold the tradition of this publication without the funding of the Department of History and the CAS Student Council.

Particular thanks are owed to our friends in the Department of History: our advisor Professor Rebecca Goetz, who was so generous with her time and advice, the ever capable Chelsea Rhodes and the wonderful Catherine Judge, who cheerfully and ably took over for Chelsea.

As students, we are proud to be able to both present and learn from articles of such quality on a variety of topics with pressing historical and contemporary relevance. As editors, we are proud of the contributions our colleagues have made to historical scholarship.

Finally, to the professors, writers, and readers of our journal: thank you for reading *Historian* over the years, for encouraging students to submit, and for sharing your ideas and work with us. We look forward to many more years of this historical tradition at NYU.

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ENGHELOB'EH SAFID: THE WHITE REVOLUTION AND THE IMPACT OF ANALYSIS

Nika Arzoumanian

I. Introduction

Today, many American and British scholars argue that the White Revolution was ineffective in achieving the Shah's primary aims and that its failures laid the groundwork for the Iranian Revolution and the fall of the Shah in 1979. This allowed Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the Iranian Revolution, to gain traction with groups that were both excluded and disadvantaged by the White Revolution's reforms. Additionally, it set the international stage for the shattering of U.S.-Iranian relations in the early 1980s. While there is limited scholarship that discusses both the relationship between the perspectives of American foreign policy intellectuals in the years surrounding the White Revolution and those espoused by the Kennedy administration and its foreign policy apparatus, there are a multitude of scholarly voices that emerged to discuss similar relationships in the context of both the 1953 coup and the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

⁶ In this essay, I argue that the confidence that the Kennedy administration held in the long-term security of the Shah's regime allowed it to dismiss the acknowledged perils of the White Revolution and lend its support to the seemingly stable Shah. I will demonstrate this point first by examining some of the relevant contemporary literature on both the White Revolution and U.S. involvement and perceptions of the Revolution. I will then analyze U.S. government documents and *Foreign Affairs* articles from the late 1950s through the early 1960s in order to understand why the government documents recognize the criticisms being made in the scholarly articles yet turn away from them to draw a different conclusion. This analysis is significant because it prompts the question: if these conclusions were drawn at the time of the White Revolution, why did they not impact the course of U.S.-Iranian relations more significantly? Through my analysis, I hope to begin to answer this question and, in doing so, shed light on a unique collection of primary and secondary sources.

II. Secondary Source Analysis

On January 27, 1963, an overwhelming majority of the Iranian people approved the inception of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's White Revolution, the official name for reform program of "emancipation, modernization, and industrialization."¹ The Shah was, in conjunction with other prominent po-

¹ Rustin-Petru Ciasc, "From the White Revolution to the Islamic Revolution—The Social, Economic, Legal, and Religious Context That Led to the Fall of Monarchy in Iran," *Cogito: Multidisciplinary Research Journal* 5, No. 2 (June 2003), 58.

litical leaders such as Asadollah Alam, the leader of the opposition Mardom party, the primary player in conceiving of and implementing the White Revolution.² Historians debate why the Shah thought it necessary to initiate this series of reforms. Some argue that he hoped to achieve “the regeneration of Iranian society through social, economic, judicial and religious reforms, with the long term aim of transforming Iran into a global power.”³ Others claim that he was more invested in “fulfilling the expectations of an increasingly politically aware general public as well as an ambitious and growing socio-economic group.”⁴ Some take this claim further, positing that the Shah wanted to implement a bloodless, top-down revolution in order to mitigate the potential ramifications of what one scholar termed a “bloody revolution from below.”⁵ Ali M. Ansari offers an analysis of what he calls “the ideological construction” of the White Revolution, developed between 1958 and 1963.⁶ Ansari’s general claim is that the Shah implemented a top-down revolution to stave off a potentially violent revolution from below.⁷ According to Ansari, the ideology that motivated the Shah most significantly was modernism.⁸ He argues that the Shah understood from the outset of his reform program that the White Revolution could be used to “secure dynastic legitimacy and the institutionalization of his monarchy.”⁹ It was, in Ansari’s view, “a political exercise pursuing a particular conception of modernity, undoubtedly influenced by [the Shah’s] perception of the industrialized West.”¹⁰ The White Revolution was thus a means by which the Shah could portray himself and his regime as progressive and reform-minded, rather than as despotic and a pawn of the United States. As Ansari puts it, “Modernism and Pahalavism were to merge and become both synonymous and mutually independent.”¹¹ The Shah’s government borrowed “‘rational’ and ‘universal’ norms” from the West that ultimately did not resonate with much of the Iranian populace.”¹²

Ansari notes that by the 1960s, an increasing number of Iranian students were traveling abroad to study. These “well read” students “had been members of students’ unions and debating clubs; and above all they [had] escaped for a few years from the autocratic system of domestic relations of Iranian family convention. They [were] acutely conscious, not so much of the absence of political freedoms in their own country, as of social justice, nepotism, corruption and incompetence.”¹³ Many of these students returned to Iran to become

2 Ali M Ansari, “The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, ‘Modernization’ and the Consolidation of Power,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, No. 3 (July 2001), 2.

3 Ciasc, “From the White Revolution to the Islamic Revolution,” 58.

4 Ansari, “The Myth of the White Revolution,” 2.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 7.

8 Ibid., 2.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 14.

13 Ibid., 4.

officials in the Shah's government, bringing with them ideas influenced by Western thought. Ansari notes that this overseas exchange had some impact on the White Revolution, for some of its key players had significant ties to the West. For example, Prime Minister Ali Amini, a figure installed and supported enthusiastically by the Kennedy administration, and to whom Ansari attributes many of the Revolution's reforms, had been educated in France and had served as Iran's ambassador to the U.S.¹⁴

Historian April R. Summitt, in her work "For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran," argues that while both the American government and people thought of the Shah's regime in Iran as was "one of the most stable . . . in the area," the Shah of the early 1960s was, in fact, "a ruler out of touch with his people and their needs."¹⁵ He was not concerned about the people of Iran but rather his own ability to stay in power. In the Shah's mind, the threat of Iran's underground communist Tudeh Party and pressures from the Soviet Union in northern Iran posed a significant threat to his reign that he needed to mitigate.¹⁶ According to Summitt, the White Revolution was the ultimate manifestation of the Shah's fears of communism taking hold in Iran, either through the rise of the Tudeh Party or a Soviet invasion. He utilized American fears of communist expansion in the Middle East during the Cold War to gain increased financial and military aid.¹⁷

- ⁸ The Shah's main focus in the White Revolution was agrarian reform. While breaking the political and economic power of large landowners was not his primary objective, it was a critical consequence of his modernizing reforms and part of his greater vision for the Iranian state. He divided large tracts of land to be sold to peasants, a significant majority of which had previously belonged to Shi'i religious leaders.¹⁸ Iran's forests and pastures were nationalized, leading to a significant decrease in the income of these religious leaders as well. He also limited their "notary-related power" by establishing a land registry. Overall the clergy and the conservative landowning elite lost both status and power as a result of the reforms.¹⁹

Land reform, however, was not the only aim of the White Revolution. Inspired by French President Charles de Gaulle, the Shah reserved 20 percent of the capital generated by Iran's major companies to be distributed among their workers.²⁰ The Revolution sought to increase women's rights as well. Women were given voting rights, and the Shah's government created more

¹⁴ Ibid., 7.

¹⁵ April R. Summitt, "For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran," *Middle East Journal* 58, No. 4 (October 2004), 562.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 560.

¹⁸ Ciasc, "From the White Revolution to the Islamic Revolution," 58.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 59.

jobs specifically for women and reconsidered preexisting laws regarding maternity leave and equal pay. Polygamy was eliminated almost entirely, abortions became conditionally legalized, and women were granted the ability to initiate a divorce on almost the same grounds as their male counterparts.²¹ Additionally, in 1964, the Shah established a new corps that sought to modernize rural Iran. Consisting of recent university graduates, they were instructed to bring literacy, hygiene, and improved development and reconstruction to the villages outside of Tehran and beyond.²² Anti-corruption and anti-bribery campaigns were initiated, and, while both legal political parties were very docile and no real opposition was tolerated, the Shah's Cabinet was expanded to temporarily include individuals from the opposition party as well.²³

Legal scholar Rustin-Petru Ciasc's argues, in his work "From the White Revolution to Islamic Revolution—The Social, Economic, Legal, and Religious Context That Led to the Fall of the Monarchy in Iran," that the White Revolution cemented the relationship between the bazaar merchant classes and religious leaders due to both groups' common resistance to the "influence of the Western world and expansion of Western customs."²⁴ This unified coalition, Ciasc explains, formed the conservative elite that the White Revolution failed to serve and that sought retribution in the form of the Iranian Revolution sixteen years later.

In her essay, Summitt claims that, given the Kennedy administration's primary objective of mitigating Soviet influence in the Middle East and preserving Western access to the region's oil, the Shah's ability to "pose as a reformer" meant that he was able to secure significant foreign aid from the United States.²⁵ While the Kennedy administration initially planned simply to maintain its alliance with Iran, Kennedy's foreign policy aims in the Middle East during his first year in office ultimately constituted direct involvement in the state.²⁶ According to Summitt's research, President Kennedy insisted that the State Department and the staff of the National Security Council put maximum effort into understanding and dealing with the situation in Iran, in an effort to mitigate the communist threats in the region, particularly that of the Soviet Union.²⁷ Bringing an end to this sort of threat required what, in hindsight, Summit calls the "continuance of a Pro-Western regime, for the alternative was a weak neutralist government which could not withstand Soviet pressures."²⁸ That being said, because other higher profile Cold War crises like those in Berlin and Cuba were happening simultaneously, "officials formed

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 David R Collier, "To Prevent a Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Promotion of Democracy in Iran," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 24, No. 3 (September 2013), 463.

24 Ciasc, "From the White Revolution to the Islamic Revolution," 60-61.

25 Summitt, "For a White Revolution," 561.

26 Ibid., 562.

27 Ibid., 561.

28 Ibid., 563.

policy on [Iran on] an ad hoc basis in response to crises as they emerged,” without the hindsight from which Summitt and other historians benefit.²⁹

Summitt also notes that a general disagreement existed within the Kennedy administration’s national security apparatus as to how stable the Shah’s regime actually was and how much the U.S. government could trust him to protect U.S. interests in Iran.³⁰ Despite the divide, most policymakers in Washington ultimately “agreed that Kennedy needed to pressure the Shah for internal reforms before giving him large sums of money. Most agreed that it was only through such reform that the Shah could avoid internal instability.”³¹

10 In historian David P. Collier’s article “To Prevent a Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Promotion of Democracy in Iran,” he takes a unique approach to describing the White Revolution. He portrays it not as the Shah’s attempt to subdue his own people and maintain office, but rather as his response to an “experiment” conducted by the U.S. in the early 1960s to “reform and democratize Iran through a policy of strident intervention and control of its political process,” an experiment that included removing the Shah and replacing him with an American-sponsored government.³² Because the Kennedy administration (and prior administrations including that of President Eisenhower, who approved the 1953 coup against the nationalistic Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh) viewed the position and power of the Shah as its best means of securing American access to Iranian oil, the increasing likelihood that the Shah would be overthrown became the top concern of the Kennedy administration.³³ President Kennedy’s support of this approach was deeply influenced by his interest in modernization theory, which Collier defines as “the idea of promoting [economic] development to bring ‘traditional’ societies in line with modernity.”³⁴ President Kennedy and his administration became increasingly confident that an “exogenous power,” in this case the U.S., could accelerate the democratization process in countries around the world by providing both monetary aid and intelligence to help catalyze development.³⁵ While it was only for a brief period in the early 1960s that the administration entertained the idea of replacing the Shah with a more reformist figure, Collier argues that it was this discussion within the Kennedy administration’s national security apparatus that prompted the White Revolution in Iran.³⁶

Ultimately, the Kennedy administration decided to pressure the Shah to install Ali Amini as prime minister, a man deemed friendly to the United States and more acceptable to the opposition party, the National Front. The administra-

29 Ibid., 565.

30 Ibid., 563.

31 Ibid.

32 Collier, “To Prevent a Revolution,” 456.

33 Ibid., 459.

34 Ibid., 457.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

tion called for American-trained reformers to be included in the Iranian government to spearhead a reform program, and kept a close check on the Shah's actions, remembering his ability to work against "previous American-imposed prime ministers in the past like Haj Ali Razmara and Ahmad Qavam."³⁷ While it is true that the Iranian government itself brought about the White Revolution and the reforms that it constituted, Collier argues that these reforms were launched by a government built on "American reform priorities, guided by American officials, and financed by American economic assistance."³⁸ In Iran, public dissatisfaction increased surrounding Amini's role in preserving the West's control over Iranian oil. Simultaneously, the public began to side with the Shah and the U.S. initiated its formal support of a more powerful Shah and both his modernizing and Western-friendly White Revolution.³⁹

Collier contrasts the Kennedy administration's most desired outcomes for social and economic reform in Iran with those of the Iranian government. The White Revolution, he argues, was the Shah's attempt to maintain "authoritarianism despite popular protest."⁴⁰ In contrast, the Kennedy administration sought to instill democracy and avoid "uncontrolled revolution" in Iran that could potentially lead to a communist takeover of the state.⁴¹ Collier utilizes the Shah's land reform to illustrate this point: "rather than a means to educate the peasantry in the democratic ideal, the Shah intended that in return for land, he looked to the peasantry to form a strong pillar of support for his reign."⁴² According to Collier, it was not until after President Kennedy's assassination that the U.S. government fully embraced the White Revolution and began viewing it as a tool for achieving its own aims in the region.⁴³ While one could argue that the United States would not actually want democracy in Iran as it could strengthen oppositional and perhaps dangerous forces, Collier does not acknowledge this point. 11

Andrew Warne, like Collier, discusses the U.S.'s brief attempt to sideline the Shah and push Iran towards a more constitutional government structure, in light of its ultimate turn to supporting the Shah's White Revolution. Warne's unique take on this conversation is his psychological approach: he argues that U.S. policymakers "modernized Orientalism" in the early 1960s by taking into account what they depicted as Iran's "psychological profile." Doing so enabled the U.S. to maintain the security of its interests in Iran by deeming the Iranian people "psychologically unprepared to rule" and the Shah "psychologically unprepared to give up power."⁴⁴ As it became less acceptable in the

37 Ibid., 462-463.

38 Ibid., 463.

39 Ibid., 466.

40 Ibid., 468.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 469.

44 Andrew Warne, "Psychoanalyzing Iran: Kennedy's Iran Task Force and the Modernization of Orientalism, 1961-3," *International History Review* 35, No. 2 (April 2013), 396.

United States to deem others racially inferior, psychological analysis offered “a more publically acceptable way of understanding the world.”⁴⁵ It was this psychological understanding of Iran, Warne claims, that eventually convinced Washington to reject political reform and instead focus on bolstering the Shah and his reform program, ultimately strengthening his ability to rule.⁴⁶ Citing State Department reports on the situation in Iran that had sections entitled “Psychological Characteristics” and perceptions of Iranians as a racially inferior and culturally backward people, Warne argues that the Kennedy administration supported the Shah in order to “prepare middle-class Iranians for eventual political maturity and assuage the Shah’s ego.”⁴⁷

Ciasc, Ansari, Summitt, Collier, and Warne all make critical observations and draw powerful conclusions regarding some aspect of the White Revolution and its domestic and international implications. My analysis of the available relevant primary source material reveals that American intellectuals were in fact making similar observations and drawing similar conclusions a half-century ago, and that these observations and conclusions were acknowledged by the Kennedy administration’s national security apparatus but were not incorporated into policy decisions.

III. Primary Source Analysis

12 In order to explicate my claims, I will draw from three declassified U.S. government documents drafted between 1960 and 1963 and two articles from *Foreign Affairs* published in 1962 and 1965. I chose to focus on these five sources specifically because they provide a representative view of the overall trends of the primary source material I reviewed without presenting too many documents with insufficient analysis. I selected *Foreign Affairs* articles specifically rather than drawing examples from a variety of journals not only because *Foreign Affairs* is a reputable journal of international affairs but also to ensure greater consistency in the analysis.

As a result of my examination of the available relevant primary source materials, I have found that U.S. government documents discussing Iran in the early 1960s often cite criticisms of the White Revolution. I have additionally seen that foreign policy intellectuals simultaneously discussed many of these criticisms in contemporary academic journals like *Foreign Affairs*. While this consistency is apparent, the final conclusions drawn by the authors of U.S. government documents compared to those of articles published in academic journals differ. The scholarship of foreign policy intellectuals did not significantly influence the ultimate decisions of those leading the Kennedy administration’s national security apparatus in terms of its policy. The administration ultimately chose to disregard these criticisms of the Shah’s reform program and support it. Despite significant opposition to the Shah in Iran,

⁴⁵ Ibid., 398.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 397.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 396; Ibid., 398.

the Kennedy administration made this decision because it was confident in the long-term stability of the Shah's regime, allowing the administration and its national security apparatus to dismiss the acknowledged potential perils of the White Revolution.

Middle East scholar T. Cuyler Young's "Iran in Continuing Crisis," published in the 1962 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, notes that "Iran was economically one of the most favored countries in Asia" and that its "human resources" were more developed than was the global standard.⁴⁸ However, Young culminates his discussion of Iran's economic development by stating that "economic development...is not, as many think, the preventer of revolution or the answer to social unrest."⁴⁹ Even before the White Revolution was formally launched in 1963, Young was beginning to foresee the potential perils of top-down reform, whether the reforms were primarily economic as they were when Young was writing, or social as they would become a few months later.

The Shah's Third Plan proposed by his government in 1962, included very similar provisions to those of the White Revolution. According to Young, who wrote his essay when the Third Plan was proposed, it was "the first [instance of] truly comprehensive economic and social planning in Iran,"⁵⁰ Young ultimately argues, however, that "[t]here are any number of serious problems connected with this program that will have to be faced and solved before Iran can hope to secure the external loans that she seeks. These involve internal reforms and self-help of the kind that President Kennedy has declared to be the conditions for aid, at least from the United States."⁵¹ This excerpt demonstrates that Young was already seeing the holes in the reform program being put forth by the Shah, before it had even been promulgated. 13

The Kennedy administration's national security apparatus, however, was not blind to the weaknesses of the Shah's reform program. The CIA's Special National Intelligence Estimate 34-63, circulated in April 1963, notes that the beginnings of the White Revolution had already "changed the traditional social structure" of Iran and that such a shift would have potentially dangerous effects on the stability of the Shah. The document's authors claim that "forces have been set in motion which...will be difficult to organize and direct" and that "the key question in Iran over the next few years is whether [the Shah] will be able to control the political forces he has unleashed."⁵² It is clear from these excerpts that the national security apparatus understood the areas of weakness present in the Shah's reform program and their potential

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 281.

⁵⁰ T. Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 40, No. 2 (Jan 1962), 282.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Meetings and Memoranda. National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]; NSAM 228, Review of Iranian Situation: Report on U.S. Strategy for Iran, May 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

implications. In response to these concerns, however, the document's authors claim, "it is likely that the Shah will be able to surmount the threats to his position and programs during the next few years."⁵³ Later attributing this to the might of the Shah's internal security system as bolstered by the United States, these excerpts indicate that Kennedy's national security advisors were confident that a revolution from below was unlikely as long as adequate reform was implemented.

In addition to his criticisms of the Shah's reform program, Young poses questions regarding the reliability of the Shah himself to enact reform, questioning the existence of "the will to act by those responsible." Young states that "such a will is publicized, but past efforts to exercise it have not produced results which satisfied an alienated and skeptical public." He goes on to "wonder if...even sincere leaders...can adequately conceive, much less successfully implement, these necessary governmental and administrative reforms."⁵⁴ Here, as Young writes in 1962, he is pointing to a significant issue of underlying dissatisfaction with the Shah in both the U.S. and Iran: the Shah's dubious willingness to reform. Young notes that the U.S. did not initially deem the Shah a reliable vessel for the reforms it determined necessary to avoid revolution. He claims that the Shah had "become convinced—almost mystically—that he had a mission to save his country," making him appear almost deluded. For both the Iranian people and the U.S. government, his dictatorship was "glaringly inadequate." The U.S. government, however, wanted him to remain in power.⁵⁵ While the Kennedy administration's fears were somewhat eased with the launch of the White Revolution a few months after this essay was published, the widespread opposition to the Shah in Iran and his lack of connection to the Iranian people justified the administration's doubts that the Shah could in fact successfully put in place the reforms necessary to avoid a revolution.

National Security Action Memoranda number 228 (NSAM 228), released internally in 1963, reveals the significant doubts the Kennedy administration's national security apparatus had about the ability of the Shah to implement the necessary reforms to ensure his position. In discussing the Shah's ability to effectively implement the White Revolution's reforms, the document states that the "planning and implementation of a broadly conceived, integrated economic development program will be limited by [the] lack of effective government direction and by the shortage of administrative talent."⁵⁶ Clearly the authors of this document were not confident in the Shah's ability to provide

⁵³ Ibid., 4-5.

⁵⁴ Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," 284.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 288; Ibid., 290.

⁵⁶ Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Meetings and Memoranda. National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 228, Review of Iranian Situation: Report on U.S. Strategy for Iran, May 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 6.

the necessary “direction” to implement the reforms he wanted to put in place.

Released internally on April 15, 1960, a Department of State background paper entitled “Politico-Economic Situation of Iran” also indicates that the U.S. government was uneasy, if not highly dubious, about the Shah’s ability to institute reforms that were sufficient to subdue the Iranian populace and mitigate the risk of violent revolution. The document notes that “[the Shah] has taken some steps to rectify centuries-old abuses, but most reform is more apparent than real, at least so far as the general populace is concerned.”⁵⁷ The document continues on to assert that “the most dramatic step the Shah could take in a political sense would be to remove some of the notoriously corrupt members of his family or his immediate entourage. To date, he has been unwilling to take this step.”⁵⁸

Despite these doubts, however, the United States ultimately did support the Shah and his White Revolution. Although scholars have argued why the Kennedy administration made this choice, NSAM 228 offers reasoning for this decision. The authors of the document claim, “the monarchy, which provides the stability not yet available through popular institutions or long popular experience in political affairs, is in fact the sole element in the country that can at present give continuity to public policy. The Shah, therefore, remains a linchpin for the safeguarding of our basic security interests in Iran.”⁵⁹ The Kennedy administration, seeking a stable pro-Western regime in Iran, had 15 determined that the Shah was the best option available to achieve its foreign policy goals in the region. The U.S. government would not risk the rise of an unfriendly, possibly unstable regime potentially susceptible to manipulation by the Soviet Union. The authors of the document clearly state that “U.S. support for the program is dictated by the fact that only by supporting it can we influence a broad and sweeping change which we could not effectively halt if we wanted to.”⁶⁰ While the Shah may not have been an ideal candidate for U.S. support, the Kennedy administration’s national security apparatus deemed supporting him and his reforms necessary to ensure the stability of the Shah’s reign and achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives in Iran.

Published in the October 1965 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, economist Hossein Mahdavy’s “The Coming Crisis in Iran” looks back at the beginning of the White Revolution, the years leading up to it, and the motivations that brought it about, particularly noting the implications of the White Revolution for the future of Iranian politics. Despite having been written a near half-century earlier, Mahdavy’s essay foreshadows Ciasc’s twenty-first century understanding of the alienation that the White Revolution fomented in many segments of

⁵⁷ Department of State, Report, Politico-Economic Situation of Iran ::Background Paper, April 15, 1960, Secret, CREST.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Papers of John F. Kennedy, 6.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Iranian society. Mahdavy argues that land reform alienated a large proportion of the Shah's strongest allies, including landlords, industrialists, and religious leaders.⁶¹ This assertion is bolstered by a proclamation made in Young's article three years prior, "a kind of political triangulation [exists], involving the Shah, the conservative elite and the urban middle class led by the National Front."⁶² Young and Mahdavy were both able to anticipate the implications of an alliance that would unite religious and secular elite into an Iranian "conservative elite" and ultimately contribute to the fall of the Shah.

The Kennedy administration's national security apparatus was well aware of the way in which the Shah's reform program could alienate some of his key supporters. In NSAM 228, President Kennedy's national security advisors claim that "[the Shah] has aroused the animosity of the dispossessed elite and the fanatical clergy, and having not yet consolidated support of the emancipated peasantry, he is dependent in the immediate future to a greater degree than ever on the support of the military and security forces."⁶³ The authors of the document also note that "the hostility of the urban educated groups, the dispossessed landlords and the mullahs toward the Shah and his program will continue, but it is not likely that these forces will coalesce in a way which would cause the Shah to fall. The military will remain loyal to him."⁶⁴

16 In these excerpts from NSAM 228, it is clear that Kennedy's national security advisors acknowledged the divisive implications of the Shah's reform program. What is interesting, however, is that they were exceedingly confident in the ultimate stability of the Shah's regime, claiming that it was "unlikely" that a revolution to depose the Shah would occur. According to NSAM 228, one of the U.S.'s key goals was to "maintain internal political stability and prevent the coming to power of neutralist elements by maintaining the armed forces' morale and loyalty to the regime [and by] improving the counter-insurgency capacity of the military and of rural and urban police forces," in addition to providing significant military aid.⁶⁵ Confidence in a U.S.-supported security system allowed the Kennedy administration to worry less about a potential uprising against the Shah. The document notes that the military "will remain loyal to [the Shah]" and that, "although [military and security] forces might not be able to put down a coordinated country-wide rising of tribal and urban elites, this development is unlikely."⁶⁶ These comments are consistent with the Special National Intelligence Estimate 34-63 as well, which claims that the Shah "can probably count on the support of the military and security forces, which can probably deal with any internal security problems likely to arise."⁶⁷

61 Hossein Mahdavy, "The Coming Crisis in Iran," *Foreign Affairs* 44, No. 1 (Oct 1965).

62 Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," 290.

63 Papers of John F. Kennedy, 6.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Papers of John F. Kennedy, 6.

The national security apparatus' confidence in the long-term security of the Shah's regime is apparent and allowed the Kennedy administration to dismiss the many acknowledged potential perils of the White Revolution in favor of supporting the seemingly stable Shah.

IV. Conclusion

Analysis of the primary source material reveals the confidence that the Kennedy administration and its national security apparatus held in the long-term security of the Shah's regime. It was this confidence that enabled the U.S. government to dismiss the many acknowledged potential perils of the White Revolution in favor of supporting the seemingly stable Shah. It is interesting to note that one of the most prominent areas of divergence between the perspectives of foreign policy intellectuals and those writing U.S. government documents at the time were their thoughts on the future of relations between the United States and Iran. The authors of NSAM 228 stated, "unless he is assassinated, the Shah will remain as Chief of State and the ultimate repository of power in Iran. Under his direction Iran will continue its pro-Western posture and close alliance with the U.S."⁶⁸ They foresaw a strong relationship between the United States and Iran for many years to come.

In contrast, Young describes U.S.-Iranian relations in 1962 in the context of the 1953 coup, during which the CIA helped depose the nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. He says that Iran "dislikes" and "distrusts" ¹⁷ the U.S., primarily because they "fear becoming so beholden to, and identified with, the United States that the nation loses its independence and freedom of action" as it did in 1953 with the removal of a leader that had broad popular support.⁶⁹ According to Young, Iranians feared extensive U.S. military and economic aid because they believed that "the United States was interested primarily in the [political] status quo." This analysis of the primary source material points to this belief being more true than false.

Perhaps the eeriest prediction made in the primary source material was in Mahdavy's text. He claimed in 1965 that "it is probable that the American position in Iran will continue to deteriorate along with the growing unpopularity of the Shah's regime and that the United States will replace Britain as the prime target of nationalist attacks."⁷⁰ The past half-century has proven Mahdavy's prediction correct, and glimpses into the past through primary source material may reveal at least partially why this deterioration occurred. Americans were seeing the potentially dangerous ramifications of their actions in Iran as they were taking these actions, yet the individuals in power took no steps to change their course. Coming to this conclusion is the primary finding of my analysis, which sheds further light on American perspectives and observations of the White Revolution as a means of beginning to

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," 291-2.

⁷⁰ Mahdavy, "The Coming Crisis in Iran," 146.

piece together a greater understanding of the past fifty years of U.S.-Iranian relations as a whole.

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BENJAMIN DISRAELI AND THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE OVER THE SUEZ CANAL IN 1876

Chris Berenson

In November of 1875, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli purchased a minority stake in the Suez Canal Company, making Britain a joint shareholder with France in an essential thoroughfare for world trade. This purchase created controversy within the British Parliament because Disraeli bought the canal shares with borrowed private funds and did so without consulting his Parliament beforehand. An intense debate in Parliament followed the purchase, pitting two of England's most prominent figures and parties against each other: the Tory party of Prime Minister Disraeli and Liberal rival William Ewart Gladstone.

20 The debate in Parliament centered around three main themes: the role of private interests in the purchase, the benefit the purchase would have for British economy and trade, and the morality of the purchase and subsequent intervention in Egypt. While debates in Parliament over the Canal Purchase are important, they also highlight the ideologically discrepancies between the Tories and the Liberals over the structure and purposes of the British Empire. The Tories and Disraeli advocated using financial and military power to assert a British presence overseas and create a truly imperial state, while the Liberals and Gladstone saw this intervention as the beginning of a formal British Empire that would primarily benefit private interests at the expense of the British economy and state by raising taxes and creating unnecessary wars.

Before analyzing the debate that followed the purchase of the Suez Canal Company, it is essential to examine the history and importance of the Suez Canal itself. Suez lies strategically on a thin piece of land between the Mediterranean and Red Seas, and efforts to build a canal there date back to Ancient Rome to, and most famously, to Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in the late eighteenth century. The Suez Canal became a reality when it was completed in November of 1869 at a cost of 100 million dollars under the supervision of the French engineer and diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps. The Canal was owned by a joint stock company that was jointly administered by the Khedive of Egypt and the French government, with a British sponsored agreement to transfer power to the Egyptians after 99 years.

The canal's completion changed the course of international shipping. Instead of having to circle the Cape of Good Hope at the most southern

tip of Africa to reach the Indian Ocean, which took about a month and was dangerous, merchant vessels could cross the canal and make the same trip in about half the time and save 6,000 kilometers in distance. Because of India's importance to the British Empire, British ships soon comprised a majority of the canal's traffic and the stability of the canal was pivotal for maintaining Britain's colonial operations in India.

The Suez Canal was initially an Egyptian and French venture, but in 1875 the Khedive of Egypt was faced with bankruptcy due to a series of over-ambitious modernization projects and was forced to sell his shares in the Suez Canal Company. Prime Minister Disraeli found out about Egypt's bankruptcy through private channels, and in late 1875, Disraeli borrowed 4 million pounds from Lionel de Rothschild to purchase the Khedive's minority shares which gave Britain a 44 percent stake in the company. This purchase had major implications for British trade and foreign policy, the British government exercised substantial control over the strategic waterway.¹

Disraeli's motivations for the financial coup of the Canal shares can be traced back to his attitudes about the nature of the British Empire. After his short-lived first premiership in 1868, Disraeli led the opposition to Gladstone's liberal government and clashed with him on the role of the British Empire. This clash foreshadowed the argument over Suez and outlined many of Disraeli's feelings towards Empire, which he made clear in his 1872 21 Crystal Palace address. In this speech, he opened by stating that the second great objective of Tory political life after upholding the state domestically was to maintain the Empire that the Liberals had spent more than forty years attempting to destroy through ventures such as granting self rule. Disraeli believed that Liberal governments had been actively attacking the British state by making the empire weak, and his duty was to restore the past glory of the British Empire.

Disraeli's alternative to Liberal imaginations of Empire was a "great policy of imperial consolidation" in which colonies would have preferential tariff agreements with Britain, an obligation to provide British citizens with settlement in unsettled areas, and a representative council of colonial delegates that would meet in Britain.² These policies would allow Britain to be placed above the rest of the continent and remain "an imperial country—a country where your sons, when they rise, rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of their countrymen, but command the respect of the world."³ While his Crystal Palace speech did not comment directly on Egypt, it depicted Disraeli's dedication to making British Empire a more formal one that explicitly advocated direct colonial domination by way of trade regula-

1 Douglas Hurd and Ed Young, *Disraeli, or the Two Lives* (London: Phoenix, 2014) 1-20.

2 PR Ghosh, "Disraelian Conservatism: A Financial Approach." *Eng Hist Rev The English Historical Review* XCIX, no. CCCXCI (1984): 268-96.

3 Benjamin Disraeli. *Crystal Palace Address*, 1872.

tion and government oversight.

In 1874, Disraeli was elected once again to the premiership after an unsuccessful run by Gladstone and his Liberal Party.⁴ During his second tenure in office, Disraeli became more focused on foreign affairs and dedicated much of his time to the discussion of international politics with Lord Derby, who stated that “he (Disraeli) takes peculiar pleasure in turning over and discussing all sorts of foreign questions, on which action is not necessary and often not possible.”⁵ To Disraeli, international policy was “real politics,” and its most important theaters were the Middle East and India, with Egypt playing a central role in both. Therefore, when Disraeli learned that the Suez Canal shares were up for sale, he acted swiftly to buy the shares, thereby placing England in a central role in the Middle East and, by extension, in India as well. He intervened in this way in an effort to create a more powerful overseas empire, one that would allow Britain to reclaim its spot on top of the European hierarchy.⁶

22 While Disraeli and his Tory allies advocated for an Empire that would be the envy of the world, Gladstone and the Liberals felt that Disraeli’s dedication to a more direct imperialism was a threat to the British nation. William Ewart Gladstone led the radical, anti-Tory movement in Parliament and was a bitter rival of Disraeli’s dating back to the 1850s, and the two men reportedly despised each other personally.

To fully understand Gladstone and the Liberals’ stance in the Suez Canal Shares debate, it is necessary first to analyze their larger criticisms of Disraeli’s imperialism. In Gladstone’s opinion, Disraelian imperialism was dangerous in two related ways. It would bolster the rich by fostering investment in British-controlled territories overseas and then use the prestige of Britain’s enhanced global position to trick the masses into a blind patriotism that would obscure the extent to which the Empire was making their lives worse. Gladstone pointed to the dramatic, five-million-pound hike in taxes during the Disraeli regime and the increase of the national debt by six million pounds as the result of his muscular imperialism, an imperialism that was lucrative to a domestic and foreign financial elite but costly to the British people.

Gladstone was also weary of the types of military intervention that came with Disraeli’s expansion of imperial power. He saw these entanglements as ones that would cost British lives and be detrimental to the national interest. In speeches during his 1879 Midlothian Campaign, in which Gladstone travelled Britain and spoke to large crowds to sway public opinion against

4 Jonathan Philip Parry, *Benjamin Disraeli* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, GB 2007), 1-15.

5 Victoria and George Earle Buckle. *The Letters of Queen Victoria. Second Series. A Selection from Her Majesty’s Correspondence and Journal between the Years 1862 and 1878* (London: J. Murray, 1926).

6 Hurd and Young, 30-45.

Disraeli's popular imperial policies, he points to instances like the 1879 Zulu War where 800 British soldiers were killed as an example of costly imperial intervention. He also points to a direct consequence of the Suez Canal Purchase, which was the increasing instability in Egypt because of the failure Egyptian economy. Because British interests were now at stake in Egypt, the government had to increase its naval presence in the region, which risked English lives, increased national spending to maintain a military presence, and most importantly saw the government directly intervene in an area that was not officially part of the British dominion.

Despite his reservations against British interventionism, Gladstone did not see all imperial action as detrimental to the British state. He saw empire as a moral obligation in which Britain's role was to help civilize less fortunate nations and protect their people from barbaric rule. In the same year as the Canal Purchase, there was a large massacre of Bulgarian Christians within the Muslim Ottoman Empire rule that sparked debates that would be known as the Bulgarian Crisis. While Disraeli supported the Turks for financial and political reasons—mainly access to the Suez Canal and fear of the Russians—Gladstone saw a moral obligation to the oppressed Christians and felt that British intervention was necessary to protect these people. Gladstone saw Disraeli's support of the Turks as directly undermining the obligations of a Christian nation like Britain, and felt that Disraeli was more concerned with creating an "Asiatic" empire than upholding the moral duties 23 of the British nation. For Gladstone, the Suez Canal Purchase was the first instance of a dangerous Asiatic expansion, and the arguments that ensue in 1876 are representative of the Liberals' fear that Disraeli's imperial policy will lead Britain down the slippery slope toward the wrong kind of empire.⁷

The debates that raged in Parliament over the Canal Purchase itself are representative of both side's differing views of what the British Empire should be. The first Liberal criticism of Disraeli's imperial policy in the Suez Canal Debate concerned the Prime Minister's sudden and secret purchase of the Canal Shares. This cavalier coup enraged Liberals, and the main issue that the two sides disagreed on was Disraeli's use of a private loan from the Rothschild family to buy the shares, rather than using public funds. Opposition leaders felt that Disraeli was presumptuous in assuming that Parliament would repay the loan and were concerned about its terms. In a response to a payment plan proposed to the House of Commons on February 21 that required the 4 million pound loan and commission be paid by the March 31, former Liberal Party Cabinet member and political rival of Disraeli, Robert Lowe questioned the ethics of the loan's terms in a Parliamentary debate. He felt that the Disraeli administration effectively placed Parliament in a situation in which they could not refuse to repay the loan under any circumstances even though they thought the commission and interest were exorbitant.

7 Roy Jenkins, *Gladstone: A Biography* (New York: Random House, 1997), 20-30.

Because Britain could not default on the loan for fear of jeopardizing its credit status internationally, Parliament was “bound to pay the money, and, grievous as he might think it was, there was no alternative whatever.”⁷⁸ The Rothschild family; therefore, assumed “no risk in making the loan.”⁷⁹ Lowe argued that Disraeli and Rothschild had cheated the British government by forcing it to accept a loan and interest terms that are not beneficial for the state. The use of Rothschild funds also made the government to submit to the will of a private interest and the upper class investors who supported it.

24 In his response to Lowe’s grievances in the same session of Parliament, one of Disraeli’s conservative supporters Henry Wolff disputed the claim of predatory lending practices by Disraeli and the Rothschild Bank. He maintained that there had been no private loan to the British government, but “merely a purchase by Messrs. Rothschild of the Khedive’s shares, which they undertook to sell again to the Government when they obtained powers from Parliament for that purpose.”¹⁰ In addition to the lack of a strict loan, Wolff also denied Lowe’s assertion that Disraeli and Rothschild ran no risk in securing the loan. While Lowe maintained that Parliament had no choice but to pay, Wolff believed that Rothschild still had plenty of risk factors for his loan such as the dissolution of Parliament or an uprising in which the government would be placed in a situation where it could not honor the loan. In Wolff’s eyes, there was no conspiracy formed by Disraeli and Lionel de Rothschild to force Parliament to make a private citizen wealthier, but a gracious agreement made between two parties that would allow Britain to further prosper economically.

While Lowe and Wolff arguments focused around the government’s obligation and risk in regards to the private loan, Gladstone and Disraeli argued over the larger issue of whether the British government should use private capital to fund its operations. Gladstone agreed with Lowe’s views of the loan, but had a more radical opinion. He believed that the government’s use of private loans for any purpose was unethical, and he questioned whether the English government had used private money for a purchase on the scale of the Suez Canal since the 1815 peace, or ever. Gladstone asked Disraeli and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Henry Northcote, why they did not use constitutional means to secure the capital for the Canal Shares. He felt that it would have been better to ask the Bank of England for the £4,000,000 because it was an independent body and obliged by law to serve the British government’s best interest. The Rothschild family had no obligation to help Britain, and therefore the bank should not have been trusted to help make such a large-scale government purchase.¹¹ In Gladstone’s view, Disraeli’s circumvention of government protocol represented the Prime

8 Hansard Collection, British Parliamentary Papers. Feb 21 1876 vol 227 col 567-568.

9 Ibid., col 567-568.

10 Ibid., col 578.

11 Ibid., cols 590-599.

Minister's placement of imperial expansion over the morals and laws of the British state. This circumvention established a dangerous precedent in which Disraeli could use the financial power of a foreign bank do as he pleased in Britain, thereby making Parliament powerless to oppose the Prime Minister's and the Rothschild's dedication to expand the Empire.

In response to Gladstone's argument against the use of private capital, Disraeli argued that it would have been impossible to buy the shares if he had gone to the Bank of England because it is against the law for the Bank to advance funds to the ministry. He continued by claiming that even if the government were able to use the constitutional route and ask the Bank to buy the shares, there would have been too many obstacles to granting the purchase such as the fear of legal advisors or a public court blocking the Bank from buying the shares. For Disraeli, the main goal was buying the shares in the company, and the use of private funds was not a constitutional problem because it was the only way the government could have made the purchase.¹² This defense of private capital is emblematic of how Liberals viewed his connections with the upper class in England as well as the Tory, Conservative party who were seen as only appealing to the "10,000" in England that Gladstone and the radicals campaigned against. In the case of the Rothschild loan, the French family would collect the high rate of interest set on the loan, while the common Briton would be at risk of higher taxes to help repay this private entity. Gladstone saw this relationship as one that preyed on the British person and used the splendor of the Canal to deceive them into being complicit. 25

The role of private finance was not the only aspect of the Suez Canal debate that Parliament commented upon. The political structure of the Suez Canal Company was also a major point of contention in Parliament. Because the shares were bought from the Khedive of Egypt and represented only a minority stake, Britain's role in the company would essentially be the same as the Khedive's was. These conditions were seen by many on both sides of the debate as unfavorable to the British government because the French still had the majority of the power in the company. The terms outlined in the agreement between the British government and the Khedive gave the British only three directors on the company's board compared to France's twenty-one. In the May 5 session of Parliament, Liberal unionist and noted independent radical Peter Rylands declared that "the country was deceived in its expectations that the purchase of these Shares would give England any political influence in the East, or any controlling influence over the Canal."¹³ Essentially, the British government was four million pounds poorer and had the same amount of power in the region that it had before the purchase in 1875. The only involved parties who benefited from the company's structure

¹² Ibid., cols 653-655.

¹³ HC May 5 1876 vol 229 682-690.

were the Rothschild's, the government officials sent to sit on the company's board, and worst of all, the private French company that held the real power in the company. Again, the purchase was seen by radicals as taking money from the British state that could have been used for the national interest but spent on a useless imperial venture that only benefitted private interests allied with the Tory Party and a competing foreign power.

Rylands' concerns were echoed by the conservative member of Parliament Henry Wolff, despite supporting the purchase and Disraeli's use of private funds. Wolff saw the under-representation of British interest within the company as a geopolitical problem that found British national interests subject to a French company. In his address to Parliament on April 11, Wolff claimed that the French had attempted to block British interest in the Canal since its completion in 1868. He claimed that in 1871, "M. de Lesseps recoiled with aversion from the proposition to admit British influence into the management of the Canal, and declared that he never would be a party to transfer its control from French hands."¹⁴ Wolff went on to claim that the French reduced British government's representation on the Board after the purchase and criticized the government's lack of action on this point. Wolff maintained that the government needed to purchase more shares, not fewer, and buy out the French shareholders to form an international British-operated superhighway that would flow through the Suez Canal and secure English dominance in the region.

While members on both sides of the party lines agreed that British under-representation was a problem in the Suez Canal Company, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Northcote denied that the structure of the company was detrimental to British interests. He believed that it was wrong to assume that all twenty-one non-British members of the board would arbitrarily vote against British interests because the committee was initially created to give representatives of all nationalities an equal say. France appeared to control the board on a technicality because no other countries had been willing to send directors to the board. In the Chancellor's mind, the French were not dedicated to running the Canal according to French national interests. The French directors had the same interest in generating revenue from the Canal that the British did, so there was no reason to worry that they would block British commerce. The debate over the number of directors and role of the French was therefore of little importance and Northcote a waste of Parliament's time. The important issue was in the actual purchase of shares of the Canal Company and the revenue and power that will come from the Canal's partial control.¹⁵

While details of the arrangement such as the use of private funds and the

¹⁴ HC April 11 1876 vol 228 1565.

¹⁵ Ibid., cols 1568-1570.

political structure of the company were debated by Parliament, MPs also commented on the larger question of the Canal's ability to secure the Indian trade. Besides making the distance shorter to India, the canal provided a variety of other benefits to Britain's connection to the colony both economically and administratively. According to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, British ships made up 73 percent of the vessels that passed through the canal, and he predicted that in 1876 alone these ships would carry 1,500,000 tons of British and Indian goods, which is no small proportion of Britain's international trade.¹⁶

More importantly, the canal provided administrative advantages that protected Britain and its Indian colony in both times of war and peace because of cheaper and safer transportation of troops to India. Instead of having to stop at Alexandria and cross the land barrier to Suez or go around the Cape of Good Hope, British ships could go straight through the canal without serious impediment, which saved the government a substantial amount of money in fuel and ship maintenance. The Canal also allowed for quick trips to India in times of rebellion or famine and could save lives and secure India in the case of a revolt. All of these advantages existed before Britain bought the shares, but Northcote maintained that purchasing the shares ensured that they would be maintained. With Britain as part owner of the Canal, the French would not be able to charge exorbitant duties and other nations would not be able to blockade it, as they would have reason for military intervention. 27

In a response to the chancellor's motion, Peter Rylands acknowledged the economic and administrative benefits of the canal, but questioned the security that came with being a shareholder in the company. Rylands doubted that the shares' purchase would deter other nations from implementing a blockade of the canal and believed that military power is the only way to keep the canal secure. He ended his speech by asking, "If our fleet is swept away, what power was there in these £4,000,000 of worthless paper?"¹⁷

Beyond the ineffectiveness of purchasing the shares, Liberals including W.E. Gladstone and Robert Lowe argued securing a route to India was an afterthought and an unnecessary expenditure that could lead to increased intervention in India. Liberal Radicals in Parliament believed that free-trade policy would open up new markets for British manufactures regardless of whether these markets were direct colonies of the Empire. Because British manufactures could find markets in the free-trade economy, the military and diplomatic costs of maintaining the Indian colony outweighed the benefits that came from Indian trade. The only people who benefitted from this situation were colonial officials and merchants closely tied with the Tory Party

¹⁶ HC March 6 1876 col 1421.

¹⁷ HC Dec 5 1867 col 173.

who could now have an easier path to capitalize on Indian government and commerce. Therefore, the investment in a faster and safer route to Indian commerce that came with the Suez Canal Purchase was an unnecessary expenditure and in fact dangerous, because it would allow the state to become more embroiled within Indian affairs.¹⁸

Beyond the debate over the ethics of the private loan and the question of ownership and power, leading political figures argued over the extent to which the purchase of shares in the Canal Company would embroil Britain in the internal affairs of Egypt and make the country responsible for Egypt's financial and geopolitical security. Opposition leaders like Gladstone and Lowe were very concerned with this topic and raised questions about the ability of the British government to maintain stability in the Canal Zone. The main debate that occurred in Parliament over this topic revolved around the dispatch of paymaster general and Disraeli cabinet member Stephen Cave to help the Khedive reorganize his finances after bankruptcy by giving a series of loans to Egypt. The first criticisms of the project came from the Indian administrator and Parliament member George Campbell. He looked to the past and felt that misuse of past loans to the Egyptian government under different rulers meant that the country could not be trusted to use British money wisely. Loans intended to bolster Egyptian credit led instead to the Khedive's using the money for conquests in Africa, oppression of
28 Christian Turks, and the continuing of the slave trade that the British had been attempting to stop. Campbell therefore considered it unwise on moral grounds to give the Egyptians more money.¹⁹

In a response to Campbell's questions, Cave defended his actions as necessary for the well being of both Egypt and Britain. He claimed that without his intervention and exposure of the terrible state of Egyptian finances, the Ruler would, "like so many others in similar difficulties, have gone on shutting his eyes to the danger of the course he was pursuing, and the end would have been more hopelessly disastrous than the present crisis." Cave thus justified the British intervention on imperial grounds, claiming it was his and Britain's duty to save the economy of a people incapable of doing so themselves. Cave also answered Campbell by denying his portrayal of Egypt as a backward and aggressive country. Cave claimed that Egypt had many Western values and was a place where they "value the security of life and property and the most entire freedom of religious worship." Egypt was also a safe country where white women could travel by themselves with no fear, and therefore was a place for which "every Englishman must take especial interest as the gate of our mighty Empire in India."

Lowe saw many problems with Cave's justification of investment in Egypt,
18 Jim Powell, "William Ewart Gladstone's Great Campaigns for Peace and Freedom." The
Freeman: Foundation for Economic Education." Foundation for Economic Education.
19 HC Aug 5 1876 vol 231 cols 616-619.

and viewed Egyptian intervention as a path that would inevitably lead to “four acts “ of imperialism of which “the first of those acts may, I think, be named “intrusion;” the second, “inquisition;” the third, “suppression;” and the fourth and last, “repudiation.” The first act involved the British sending military envoys alongside the financial ministers to “ransack” the Khedives’ finances. Lowe believed that the British were “inserting” themselves in Egypt against the Khedive’s wishes or best interest, and this intrusion was unjustified. Second, in the “inquisition” act, Lowe maintained that the British government had infringed upon the rights of Egypt as a sovereign, independent country. The British government, according to Lowe, had “sent out persons with no right whatever to inquire, but the Khedive being in difficulties and almost at his wit’s end, was glad to do almost anything in the hope of getting some assistance of some kind or another.”

This predatory injection of Britain in Egyptian politics went beyond intrusion and inquisition and led the government to the act of suppression. After the two auditors had left Egypt, they produced a report on the state of Egyptian Finances that was released to Parliament and presented an unfairly negative outlook on Egypt’s financial situation. According the Lowe, the Khedive strongly opposed the report’s findings as well as its presentation to the government and the Queen on grounds that it was an unfair and biased representation of Egyptian finances that would deter further investment. The Khedive wanted to secure a loan from the crown or other financiers before the report was published, but the Disraeli administration published the report prematurely. This quick release made the Khedive’s state look unappealing for investors, and Lowe argued that it ruined Egyptian finances to the point where they might not recover. According to Lowe, the Khedive was subjugated to the will of the British government and his wishes were completely ignored, leaving him and Egypt in a worse situation because of the British government’s intervention. 29

After its acts of intrusion, inquisition, and suppression the British government, Lowe maintained, then enacted the “repudiation” of all responsibility for what had happened in Egypt. Lowe claims that Disraeli and his foreign minister, the Earl of Derby, had unfairly absolved themselves of any wrongdoing in Egypt even though they had forced the Egyptian economy into a terrible situation. Essentially, with Lowe’s four acts that he labels a “tragedy,” the British government had entered Egypt against the Khedive and people’s will, ransacked its finances while subjugating the king, and to top it off, rejected any notion of wrongdoing. Lowe’s argument mirrored many Liberal criticisms of Empire at that time by maintaining that imperialism allowed financial institutions to prey on the weakness of non-western countries to enrich themselves and the upper class at the detriment of both the foreign nation and the British national interests.²⁰

20 HC Aug 5 1876 vol 231 cols 645-649.

In a response to Lowe's accusations of Britain's abusive practices in Egypt, Wolff provided a scathing rebuttal. Wolff denied any wrongdoing or predatory practices in Egypt and argued that the Khedive wanted the British intervention. Wolff asserted that the British government did not hurt the finances of Egypt, but made them better by bringing the country's credit back to a natural level. This reform may have deterred some investors, but the British administration up for it by convincing French creditors in Cairo to re-invest in the Khedive due to his balanced credit.²¹

Although Wolff saw the re-financing of Egyptian debt as beneficial project, it was an afterthought, as he was more concerned with how the project helped England and its empire. He believed that by entering Egypt and working with its government, the British state had "shown it was determined to maintain her position in the Mediterranean, to keep open the thoroughfare to India, and that she was desirous to enable the Khedive to administer the affairs of a country in which he held so great an interest." In Wolff's mind, Cave's mission to Egypt helped all parties, and especially the British interest in the near East.

While Wolff saw this intervention as a beneficial project that would serve British interests, Gladstone saw this intrusion as a slippery slope that could
30 lead Egypt on the path to becoming a British colony. The debates in Parliament over the intrusion of private finance, representation in the Canal Company, the securing of Indian Trade, and intrusion in the Egyptian state are all facets of a larger argument about the imagination of the British Empire by two different men in the 1870s. Interestingly enough, in the 1880s, it is Gladstone, not Disraeli, who created the strong imperial connection to Egypt that Gladstone had warned against in the 1870s. As prime minister in 1882, the Liberal leader sent ships and troops to Egypt and made it a quasi-colony of the British Empire through a costly, bloody war—exactly what he had feared Disraeli would do.

²¹ Ibid., col 655.

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HUMAN-ANIMAL EMOTIONAL RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON EUROPEAN SOCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS, SIXTEENTH CENTURY – PRESENT DAY

Supriya Kamath

32 From the Holy Bible, which advocates kindness towards animals, to modern animal rights movements, the language of communication between humans and animals has always been powered by emotions. The human understanding of non-human emotional capacities has been essential to the configuration of the dynamic relationships between the two. The implications of fluctuating human-animal relationships, however, are not insular. Deeper insights into the affective economies of animals have created ripples in society at large, both justifying and challenging the validity of social constructs such as social hierarchy, the process of “civilization”, and our conception of justice, as well as scientific constructs such as taxonomies and contemporary experimental methods. As human interpretations of animal emotions have transformed from metaphysical to sensual to physiological, the need to form emotional and social contracts with animals has transformed accordingly. This need first became perceptible in the late sixteenth century, as the disintegration of medieval society and the introduction of ‘civilization’ as a social institution marked the beginning of an increasingly apparent ebb-and-flow in the distinctions between the concepts of *human* and *animalistic*.¹ Thus, from an examination of human and non-human emotional relations from the sixteenth century onwards, it is clear that developments in our understanding of non-human emotions over time have had a significant impact on prevailing social and scientific institutions, destabilizing them in some instances but perpetuating them in others.

The distinction between the intellectual and emotional capabilities of man and animal appears to have been at its sharpest in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. Interestingly, this is the very setting for the onset of the ‘civilizing process’. The end of the Middle Ages and the publication of Erasmus’ *De civilitate morum puerilium* in the early 1500s paved the way for the popularization of the new concept of *civilité*, or social propriety.² Translated directly as “A Little Book of Good Manners for Children,”³ Erasmus’ treatise was a detailed guide to appropriate social behaviors, including rules for clothing, dining and social interaction. It was not the first of its kind, but it was certainly the most comprehensive, and marked a post-medieval impulse to set

1 Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (1937; repr., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 47.

2 Ibid., 47.

3 Craig R. Thompson, trans., *The Collected Works of Erasmus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 70.

new, 'improved' standards of propriety, suggesting a heightened cognizance of such rules following the turbulent Middle Ages. Consequently, the civilizing process thus set into motion was fundamentally based on the drumming of the individual into a rigid affective mould (*habitus*), which compelled the individual to transform external social constraints into internal behavioral constraints via affective control mechanisms such as disgust, shame and guilt.⁴ Amongst these new social constraints was the compulsion to prevent the external manifestation of violent impulses, or "affective outbursts."⁵ The need to temper pleasurable but overt experiences of aggression was now transferred to wanton acts of cruelty against animals, described by Norbert Elias as the "transfer of emotions from direct action to spectating."⁶ sixteenth-century Parisians, for example, celebrated Midsummer's Day by burning cats. Describing the burning of cats as a "social institution," Elias states, "the joy in watching pain inflicted emerges in a particularly pure form, without any rational justification..."⁷

In order to understand how such unjustified cruelty towards animals became an essential mechanism to sustain the civilizing process, one must consider late sixteenth to seventeenth century notions about the emotional capacities of animals. One such notion is reflected in the writings of French philosopher Malebranche, in 1674. Adhering to the Cartesian 'beast-as-machine' doctrine, Malebranche believed that animals possessed "neither intelligence nor soul."⁸ He believed that if animals had feelings, they would experience pain, but since a kind God would not subject the innocent to pain, we must assume one of two things: one, animals with 'feelings' are sinful or two, animals do not possess feelings like pain and pleasure.⁹ Both justify acts of human cruelty towards animals. He believed that beasts could *sense* (passively), but not *perceive* – this required active intellectual awareness, which animals lacked because perceived acts of "intelligence" in animals were purely mechanical acts of self-preservation.¹⁰ However, the idea that animals were unthinking, unfeeling creatures was not adopted by all. Baruch Spinoza, in 1677, suggested that animals *did* have emotions, but these emotions were unlike human emotions, because they were of a fundamentally "brute nature."¹¹ His acknowledgement of animal emotions, therefore, was marked by a qualitative distinction between human nature and animal nature. He stated, "everybody beholds with admiration in animals what he dislikes and regards with aversion in men, like the warring of bees, the jealousy of doves, and so on. In men such things are detested, yet we esteem animals as more perfect because of

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4 Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 373.

5 Ibid., 163.

6 Ibid., 171.

7 Ibid., 171.

8 Nicolas Malebranche, *The Search After Truth*, ed. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp (1674; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 494.

9 Ibid., 351-352.

10 Ibid., 495.

11 Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. W.H. White. (1677; repr. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), Part III Proposition 57, Note.

them.”¹² Clark argues that this is evidence for Spinoza’s belief that although the actions of animals are labelled using moral terms (like ‘warring’ or ‘incest’) we do not attribute qualities of ‘vice’ or ‘virtue’ to these actions; so if animals are not *condemned* for their “vices”, they cannot reasonably be *pitied* either.¹³ Thus, Spinoza concluded that humans, being superior by virtue of their moral nature, could use animals for their pleasure and advantage.¹⁴

34 These ideas, while dissimilar in their specifics, highlight a common idea that shaped the general social attitudes towards animals at the time: animals were not seen as being worthy objects of human emotion. Whether they lacked feeling or possessed feelings that were “different” from those of human beings, human emotional investment in animals was seen to be futile, and perhaps even impossible. The impact of this idea, echoed by many if not all philosophers of the time, is evident in the transformation of the scientific method of vivisection into a public spectacle in the sixteenth century—the trickling of an established practice of animal exploitation from the scientific sphere to the social sphere made it clear that rational justification in the form of ‘scientific pursuit’ was now unnecessary; the fact that animals were *not* embedded in the human web of social interdependence was sufficient justification for animals to be used as “safe” outlets for aggression.¹⁵ Interestingly, like the civilizing mechanism itself, permission to abuse animals came from above: in Paris, it was the king who set the cats’ pyre on fire, and it was high-ranking clergymen who constituted the first audiences for public vivisection.¹⁶ Thus the problem of channeling aggressive impulses in a non-socially-disruptive way found resolution in the philosophical paradigm of ‘unfeeling animals,’ which claimed that animals lacked the capacity to feel and reciprocate feelings as humans did, and could, therefore, be used as per the needs of human society with little regard for moral issues. This made it inevitable that social institutions involved in the “civilization” of the individual would come to be stabilized by, and to some extent dependent on, socially-permitted acts of cruelty towards animals.

Visible cracks in this perception of the unfeeling animal, closely associated with the idea of the ‘unreasoning’ animal, began to appear in the eighteenth century. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most ideas put forth about the nature of animal emotions created an environment conducive to *existing* practices, such as the use of animals for purposes of entertainment (in circuses, etc.). Even Malebranche interpreted Cartesian doctrines in a way that justified animal cruelty, when La Mettrie, in 1748, interpreted the same doctrines to suggest that *both* man and animals were instinctual machines.¹⁷

¹² Michael L. Morgan and Samuel Shirley, comp. *Spinoza: The Complete Works* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), 808.

¹³ Stephen R.L. Clark, *Animals and Their Moral Standing* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 90.

¹⁴ Spinoza, *Ethics*, 57.

¹⁵ Catherine Tiplady, *Animal Abuse: Helping Animals and People* (Oxfordshire: CABI, 2013), 10.

¹⁶ Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 47; Tiplady, *Animal Abuse: Helping Animals and People*, 10.

¹⁷ Julien Offray de La Mettrie, *Machine Man and Other Writings*, trans. Ann Thomson (Cam-

This shift in paradigms became clear with the publication of David Hume's 'A Treatise on Human Nature' in 1739. Like Malebranche, Hume differentiated between "original impressions" ('sensations' such as pleasure and pain) and "reflective impressions" ('perceptions' or contemplative experiences of emotion).¹⁸ In Hume's view, however, animals possessed both. He proposed that animals possessed a form of reason equivalent to man, suggesting that "Reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls."¹⁹ Since animals possessed instinctive capabilities for reasoning, they could *appraise* sensations and have feelings akin to human beings. Thus by taking the behavioral approach to metaphysical doctrines, Hume deduced that animals could reason and feel.

The ideas of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been so far-reaching that these new insights had significant consequences for human-animal relations, and certain social institutions. Firstly, the recognition of the affective capacities of animals gave rise to a new feeling of kinship between man and animals. As Jane Spenser notes, "From the 1740s onwards, a number of Anglican churchmen tackled the question of animals' mental and feeling capacities as part of a moral argument for the human duty of kindness to beasts."²⁰ The trickling of philosophical ideas into the social sphere, therefore, was mandated by new religious discourse. The domination of the Church by the aristocracy, however, meant that these ideas (like the initial stages of the civilizing process) took root in the upper classes, which, in turn, had a perpetuating effect on notions of social superiority and inferiority manifested in the social hierarchy. The ability to show compassion towards animals now became a unique capacity of the gentry, whereas the "immoral" lower classes continued to enact violence against inferior beasts. This is evident in Hogarth's series of prints, 'The Four Stages of Cruelty' (1751). The first print depicts Tom Nero—a member of the underclass—torturing a dog, while other members of the underclass throw cats from windows and set them on fire. A well-dressed member of the upper class attempts to protect the dog, and the accompanying text reads, "Learn from this fair Example—You/ Whom savage Sports delight/ How Cruelty disgusts the view/ While Pity charms the sight."²¹ In the second image, Nero and other members of the underclass are depicted to be whipping horses and sheep. Here, the text refers to Nero as an "inhuman wretch."²²

These images provide significant insights into the importance of the "sensitive animal" to the perpetuation of social distinctions between classes and the maintenance of the institution of social hierarchy. Amongst the ways in

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3–4.

¹⁸ Jane Spenser, "Animal Feeling in The Century Before Darwin," *Clio Medica* 93, no. 1 (2013): 30.

¹⁹ David Hume, "Of The Reason of Animals," in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739; repr., Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003): 127.

²⁰ Spenser, "Animal Feeling in the Century Before Darwin," 37.

²¹ William Hogarth, *First Stage of Cruelty*, 1751. Print, 37.7 cm x 31.8 cm. The British Museum

²² William Hogarth, *Second Stage of Cruelty*, 1751. Print, 37.7 cm x 31.8 cm. The British Museum.

which to distinguish the gentry from the lower classes was the upper classes' enhanced moral capacities, as well as the perceived exclusivity of certain emotions to the gentry, with sympathy being amongst these. With the recognition of the fact that animals can feel, cruelty towards animals became an immoral and "inhuman" action. The upper classes' quality of being "human"—as opposed to the "savage" and immoral character of the lower classes—meant that they were necessarily required to display sympathy towards animals—it was, after all, a "cardinal human virtue."²³ The lower classes' cruelty and lack of compassion, however, was necessitated by their perceived general immorality and social rank. Thus the ability to empathize became a marker of social superiority, and consequently, the capacity for pity was seen as being exclusive to the gentry. Hence it is evident that the recognition of the fact that animals *could* feel made them worthy objects of emotion, tying them inextricably to a social hierarchy that was sustained by, amongst other things, the relative emotive capacities of different classes. The construct of social hierarchy, therefore, was stabilized by the targeted appropriation of the idea of the 'sensitive animal' by the aristocracy.

36 The aforementioned developments in our understanding of non-human emotions clearly demonstrate the effect of new insights in this field on the stabilization of constructs such as social hierarchy and social standards of civility. But no metaphysical or scientific insights had a greater impact on social and scientific institutions than the physiology-based discoveries of Charles Darwin, and his evolutionary theory. In 1872, Darwin published *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* which advocated the shared emotional heritage of man and animal, and the universality of emotional expression across species, races, and social classes. Darwin situated emotions within the realm of "innate elementary urges" called drives, which men shared with animals.²⁴ Drives (or instincts) were largely free of wilful control, as were their behavioral manifestations, and had arisen from "long-continued and inherited habit(s)."²⁵ Darwin's ideas were not without precedence—after all, Malebranche had advocated for the presence of "actions and sensible movements" that compel beasts to "preserve their lives," whereas Hume had suggested that reason and emotion are instinctive.²⁶ But the cross-cultural proof provided by Darwin for his theory was irrefutable; it was clear that all races had "descended from a single parent-stock."²⁷

The idea that there was a definite homology between the behaviour of humans and of animals was tremendously destabilizing to prevailing social institutions. By suggesting that the core of the human being is fundamentally

23 Ute Frevert, "Defining Emotions: Concepts and Debates Over Three Centuries," in *Emotional Lexicons* by Frevert et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 13.

24 Pascal Eitler, "The Origin of Emotions: Sensitive Animals, Sensitive Humans," in *Emotional Lexicons* by Frevert et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107.

25 Charles Darwin, *The Expression of The Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872; repr. London: Penguin Group, 2009), 50.

26 Malebranche, *The Search After Truth*, 323.

27 Darwin, *The Expression of The Emotions in Man and Animals*, 329.

animalistic, the theory not only challenged the belief that man was akin to the gods, but also threatened the premise of the civilizing process. The idea of civility necessarily depended on the idea that controlling aggressive impulses was an essentially *human* quality. The new Darwinian notion that the “true nature” of humans was that of the animal countered the idea of enculturation and civility, and justified the regression of human beings into their original, pure fighting form – this would be hugely threatening to the existence of civilized societies. In reaction to this, the concept of essentially human “moral, intellectual and aesthetic drives” emerged, which superseded uncontrollable “animal sensual drives” and reinstituted the place of civilization and self-control as concepts essential to human society.²⁸

Darwin’s theory was also destabilizing to prevailing scientific institutions. This was an era during which there had been a scientific impetus to categorize—to create taxonomies and hierarchies of qualitative distinction across species and races. The predominant scientific belief pre-Darwinism was that biological constitutions of different races could be associated with various cultural and behavioral hallmarks, and the notion of biology as being immutable had exacerbated scientific racism, wherein some groups were perceived as being biologically superior to others. This was seen to justify colonialism, and even within Darwin’s cross-cultural research, colonial officials’ tendency to misinterpret natives’ emotional expression by painting it as “savage” or “inferior” is evident.²⁹ Darwin’s postulates about the physiological equivalency and brotherhood of all men unsettled this narrative and classified as arbitrary all the distinctions that imperial powers had perpetuated in order to justify the warped balance of power between colonizers and colonized. Similarly, social distinctions based on emotive capacities, as described earlier, also came to be threatened, largely due to the theory of instinctive sympathy put forth by Darwin in extension of his original evolutionary theory. Darwin believed that moral impulses were innate and instinctive, and that they had evolved due to the advantage conferred by them on animal social groups.³⁰ In the words of Paul White, “the superior status attributed to ‘higher’ mental powers and productions [...] was potentially undermined by Darwin’s account of human virtue as an animal emotion.”³¹ No longer could the upper classes be viewed as more virtuous or more moral than the underclass; behavioral social distinctions based on their alleged “greater capacity” for empathy and fellow-feeling were in danger of collapsing irreparably.

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It is in this context of social destabilization that parts of the Darwinian thesis began to be appropriated for specific social and ideological programs. Amongst these was Social Darwinism. Social Darwinists suggested that Darwin’s theory of “survival of the fittest” applied not only to animals but to hu-

²⁸ Eitler, “The Origin of Emotions: Sensitive Animals, Sensitive Humans,” 107.

²⁹ Paul White, “Darwin’s Emotions: The Scientific Self and The Sentiment of Objectivity,” *Isis* 100, no. 4 (2009): 818.

³⁰ Paul White, “Becoming an Animal: Darwin and The Evolution of Sympathy,” *Clio Medica* 93, no. 1 (2013): 112.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 124.

man groups as well; consequently, only the “fittest” individuals would survive. This was seen to justify distinctions and social hierarchies, because it was believed that inequality and social categorization was a natural, self-sustaining process aimed at separating the fit from the unfit, who would eventually be removed from society, leading to the formation of “pure” groups or races. As Margrit Pernau notes, “It was argued that history could be arranged in a sequence of ‘stages of development’, from ‘rude and barbarous’ beginnings to the ‘ages of civility and politeness.’”³² Thus, through Social Darwinism, the distinctive characteristics of different social groups were tied to their superior or inferior physical constitutions, which were thought to determine an individual’s innate ability to survive in the social environment. For Social Darwinists, this social extrapolation of evolutionary theory conveniently eclipsed postulates about the physiological equivalency of all men, and they began using their perception of class distinctions as being “predetermined” by nature to encourage the perpetuation of social hierarchies.

38 Such perpetuation was evident in the emergence of practices like eugenics, which advocated procreation amongst people with “desirable” traits and the elimination of people with undesirable traits (the poor, the criminals, the mentally disabled and the “savages” from non-Western cultures) from the gene pool, to ensure the purity of the civilized races and upper classes. This represented a hijacking of Darwin’s ideas, and a misinterpretation of his theory about the human’s descent from animals—groups unschooled in Western ideals of civility were seen as being closer to unevolved beasts, and thus biologically unfit and destined for extinction. With overpopulation by the underclass and the consequent emergence of mass politics, this also highlighted the upper classes’ fear of demographic decline and consequently, its perceived devolution—the propagation of biological determinism was a powerful way in which to sustain social distinctions when social markers such as rules of conduct proved inadequate.³³ It is clear, therefore, that while the insights provided by Darwin about the common ancestry and the homology of emotions in man and animals did initially destabilize social institutions of hierarchy and cultural superiority, they were eventually appropriated as evidence used to stabilize these very institutions.

In addition to social institutions, the advocacy of human-animal kinship by Darwin’s theories also destabilized scientific institutions. Since antiquity, the biological sciences had relied on the experimental method of vivisection, because animals were seen as subjects on which one could conduct experiments that couldn’t be performed on human beings. But the recognition of the fact that animals possessed ‘human’ feelings like sorrow and pain, the increasing psychologization of animals, and the subsequent pedagogical impetus that encouraged the display of empathy towards animals in order to nurture a

32 Margrit Pernau, “Civility and Barbarism: Emotions as Criteria of Difference” in *Emotional Lexicons* by Frevert et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 241.

33 Richard A. Soloway, *Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in Twentieth-Century Britain* (University of North Carolina Press, 1990, 1995), 38.

generally compassionate character in human beings led to the politicization of animal-human relationships and the rise of passionate anti-vivisection movements.³⁴ In fact, the very *definition* of emotion was influenced by the perception of the ‘sensitive animal’—experimenters began to define emotion in ways that would prevent “political entanglements.”³⁵ For example, pain was seen as a non-emotion because attempts to induce pain in lab animals would be met with public outcry. In the words of Otniel E. Dror, “The elimination of pain was both a scientific and a political act.”³⁶ As a result, the protocol of objectivity animating methods of scientific investigation was also unsettled: the emotional detachment and mechanical precision that defined the sciences and scientists, although still essential, was no longer their *sole* attribute. Experimenters had to necessarily shift between the strict discipline of the laboratory and sympathy in the social environment for the wider social acceptability of their research.³⁷ The growing perception of animals as being “fellow creatures,” therefore, destabilized the scientific institution by raising ethical questions about animal experimentation and introducing the idea of emotional economy in the sciences.³⁸

Today, the question of treating animals “correctly” transcends the realm of scientific experimentation. The extremely close relationship between man and animals in modern times raises significant, potentially destabilizing questions for social institutions that were long considered to be essentially human constructs. One such construct is justice. The recognition of sentience in animals raises the question of whether it is sufficient to display compassion and humanity towards animals, or if these values should be concretized and institutionalized in the form of justice instead.³⁹ Most traditional views disagree with the latter. Kant’s rational contractarian approach, for example didn’t picture animals as objects of direct moral obligation, since they were incapable of reciprocity.⁴⁰ Even those who did admit the role of sentiment, like Rawls, saw animals merely as objects of “duties of compassion and humanity;” animals could not be given rights since they did not participate in the framing of the principles of justice.⁴¹ The community of loyalties to which principles of justice applied, therefore, was traditionally restricted to the human species.

The unsettling of this idea of justice as traditionally conceived, therefore, results from a new belief that animals, being emotionally equivalent to humans, form a part of this community of interests. This community is no longer seen as being static; it constantly expands and contracts. The blurring of the

34 Eitler, “The Origin of Emotions: Sensitive Animals, Sensitive Humans,” 113-114.

35 Otniel E. Dror, “Fear and Loathing in The Laboratory and Clinic,” in *Medicine, Emotion and Disease, 1700–1950*, by Fay Bound Alberti (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 137.

36 Ibid., 137.

37 White, “Darwin’s Emotions: The Scientific Self and The Sentiment of Objectivity,” 825.

38 Eitler, “The Origin of Emotions: Sensitive Animals, Sensitive Humans,” 112.

39 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Beyond Compassion and Humanity,” in *Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions* by Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 299.

40 Ibid., 300.

41 Ibid., 299.

lines between reason and emotion means that justice—thought by Kant to spring solely from reason—can now be conceived as a loyalty to a larger group to which an individual identifies himself as belonging, and the recognition of animal-human kinship means that this group may transcend species.⁴² Nussbaum, therefore, advocates the capabilities approach to justice, which formulates the unjustness of actions on the basis of harm done to complex organisms with the ability to flourish and inspire wonder.⁴³ The belief that compassion is insufficient because it excludes the concept of blame for harm-doing leads Nussbaum to argue that animals should be recipients of all the basic entitlements that the term “justice” encompasses.⁴⁴ Additionally, Nussbaum’s consideration of *sentience* as the threshold condition for membership to the community of entitlements further contends the idea of justice as being a bastion of rationality alone.⁴⁵ Thus the growing emotional proximity of animals and humans has in many ways contributed to the toppling of the idea of morality and justice as being rational, eternal ideals consisting of universal principles; contemporary scholars are now formulating justice as deriving from loyalties to communities of belonging—or communities of feeling—instead.

40 It is evident that new insights into the emotional economies of animals have consistently influenced social and cultural attitudes towards animals, and subsequent developments in human-animal relationships have had considerable repercussions for social and scientific institutions. History has shown us that regardless of whether they were viewed as scapegoats, evidence of nature’s prowess or simply man’s best friends, animals are inextricable from the human experience, as viewed from the sociological perspective. While animals have always commanded a central role in pastoral societies, we do not often think of animals as being indispensable to the evolution of post-industrial society—and yet, as their position as key subjects in the philosophies of paradigm-changing thinkers has shown, they are clearly indispensable to modern sociological structures upon which society rests. The stabilization of the civilizing process through ‘cathartic’ spectacles of animal abuse, the perpetuation of social hierarchies based on the capacity to form emotional attachments with animals, the strengthening of social hierarchies by ideas of biological “purity”, challenges to the construct of civility, the destabilization of scientific institutions based on scientific racism, objectivity and experimental methods of vivisection, and the unsettling of justice as being a rational and essentially human construct were clearly influenced by our changing conceptions of animal affects, as delineated by diverse groups of philosophers, physiologists and sociologists from different eras and contexts of comprehension. It is clear, therefore, that the miracle of cross-species interaction via bonds of emotion transcends the realm of the spiritual, and that the development of human-animal relations has had (and continues to have) notable effects on human society at large.

42 Richard Rorty, “Justice As a Larger Loyalty” in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* by Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 45.

43 Nussbaum, “Beyond Compassion and Humanity,” 305-306.

44 Ibid, 302.

45 Ibid, 309.

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HOW TO EXIT MERCANTILE EMPIRE: THE DEBATE IN 1790s AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY OVER THE ROLE OF MANUFACTURES AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

Scott Kanchuger

In 1776, the American colonists revolted from England's empire to formulate themselves as an independent republican nation free of British mercantile influence. Before the revolution British mercantilism restricted American shipping and dictated what goods and products the colonists could produce and trade. The revolutionaries believed that by breaking away from England they, in contrast to the restrictive British Mercantile system, could institute a system of free trade that would liberate American commerce. After the Revolutionary War, Britain prohibited American trade with their West Indies colonies, which compromised a quarter of American export trade.¹ Furthermore, the British Corn Laws excluded American wheat from the British home market. America in the 1780s was an agrarian economy that relied heavily on foreign trade. Because of British policies to exclude America from international markets, American farmers continually produced an agricultural surplus in the late 1780s and had to sell their products at a markdown leading to significant economic malice in America.² By the early 1790s, America imported much more than it exported and emergency tariffs were implemented by Congress just to meet debt interest payments that arose from America's trade deficit.³ In the early 1790s America found itself more marginalized by British mercantilism and economic hegemony than before the Revolutionary War. The Founding Fathers main concern in the 1790s was not only how to restructure American political economy in order to uphold American republican values, but also how to thrive in a world dominated by British mercantilism.

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Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Virginia House of Representatives member James Madison offered one solution for how to combat British economic hegemony. These two future presidents envisioned an American economy that would maintain its agrarian decentralized structure and continue to expand westward to allow all men to own property and maintain their liberty. To keep America in an agrarian stage of development, they sought to enact harsh commercial discriminatory policies against Britain.

1 Douglas A. Irwin, "Revenue or Reciprocity? Founding Feuds over Early U.S. Trade Policy," *The National Bureau For Economic Research*, July 2009, 7.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 25.

They believed that because America produced a necessity for Britain, namely agricultural products, while Britain manufactured luxury goods for America, that Britain would suffer from the stoppage of trade with America and give into their demands of creating a free trade internationalist system with America as the world's *de facto* breadbasket. America would serve as the center of this free trade metabolism because America would be the world's largest market for international manufacturing products and the largest supplier of agricultural produce and natural resources.

Conversely, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton found Jefferson and Madison's proposal to be ineffective and delusional. He saw a world that would remain under British economic control and sought to construct an American political economic system that would enable America to thrive within the British mercantile world. Hamilton's plan called for continuing trade with England—America's primary trade partner—as the customs duties on imported British goods compromised a majority of American government revenue.⁴ The revenue from customs duties on British imports kept America credit rating strong, which enabled America to have access to British credit and capital, while also funding the debt of Hamilton's recently created National Bank. To Hamilton the debt of the National Bank provided an additional source of capital for America's economy. Furthermore, Hamilton called for increased government centralization to better enforce tariffs and allocate state bounties (subsidies) to develop American manufactures. For Hamilton an extensive manufacturing industry would not only increase America's production powers, but also stabilize America's agricultural industry by creating a greater domestic market for agriculture, lessening American farmers' dependence on unstable international markets for agricultural produce.

By examining the fiery debate, over the role of manufactures in American society and of commercial relations with Britain, between Alexander Hamilton versus Thomas Jefferson and James Madison that was carried out in Congressional debates, letters and myriad publications from 1791 to 1795, we see two fundamentally different proposals for America's future political economy. Jefferson and Madison proposed a system of harsh commercial discriminatory policies against Britain in order to create an international free trade system that would enable America to maintain its agrarian economy and decentralized regionally independent American republican society. Hamilton, meanwhile, proposed a territorially bounded and regionally interdependent American political economy with a more active centralized government in order to facilitate the accumulation of capital and development of America's nascent manufacturing sector. While both systems advocate an exit from British mercantile empire, however, they also envision maintaining a partnership with Britain. For Jefferson and Madison, their system looked to incorporate Britain as a trade partner on more equitable and fair terms. For Hamilton, his system seeks continued access to British capital and an

4 Ibid.

emulation of Britain's economic and financial mechanisms in order to create an America less reliant on British financial and manufacturing industries.

The ideas of classical eighteenth century European political economy influenced Jefferson, Madison and Hamilton. French physiocrats and Scottish eighteenth century political economists like Francois Quesnay, John Millar, and Adam Smith formulated the idea that societies developed in an evolutionary process of discrete stages of social development.⁵ The four stages were described as hunting, pasturage, agricultural and commercial societies with the final commercial stage of development looking like English society, a nation with extensive commercial and manufacturing industries. Many of these political economists, however, noted the maladies of a society in the commercial stage. These political economists posited that nations like Britain suffered from overpopulation, which forced the British people into urban areas where manufacturing was the only outlet for employment, which suppressed wages and created a stratified society.

Jefferson and Madison agreed with the ideas of classical political economists on the benefits of maintaining an agrarian society versus becoming a manufacturing based society. Jefferson endorsed the commercial agrarian model in his 1781 book *Notes on the State of Virginia*. Jefferson saw America as having an "immensity of land" that would provide employment for a rapidly expanding population barring the need for extensive domestic manufactures.⁶ Madison offered a similar approval for an agrarian commercial society in his 1792 essay *Republican Distribution of Citizens*. Madison wrote that the "husbandmen" has "happiness" and "an appurtenance of his property and his employment."⁷ He continued by asserting that farmers who "provide at once their own food and raiment" are the "best basis of public liberty."⁸ Madison in a subsequent essay, "Fashion", portrayed Britain's manufactures as an impoverished class of dependents. He writes that the 20,000 Britons employed in Birmingham's buckle manufactures will become unemployed depending on whether a "wanton youth" decides to "fasten his straps with strings or with buckles."⁹ Madison extended this analogy to illustrate how manufacturing nations are dependent upon the "caprices of fancy" of another nation.¹⁰ Madison then juxtaposed this deplorable condition with the "independent situation" of America. In America citizens live "on their own soil "where "labour is necessary to its cultivation," which inspires "a dignified sense of social rights" that are not found in England.¹¹ Jefferson and Madison viewed the agrarian model as the economic form America must

5 Drew R. McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 1980), 18-19.

6 Ibid., 14.

7 James Madison, "Republican Distribution of Citizens," *National Gazette*, March 5, 1792, Constitutional Society.

8 Ibid.

9 James Madison, "Fashion," *The National Gazette*, March 22, 1792, Constitution Society.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

maintain because it creates an egalitarian society necessary for upholding a republican form of government.

While Jefferson and Madison envisioned America becoming a commercialized agrarian society that would serve as the center of an international free trade system, Alexander Hamilton in his *Report on Manufactures* presented to Congress on December 5, 1791 proposed a much different formula for America's future political economy. Hamilton argued for a system that was territorially bounded with a more active centralized government. He called for channeling of capital to America's manufacturing sector, continued trade with Britain and a greater emulation of Britain's political economy.

46 Hamilton began his *Report on Manufactures* by debunking the idea that agriculture is a nation's most productive economic sector. Hamilton wrote, "the reality of this suggestion" of an agrarian economy as the most productive form of economy is not "verified by any accurate detail of facts and calculations; and the general arguments, which are adduced to prove it are rather subtil and paradoxical, than solid or convincing."¹² Hamilton then addressed the ideology of Jefferson and Madison that farming is the most productive form of employment by declaring that manufacturing is year round while farming is "liable to various and long intermissions..." Hamilton further attacked the virtues of farming by writing that a farmer can be successful "even with a degree of carelessness in the mode of cultivation" as a farmer's success often relies on the quality of his land and weather patterns.¹³ He then posited that an American employed in manufacturing relies less on luck but on their "ingenuity" to create better products.¹⁴ Hamilton portrayed manufacturing as the ultimate meritocratic industry, thus aligning manufacturing with American Republican values that stress the importance of a meritocratic and equitable society.

After attacking Jefferson and Madison's ideological convictions for why America should maintain its agrarian structure, Hamilton proposed that America needs an expanded manufacturing industry due to the division of labor between manufactures and farmers, which would encourage innovation and the accumulation of wealth within America. Another reason why Jefferson and Madison dismissed developing an extensive domestic manufacturing industry was because they believed farmers could adequately supply themselves with clothing and other manufactured products.¹⁵ Hamilton asserted that a system where farmers were expected to both till the land and then provide themselves with their manufacturing needs, places an unfair strain on farmers and lowers America's overall production. Hamilton rather supported the division of labor at a national level. He argued that by having a division of labor between farmers and manufactures it increases a nation's

¹² House, *Report on Manufactures*, by Alexander Hamilton, 2nd Cong., H. Rept., 974, Library of Congress.

¹³ Ibid., 976.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Madison, "Republican Distribution of Citizens."

production potential as men could focus the entirety of their workday on one pursuit, which encouraged ingenuity and innovation. Hamilton declared that greater innovation stems from the manufacturing industry as manufacturing relies on machines, which are more susceptible to innovation. He saw the invention of the cotton mill in England as a perfect example of how the division of labor increases a nation's technological prowess and production. In England the Cotton Mill runs "during the night, as well as through the day" propelling England to become the world's largest producer of cotton products.¹⁶ Hamilton stressed that manufactures increase employment, which is most evident in England where "it is computed that 4/7" of manufacture workers are "women and children."¹⁷ Here we see how Hamilton looked towards England's political economy as a model to emulate. He later noted that the wealth, independence, and security of a country "appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures."¹⁸ For Hamilton, American manufacturing would allow the American farmer to continue his occupation, while his wife and children worked in the manufacturing industry increasing the family's wealth. Consequently, this accumulation of wealth would benefit America because American demand for domestic manufacturers would increase and American demand for foreign manufactures would decrease, ensuring American independence.

Hamilton then argued that the promotion of an American manufacturing industry would create a more stable market for American agriculture domestically. Hamilton wrote that the "exertions of husbandmen" depend on the fluctuations "of the markets on which he must depend."¹⁹ These fluctuations stem from the changing international demand of agricultural products that make the "domestic market... preferred to a foreign one..."²⁰ By having an extensive manufacturing industry there would be a large class of American workers dependent upon the American agricultural sector. Hamilton responded to the economic malice of the late 1780s caused from inadequate foreign demand for American agriculture. This creation of a steady and dependable domestic market for agricultural produce would further incentivize investment into the land, as farmers would seek more robust harvests. Overtime, Hamilton asserted this dependability would increase the value of the land and America's productive powers. Hamilton also found that a burgeoning manufacturing sector required a multitude of resources and input materials. Since America has an abundance of land and diversity of resources at its disposal, Hamilton proclaims that these natural advantages should not be traded away to support European manufacturing, but rather utilized domestically to support America's manufactures for the benefit of all American's.²¹

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16 House, *Report on Manufactures*, by Alexander Hamilton, 2nd Cong., H. Rept., 981, Library of Congress.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 1005.

19 Ibid., 984.

20 Ibid., 985.

21 Ibid., 986-989.

After outlining the benefits for channeling capital to American manufactures, Hamilton argued that American trade must be continued with the British in order to have access to British capital. He welcomed the introduction of foreign capital into the United States and explained that those who shun foreign capital are “unreasonable.”²² Foreign capital puts into “motion a greater quantity of productive labor” than can exist without it.²³ To Hamilton this foreign capital acquired from trade with Britain could be invested in any industry or region for the benefit of all Americans, which shows how Hamilton is imaging a regionally interconnected domestic economy. He declared that foreign capital has already been invested for improving “public communications” and the nation’s infrastructure.²⁴ Furthermore, when foreign capital enters the United States it hurts European nations as they lose their own capital that could be invested in their own nations. Since Britain is America’s largest trade partner Hamilton saw Britain as a source of much needed capital.

48 While Hamilton lauded British capital that enters America, he asserted that America’s best source of capital is the funded debt of the National Bank. Hamilton wrote that “There is a species of Capital actually existing within the United States, which relieves from all inquietude on the score of want Capital – This is the funded debt.”²⁵ Hamilton wrote that critics of the funded debt point to the annual interest payment on debt as capital that leaves the United States. Hamilton asserted, however, that this is an unsophisticated view of public finance because the increase of the banks debt allowed for more loans to be given to American manufactures, farmers, and communities, which encouraged the development of industries and subsequent accumulation of capital. He cites Britain’s Central Bank’s success in stimulating Britain manufacturing as proof of why America needs a similar financial mechanism.²⁶ Because America runs a trade deficit with Britain this deficit increases the debt of Hamilton’s National Bank portraying how the debate over manufactures and trade with England was closely tied to his interests in creating a more sophisticated American financial system. Furthermore, we see Hamilton’s chief concern was accumulating capital within the United States in order to develop the nation’s manufactures to boost the productive powers of America.

Hamilton concluded his report by outlining how protective tariffs and pecuniary bounties would foster the accumulation of capital and the development of America’s manufacturing industry. He wrote that tariffs and duties are “an efficacious mean of encouraging national manufacturing...”²⁷ Hamilton asserted, however, that tariffs and duties are only effective when a

²² Ibid., 995.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 995-996.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 998.

²⁷ Ibid., 1009.

manufacture has made enough “progress” to compete with European manufactures.²⁸ Because America’s manufacturing industry was greatly underdeveloped, Hamilton saw that bounties to particular manufactures are the most effective way to encourage the growth of America’s manufacturing industry. He wrote that in “new undertakings” bounties “are oftentimes necessary.”²⁹ Hamilton addressed the concern against bounties that they “enrich particular classes” and asserted that his bounties would create new American industries, increase the nation’s capital stock, and in turn, ensure American independence as the nation would not rely on foreign manufactures anymore. Furthermore, Hamilton addressed the legality of his proposition to use bounties to fund America’s manufactures.³⁰ While bounties had never been used in America before, he cites the “general welfare” clause of the constitution as giving him the right to enact a bounty measure to promote manufacturing for the good of the American people.³¹

Hamilton’s bounty proposal infuriated Jefferson and Madison, as they believed bounties to specific manufactures placed the federal government in too central of a role in American enterprise. Shortly after the publication of Hamilton’s *Report on Manufactures*, James Madison expressed his disdain with the bounty’s proposition in a letter to Virginian politician, Edmund Pendleton. Madison wrote that Hamilton’s interpretation of the general welfare clause is “a new constitutional doctrine of vast consequences” that infringes on American republicanism.³² He continued by writing that Hamilton was subsidizing “artificial” monopolies at the expense of the private “natural” producers, creating an unrepugnant disparity in wealth.³³ To Madison, Hamilton’s bounty proposal would go against the laissez-faire republican principles that America was founded upon.

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Jefferson in a letter sent to George Washington on May 23, 1792 expressed similar scorn with Hamilton’s bounty mechanism. Jefferson wrote that Hamilton interprets the general welfare clause as giving the government the right to “exercise all powers” for the benefit of the general public. Jefferson declared, however, that this seemingly benign assertion by Hamilton carries powerful consequences: “There was indeed a sham-limitation of the universality of this power to cases where money is employed... Thus the object of these plans taken together is to draw all the powers of the government into the hands of the general legislature...”³⁴ Here, Jefferson’s chief concern with Hamilton’s proposed system for America’s political economy was Hamilton’s call for a more centralized federal government.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 1010.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² McCoy, *The Elusive Republic*, 154.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., *Jefferson vs. Hamilton: Confrontations That Shaped a Nation* (Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), 98.

To Jefferson and Madison, Hamilton's call for increased centralization was an attack on their republican values. Jefferson and Madison viewed Hamilton as wanting to create a federal system that had more in common with Britain's political economy than the decentralized state system they supported during the revolution and in the passing of the Constitution. Jefferson and Madison imagined the United States' domestic economy in a more local and regional sense than Hamilton. Their anger over the bounties portrayed their idea for a regionalized American economy as they saw the bounties as favoring northern elites that would create an aristocratic class similar to Great Britain's. Meanwhile, Hamilton viewed America's political economy in a more regionally connected, nationalized, and centralized manner. In his *Report on Manufactures* Hamilton argued that his system of promoting manufactures would increase the nation's capital stock and productive powers for the good of all Americans. Hamilton envisioned a more complex American economy in which there existed a symbiotic relationship between America's manufacturing and agricultural sectors. To Hamilton, America needed a centralized government to facilitate the development of an integrated American economy and encourage the accumulation of capital to eventually rival the powers of Europe. While the bounties were the only part of Hamilton's plan that was rejected by Congress, due to the harsh opposition to them from Madison and Jefferson, this point of contention portrays some of the ideological differences between the architects of America's political economy. Additionally, by examining the continued debate over manufactures and the role of commercial relations with Britain we see how Madison and Jefferson imagined America's future political economy as being the focal point of an international free trade system.

Thomas Jefferson in his address to Congress in December of 1793 entitled *The Privileges and Restrictions on the Commerce of the United States in Foreign Countries* argued for commercial discriminatory policies on Britain in order to force Britain to abide by his free trade system. Jefferson first diagnosed the problem of America's trade with Britain. He notes that American "navigation" with Great Britain is "excluded from the security of fixed laws."³⁵ While other nations are "secured by standing laws" American ships are prohibited from the carrying "of our own domestic productions and manufactures."³⁶ Furthermore, Jefferson remarked that American ships cannot carry agricultural produce to Great Britain; rather Britain will send ships to pick up American agriculture and send back British goods, charging a carrying fee in the process.³⁷ Because of these maladies Jefferson posited that commercial discrimination must be taken against Britain to free America from the shackles of British mercantilism and create a free trade international system for the benefit of American commerce.

³⁵ House, *The Privileges and Restrictions on the Commerce of the United States in Foreign Countries*, by Thomas Jefferson, H. Rept. (London, 1793), 38, *The Making of the Modern World*.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 35.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 36.

Jefferson asserted that America was the ideal nation to implement an international free trade system. He then declared that commercial discrimination must be done against Britain if they refused to abide by his free trade system. Jefferson wrote, "Instead of embarrassing commerce under piles of regulating laws..." free trade would enable "every country to be employed in producing that which nature has best fitted it to produce... to exchange with other mutual surpluses for mutual wants..."³⁸ To Jefferson a free trade system would increase the "number of mankind" and better "their condition". Jefferson saw America as the ideal nation for a free trade system because America offered commodities that "are either necessities of life, or materials for manufactures... and we take in exchange, either manufactures... or mere luxuries."³⁹ Jefferson imagined an internationalist system where the division of labor is seen between countries not within countries. Worldwide free trade would favor America in Jefferson's view because America had agricultural produce and natural resources for manufacturing that all nations needed, which would then make America the center of this international system. Free trade would allow America to both maintain its agrarian economy and encourage westward expansion. This would allow America to acquire more resources and farmland and thus provide America with an even greater influence on world trade. Jefferson then concluded his report by stating that any nation who does not wish to adopt this free trade system, hence Britain, should face harsh commercial discrimination policies.⁴⁰ Because America supplied necessities for life to Britain, Jefferson believes Britain would be unable to survive without American goods. Jefferson called for an increased trade with Britain's greatest rival, France, because France recently revolted to become a republican government and granted America with more favorable trade terms. An alliance with France in Jefferson's opinion would put increasing pressure on Britain to adopt his free trade system. While Jefferson acknowledged that this commercial discrimination policy would initially hurt the American economy, he asserted that the long-term implications of a free trade system far outweighed the initial pains brought by commercial discrimination.⁴¹

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William Loughton Smith in his 1794 speech to Congress, "Commerce of the United States," railed Jefferson's plan of commercial discrimination and advocated for continuing trade with Great Britain. William Loughton Smith was a political ally of Hamilton's. Additionally, Hamilton wrote the majority of Smith's speech.⁴² Smith first debunked Jefferson's claim that all of America's trade with Britain was disadvantageous. Smith cited that America's flour and tobacco trades faced less tariffs with Britain than they do with France.⁴³ In response to Jefferson's claim that America suffers from Britain's

³⁸ Ibid., 38.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 39.

⁴¹ Ibid., 44.

⁴² McCoy, *The Elusive Republic*, 163.

⁴³ House, *Commerce of the United States*, by William Loughton-Smith, 3rd Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept., 178-179, Library of Congress.

re-exportation of American goods, Smith argued that this was a natural occurrence. American merchants allowed Britain to serve as an “entrepot” for trade under circumstances where it was “inconvenient” for American merchants to carry a particular trade.⁴⁴ Smith claimed that American merchants let British ships carry a long distant trade, due to the fact that American merchants lacked the capital to finance this trade independently. Smith lamented the fact that American merchants lacked capital and used this to promote American dependence on British trade.

Smith declared that trade must be continued with Britain in order to ensure American access to British capital. He asserted that Jefferson’s insistence to rely on France, as America’s preeminent trade partner was ludicrous. Because France was currently in a state of revolution they could not be relied upon as a stable trade partner. France did not have the necessary financial and commercial industries to provide America with the capital and credit needed to improve America’s economy. Smith wrote that America was “deficient in capital” and “it has been very useful... to find a country [Britain] which could supply that deficiency...”⁴⁵ He evoked Hamilton’s earlier proclamations of the benefits of international capital by citing that British capital had improved American agriculture, manufacturing, and commercial sectors.⁴⁶

52 Smith concluded his speech by illustrating how Jefferson’s call for discriminatory policies against Britain to eventually establish a free trade system was nonviable. Smith argued that Britain could supply itself with “most of the articles she obtains from us” from other European colonies and the Far East.⁴⁷ In contrast, “no other nation can supply us...” with manufactures like Britain. Smith declared that the British response to commercial discriminatory policies would be severe and cripple America’s economy. He posited that Britain would either declare war on America or respond with harsh “retaliatory regulations”.⁴⁸ Smith then asserted that the idea of Britain abandoning its mercantile policies was absurd. He declared that Britain had become the world’s most powerful economy through mechanisms like the Navigation Acts and saw no reason for Britain to abandon their commercial policies. Smith left his fellow Congressmen with his suggestion for how America should proceed in a British world. He stated that America must be patient as for every year America becomes a “more important customer to Great Britain” and a “more important furnisher of what she wants.”⁴⁹ Therefore, America must stay its current course, continue to channel capital to manufactures, and only then would America find itself in a position of strength to better negotiate with Britain.

44 Ibid., 186.

45 Ibid., 189.

46 Ibid., 190.

47 Ibid., 203.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., 208.

Shortly after Smith's speech to Congress Hamilton and Smith saw their party win the debate over manufactures and commercial relations with Britain. In 1794, Jay's Treaty was passed with England barring America from enacting commercial discriminatory policies against Britain. Furthermore, Jay's Treaty reopened the British West Indies market to American shipping, which caused the re-export trade to flourish and enabled the American government to pay back the national debt. Furthermore, outside of the bounties, all of Hamilton's tariffs and proposal to continue to use the national debt as a financial instrument were implemented. During the next ten years the debate over manufactures simmered down as the Napoleonic Wars resulted in increased European demand for American agricultural products.⁵⁰ By 1812, however, America found itself once again at war with Britain and the American manufacturing industry served a pivotal role in supplying the military with wartime goods during this period, which forced many Republicans to acknowledge the importance of a strong manufacturing center.⁵¹

By examining the early 1790s debate over the role of manufactures in America's society and commercial relations with Great Britain we see a greater exercise in nation building. In order to exit the British mercantile empire, Hamilton and Jefferson created two distinct and creative solutions in an effort to ensure the future of America's political economy. Jefferson and Madison proposed a system of commercial discriminatory policies against Britain in order to force Britain to succumb to becoming a part of their free trade system. Madison and Jefferson saw an international free trade system as pivotal for keeping America in an agrarian stage of development, which was necessary to uphold a republican society. An international free trade system in their eyes would have America at its fulcrum, for America would be both the largest market for manufactured goods and the largest supplier of agricultural products and natural resources. Interestingly enough, their ideal system incorporated Britain, as their system still relied on importing British manufactures. Jefferson and Madison envisioned a world within which nations remained dependent upon each other. Hamilton meanwhile, imagined America's political economic structure in a territorial and nationally bounded space. Hamilton was not concerned with creating an egalitarian society, but rather with keeping capital within America and accumulating capital in order to develop America's manufactures and boost America's overall productive powers. While Hamilton called for continued trade with Britain in the foreseeable future, he envisioned America becoming a self sufficient and independent nation. By having both strong manufacturing and agricultural sectors America would be less dependent on foreign trade and thus free from the influence of foreign powers, like Britain. Finally, what we see from this debate is that Hamilton, Jefferson and Madison did not call for a complete exit from Britain's empire. For Jefferson and Madison they wanted a more equitable relationship with Britain, but they still saw America relying partially on British manufactures. For Hamilton, he sought to both continue

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⁵⁰ McCoy, *The Elusive Republic*, 164-165.

⁵¹ Ibid.

trade with Britain in the short run and emulated many aspects of British political economy in an effort to develop a more sophisticated economy, which would one day create an America that was less reliant on British financial and manufacturing industries.

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TRANS-ASIAN CULTURAL REVIVAL AND SYNTHESIS IN IRAN UNDER ILKHANID RULE IN THE THIRTEENTH AND FOUR- TEENTH CENTURIES

Krishna Kulkarni

"For civilizations, exchange is oxygen"
Aimé Césaire, "Discourse on Colonialism," pg. 11

Introduction

56 Iran saw a flourishing of cultural activity under the Mongol Ilkhanate that conquered the region in the first half of the thirteenth century. This artistic revival seems bizarre considering the utter annihilation performed by the Mongols prior to Ilkhanid rule, yet the period yielded beautiful textiles, ceramics, illuminated manuscripts, and architectural monuments, building a synthesized artistic tradition that fundamentally influenced Islamic cultural production for centuries after the Ilkhanate had disappeared. How, then, did Mongol rulers stimulate an open commercial and cultural exchange in Asia, and what ramifications did their policies have for a fusion of Islamic and Chinese techniques, styles, and motifs in ceramics and architecture in Ilkhanid Iran?

This paper seeks to shed light on the cultural revival of the Ilkhanid period by asserting that the *Pax Mongolica*, compounded by Mongol rulers' extremely favorable policies towards merchants and commerce, cultivated a rich inter-Asian exchange of resources and cultural products that, due to the close links between the Ilkhanate and the Yuan Dynasty, triggered Iranian artisans to incorporate numerous Chinese techniques, styles, and themes into their works. This new, multifaceted artistic language of Iranian 'chinoiserie' set resounding artistic precedents in the region while also stimulating a richly diverse cultural space that stretched from Tabriz to Karakorum.

This argument will consist of four distinct sections in order to illuminate the array of dynamics that affected cultural fusion in Ilkhanid Iran. A brief history of the Mongol invasions and the establishment of Ilkhanid rule will serve to contextualize the argument, followed by an examination of specific policies undertaken by Ilkhanid and Yuan rulers that actively fomented a vibrant commercial sphere. A close study of architecture and ceramic production will conclude the argument as a demonstration of how particular techniques and styles show cultural synthesis at work in the art of the time.

The paper will draw information from scholarly works on Ilkhanid art forms

that paint a vivid picture of the cultural landscape of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Iran. These studies include articles from Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni's collection, "The Legacy of Genghis Khan," Donald N. Wilbur's, "The Architecture of Islamic Iran," Yuka Kadoi's, "Islamic Chinoiserie," and Henri Stierlin's, "Persian Art & Architecture." Additionally, artifacts from the Metropolitan Museum of Art's "Art of the Islamic World" collections will be used in order to provide a visual glimpse into the subject matter of this research paper.

A Brief History of the Mongol Invasions

The thirteenth century CE saw the tidal wave of the Mongol army sweep through Central Asia and the Middle East, toppling the Chinese Empire, the Khwarazmid Empire, and the 'Abassid Caliphate in its rampage. The bloodbath perpetrated by the armies of Genghis Khan in 1219 and Hülegü in 1256 cannot be easily encapsulated. After decimating resistance to the horde's southward march in China, the Mongols sent emissaries westward to the lands of the Khwarezmshah Sultan Mohammad II in an attempt to build diplomatic and trade relations. What happened exactly is unclear, but it resulted in the deaths of these emissaries at the hands of the Khwarezmshah. This was an affront to the Mongols, and Michael Axworthy points out that "contrary to popular perception, the Mongols were not just a ravening mob of uncivilized, semi-human killers... but their ultimate foundation was the prestige of their warlord, Genghis Khan, and an insult could not be overlooked."¹ Just as, later on, the Mongols would punish the Ismaili Assassins of Alamut terribly in retribution for an assassination attempt on one of their leaders, the horde held a zero-tolerance policy for attacks on their leader's honor.²

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Observers of the siege of Merv, a city in northeast Khorasan, recounted that between 700,000 and 1.3 million people were massacred as the Mongols invaded, a number that constituted most of the population residing in Khorasan and Transoxiana at the time.³ The killing extended to the rest of Iran and then to Baghdad, where rulers continually refused to bow to Genghis Khan and subsequently saw their cities crumble. It was not only blood that was spilled, for "alongside the urban ruin and loss of life came the destruction of many libraries and treasures and thus, perhaps, precious evidence about the nature of cultural and artistic activity on the eve of the Mongol invasions."⁴ Thus, the annihilation was twofold: both the population and their cultural artifacts suffered tremendous damage, prying open a power vacuum that Hülegü filled with the establishment of the Ilkhanate in 1256.

Hülegü supported Khubilai's accession to the throne of Great Khan after Möngke's death in 1259 (Möngke was the eldest son of Tolui, who was also

¹Michael Axworthy, *A History of Iran*, (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 100.

² Ibid., 103.

³ Ibid., 102.

⁴ Charles Melville, "The Mongols in Iran," in *The Legacy of Genghis Khan*, ed. by Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 38.

the father of Hülegü and Khubilai), a move that forged a strong bond between the two dynasties. Hülegü took the title of 'Ilkhan,' meaning 'subject khan,' in a recognition of Khagan (Great Khan) Khubilai's preeminence. The Ilkhanid ruler Ghazan would later retract the Ilkhanate's nominal loyalty to the Yuan when he converted to Islam in 1295.⁵

With its capital of Tabriz, the Ilkhanate shifted the regional power of Iran into the northwest, an area that sat astride the ancient Silk Route, thereby situating the empire's epicenter along the constant flow of goods passing back and forth through Eurasia. This, according to Donald N. Wilbur, "caused a sudden shift of the wealth and the culture of the country from Khurasan where it had been for several centuries."⁶ After the wholesale destruction of Khorasan's greatest cities (namely, Merv, Neyshapur, Tus, and Herat), the Ilkhanate reshaped the cultural and commercial landscape of Iran by tilting the axis of power into the region's mountainous northwestern corner.

Commercial Policies of the Yuan and Ilkhanid Rulers

58 Cultural exchange between the Yuan Dynasty and the Ilkhanate was initially sparked through government policies immensely favorable to merchants and trans-Asian trade, which had existed for over two millennia prior to the thirteenth century. This explosion of commercial activity relied heavily on the *Pax Mongolica*, which, as Komaroff and Carboni explain, gave birth to a unprecedentedly dynamic and connected cultural space in Iran and Central Asia that "made it a focal point of innovation and synthesis for the next three hundred years."⁷ The presence of Muslims, and particularly Iranians, in the Yuan court stood as a human bond linking the administrations of the Ilkhanate and Yuan Dynasty. By suspending the civil service examinations, biased towards Confucian teachings, that were previously the only standard for recruiting state officials, the new Mongol rulers gained the ability to fill their administrative posts with subjects from the new lands they had conquered.⁸ This included Muslims from Iran who were hired as financial administrators or, on occasion, as provincial governors.⁹ It is clear from the powerful administrative roles Iranians played in the Yuan government that the fusion of Chinese and Iranian peoples and cultures took place on multiple levels, and it would not be surprising if Iranian officials in the Yuan government encouraged active exchange with the empire that ruled over their homeland.

Commercial and social reforms under the Yuan Empire remain the crucial seeds in the cultivation of trans-Asian trade in this period. Morris Rossabi

5 Morris Rossabi, "The Mongols and Their Legacy," in *The Legacy of Genghis Khan*, ed. by Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 32.

6 Donald N. Wilbur, *The Architecture of Islamic Iran*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1955), 8.

7 Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni, "Introduction: On the Eve of the Mongol Conquest," in *The Legacy of Genghis Khan*, ed. by Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 4.

8 Rossabi, "The Mongols and Their Legacy," 20.

9 Ibid.

provides several examples of these transformations in his article, "The Mongols and Their Legacy," in the collection *The Legacy of Genghis Khan*. To begin with, the Mongols supported the growth of merchant groups (called *ortoghs*) who received low-interest loans from the state for perilous caravan journeys across the westward silk routes. These *ortoghs* served as a way for merchants to pool resources into a single caravan train, rather than traveling alone, thus spreading the risk across several parties.¹⁰ By slashing the rate of interest on government loans, and creating opportunities for joint ventures, the Yuan administrators greatly incentivized commerce on a broader scale throughout Mongol territories by decreasing the risk of financial ruin in the case of a robbery or similar misfortune. In addition, "the damagingly high tax on commercial exchanges was cut to a relatively modest 3 1/3 percent," thereby lessening the financial burden on merchants, and encouraging greater amounts of commerce at the low tax rate.¹¹ Furthermore, the Mongols invested heavily in road construction and postal stations, thereby reaping the benefits of the vast landmass they exerted control over by constructing wide-reaching infrastructure to expedite commercial missions and communication across Asia.¹² Finally, Mongol rulers ended the Chinese tradition of "[denigrating] trade and [portraying] merchants as parasites" and rather treated merchants as valued members of society.¹³ Through a fusion of favorable commercial policy and an elevation of commerce's social connotation, the Mongols successfully ushered in an era of unparalleled commerce and trade.

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Iranian merchants also favored from the implementation of these new commercial policies. As Rossabi mentions, "Few Chinese traveled westward... Persian traders arrived overland along the caravan trails of Central Asia to northwestern China and by ship via the Indian Ocean to the southeast coast of China" and returned with Chinese products and goods in hand.¹⁴ Some of these traders even decided to settle down in China, forming "virtually self-governing communities," with leaders called *shaikhs al-Islam*.¹⁵ Even more telling of the strong bond between the Yuan dynasty and the Ilkhanate is a story about a Chinese merchant who was hired by Ilkhan Ghazan to collect and bring tribute back to the Yuan emperor, but was then sent back to Ghazan's court as the official Yuan emissary to the Ilkhanate in 1299.¹⁶ With regards to this tale, Rossabi underlines the fact that, "there can scarcely be greater confirmation of the Mongols' favorable attitude toward trade than the selection of a merchant to fill the position of court envoy."¹⁷ Clearly, trade served as the most prominent and penetrating linkage between the Yuan and Ilkhanid governments, and subsequently between the two societies

¹⁰ Ibid., 22.

¹¹ Ibid., 22.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., 24.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 24.

¹⁷ Ibid.

of China and Iran.

The Ilkhanate's close connection with the Yuan Empire brought it into the fold of commercial prosperity inaugurated by Yuan rulers. The Ilkhanate was so supportive of trade that Iranian merchants became the intermediaries of trade between Western Europe and East Asia, resulting in "Persian becoming a lingua franca for merchants and bureaucrats in Eurasia."¹⁸ The fact that the Persian language stood as the connective tissue between the disparate merchants across Eurasia is a testament to just how far and how frequently Iranian merchants traveled in this proto-globalized world. However, Ghazan's ascension to the Ilkhanid throne saw the implementation of trade policies that outshone even the favorable policies of the Yuan. Ghazan "reduced taxes on traders and commercial transactions, devised uniform weights and measures, and established fixed standards for the weight and value of coins."¹⁹ Donald Wilbur suggests that because Mongol tribal code, or *yasa*, was obsolete when faced with administering such a large area of land, the Ilkhanate's adoption of pre-existing Islamic civil and criminal law "began to prepare the way for the adoption by the Mongols of the Islamic religion."²⁰ Iranians were repeatedly chosen for high positions in government, demonstrated by administrators like Rashid al-Din, writer of the seminal historical work "Jami al-Tawarikh," and a prominent figure in the Ilkhanid court. Perhaps most importantly, Ghazan ordered serious reforms with regards to road security. As Wilbur mentions, "The road guards were no longer themselves the corrupt robbers of the traveler, but were a highly efficient force. Brigands were relentlessly hunted down, while the guards and villages along the main roads were held responsible for any thievery in their own localities."²¹ By securing the routes of trade, Ghazan greatly improved the atmosphere of commerce within his empire and this allowed Tabriz to become the cosmopolitan, multicultural center of Ilkhanid prosperity. The Ilkhans' blending of local civil and criminal law with new regulations and policies rooted their government in the Iranian cultural context while making administrative improvements that greatly increased the commercial importance of the region. In imitating and exceeding the trade policies of his Yuan counterparts, Ghazan paralleled the artistic imitation that Iranian artists would perform at the same time by interweaving Chinese techniques and motifs into traditional Islamic and Iranian styles.

Architecture of the Ilkhanid Period

The sheer amount of wealth brought into Iran by trans-Eurasian commerce is reflected in the architecture commissioned by the Ilkhans. Some of the most magnificent monuments of the Ilkhanate still remain to this day in the form of the beautifully decorated mosques and tombs constructed under their rule. The Ilkhans built Sufi shrines across their territory, observatories

¹⁸ Ibid., 33.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Wilbur, *The Architecture of Islamic Iran*, 9.

²¹ Ibid., 19.

in Tabriz and Takht-i Suleiman, and mosques that still stand today. The reign of Ghazan stands as the moment when architecture “surpassed all earlier efforts.”²² According to historians of the time, Ghazan had “practical knowledge and skill in architecture, natural history, medicine, astronomy, and chemistry,” and according to Wilbur these accounts “are both too precise and too detailed to be discounted as sheer flattery.”²³ These descriptions suggest Ghazan took a personal interest in the construction of several buildings, an interest not common among Mongol rulers of the time. He ordered the addition of a dome to the observatory at Maragha and commissioned an observatory to be built in Shenb that incorporated his own designs.²⁴ Ghazan further built up the city of Shenb, with construction beginning on a monastery, a Shafi’i sect college, a Hanafi sect college, a hospital, a palace, an academy of philosophy, and a library, among other projects.²⁵ Ghazan set a precedent for his successors that culminated in the construction of architectural treasures that display some of the richest elements of Islamic and Chinese artistic styles.

The two monuments that truly stand out from this period are the Soltaniyeh Mausoleum, also known as the Tomb of Öljeitü, and the Friday Mosque of Isfahan, or the Madrasa Imami of Isfahan. One of the most apparent innovations of this time was that architects would vibrantly color bricks and add ceramics to ceiling vaults²⁶ The incorporation of ceramics (which will be discussed in their own right later on) lent polychromatic vivacity to the stones of Ilkhanid and Muzaffarid (the dynasty ruling over southern Iran) monuments, and subsequently influenced the rich decoration of Islamic buildings for years to come. Wilbur notes that Seljuq architecture exhibited many stylistic aspects of Ilkhanid buildings, and thus should be considered a proto-form of the architectural styles that the Ilkhanids and Muzaffarids subsequently developed to a greater extent.²⁷



Fig. 1, Mihrab (Prayer Niche). Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

The Friday Prayer Mosque of

²² Ibid., xi.

²³ Ibid., 17.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Henri Stierlin, *Persian Art & Architecture* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2012), 63.

²⁷ Wilbur, *The Architecture of Islamic Iran*, 33.



Fig. 2., Gunbad-i Uljaytu. Image by Baroness Marie-Thérèse Ullens de Schooten, Courtesy of Special Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University

Isfahan is a living history of Iranian architecture throughout the centuries, but for the purposes of brevity, this paper shall focus solely on those elements built under Ilkhanate rule. The stunning *mihrab* from the Mosque ⁶² (Fig. 1), built towards the end of Ilkhanid rule in Iran, illustrates in gorgeous detail the polychromatic styles of Iranian architects and artisans in this period. Floral highlights in gold and white entangle with the winding kufic script that lines the outer rim of the structure. Combining classical Islamic geometric motifs with a contrasting color scheme derived from the blue and white ceramics of China, the *mihrab* represents a vivid portrait of Sino-Islamic exchange.²⁸

Begun by Sultan Öljeitü in 1302, the Soltaniyeh Mausoleum was built to house the bodies of ‘Ali and Husayn, the first and second Shi’i imams, respectively.²⁹ The Soltaniyeh mausoleum originally consisted of an enormous compound, but today all that remains is the grand octagonal structure crowned with a sky-blue dome. The interior contains tilework that parallels the *mihrab* of the Madrasa Imami of Isfahan (Fig. 2). Blue and white elements combine with star-shaped geometrical patterns to form a synthesis of Chinese and Islamic styles. Its “revolutionary dome... represents a landmark in the history of Persian Islamic architecture” because it was “the first large-scale example of a double-shell dome.”³⁰ Yet despite incorporating Chinese and Islamic motifs into its design, the Soltaniyeh Mausoleum also, interestingly enough, embraces the Mongol heritage of the Ilkhans. As Sheila Blair writes in her article “Religious Arts of the Ilkhanids,” “The Mongols had set the entrances of their tents and the gates of their encampments to the south

²⁸ Yuka Kadoi, *Islamic Chinoiserie* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 50.

²⁹ Ibid., 24.

³⁰ Stierlin, *Persian Art & Architecture*, 74.

and faced that direction during religious rites... The monumental tomb of the Ilkhanid sultan Öljeitü at Sultaniyya, for example, is positioned not toward the southwest to face the qibla, as it should be according to Islamic practice, but rather on a cardinal north-south axis.”³¹ Thus, in this fashion, the Ilkhanid artisans managed to infuse into the Tomb of Öljeitü three distinct cultural languages that blended spectacularly into this magnificent structure that still stands today.

Ceramic Production under the Ilkhanids

Ceramic production underwent radical changes in the Ilkhanid period that fundamentally shaped the visual lexicon of Iranian artisans and influenced architectural styles. The roots of cultural fusion in ceramics lie in the sociocultural needs of Mongol society. Yuka Kadoi, in her book “Islamic Chinoiserie,” explains why textiles served as a crucial currency in cultural exchange, asserting, “it is a common custom among nomads to travel together with their possessions, and therefore they give priority to the portability and practicality of products, as well as to the quality of their visual presentations as symbols of power and wealth.”³² Chinese motifs and styles travelled easily through the portable and relatively non-fragile textiles that were brought along with the nomad culture of the Mongols. The styles of textiles were easily transferred onto ceramics, which, although more fragile, were still highly portable and lent themselves to the roaming court of the Ilkhans. Furthermore, the dissemination of paper across the Ilkhanate played a significant role in the spreading of motifs, since paper was also very mobile and “became widely available and affordable in Iran under the Mongols, thanks to its close commercial links with China.”³³ These two factors were crucial to the dispersal of Chinese styles in Iran.

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Chinese ceramics were called *chini-i faghfur*, and significantly influenced Iranian potters. Iranian artisans invented techniques, even before the Ilkhanate, in an attempt to imitate the color and weight of real porcelain.³⁴ Porcelain remained a carefully guarded secret by Chinese artists, and so to reproduce the styles embedded in *chini-i faghfur*, Iranian artists circumvented this obstacle by using ‘fritware,’ or ‘stonepaste,’ a technique that combined ground quartz, glass frit (partially fused glass), and a small proportion of fine white clay as a substitute. A ‘lustre,’ consisting of a metallic pigment, would be painted onto this medium and fired in a low-oxygen kiln to imbue a colorful gloss onto the ceramic. Although the ‘Abbasids made use of these techniques, they were perfected under the Ilkhanate. These techniques infused elements of “translucence, whiteness, and hardness” that Iranian artisans observed in *chini-i faghfur*.³⁵

³¹ Sheila Blair, “Religious Art of the Ilkhanids” in *The Legacy of Genghis Khan*, eds. by Komaroff and Carboni, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 107-108.

³² Kadoi, *Islamic Chinoiserie*, 19.

³³ Ibid., 56.

³⁴ Komaroff and Carboni, “Introduction: On the Eve of the Mongol Conquest,” 4.

³⁵ Kadoi, *Islamic Chinoiserie*, 39.

After the demise of the Fatimid Empire of North Africa in 1171, artisans from the famed Egyptian ceramic industry fled eastward to Iran and contributed significantly to making Ilkhanid Iran “the center of ceramic production in the Middle East.”³⁶ Due to the wealth flowing into western Iran and cities like Tabriz and Soltaniyeh, the market for ceramics exploded when “it began to be treated by wealthy and art-conscious locals as a major art form and eventually acquired a sense of luxury.”³⁷ Thus, due to the influx of highly skilled Egyptian potters and increasing demand among the wealthy for luxury goods in the form of ceramics, the Iranian pottery industry flourished, with “[Kashan becoming] the principle site of ceramic production in Iran in the late twelfth century, and...until well after 1300.”³⁸



Fig 3, Tile with image of phoenix. Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

⁶⁴ ‘Chinoiserie’, as it is called (usually in reference to European artwork), refers to the reflection of Chinese artistic styles in a non-Chinese culture. Iranian artists frequently incorporated elements of chinoiserie into ceramic designs, especially motifs such as lotuses, dragons, pairs of fish, shades of blue and pure white, and hexagonal and star-shaped tiles painted over with lustre.³⁹ *Lajvardina* (meaning lapis lazuli in Persian) ceramics also exhibit elements of chinoiserie. This form of pottery “is enhanced by the lavish use of dark-blue glazes with overglaze painting in white, red and gold.”⁴⁰

Figures 3 and 4 depict chinoiserie in practice. In Figure 3 a flying phoenix is depicted upon a stonepaste medium painted over with lustre; at the top of the tile, one can observe a row of lotuses. This piece stands out due to its effervescent blend of blue, turquoise, and white set on a background of gold. The use of the phoenix in this ceramic reflects an interesting fusion of cultural practices. As Kadoi mentions, the repetition of phoenix and bird motifs may symbolize the “idea of hunting, a theme that was suitable in the contexts of both Mongol nomadism and Iranian kingship.”⁴¹ Although this tile is said to be from Takht-i Suleiman, its style is highly similar to that of a ‘Sultanabad ware,’ which Kadoi describes as a mixture of phoenix-like birds

³⁶ Ibid., 43.

³⁷ Ibid., 43-44.

³⁸ Ibid., 44.

³⁹ Ibid., 52.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 54.



Fig. 4. Iranian Bowl. Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

and flower motifs in the vein of chinoiserie.⁴² Thus, even if it were created at Takht-i Suleiman, and not in Sultanabad, it would simply demonstrate how broadly the new artistic styles of chinoiserie had spread in Iran. Figure 4 illustrates *lajvardina* techniques in a bowl. The deep blue overglaze underlies the painted geometric patterns and white floral accents. The sheer variety of designs and shapes in the bowl denotes the diverse array of styles the artist must have known, speaking to the cultural multiplicity in place in Ilkhanid Iran at the time.

Conclusion

The Ilkhanid period in Iran serves as a testament to the incredible power of commerce and cultural exchange. On the one hand, the arrival of the Mongols in Iran sparked violence on a scale that is difficult to believe, wiping out a large chunk of the regional population of Khorasan as well as its cultural heritage in their quest to conquer the world. Yet once their power was consolidated, the Mongols performed an abrupt about-face and set out on a mission to craft their own cultural footprint onto the landscape of Iran. Though it seems strange, it was the brutality and military might of the Mongol hordes, which brought Asia to its knees, that enabled the coalescing of various Asian cultural spheres and in fact nurtured a new, synthesized set of artistic styles. The Mongols, whose ability to produce artistic products was limited while living on the barren steppe, clearly saw their sovereignty over the rich cultural heritage of regions like China and Iran as an unparalleled chance to demonstrate that they were more than just barbaric warlords. Kadoi sums this up neatly when she attests that the repeated use of chinoiserie was seen as the “ideal means for unifying decorative ideas throughout Eurasia so as to symbolize Mongol control over Chinese and Iranian cultural spheres in a visually compelling way.”⁴³ Thus, by actively encouraging cultural synthesis in the arts, the Mongols wrote their name in not just the history of war and politics but also into the artistic fabric of Asia itself.

Through a combination of lenient commercial policies and a change in social outlooks, Mongol rulers implemented a rigorous encouragement of trade, with the effects echoing across Asia. Dynamic cultural exchange took place as merchants visited China frequently to engage in commerce with the Yuan Empire, and Iran stood at the midpoint of this trans-Eurasian

⁴² Ibid., 52.

⁴³ Ibid., 56.

exchange geographically and structurally, owing to the position of Iranian merchants as the mediators of trade between Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, the reduction of interest rates on loans, the lowering of tax on commercial exchanges, the construction of infrastructure, and the securing of trade routes all incentivized trans-Asian commerce to an unprecedented level. The effects of this commercial policy are visually observable in the cultural artifacts of the time, illustrating the palpable connection between commodity mobility and cultural hybridity.

Many new questions arise as a result of acknowledging the huge influence of Iranian merchants in mediating Asian trade. Tabriz was acknowledged as a major cosmopolitan trading center, with Western and Eastern merchants taking residence there.⁴⁴ Wilbur notes, “Venetian merchants were present in some number at Tabriz and had their own consul there.”⁴⁵ A plunge into the rich Venetian archives would perhaps shed light onto what daily life was like in the city of Tabriz at this time, for commercial transactions and perhaps even the experiences of merchants in the city could have been recorded and stored in the collections of Europe’s trading hub. Tabriz, under the guidance of the religiously and commercially tolerant Mongol rulers, could perhaps have been the archetypal global city, and would most certainly serve as a fascinating model for globalization on a miniature level. Although many architectural records of Ilkhanate rule crumble in their old age, we may still yet hold the power to paint a vibrant new sociocultural picture of what stands as one of the most fascinating moments of the pre-modern world.

The blend of an array of cultural styles in Ilkhanid art had profound effects for the future. Artistic production under the Timurids, Safavids, and Ottomans incorporated many of the same styles of chinoiserie that one can see forming under Ilkhanate rule. On a wider level, the Mongols’ enabling of a holistic Eurasian cultural dialogue represents an important milestone on the path trans-Asian globalization that continues to effect trade and cultural exchange to the present day. Had it not been for the Mongols’ ruthless penetration of the various, semi-segmented empires of China, Central Asia, and the Middle East, disparate Asian cultures would have remained to some level confined to their own spheres. This is not to say that cultural exchange did not have a precedent before the Mongol conquests. But the binding together of Asia under the rule of the trade-friendly Mongols catapulted inter-Asian commerce to a level unseen before, and in doing so allowed a new, vibrant, and hybridized artistic language to form. Yet while this artistic language was technically ‘new’ by virtue of its unique blending of cultural motifs, it was, as we have seen, thoroughly informed by the ancient artistic traditions that developed regionally in Iran, China, and everywhere in between.

⁴⁴ Wilbur, *The Architecture of Islamic Iran*, 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

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- Special Thanks to Dr. Maryam Ekhtiar for explaining various technical details regarding ceramic production*

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Images

- Figure 1. "Mihrab (prayer niche) [Iran]" (39.20) In *Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–. <http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/39.20>. (May 2012)
- Figure 2. Baroness Marie-Thérèse Ullens de Schooten, "Detail view of original decorative interior tilework," *Fine Arts Library of the Harvard College Library*, accessed on Archnet.org: http://archnet.org/sites/1671/media_contents/62908
- Figure 3. "Tile with an image of a phoenix [Iran]" (12.49.4) In *Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–. <http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/12.49.4> (May 2012).
- Figure 4. "Bowl [Iran]" (34.151) In *Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–. <http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/34.151>. (October 2006).

PROLONGING THE CONFLICT: AMERICA IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Rina Plotkin

Introduction

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was the longest conventional war of the twentieth century, and one of the bloodiest and costliest in recent Middle Eastern history. Over half a million people perished, many more were wounded, millions were made refugees, and more than 400 billion dollars of damage was inflicted.¹ The protracted war—beginning with Iraq's full-scale invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980, and ending with Iran's acceptance of a ceasefire on July 20, 1988—provided no real gains to either country. It is difficult to even declare a victor of the conflict, as both sides endured and inflicted horrible suffering and loss.

68 World powers only encouraged this stalemate, using the war to further their own interests rather than take steps to end it. France was a major supplier of Iraq's high-tech arms because Iraq provided almost a quarter of France's oil. The Soviet Union became the largest source of Iraq's weaponry, while still fighting for influence in both Iran and Iraq.² In total, according to a CIA report, 92 nations sold equipment and technology to Iraq throughout the war.³ Israel—through multiple clandestine operations from 1981 to 1983 and 1985 to 1986—provided arms to Iran, aiding in the fight against anti-Zionist Saddam Hussein, with the goals of bleeding the combatants by prolonging the war, increasing tensions between the Arab world and the United States, and emerging as the only American ally in the region.⁴ At least ten countries sold arms to both sides.⁵ The list of countries concerned with the war, however, would be incomplete without the United States, whose involvement this paper will track.

In 1980, the U.S. did not have diplomatic relations with either Iran or Iraq. Iraq had severed relations with the U.S. after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and Iran took an anti-American stance after the 1979 revolution that brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power and the subsequent crisis in which 52 Americans were held hostage in Tehran for over a year. America thus announced its neutrality when the war began. As a State Department official explained

1 Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, "Iran-Iraq War," History.com, accessed November 23, 2015.

2 Diana Johnstone, "Little Satan' Stuck in the Arms Export Trap," *MERIP Reports*, 148 (1987): 8.

3 Steven A. Emerson and Christina Del Sesto, *Terrorist* (New York: Villard Books, 1991), 216-217.

4 Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 109.

5 Mansour Farhang, "The Iran-Iraq War: The Feud, the Tragedy, the Spoils," *World Policy Journal* 2 (1985): 668.

in 1983: “We don’t give a damn as long as the Iran-Iraq carnage does not affect our allies in the region or alter the balance of power.”⁶ In fact, the United States was not indifferent to the war or its outcome, but instead saw positive opportunities in its prolongation.

First and foremost, pitting Iran and Iraq against each other would maintain the power balance in the Middle East, a goal very important for the United States, as having a hegemon in the region would be detrimental to policy objectives. Saddam’s desire for Iraq to become the dominant power in the Gulf, controlling its oil, and destroying Israel were incompatible with the United States’ goals for the region—spreading friendly, secular regimes in the area, the free flow of oil and Israeli security. Khomeini was considered to be a similar, but more serious threat to these interests and to the stability of the Middle East. Secondly, the need for financial support would make Iraq more dependent on the Gulf states, which were conservative, thereby moderating Iraq’s policies. At the same time, the war might also make Iran desperate to obtain American equipment, as all of its weapons had been supplied by the United States in the past.⁷ Moreover, the demands of war might help restore relationships between the United States and the two belligerents, as well as make them more vulnerable to U.S. covert operations.⁸ Finally, turmoil in the Gulf caused by the war might cause the Gulf states to object less to an increased American military presence in the region.

However, U.S. policymakers were particularly concerned about the prospect of an Iranian victory, as this would create instability in the entire region. Iran’s clerical regime, which saw itself as the leader of peoples ‘oppressed by imperialism,’ would spread anti-American and anti-Western sentiments throughout the region, possibly leading to revolts.⁹ A declassified CIA document on the subject summarizes this apprehension, stating that if the balance of power would alter in favor of Iran, it would be devastating for U.S. interests.¹⁰ According to the CIA report, The moderate Middle Eastern states, most notably Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan shared this fear. Nonetheless, the fact that the United States did not want Iran to win does not signify that it wanted to see an Iraqi victory. Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush, stated in a 2002 interview: “It’s my understanding that the U.S. government did, in fact, provide some assistance to him [Saddam] so that the war ended up kind of at a standstill, or a stalemate, rather than either country being defeated,” indicating that the United States provided some support to Iraq, but only to even the playing field when necessary.¹¹ This view was widely held by other U.S. officials from

6 Ed Magnuson, “Iran: Arms for the Ayatollah,” *Time*, July 25, 1983.

7 Ibid.

8 Stephen Roskamm Shalom, *Imperial Alibis: Rationalizing U.S. Intervention after the Cold War* (Boston: South End Press, 1993), 69.

9 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 34/36.2-82, Implication of Iran’s Victory Over Iraq (June 8, 1982), 8. Secret. Source: Freedom of Information Act Request, 8.

10 Ibid.

11 Donald Rumsfeld, “Interview with Donald H. Rumsfeld Defense Secretary,” interview by

the beginning of the war until the restoration of relations with Iraq in 1984. It is interesting to note that almost all world powers supported Iraq, and yet the bloody, eight-year war ended in a stalemate. A cynic might observe that weapon sales make good business, and thus letting Iran and Iraq stay bogged down by providing just enough to either nation to ensure there were no clear losses was beneficial to outside powers involved. For the United States, money was not the primary object, but bleeding both nations would ensure the maintenance of the balance of power and would weaken them.¹²

This paper will document the United States' involvement in the war, using specific instances to demonstrate the contradictions of the American government and implying the underlying desire to prolong the conflict for the reasons outlined above. The United States hoped to engineer a stalemate, and did so by supporting Iraq just enough to counter Iran's advantages in population and technology. Until 1986, it also supplied Iran with intelligence in hopes of gaining influence in Tehran. American involvement in the Iran-Iraq War was messy, a fact that this paper will emphasize. It will also highlight the sharp turns in policy taken once the United States became truly invested in Iraq in the last years of the war after it realized that a reconciliation between Baghdad and Washington was possible, while Tehran was not willing to reestablish relations.

From "neutrality" to a tilt towards Iraq

⁷⁰ While America's official position at the start of the war was neutrality, it never abided by it. This was evident from September 1980 in UN Resolution 479, in which neither the United States nor the other members of the Security Council named an aggressor in the conflict, though Iraq had attacked Iran and was at the time occupying extensive Iranian territories, including oil-rich provinces.¹³ Comparing this with UN Resolution 660, passed on August 2, 1990, the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, which 'condemned' the Iraqi invasion and 'demanded' that Iraq withdraw immediately, a bias towards Iraq becomes apparent.¹⁴ It is additionally exemplified with the fact that when mediation efforts of the United Nations proved futile due to Iran's unwillingness to cooperate—as Iran stated it wouldn't accept a ceasefire as long as Iraqi troops were on its soil—the international community, including the United States, dropped those efforts and did not resume them until two years later. But, when Iraq failed to comply by withdrawing from Kuwait in 1990, rather than waiting for two more years the Security Council met again four days later, and imposed boycotts of Iraq and insisted on the protection of Kuwaiti assets.¹⁵ Moreover, over the following months, the United Nations passed fourteen resolutions regarding the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Evidently, America's reaction to Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 was biased and a clear indication of US support for Iraq. Of course, the Security

Steve Kroft, November 14, 2002.

¹² Farhang, "The Iran-Iraq War," 660.

¹³ Security Council Resolution 479: The Situation Between Iran and Iraq, September 28, 1980.

¹⁴ Security Council Resolution 660: The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, August 2, 1990.

¹⁵ Security Council Resolution 661: The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, August 6, 1990.

Council is made up of multiple nations, but the United States carries a lot of weight; if it truly believed Iraq was in the wrong it could have gotten the UN to punish Iraq for attacking Iran.

In 1981, Washington began seeing a possible rapprochement with Baghdad. In March, the Iraqi Communist Party, which Saddam Hussein repressed, publicly broadcast speeches from the Soviet Union calling for an end to the war. Later that month, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig noted Saddam's concern with "the behavior of Soviet imperialism in the Middle Eastern area", and informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he believed there was a possibility of improved relations with Iraq.¹⁶ At that point, the U.S. approved the sale of five jetliners and sent a representative to Baghdad to open discussions.¹⁷ Less than a year later, the United States government concluded internally that Iraq's defeat in the war would be contrary to America's goals in the Gulf, and CIA Director William Casey traveled to Baghdad to secretly meet with Saddam Hussein.¹⁸ Upon Casey's return, President Reagan authorized support for Iraq in a National Security Decision Directive (a document that remains classified).¹⁹

The first official signal of the U.S. 'tilt' towards Iraq came in February 1982, when the United States removed Iraq from the list of terrorism-supporting states, thus eliminating a number of obstacles that would have hindered American support for the country.²⁰ This was done despite the fact that the Reagan administration knew Saddam's support of terrorism had not weakened.²¹ The U.S. was then free to begin passing military intelligence to Iraq, including critical satellite information that helped Iraq fix key flaws in fortifications that proved important in Iran's defeat at al-Basrah the following month.²² This decision to lend crucial help to Iraq came after American intelligence agencies reported that "Iraq was on the verge of being overrun by Iran," marking the beginnings of the American policy to take preventive measures in response to perceptions that Iraq might lose the war.²³

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This was not a secret; the world was aware of America's bias towards Iraq, but the United States' professed neutrality prohibited them from selling arms to either nation. However, as the National Security Council's Middle East Director explained, "there was a conscious effort to encourage third countries to ship US arms or acquiesce in shipments after the fact... It was a

¹⁶ Robert O. Freedman, "Soviet Policy Toward the Persian Gulf from the Outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War to the Death of Konstantin Chernenko," in *US Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region*, ed. Wm. J. Olson (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 55.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Mike Shuster, "U.S. Links to Saddam During Iran-Iraq War," NPR, September 22, 2005.

¹⁹ Howard Teicher, *Affidavit*, <http://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/Teicheraffidavit.pdf>.

²⁰ Kenneth Pollack, *The Threatening Storm* (New York: Random House, 2002).

²¹ Shalom, *Imperial Alibis*, 69.

²² Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "Bush Secret Effort Helped Iraq Build Its War Machine," *Los Angeles Times*, February 23, 1992; Pollack, *The Threatening Storm*.

²³ Seymour M. Hersh, "The Iran Pipeline: A Hidden Chapter," *New York Times*, December 8, 1991.

policy of winks and nods.”²⁴ In an affidavit, a former official of the National Security Council admitted that “CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition, and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war.”²⁵ This effort ended with significant quantities of American weapons being transferred to Iraq over the following seven years, particularly from the Middle Eastern nations of Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan.²⁶

U.S. support for Iraq soon blossomed. Beginning in 1983, the United States provided economic assistance to Iraq in the form of Commodities Credit Corporation guarantees to purchase US agricultural products: \$400 million in 1983, \$513 million in 1984, and over \$650 million in 1987.²⁷ This achieved two goals. It allowed the United States to significantly support Iraq’s war effort without formally abandoning its allegedly neutral stance, and it permitted Iraq to use the money it would have spent on food to purchase military supplies. In short, by 1983 the United States was actively supporting Iraq in three important ways: by supplying Iraq with billions of dollars of credits, by providing American military intelligence and strategic advice, and by pressuring and monitoring third-country arms sales to Iraq to ensure Iraq had the weaponry it required.²⁸

72 Another way that the U.S. supported Iraq was by turning a blind eye to Saddam’s use of chemical weapons. As early as October 1983, Iran was reporting cases of Iraqi use of chemical warfare, and pointing out that doing so was prohibited under the Geneva Protocol.²⁹ At first, the accusations received a muted response in Washington. The United States had received ample evidence to support Iran’s claims, as is made clear by a declassified memorandum from the Department of State, which speaks of “what appears to be Iraq’s almost daily use of CW [Chemical Weapons]” and that Iraq had “acquired a CW production capability, primarily from Western firms, and possibly a US subsidiary.”³⁰ In November of that year, Iran asked the United Nations to investigate Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. The United States was compelled to denounce Iraq’s actions, “in order to maintain American credibility regarding strict adherence to international law and admirable moral standards.”³¹ However, the U.S. was stuck between a rock and a hard place, as it was just reestablishing ties with Baghdad; thus, in order to

24 Douglas and Waas, “Bush Secret Effort.”

25 Howard Teicher, *Affidavit*.

26 Shalom, *Imperial Alibis*, 69.

27 Pollack, *The Threatening Storm*.

28 Teicher, *Affidavit*.

29 Foreign Broadcast Information Service Transcription, *IRNA Reports Iraqi Regime Using Chemical Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV*, October 22, 1983.

30 Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to George P. Shultz, *Iraq Use of Chemical Weapons*, November 1, 1983.

31 Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, *Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons* [Includes Cables Entitled “Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons” and “Background of Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons”], November 21, 1983.

“avoid unpleasantly surprising Iraq”, the US government warned Saddam of their intention to publicly oppose Iraq’s usage of chemical weapons.³² When Donald Rumsfeld, then President Reagan’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, arrived in Iraq in December and met with high officials, he made no mention of the issue.³³ Reagan’s administration was clearly following a two-track policy: on the one hand, it formally condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, while on the other hand it continued inching closer to Iraq.³⁴ Their strong public disapproval of CWs was probably genuine, as many official cables suggest, but it is important to remember that America’s reputation would have been tarnished if they did not sternly denounce Iraq’s illegal actions.³⁵

1984 was a critical year, because it was when the U.S. bias toward Iraq became official and public. The rapprochement that took place between Baghdad and Washington was made public, in part because it could not be hidden, but also to deter Iran. In November 1984, Iraq and the United States restored diplomatic relations, which had been ruptured since 1967.³⁶ For the first time, Reagan spoke publicly about America backing Iraq:

In light of recent development in the Iran-Iraq War and the threat which an escalation of that conflict or a terrorist campaign could pose for the vital interests of the US and its allies, measures must be taken now to improve our immediate ability to deter an expansion of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, and if necessary, defend US interests. The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, will prepare a plan of action designed to avert an Iraqi collapse.³⁷

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This speech emphasized a major motivation for the escalation of United States support: the fear that Iraq might be defeated. With Iranian successes on the battlefield (the ‘recent developments’ of which Reagan spoke) the U.S. made its support for Iraq more official and pronounced, supplying it with intelligence, arms, and economic aid.

The hidden agenda

American policy towards Iran was more complicated than its policy towards Iraq, as it followed two paths at once. Officials saw a ‘great potential’ for covert operations to undermine the Iranian government, while the Reagan administration tried to restore some diplomatic relations with the same government.³⁸ Beginning in 1982, the CIA began funding Iranian paramilitary

32 Ibid.

33 Department of State, Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, December 20, 1983.

34 Shalom, *Imperial Alibis*, 73.

35 Ibid.

36 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *War in the Persian Gulf: The US Takes Sides* (staff report, Committee Print, 1987), 21-22.

37 National Security Decision Directive 139, *Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War*.

groups based in Turkey (with one headed by General Bahram Aryana, the Shah's former army chief) and groups for the Liberation of Iran, including the group in Paris headed by Ali Amini, who had presided over the reversion of Iranian oil to foreign control after the 1953 American-backed coup.³⁹ The US was providing secret financial support for these exiled groups, which in turn recruited thousands of followers in Iran and trained them to fight against the Khomeini regime.⁴⁰ However, while the Reagan administration provided money to anti-Khomeini groups, it also allowed Israel to ship billions of dollars worth of U.S. arms to Iran. In fact, Washington continued replenishing Israel's stockpile with the knowledge that its American-made arms were being sold to Iran.⁴¹ In addition, U.S.-made weapons from the Netherlands and Belgium were sent to Tehran, and, according to the testimony of arms dealers, the U.S. also replenished their stocks.⁴² Contradicting their own policies, by indirectly building up Iran's military, the United States government ensured that Iraq would heavily rely on American support to continue their military superiority.

74 Meanwhile, State Department cables from Washington to Baghdad stressed that the United States did not condone the selling of arms to Iran, but officials made it clear that it was impossible to control all activities in the black market, highlighting that private dealers might be seeking to make a profit from the war.⁴³ This contradictory policy demonstrated that the American government tried to appease Iraq, as they were hopeful in restoring relations, but that stopping arms sales to Iran was not a priority. This makes sense under the circumstances, as at this time, Iraq occupied large chunks of Iranian territories and there was no evidence that the status quo would change in the near future. Once again, it becomes clear that the United States did not want Iraq to overrun Iran; instead, they wanted to keep the balance of power in the region intact, as that is what most US officials agreed would serve American interests best.⁴⁴

It is important to note that the idea of building a strategic relationship with Iran was well supported within the American government, though the policy of using weapons shipments to achieve that connection was not. While officials did not believe a full reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Iran was possible, they did hope to gain influence and rebuild some ties to Tehran. A CIA position paper stated that whichever superpower supported Iran first would be "in a strong position to work towards the exclusion of the other," and thus CIA officials wanted to achieve a "securing of Iran" in

38 Shalom, *Imperial Alibis*, 73.

39 Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (New York: Simon & Schuster), 480.

40 Ibid.

41 Hersh, "The Iran Pipeline".

42 Gary Sick, *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Random House/Times Books, 1991), 202.

43 Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq, *U.S. Policy on Arms Sales and Transfers to Iraq and Iran*, June 3, 1981.

44 Director of Central Intelligence, Implications of Iran's Victory Over Iraq.

order to build a relationship and deny Iran to the Soviets.⁴⁵ Until 1986, the main tool US policymakers used in order to gain influence in Iran was secretly providing intelligence information on Iraqi weaknesses.⁴⁶ The United States was giving both sides information, though more to Iraq, to achieve their policy goal of prolongation and standstill of the conflict.

While Iraq's name was removed from the terrorism list, Iran's landed on it in January 1984. It still seemed, however, that the United States was reluctant to entirely cut off Iran, as there was still hope for some restoration of relations. This is exemplified in a cable from Secretary of State Shultz to the United States Consulate General in Jerusalem, in which Shultz reported that he had decided "not to impose additional controls on export to Iran of dual-use equipment" and "not to seek to prohibit the importation of Iranian crude oil."⁴⁷

In March 1984, however, the efforts to halt arms flow to Iran were drastically increased with the assignment of a special ambassador to implement Operation Staunch, an arms embargo against Iran.⁴⁸ Due to Iranian battlefield victories and growing US-Iraqi relations, the American government launched this operation in an effort to dry up Iran's source of weapons.⁴⁹ Once again, one sees the Reagan administration escalating aid in response to Iranian victories and fears that Iraq might lose. This was done by pressuring U.S. allies—such as West Germany, Britain, Turkey, Italy, and Israel—to stop supplying Tehran. Because Iran was desperate for American-made equipment and parts, with which the Iranian army had been equipped under the Shah, these efforts had a devastating effect on Iran's military capacity. 75

Following Operation Staunch came the Iran-Contra Affair, the secret arrangement combining two of Reagan's initiatives: backing the CIA-funded and trained Contras who were fighting against Nicaragua's Sandinista government, and providing support to Iran partly in the hope of securing the release of seven Americans held hostage by Hezbollah, Iran's ally in Lebanon. The Iranian aspect of this affair had two missions: to get Iran to pressure Hezbollah into releasing the American hostages, and to use the shipments of arms to reduce tensions between Iran and the U.S., and in the long term regain political influence in Iran.⁵⁰ However, if the deal were to be publicised (as it eventually would be), the results would be embarrassing and demoralizing. Secret arms transfers to Iran not only violated U.S. neutrality, but also undercut what the United States was asking its allies to do. Thus,

45 *The Tower Commission Report, President's Special Review Board* (New York: Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987), 113; *Ibid.*, 261.

46 Woodward, *Veil*, 507.

47 Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Consulate General, Jerusalem, *Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran* [Includes Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984.

48 Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Fanning the Flames: Guns, Greed, and Geopolitics in the Gulf War* (New York: New York Times Syndication Sales, 1987).

49 Shalom, *Imperial Alibis*, 75.

50 *The Tower Commission Report*, 261.

Operation Staunch made the American arms shipments from 1985 to 1986 much more valuable, as the United States was the only one able to provide Iran with the necessary tools to fight Iraq.

Robert McFarlane, the National Security Advisor to President Reagan during the affair, later stated in an interview that the President had agreed to sell weapons via Israel only as long as the military balance in the war would not be altered.⁵¹ Reagan claimed he did not recall approving this sale.⁵² The deal itself was messy: hundreds of sophisticated missiles were sold, but the hostages were not released for the amount of arms initially agreed upon. More meetings were held and deals were called off and back on, causing more arms and intelligence to flow into Iran. Finally the story of the arrangement was published in a Lebanese paper.⁵³ This had devastating effects for Washington. Reagan's approval rating immediately dropped 20 points to 47 percent, and America's credibility was lowered amongst its allies, other countries that it had pressured into Operation Staunch, and the Gulf states.⁵⁴ While the amount of arms sold was not extensive, the symbolic weight was massive. Congress was not pleased, and some of the Reagan administration officials involved faced prosecution and were subsequently convicted of perjury, obstruction of justice, and withholding evidence.

The last year

76 In early 1987, Iraq and its allies blockaded Iranian oil exports. When Iran tried to do the same to Kuwait, which supported Iraq, the United States intervened and reflagged eleven Kuwaiti tankers, thus entitling them to US naval protection.⁵⁵ In order to protect their merchant ships from attacks, the United States increased its military and naval presence in the Gulf. In effect, this was direct military intervention in the war, a deviation from the policies of the previous six years. By this time, the military pressure on Iraq had mounted, as Khomeini had issued a fatwa in April of 1986, decreeing an Iranian victory by March 21, 1987, the day of the Iranian New Year. The Iranians succeeded in capturing Fao, Iraq's port city, which was also very close to Kuwait's border, adding pressure there.⁵⁶ The United States had wanted to enter the fray for a long time, especially with its newly increased military presence in the region, but it was officially still neutral (though obviously supporting Iraq), and needed a pretext to openly engage. That moment came on April 14, 1988 when an American frigate was badly damaged by an Iranian mine and ten sailors were wounded.⁵⁷ The United States responded

51 Philip Shenon, "Ex-Official Says Bush Urged End to Iran Arms Shipments," *The New York Times*, January 22, 1989.

52 BBC, "Reagan's Mixed White House Legacy," BBC, June 6, 2004.

53 Pollack, *The Threatening Storm*.

54 Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 1.

55 Margaret G. Wachenfeld, "Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A U.S. Response in the Persian Gulf", *Duke Law Journal* 1 (1988): 174.

56 Adam Tarock, *The Superpowers' Involvement in the Iran-Iraq War* (Commack: Nova Science Publishers, 1998), 132.

57 Reza Ra'iss Tousi, "Containment and Animosity: The United States and the War" in ed., Farhand Rajace, *Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War* (Gainesville, University Press of Florida,

with Operation Praying Mantis a few days later, the US Navy's largest engagement of warships since the Vietnam War.⁵⁸ In the days that followed, five Iranian warships and two oil platforms were sunk and an American helicopter crashed.⁵⁹

It is interesting that the United States still claimed to be neutral, though it was very clearly biased towards Iraq. This was further demonstrated when, in the same year, the USS Stark was accidentally attacked by Iraq, causing the death of 37 American sailors and leaving 21 injured. President Reagan excused Iraq instantly and used the incident to denounce what he characterized as Iran's aggression.⁶⁰ After that incident, though, American marines were on high alert and given orders to shoot at anything they thought had a hostile intent. This caused small skirmishes between American and Iranian boats. In one incident, Iranian speedboats fired at two U.S. ships and the American navy retaliated by setting two Iranian oil rigs on fire.⁶¹ In April 1988, the U.S. expanded their protection to all neutral ships in the Gulf.⁶² What ensued was that the Iraqis could attack any Iranian vessel, while the Iranians were disabled from attacking anyone. The United States justified their direct policy against Iran by stating that Iraq had only attacked Iranian ships, while Iran attacked neutral ones as well. The argument was false. Iraq had also attacked neutral ships.⁶³ Regardless, this policy helped advance one of America's goals—to have the Gulf states grow less averse to a heightened U.S. military presence in the region—while once again intensifying support for Iraq.

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As a cause of this direct American entanglement in the war, a tragic incident occurred on July 3, 1988: the shooting down of an Iranian passenger jet carrying 290 civilians. The US navy allegedly mistook the plane for an Iranian F14, and all on board died. After the downing of the plane Reagan did not formally apologize to Iran. Though he stated that he felt sorry for the loss of life, he insisted that the Navy had acted in the correct manner. Four years later, however, it was revealed that the airliner had been in Iranian airspace, not in international airspace as the United States maintained at the time. In fact, the American warship responsible for the attack was in Iranian waters.⁶⁴ America's aggressive rhetoric, encroachment upon Iranian territorial waters, and increasingly direct confrontations with Iran made it clear to Khomeini that there was a prospect of war with the United States itself. This played a significant role in his decision to agree to a ceasefire. The rapid escalation of American intervention on Iraq's behalf was more than Iran could handle. Iran was thus forced to give up its demands that Iraq admit to and 1997), 57.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Stephen Andrew Kelley, *Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy* (Monterey, California: Nava Postgraduate School, 2007).

⁶⁰ John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, *The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences* (UK: William Heinemann Ltd, 1991).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ronald O'Rourke, "The Tanker War," *Proceedings Magazine* 114, (1988).

⁶³ Tarock, *The Superpowers' Involvement*, 132.

⁶⁴ BBC, "1988: US warship shoots down Iranian airliner," BBC, July 3, 2004.

be compelled to pay for its aggression. The end of the long and treacherous war came in August 1988 with the acceptance by Iran of United Nations Resolution 598.⁶⁵

Conclusion

August 1988 saw Iran and Iraq not exactly peaceful, but withdrawn from each other's territory. There were two devastated nations and no clear victor. There was, perhaps, one winner in the war: ultimately, the United States achieved most of what it set out to do, despite many setbacks. While a revival of cordial or even respectful U.S.-Iran relations was unattainable, Washington had succeeded in increasing its influence in the region, the balance of power remained intact with both countries exhausted, the Gulf states did not object to a heightened American military presence in the Gulf, and the US had strong ties with Iraq that would continue—albeit for only a short period of time.

78 There were, however, consequences from America's contradictory actions during the Iran-Iraq War. Most important was that while the United States did not create Saddam Hussein, it did enable him. American support – in the form of technology, arms, intelligence, and direct intervention – saved Saddam's regime and helped Iraq grow into a stronger regional power. Not only would Saddam have most likely been defeated by the Iranians had it not been for key American support, but he believed that the United States would keep looking the other way as it did in the Iran-Iraq War, and the direct consequence was his actions in Kuwait. At the time Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990, one can argue, he believed that the United States would continue backing him at every turn, as they had over the past eight years.⁶⁶

65 Joanna Dodds and Ben Wilson, "The Iran-Iraq War; Unattainable Objectives," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 13 (2009).

66 Shuster, "U.S. Links to Saddam".

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“An Epidemic Creates an Opportunity”: Cleanliness and Control During the 1916 Polio Epidemic

MEGAN RAFFERTY

In 1916, an epidemic of polio (then called Infantile Paralysis) swept through New York City. The disease almost exclusively affected children, mostly under the age of five, leaving parents to watch helplessly as their children became sick overnight. As the *New York Times* printed addresses of sick residents each day, the city watched the disease spread outward from the Lower East Side and Brooklyn, where it seemed to originate. Over the past few decades, Italian immigrants had been settling in these neighborhoods, which were generally viewed as crowded and dirty, and with this epidemic the newly arrived Italian Americans found themselves at the center of the city's fear.¹

Uncertain how to prevent polio or how to cure it, New Yorkers turned to what they did know: the science of cleanliness. Desperate to protect their children, they implemented strict quarantine rules, aggressive educational campaigns, and home inspections designed to make sure all homes and public spaces were kept clean and free of germs to scientific standards.² The *New York Times* and other newspapers documented these efforts as children kept falling sick, urging citizens to follow their instructions to the letter. Nearly a century later, it is worth returning to these cleanliness efforts to determine whether they were successful. A review of literature from historians of science reveals that cleanliness campaigns were not successful in stopping the spread of polio; considering the campaigns themselves, though, it is apparent that they were effective in another realm. A close reading of coverage of the epidemic in the *New York Times* makes it possible to examine precisely how something seemingly benign and even obvious—the need to take measures to reduce the spread of disease—also effectively increased health officials' power to intervene in Italian immigrants' lives and construct them as less clean than other New Yorkers.

While New York City doctors and health officials turned to the science of 1916 to guide them in preventing polio from spreading, scientific historians have documented how their efforts were unhelpful and even counterproductive in preventing disease. In his book *Polio: An American Story*, historian David Oshinsky details the contradictions present in health officials' efforts. He writes that “Almost everyone assumed that poor living conditions—

¹ David M. Oshinsky, *Polio: An American Story* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 22.

² Naomi Rogers, *Screen the Baby, Swat The Fly: Polio in the Northeastern United States, 1916* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1986).

filth, poverty, overcrowding, and ignorance—were responsible for breeding epidemic disease.”³ These assumptions justified aggressive interventions in Italian immigrant neighborhoods that were already perceived as crowded and noisy; they placed immigrants at the center of the epidemic. Despite the seemingly obvious nature of these assumptions, though, Oshinsky describes studies that contradict them, including one that “showed that recent immigrants living in the most congested parts of Brooklyn and Manhattan had a lower incidence of the disease than native-born Americans living in rural areas of upstate New York.”⁴ Crowded or dirty conditions, then, could not be the single most important risk factor for infection; the study contradicted, too, the belief that immigrants faced higher rates of infection because they were ignorant compared to native New Yorkers. Interestingly, the study Oshinsky cites seems to have specifically singled out immigrants as a site of study, rather than communities in other neighborhoods of New York; this affirms the centrality of immigrants to the discussions and fears around polio. If rural native-born Americans were more susceptible to the disease than city immigrants, the assumptions upon which the cleanliness campaigns were founded were faulty, calling the worth of the campaigns into question.

84 Oshinsky affirms this faultiness as he goes on to consider polio in the 1930s, when cleanliness was once again emphasized. He describes a national phenomenon that mirrored New York City’s earlier fixation on cleanliness, the whole country became infatuated with soap and germ killers. Oshinsky explains, however, that with this cleanliness, “There was now a smaller chance that people would come into contact with dangerous microbes early in life, when the infection was milder and maternal antibodies offered temporary protection. In the case of polio, the result would be more frequent outbreaks and a wider range of victims.”⁵ Cleanliness, then, not only did not help to reduce the rate of infection, as the 1916 studies proved; it actively weakened immune systems and actually increased incidence of the disease. Oshinsky provides compelling evidence that the cleanliness efforts of 1916 were anything but successful in reducing cases of polio.

In her article “Screen the Baby, Swat the Fly: Polio in the Northeastern United States, 1916,” Naomi Rogers also includes details that undermine the effectiveness of health boards’ efforts. She describes how, in 1915, the director of the Health Department had discontinued almost all use of disinfectants in street cleaning, following new directives that indicated they were not useful. Despite this new knowledge of the disinfectants’ ineffectiveness, however, the Department returned to the familiar method when faced with the risk of polio. Rogers writes that officials began “flushing streets of infected areas with chloride of lime and other disinfectants.”⁶ With this

3 Oshinsky, *Polio*, 22.

4 Ibid., 2.

5 Oshinsky, *Polio*, 33.

6 Rogers, *Swat the Fly*, 47.

reversion to old tactics it becomes clear that sanitation measures in 1916 were driven more by fear than by fact, and that they were limited—and even counterproductive—at eliminating polio.⁷

Though the health officials' cleanliness campaigns did not succeed in stopping the spread of disease, they did succeed in a different kind of work. The campaigns made it possible for officials to increasingly intervene in immigrant neighborhoods and construct their inhabitants as threats. The connection between health efforts and social control is neither new nor limited to New York City in 1916; work on health around the world and throughout history provides a useful background for considering this epidemic. Warwick Anderson's article "Excremental Colonialism: Public Health and the Poetics of Pollution" is one example that considers how cleanliness was used as a measure of morality and of civilization. He writes about American work in the Philippines around the same time as this polio epidemic, and describes how American distinctions between clean and unclean constructed Filipinos as being "of a lower bodily (as well as social) stratum."⁸ Scientific health research, Anderson explains, constructed Filipinos as being inferior to Americans and justified this construction by pointing to personal hygiene and sanitation.

This conflation of the social and the physical – and the use of physical habits to indicate moral character—lent scientists more power over Filipinos. Anderson writes that in doing this work, "physicians sought to extend their power to inspect and regulate the personal conduct and the social life of the errant Filipinos."⁹ He also includes a discussion of cleanliness campaigns in the Philippines, which, much like those in New York City, included widely published bulletins, detailed instructions, and classes in schools. These efforts were designed to educate the unclean subject; Anderson explains that in doing so they also designated the subject as unclean.¹⁰ In making Filipino bodies the target of sanitation campaigns, Americans constructed them as dirty and dangerous and justified American intervention and control over Filipino habits and private lives. The work Anderson documents parallels the work that was done in New York City during the polio epidemic.

In her article "The Politics of Dirt and Gender: Body techniques in Bengali India," Sarah Lamb explores related ideas. Lamb's work on Bengali women serves as an example of how ideas of cleanliness can be concerned with morality as well as health, and how rules for cleanliness can apply to dif-

7 While there is no room to include it here, H.V. Wyatt's article "The 1916 New York City Epidemic of Poliomyelitis: Where did the Virus Come From?" provides an intriguing narrative that suggests that, not only did scientists not manage to stop the disease, but they may have also caused the outbreak in the first place.

8 Warwick Anderson, "Excremental Colonialism: Public health and the poetics of pollution," *Critical Inquiry* 21, no. 3 (1995): 643.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 660.

ferent groups in different ways. After describing historic attitudes toward purity, she writes that, “Attitudes about dirt are equally powerful in contemporary middle-class constructions of appropriateness, value, social distinctions, and civility.”¹¹ She details beliefs about cleanliness, bathing, and contamination that are grounded in rules about morality; a person, for example, can be unclean not because of the substances they touch but because of their social class. Though simplified, is worth summarizing because it shows the overlapping background for ideas about cleanliness. The clear integration of purity and morality are a valuable counterpart to 1916 New Yorkers’ ideas about cleanliness and morality. Lamb’s work is also useful because she focuses on how rules for cleanliness are not applied equally to all people, but rather differ based on aspects such as caste and gender. The idea that rules are not applied equally is helpful when considering cleanliness campaigns in 1916 that reached many New Yorkers, but were meant to target immigrants in particular.¹²

86 With Lamb and Anderson’s work as a background, it is possible to consider how cleanliness efforts in response to the polio epidemic were successful in constructing immigrants as unclean, and intervening in their lives accordingly. While these efforts took many forms, their coverage in the *New York Times* is worth particular attention. The *Times* was read throughout the city and should reflect dominant ideas at the time, unlike more local newspapers that are more likely to contain neighborhood bias. The *Times* was also an influential source of information for New Yorkers and included reprints of pamphlets and programs dedicated to sanitation efforts. These additional documents within the newspaper makes it a useful site of analysis, demonstrating dominant ideas during 1916 and provide examples of cleanliness campaigns.

On November 7, 1916, the “Topics of the Times” section of the *New York Times* included a blurb with the caption, “An Epidemic Makes an Opportunity.”¹³ The blurb—which, like all articles cited, does not list an author—explains that the child fatality rate in the city had actually decreased slightly over the past months, and states that this is because the epidemic called attention to public health in such a way as to prevent deaths from other causes. In November, with the rate of infection decreasing steadily, the newspaper could cheerfully report “considerable advances from the state of almost complete ignorance that existed with respect to this malady a year ago,” and remind readers that, after all, scientific knowledge had in-

11 Sarah Lamb, “The Politics of Dirt and Gender: Body techniques in Bengali India,” in *Dirt, Undress, and Difference: Critical Perspectives on the Body’s Surface*, edited by Adeline Masquelier, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 215.

12 For another, broader perspective on how health is tied up in ideas of morality and social norms, Richard Klein’s “What is Health and How Do You Get It?” is a wide-ranging consideration of human history that ultimately questions whether health has any value at all.

13 “Topic of the Times,” November 7, 1916.

creased even as families suffered losses.¹⁴ This emphasis on scientific growth privileges institutional knowledge over personal loss; the article only briefly alludes to the “terror” of the past summer, and then only as a contrast to the benefits that arose from the epidemic.

The article also centers on “a solid and permanent advantage [which] can be derived” from similar epidemics:

They educate the public on sanitary and health protective measures as nothing else does, and with this education comes a more or less willing submission to beneficent restrictions and regulations that are resented as irksome or needless when the appreciation of danger is less.¹⁵

This description of the benefits of epidemics performs a number of functions, primarily implying that the public is in need of education. By describing public health education about cleanliness as a beneficial part of city life, and by praising the epidemic’s role in increasing that education, the unnamed author makes it clear that educating the public is important a -- an opinion that hangs on the assumption that the public is uneducated. The particular topic of education described also emphasizes sanitation as a key goal of the city and conflates sanitation with health protective measures, even though Naomi Rogers has since established that over-sanitation was likely counterproductive to health. This conflation makes it clear that protective health measures are integral to the safety of all citizens, thus justifying official interventions if they are done for the sake of protecting sanitation and, therefore, health. Noticeably, the article acknowledges that the restrictions the health board implements could be protested as “irksome or needless,” but fails to give any weight to those complaints; if someone has good reason for resisting the health board’s rules, those reasons go unnoticed here. The actions of the health board take precedence over the responses of people affected. 87

This article’s continuing description of an epidemic’s benefits celebrates the way that official health interventions are quickly implemented, indicating that, “The health board that does not profit by the opportunity to increase its efficiency which is created by its successful handling of a rare epidemic can fairly be regarded as negligent, for at no other time is it so nearly free to issue any orders it pleases, or so nearly sure that its orders will be obeyed.”¹⁶ Besides stating the benefits of epidemics, this sentence contains a few implications about intervention. First, it connects efficiency and profit: efficiency is unquestionably good, and increased efficiency is profitable. Here, efficiency takes precedence over effectiveness or collaboration with the community; it is the speed with which programs are implemented, not their effects or community responses, that is valuable for the board and grant economic

¹⁴ “Topic of the Times,” *New York Times*, November 7, 1916.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

benefits or power. Similarly, the sentence implies that success is determined by implementing new programs: a “successful handling” is one in which the health board issues many orders that are quickly followed. A health board that does not issue orders, moreover, is labeled as negligent. Failure is then defined not by the inability to stop disease from spreading but by lack of action to increase the health board’s power. The *New York Times*’s analysis of the epidemic privileges the expansion of the health board’s interventions over a thoughtful response to the impact of disease on a community, and celebrates the way an epidemic suppresses resistance to official policies. Anyone—especially immigrants, who are already perceived as ignorant—who resists the board during an epidemic is easily framed as irrationally putting the entire city at risk, releasing the board from possible checks on its power.

88 The *Times* identified the polio epidemic as an opportunity for the health board with articles from the peak of the epidemic demonstrating how that opportunity was used. The dual role of cleanliness efforts to construct Italian immigrants as dirty and justify official intervention is apparent in an August 10, 1916 *New York Times* article that updated readers on the polio epidemic. Under the headline “Schools to Be Shut Till Epidemic Ends,” the unnamed author explained that a gathering of officials from groups including the Department of Health’s Advisory Committee on Poliomyelitis, the Board of Education, and the Bureau of Public Health Education, had together decided to keep schools closed as a public health measure. The author explained, “The doctors thought the mingling of children in the schools would... cause many children in the city to catch the disease who might otherwise escape.”¹⁷ With the disease concentrated in the Lower East Side and Brooklyn, immigrant neighborhoods were already widely perceived as the center of the epidemic. The children “who might otherwise escape,” then, were children from other parts of the city, and the “mingling” represented the threat of interaction with immigrant children. Here, the doctors’ justification for closing schools implied that the presence of children presumed to carry the disease—Italian immigrant children—would put all children at risk.

The same August 10 article included justification for intervening in immigrant neighborhoods, under the heading “Ignorant Mothers Hide Cases.” In this section, the author writes that “physicians practicing in the lower east side had reported that ignorant mothers were hiding cases of poliomyelitis because they feared that if their children were sent to hospitals, blood would be taken from them.”¹⁸ This report not only describes mothers on the Lower East Side as ignorant, but in the context of an epidemic that needs to be controlled, it also makes it clear that their ignorance is a threat to public health. In resisting the efforts of physicians, these mothers are resisting pub-

¹⁷ “Schools to be Shut Till Epidemic Ends,” *New York Times*, August 10, 1916.

¹⁸ Ibid.

lic good. Their apparent ignorance demands a response. The *Times*' portrayal of the epidemic makes it clear that a threat to public cleanliness cannot be left unchecked.

Later *New York Times* articles describe the continuation of efforts to promote cleanliness throughout the city. The *Times* does not explicitly state that immigrant families will be the target of these campaigns, but it is implied in the content of their lessons and the context of the epidemic. Cleanliness instructions are meant for those who are susceptible to the disease; with the addresses of polio victims printed in the *Times* each day, it would be common knowledge that it was centered in immigrant neighborhoods. Readers in other areas of the city, then, would understand that they were not the intended primary audience of prevention efforts even before reading what those efforts were. The content of cleanliness campaigns cemented readers' perceptions about whom they were directed at; with basic instructions about keeping houses clean and orderly, they would be redundant and obvious to a middle and upper class that prided themselves on civility. *Times* readers would infer that efforts to promote cleanliness were directed at populations who would be new to these ideas and rapidly falling ill, namely Italian immigrants.

In an August 19, 1916 article, the *Times* combated the ignorance it saw in Lower East Side mothers by printing a statement from Dr. Charles F. Bolduan, Director of the Bureau of Public Health Education at the Department of Health. The article quotes Dr. Bolduan's twelve instructions to parents, labeled "How to Guard Against Infantile Paralysis." His statement focuses heavily on cleanliness with the first sentence, "Keep your house or apartment absolutely clean."¹⁹ This is followed by instructions to clean woodwork, floors, windows, garbage, refuse, varmints, and children's bodies. In issuing this statement, Bolduan prioritizes sanitation above all else in preventing disease and makes adherence to sanitation the mark of a good parent. Bolduan also assumes that his audience does not already follow these rules, and needs to be instructed. In the context of the epidemic, it would be a poor parent indeed who would need to be explicitly instructed to "not allow garbage to accumulate."²⁰ Bolduan's instructions imagine the immigrant family as living in a mess of garbage and varmints and needing guidance to clean their disease-ridden homes.

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Just over a week later, the *New York Times* reported that families would receive more instructions, and students would be taught cleanliness in schools. On August 28, 1916 the *Times* reported details of how children would be inspected for order and cleanliness, and printed the 16-step program that they would learn, under the header "Children to Learn Hygiene."²¹ Here, the

19 "\$2,000 Fund Given for a Serum Hunt," *New York Times*, August 19, 1916. See Appendix.

20 Ibid.

21 "Paralysis Fighters Expect a Rest Soon," *New York Times*, August 28, 1916.

epidemic provided an opportunity for health officials to intervene in immigrant communities by implementing lessons in schools that would target all children. While these lessons were ostensibly meant to protect public health, they contained a familiar mix of cleanliness and morality that constituted a cultural intervention as well as a health-based intervention; children would learn not only sanitation, but the behavior expected by the dominant culture as well. The program children would learn included some steps that were clearly meant to prevent the spread of disease, such as “Wash (warm water and soap) hands, (hand brush) face, neck and chest.”²² Others, though, served a less obviously health-related purpose. Children would learn to keep “Books and clothes clean and in order,” “Observe regulations for entering school,” and “Return home for lunch without loitering.”²³ These mandates, justified by the drive to promote public health and cleanliness, instructed students on how to participate in the school and in public in a proper and orderly way, as defined by popular views of appropriate behavior. By observing regulations, keeping their things in order, and moving efficiently through city streets, they would become not only clean, but also active and effective members of society.

90 1916 efforts to promote cleanliness worked to control Italian immigrants who were seen as dirty and threatening not only to public health, but also to social order. Informational campaigns about sanitation served as a form of instruction and control, justified by the fear of polio and the threat it posed to children’s safety. The mix of cleanliness and morality documented by Warwick Anderson and Sarah Lamb appears in *New York Times* articles detailing the importance of following health officials’ orders and lamenting the ignorance of those who did not. The use of fear about public safety as a justification for increasing state control is not a phenomenon limited to this epidemic; a similar analysis of contemporary media will reveal the same work being done. These 1916 sanitation efforts may have done very little to actually prevent disease, but they successfully constructed the immigrant as a dirty body in need of control.

²² “Paralysis Fighters.” See Appendix.

²³ Ibid.

Appendix: Instructions for Cleanliness

Below are the two lists of cleanliness instructions referenced in this paper. The full articles containing these instructions, as well as other similar articles, can be easily accessed through the *New York Times* archive and are well worth a look.

“\$2,000 Fund Given for a Serum Hunt.” *New York Times* (1857-1922): 10. Aug 19 1916. *ProQuest*. Web.

HOW TO GUARD AGAINST INFANTILE PARALYSIS.

Keep your house or apartment absolutely clean.

Go over all woodwork daily with a damp cloth.

Sweep floors only after they have been sprinkled with sawdust, old tea leaves, or bits of newspaper which have been thoroughly dampened. Never allow dry sweeping.

Screen your windows against flies.

Do not allow garbage to accumulate.

Do not allow refuse of any kind to remain in your room.

Kill all forms of varmint.

Pay special attention to bodily cleanliness. Give your children a bath every day and see that all clothing which comes in contact with the skin is clean.

Keep your children by themselves as much as possible.

Do not allow them to visit places where there may be a large gathering of children.

Do not take your children with you when you go shopping.

Do not allow your children to be kissed.

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“Paralysis Fighters Expect a Rest Soon.” *New York Times* (1857-1922): 7. Aug 28 1916. *ProQuest*. Web.

What Dr. Crampton has called “a typical program of hygienic events of the day” will be impressed upon the minds of the children by the teachers. Here is the program:

1. Rise promptly.
2. Take breathing and setting-up exercises appropriate to the grade.
3. Wash (warm water and soap) hands, (hand brush) face, neck and chest. Cold splash on face, neck and chest. Clean finger nails.
4. Clean the teeth. Brush the gums and the whole mouth and rinse the mouth. Drink a glass of water.
5. Dress with inspection of clothes as to cleanliness.
6. Eat slowly at breakfast and chew well.
7. Prepare for school. Books and clothes clean and in order.
8. Observe regulations as to entering school.

9. Care for outer clothing. Attend to order of desk and prepare for daily morning hygienic inspection.
10. Keep correct sitting and standing posture in school.
11. Drink water at recess. Use individual drinking cup or bubble fountain.
12. Return home for lunch without loitering. Wash before lunch. Eat slowly.
13. Play in fresh air after school.
14. Study. Pay attention to lessons and finish the work.
15. Wash and prepare for the evening meal.
16. —Prepare for bed early. Wash, put clothes in order and open window.

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Advocating Partition? A Reassessment of Israeli Policy Towards Jerusalem, 1947-1967

ZACHARY SCHWARZBAUM

Following the British request for the United Nations' input concerning the future government of Palestine, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed with the goal of investigating and presenting a solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict. Their proposal, with slight adjustments, was adopted on November 29, 1947 in Resolution 181 of the United Nations General Assembly, which called for partitioning the land of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states and established Jerusalem as a "*corpus separatum* under a special international regime" that "shall be administered by the United Nations."¹ Israel's delegation to the United Nations accepted Resolution 181, thereby agreeing to the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Arab states rejected and invaded the newly formed State of Israel on May 15, 1948. Following the War of Independence, Jerusalem was divided, and would remain so for the next nineteen years, until the Six Day War.

⁹⁴ During the period between 1948-1967, Israeli political and military leaders accepted the status quo of a divided Jerusalem and, moreover, supported partition in the face of calls for internationalization. Since 1967, however, Israeli leaders have maintained Jerusalem as the "eternal and indivisible" capital of the State of Israel, complicating prospects for a long term settlement with the Palestinians, who demand Jerusalem as the capital of their future state. While this is indicative of a clear change in position, Israeli policy towards Jerusalem between 1947 and 1967 advocated partitioning the city despite territorial ambitions for the future reunification of the city and acted as a provisional sacrifice for the immediate needs of the Jewish state. Larger territorial ambitions for the future reunification of the city often surfaced throughout this period, but were only realized in 1967 following Israel's conquest of Jordanian-held territory.

This paper begins with an examination of the role of Jerusalem in the Israeli conscience followed by an analysis of the Israeli response to United Nations Resolution 181. The decisions made by the Israeli army vis-a-vis Jerusalem during the 1948 war are then reviewed. Next, it considers the Israeli government's response to calls for internationalization of Jerusalem and its preference for partition. Then, Israeli plans to conquer Jerusalem in 1956 and 1963 are presented and assessed. Lastly, it evaluates the implications of Israel's immediate annexation of East Jerusalem following June 1967.

1 UNGA Resolution 181.

The restoration of Jewish statehood without Jerusalem, the spiritual gathering place of the Jewish people and the symbolic capital of the Zionist project, would deprive the new state of its primary connection to its national past. The term *Zionism* refers to one of the hilltops “upon which the city was founded nearly five thousand years ago.” Historically, Jerusalem was the heart and capital of the first Jewish kingdom in the Land of Israel under King David. Jerusalem was the home of the first and second temples and has been the subject of Jewish prayers for over 2,000 years. Failure to include Jerusalem “would place in question the very meaning of the national future of the state.”² Furthermore, a Jewish state without Jerusalem as its capital “seemed a mockery of the historical connection to which the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate had granted recognition.”³ The Balfour Declaration, a letter from the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Lord Walter Rothschild, a leader of British Jewry, called for the establishment of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine.⁴ The Mandate refers to the years 1920 to 1948, during which the British ruled over Palestine. The viability of the Zionist movement was dependent upon Israeli sovereignty over a portion of Jerusalem.

United Nations Resolution 181, which sought to internationalize Jerusalem instead of making it part of a future Jewish state, challenged the Jewish connection to the city, denying its historic legitimacy and centrality to the Jewish people. Nevertheless, the Zionist leadership accepted the resolution, seemingly abandoning Jerusalem, their “heart of hearts,” for the future of the Jewish state as a whole. It was the most difficult decision they had to face in agreeing to the partition plan. David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel explained: “It was the price to be paid for statehood.”⁵ Demographic considerations had largely dictated the character of partition for most of Mandatory Palestine. As a result, the Zionist leadership thought Jerusalem, with a Jewish majority, should have been apportioned based on the existing population distribution. They felt a deep injustice in the fact that different criteria were used in determining who had the rights to Jerusalem and Jaffa, which had an Arab majority. According to Moshe Sharett, the Zionist representative at the United Nations, Israel had no other choice. The majority Israel needed to secure the passage of the resolution could not be mustered without the clause that internationalized Jerusalem, “thus warranting acquiescence in the elevation of the Jewish people to the level of sovereign statehood.”⁶

2 Shlomo Slonim, “Israeli Policy on Jerusalem at the United Nations, 1948,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 30.3 (1994): 579.

3 Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 373.

4 Arthur James Balfour, *The Balfour Declaration*, (British Foreign Office, 1917).

5 Quoted in Michael Brecher, “Jerusalem: Israel’s Political Decisions, 1947-1977,” *The Middle East Journal* 32.1 (1978):15.

6 Ibid.

The decision to accept the resolution, however, was not a total renunciation of Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state, but a choice made to serve the more pressing needs of the Zionist movement. The resolution also called for a reexamination of the status of Jerusalem after a ten-year period whereby “the residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City.”⁷ Following the establishment of statehood and the opening of the borders to Jewish immigration, the Zionist leadership was confident that Jerusalem would have a Jewish majority at the time of referendum. Furthermore, even though Jerusalem, under the partition plan, would not be the capital of the Jewish state, Ben-Gurion understood that this was not fixed: “Jerusalem ever was and must continue to remain the heart of the Jewish nation...and finally...we know there are no final settlements in history, there are no eternal boundaries and there are no final political claims and undoubtedly many changes and revisions will yet occur in [the map] of the world.”⁸ The decision to endorse the partition plan, despite its calls for internationalization of Jerusalem, served the immediate needs of the Zionist movement and was not a renouncement of Jewish claims to Jerusalem. In fact, it is clear from Ben-Gurion’s statements that the Zionist leadership, though supportive of the plan, did not envision internationalization as permanent.

⁹⁶ After the resolution passed in the United Nations, a civil war broke out between the Jews and the Arabs living in Palestine. This conflict later developed into a war between Israel and its neighboring Arab states after Israel’s declaration of independence on May 14, 1948. On the very same day, the United Nations appointed Count Folke Bernadotte, a Swedish diplomat, to serve as the mediator, tasked with “[promoting] a peaceful adjustment to the future situation of Palestine.”⁹ Bernadotte successfully established the first truce on June 11, 1948 and among other recommendations, suggested that the internationalization of Jerusalem be abandoned and the city, in its entirety, be incorporated into Arab territory. Israel was “shocked and angered” by the proposal and viewed it as an affront to both Jewish history and the present day reality. The official Israeli reply articulated the provisional government’s belief that the proposal

[utterly disregarded]...the historic associations of Judaism with the Holy City; the unique place occupied by Jerusalem in Jewish history and present-day Jewish life; the Jewish inhabitants’ two-thirds majority in the city...the fact that the whole of Jerusalem, with only a few minor exceptions, is now in Jewish hands... the Jewish people, the State of Israel and the Jews of Jerusalem will never acquiesce in the imposition of Arab domination over Jerusalem...They will

⁷ UNGA Resolution 181.

⁸ Slonim, “Israeli Policy on Jerusalem at the United Nations, 1948,” 580.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 582.

resist such an imposition with all the force at their command.¹⁰

Bernadotte continued to support the plan, but Israel's explicit and forceful rejection of it resulted in its eventual decline. Fighting resumed, and the United Nations Security Council soon passed a resolution calling for the demilitarization of Jerusalem. Again, Israel refused to comply, fearing that demilitarization "may turn out a mere prelude to Arab domination."¹¹ In a letter to Bernadotte formally rejecting demilitarization, Moshe Sharett, then Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained that Bernadotte's first plan to give all of Jerusalem to Transjordan undoubtedly influenced the calls for demilitarization, and Israel could not accept such a proposal. The plan, however, was destined to fail because America refused to send troops to ensure demilitarization. Nevertheless, Israel used the opportunity to delineate its new policy on Jerusalem. Israel would now advocate for partition with Jordan, fearing that any international regime over Jerusalem would be "anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist," further asserting that the failure of the United Nations to safeguard Jerusalem absolved Israel from its previous commitments to internationalization.¹² This change, however, was more than just rejection of internationalization; it was the first Israeli policy "edging toward the inclusion of Jerusalem into Israel proper, on a formal basis."¹³ When Dr. Dov Joseph was appointed military governor of the city in 1948, Israeli law was applied to the territory.

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Though the international community, led by the United Nations, would not accept Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, the Israeli government was resolved to stake its claim to the city. In September 1948, Bernadotte submitted a second proposal, this time suggesting Jerusalem be internationalized with local autonomy for the Arab and Jewish communities. In many ways this could be seen as an improvement from his first proposal and a reversion to the original partition plan with regard to Jerusalem. One crucial piece, however, was absent. Bernadotte's second plan did not call for a referendum in ten years to reassess the regime of the city. The day after he submitted his suggestion, Bernadotte was assassinated, strengthening the resolve of the international community to implement his proposal. Having already secured recognition by the United Nations for statehood, the Israeli leadership was unwilling to accept such a plan. Chaim Weizmann, the first President of Israel, articulated the Israeli response: "It seems inconceivable that the establishment of a Jewish state...should be accompanied by the detachment from its spiritual centre and historical capital."¹⁴ Israel was determined

10 State of Israel, *Political and Diplomatic Documents December 1947 – May 1948*, (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1979), 264.

11 Ibid., 369-370.

12 Ibid., 378.

13 Slonim, "Israeli Policy on Jerusalem at the United Nations, 1948," 589.

14 Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Israel's Foreign Relations*, ed. Meron Medzini. Vol. 1. Jerusalem, 1976, 222.

to affirm Jerusalem as its everlasting capital. Granting the United Nations trusteeship over Jerusalem would be tantamount to abandoning the city as a whole. Partition, on the other hand, incorporated a section of Jerusalem into the Jewish state.

Amidst the political developments in the United Nations, war raged on until March 1949, during which West Jerusalem fell to Israeli control. The Israeli Defense Forces failed to conquer East Jerusalem. Yitzhak Rabin, director of operations specifically for the Jerusalem area during the war, blamed Ben-Gurion for the shortcoming: "Whatever Ben-Gurion truly decided, he could have made happen."¹⁵ Historian Motti Golani notes, "the Israeli government deliberately made little effort to capture the eastern city."¹⁶ It is unclear, however, if that was indeed Ben-Gurion's position, as Rabin asserts. Another account suggests that Ben-Gurion called for renewed military action to conquer the entirety of Jerusalem, but the cabinet struck down his proposal. Ben-Gurion reportedly called this "a misfortune of generations."¹⁷ In any case, policy makers decided to refrain from ordering the conquest of East Jerusalem, seeming to abandon the entirety of Jerusalem and specifically, the Jewish holy places. A closer examination of the context, however, indicates that pragmatism was the driving force behind this decision.

98 After the War of Independence ended in March 1949, Israel submitted a bid for statehood at the United Nations. The Israeli leadership had been receiving criticism, "from the international community's objections to Israel's actions in the city's western part."¹⁸ The Israeli leadership, whether it was Ben-Gurion or his cabinet, understood that the only way for Israel to ensure its survival within the international community and retain any portion of Jerusalem was by refraining from occupying East Jerusalem. Had Israel conquered East Jerusalem as well, its quest for admittance into the United Nations in 1949 would have been endangered and calls for the internationalization of Jerusalem would have been much louder. Instead, Israeli policy advocated for partition as a means to safeguard its United Nations bid.

In order to secure sovereignty over the city in its entirety, Israel first needed to entrench itself into West Jerusalem. On December 20, 1948, Israel began moving government institutions to Jerusalem and abolished military rule, placing the city under civil administration. In the parliament debate regarding the transfer of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) to Jerusalem, Yosef

15 Quoted in Tom Segev, "Maps and Dreams," in *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East* (New York: Metropolitan, 2007), 182.

16 Motti Golani, "Jerusalem's Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31 (1999): 581.

17 Quoted in Meron Benvenisti, *Jerusalem: The Torn City* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1976), 7.

18 Golani, "Jerusalem's Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67," 581.

Sapir, of the General Zionists party, commented on the move: "The U.N. decision to internationalize Jerusalem obliges us to take our stand in practice as well as in theory, in order to stem this undesirable development, and we must proclaim Jerusalem to be our capital immediately."¹⁹ Right before the annexation of West Jerusalem, in the same sitting of the Knesset, Ben-Gurion articulated the deep and unbreakable connection between Israel and Jerusalem: "Jewish Jerusalem is an organic, inseparable part of the State of Israel...Jerusalem is the heart of the State of Israel...[we] will never agree to be separated from Jerusalem. Jewish Jerusalem will never accept alien rule after thousands of its youngsters liberated their historic homeland."²⁰ His steadfastness with regard to Jerusalem can be seen as a direct response to continued United Nations attempts to remove Jewish sovereignty from Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion's reference to the western city as "Jewish Jerusalem" reflects his attempt to ingrain this connection into the minds of the world leaders. He feared that failure to stand strong in the face of United Nations declarations would "result in a call to Israel to permit Arab refugees return and to give up territories conquered in the war across the 1947 U.N. partition boundaries...Israel viewed the issues of refugees and the territories as matters of life or death."²¹ Standing firm on the Jerusalem issue by consolidating its hold on the western city and demonstrating the stability inherent in partition with Jordan would benefit Israel in its geopolitical future.

Jordan, like Israel, opposed internationalization and sought to benefit from a partitioned Jerusalem. The second truce in the War of Independence began on July 18, 1948 and effectively ended the fighting in Jerusalem. Control over East Jerusalem granted Jordan rule over the Noble Sanctuary, or Temple Mount, the third holiest spot in Islam. Discussions between the Jordanian monarch King Abdullah and Israel resulted in the signing of the "sincere ceasefire" in Jerusalem on November 30, 1948. Both Israel and Jordan understood that in order to combat the calls for internationalization, they needed to develop a solution for partition. Dov Joseph summed up Israel's policy change from supporting internationalization to backing partition: "It is difficult for me to fathom political thought that says that instead of the Arabs having something, it is better that neither we nor they have anything; we will remove one eye of our own, provided we can remove two eyes of theirs."²² In other words, it was more important for Israel to retain some portion of Jerusalem than for neither Jordan nor Israel to have any part of the city. While Jordan and Israel reached a basic understanding regarding dividing Jerusalem during the armistice talks, the United Nations

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¹⁹ Israel Knesset, *Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981* (Jerusalem: Lanham: University of America, 1993), 585.

²⁰ Ibid., 549.

²¹ Golani, "Jerusalem's Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67," 582.

²² Quoted in Golani, "Jerusalem's Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67," 583.

still sought to implement its decision of internationalization. Unified in their rejection of the United Nations' demands, Israel and Jordan worked quickly to divide the city. In their haste, Israel essentially forgave access to the holy places and Jordan gave up its use of the Jerusalem-Hebron road, among a number of other contentious issues. The agreement "guaranteed that the intention to internationalize the city would be thwarted and ensured international acceptance in practice of Jerusalem's divisions between the two countries."²³ Moreover, partition was Israel's only hope for making any piece of Jerusalem the capital of its state.

Acceptance of partition, however, did not mean abandonment of the rest of Jerusalem. Israeli leaders still sought to reunite Jerusalem under full Israeli sovereignty at a later date. In the interim, Israeli policy focused on the development of new "holy sites" in West Jerusalem as a means to entrench Israel's presence in this territory into the minds of the international community. The development of West Jerusalem would serve two goals: the establishment of Jerusalem as a governing capital in practice and the improvement of infrastructure to accommodate a growing population. Immediately after the creation of the first government in April 1949, Israel began to develop the national cemetery, Mount Herzl, named after the father of modern political Zionism, Theodore Herzl. The government compound, including the Prime Minister's Office, buildings for the Finance and Interior¹⁰⁰ Ministries and the new home of the Knesset, were completed in 1966. These Israeli actions met little international criticism. Consequently, Israel made the decision to move its Foreign Ministry in July 1953 to Jerusalem, and soon after, international leaders were brought to Jerusalem to present their credentials. The willingness of foreign diplomats to do so indicates the growing acceptance to Israel's presence in Jerusalem.

Due to the inaccessibility of Hebrew University, located on Mount Scopus, Israel decided to construct a satellite campus of the university in West Jerusalem in order to more fully incorporate the city in the larger State. For the Zionist movement, Hebrew University was "a secular spiritual alternative to the yeshivas of the Old Yishuv and...a center to create the new Zionist-Israeli elite."²⁴ Furthermore, the establishment of the university in the first place was the "most overt Zionist public act in Jerusalem until 1948."²⁵ The question was where to build the new university branch. The proposal to move the university beyond Jerusalem's city limits would "lend support to the claim that the city was not a significant center recognized by the government of Israel itself."²⁶ As a result, the government decided to build the new campus within the city limits, reinforcing their standing in West Jerusalem.

²³ Golani, "Jerusalem's Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67," 585.

²⁴ Ibid., 591-92.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 592.

With the building completed in 1954, West Jerusalem now was home to the educational flagship of the State of Israel in addition to its governing bodies and national memorial, entrenching the city into the State of Israel as a whole and thereby solidifying partition and challenging the international community's demands.

The establishment of Jerusalem as the heart of the state was advanced with creation of a new holy site in West Jerusalem, which served to temporarily imbue the Western portion of the city with spirituality. Despite the fact that the 1949 armistice required Jordan to give Jews free access to the Western Wall and other holy sites, the Jordanians did not uphold the agreement. Seeking to create sanctity in West Jerusalem, the Israeli Ministry of Religions began to emphasize David's Tomb on Mount Zion, the only potential holy site under their control.²⁷ The Ministry of Religions, in coordination with the newly formed Mount Zion Committee, encouraged pilgrimage ceremonies at the site. They transformed David's Tomb into the primary location for memorials that had previously been held at the holy sites now under Jordanian rule because the view from the rooftop was the closest observation point to the Old City and the Western Wall.²⁸ In addition to the religious ceremonies at the site, the tomb also became a center for nationalistic commemorations. It was one of the first locations in the State of Israel at which a holocaust commemoration site was established and a massive menorah, symbolizing the state and the Jewish nation, was constructed.²⁹ Though the validity of the historical narrative claiming that David is actually buried there is uncertain, David's Tomb transformed into the center for ritual worship. It became the focus of religious aspirations for many Jews, developing into the most important Jewish site within the borders of the State of Israel. Following the Six Day War, however, visits to the tomb sharply declined, and the government stopped promoting the site as its national holy site.³⁰ The almost immediate reduction of activity, both religious and nationalist, at the site indicated that the government's decision to promote David's Tomb was purely pragmatic. It allowed West Jerusalem to be temporarily sanctified, serving as a replacement for East Jerusalem, the location of the true holy sites, until it once again became accessible.

Further support for Israel's ultimate goal of a united Jerusalem is evident in the military preparations to take over East Jerusalem prior to 1967 that were drawn up twice, first in 1956 amidst the Sinai Campaign and again in 1963. In 1956, Israel wanted to take advantage of its collaboration with France and Britain against Egypt to change the geopolitical landscape in Jerusalem as well. At first, plans were drawn up for capturing Mt. Scopus, but then

27 Doron Bar, "Re-creating Jewish Sanctity in Jerusalem: Mount Zion and David's Tomb, 1948–67," *Journal of Israeli History: Politics, Society, Culture* 23.2 (2004): 261.

28 Ibid., 263–6.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 270.

included all of East Jerusalem in addition to the West Bank. A week and a half before the start of the Sinai War, Israeli intelligence learned that an Iraqi company was planning on entering Jordan. A “concrete plan, intended for implementation” was prepared for the conquest of strategic positions in East Jerusalem.³¹ To Israel’s dismay, the Iraqi presence in Jordan did not materialize, thus removing Israel’s pretext to attack Jordan. Nevertheless, “the preparations that were undertaken show that Israel was ready to act, in certain conditions, to enhance its position in Jerusalem.”³² The decision of Israel not to act in 1956 reveals the practical nature of Israel’s decision makers who, despite their desire to reunite Jerusalem, held off for a later, more realistic date.

102 Israeli leaders would again contemplate military action in 1963, demonstrating their dissatisfaction with partition and eagerness to conquer East Jerusalem. Soon after Levi Eshkol became Prime Minister in June 1963, he expressed a desire to expand the borders of Israel such that they would be more in line with the early Zionist vision for the State of Israel. Yitzhak Rabin, serving as deputy chief of staff, indicated the desirability of having the border along the Jordan River. Within months, a plan was drawn, code-named Whip, to conquer the West Bank and East Jerusalem.³³ A worthwhile opportunity for conquest, though, never arose. Until 1967, discussions regarding active border expansion happened repeatedly, but plans were never executed. The deliberations about and development of operational plans to occupy East Jerusalem again underscored an Israeli desire to be sovereign over Jerusalem in its entirety. Israeli politicians, in addition to military leaders, also expressed a desire for the reunification of Jerusalem in the years leading up to the Six Day War. In December 1966, Teddy Kollek, mayor of Jerusalem, promised that Jerusalem would be reunited one day and emphasized that the master plan for Jerusalem ensured a smooth integration of the eastern half of the city upon its reunification.³⁴ Further articulating this desire for East Jerusalem, Eshkol, in the spring of 1966, declared, “Our demand for access to the Western Wall is eternal.”³⁵ Speaking for the public, in January 1967, the newspaper *Maariv* wrote that the Old City had been “pilfered” and that “your soul cries out to them but your feet may not tread there.”³⁶ Perhaps the strongest indication of the increase in public opinion for a united Jerusalem was the transformation of Israeli composer, Naomi Shemer’s song “Jerusalem of Gold” into an unofficial national anthem. The lyrics speak of the isolation of and the desire to return to the biblical, eastern section of Jerusalem. On May 17, 1967, two days after the song’s debut

31 Golani, “Jerusalem’s Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67,” 595.

32 Ibid., 596.

33 Segev, “Maps and Dreams,” 175.

34 Ibid., 174.

35 Quoted in Segev, “Maps and Dreams,” 170.

36 Segev, “Maps and Dreams,” 170.

and three weeks before the Six Day War, the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* wrote, "The singer was not allowed off the stage...[with the audience] demanding [she] sing it once more."³⁷ That same week, Shemer was made into an honorary citizen of Jerusalem and when the Six Day War was at last declared, *Maariv* reported that "Jerusalem of Gold" was the "most popular tune sung in Jerusalem's shelters."³⁸ The almost immediate success of the song indicates the public's feelings of attachment to a united Jerusalem and its increasing support of the reunification of the city.

Despite the public support for the reunification of Jerusalem, Israel's conquering of the territory on June 7, 1967 occurred only after a cable was sent to Jordan indicating that Israel would only attack in response to Jordanian provocation. When Jordanian shelling began on June 5, Israel was compelled to attack, realizing its dream of a united Jerusalem. The quickness with which Israel integrated East Jerusalem into the larger municipality demonstrates the territorial objective for a unified city. On June 27, 1967, a mere seventeen days after the conclusion of the war, the Knesset amended the Law and Administration Ordinance, thereby incorporating East Jerusalem into the territory of the state and finally fulfilling the nineteen-year-old longing for a united Jerusalem.

Israel's policy makers, between the founding of the state in 1948 and the Six Day War in 1967, advocated for partition of Jerusalem. Partition, however, 103
was not the end goal, but merely the sacrifice the early Zionist leaders were willing to make for the needs of the time. Their territorial ambitions for the future reunification of the city often surfaced throughout this period, but were only realized in 1967 following Israel's conquest of Jordanian-held territory. Israeli policy has since declared Jerusalem indivisible, complicating the issue of Jerusalem in peace talks with the Palestinians, who envision Jerusalem as the capital of their future state.

37 Dalia Gavriely-Nuri, "The Social Construction of 'Jerusalem of Gold' as Israel's Unofficial National Anthem," *Israel Studies* 12.2 (2007):106.

38 Ibid., 110.

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Contributor Biographies

NIKA ARZOUMANIAN is an aspiring lawyer with a passion for Middle Eastern history. She is graduating summa cum laude this spring and will spend the upcoming year working at Gogo, a tech company in Chicago, and leading the National High School Model United Nations, the largest Model UN conference in the world.

CHRISTOPHER HILLIS BERENSON is a graduating History major at New York University, whose studies have focused on Britain and its Empire as well as French-Canadian nationalism. He lives in New York City and plans on going in to the educational field as a secondary school teacher.

SUPRIYA KAMATH is a freshman and an aspiring psychology major studying at NYU Abu Dhabi. She has harbored a deep love of history since high school, and is especially intrigued by the politics and history of the former Soviet Union. She spends most of her free time writing, be it academic essays, humor pieces or screenplays for sitcoms about pigeons

SCOTT KANCHUGER is a member of the CAS Class of 2016. His research interests are in early American political economic history and the history of economic thought, focusing on 19th century classical political economic thinkers. Scott will be working at a corporate law firm for a year after graduation, after which he plans on attending
106 law school. Outside of academia, Scott enjoys playing basketball, watching classic cinema, and traveling.

KRISHNA KULKARNI is a junior in CAS pursuing majors in History and Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies. His current research interests lie in the history of the narcotics trade in Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, places to which he one day hopes to travel. When he isn't sipping a cup of tea and contemplating the universe in a cafe, Krishna enjoys listening to the Grateful Dead, watching Tarantino films, and reading dull philosophy and poetry.

RINA PLOTKIN is a junior with a History major and a passion for understanding what drives American foreign policy. She is currently working on her honors thesis, which will be about how decisions were made within the American government, and who made them, during the Iran-Iraq War.

MEGAN RAFFERTY is a writer, scholar, and former Goddard resident with a passion. She will graduate in May 2016 with a degree in American Studies after four years of academic inquiry into what, exactly, American Studies even is.

ZACH SCHWARZBAUM graduated from Gallatin in 2016. Taking a linguistic, political, and historical approach, he concentrated in the intersection of language, conflict and national identity with a particular focus on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Zach is originally from Westchester, New York.