Contents

3 Masthead

4 From the Editors

6 Hyanna Cardoso – Marronage: A Central Influence on the Haitian Revolution

16 Marie Chapman – Non-Elite Female Agency in Colonial Virginia: The Case of Mary Rawlins

28 Aristidis Steven Dionisiou – The New Temple Tax


58 Sinéad Macleod – “A Girlish Thing To Do”: Women in Early Film

68 Shira Mogil – United We Struggle: Exploring the Relationship Between the Cuban Revolution and the Black Fight for Freedom in the United States


95 Joshua Tan – Contesting Nationhood: An Examination of Hong Kong’s 2014 Protest Movement

112 Jonathan Xu – The Education of a King: The Scottish Court and the Coursework of James I & VI

122 Contributor Biographies

124 Past Historian Staff
VOLUME 56, SPRING 2015

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From The Editors

We are so grateful for the supporters of the fifty-sixth edition of Historian. Thanks to the generous funding of the NYU Department of History and the CAS Student Council, we are able to share this year’s journal with you.

We extend a special thank you to our sponsors and advisors in the History Department: Professor George Solt, Professor Guy Ortolano, Chelsea Rhodes, and the department’s administrative staff. Their encouragement and support have allowed the editorial board to continue our tradition of developing and publishing excellent undergraduate historical research.

As students, we are proud to be able to present articles of such quality on a variety of topics with pressing historical and contemporary relevance. As editors, we are proud of the contributions our colleagues have made to historical scholarship.

Finally, to the professors, writers, and readers of our journal: thank you for reading Historian over the years, for encouraging students to submit, and for sharing your ideas and work with us. We look forward to many more years of this historical tradition at NYU.

With gratitude,

The Historian Editorial Board
Marronage: A Central Influence on the Haitian Revolution

HYANNA CARDOSO

Introduction

The spark of revolution is intrinsically elusive and mysterious. As the colonial world marveled at the success of Saint Domingue’s “unthinkable” revolution in 1791, the origin of its revolutionary spark became increasingly contested. But prior to this abrupt shock, slave solidarity had been subtly extending its deep and sinuous roots throughout the island community.1 Although former slave and revolutionary Toussaint Louverture has been deemed the face of Saint Domingue’s independence, slave leaders had been planting revolutionary seeds decades before Bois Caïman. By fostering maroon and voodoo communities, early slave leaders built community solidarity and a proto-revolutionary identity that would serve as essential cornerstones to the successful mobilization of 1791. This paper will investigate how complex organizational and communication networks, produced through alternative slave communities, were key in transforming small-scale resistance into nascent yet powerful national collective action.

Although slaves participated daily in small forms of resistance, marronage encompassed a large-scale opportunity for centralized resistance.2 I argue that marronage directly generated the necessary preconditions for communal unity and leadership management to initiate the Haitian Revolution. Marronage and its associated practice of voodoo unified slaves of diverse African backgrounds under the central principle of rejecting slavery. This paper will explore how effective leadership shaped the anger and vengeance of slaves into a military network dedicated to eradicating white colonialism. With an established vision for black self-determination, the maroons were a vital force in creating the social capital necessary for the Haitian Revolution.

Understanding Marronage

The practice of marronage is “as old as slavery itself.”3 Maroons, or fugitive slaves who abandoned the plantation to live freely as outlaws, generally occupied mountainous or wooded areas around Le Cap, Cul de Sac, and Les Cayes.4 Slaves would run away during their time off, usually in search of

4. Leslie Manigat, “The Relationship between Marronage and Slave Revolts and Revolution in
entertainment, or as a result of fear, humiliation, or punishment by a cruel master. Bands of maroons, often motivated by the attainment of liberty, property, and independence, fled the plantations. Prior to 1785, about 1 in every 200 slaves ran away. This high rate of runaways offered maroon communities the strength of numbers necessary to create a large military movement that would mature into a potential political organization for freedom.

Marronage manifested principally in two forms: grand marronage and petit marronage. Grand marronage occurred when slaves determined to run away fled to inaccessible locations and remained there for as long as possible. This type of maroon would later unite with the larger maroon community to participate in hit-and-run guerrilla tactics against plantations. On the other hand, petit marronage occurred when a slave fled spontaneously, often disappearing for just a few days and remaining relatively close to the plantation.

A maroon undoubtedly faced many pressing risks given that success depended on two essential acts: stealing food and clothes prior to running away and later raiding plantations for poultry and cattle to survive. Mardchauss (countryside rangers) pursued maroons and constantly posed a threat to their security, which typically forced the runaway slaves to live a primitive lifestyle. They constantly faced basic food and health insecurities. In an effort to remedy this situation, the maroons established African agricultural communities, which cultivated a variety of fruits, vegetables, legumes, and cash crops. Regardless, the difficulties associated with survival could quickly shift an attempt of grand marronage into petit marronage. In many cases, a significant number of runaways gave up and returned to the plantation for more secure, but ultimately inhumane, conditions.

Despite substantial difficulties, many slaves overcame the obstacles to producing a free and diverse maroon community. This diversity increased solidarity, as it forced slaves of different backgrounds to engage with each other under a single shared belief of rejecting the oppressive system. Slaves who partook in marronage ranged from young and old, creoles and mulattos, plantation workers and artisans, and property of both wicked and kind masters. Women surprisingly comprised a sizable portion of the maroon population. Though marronage was often an individual endeavor, mothers

5. Ibid, 40-433.
6. Daniels, “Recovering the Fugitive,” 130.
boldly escaped plantations with their children or small family units in tow. The *marronage* captured dozens of pregnant or nursing mothers. Skilled creoles also partook in marronage, but at a lesser rate, likely due to their elevated status.

Nonetheless, many maroons put effort into fostering a community, including utilizing the skills and talents of the free slaves. Black men and women worked as butchers, hairdressers, sailors, coachmen, and blacksmiths. Of these occupations, cooks, bakers, and wig-dressers composed 45% of the maroon population. Historian Jason Daniels speculates that these skilled slaves were closer to their masters and thus less likely to accept harsh conduct. Therefore, he argues, they were more likely than others to run away after cruel treatment.¹⁰

**Marronage as Nascent Revolution**

As a collective, the organized maroons established a fight against white oppression, culture, and power. Marronage essentially manifested as an expression of the rejection of slavery and the brutal conditions associated with plantation life. The individual consciousness of rebellion formed into collective action, as maroons obtained modern arms and eventually orchestrated intricate attacks on plantations. As the guerilla attacks associated with marronage increasingly developed an affiliation with a movement of proto-national resistance, the collaborative efforts of the maroons metamorphosed into the necessary foundations for revolution.

Before the Haitian Revolution, maroons relied on several techniques to transform their communities into the “pivot of the resistance against oppression.” Manigat describes this process as the “mutation of marronage,” or the formation of revolutionary consciousness from a social community. In the case of the maroons, voodoo, the expansion of plantation communication networks, and the spread of guerilla activities all led to this revolutionary mutation. Manigat also defines the resulting determination to “resist oppression and exploitation” on the collective level as marronage-resistance.¹¹ These examples reflect the deeply rooted hatred that emerged in the form of “embryonic” political consciousness. This important psychological connection eventually forged a vital emotional link to revolution. The accumulation of these negative emotions, indicated through violent maroon attacks throughout the island, testified to the growing desire for retaliation. Now emotionally united, the maroons sealed their collective consciousness as they worked together in destroying plantations, igniting fields, and poisoning whites.

¹⁰ Daniels, “Recovering the Fugitive,” 122, 134-135, 138, and 140-141.
As the maroon communities transformed from a loose band of angry rebels into a goal-oriented unit, marronage shifted its focus exclusively towards the destruction of white masters and slavery. A vision of national independence from whites began surfacing as early as the 1750s, when free blacks increasingly began shattering the colonial system by assisting slaves that were transforming into maroons. Aside from contributing to a greater social phenomenon, the increasing collaboration of the maroons on the macro-level earned slaves “small concessions” to improve their daily lives. On the micro-level, marronage also functioned as an outlet for aggrieved slaves to participate in the rebellion. The free slave community provided a social safety net that was steadily gaining a reputation as a coordinated and structured entity. Through inter-plantation communication, the ultimate purpose of the maroons was spreading. Slaves were aligning themselves with the maroon ideology of freedom. This “spirit of marronage” undoubtedly trickled down into the slave consciousness, as in one instance an entire plantation boldly fled to the mountains to participate in the movement.

Makandal, the Leader and Prophet

François Makandal, a maroon organizer and leading revolutionary radical, capitalized on the rebellious ambitions of this runaway community. Makandal’s principle goals sought to utilize violence to achieve emancipation for slaves, completely eradicate the existing colonial system, and establish an independent state of black slaves. Known for his charisma, oratory skills, and status as a religious leader, he eventually acquired “immeasurable influence and command” over the maroons. A veteran maroon, Makandal carefully crafted a “network of resistance” throughout every part of the colony. This network was particularly realized in Santa Domingue’s northern province. The network organized to generate an island-wide perception of slave solidarity and execute strategic attacks against white residents. His successor Dutty Boukman would eventually depend on these managed insurrectionist communities for the ignition of the revolution in 1791.

Makandal’s leadership of the maroons revolved around a violent agenda with the aim of decolonization. He recognized that slavery was an unacceptable and dehumanizing institution, which “threatened the very existence” of a collective black race. Makandal believed that the cessation of slavery and colonialism would end human suffering on Saint Domingue and reestablish black dignity and self-determination. In order to achieve this vision of justice and freedom, he harnessed the cohesiveness of the maroons to carry out systematic violence against whites. Celucien argues that through mobiliz-

ing the maroons, Makandal was “decolonizing the Saint Domingue landscape” by capitalizing on the ability of slaves to perform a type of “cathartic violence.”\textsuperscript{16} Makandal ordered the maroons to attack the whites as a means to the ultimate end of collapsing the institution of slavery. These actions encouraged a collective idea of black independence on Saint Domingue that added to the evolving dissent.\textsuperscript{17} As part of the maroons, slaves were not only developing visions of self-determination, but they were also actively working towards establishing an independent island of their own.

Makandal’s use of violence as a tool to eradicate slavery and the colonial administration strengthened an already growing spirit of liberation and white resistance among the maroons. He linked the idea of genuine independence to black land ownership and the “cultivation of land for their self-gain.” By destroying the colonial system of the whites, blacks could find self-determination while becoming the rightful masters of Saint Domingue. Securing independence through violent decolonization involved a “radical mutation of consciousness,” as slaves began to associate liberation with land ownership. However, obtaining land would of course require the removal of European colonizers and their existing colonial system.\textsuperscript{18} Makandal acknowledged that eliminating white society would require tactics that were more comprehensive than the previous guerilla plantation raids. Employing the maroon network, he arranged an island-wide water-poisoning scheme in a plan he hoped would climax in a coordinated armed rebellion.\textsuperscript{19}

Voodoo also played a crucial role as an organizational tool for solidifying proto-national resistance. Voodoo ceremonies were saturated with direct cultural ties to Africa, comprised of traditions like dance, language, religion, and natural medicine. Most importantly, voodoo distinguished the African gods from the Western God and saints.\textsuperscript{20} Makandal integrated voodoo ceremonies with colonial practices, developing chants in African languages that decried the evil of whites and slave traders. As more maroons slaves began to gather covertly for voodoo ceremonies, the religion transformed into a catalyst for inter-plantation communication, a type of solidarity between slaves of different origins, and a guise for secret meetings to plan attacks.

The resulting recognition Makandal received as a voodoo leader eventually led to the affiliation of his name with slave dances, ritual talismans, and poisoning.\textsuperscript{21} This identification with supernatural power synthesized his leadership goals with an infallible religious background.\textsuperscript{22} As the maroons

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 1-2, 4.
\textsuperscript{17} Manigat, “The Relationship between Marronage,” 434.
\textsuperscript{18} Celucien, “Prophetic Religion, Violence, and Black Freedom,” 14, 16, 22, and 29.
\textsuperscript{20} Manigat, “The Relationship between Marronage,” 431.
\textsuperscript{21} Fick, The Making of Haiti, 57-59, and 63.
\textsuperscript{22} Aisha Kahn, “Islam, Vodou, and the Making of the Afro-Atlantic,” New West Indian
developed militarily, members started to depend increasingly on Makandal and feared missing meetings or failing to meet his demands.\textsuperscript{23} This concentration of power allowed him to effectively indoctrinate slaves with his agenda of colonial destruction and black liberation.

To the black population of Saint Domingue, Makandal’s maroon and voodoo leadership transformed him into a prophet. He persuaded countless slaves to believe that he was sent by the Creator to eliminate whites and liberate blacks. His vehement demands for slave emancipation and predictions for a black-dominated island were interpreted as prophetic revelations. In linking “religious conviction” and “nationalist discourse,” he inspired blacks with his dialogue on deliverance from whites and finding redemption through liberty. By combining elements of African identity, religion, and politics, Makandal’s prophetic language inevitably had a pervasive effect on the slave psyche.\textsuperscript{24}

Maroon participation in voodoo ceremonies started to mutate into a collective form of black resistance and political ideology. Since marronage was becoming synonymous with freedom fighting, the movement only lacked a political creed for slaves. The ongoing expansion of voodoo, which was already tightly outlawed, augmented racial tensions among plantations and raised awareness about the differences between white and black culture. The voodoo teachings emphasized the differences between white and black gods, which added racial tension to the situation. Thus, the religion transformed into a counter-culture movement against the oppressive white religious system.\textsuperscript{25} As racial tension continued to heighten, it forced a split between the black and white worlds commenced. Aligning with the maroons was no longer solely a statement of rejecting slavery, but instead stood as an expression of black independent consciousness. The fusion of Makandal’s organized and armed maroons plus the political consciousness formed from racial tensions initiated a well-calculated resistance movement.\textsuperscript{26}

**The Forgotten Revolutions**

Although the exact extent of marronage’s influence on the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution is highly contested, marronage undoubtedly established the social capital and the mobilization necessary for black national resistance in 1791. The Haitian noiristic (black power) school contends that the maroons effectively symbolized black collective consciousness and African culture through the practice of voodoo. Their rejection of the colonial system made them central actors in molding revolution into a racial issue. Therefore, par-

\textsuperscript{23} Fick, *The Making of Haiti*, 57, 59 and 61.
\textsuperscript{25} Manigat, “The Relationship between Marronage,” 431-432.
\textsuperscript{26} Daniels, “Recovering the Fugitive,” 125.
taking in marronage was a performance action, which demonstrated growing slave solidarity and an expanding movement for independence. Perhaps the greater frequency of marronage and colonial resistance in the north simply “boiled over” into rebellion in 1791, or perhaps the rebellion depended on the “global context of revolutionary events.” Regardless of the precise moment of revolutionary spark, participating in marronage and practicing voodoo developed into a direct declaration of intolerance of slavery and support for black independence.

With social capital, emotional motivation, and a budding ideology of black independence, Makandal mobilized the maroons to strategically carry out his goals. A century before his notorious poisoning scheme, four armed rebellions had already been coordinated by slaves throughout Saint Domingue to massacre whites. These attacks ultimately turned out to be unsuccessful due to lack of collective consciousness. However, before the successful revolution, one of the most notable examples of a successfully calculated slave uprising occurred in 1757. The Makandal Conspiracy, first formed out of an organized slave rebellion, demonstrated a “collective pre-revolutionary consciousness” and demand for independence.

Makandal plotted the event from northern Saint Domingue and spread information about the plan throughout the colony via his existing maroon network and voodoo ceremonies. By capitalizing on the devotion of his disciplined followers, Makandal hoped to overthrow whites and establish political independence. To achieve this, he planned a particular hour for all of the water in the houses of Le Cap to be poisoned, after which plantation slaves would retreat to the countryside and surround the town with weapons to massacre whites. He formulated a system of agents, captains, and lieutenants to mobilize plantation slaves. Free blacks were responsible for trafficking the poison to house slaves, who would eventually distribute the poison to the plantation slaves. Plantation slaves had orders to poison the livestock and slaves who were deemed untrustworthy. This precisely orchestrated endeavor ultimately led to the deaths of 6,000 people and a paranoid hysteria amongst whites.

The efficacy of the Makandal Conspiracy caused lasting implications, especially after Makandal’s arrest and execution in 1758. Aside from a widespread sense of panic, the discrete use of poison to subtly kill white masters also produced a colonial mentality of distrust towards slaves. A cloud of fear loomed over the island as poison posed a viable threat to the livelihood of white slave owners. This constant tension lead to ongoing rumors of poisoning schemes, and eventually manifested into a witch-hunt for slaves who

27. Ibid, 131.
engaged in acts of voodoo. To remedy this, the Upper Council of Le Cap outlawed slaves from circulating remedies without permission from a master, casting spells, and assembling voodoo talismans (known as makandals). It is likely that the white establishment recognized the revolutionary potential of the Makandal Conspiracy, which foreshadowed an emerging movement to eradicate slavery and the colonial system. Later in 1758, free blacks and mulattos were also prohibited from owning and assembling makandals. As the whites attempted to contain the developing revolutionary fervor, the tactic of poisoning gave way to overt violent resistance. By the 1770s and 1780s, small groups of slaves were gathering independently to murder white slave-owners.

These isolated cases of slave resistance, such as murdering a master, committing infanticide, poisoning plantation livestock, or carrying out suicide attacks certainly existed as everyday forms of resistance. Genovese argues that the maroons who functioned this way in practice were often loosely allied and small in number, and ultimately unable to challenge the colonial machine. According to this perspective, marronage practices like voodoo and hierarchical organization combined African and European traditions into a complex lifestyle of coexistence within the existing colonial regime. Genovese also emphasizes that the goals of the maroons were to reestablish a “lost African world” that did not sophisticatedly engage with politics, economy, or ideology. Through classifying marronage as a backward restoration movement instead of a forward-looking revolution, marronage was not revolutionary in practice.

However, the importance of marronage cannot be disregarded on the basis that it did not necessarily fit within Genovese’s bourgeois European narrative of a democratic revolution. Although the maroons did not fit the mold of the French revolution, the demand for freedom and eradication of colonial government inherently required major political change in Saint Domingue. As a result, this comprehensive social and political upheaval of the European system contained a revolutionary tone for the time. Furthermore, Genovese’s interpretation of the reestablishment of African practices as “backwards” is dangerous. This oversimplification of African systems overlooks the complex network of trade, communication, and skills that the maroons successfully established while still facing the surveillance of slavery. But even when curtailed, marronage provided a pivotal opportunity for slaves to collectively exercise the self-determination that would be necessary for the inception of Haitian proto-nationalist resistance.

34. Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution, 52, 80, and 109.
Conclusion

Slave solidarity and black political consciousness had been festering decades before the outbreak of the revolution of 1791. Alternative slave communities, accessed by participating in marronage and voodoo ceremonies, gave slaves the opportunity to build a premature political ideology necessary for the revolution. By fostering the growth of these groups, black slave leaders converted the racial tension and emotional stress of slaves into political motivation for mobilization. The result of a well-organized network of communication and dependable bodies willing to contribute to violent resistance created the perfect storm for a coordinated attack. The later success of the revolution would inevitably depend on the success of these earlier groups. Although often historically overlooked, Saint Domingue’s underground religious and military communities directly produced the necessary black political consciousness required for the spark of revolution.


In late April and early May of 1661, Mary Rawlins—the indentured servant and maid of John and Bridgett Russell—was beaten at least twice by her masters in York County, Virginia. This in itself was unexceptional; servant beatings were common enough at the time to merit a reasonably thorough mention in Virginia law.\(^1\) The significance of Mary Rawlins’s abuse was instead in its eventual outcome: over the next several weeks, Rawlins fled her masters, sought help from a local justice, and ultimately left the Russells’ service for good. This victory of a female indentured servant over her wealthy masters is historically valuable primarily because of its unlikelihood. How could a servant woman in Colonial Virginia exert her agency within a patriarchal society that was dominated by wealthy landowners, and as such implicitly designed to stifle female, non-elite agency?

This question is at least partially answered in the depositions that described Mary Rawlins’s attempts to free herself from the Russells. Rawlins first fled to the home of a Major Joseph Croshaw, who was evidently on an even social footing with her masters; afterward, most of the drama of the case occurred not between Rawlins and the Russells, but between the Russells and the various powerful figures from which Rawlins sought assistance. In fact, after she fled the Russells, Rawlins appeared only rarely in the depositions, apart from the occasional examination of her injuries. Based on the evidence of these depositions, a reasonable conclusion would be that Mary Rawlins was able to exert agency within 17th-century Virginian society not by meeting her opponents on a level playing field, but by acting so that her case would become a point of contention between her master and other powerful men.

Nine people with connections to Mary Rawlins’s case gave their depositions before the York County Court in June 1661, testifying as to the nature and circumstances of the beatings. These depositions came from witnesses of all genders and social classes, and their content provided insight not only into the narrative of the case, but also into the character of Mary Rawlins herself. There are three things that could be said for certain about Rawlins just from the evidence of her court case: she was an indentured servant, she was unmarried, and she worked as a maid in the Russell household. These first two

facts were unsurprising within the context of seventeenth-century Virginia: Rawlins was only one of many indentured servants who had immigrated to the colony under contract. In fact, in Maryland, which had a demographically similar population to Virginia during this time period, an overwhelming majority of immigrants were unwed indentured servants. After serving out their contracts, these former servants would get married (likely to other indentured servants) and remain in the colony, sometimes becoming members of the elite planting class in their own right. The only thing that set Rawlins apart from the rest of her social group was her gender. Records of immigrating servants suggested that a relatively small proportion of British immigrants to Virginia were female. This was in accordance with the wider gender ratio of the colony, where men vastly outnumbered women. Mary Rawlins thus arrived in a Virginia that was overwhelmingly populated by men, both as fellow indentured servants and members of the gentry. Like the rest of her female peers, Rawlins likely hoped to marry out of her servitude and into a higher class of living.

The third fact of Rawlins’s indenture—her position as a maid servant to the Russells—set her apart from the majority of her peers. John Russell was mostly likely a tobacco planter; the initial events described in the court case took place during the building of a “tobacco house” on his property. In a tobacco colony such as Virginia, household work would have been far less valuable than field labor. Given the cost of an indentured servant, setting them to work in the fields would have been the most cost-effective option for a planter of average means, and some female indentured servants worked in the fields regardless of their gender. The fact that Rawlins worked specifically as a maidservant suggested that her master was an unusually wealthy man in comparison to the average Virginian planter. If the Russells could afford to support a servant who worked solely within the home, they likely had a good number of other indentured servants who could be used to work the fields. This notion is supported by the depositions given in court, at least two of which seem to have been given by fellow indentured servants of the Russells. Thus, John Russell was in all likelihood wealthier than the average tobacco planter in York County, Virginia in 1661.

The case began in the last days of April, when Mary Rawlins suffered two beatings at the hands of her masters. Most accounts agreed that the beatings occurred on two consecutive days. During the night of the first day, while John Russell was away from home, Rawlins claimed to have been beaten by her mistress, Bridgett Russell. Three depositions from Thomas Middleton and Edward Clarke (both fellow servants), and William Parman (a juror and possibly a servant as well) confirmed that Mary came down to dinner with “a black eye,” although they did not claim to know who, precisely, was responsible. All three men did agree that Mary, after making her claim of abuse, spoke the wish that “the plague rott [her] mistris,” and swore “she [Mary] would be revenged of hir.”

Middleton, Clarke, and Parman also claimed that John Russell, who had returned that evening, beat Rawlins the following day within full view of the deponents. The three men’s depositions again gave the same account: John Russell beat Mary Rawlins while she lay on the floor near the front door of the house. None of the men could say for certain whether Rawlins fell to the floor or was pushed by Russell, but all agreed that Rawlins did not make any attempt to fight back. Toward the end of the encounter, Rawlins stood up and attempted to leave through the front door but fell down again, at which point Russell kicked her in the elbow. This seems to have been the final blow. At one point, Parman entreated Russell to stop the abuse. Russell struck Parman with a riding switch on the back of the hand in response, prompting Parman to leave the scene.

Parman also claimed that at some time before the beating, Rawlins had said that her masters “would force the devell to runne away from there.” This aside indicated that the abuse Rawlins endured was likely not a one-time occurrence, as her relationship with her masters seemed to have been rocky before the events of the case. This was in agreement with the deposition of Jane Middleton, who stated that in March of that year, Rawlins had seemed discontented with her master, claiming that he was keeping her from Andrew Lather, the man implied to be her lover by John Russell, and furthermore that she would “worke hir witts” and complain if Russell ever beat her again.

As a dissatisfied indentured servant in 1661, Mary Rawlins had to make a series of deliberate choices in order to escape the Russell household. In order to comprehend why those particular choices were significant, the options

8. Ibid.
that were available to Rawlins must first be understood. Perhaps the most obvious option would be simply to run away from the Russells. If Rawlins had immediate fears for her physical safety, this course of action would be the easiest means of removing herself from danger. If caught, however, runaway servants faced heavy penalties: they would at the very least be made to serve a double term of service, and on a second offense might be branded with the letter “R.”

Instead of running away and facing these penalties, Rawlins instead sought help from Major Joseph Croshaw. This was in line with the other typical recourse for abused servants: a petition to a local justice or “Commissioner.” This choice came with its own risks. If a servant managed to secure the sympathies of the justice they petitioned, they would have earned a powerful ally. However, if they failed to make an impression upon the justice, then they would remain at the mercy of their master and possibly face further punishment for attempting to bring him to court.

Rawlins, however, seems to have assessed this path as the least risky and, after the beating, she fled to the home of Major Joseph Croshaw. Upon Rawlins’ complaint, Croshaw sent for two women to examine her injuries and attest to the severity of her condition, after which deponent Henry Blagrave (likely a physician) was also called upon to do the same. He stated in his deposition that Rawlins had bruises on her shoulders, back, and arms, as well as a “small red swelling” on the small of her back. He also described Rawlins as feverish and petulant at the time of his examination. On May 2nd, John and Bridgett Russell also came to see Major Croshaw. During their discussion with him, the Russells were openly accusatory and angry. As Hawthorne testified, John Russell accused Major Croshaw of attempting to “diprive him of his servant.” According to Hawthorne, harsh words were exchanged, and at one point, Bridgett Russell angrily clapped her hands in Croshaw’s face and swore that, in a parallel to Rawlins’s earlier words against her, she “would be revenged.”

Hawthorne claimed that the argument went on for some time, although she did not recount the rest of it. Ultimately, Major Croshaw—apparently convinced of Mary Rawlins’s poor treatment—demanded that the Russells put up a bond to ensure the future safety of their maid, whereupon Russell replied that he would “venture a hanging for hir [Rawlins]” before he would “bistow one penny on hir.”

This argument served an important function: it made the Russells look bad,
both to Croshaw and to the York County court. Rawlins’s case could only have been strengthened by this confrontation. The physical evidence of her beatings was obvious enough to Croshaw and those he called upon to examine her, and seemed to have been good enough reason for Croshaw to take her into his custody, but the poor behavior of the Russells must have been equally striking to Croshaw and to those who heard Mary Hawthorne’s deposition. The Russells’ poor tempers likely cast doubts on their honor as effectively, if not more so, than the beatings they had given to their servant.\(^\text{16}\) Perhaps Rawlins herself was aware of the possibility of this outcome; might she have anticipated that her masters would shame themselves before Croshaw or the court? She was, after all, well aware of John and Bridgett Russell’s temperaments. The deposition of William Parman described Rawlins and Mrs. Russell “scolding” at one another, a description that implied Mrs. Russell was known to have a poor temper even before her confrontation with Croshaw. It was at least a possibility, then, that Rawlins took the Russells’ irritability into account when formulating her legal strategy.

Whatever Rawlins’s conscious intentions, the deponents who witnessed the argument between the Russells and Croshaw obviously found it significant; both Henry Blagrave and Mary Hawthorne described the confrontation and remembered it well enough to quote the Russells’ exact words.\(^\text{17}\) In all likelihood, the Russells’ public and humiliating confrontation with Croshaw worked in Rawlins’ favor; it demonstrated that the Russells’ private abuse of their servant was no fluke, but a larger manifestation of their poor temperaments.

At the time of the argument, however, it seemed that Croshaw’s power was limited; the depositions suggested that Rawlins returned home with the Russells at some point after this encounter. In the following days, she was apparently beaten yet again.\(^\text{18}\) It is hardly a stretch to infer that this beating might have been a punishment for her impudence in seeking to bring Russell up before the court. In fact, there was a good chance that it was meant to dissuade Rawlins from seeking further help. A servant less dedicated than Rawlins could hardly be blamed for failing to make another petition. After all, her first petition had led her right back into the hands of John Russell, and should she fail again, more beatings likely awaited her.

Even so, Henry Blagrave states that Rawlins went to Major Croshaw to complain a second time, at which point Blagrave examined her yet again and this time found her breast to be “blackish like unto sunne stroake,” suggesting that she had endured a fresh beating on a different part of her body. A physician named Samuel Tracy corroborated this, also stating in his deposi-

\(^{16}\) Snyder, 104.  
\(^{18}\) Ibid.
tion that Rawlins’s breast was “blacke and rede like unto sunne stroake.”

After this second beating, Major Croshaw took a more active role in Rawlins’s defense. He apparently entrusted her to the custody of John Horsington, likely a fellow member of the gentry. She stayed with the Horsingtons for seven to ten days (the accounts of William Parman and Andrew Lather disagree on this point).

After this tenure, John Russell arrived at the Horsington house while Horsington himself was away, although his wife, Andrew Lather and William Parman were present. William had accompanied Russell on a visit to the Governor, though the subject of the visit was not relayed in his deposition. Russell cryptically asserted that Rawlins “was not his servant but another’s,” addressing himself to Andrew Lather, and then asked if “shee were not his [Lather’s].” Lather states that at that point, “an agreement was made between them,” and it was decided that Lather would pay Russell twenty-three pounds of sterling for Mary Rawlins’s indenture. At this point, though, Mrs. Horsington interceded in the deal between Russell and Lather. She reminded the two men that her husband was not home and told them that “the mayd should not go without order from Maj. Croshaw.” Russell took offense at her interference and retorted that he “had an order above hir husband’s,” and that “his horses without did not sweat for nothing.” He then pulled a “wrighting” from his pocket and showed it to Mrs. Horsington. Andrew Lather did not know what this writing contained, but given Russell’s statement that he had an “order above [Horsington]”, it might have been an order from the Governor himself, given that Russell had allegedly just returned from his office. Presumably, then, Governor Berkeley had not only ordered Russell to relinquish Rawlins from his service, but had also authorized her sale to Andrew Lather. This outcome was likely ideal for Rawlins; instead of returning home to Russell and in all probability receiving further punishment for her actions, her indenture was to be sold to her lover and presumably future husband. Although Rawlins endured three beatings in the course of her efforts to gain freedom from Russell’s service, her strategy paid off. By petitioning powerful figures within York County instead of fighting Russell herself or attempting to flee, Rawlins managed to win her own enduring freedom.

It was not illegal for a master to beat their indentured servants. The severity of the beating was what determined ill usage, and that severity was subjective. For instance, if Joseph Croshaw had decided that he did not want to

19. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
come into conflict with the Russells, he could have easily dismissed Rawlins’s beatings as moderate and thus acceptable. Luckily, Rawlins seemed to have made a favorable impression upon Joseph Croshaw. The sale of her indenture was even implied to be on the direct order of Governor William Berkeley: evidence that Mary Rawlins petitioned not only Joseph Croshaw, but also the most powerful man in York County in order to win her freedom from the Russells.

Although the specific contents of John Russell’s “wrighting” were never revealed in the text of the depositions, both Russell and Parman implied that Russell had received an order from the governor. This hypothesis was not supported by any of Governor Berkeley’s own papers, and may therefore have been false. However, William Berkeley did incontrovertibly intercede in favor of Mary Rawlins at least once. On April 2, 1661, he wrote a letter to Joseph Croshaw, stating first that Mary Rawlins had come to him (seemingly in person) and then asking that Croshaw confront John Russell and obtain a “Security” for Rawlins’s safety, and for Croshaw to send the case to the County Court if Russell refused.

Not only did Rawlins go to see Governor Berkeley in person at some point, but she also twice made the deliberate choice to bring her case to a local justice instead of simply running away from the Russell household. Even after being returned to John Russell and receiving yet another beating at his hands, Rawlins once again went through the proper legal channel of bringing her petition to a justice. Why did Rawlins repeatedly petition Joseph Croshaw for help? Although this was seemingly the only legal channel available to indentured servants, it was not the only option Rawlins had available to her; she could have just run away (surely a tempting notion when faced with repeated, frequent abuse), or even decided to endure the beatings for her remaining term of service. However, the deposition of Jane Middleton implied that Rawlins was not the sort of woman who would take the easy way out of her situation. Middleton claimed that Rawlins swore to complain and “further worke hir witts” if “ever [Russell] would beat hir again.” This evidence suggested that Rawlins did not act without thought or strategy at any point during the events of her case; instead, her decision to petition Croshaw was seemingly premeditated, a plan of action she had formulated.

26. 25 June 1661. “John Russell and Mary Rawlins.” York County Court Records, Vol. 3, fol. 121-124. Deposition of Mary Hawthorne, fol. 123. Mary had “come to Major Croshaw to complain,” with no mention of Berkeley. Had she come from Berkeley’s office, or had she visited him the month before? In any case, she seems to have deliberately approached Croshaw.
in the event that John Russell dared to lay his hands upon her more than once. The portrait of Mary Rawlins presented in these depositions suggested a woman who consciously intended to exert her own agency within a society that made it difficult for her to do so. Her victory, although well within the legal bounds of the time, was not due to chance, but was instead a product of Rawlins’s competence and intelligence.

The case of Mary Rawlins was significant in the context of Virginian gender politics. Rawlins sought help from a powerful man because that was what the law permitted her to do; it directed petitioners to bring their cases to a local justice, and during this time period, that justice would have been male. Thus, it was the very construction of this law that is significant. If Rawlins had fled the Russell home and sought sanctuary at the home of anyone other than a justice, she would have technically been a runaway servant, and both she and her protector would have been subject to legal penalties. Rawlins did not have the option to seek help from a friend or even her lover, but instead had to go directly to a justice in order to establish herself as a petitioner and not a runaway. Furthermore, the language of the law specified that a petitioner must seek help only from the “next” (nearest) commissioner, meaning that an indentured servant would have to gain the favor of an individual justice rather than simply petitioning an entire court. The structure of this law ensured that, if a servant’s complaint was viewed favorably, that servant would automatically gain a powerful male protector, an advocate for their cause who was almost certain to be in the same social class as their master, given that the courts were composed of wealthy landowners.

It is important that this protector was always male, even outside the context of the justices’ relative social prominence. The 1649 case of Charity Dallen, for instance, featured male protectors who were not elite, but nevertheless seem to have helped a female indentured servant gain protection from her mistress. In this case, Charity Dallen, the maid servant to Deborah Fernehaugh, was repeatedly beaten by her mistress, allegedly for “shewing her body to the men.” Two male servants from the Fernehaugh household testified to the nature and frequency of these beatings, which are depicted in the depositions as brutal. Ultimately, Charity Dallen was removed from her mistress and put into the custody of a man named Thomas Lambard due to the evidence provided by these depositions, as well as “other sufficient testimonies.”

30. Ibid.
In this case, there was no mention of any powerful man who might have come to Charity’s defense, save for the otherwise-unmentioned Thomas Lambard into whose custody Charity was to be released. Instead, we see only the testimonies of two men who seemed to occupy the same position as Charity herself: Joseph Mulders and Michaell Mikaye, both indentured servants in the house of Deborah Fernehaugh. Why, then, were their depositions considered to be valuable by the court? The gender of these two deponents likely played a role in making their testimony seem trustworthy: in an argument between two women, the accounts of men who had witnessed that argument would have held significant weight, even if the men were nothing but servants themselves. Since two men were willing to corroborate Charity Dallen’s story of abuse, her case seemed stronger in the eyes of the court.

This precedent implied that, although Mary Rawlins’s victory was perhaps not the norm in seventeenth-century Virginian society, it was also not a fluke. In fact, the proportion of indentured servants who successfully petitioned the courts during this time period was around 70 percent with female suits at a slight advantage, based on York County court records. This evidence suggested that the systems put in place for allowing servants to seek freedom or recompense from their masters were surprisingly effective, provided that a petition was ultimately brought to court. However, there was an inherent difficulty in successfully petitioning justices. Many indentured servants would have had to bring their petitions to people who were well-acquainted with their masters; there was thus a risk that a justice would sympathize not with a servant but with that servant’s master and refuse to call their master before the court. Of course, there would have also been the possibility that a justice had a grudge against a servant’s master, in which case the servant would be at a distinct advantage.

Did Mary Rawlins represent the average female indentured servant? It was true that many of her peers won similar suits against their masters; however, there are no records to suggest how many other indentured women never managed to bring their petitions to court. Certainly, Rawlins seemed to have had a keen mind and a strategy in place for her eventual freedom; in the depositions, she swore to be free by “Whitsonday” (Pentecost), indicating that she had every intention of escaping her indenture rather than waiting out her term of service. Of course, Rawlins was also lucky: she was not released from her indenture but instead purchased by her lover Andrew Lather, who was likely wealthy based on the hefty price he offered to pay John Russell. Had Rawlins not had Lather as a means of support, her case might have turned out very differently. There was seemingly little doubt that the Russells were unfit masters—John Russell’s abuse was described in the court records

31. Snyder, 104.
32. Ibid.
as “unchristianlike” and Rawlins likely would have been released from their service regardless of Lather, but would Rawlins have even brought her petition to Croshaw in the first place had she not known that Lather was ready and waiting to assist her? For that matter, why did it take an alleged order from Governor Berkeley to incite the sale of Rawlins’s indenture? Perhaps Russell had earlier refused to sell the indenture to Lather for reasons that are not mentioned in the deposition.

Whatever the specifics of the case, Rawlins absolutely played a large role in gaining her own freedom from the Russells, thereby exerting agency through a series of deliberate decisions that resulted in the disgrace of her masters and the sale of her indenture to her lover. To some extent, the why and how of Rawlins's victory against John Russell are evident. Given the records of similar cases, the odds were seemingly in her favor—or at least the favor of those women able to bring their petitions to court—and her repeated decision to escape the abuses of her masters by petitioning Joseph Croshaw ultimately resulted in an argument that centered around Croshaw versus the Russells rather than the Russells versus Rawlins.

Although Rawlins won her freedom from the Russells through the standard legal channels of the time, her case was still significant because of its importance to the larger historical narrative of non-elite women in the Western world. Rawlins occupied an extremely low rung in colonial society, perhaps the lowest rung one could occupy while still being a free white: she was an unmarried, indentured laborer, and as a woman, she would not have been able to gain status even after being freed from her indenture unless she managed to marry well. However, the Mary Rawlins at the start of this case was very different from the Mary Rawlins at its conclusion. In the deposition narrative, Rawlins grew from a maid servant indentured to abusive masters, someone who quite literally took her beatings lying down, to a woman who took the steps necessary to free herself from her abusers and ended up safe in the custody of a trusted ally. Her achievement was no less impressive because it took place through legal, standardized means; Rawlins likely faced intimidation and danger from many sides in order to successfully bring her petition to Joseph Croshaw.

This narrative of a woman deliberately escaping dangerous circumstances and ultimately triumphing over those who sought to exploit her is an incredibly valuable one in the context of Western history, and indeed in the context of modern America. The patriarchal construction of colonial Virginian society—power centralized in the hands of a governing body of elite, landowning men—was hardly unique to that time and place. Today, American women still have difficulty escaping abusive situations even when there are

specific laws in place to help them do so. Mary Rawlins’s victory against John Russell was valuable because it demonstrated how a woman who is not powerful in her own right might exert agency in a society that is not culturally inclined to accommodate that agency.
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1646-1651. Lower Norfolk County Order Book, fol. 120.
Paul of Tarsus was not one of the original disciples of Jesus Christ. In fact, by his own admission, he persecuted the followers of the nascent church. But on a road traveling to Damascus, Paul had a metanoia that completely changed his life. From then on, throughout the mid-first century CE, Paul travelled throughout the eastern Mediterranean preaching the gospel. Records of these travels are preserved in the Epistles of the New Testament. Although scholars consider a number of these works pseudepigraphic, consensus holds that Paul himself wrote most of what is attributed to him. Paul’s ministry in Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome was instrumental to the development of Christianity. His radical ideas about Gentile inclusion into the Jewish-Christian community often brought him into opposition with the central religious authorities in Jerusalem. Perhaps his most radical act of Gentile inclusion was the “Collection for the Saints in Jerusalem.”

Although Paul speaks about the Jerusalem Collection in a number of his letters, few historians have contributed scholarship to the topic. This seems like an egregious gap, as the Collection clearly had intense theological and material significance for Paul. The implications of the Collection were so controversial for the members of the early Church that Paul’s insistence on its establishment may have even contributed to his ultimate arrest and execution. His writings suggest that the Jerusalem Collection had several spiritually important meanings. For Paul, the concept of donating money to the central religious authority in Jerusalem was inextricably linked with the Jewish Temple tax and the Hebrew tradition of community, unity, and eschatology. For a first century Jew like Paul, spreading the good news of a Jewish Messiah, sent to bring salvation to the Gentiles, must have involved tying these new Gentile congregations into the existing framework of Jewish ritual and community.

In recent years, modern New Testament scholarship has emphasized the Jewishness of early Christianity. The ‘New Paul’ movement and comparison studies of the Bible with the Dead Sea Scrolls have been prominent features of this scholarship. Paul’s Collection for the Saints is another important piece of this academic quest. The following paper will examine a number of different issues. First, it will establish what the Jewish Temple tax meant in the context of the Jewish diaspora. It will then go over the history of Paul’s Collection before putting it in context and examining its many possible meanings in light of both its Jewish precedent and its history. Out of these many meanings, the strongest possibility seems to be the role of the Collection as a new Temple tax that allowed Gentile congregations to pay a spiritual debt to their Jerusalem forebears in exchange for blessings and
connection with God.

The Jewish Temple Tax

The question of Jewish precedence is extremely important for determining the role of the Jerusalem Collection in the early Church. As much of Paul’s ministry was focused on congregations in and around Asia Minor, a micro-study of the Jewish communities in this area is especially helpful for understanding the relationship of these Jews to the Temple tax. Though whether or not Paul’s evangelization was focused on synagogues is hotly debated, it is indeed certain that he would have at least interacted with local Jews and preached to them about Christianity throughout his travels in Asia Minor.

The diaspora Jews in Asia Minor had a large amount of religious freedom under Roman law. As they had a very old religious tradition, Jewish practices were respected, albeit viewed as peculiar by polytheistic eyes. As such, Jews received exemptions from pagan religious duties such as participating in sacrifices to the Roman gods and emperor. Although the Roman elite supported this custom of abstaining, local populations often persecuted Jews for their rejection of standard religious practices. This prejudice, however, was not a new phenomenon. Jewish exemption from certain laws had been a major point of contention between Jewish and Hellenic communities throughout Asia Minor for some time. Nevertheless, the Jews were relatively well protected by Roman law. Indeed, theft of the Temple tax or sacrilege of Jewish religious objects was made a crime punishable by confiscation of the thief’s own property.

The Temple tax was an annual tax of half a shekel collected from all Jewish men between twenty and fifty years of age. The tax, which was used to pay for the Temple’s upkeep and yearly religious ceremonies, was transported to Jerusalem by elected envoys from various communities. Although the shipment of the tax would not necessarily take place at the same time every year, it would often coincide with a particular Jewish festival or religious holiday. This conveyance, which involved large sums of money, necessitated protection from thieves and bandits.

Temple tax convoys must have carried a lot of money, as even kings like the Persian Mithridates attempted to raid and capture them. The fact that local Jews risked their lives in 88 BCE to protect the Temple tax by hiding a por-

2. Trebilco, Jewish Communities In Asia Minor, 8.
4. Trebilco, Jewish Communities In Asia Minor, 13.
5. Ibid., 13, 20.
7. Ibid.
tion of the funds from this powerful ruler in Cos shows how dedicated they were to its transport. Even Roman governors like Flaccus endeavored to seize Temple tax money. The desire of these rulers to steal the tax revenue suggests that the Jewish communities in Asia Minor were quite large and wealthy. This assumption is reinforced by evidence that Jews in Asia Minor were able to send money more often than the Temple tax required.

The Jews of Asia Minor seem to have had a sense of nationalism about the Temple tax. When the Roman governor Flaccus tried to stop its export to Jerusalem in order to seize the money for himself, the Jews defied the ban. Beyond sheer disobedience, the Jews also challenged Flaccus’s prohibition on the export of gold in court. During the trial, the tax’s donors stressed the ancientness of the Temple’s traditions. They explained that it was crucial that they had at least some part in the Temple’s yearly rituals. In the end, the Jews were allowed to circumvent the sanction and transport their “τεράχρηματα” (sacred/holy money) to Jerusalem. This episode indicates that first century Jews in Asia Minor were extremely dedicated to supporting the Temple, despite the fact that most of their communes had been separated from both the city of Jerusalem and the Temple itself for centuries.

Regardless, the Temple, its ceremonies, and the tax that it needed to keep running smoothly seem to have been a deep part of Jewish diaspora identity. By contributing to the Temple tax, Jews vicariously shared in the redemption brought about through the sacrifices and ceremonies of the Temple. More than that, the Temple tax was a great indicator of solidarity in Jewish community. It carried enormous ethnic significance and reminded all Jews spread throughout the diaspora that they were united in Temple worship.

Not all Jews, however, had such a positive relationship with the Temple tax. The Galilee, the northern part of modern-day Israel where Jesus and his core followers originated, was a place of particular tension. Josephus, a first century Jewish scholar and tax collector for the Romans, wrote that the Pharisees accused the Galileans of not paying the Temple tax. However, despite his duties he simply refused to take the tax money from the Galileans because of their poverty. It is possible that the Pharisaic rulings on an annual Temple tax were simply not followed in the Galilee because of the

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8. Trebilco, Jewish Communities in Asia Minor, 13.
9. Trebilco, Jewish Communities in Asia Minor, 14.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 15.
12. Ibid., 16.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 24.
17. Ibid.
local poverty. This was certainly not without precedence. The Essene cult also denied the necessity of an annual Temple tax, claiming that a Jewish male only needed to be taxed by the Temple once in his entire life.\(^{18}\)

The fact that the Galilean Jews had a particularly contemptuous and conflicted relationship with the Temple tax is extremely interesting. The Galilee was the birthplace of Jesus Christ, his family, and his immediate followers. These people were the key figureheads of the early church community in Jerusalem after Jesus’s death. If the leaders of the early Church were Galileans, perhaps they too had a rocky relationship with the Temple tax. The question of how this attitude informed early Christian views on the Jerusalem Collection is worthy of exploration.

**A History of Paul’s Collection**

The idea for the Jerusalem Collection was first introduced at the Council of Jerusalem in 48 CE.\(^{19}\) Paul and his helper, Barnabas, with the support of the leaders of the early Church, established the council to solve problems related to Church doctrine.\(^{20}\) Representatives at the council were primarily concerned with reconciling elements of Torah law and the new religious canon of the Church with the beliefs of Jewish and Gentile converts. The council also included discussions about the qualifications for Gentile converts and the commission of the Jerusalem Collection.\(^{21}\)

There are two accounts of the Council of Jerusalem recorded in the New Testament: Acts 15 and Galatians 2:1-10. Acts 15 is not considered to be a reliable description of the meeting for two reasons. First, its writer, Luke, wrote it about thirty years after the event. Second, Luke himself was not there and thus this is a secondhand retelling of the proceedings. On the contrary, Paul’s report in Galatians is a reliable source, as Paul was present at the Council. Galatians 2:1-10 was also written closer to the actual event than Acts 15.\(^{22}\) It is important to note that when writing Galatians, Paul was no longer a leader of the Antioch Christian community or working with Barnabas, and so he had no reason to make them look better or whitewash events.\(^{23}\)

Galatians 2:4 describes a conflict in the early Christian Church between Jewish and Gentile converts. Paul states that “false brothers and sisters,” presumably Jewish Christians, came into conflict with Paul and disrupted his work with Gentile congregations by promoting Jewish Torah observance.\(^{24}\)

18. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 22.
24. Ibid., 23.
Paul even claims that these “false brethren” were spying on the Gentile congregations. If this is true, they must have been doing so at the behest of the Judaizing sector of the Church centered in Jerusalem.\(^{25}\) The Antioch church, which was the center of the Gentile congregation, felt that if these Judaizers took over the leadership of the entire Church, the Gentiles might be turned away from the faith.\(^{26}\)

Paul brought Titus, one of his Gentile assistants, along with him to the Council of Jerusalem to send a message that Gentiles should be included in the Jesus movement.\(^{27}\) This led some council members to demand that Titus be circumcised in order to show good faith and submission to the Mosaic Law.\(^{28}\) Paul overruled this mandate, however, and Titus was not circumcised.\(^{29}\) The method by which the Titus conflict was resolved shows that the leaders of the Jerusalem church must have seen themselves as equals with identical decision-making power.\(^{30}\) Paul’s rejection of the circumcision proposal, however, does not necessarily imply that he had equal decision-making power with the Jerusalem leaders in all matters. The fact that Titus did not ultimately get circumcised simply suggests that these leaders made a compromise with Paul, who was a powerful figure in the Gentile congregation at the time. Indeed, the fact that Paul refers to some Jerusalem leaders as “esteemed ones” suggests that there was, in fact, a hierarchy of power in the early Jerusalem church.\(^{31}\)

Although some historians have suggested that the location of the council was not significant in terms of Church hierarchy, it is more likely that Jerusalem did have importance for the members of the early Church. The Antiochene delegation must have gone down to Jerusalem because they recognized the great symbolic importance of the city and that it was the home of the Church’s leadership. Because the apostolic leadership resided in Jerusalem, the Jerusalem congregation was surely considered greater than the other congregations. Peter, James, and John, the leaders of the Jerusalem Church, clearly had great decision-making power. As Jerusalem was their base, important matters had to be taken care of in Jerusalem.

This conception of the Jerusalem Church at the top of the early Christian hierarchy is supported in the Gospel of Luke and Acts of the Apostles. In Acts, Luke claims that the Jerusalem Church ran smoothly under the auspices of the Twelve Apostles.\(^{32}\) Regardless of the truth of this statement, Acts suggest that there was a tradition of a quasi board of directors

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 24.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.

\(^{27}\) Georgi, *Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem*, 25.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) Galatians 2:1-10.

running church affairs in Jerusalem. The fact that Peter, James, and John are
described as the leaders of the early Church in Acts firmly establishes that
the Jerusalem church was considered to be superior to other congregations.
It follows naturally that Paul’s Collection would be sent to Jerusalem, as the
city commanded great power in theological matters.

At the Council of Jerusalem, the delegates agreed that the Antioch Church
was independent of the Jerusalem Church. They also ruled that Gentile
converts did not need to be circumcised in order to obtain admission into
the Christian community.\(^\text{33}\) Acts 15:24-29 also indicates that the council
drafted the Apostolic Decree, a document which forbade Gentiles to partake
in polluting behavior such as fornication, worshipping idols, and eating meat
sacrificed by pagans.\(^\text{34}\) Paul would have supported the Apostolic Decree as
it refers to nothing he opposed in his writing. In fact, the Apostolic Decree
calls on Gentile Jesus-believers to simply follow the Noahide laws, which
Paul was already encouraging.

The prohibitions in Acts 15:29 have parallels in 1 Corinthians 8:4-13.
However, in 1 Corinthians Paul doesn’t take a strong stand on the topic of
eating meat sacrificed during pagan festivals. Nevertheless, the Council of
Jerusalem almost certainly took place before 1 Corinthians was written, so
perhaps Paul had not fully formulated his ideas about the permissibility of
eating sacrificed meat. Another parallel we can find between the Apostolic
Decree and Paul’s writings in 1 Corinthians 8:4-13 is in 1 Corinthians 6:18.
Here, Paul explicitly agrees with the Apostolic Decree, and tells his followers
to abstain from sexual immorality. Because of these doctrinal similarities, the
idea that Paul would have “distanced” himself from this second agreement
as a way of asserting independence from Jerusalem seems implausible,
especially in light of his devotion to the Collection for Jerusalem later on in
his mission.\(^\text{35}\)

The most accurate version of the Jerusalem agreement is preserved in Ga-
latians 2:9-10. In this account, Paul agrees to minister to the Gentiles while
Peter evangelizes to the Jews. Galatians advises both men to “remember
the poor.”\(^\text{36}\) This command, along with the fact that the term “the poor”
eventually came to be associated with the Jerusalem Church, asserts Jerusa-
lem’s superiority over the Antiochene congregations in spiritual and earthly
matters. Despite Paul’s powerful position among the Gentile congregations,
he and his followers must still have recognized Jerusalem’s superiority, be
it by apostolic authority, spiritual debt, ascetic poverty, or eschatological
significance.

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\(^{33}\) Ibid., 28-30.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Georgi, Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem, 30.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 32.
If the conflict between Paul and Peter that was written about in Galatians 2:11-21 led to a permanent break between the two men and, as a consequence, the entire Antiochene congregation with the Jerusalem church, then why does Paul continue to want to collect money for Jerusalem? The fact that Paul doesn’t write about the Collection in his letters recorded in 1 Thessalonians and Galatians does not suggest that there was no collection carried out. This would simply be an argumentum *ex silentio*. We must remember that Paul’s letters were occasional. If the Collection was not a controversial issue for those congregations to whom he was writing, Paul might have declined to mention it in the letters at all. Furthermore, we know that there was a collection of money in Macedonia later on in Paul’s ministry. Therefore, the argument from some scholars that Paul had bitter feelings about Antioch and decided not to carry out the Collection seems shaky at best.

Nevertheless, evidence suggests that Paul began the Collection in earnest sometime after Galatians was written. It is intriguing, however, that Paul would attempt to start a collection at this time, as the congregations in Corinth were already having trouble following Paul’s teachings. The Collection would have presumably just increased tensions in the region. Paul, however, may have begun the Collection in Corinth as a way of deflating conflict and promoting unity among the congregations. Paul’s writings on the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15 show that he was already attempting to foster a relationship between his congregations in Asia Minor and the Jerusalem church.

The Corinthians believed in a symbolic resurrection, one that was spiritualized and existed outside of time. They held that the final resurrection had already happened and that the Jesus believers were currently living in Christ. Paul corrected this idea by promoting knowledge of the physical appearances of Jesus in Jerusalem and Judea after the crucifixion. By endorsing these resurrection appearances, Paul showed the Corinthians that their faith originated in the holy city of Jerusalem. Furthermore, 1 Corinthians 16 contains evidence that Paul mentioned the Collection to the Corinthians previously. At 16:1-2, he tells the Corinthians to follow the orders he gave to the Galatians. Here, he mentions the Collection off-handedly. Thus, we can infer that Paul had previously discussed the Jerusalem Collection with the Corinthians earlier in his ministry. Money, he writes, should be put aside

37. Ibid., 45.
38. Ibid.
39. 2 Corinthians 8:1.
41. Ibid., 49-50.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 51.
44. 1 Corinthians 15:22.
46. Ibid., 54.
every Sunday in individual churches and sent to Jerusalem with Paul and elected delegates.47

Paul must have changed his mind after sending 1 Corinthians, as he sent Titus as a proxy to gather the Collection.48 We can tell in 2 Corinthians that Titus’s trip to Corinth was a success.49 This boon was sort lived, however, as a third letter inserted into the text of 2 Corinthians claims that Corinth had been overtaken by Judaizers shortly after the advent of the Jerusalem Collection. As a result, Paul lost standing in Corinth and the Collection ultimately fell through.50 Nevertheless, whatever problem existed during the time between these 3 different Corinthian letters seems to have been eventually solved by Titus.51

After some time, the qualms that Paul’s congregations had about the Collection were assuaged. Churches throughout Greece and the Mediterranean eventually sent funds to Jerusalem. A list preserved in Acts 20:4 of delegates from Mediterranean congregations who accompanied Paul to Jerusalem seems legitimate.52 Unfortunately, the Jerusalem congregation was not pleased by the Collection. There is no mention of the Gentile donation preserved in Acts, and Paul doesn’t write about the Collection’s reception in his own works.53 If the Collection were well received, someone would have presumably recorded its success in the New Testament. The absence of such a passage leads one to wonder whether this was a sign of Christian division to come or if Paul simply failed in his ambition.54

While it is possible that those in Jerusalem were uncomfortable with the theological implications Paul attached to the Collection, it ultimately seems as if the large number of Gentiles that Paul brought with him into the city caused the major controversy. He in fact may have overstepped his bounds by bringing these Gentiles into the city with the large amount of money.55 Although one cannot be certain about the motivation for this disagreement, it is apparent that tensions flared in Jerusalem’s conservative religious atmosphere. On this same trip, Paul was accused of bringing a Gentile into the Temple. This eventually led to his arrest and execution.56

As we have seen, the history of the Jerusalem Collection is complex and filled with ambiguity. A few key facts, however, stand out amid the specu-

47. Georgi, Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem, 54.
48. Ibid., 56.
49. Ibid., 57.
50. Ibid., 60.
51. Ibid., 69.
52. Ibid., 111.
53. Ibid., 125.
54. Ibid., 126.
55. Georgi, Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem. 126
56. Ibid.
lation. We know that the decision to collect monetary donations for the Jerusalem Church was made at the Council of Jerusalem. Although Paul was quiet about the Collection in his early letters, he began to heavily promote the Collection in Corinth not long after the Council concluded. Controversy in Corinth began to arise pertaining to the Collection soon afterwards. When this mysterious dispute was settled, monetary support was sent to Jerusalem from several congregations in Greece. The controversy that ensued in Jerusalem as a result of the Collection seems to have played a part in Paul’s final arrest.

The Significance Of The Collection: For Who?

It is uncertain what the Collection and the controversy that surrounded it meant to Paul and the early Church. If the Collection for Jerusalem had a troublesome history fraught with disagreement and conflict from beginning to end, why did Paul keep pushing the issue? Surely the Collection had a deeper symbolic meaning in addition to representing economic help for the literal “poor” in Jerusalem.

Although Paul uses the phrase “the poor” to describe those in Jerusalem, this use of “the poor” in the context of the Collection seems to have been understood as a title for the Jerusalem Church as a whole. In a practical sense, many Christians living in Jerusalem were financially destitute. One must understand, however, that “the poor” was also used as an honorific title throughout Second Temple Jewish literature. This spiritual designation had an eschatological element.

Paul perhaps felt that this “remembrance of the poor” would unite the Jesus-believing congregations. He certainly believed that there was an eschatological element to the Jerusalem church. Unlike the Christians living in the Mediterranean, these converts were residing in the birthplace of their religion. They were awaiting the Lord’s return and holding out against secular and religious opposition.

The Significance Of The Collection: Why Jerusalem?

Jerusalem was an eschatologically significant place for the early Christians. As we can see from the Gospel accounts, most of Jesus’ disciples fled back to the Galilee after his arrest and crucifixion. After seeing their Messiah during the resurrection, the disciples returned to Jerusalem under Peter and the other apostles. It was believed that Jesus would come back to Jerusalem because it was located near eschatologically significant places like the Mount of Olives and Mount Zion. Despite economic hardship and opposition from

58. 1 Corinthians 16:1.
Romans and Jews alike, these early followers held out in Jerusalem awaiting the end of days.\(^60\) The fact that Galilean natives like Peter, John, and James returned to Jerusalem to establish the new Christian church rather than remaining in their homeland suggests that the city was important. Considering that the early Christians were expecting an imminent apocalypse, one can safely assume that the significance of Jerusalem to Jesus’ disciples was an eschatological one.

**The Significance Of The Collection: From Remembrance To Collection**

Because of the eschatological belief that the Jesus-believers in Jerusalem were keeping watch over the holy city for the imminent return of Christ, those living outside the city surely felt that these Christians deserved to be remembered.\(^61\) Indeed, the economic remembrance of those in Jerusalem transcended the material. In 1 Corinthians 16:1-4, Paul refers to the Collection as both λογεία (tax) and χάρις (gift).\(^62\) Greek readers in Paul’s congregations would have understood that the Collection was a payment to the Jerusalem congregation to carry out Christian rituals on behalf of the rest of the church.\(^63\) Paul uses explicitly Old Testament imagery in Philippians 4:18, where he refers to the gift to Jerusalem as a “fragrance sweet to God.”\(^64\) This is precisely the same understanding that diaspora Jews had of the Temple tax.\(^65\)

**The Significance Of The Collection: Eschatology**

Some Old Testament texts refer to the end times with the imagery of “seeds coming home and bearing fruit.”\(^66\) Many Second Temple authors had thought of this as a prophecy of the Gentiles bearing fruit to the Jews at the end of days. This imagery was representative of the Gentiles coming to the true faith. Paul would have certainly been aware of these sorts of predictions. Perhaps Paul felt that by bringing a large number of Gentiles, with a large amount of money, to Jerusalem he was sending an eschatological message.\(^67\) Through his actions, Paul proved that the end times were near and that the Gentiles had started receiving grace.\(^68\)

By the time Romans was being written, it is clear that the term “the poor”

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\(^{60}\) Ibid., 60.
\(^{62}\) Ibid., 53.
\(^{63}\) Ibid.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., 64.
\(^{65}\) Trebilco, *Jewish Communities In Asia Minor*, 16.
\(^{66}\) Isaiah 55:10, Hosea 10:12.
\(^{67}\) Georgi, *Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem*, 100.
\(^{68}\) Ibid.
had gained an eschatological meaning in addition to its economic one. The often-repeated phrase “poor among the saints” might have referred to the original Christians of Jerusalem. Because of this association, Paul needed to be more specific about the eschatological remnant he was referring to when he spoke about the Collection. It is believed that Paul was indicating in his Epistles that “the poor” were the members of Jesus’ original disciples. It is also possible that Paul wished to signal out a larger number of early Christians in Judea. The eschatological connotations of Gentiles bringing offerings to Jerusalem were certainly something of which Paul would have been conscious. As a result, it seems that Paul conceived of this “διακονία εἰς Ἱεροουσαλήμ” (ministry to Jerusalem) as a provocative move for the early Church. This has been preserved in Acts 24:17.

It is undeniable that the Gentiles bringing money to Jerusalem had religious connotations and an eschatological meaning that would have been apparent to Paul’s contemporaries. Unfortunately for modern scholars, Paul never explicitly states his motivations in his letters. So if eschatological significance explains the purpose of the Collection, why wouldn’t Paul simply say so? As imminent eschatology was no secret to Paul, and he was certainly not bashful of proclaiming the coming apocalypse, it seems strange that he would have not explicitly spoken of the Collection as something that would bring about the return of Christ.

**The Significance Of The Collection: Ισότης**

Although it is not very likely that the Jerusalem Collection’s significance was a byword for the mystical concept of “ισότης” (equality), this possibility is worth exploring. The word “ισότης,” only appears in 2 Corinthians 8:13-14. This term was often referenced in Hellenistic Jewish literature and was tied into the concept of δικαιοσύνη (righteousness). In the writings of Philo, an ancient Jewish author, “ισότης” was often thought of as some sort of divine, cosmic force. This concept was considered intrinsic to attaining salvation, as it was believed that equality would give way to peace and grace. Equality, however, did not necessarily have to be economic equality. Spiritual parity was believed impart divine wisdom just as well as economic egalitarianism.

Although Paul does state that equality is the goal of the Collection in 2 Corinthians 8:14, this does not necessarily imply that this is the Collection’s

69. Georgi, Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem, 114.
70. Ibid., 119.
71. Ibid., 120.
72. Georgi, Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem, 84.
73. Ibid., 85.
74. Ibid., 86.
75. Ibid., 138.
76. Ibid., 139.
only aim. As we have seen from New Paul literature, Paul was keen on using many different viewpoints and voices in his writings. It is possible that this use of the word “ισότης” is an example of that. After all, it only appears in this chapter. As a result, it is highly unlikely that the Collection was connected to Philo’s mystical literature. It seems more likely that Paul wanted to bring about some sort of spiritual equality by which divine grace could be shined through economic equality.

The Significance Of The Collection: Christian Community And Unity

The Collection was a way to unite the various Christian communities around the Mediterranean. Paul refers to this idea on a number of occasions. In 2 Corinthians 8:1-5, Paul expressed how pleased he is that the Macedonians were willing to collect for the church in Jerusalem.77 He calls this collection on the part of the Macedonians a “service to the Lord’s people.”78 Here, Paul explicitly claims that this charity was a way to strengthen communal bonds between the congregations of the Mediterranean and Jerusalem.

Furthermore, Paul proclaimed that love and respect were shown through the Collection in a number of verses.79 This love was directed at both the Jerusalem church and Jesus Christ himself.80 Thus, the Collection and the love it demonstrated was an intrinsic part of maintaining and sustaining the body of Christ. To prove that one was a member of the early Church, one had to exhibit the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Contributing to the Jerusalem Collection was one such way of doing so.81

This concept of communal love was also demonstrated when Paul called the Collection a ευλογία (blessing) for Jerusalem.82 Paul expounded upon this point by altering a verse from Proverbs in his letter recorded in Corinthians 9:7 to make it include the Greek word for love. This enforced the idea that the Collection was done in the atmosphere of God’s love and had the purpose of furthering this love.83 With God as the source of all human goodness, and the Collection an example of human goodness, it was implied that if the Corinthians failed to collect they did not have God within them.84 Because one could not be a member of the body of Christ without God, the failure to collect would have resulted in these people being ostracized from the larger Christian community.

The concept of people proving that they had obtained the gifts of the

77. Ibid., 77.
78. Georgi, Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem, 77.
79. 2 Corinthians 8:8.
80. Georgi, Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem, 75.
81. Ibid., 82.
82. Ibid., 81.
83. Ibid., 96
84. Ibid., 83.
Holy Spirit as a way to be considered members of the body of Christ was especially important to Paul in the context of his Gentile congregations. Paul felt that the Collection should be a way for Gentiles to prove that they had engaged in a grace-filled communion with God.\textsuperscript{85} If the Gentiles could establish that they had the same close relationship with God as the Jews, the Jewish-Christians would be more willing to accept them into the Church. In this way, unity for all Christians would be ensured. Though the Collection was certainly a way to prove that one’s congregation was united with Jerusalem and the rest of the church abroad, the spreading of spiritual gifts also strengthened this sense of unity and community.

**The Significance Of The Collection: A New Temple Tax (A Spiritual Debt)**

If the Christian sense of community could be strengthened by spiritual gifts and blessings, the implication stands that there was a party who needed to be blessed. This is the idea of spiritual debt, the sense that the Gentile congregations owed something to the Jewish Christians in Jerusalem. As it was believed that Gentiles could receive salvation only from the Jews, this spiritual debt necessitated Gentile repayment for redemption.\textsuperscript{86}

In Philippians 4, Paul claims that the Jerusalem church would offer up a prayer of thanksgiving to God when they received the Collection from the Mediterranean congregations.\textsuperscript{87} These thanksgiving prayers, he stated, would lead to abundance for all Christians.\textsuperscript{88} The fact that the Corinthians could not offer prayers and thanks to God themselves, indicates that the prayers and rituals of the Jerusalem Church were somehow more important than those of the other congregations. This is, perhaps, a New Temple ideology. The Jerusalem church served as the spiritual center of the Christian Church and, as a result of its position of power, its rituals were more powerful than the rituals of the other congregations. This sort of Temple imagery continues as Paul described his conception of the Collection as a cog in a cosmic cycle. In this progression, God sends his divine gifts into the believers. By doing good works for each other (in this case, contributing to the Jerusalem Collection), believers engage in reciprocal behavior. When one party gave charity to another group, that group offered up thanksgiving prayers to God in return for the good work.\textsuperscript{89} Thus, all participants received grace.

In this way, the Jerusalem Collection is similar to Jewish priestly services. This brings to mind even more Temple imagery. In the Jewish tradition, the people brought animals to the Temple or local synagogue for the priests to

\textsuperscript{85} Georgi, *Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul's Collection for Jerusalem*, 101, 105.
\textsuperscript{86} John 4:22.
\textsuperscript{87} Georgi, *Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul's Collection for Jerusalem*, 102.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{89} Georgi, *Remembering The Poor: The History of Paul's Collection for Jerusalem*, 104.
sacrifice. The priests vicariously atoned for the sins of the people through slaughtering the offered animals. This idea of vicarious atonement or prayer apparently influenced Paul’s conception of the Collection. As we have seen, the Jerusalem Collection was not without Jewish precedents, as the relationship between the Jewish diaspora and the Temple tax was very similar to that of Gentile-Christians and the Jerusalem Collection.

The temple imagery doesn’t end there. 2 Corinthians 8-9 contains various Temple references in writings about the Jerusalem Collection. It is explicitly stated in Romans 15:27 that the Gentile congregations owed a spiritual debt to Jerusalem. As fellow Christians, these Gentiles shared in spiritual gifts that came from the rituals performed by the congregation in the holy city. Furthermore, the New Testament generally viewed taxation as a sign of subordination or loyalty to a greater power. With the Collection effectively being a voluntary tax, it is likely that the Mediterranean congregations saw Jerusalem as a great spiritual power.

It seems clear that Paul thought the Jerusalem Collection would lead to the praise of the contributing congregations. He also hoped that it would represent a gesture of spiritual solidarity between Gentiles and Jews. Paul consistently reminded his readers that the Collection was being undertaken as a sign of unity and a means of repaying the debt that the Mediterranean congregations owed to the Jerusalem church. It was not considered a financial burden, but a sign of the universality of the new Gospel. This reasoning, in conjunction with preceding Jewish ideas about the Temple tax, makes it clear that the Collection was a way for Gentiles to have a part in the blessings that could only come through the original Jerusalem-based apostles.

90. Ibid., 108.
91. Ibid., 116.
93. Ibid., 193.
94. Ibid., 195
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NATHAN GRAU

*Galula, Trinquier, ou Challe?* For American audiences, this question concerning the different French strategies in Algeria has affected their own counterinsurgency doctrines.¹ The struggle between 1954 and 1962 to preserve France’s colony south of the Mediterranean, *Algérie Française*, has resonated with American military thinkers attempting to succeed in their own counterinsurgency campaigns since Vietnam.² American military minds concerned with combatting a seemingly uncontrollable insurgency in Iraq found a wealth of counterinsurgent knowledge and experience in the Algerian War that had been lost to the United States after the traumatic conclusion of the Vietnam War. Just as in Iraq, in Algeria Americans saw a well-armed, well-trained force like their own rendered largely ineffective by an elusive conglomeration of insurgent groups that the French were unable to separate from the population, and thus unable to neutralize. Quickly absorbing and reproducing the “lessons” that were readily ascertainable from the testimonials of influential, but nonetheless ideological French military minds like David Galula or Roger Trinquier, the American counterinsurgency doctrine that developed in the year prior to the troop surge in Iraq of 2007 bears the unmistakable signature of the counter-revolutionary tactics employed by France in both Algeria and Indochina.³

Despite the many recognized similarities between the French-Algerian and U.S.-Iraqi conflicts, the historiographical analysis, especially among American military circles, focuses largely on the earlier years of the war about which David Galula wrote his well-known work *Pacification in Algeria* at the expense of the years after 1958. In their attempts to neatly categorize the war in Algeria as one of “pacification” so as to advocate for the adoption of such a strategy in the Iraqi context, American military thinkers overlooked the centrally important and largely kinetic Challe plan of 1959 when applying the lessons learned from the French experience to the Global War on Terror.⁴

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⁴ Kinetic operations, also known as conventional operations, are typically understood to be military operations primarily designed to kill or capture an enemy force on a pre-determined field of battle by largely conventional means (e.g. infantrymen, artillery, armor). Non-kinetic operations include pacification, nation-building, and other initiatives that do not use violence as their primary means of action.
While the Challe plan itself remains a lesser-studied phenomenon in the broader context of Algerian War historiography, the decisive military successes and large-scale recruitment of the indigenous Algerian population to fight the rebel Front de Libération Nationale (F.L.N.) represents the closest tactical change that the French army had to a “surge.” As ordered by the plan, France’s already sizeable army was supplemented with additional financial, logistical, and material support from 1959 until 1961, when Challe was removed from his post before the offensive could be concluded. Plan Challe, and its socio-political equivalent in Algeria entitled “Plan Constantine,” represented the fusion and refinement of pacification operations with a surge of intelligence gathering, conventional search-and-destroy missions, and indigenous recruitment. This fusion, short-lived as it was, yielded both decisive results and a wealth of accounts that more closely mirror the American troop surge of 2007 than any of Galula’s exhausted Pacification in Algeria narratives.

While the primary objects of this paper will be the high-intensity counterinsurgency operations led by General Maurice Challe and the plans to produce viable indigenous intermediaries by rebuilding and developing Algerian civil society encompassed in Prime Minister Guy Mollet’s Constantine Plan, the military and political conditions that yielded the Algeria of 1959 are impossible to divorce from the turbulent years that preceded them. In order to fully understand the parallels between the U.S. troop surge of 2007 and the earlier French experiences in counterinsurgency operations, and to reckon with the American military’s shallow treatment of the Algerian War, the scope of the investigation of Algeria must be expanded beyond the boundaries of 1956-1958.

The decade prior to the official outbreak of violence in Algeria on 1 November 1954 and the ineffective French response that followed emblemize both a lack of receptivity to the demands for political and social reforms made by moderate, non-violent Algerian intellectuals to the French administration and also a misunderstanding of the nature of the F.L.N. insurgency, and how to combat it, on the part of France’s military leadership. Between 1945 and 1957, French military and political strategy towards Algeria was ineffective first in diffusing the nationalist sentiment that was beginning to take root there before 1954 and then in stopping the momentum of the F.L.N. after they had begun their revolt. The Challe plan, for all of the positive results it achieved in successfully integrating pacification and conventional military operations, was a product of the lessons learned from the eclectic, often arbitrary mix of strategies pursued in the less-successful early years of the war.
Sétif and the Flight of the Moderates

On 8 May 1945, as all of metropolitan France celebrated the defeat of Nazi Germany and the restoration of the French Republic with parades and celebrations, a different sort of parade was forming in the northern Algerian city of Sétif and in the countryside of the Constantinois province. Ostensibly to honor the Algerian dead of the Second World War, eight thousand Muslim Algerians flooded the city of Sétif, a locality protected by only twenty gendarmes, in order to place a wreath at the monument-aux-morts at the center of the city. Muslims entered the city armed with “knives, axes, sabres…pistols” and nationalist banners.5 Faced with banners in direct contradiction to the deal negotiated between the chief of police and the marchers, the gravely outnumbered gendarmes waded into the crowd in order to seize offending banners with slogans like “Long Live Free and Independent Algeria.” A scuffle broke out in the ensuing struggle, and according to the police report filed after the outbreak of violence, elements in the crowd fired upon the beleaguered gendarmes with their concealed weapons, resulting in an exchange of fire leaving several dead.

The fight with the gendarmes functioned as the spark to a larger outburst of violence against Europeans in Sétif. Ignited by the first wave of violence, enraged Algerians engaged in an “indiscriminate massacre of any Europeans caught in the open.”7 Petites fonctionares, the “symbols of the presence française” were particularly brutalized, and at the end of five days 103 Europeans had been murdered, with many violently dismembered.8 The images broadcasted throughout Algeria of farmhands killing their proprietors of 30 years were burned into the psyches of Europeans throughout the colony.

The European reprisal was both swift and merciless. The counterattack ordered by the governor-general and the violence perpetrated by vigilante European settlers mobilized by the massacre included gathering large groups of Muslim Algerians together and forcing them to beg for forgiveness from the French tricolor flag, in addition to indiscriminate destruction of indigenous villages. These incidents were reflective of the larger course that the war would take.9 By mocking their religious honor by forcing them to beg to a temporal symbol of power, the soon-to-be executed Muslims would die apostates; examples of the absolute control France exercised over the indigenous population. Markers of sovereignty over the Algerian populace, both actual and symbolic, were the targets of attack and protection in what can be argued was the first violent episode of the Algerian War, and their contesta-

9. Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 88.
tion was to intensify significantly in the next chapter of the conflict. In the aftermath of Sétif, France’s divisional commander in charge of quelling the uprising, General Raymond Duval, declared that he “[had] given [Paris] peace for ten years,” but cautioned them “not to deceive [themselves].”

The Muslim dead of Sétif, who numbered between ten and forty thousand, were not to be forgotten in the years ahead. Disproportionate and blind justice would characterize French responses to acts of violent resistance committed by Muslim Algerians after 1945, driving more and more of the indigenous population into the arms of the nationalists and escalating the conflict to increasingly violent levels. Journalists in the latter years of the war described Sétif as “an event which…has marked every Algerian Muslim alive at the time” and is the turning point to which “every new…Algerian nationalist…today traces his revolutionary determination.” While it would later become the defining event in the articulation of anti-French Algerian nationalism, and would profoundly influence the founding of the F.L.N., the silence of the following nine years and the relatively slow start to the Algerian War of Independence in 1954 are testament to the time that it took the Algerian nationalist narrative to gain significant inroads amongst the population. More specifically, while it would be incorrect to state that the blind rage of the Algerian Muslims in Setif was a serendipitous expression of anger unconnected to a larger, more structural sense of discontentment with the French governing system, the violence was a far cry from the organized and conscious expression of Algerian nationalism that the F.L.N. would later attribute to the event.

What Sétif did accomplish in its more immediate aftermath, however, was the alienation of what would come to be known as interlocutors valables; indigenous intermediaries who could function as conduits for peaceful negotiations between the French administration and the Muslim Algerian population. A particularly illuminative example of this alienation is that of Ferhat Abbas, the future president of the first National Constituent Assembly of an independent Algeria. In 1936, Abbas argued that he “[would] not die for an Algerian nation, because one does not exist.” His later recruitment into the F.L.N., and his ascent to one of its highest stations, illustrates the frustration with and eventual abandonment of ideas like assimilation and parity in the Republic by the Algerian moderates in the post-Sétif period. Rebuffed in the National Assembly by the strong colonial lobby, moderates interested in the integration of Muslim Algerians into the French Republic began to turn away from France quickly after 1945, and would not return even after their demands had been met.

The “men of good faith” in the European Algerian community, among them *pied noir* writer Albert Camus, envisioned a plan of integration similar to that of Abbas, but they too found no place in an Algerian political dialogue dominated by hardliners. Conveying to European audiences the horrors of Sétif while simultaneously arguing that it was an oversimplification to characterize the Muslim Algerian community as an immovable bloc unwilling to assimilate, Camus’ supplications failed to move the Europeans towards any significant change. Bringing “French and Muslim together, albeit within a French framework” was a demand that had been articulated by Abbas’ some ten years before European leftists like Camus and Radical politician Jacques Chevalier adopted it as their suggested framework for lasting harmony, and it was equally unsuccessful in gaining meaningful political traction. Still, given that by 1946 Abbas had joined his moderate party (the U.D.M.A) with that of more extreme nationalists, even if this framework had miraculously been adopted in 1946 (as it would later be in 1959), it is difficult to determine if national reconciliation would have been possible even then.

For as readily as they marginalized moderate intermediaries in Algeria, however, the National Assembly’s move to create the French Union, and within it a framework for moderate participation for the indigenous peoples of its colonies, represents a counter-model that Muslim parliamentarians looked to when articulating their own rights in the Empire. Originally forged in the aftermath of the Japanese takeover of Vichy-controlled Indochina during the Second World War, the French Union as proposed by socialist minister Marius Moutet was to be a new framework for dealing with overseas territories within which the metropole would “recognize that inhabitants in the overseas territories had the same rights” as they did. Abbas, leaning towards nationalism but still an elected member of the French National Assembly, as late as 1946 seized the anti-racist and integrationist impulse in the Socialist-controlled National Assembly and declared that “[the Muslim Algerians] need France” because they were “only apprentices in the matter of democracy.” The Muslim Algerian support for the French Union is testament to the fact that anti-colonial nationalism was neither universal nor exclusively articulable in terms of Algerian independence. Still, the eventual rejection of many of the reformist proposals put forward in the debate over the French Union by a National Assembly desperate to pass a new constitution after years of fascist Vichy domination represents yet another refusal

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13. *Pied noir*, or “black foot,” is the common name by which Algerians of European origin are known.
by the French government to accommodate non-violent nationalism in any meaningful way.

The years between 1946 and 1954, while stable in the sense that there was little violence between European Algerians and their Muslim counterparts, confirmed to many moderates on both sides of the racial divide that meaningful institutional reform was an increasingly distant possibility. The French Union, legally enshrined by the Constitution of France and later by the Organic Statute on Algeria of 1947, while based officially on “equality of rights and obligations,” contained none of the devolutions of sovereignty that Abbas had pressed for in the National Assembly. It also preserved the electoral college system in Algeria that separated Europeans and integrated Algerians from the rest of the Muslim Algerian population.\(^{18}\) While it gave Muslim women the right to vote and abolished a number of the worst manifestations of institutionalized racism, the statute contained no meaningful mechanism to incentivize indigenous participation in the newly formed Union.

Abbas’ moderate nationalist party, the U.D.M.A., is only a single example of the many viable interlocutors with which a more palatable arrangement for the indigenous Algerians could have been struck before 1954. The central role that Abbas played in the debate over the Organic Statute and the support that his political party received are testament to the relatively marginal position of independence activists at this point and the still-central connection that Algerian moderates felt to France. Yet in repeatedly rejecting their peaceful supplications for relatively modest reforms, and failing to enact any meaningful alterations to the socio-political dynamics that disproportionately benefited the pieds noir, the Socialist-controlled French government was rapidly driving its final remaining linkage to the indigenous Algerians into the violent-nationalist camp.

The F.L.N.’s Military-Political Strategy: 1954-1956

In the years leading up to and following 1954, the connection Muslim moderates felt towards France would begin to rapidly fray for a number of reasons, beginning with the official founding of the F.L.N. Formed in the years following one of several electoral frauds of post-Second World War Algeria by a committee of nine young nationalists who had splintered from the more established U.D.M.A. (led by Abbas) and the hardline Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (M.T.L.D.), the F.L.N.’s immediate predecessor organization had agreed that a revolt was the only way forward for Algeria by the spring of 1954.\(^{19}\) All Saints’ Day 1954 was to mark the beginning of the end of Algérie Française, though none at the time would know it.


\(^{19}\) Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 75-78.
The early rebellion, based more on the fantasy of a unified Algerian front against French rule than any realistically united sense of Algerian “nationhood,” began its war over a population unsure of what side to take with ill-planned but highly publicized attacks against the symbols of French rule. Mainly targeting indigenous Algerians who had benefited most from the mission civilisatrice, the F.L.N.’s early campaign filled the power vacuum created in the Algerian countryside by weak or peripheral French control with what a French captain stationed in Algeria characterized as terror and obedience.\(^{20}\) The strategic decision to shift between “blind” and “targeted terrorism,” which will be discussed in more detail shortly, makes particular sense when coupled with the political aims articulated in the F.L.N.’s proclamation of 1 November 1954. Declaring that a principal objective of the movement was “political house-cleaning through the destruction of the last vestiges of corruption and reformism” that they felt to be “the causes of [their] present decadence,” the F.L.N. understood the significance of destroying the symbols of compromise between Muslim Algerians and the metropole in their ultimate goal of securing the compliance of the population.\(^ {21}\)

The nature of F.L.N. attacks from 1 November 1954 until the Battle of Algiers in 1956 demonstrated that they had an early grasp of a basic fact that the French would not come to understand until later on, which was that the political conditions created by military actions were where their effectiveness should be judged. Despite the outrage of the pieds noir at the deaths of several gendarmes and a European teacher, the main targets of the All Saints’ Day attacks were Muslims, including the judges, teachers, and civil servants who were the most visible connections between the French government and the Muslims of Algeria.\(^ {22}\) Yet aside from the paranoia that it instilled in the hearts of the pieds noir, and the minor setbacks that some of the local police forces had to deal with, the attacks of 1 November were a shadow of what was to come in the next violent chapter of Algeria’s history. They inspired neither the general revolt that was hoped for nor did they elicit from the French government any escalation of force that may have pushed the population towards the F.L.N.

In the immediate aftermath of 1 November 1954, the F.L.N.’s organizational and strategic focuses on securing and controlling the population created sophisticated systems of taxation, conscription, and support that made it virtually impossible for conventional French attacks to succeed against them. Benefiting from both the slow pace of the reaction from the French and their already limited ability to project power into the Algerian interior, the F.L.N. rapidly established spheres of refuge and sustainment amongst

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the rural population with varied degrees of brutality that it would take the French years to dislodge. Possessing a repertoire of differing forms of “terror­ism,” an efficient administrative system with which *maquis* could rapidly be established throughout the interior, and the invitation to use their newly independent neighboring North African states as safe­havens within which they could train and supply new fighters, the F.L.N. began the war in an advantageous position that only improved between 1954 and 1956.

Following the period of random acts of violence against French authorities in late 1954, the F.L.N. began a campaign of “selective terrorism” between 1955-1956 of which the main purpose was to “control the population” and win the “battle for silence.”

Galula and other French officers assigned to the Algerian countryside would encounter this silence often; selective terrorism had destroyed the mechanisms by which the French could project their protection over the population and thus the army could no longer ensure that collaborators would not endure violent reprisals upon the F.L.N.’s return to their village or hamlet after they had left. The inability of the French to control the escalating levels of violence, and the proliferation of F.L.N. attacks in the countryside (501 in June 1955), of which the vast majority were against Muslim moderates, is further testament to the rebel force’s desire to violently assert their dominance over the population of the interior.

Continuously ambushed by an insurgent force that had superior intelligence assets and the fearful acceptance of the locals, the position of the French army before the calling up of reservists in April of 1956 was precarious.

The F.L.N. coupled the effective use of violence against French and indigenous targets in the early years of the war with the equally important reintroduction of the *wilaya* system, an administrative structure spanning all of Algeria that paralleled the French *quartier* system and devolved recruiting and tactical power to the local level whilst simultaneously ensuring continued centralized control on issues of national strategy. The *wilaya* system was not only an easily transplantable template with which potential insurgents could spontaneously organize themselves, its design also made it especially effective in rendering the search­and­destroy missions commonly executed by the French largely ineffective by sectioning off locally accessible “refuge areas” in each sector within which the insurgents could easily disperse and remain hidden. In this manner, the F.L.N. benefited in that it could direct and control the growing stream of local rebels who had taken up its call for revolt, it could keep these rebels close to their localities where they most

25. Roger Trinquier, *La Guerre Moderne*, trans. Bernard B. Fall (Washington: Combat Studies Institute, 1963), 31. *Wilayas* meaning “state” were the subdivisions resurrected from the Ottoman period by the FLN in order to manage the conflict and decentralize leadership. They varied in size and population composition.
26. Ibid.
effectively imposed their will on the population, and it had contingency plans for each sector that rendered the attack strategy most frequently used by France largely ineffective. These “refuge areas,” inaccessible to French soldiers unaccustomed to the terrain, would become the primary targets of the Challe plan in 1959.

An additional geopolitical advantage that the F.L.N. enjoyed over the French, one which was also to be a main priority of the Challe plan, was the sanctuary that the F.L.N was able to enjoy in Algeria’s immediate neighbors, namely Tunisia. Officially non-aligned and thus unreachable by French forces without international incident (something that the French would learn the hard way after their air force bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet in pursuit of rebel anti-aircraft batteries), Tunisia proved to be a political and financial base for the F.L.N. leadership situated outside of Algeria.27 While the French quickly began construction of border fortifications and increased the diplomatic pressure on the Tunisian government to police their borders, the Algerian-Tunisian border remained a largely porous gateway for F.L.N. arms, money, and recruits until late-1957 when the fortifications were completed.

**Learning by Failing: French Military-Political Strategy, 1954-1956**

French strategic thought in the period between 1 November 1954 and the Battle of Algiers vacillated depending on the individual preferences of the commanders in the theatre, those of their subordinates, and the austere conditions on the ground dictated by the Algerian populace. Encouraged by the declaration of the leftist prime-minister Pierre Mendès-France that “the Algerian departments are … irrevocably French” but faced with a tactical situation characterized by limited financial resources and the even more limited numbers of available combat troops in Algeria, French leaders in Algiers were unable to provide a uniform, workable strategy for defeating the F.L.N. in the early years of the war.28 With the majority of combat troops returning humiliated from Indochina and no official state of war declared, the responses to the acts of blind terrorism perpetrated by the F.L.N in the crucial early battles for control of the population were slow and ineffectual. According to Galula, who spoke with a number of junior officers in the field, the lack of both an official declaration of war or of an official state of emergency in Algeria’s urban centers until years into the conflict saddled local commanders and their gendarme counterparts with excessive amounts of paperwork that hindered their already limited capabilities to strike at the insurgents.29 “Manslaughter reports” by which local gendarmes charged company commanders each time an insurgent was killed unneces-

27. Ibid. 42-43. For details of the attack on Sakiet see Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 249.
sarily encumbered an already backlogged judicial system and siphoned vital gendarme resources away from the centrally important task of securing the population. Instead of its usual security responsibilities, the police force was tasked in early counterinsurgency operations with the more administrative, ultimately ineffectual job of ensuring that company commanders were held “accountable” for the losses they inflicted on the fellaghas.30

The activation of reservists in 1956 and a number of pivotal innovations in the French management of the war, however, began to create a new organizational framework from which the counterinsurgents could plan and execute their operations against the F.L.N. The first and most obvious tool implemented to dislodge the bureaucratic morass that had begun to accumulate as a result of the “police” operations that had grown in intensity since late 1954 was the evocation of states of emergency, first in Constantine and Kabylia in 1955 under the mandate of the Special Powers Act, but later throughout Algeria.31 Doing away with many of the increasingly dangerous restrictions on the use of force imposed on the army and police during peacetime, the Special Powers Act gave the governor-general (whose position title would change more than twice over the course of the war) and his subordinates a free hand in legislatively regulating the operations of the counterinsurgent force.

Illuminative of the understanding, from the start, of the importance of both civil and military victory in Algeria, the Special Powers Act contained a mixture of comprehensive economic and social reforms coupled with the devolution of police power into the hands of the military.32 Opening previously inaccessible administrative positions to Muslims and investing the local Algerian assembly with an unprecedented level of legislative independence from the metropole, the Special Powers Act was the French commencement of the two-front war for the loyalty of the population that the F.L.N. had begun nearly two years prior. While the subject of a great deal of retrospective historiography on the Algerian War centers around the fifth article of this act, which enables the government to engage in “any exceptional measure” with the goal of the “reestablishment of order,” and the alleged implicit justification for torture contained therein, the overwhelming majority of this decree focused on the establishment of a more inclusive, just society in French Algeria.33 With that being said, the devolution of powers to the military enabled them to begin to conduct previously forbidden but customarily routine wartime operations, among them the interrogation of prisoners, the flexibility to act quickly on reliable intelligence in order to

30. Fellaghas was a common term used at the time to refer to nationalist insurgents operating in the Algerian countryside, along with their term for the general organization “maquis.”
33. Ibid.
arrest suspected terrorists, and the ability to assist in the construction of infrastructure promised by the earlier articles of the Act.\textsuperscript{34}

An additional effect of the political climate from which the Special Powers Act emerged was the radical reorganization of the Algerian départements along wartime boundaries, an administrative revolution that would prove central to the planning processes of the Challe plan and its many predecessors. Algeria of 1954, with a landmass larger than that of metropolitan France, was subdivided into only three départements, grossly under-administered and unable to deal with the burden placed on the courts and the bureaucracy by the violence of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{35} While a lasting solution was not readily available in the first years of the F.L.N. uprising, the administrative reforms initiated by newly invested Algerian Governor-General Guy Mollet attempted to alleviate this burden by increasing the number of départements to twelve.\textsuperscript{36} More importantly, they provided the French military with an organizational framework within which it could place its gradually increasing forces in a manner that took into account the civil apparatus being emplaced simultaneously in Algeria. Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS) developed using the template provided by Native Affairs units returning from newly independent Morocco would factor heavily into the pacification operations of the early war.\textsuperscript{37}

As slow as they were, the administrative and political reforms implemented by the Mollet-Lacoste government significantly outpaced changes in military tactics. As force levels steadily increased, commanders continued to use their units in multi-part search-and-destroy missions easily foiled by the insurgents who exploited their superior knowledge of the terrain to escape through the porous French lines during the attacks.\textsuperscript{38} After their victory in the “war of silence,” the F.L.N. operatives targeted by the attacks could hide without fear of discovery in the villages abandoned to their control at the start of the conflict. Exasperated by the ability of the F.L.N. fellaghas to consistently escape the search-and-destroy missions that were prevalent in the immediate aftermath of the call up of reservists in 1956, Colonel Roger Trinquier characterized French tactics as that of “a pile driver attempting to crush a fly.”\textsuperscript{39} In the earliest stages of the conflict French sweeps netted moderate gains, but insurgency’s reduction in the number of fighters with which they conducted operations at any given time rendered conventional tactics without intelligence provided by the population functionally obsolete.

\textsuperscript{34} Galula, \textit{Pacification in Algeria}, 21.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 22.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Roger Trinquier, \textit{La Guerre Moderne}, 6.
Such tactics, and the tradeoffs with population protection that they necessitated, created a situation by mid-1956 wherein “France could not stop the spread of the revolt, and the F.L.N. Organisation politico-administrative (OPA) spread its influence over the entire country.” More men would be needed if order was to be restored.

The prompt return of French soldiers from Indochina and their redeployment to the new conflict diversified the tactical discussions surrounding Algeria significantly. Schooled in la guerre révolutionnaire by the Maoist Vietminh, many of the senior officers who had fought in Indochina supported exporting the “psychological” and “pacification” operational frameworks to Algeria. While they were a vocal minority in the army, the strategic outlooks of many of these “psychologists” would come to define a great deal of the historiography on the Algerian War, particularly in American circles, to the detriment of the rest of the French operations there. In reality, while many of the newly established Specialized Administrative units scattered throughout Algeria’s diverse sous-quartier networks would adapt pacification and psychological operations as their primary purpose, and would establish battalion bureaus for the achievement of these ends, the level of cooperation that they received from the battalion commanders to whom they were responsible was mixed.

The shift from purely conventional operations to a more mixed approach in the years before the Battle of Algiers formed the foundation for the similarly mixed approach that the Challe plan would later champion. The product of national strategic policy that was circulated in the form of broad mandates that lacked specific, generally applicable doctrine, the divergence in both tactics and success between sous-quartiers was due in large part to the personal preferences of the junior officers placed in charge of these areas. Faced with a promotion and award system that continued to award officers that engaged in kinetic operations, regardless of their increasingly limited success, it is little wonder that pacification was not comprehensively adopted across the theatre.

Still, the influence of the “psychologists” in shifting at least a section of the

43. See quotes from and sections on Galula throughout U.S. Department of the Army: *F.M. 3-24.*
44. For an example of this see Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 67.
45. Examples of this lack of uniformity are mentioned both in Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 87 and Trinquier, *La Guerre Moderne*, 2.
focus of commanders towards the population, and the revisiting of more classical counterinsurgency theories like the ink-blots or *tache d’huile* by French officers situated throughout Algeria is indicative of the increasing priority that the military placed on the safety and cooperation of the civilian population.  

Premised on the notion that immersion in the populace was the only sustainable mechanism to ensure both their security and their active cooperation with the counterinsurgency, the ink-blot strategy began by placing platoon-or-smaller sized elements in homes rented or abandoned by local villagers and conducting a census of the village.  

Meticulously interviewing each villager individually and driving out the rebels bold enough to approach the village, the counterinsurgent forces could disperse its soldiers, like ink splotches spreading across a page, until the F.L.N. had been totally isolated from the population, ideally encouraging the once-intimidated villagers to denounce the F.L.N. agents who were still among them.  

The growing presence of the French military in the villages where Algerians lived, worked, and were taxed by the F.L.N. reflects the French realization of the importance of signs of sovereignty and security in determining the loyalty of the population, and the escalation of their efforts to restore these signs throughout the Algerian countryside.

While the *tache d’huile* strategy featured prominently in the *sous-quartiers* under the command of more pacification-minded French officers, the widespread adoption of population transfers as a means of separating, in the words of Mao, the insurgent “fish” from the “water” that was the population was indicative of the influential role that proponents of the psychological approach played in the highest echelons of Algerian military strategy.  

Population transfer operations, which emptied large swathes of the Algerian interior of its rural inhabitants, transferring them to more densely populated, but strictly controlled internment camps, began to be implemented on a large scale in 1955. The camps, which were strictly monitored by the army, were also the sites of a number of other population-centric operations, among them intensive propaganda operations and the recruitment of some of the first indigenous troops, later known as *harkis*, in militia capacities.  

All three of these strategies would grow in influence and prevalence in the following years, and the *harkis* in particular would find that that their roles as indigenous embodiments of anti-F.L.N. resistance would factor heavily into the tactical considerations of French generals in the latter years of the war.

47. For an account of the ink blot strategy in action, see Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 103-115.  
50. Ibid.
Setting the Stage for Challe: the Battle of Algiers and Beyond

While its start had been slow, by the time the Battle of Algiers began in 1957 the French army had begun to take initiative against the insurgency. Fully grasping the threat that the F.L.N. posed to the continuation of Algérie Française, France committed billions of francs and thousands of its youth to border protection, counterinsurgency operations, and infrastructure projects throughout Algeria.\(^51\) As its control of the countryside began to slip in mid-1957, the F.L.N. reverted to blind acts of terrorism, this time against European urbanites living primarily in Algiers to refocus international media coverage on the war.\(^52\) In doing so, the F.L.N. set in motion events that would lead to their most catastrophic defeat of the war up to that point, although they would rapidly rebuild their forces inside Algeria and would not be ultimately broken until the Challe plan of 1959.\(^53\) Still, the reconstitution of the bulk of the F.L.N., first as an urban force, and then again as a rural resistance movement, was a direct response to French tactical experimentation and adaptation. While they began as an ineffectual and unorthodox patchwork of differing, occasionally contradictory strategies, France’s counterinsurgency operations between 1954 and 1957 institutionalized the lessons that made plan Challe a possibility. With a successful mix of pacification and kinetic operations, the combined results of the Challe and Constantine plans would be France’s final major military successes in Algeria, although those successes could not be converted into corresponding political gains because of the lack of viable Algerian interlocutors with which to negotiate, the rapid collapse of France’s political will to retain its Algerian territory in the months and years following the Battle of Algiers, and the collapse of the Fourth Republic.


\(^{52}\) Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War*, 189-190.

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As major producers, stars, and consumers, women influenced the development of early film significantly. During the initial development of its narrative and form, film was in many forgotten ways a feminist project. Not only could women participate in the making of films, but they also became the projected audience, symbolic arbiters of taste. Moreover, film increasingly became a medium through which cultural issues like gender could be contested. To please a growing female audience, early films were both a projection and a constructor of the limits of gender ideology in turn of the century to prewar America. Cinema’s rocky development through technological experimentation in the 1890s into the industry’s codification and consolidation in the 1920s, or the medium’s “identity crisis,” coincides with a period of great instability, anxiety and change in gender relationships. Because women were integral to the development of the medium, histories of women in film offer insight into shifting labor divisions, social articulations of gender and the public sphere, and representations of the “new woman.”

Women occupied nearly every role available in the film industry between 1900 and 1920, from stars to theater owners. In these first years of the nascent medium, production jobs were accessible to women, and movement between such positions was fluid. For example, Alice Guy-Blanché directed what may be the first narrative “photoplay,” La fée aux choux, for Léon Gaumont’s French production company in 1896, before arriving in the United States in 1907. Between 1896 and 1920, Guy-Blanché directed or produced over a thousand films and headed her own production company, Solax Pictures. Even so, much of Guy-Blanché’s work has been overshadowed by that of her male collaborators. Even her words have been appropriated in the writing of film history.¹ In a comment to the magazine Views and Film Index in 1908, she wrote that “women’s chances of making a living have been increased by the rise of the cinematograph machines.” Anthony Slide and other film historians however have left this quote uncited or attributed to various other, male early filmmakers.² Guy-Blanché is certainly not the only forgotten female filmmaker, as many women took opportunities in film between 1907 and 1917.

Without an existing industry, early film studios were smallscale and relatively egalitarian. Lizzie Francke writes that “women seemed destined to become

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equal partners with men in this new industry.” Before the foundation of large studios and unions, as well as the institutionalization and specialization of film production, many women were employed to fill a variety of roles. Hopeful women often entered the industry as potential actors, but instead found opportunities for skilled employment behind the camera. A burgeoning industry without rigid structures of employment, film offered fulfilling careers to a new generation of working women, a group which grew rapidly in the early decades of the 20th century. For a brief window, the film industry seemed to offer viable, though contentious, careers for women. To take just one example, in 1920 director Ida May Park suggested the job of Motion-Picture Director in a book called *Careers for Women*, with the misguided caveat that women might want to wait until the industry had solidified to find work appropriate to them. It was not only the women working in the industry who influenced early cinema; “female sensibility” as a whole, it seemed, shaped the course of film’s place in society.

Between 1905 and 1912, exhibitors attempted to rid film of its lower class vaudeville connotations by marketing their products to a bourgeois public. Trade journals urged exhibitors to court respectable audiences and to “play to the ladies.” A respectable theater would appeal to a young woman as a consumer and conform to appropriate public codes. Film was popular with women, attracting audiences through emotional narratives, melodrama, and recognizable stars. Bourgeois tastes of progressive moral reform harkened to the Victorian notion of women’s purity and, as Mahar writes, “the understanding that women existed in the private sphere, above the corrupting influences of the public sphere.” Women were both the consumers of film and increasingly the agents of social improvement. The element of “uplift” became a central feature of films appealing to genteel, female audiences. To redeem film as meaningful art, many movies were created and marketed as educational or moral experiences. As the film industry attempted to appeal to certain classed tastes, women’s opinions and political activism reshaped those classes and the roles of women within them.

The film industry was formed alongside a growing female consumer class eager to watch movies. Director and writer Eustace Ball described the experience of early film’s burgeoning popularity and negotiation of the medium’s identity, writing in his book *The Art of The Photoplay* in 1913, “Where five years ago the attendance of the moving picture show by well-to-do people was

3. Ibid.
4. “As for the natural equipment of women for the role of director, the superiority of their emotional and imaginative faculties gives them a great advantage. ...Wait until the profession has emerged from its embryonic state and a system has been evolved by which the terrific weight of responsibility can be lifted from one pair of shoulders. When that time comes, I believe that women will find no finer calling.”

6. Ibid.
considered a ‘slumming expedition,’ it has now become a standard amusement at which wives, mothers, sisters and daughters of the best classes in America are the most devoted patrons.’ As Shelley Stamp notes of Ball’s comments, he makes a connection common in descriptions of the period: by associating female patrons with the “well-to-do,” he links class and gender. Trade journals like *Moving Picture World* profiled female theater owner Mrs. Edward H. Clement repeatedly between 1910 and 1913, attributing her success and “refined management style” to her gender. Articles applauded her theater’s “wholesome condition” and projected the benefit of “good women’s” influence on the film industry. Women were employed by theaters both as a way to domesticate the space for female use and as an added attraction, often adding to the ambiance of the exhibition.

Distributors aggressively solicited female filmgoers through advertising schemes like “Ladies Tickets,” invitations mailed directly to women in their homes. “Ladies Tickets” described a dignified atmosphere at the theater, implored women to bring accompaniment but promised a largely female, respectable audience. As Shelley Stamp describes, ploys like “Ladies Tickets” had a profound impact on women’s leisure in the 1910s. She writes, “delivered to women at home, invitations and coupons also bridged the distance between commercial entertainment culture and the familial sphere, reaching out to women not normally found at picture houses in a gesture designed to express the compatibility of the two realms.” In this way, film viewing as a leisure activity became a part of the female sphere, and household decisionmaking about entertainment fell to women. Promises of moral and educational value at the theater “cast bourgeois wives and mothers as moral guardians within their immediate families, as well as in the community at large,” writes Stamp. Female authority over film viewership places the young medium in a meaningful historical position as a site of integral conflict. After this period of identity crisis, female viewership was never again so central to debates about the role of film in society.

Women’s relationship to film was not quite as simple or wholesome as distributors and trade journals described. Not only were women not entirely sold by moralistic educational pictures, often female audiences themselves did not easily “uplift” the status of film as pure, respectable entertainment. Female patrons created sources of tension in the public space of the theater. “Ironically, the attention to socializing and self-display that many showmen encouraged in their female clientele fostered modes of conduct that were

seen as disruptive in theaters,” Stamp writes. While suggesting exhibitors include mirrors like department stores and encourage women’s leisurely social interaction, trade journals also described the problems of ladies hats and feminine display distracting from the film. Women increasingly came to the cinema to be seen, and that interest in exhibitionism greatly influenced the exhibition of film itself. Trade journals were especially concerned with the proper training of film audiences in attendance procedures. Women were instructed to remove their hats and move through the space properly: “by circulating expected models of cinemagoing, proprietors hoped to position photoplays within an urban ‘pleasure center’ evolving for both married, middleclass women and so-called bachelor girls of the working class.”

For film exhibitors, navigating the gendered social politics of these two groups could prove difficult as “the former indulged the city’s daytime diversions—theoncerts, museums, shopping and vaudeville—nearly always accompanied by women friends, while more adventurous ‘bachelor girls’ toured the cities delights at night, often on the arm of a male companion.” Film exhibition was the site of a discursive medley between heterosocial interaction, public space, sex, and the “new woman.” Sumiko Higashi writes of this conflicting ideal, “whether social activist or flapper, the ‘new woman’ expected to function in both the public and private spheres despite controversy regarding the nature of her role.”

Mov Aege a popular recreational activity for many women, offering a view of upward mobility on screen and behind it, as well as an increasingly glamorous ideal of consumerism. With giveaways, promotions and star souvenirs, film exhibitors tied individual pictures to repeatable profits. Serial films became popular, enticing women with tie-ins, familiar faces and cross-advertising in women’s magazines. With the popularity of stars rising after 1910, female audiences were drawn to the glamour of actresses like Mary Pickford and further enticed by promotional products, cementing the commodification of early film and the star system. Early film exhibitors explicitly mimicked retail establishments with their physical design and promotion. Mov Aege replaced window-shopping as the preferred activity for women during their leisure time. Higashi highlights the connection between shopping and women’s place in the public sphere, writing that “the feminization of shopping, or the conversion of women into retail shoppers that began in the midnineteenth century was thus a sign of the increasing interpenetration of home and marketplace.” In terms of both shopping and filmgoing as leisure activities, commodification was the cost of women’s spatial freedom.

13. Ibid, 15
14. Ibid.
16. Higashi, Cecil B. DeMille and American Culture, 88.
Both shopping and film viewing emphasized commodified display. Stamp mentions the importance of mirrors, noting that they “had been an essential feature of department stores for many years, creating illusions of space and abundance crucial to the consumer ethos.”

Early cinema’s relationship with the female gaze is founded on consumption, creating tension between commercial and social practices predicated on gender. Female viewers did not always readily adopt the gaze assigned to them by exhibitors, frustrating the industry and forcing the adaptation of both film presentation and audience propriety.

Fan magazines offer insight into the cultural milieu many consumers encountered early film and the ways advertisers and distributors communicated with their customers. While trade magazines are filled with full-page ads for upcoming films and production houses marketed on reputation, fan magazines advertise a variety of products relevant to their target market. Upcoming films are listed beside hats, skincare solutions, garters and makeup, as well as scene-writing courses and calls for writers. These magazines glamourize the industry while also implying that there was room in the field for enthusiastic female fans to become creators.

Miriam Hansen points out the correlation between the foundation of filmic narrative and this refashioning of the film industry’s projected audience: “The bid for cultural respectability (literary adaptations, casting of stage celebrities, gentrification of exhibition) coincided with the rise to hegemony of the narrative film.” Female audiences enjoyed the narrative function of film, as recreational storytelling was a feminine activity. In fact, when Alice Guy-Blanché asked her employer Léon Gaumont if she could film a scene instead of just an image — one of the first uses of narrative — he allowed it, with the comment that “it seems like a girlish thing to do.” Narrative films like melodramas and serials appealed to women’s tastes like Victorian novels had decades before. “Women’s identity as the most fanatic moviegoers led to the feminization of movie fan culture just as the industry’s most prestigious fare became the featurelength storypicture centered on a female star,” writes Hilary Hallett.

Women identified with images onscreen and with intertextual information about the stars and stories.

17. Ibid, 21.
18. The advertisements also suggest the economic power of the “new woman” who might pay for writing or voice lessons to launch her career or who could buy “The Star Electric Massage Vibrator” (“It takes the kinks out of sore muscles, stiff joints, sprains; it relieves headache, nervousness, fatigue…”) or Winfield Scott Hall’s book “The Illustrated Sexual Knowledge,” (“Sex Facts Made Plain”), all of which were advertised in a 1920 issue of Motion Picture Classic. Motion Picture Classic, January 1, 1920, 82, 103.
Fans’ interest carried over outside the medium, blurring film life with reality. Many female film patrons not only saw themselves in the mirrored theater, but also imagined themselves projected onscreen. Female actresses and stars dominated the box offices in the silent era. Though originally actors remained unnamed, after 1910 audiences gradually insisted on knowing the performers. No longer content to refer to familiar faces with names like “the Biograph Girl,” film patrons were excited by the billing of famous performers like Lillian Gish and Mae Marsh. The film industry courted women with information about these new stars. Citing Kathryn Fuller, Stamp writes that “motion picture magazines began to amend their largely technical coverage of moviemaking with a marked concern for fashion, beauty, and performers’ private lives around 1911, signs of their growing address to women.”

Performers were often able to cross over into production roles and many female actors made their own films or founded independent studios. The women early film audiences saw on screen were icons of possibility and new femininity. Film fan magazines like Photoplay and Motion Picture Classic enthusiastically probed filmmakers for information about the impact of filmmaking on their home life. They relished in details that might help fans relate to the distant yet simultaneously familiar stars. Curiously, they validated the genius of the women they profiled while also calling attention to the oddity of a woman being in charge. Between detailed descriptions of the women’s clothing and skincare, a 1918 issue of Photoplay Magazine delves into the new roles for women in and out of film, questioning whether these opportunities signaled a broader change in gender roles. “Are we going back to the time when women ran the civil government, the army, the men, and everything else that needed running?”

By the 1920s, film studios were using female directors’ and screenwriters’ independent career girl images to harness their star power as producers. A new era of female stars and star producers blurred boundaries between fiction and reality with intertextual advertising like souvenirs and cookbooks. Hollywood women’s home life was important to fans, and expressions of femininity and glamour increasingly defined film personalities. Profiles of prominent female directors like Lois Weber made pointed references to gender and the benefits of femininity in filmmaking. Weber’s moralistic “issue films,” created with her homemaker’s attention to detail and respectable marriage, assigned an appropriate post-Victorian femininity to her persona. Often, female filmmakers worked in partnership with a man, relying on a male counterpart for business or appearances. Alice Guy-Blanché, Mary

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22. Stamp, Movie-struck Girls, 152
23. “‘Is directing a man’s work? --I should say it is!’ Very carefully she drew down the top of one silk glove, disclosing a forearm plentifully sprinkled with freckles. ‘Look at that!’ said Director [Elsie Jane] Wilson, and added “Oh, my dear, you can’t imagine the money I’ve spent this summer on freckle cream!” In that exclamation she expressed all a woman’s natural horror of freckles…” Frances, Denton. “Lights! Camera! Quiet Ready! Shoot!” Photoplay, February 1, 1918, 48-50.
Pickford, and Lois Weber worked alongside their husbands with various arrangements. Lois Weber and her husband presented their partnership as harmonious, domestically and creatively. Weber’s marriage was central to her character as a celebrity and served to offer “marriage as an appropriate template for working partnerships between men and women, and egalitarian collaboration as a new blueprint for modern romance.”

According to Shelley Stamp, portraits of Lois Weber as a guardian of bourgeois values “marshaled Weber’s matronly persona in the service of a more general project of uplifting the cinema, while at the same time creating not only a legitimate place for women in the industry, but a privileged one.”

For some female directors like Lois Weber, their gender garnered them respect and authority in a medium increasingly associated with feminine sensibilities. A 1915 issue of Photoplay Magazine quotes Lois Weber, “I like to direct because I believe a woman, more or less intuitively, brings out many of the emotions that are rarely expressed on the screen. We may miss what some of the men get, but I will get other effects that they never thought of.”

Some early films dealt explicitly with issues of women’s rights and roles. Images of suffragists are common in silent films, many of them in parody of contemporary events. Comedic stereotypes of masculine feminists depicted fears of wild and extreme activists. Parodies play with images of role reversal and cross dressing, humorizing gender transgressions. These films highlight contemporary fixation to binary gender and fears about changing expectations, offering insight into cultural anxieties. As Shelley Stamp writes, “By exploding formerly rigid polarities of gender identity and separate spheres, comedies like A Busy Day at once register and resist rapidly changing expectations about women’s lives that had been set in motion by the suffrage debate.”

While parody opened a discursive space for comedic representations, film also offered a direct look at events of suffrage activism. Radical actions by British suffragists intrigued American audiences, and newsreels presented a more serious perspective of the movement. Images of the suffragists brought to the theater a new spectacle of women claiming public space. While only a few years earlier women could not move around the city in public alone, film offered images of radical women chaining themselves to government buildings from the relative safety of another public space, the movie house. Serious questions of women’s equality were visible sources of

27. Stamp, Movie-struck Girls, 167.
tension in issues of leisure and recreation.

 Seeing the possibilities made available by the new medium, the National American Woman Suffrage Association and the Women’s Political Union released four films between 1912 and 1914. *Suffrage and the Man* and *Votes for Women* (actually two films: first a documentary and later a fictional film by the same name) were vastly successful in attracting audiences by pairing famous suffragists with narrative melodrama and romance. The chance to see Emmeline Pankhurst, notorious for her radical activism and intense tactics, drew many people interested in the intensifying conflict.

 The 1913 film *What 80 Million Women Want* opened with Pankhurst speaking, accompanied by a narrating suffragist at exhibition. The film that followed included a melodrama of a suffragist woman and her struggle with her fiancé’s approval, appearances by Harriet Stanton Blatch, and finally a happy ending of romantic resolution and votes for women. Both a Progressive-style teaching film and a romance, *What 80 Million Women Want* combines moral messages with a plot and features a strong but beautiful heroine. As Shelley Stamp writes of suffrage films, “they express the essential elements of ‘feminine uplift’: stately features on educational subjects addressed to patrons attuned to current political issues.”

 However popular among audiences these films were, the industry papers were less pleased with the suffragists’ propagandizing. “If serial films had successfully marshaled female filmgoers around models of consumption,” Stamp explains,” by embedding films within a larger field of images, products and discourses, suffrage films performed a similar function in a much more tangible, and undoubtedly more threatening, arena: politics.” Dismis-sive reviews speak to an industry fearful of change and alienated by politicization, though by 1920 women had won the vote and feminist tensions in film were less acute. The medium had found its stride and channeled the desires of filmgoers into a consumption model. In Hollywood studios, there was little room for feminist political filmmaking and the window of open independent production had closed.

 Organizations like the Motion Picture Director’s Association founded in 1915, contributed to the increasing exclusion of women in the industry. The MPDA was created in response to male director’s concerns about working in a heterosocial space, sexual harassment scandals, worries about the prestige of the director being degraded by women’s participation, and fears that the film industry was not a virtuous place for women. The MPDA did however grant honorary memberships to both Lois Weber and Ida May Park. In “The City that Made the Pictures Move: Gender, Labor, and the Film Industry,”

29. Ibid.
Denise McKenna writes, “at a time when directing was not entirely limited to men, the foundation of the MPDA asserted the collective identity of directors not only as responsible and respectable, but as male.”

It is impossible to ignore the omission of many of these histories from virtually all writing before 1960 and most until the last 15 years. Women’s powerful prominence throughout the early film industry’s development has only recently begun to be thoroughly explored. It is anachronistic to describe early film as a “feminist” endeavor, but the birth of film as an art form and an industry is so profoundly intertwined with changing perspectives about gender and the role of women in society that speaking retroactively, this greatly overlooked mutual impact ties the birth of film to the birth of the “new woman.”

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United We Struggle: Exploring the Relationship Between the Cuban Revolution and the Black Fight for Freedom in the United States

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Introduction

On January 21, 1959, Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement ousted President Fulgencio Batista of Cuba from his position of power, and thus the revolution commenced. The Cuban Revolution, as defined by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, was conceived in an ideology of common suffering which united Third World peoples against the hegemony of the United States. Castro and Guevara pronounced the importance of action and the transformation of the Revolution’s ideological principles into guerrilla warfare. For these men, this type of revolution provided the only means to destroying imperialism.

The impact of the Cuban Revolution reverberated with the emergence of the Black Power movement in the U.S., which used the Cuban Revolution as a source of guidance and inspiration. The Cuban Revolution “was not only a powerful catalyst across the Third World, but [it] also resonated in the U.S. with an anarchic force, shaking up the body politic.”

The Black Power movement, under the auspices of Stokely Carmichael, championed a united proletariat, a mass revolutionary movement, and an overthrow of colonial America. Black activists forged connections with Fidel Castro, and even used Cuba as a haven to escape from the U.S. government.

The Cuban revolution was not a contained movement. Its effects were international in scope and the power of its revolutionary struggle inspired oppressed peoples of the Third World. Once Black activists arrived in Cuba, however, they were faced with an increasingly racialized society. Although Cuba was a country that prided itself on the eradication of racism, the Cuban state, in practice, suppressed any discussion regarding racial issues. Castro spoke of racism as a strictly American problem, and he was unwilling to admit that racial discrimination continued to run rampant in his own country. Although Castro’s revolutionary rhetoric and friendships with many black American leaders helped direct the Black Freedom movement, ultimately Castro’s inability to speak openly about racism within Cuba resulted

in the growing tension between Black leaders and Castro. This furthered the development of racial inequality and discrimination in Cuban society.

The Cuban Revolution: Seen through the Lens of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara

In 1967, Cuba held the First Latin American Conference of Solidarity. At the event, both Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, the preeminent leaders of the Cuban Revolution, addressed the Latin American community. Castro and Guevara fervently spoke out against the United States. The U.S., they stressed, oppressed the underdeveloped nations of the world through its greed for material possessions and power. Only through revolution could the people of Latin America, Asia, and Africa thwart the intervention of the United States. Using the Cuban Revolution as their prime example, Castro and Guevara defined revolution as first an ideological movement. This movement then manifested its ideas into the tangible actions of guerilla warfare. Struggle and bloodshed, they asserted, were the necessary means to a victorious revolutionary end. United among the underdeveloped nations of the world, revolution was intrinsically a national and international struggle. The United States and colonialism, therefore, would be destroyed through an international revolution, characterized by the ideologies of socialism and manifested through guerilla warfare and mass bloodshed.

Castro and Guevara characterized U.S. imperialism as military intervention, economic domination, and the usage of puppet rules and regimes. The U.S., therefore, was not the maker of peace and order it claimed on the world stage. Rather, through its imperialist means, the U.S. destroyed the countries of the world, dismantling their ability to function as independent nations. Guevara noted that due to U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Guatemala, the region had been transformed “into a dangerous detonator ready at any moment to explode.” He also expressed that the U.S. imposes its dominance through the implementation of “puppet governments or, in the best of cases, weak and fearful local rulers, [who] are incapable of contradicting orders from their Yankee master.” Although the states appear to self-govern, in actuality these rulers act as mere pawns of U.S. imperialism.

Moreover, Castro fervently spoke out against the Central Intelligence Agency. He asserted that the CIA violated a series of international laws, moral standards, and norms of civilizations. They are, he said, “like vulgar pirates, using the flag of any country, yet, the U.S. Government is more immoral than the pirates of old- for the pirates of old, we hear, used the pirate flag, and the piratical Yankee imperialism uses the flag of any country in the

3. Ibid., 5.
world.” For the U.S. breaks the laws of the international order while acting under the guise of a democratic peacemaker nation. Like pirates, the United States behaves in an unlawful manner, stripping its victims of resources and leaving them bare, stranded, and starving at sea.

For Castro and Guevara, the only way to rid the world of U.S. imperialist influence is through the process of revolution that possesses ideological roots that ultimately transform into actions of guerilla warfare. The ideological origins of a revolution are essential components to defeat the United States. Castro stressed that only through action can these ideas disseminate among the masses. He states, “whoever hesitates while waiting for ideas to triumph among the greater part of the masses before initiating revolutionary action will never be a revolutionary.” This coupling of ideology and action makes guerrilla warfare successful, Guevara noted. He declared:

The galvanizing of the national spirit through a relentless hatred of the enemy, impelling us over and beyond the natural limitations that man is heir to and transforming him into an effective, violent, selective and cold killing machine. Our soldiers must be thus; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy.

To destroy imperialism, the countries of the world must incite a revolution that ignites a total war. “We must carry the war into every corner the enemy happens to carry it: to his home, to his centers of entertainment,” Guevara articulated. This war will destroy the morale of the enemy with each passing victory for the revolution.

The proletariat armies will enact a total guerrilla war, a war of struggle and bloodshed. This international revolutionary war against the U.S. attempts to thwart the imperialist oppressive regime. Castro expressed that all “true revolutionaries will always feel solidarity with Cuba,” for no true revolutionary “will ever let himself be drawn into those positions which would lead him to an alliance with imperialism.” Although Castro appears to warn the countries of the world not to ally with the U.S, he is also offering an alliance among all proletariat nations. Castro created a sense of solidarity, a unified front against imperialist power. Moreover, Guevara called for the development of a proletarian army united under one flag. Every drop of blood spilled and “each nation liberated is a phase won in the battle for the

liberation of one’s own country.” While Guevara warned that this would be a long and bloody war, he also states that every action of the revolution “is a battle cry against imperialism, and a battle hymn for the people’s unity against the great enemy of mankind: The United States of America.”

While Guevara spoke of the oppression of people living outside of the United States, Castro expressed how Black Americans suffered from both governmental and social oppression within the United States. Castro forged a connection between the struggles of Black Americans, the Cuban Revolution, and the broader revolutionary world. Black Americans, Castro expressed, have concentrated their “energies on defending [themselves], on resisting, on struggle.” Furthermore, historian Sarah Seidman notes, “tricontinentalism’s emphasis on anti-imperialism and its inclusion of a critique of racism elicited the interest of African American internationalists.” Now, the proletariat army was no longer solely composed of people outside of the United States. Black Americans joined its ranks and incited revolution within the borders of the U.S.

The Black Power Movement: Oppression, Frustration, and Revolution

The 1960s represented years of great turmoil for Black Americans. Even after the passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the nature of race relations in the U.S. only slightly changed. This racially charged dynamic resulted in a subsequent disenchantment with the United States’ political establishment. While Black Americans formed mass movements to fight for equal rights and justice, the U.S. utilized violent government forces to repress their outcries.

Due to the frustration and lack of progress of peaceful protests, many young activists turned to militant forms of nationalism. Black Nationalism encompassed various strains including cultural nationalism, Pan-Africanism, Black Power, and revolutionary nationalism. In varying degrees, nationalists believed that white supremacy is a central principle ingrained into the modern global world, and “blacks must develop autonomous institutions to combat it, and that race is salient and primary identity.” Nonetheless, different leaders represented different factions and sometimes even possessed a combination of some factions or all of them. Stokely Carmichael, the public face of Black Power from 1966-1968, defined Black Power as the “call for black people in this country to unite, to recognize their heritage, to build a

8. Guevara, Message to the Tricontinental, 12.
sense of community.” Moreover, “it is a call to reject the racist institutions and values of this society.”

Even before the emergence of the Black Power movement, Malcolm X, a once prominent minister of the Nation of Islam, declared the importance of Black solidarity. A unity characterized by a shared hatred of the white population, which ultimately is meant to form a Black revolution. At the Northern Negro Grassroots Leadership Conference, which convened in Detroit in 1963, Malcolm X declared that America possessed a problem, which he defined as the “Negro.” Each time you look at yourself, he said, “be you black, brown, red or yellow, a so-called Negro, you represent a person who poses a serious problem for America because you’re not wanted.” With this statement, Malcolm X made a call of solidarity to all people of color. “We are a collective problem, yet we are united by this problem,” Malcolm asserted. He did not speak of love and peace, he spoke of common suffering, pain, and rejection. It was this common oppression that allowed for a ripe revolutionary rhetoric to flourish, one which was driven by a common hatred: “We’re all black people, so-called Negroes, second-class citizens, ex-slaves. You don’t like to be told that. But what else are you?” Malcolm asked the public. “We have a common oppressor, a common exploiter, and a common discriminator,” this is the white man.

Similarly, Robert Williams, another distinguished leader in the American Civil Rights Movement, expressed that revolution represents the last straw of hope among an oppressed population. According to Williams, the subjugated population retains the right to revolt in order to restore justice. He asserted that revolution is the “natural human response to brutality and sustained tyranny.” Thus, the black man is left with two choices. He “must either meekly submit to tyranny and risk ultimate extermination or invoke the natural law of survival and resort to revolutionary resistance.” Only through a black revolution will American tyranny and injustice cease. Interestingly, Williams refers to the U.S. as a colonialist regime, a power that not only subjugates non-whites abroad, but also oppresses people of color within its own nation. Through the suffering and pain of an afflicted people, an environment of revolution is conceived, and only through revolution and the usurpation of a tyrannical regime can peace occur. He states, “revolution is a Caesarean operation to facilitate the deliverance of the child of peace.” Thus, “the American black man holds the fate of America in its hands.” For only through a black revolution can America cease to act as an

15. Ibid., 19.
imperialist repressive power. This revolution, however, was not only an American battle, but also a worldwide struggle. Malcolm X defined the black revolution as an entity that is “worldwide in scope and in nature. The black revolution is sweeping Asia, is sweeping Africa, is rearing its head in Latin America. The Cuban Revolution—that’s a revolution.” Malcolm X characterized the black revolution as the global coalition of all non-whites, and he declared Cuba as its direct source of inspiration and guidance.

**Revolution Across Hemispheres: Cuba and the Leaders of the Black Power Movement**

In September 1960, Castro traveled from Cuba to New York to deliver a speech before the U.N. General Assembly. After staff members at the Manhattan Hotel “snubbed” Castro, he made his way to Harlem to stay in the Hotel Theresa. An excited crowd greeted Castro on the streets of Harlem. The enthusiasm of the masses in Harlem matched the warm welcome and respect black leaders greeted him with. Castro declared that the “American Negroes have grasped one great human truth: that everyone is happy in Cuba.”

To Black Americans, Cuba embodied an ideal setting where racism had been eradicated from the framework of the country and equality reigned. The U.S. black media closely followed the Cuban revolution. While the mainstream media was suspicious of both Castro and his revolutionary tactics, “to blacks in the United States, the revolution appeared to have created a far more fluid system of race and class than the system that existed in the United States, or, for that matter, anywhere in Latin America.” Castro publicly promoted Cuba and drew attention to the mixed-race nature of Cuba’s population. Many black nationalists believed that the Cuban regime, through its revolution and socialist nature, modeled a society in which racial inequality no longer existed. They praised the Cuban government for its ability to improve the quality of life of Afro-Cubans. Black leaders revered Castro, for he seemed to have solved the worldwide problem of racism within his nation.

Due to the perception that Castro had created a social, political, and economic society free from racial inequality, Cuba turned into a haven for black activists. During the 1960s, black activists challenged authority within the U.S. At times, this resulted in violent interactions with the police that led to the prosecution of many of these activists, including Robert Williams and Eldridge Cleaver.

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17. Ibid., 17.
20. Ibid., 79.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 88.
he ran *Radio Free Dixie*, a radio program that was broadcasted in the United States while he was in exile. Activists fled to Cuba in an effort to seek safety from U.S. authorities. Cuba did not possess an extradition treaty. Additionally, Cuba “represented defiance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.” As an ideological and physical haven, Cuba allowed black activists the ability to flee the United States and maintain their freedom. While Stokely Carmichael visited Cuba, he did not land on Cuban soil as a fugitive. Carmichael traveled to Cuba to attend the First Latin American Conference of Solidarity in 1967. During the conference, Carmichael “characterized Castro’s facility with the audience as palpable.” In his speech, Carmichael called for the unification of all Third World peoples, including black Americans. Carmichael stressed a shared struggle and enemy, the enemy of “white imperialist society.” Carmichael goes on to say that the struggle of the non-white people is to “overthrow this system that feeds itself and expands itself through the economic and cultural exploitation of non-white, non-Western peoples—of the Third World.” Using rhetoric similar to Che Guevara, Carmichael declared that the destinies of all Third World nations are intertwined. A triumph over colonialism cannot ensue unless that victory belongs to all peoples in the Third World. He declared, “we look to Cuba as a shining example of hope in our hemisphere.” This struggle transcends borders and looks to a future in which the “true United States of America will extend from Tierra del Fuego to Alaska, when those formerly oppressed will stand together, a liberated people.”

Furthermore, Carmichael expressed that similar to the American colonization of Third World countries, the Unites States also subjugated black Americans under its colonial tutelage. The black communities in the U.S., Carmichael said, are the “victims of white imperialism and colonial exploitation—in practical economic and political terms.” Black Americans, alongside Mexican Americans, Indian Americans, and Puerto Ricans, populate American cities. The non-white population lives in the “heart of commercial trade.” As black Americans, “we do not control our resources. We do not control the land, the houses, or the stores. They are owned by whites that live outside of the community.” Similarly, the United States exploits the people of other nations by stripping them of their natural resources and economic independence. Therefore, the non-white population of the United States remains economically handicapped. They do not possess control over resources, and are controlled by a colonial white population.

Carmichael, like Guevara and Castro, united the struggles of all Third World

23. Ibid., 89.
26. Ibid., 105.
27. Ibid., 105.
peoples and argued that imperialism would only fall through a united mass
revolution. Carmichael also adds another dimension to the struggle of Third
World people: race. The purpose of Black Power is to end both racism and
exploitation. However, he expressed that the destruction of racism would
not necessarily eliminate exploitation, and vice versa. Both racism and
exploitation must be terminated, he argued, and thus he launched a “two-
pronged attack” against the United States.28

Tension Ensues: Cuba and the Leaders of the Black Power Movement

Although Castro praised Carmichael as an “exemplary revolutionary” during
an emotional mass rally in Havana, he never addressed the racism that
thrive on his island.29 Rather, Castro spoke of the racism and bigotry in
the United States. Racism was an American problem, not a Cuban problem.
Furthermore, Castro emphasized exploitation over racism. In his speech
at the First Latin American Conference of Solidarity, Castro proclaimed
that the black sector within the United States is the “most exploited and
repressed sector, the most brutally treated in the United States.” He then
noted that the revolutionary movement in the U.S. will rise from this Black
sector “not for racial reasons, but for social reasons, reasons of exploitation
and oppression.”30 Castro conveyed two issues with this statement. One, he
assumed that problems of race belonged to the U.S. Secondly, the revolution
that will ensue is not rooted in racial reasons, but social issues. Thus, revolution
results from exploitation, not racism. This ideological relation directly
contradicts Carmichael’s point, which explained that the black revolution
requires the termination of both exploitation and racism. Castro instead
places the emphasis on exploitation rather than on racial problems. There-
fore, according to Castro, racism would cease to exist in so far as exploita-
tion ceased to exist.

In an effort to downplay the racial issues of Cuban society, Castro did not
openly speak about problems of Cuban racism. Nonetheless, discrimination
against Afro-Cubans existed within the Cuban regime, despite the govern-
ment’s attempt to suppress it. Carlos Moore, a half-Black native Cuban,
wrote a memoir dictating his return to Cuba after moving to the United
States. In his writing, Moore speaks about a conversation that he had with
his brother in Cuba. His brother expressed to Moore that, “every black
Cuban must defend this Revolution with his blood.” While Moore agreed
with his brother and stated that the revolution was the “only hope we blacks
had,” he also asserts that despite his commitment to the revolutionary
cause, “a number of problems persisted [in Cuba] regarding race.” Moore

28. Ibid., 107.
writes, “I desired nothing more than to be useful to my country.” However, as Moore began attending neighborhood meetings of the Committee to Defend the Revolution, he noticed that all the majority of people who possessed positions of authority were white. Moore felt that the white revolutionaries believed that blacks should be grateful to them. He writes, “It was there in the way they looked at you, as if to say, Who the hell does this negrito think he is, coming here demanding a job?” It was in their tone of voice, “the irked robotic way they spoke. There was no mistaking it. I detected the cacophonous music of racism getting louder.” While Moore returned to Cuba to actively participate in the revolution, he did not receive the treatment a respected member of Cuban revolutionary society deserved. Due to his race, Moore’s ability to actively engage in the revolution was limited, as he could not participate as an integral leader in a position of authority.

While racial discrimination was widespread within the Cuban revolutionary ranks, Black American leaders pointed to the roots of racism in Cuba by turning towards its history. Eldridge Cleaver, a leading figure in the Black Power movement who for a time was exiled in Cuba, noted in an interview with Skip Gates that José Martí, the famous white Cuban revolutionary, often receives the sole credit for his nineteenth century revolutionary victories, despite the fact that Antonio Maceo, a Black revolutionary, fought beside Martí. Cleaver explained to Gates that wherever one looked one “could see statues of Jose Martí. It reached the point where it was sickening; it looked as if they were trying to foist something off on you.” It was only “now and then that you’d see something about Antonio Maceo.” Cleaver emphasized the fact that Maceo was described as the one who “liberated Cuba with a sword,” while Martí received the title of the “father of the Cuban Revolution.” At one point, Cleaver went to a library to try to collect information about Maceo. When he asked the librarian for works on Maceo, the librarian returned with an abundance of Maceo’s works on morals, political philosophy, and agriculture. When Cleaver asked the librarian where these things were located, she said, “they were locked-up in a room…where the Cuban people were unable to even see them.” Cleaver described this story to Gates in a shocked manner. Cleaver felt Maceo «was representative of [the] hidden racism in Cuba.” This revolutionary figure should have been a hero to the Cuban people, according to Cleaver’s investigation. Instead, his legacy and works were locked in a place where no one would find them. It is Martí, the father of the revolution, whose actions are said to have conceived Cuban nationality and revolutionary pride. The revolution was born to Martí, a white man, while the legacy of Maceo, the black revolutionary, lays locked

31. Moore, Pichon, 169.
32. Ibid., 170.
34. Ibid.
35. Moore, Pichon, 94.
away gathering dust in the dark. This anecdote that Cleaver told conveys the skewed perception of race within Cuba at the time. The white man dominated the position of the hero, the essential component to revolutionary victory, while the black man stood supportive by his side.

According to Cleaver, the Cuban Revolution was conceived by a white man and belongs to the white people of Cuba. Although Maceo garners some credit, he is discarded as a mere afterthought of the revolution. Similarly, since Castro stressed the eradication of racism from Cuban society, the issues of racism could not be openly discussed. Instead, underlying racist tones and notions could be felt throughout the country. Many black activists, after spending time in Cuba, afterwards were convinced of the regime’s racist nature. These exiles included Eldridge Cleaver, Robert Williams, and Stokely Carmichael. Cleaver later maintained “Carmichael discouraged him from fleeing to Cuba as a political fugitive in 1968 because of ongoing racism on the island.”

Thus, while Castro preached the end of oppression for all people, Cuba’s suppression of racism and its inability to confront its racial issues caused Cuba to harbor much racial tension, ostracizing many black American leaders.

**Conclusion**

Castro and the leaders of the Black Nationalist movement within the U.S. established a connection, “forged through an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and anti-racist tri-continental ideology.” Their differences regarding the centrality of race in their fight against imperialist oppression led to the divergence between Castro and many leaders of the black freedom struggle.

Although tension developed between Castro and multiple key black leaders, Stokely Carmichael still traveled to Havana in 1997 to attend the thirtieth anniversary of the First Latin American Conference of Solidarity. Carmichael even spent time in Cuba “receiving free medical treatment for what proved to be a fatal cancer in the 1990s,” and his initial trip to Cuba in 1967 “helped chart his life’s course.” Thus, the Cuban revolution and the black struggle for freedom within the U.S. were inextricably linked, despite differences in their perceptions of race.

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37. Ibid., 14.
38. Ibid.
Works Cited


The X-Ray and the Razor: Gendering Hair Removal in Science and the Mass Market, 1900 - 1940
Paige Picard

As the early twentieth century entered an era of consumerism, American beauty culture flourished in a strikingly short amount of time. In the nineteenth century, women pioneered a grassroots network of neighbors, family, and friends who exchanged homemade remedies and beauty advice. Some women even started their own businesses that loosely mirrored later models of sales strategies and mass-market industries. However, in the early twentieth century, men increasingly began to capitalize on this work and transformed traditional remedies into an industry of mass-produced cosmetics. Historian Kathy Peiss notes that between 1909 and 1929 the factory value of the cosmetics industry rose from $14.2 million to $141 million.¹ While this statistic does not account for body hair removal products alone, this growth reveals American business’ increasing focus on the beautification of the female body. Even King C. Gillette incorporated a line directed at beautifying the female underarm into his already successful masculinized shaving enterprise.²

On the other hand, science continued to pathologize female facial hair by creating new scientific methods of permanent removal. Electrolysis, a practice discovered in the 1870s catered mostly to the upper class, and remains the only reliable and safe way of permanently removing body hair even to the present day. In 1897 physicians began using the x-ray as a scientific alternative to electrolysis in treating hypertrichosis (a disease of excessive hairiness found primarily in women).³ Advertised as painless and permanent, the x-ray provided a cheaper form of treatment for people suffering from hypertrichosis. By the 1910s many physicians grew aware of the dangers involved in using the x-ray for the practice of hair removal and began to regard excess female body hair as a cosmetic issue rather than a medical condition. However, many practitioners and other beauticians chose to commercialize the cosmetic aspect and continued to use the x-ray for

² Previous to 1915, the Gillette Corporation only marketed their razors to men. King C. Gillette himself, the founder of the company and inventor of the safety razor, relied on rhetoric and images of masculinity to sell shaving to the male consumer. See King C. Gillette: The Man and His Wonderful Shaving Device by Russell B. Adams for a history of the company and male shaving practices.
hair removal purposes until the 1940s. This essay will examine the intersection of science and beauty within the emerging social pressures to remove hair from female bodies in the early twentieth century. It will also examine hypertrichosis juxtaposed against a proliferation in the commodification of female body hair removal products. Lastly, it will analyze how gendered images of body hair on men and women influenced changes in the methods of excess hair removal. Although this paper focuses on female body hair removal, men also faced expectations to shave during this time, as Gillette’s advertising campaigns touted masculinity as a clean-shaven face. Therefore, this essay will also compare how cultural norms informed gendered body hair practices.

This paper will primarily focus on two hair removal devices: the x-ray and the razor. However, it should be noted that a wide range of depilatories entered the mass-market throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Contested sites of body hair on women changed and expanded during this period. Previous to the 1910s, most women did not remove any body hair below their neck, and if they did, this process was not a regular routine. In 1915 the emerging beauty industry began to target other more intimate regions of body hair in response to changing fashions that revealed parts of the body previously invisible to the public eye. Raised hems and shortened sleeves exposed the underarms, arms, and legs, which respectively became targets in advertising campaigns for various depilatories. During this period, female body hair became the site of a scorched earth policy inflicted both by science and by the mass-market.

The X Ray: Applying Science to Beautification

On February 29th, 1896, Dr. John Daniel and Dr. William L. Dudley, two physicians at Vanderbilt University, prepared to perform a surgical procedure on a young boy who had been shot in the head. They decided to first apply an x-ray tube to the affected region, which they placed approximately one half inch from the hair for one hour. Dr. Daniel later wrote an article stating that just twenty-one days after exposing the patient to the x-ray all of the hair closest to the tube had fallen out. He noted that “the skin looks perfectly healthy, and there has been no pain nor any other indication of disorder.” Thus hair removal by the x-ray had accidentally been discovered. Unknown to Dr. Daniel and Dr. Dudley, they had stumbled upon the method of depilation that would come to embody the crux of the medicalization and the commercialization of female body hair removal. The dangers of radiation remained largely unknown until the 1910s, but even after scientists disseminated information about the hazardous implications, women continued to attend x-ray salons with the goal of permanently ridding themselves

of their unwanted hair. In the early twentieth century, this method would come to represent an extremity in the drive to keep the female body hairless.

From the late 1890s to the 1940s, the x-ray provided a promising and permanent method of hair removal for thousands of women. Albert C. Geyser, a New York physician and professor at Cornell, dedicated his career to electrotherapeutics and focused on the x-ray as a “healing agent,” which reveals his insistence that excessive female body hair did in fact indicate disease. Despite maiming his hand through x-ray experimentation, he continued to advocate for the use of the x-ray. In 1908 Geyser invented a revolutionized x-ray called the Cornell Tube, which he deemed safe and the solution to hypertrichosis. This procedure involved “direct contact of the sound skin,” as it slowly moved around a large area for about three to four minutes in each session. Geyser willingly ignored the incredible dangers evident in x-ray technology and claimed to have tested his Cornell Tube on over 5,000 patients by 1908. The overall effectiveness and success of the x-ray in removing unwanted hair allowed Geyser’s methodology to develop into a corporation called the Tricho Sales Corporation, through which he distributed thousands of x-rays to private salons all over the country from 1918 to 1930. Tricho was only one of many x-ray companies that distributed the machines for cosmetic purposes. Historian Rebecca Herzig estimates that tens - if not hundreds - of thousands of women used radiation at these salons in order to remove unwanted body hair. These x-ray salons exemplify a key way in which commercialization and science intersected to impact the removal of female body hair.

Excessive body hair became less of a medical concern by the 1910s probably as a result of physicians knowing more about the negative effects the x-ray can have on the flesh; therefore the treatment of hypertrichosis with the x-ray declined. In some cases, these effects included stronger and thicker hair growing in after several months. In more severe cases one physician wrote that patients over time developed a “decidedly wrinkled, prematurely senile appearance,” or in other cases patients suffered from lesions ending in the “contraction of scar-tissue.”

However, cosmetologists and other salon owners continued to employ the x-ray as a beautifying device. As scientists delineated between necessary and unnecessary x-ray treatment, most cases of hirsutism became a “cosmetic”

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issue rather than a medical one. One physician maintained that electrolysis was the only method of assuring safe and permanent hair removal. A study by the American Medical Association in 1947 estimated that thousands of patients who received x-ray treatment for hair removal from 1900 to 1945 later suffered from various illnesses including x-ray burns, cancer, and in many cases, death.

Figure 1 - “Patient receiving treatment on the cheek. No pain or sensation of any kind. The INFALLIBLE method successfully used for 16 years by Dr. Albert C. Geyser, late Professor of Electrical Therapeutics at Cornell University and endorsed by many leading physicians. No Needle. No Wax. No Chemical. Painless and Harmless - Guaranteed to be Permanent

However, cosmetologists and other salon owners continued to employ the x-ray as a beautifying device. As scientists delineated between necessary and unnecessary x-ray treatment, most cases of hirsutism became a “cosmetic” issue rather than a medical one. One physician maintained that electrolysis was the only method of assuring safe and permanent hair removal. A study by the American Medical Association in 1947 estimated that thousands of patients who received x-ray treatment for hair removal from 1900 to 1945 later suffered from various illnesses including x-ray burns, cancer, and in

many cases, death.\footnote{Cipollaro, “The Use of the X-Ray for the Treatment in Hypertrichosis is Dangerous,” 350.}

However, some physicians and beauty specialists established private salons that re-appropriated scientific rhetoric to legitimize the practice, which helped maintain the x-rays aura of scientific validation.\footnote{Herzig, “Removing Roots,” 736-737.} Despite the dangers of the x-ray, this reputation caused many to believe that irradiation solved any previous conundrum over female body hair removal. The commercialization of x-rays, and the industry’s reliance on false scientific facts contributed to the developing beauty industry within the burgeoning American consumer culture. Whereas the medicalization and commodification of female body hair removal remained fairly separate in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century introduced an intersection between the market place and the doctor’s office that blurred the lines between patient and consumer. Figure 1 depicts a young woman receiving treatment from a Tricho machine.\footnote{James Bennett, “Cosmetics and Skin: X rays and Hair Removal,” 2014. Image available from http://cosmeticsandskin.com/cdc/xray.php# (accessed 6 December 2014).}

The ad heavily relies on the word of a late professor of Cornell and the notion that the machine is “endorsed by many leading physicians.” Even as the x-ray transitioned from the doctor’s office to the beauty industry, the female still encapsulated the image of patient. Similar to electrolysis, the female patient received the treatment from an external source of power, which meant she did not control the removal of her hair with her own hand. In the ad we see the young woman passively sitting at the machine rather than removing her hair with her own labor or effort. Advertisements and pamphlets also focused on the messes and complications resulted from the use of waxes, razors, creams, and how women only had to rely on the wonders of science to fix their hirsute problems.\footnote{Herzig, “Removing Roots,” 733.}

Although some men received x-ray hair removal treatment, women made up the primary client base of the X ray hair removal industry. This particular treatment appealed to women because it was far cheaper than electrolysis, and it was also painless and permanent.\footnote{Herzig, “Removing Roots,” 729-733.} X-ray salons attracted a range of non-English speaking immigrant women to other working and middle class women because they charged between five and thirty dollars.\footnote{Ibid., 740.} Considering that a Gillette razor cost five dollars, this price alone would have been appealing to women, especially because the x-ray also promised permanent removal. Many women still avoided using razors despite their widespread availability probably because they symbolized masculinity, and because the first safety razors would have been uncomfortable.

Perhaps the x-ray connoted femininity because of the passive nature
required of the patient while razors required active self-labor. Men rarely participated in irradiation even though clean-shaven faces epitomized masculinity in the early twentieth century. King Gillette, a hyper-masculine businessman possessing a burly nature, likened razors to tools, while x-ray machines evoked imagery of elegance and ease. This claim parallels the differences between the consumer and the patient. Actively shaving required economic privileges including wages to spend freely, as well as unrestricted freedom to participate in the consumer market, while the passive patient was pathologized and perceived to need healing. The next section will examine hair removal as a consumer-based industry.

**Gendering Razors**

While x-ray and electrolysis treatments, methods associated with science and medicine, continued to target female facial hair, the early twentieth century began a pattern of what historian Christine Hope terms an “assault” on other sites of female body hair. While science remained focused on facial hair, the underarm became the target for Gillette in 1915, and legs subsequently began to center hair removal advertisements in the 1920s within a plethora of other depilatory brands. Magazines such as *Harper's Bazaar*, *McCalls*, and *The Delineator* advertised razors and other products like Neet (a cream that dissolved the hair when applied) to mostly young middle class white women. Nevertheless, the mass market also made cosmetics more affordable to young female consumers from different class backgrounds.

This section will primarily focus on the advent of the female razor and the explicit gendering of hair removal rhetoric in advertisements. By examining a sample of these advertisements, this essay will ultimately reveal how mass-market hair removal advertisements matched femininity and attractiveness to a hairless body.

The history of the razor radically altered both female and male body hair removal. In 1915 Gillette produced the first female-specific razor under the title Milady Décolleté, which specifically targeted the underarm. Previous to 1915, Gillette dominated the shaving market for men. Throughout the nineteenth century, barbers would use a straight razor to remove the hair from male faces. In 1901, Gillette invented the first safety razor, which remarkably altered the culture of shaving as more men could shave their hair in their own homes. The invention of the safety razor led Gillette to expand his consumer base to women. If the straight razor had continued as only option, there likely would be no market for a woman’s razor because straight razors would not be affective on women’s bodies. The history of the

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23. Peiss, Hope in a Jar, 97.
24. McKibben, Cutting Edge, 16.
razor exemplifies a key way in which the act of shaving and the razor itself became gendered.

Razors and the act of shaving implicated masculinity. Male advertisements conveyed ‘manly’ images and employed rhetoric associated with power and simplicity. Figure 2 displays Navy men shaving while also performing their military duties. The ad evokes convenience, efficiency and shaving as an act that can be done in battle if necessary. Another male-targeted ad refers to the imagery of “big, strong-limbed, supermen who are fighting to save Freedom.” The clean-shaven perform acts of heroism in contrast to the “arrogant” and by default dirty or hairy enemy.26

While male shaving ads depicted men as both the aggressors and the defenders of freedom, women remained objects of beauty and elegance. Milady Décolleté salesmen were instructed to never mention shaving, but rather they instructed women to “smooth.”27 This indicates an explicit delineation: men (actively) shaved, while women (passively) smoothed. Moreover, advertisements focused on men’s faces while the female advertising focused on any visible hair below the head on the body, namely the underarms and legs. Gillette never instructed women to use the Milady Décolleté to smooth

27. Adams, King C. Gillette, 92.
their faces. Shaving facial hair symbolized a ritual of masculinity; therefore creating advertisements depicting women with a razor near their face would have been confusing and anti-feminine. By assigning clear divisions of gendered rhetoric to the act of shaving, Gillette successfully invented different definitions of the same practice, and for the product as well.

For men, Gillette not only focused on the valor of soldiers, but also on violent wartime rhetoric. For example, in Figure 3, a young officer writes that the razor will “outlast the war if it is not blown to pieces.”28 This ad displays rifles in the background, and the razor itself resembles a robust instrument. Another advertisement calls on the Navy and that “on a modern battleship,

men shave wherever they happen to be.” Male razors came to symbolize patriotism and heroism. On the other hand, Figure 5 for the Milady Décolleté contains a dainty font and instructs the consumer that good grooming signifies a white and smooth underarm.²⁹ For women, the razor symbolizes beauty, refinement, and a solution to the unfortunate parts of their bodies.

Before Gillette’s foray into the female market, most women used other depilatories such as creams, pumice stones, and waxes, or removed their hair rarely, if at all.³⁰ Before 1915 a female razor did not serve any practical function because of the availability of other depilatories. By including a female consumer base, Gillette created a need for women to shave. Gillette marketed the razor as a “safe and sanitary” product, and the ads focused on the social disadvantages of females having underarm hair. This abstract promise of social mobility pressured women to conceal her body hair if she wanted to be accepted in any public setting. One 1915 advertisement referred to underarm hair as an “embarrassing personal problem.”³¹ Associating body hair with a physical flaw and an embarrassment aided in establishing a new cultural norm of the hairless body as a social necessity.

³⁰. Hope, “Caucasian Female Body Hair and American Culture,” 93.
Figure 4 stresses the importance of fashion. This ad features a young woman seductively revealing her ‘fashionable’ smoothed underarm, while Figure 5 depicts a delicate gift box concealing the “welcomed” gift of the razor and advertises the elegant color options to choose from such as French Ivory and Gold. The new women’s razor appeared elegant, simple, and most of all feminine. These ads explicitly connected notions of femininity to hairlessness and related the razor as an accessory necessary to any woman’s collection of toiletries. By creating a female razor, Gillette transformed a previously masculine device into a unisex object. However, Gillette also constructed a way to emphasize a polemic gender binary. The advertisements themselves reveal the ways in which products became gendered despite their identical function. Gillette created two different ways to view the practice of shaving as well as two different ways to view the razor.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, advertising marketed products for female leg hair removal. Hope notes that legs could be interpreted as non-existent and therefore unimportant before 1920 because hemlines hid them. After 1920 legs made up the bulk of hair removal advertising as the flapper-style became popular, and when hemlines rose again after 1940, advertising followed suit.³³ By the 1930s one advice author went as far as to say that any hair on a woman’s body not on the head should be considered excessive and that any woman faced with an excess of body hair should “shun social intercourse altogether.”³⁴ Advertising portrayed female body hair as a blemish that should be concealed by any means necessary when in public. Although different from a diagnosis of hypertrichosis, ‘superfluous’ body hair continued to exist as a defective secondary trait, a stigmatized cosmetic blem-

³³ Hope, “Caucasian Female Body Hair and American Culture,” 95.
ish that necessitated eradication.

Conclusion

The obsession to maintain the ideal of hairlessness can be seen in the dangerous if not lethal x-ray industry and the abundance of marketing strategies used by companies like Gillette. X-ray advertisements relied on the rhetoric of science, while Gillette employed rhetoric evoking femininity and social mobility. Each strategy pressured and convinced women that hair removal was a feminine and social imperative. Some physicians and advice authors even argued that it was natural for women to be hairless and that the reason men did not have to worry about their own body hair was because women’s “personal beauty has a much higher premium than with men.”

This assertion suggests that men did not face the pressures to appear attractive as much as women did at the time, or rather that appearing attractive did not require as much personal grooming. However, beauty did not serve as the only reason for female hair removal advocacy, as some claimed that hairless women showed signs of good health. For example the same author stated that excessive hairiness often related to poor teeth. Although the medical community devoted less attention to treating excessive hairiness as a disease, the notion that body hair represented poor health still existed. This author in particular employed both hygienic and commercial arguments for hair removal, and this duality created an imperative for women to rid themselves of excess hair.

Some women subjected themselves to hair removal by any means necessary. As mentioned above, most of the women who attended x-ray salons only sought removal for their unwanted facial hair, although some cases reported women removing hair from their legs, arms, backs, chests, necks and buttocks. One case resulted in “painful ulcerations of the anterior and posterior surfaces of both thighs that she would be awakened screaming in the middle of the night.”

These cases of total excess body hair removal mostly occurred in the 1920s, which coincided with the surge in beauty advertisements instructing women to remove their more intimate body hair. The strong rhetoric prevalent in feminine hair removal advertising with the propagandic nature of advice manuals influenced women to trust the abstract promises of scientific guarantees in x-ray salons. Even though physicians overwhelmingly knew of the x-ray’s dangers after 1915, some women still felt that removing their hair was worth the risk. These women chose to be patients over the role of consumer for temporary hair removal products despite their increasing availability. The role the x-ray played in the history of hair removal epitomizes the example of the most extreme instance in which commercialization and science intersect, and it reveals the power of

35. Niemoeller, Superfluous Hair, 11.
industry and science in reinforcing beauty. The rhetoric used in x-ray and mass-market advertising suggests a socially constructed notion of femininity too powerful to be overcome.

One advice author dedicated an entire book to the topic of superfluous hair removal in 1938. A.F. Niemoeller, a mysterious man that I have had a difficult time uncovering information about, wrote a book deeming excessive hairiness a very important issue that physicians and women should not overlook. His argument combines a reliance on scientific development and knowledge about body hair and why we grow it, as well as a helpful guide for women to remain beautiful and hairless without subjecting their bodies to hazardous methods of removal. On one hand he provides information on dangerous forms of treatment that women should avoid such as poisonous depilatories or under-qualified X-ray and electrolysis technicians. On the other hand, Niemoeller still emphasized the duty of women to conceal their body hair from the public eye. He repeatedly mentions fashions including “halterneck playsuits, and the scanty bathing costumes of only a tight little panty and a brief brassiere” to cite these changes as the fundamental reason that hair removal’s significance reached a climax. These detailed and conservative descriptions indicate the female body’s ever increasing presence as a symbol of sexuality. Although he followed these fetishized descriptions of women with discussions about safe methods of hair removal, his argument emphasizes the preservation of sexuality. Niemoeller stressed the notion that beauty represents women’s greatest achievement, something that every woman needed to strive for.

However, this singular example of advice literature does not negate the significance of women’s voices in shaping this ideal of femininity and beauty. Networks of grassroots entrepreneurial women and homemade remedies established in the nineteenth century certainly influenced mass industry in the twentieth century as they created communal support and a market of women that wanted to buy products in order to feel more beautiful. Some women also argued for hair removal out of practicality. One advice author wrote “hair in the armpits makes freedom from odor more difficult,” and she continued to instruct women to remove it only once every two weeks. This author indicates that many women probably did not obsess over their body hair in ways that advertisements and male written advice literature advocated they should. On the other hand, this same female author also argues that women needed to appear natural, while also spending at least an hour a week on grooming. Therefore she reveals contradictions in natural and constructed beauty. Women needed to constantly work in order to appear natural, which reflects a true double standard women strive for.

The pressure to keep body hair hidden was greater for women than for men because of its symbolic threat to femininity. Male facial hair did not embody deviance in their sex and therefore the incentive to permanently remove it was not as great. Moreover, the evidence that both science and industry spent resources to terminate excess hair on the female body reveals the perceived threat body hair posed to femininity in American culture. Some physicians and scientists ignored real dangers of skin deformations and cancer in order to eradicate the sight of female body hair. Both scientists and business profited from the constructed mass hysteria over unsightly hair. Both science and industry promoted an ideal of the female body as white, hairless, smooth, and yet somehow natural. For these reasons, the history of female body hair needs to be considered when studying the histories of the relationship of science and medicine to the human body, as well as when studying the history of American capitalism.
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Contesting Nationhood: An Examination of Hong Kong’s 2014 Protest Movement

JOSHUA TAN

Hong Kong almost exists as a nation, considering Benedict Anderson’s definition of a nation as an imagined political community that is limited and sovereign.¹ Imaginings of nationhood within the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are limited to “Hong-Kongers” who reside within the flourishing metropolis of China’s southeastern coast. Likewise, their “deep, horizontal comradeship” of community is not extended to their co-ethnics in the mainland, and national identification, expressed through various national activist movements, clearly delimits their counterparts on the mainland as an outside group.²

Despite the significant degree of autonomy it exercises within the larger Chinese nation, Hong Kong is not sovereign. British colonial authorities returned Hong Kong to the PRC in July 1997, following the Chinese government’s declaration that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.”³ Since the handover, Hong Kong has been administered as a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic. Socio-economic structures set in place by the British regime were preserved by special government concessions, minimizing disruption in Hong Kong’s transitory phase. While the PRC claims legal sovereignty over Hong Kong, the government has consistently espoused its “basic policy of ‘one country, two systems,’ [and] ‘Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong.’”⁴

Inherited from the British and strengthened in the face of impending Chinese encroachment, the existence of two separate systems has sustained the imagined community of Hong Kong. Tension between state sovereignty and Hong Kong’s imagined community—prevalent and growing in the post-British period—has also manifested itself through the history of protests

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2. Ibid., 6.
against the Chinese central government and its subordinate SAR authorities. Recently, popular protests rallying for the liberty of Hong Kong to elect its own Chief executive—presumably one that would not toe the line drawn by central authorities in Beijing—drew this conflict to international scrutiny. This movement for greater autonomy within China—although misrepresented in some sources as independence—is a constant feature of Hong Kong’s political activism, which is significant given its current antagonisms with the mainland. Hong Kong has never espoused claims to nationhood through secession; its position as part of the Chinese nation is firmly established, albeit with a separate national identity. Yet the history of conflict and protest against the mainland highlights unresolved tensions between national identity and a more exclusive imagined community, an imagined community founded upon extensive economic, political, and cultural developments from the British period. Official nationalism scripted by the Chinese central government has proven largely incompatible with the spontaneously arising national sentiment of Hong Kong’s protesters.

Literature Review

Existing scholarship on Hong Kong’s identity and its relationship with the larger Chinese nation in the post-British period has focused on how systems constructed prior to the Chinese handover have created very different conceptions of nationhood and nationality. Scholars have analyzed at length how Hong Kong’s British colonial legacy and development, which emerged parallel to China’s socialist construction under the Communist party, installed a collective identity independent of modern Chinese nationalism. These divergent developments formed the basis of tension with mainstream Chinese national narratives when Hong Kong was absorbed back into the PRC in 1997.

In Chou Kwok Ping’s study of national identity in the SARs of Hong Kong and Macao, he argues that receptivity to “state-defined national identities,” and participation in a larger national identity is contingent on existing conditions within a particular territory. Since the 1960s, cultural formations have shaped Hong Kong’s identity. It emerged at “the center of distinct film traditions,” and as a regional media exporter with great success. This national consciousness was imperative in “framing the histories, stories, and national or regional distinction” of Hong Kong, framing a particular image of a Hong Kong resident. Accompanied by the city’s role as a “regional hub of trade and communication, as well as a magnet of foreign direct investment and talents,” Hong Kong residents perceived their model as superior,

creating a clearly defined political, social, and legal culture apart from the mainland. Chou’s analysis focuses on Hong Kong’s role as a financial and cultural capital in its own right, explaining how “strong territorial centers tend to resist the encroachment of state power,” as with Hong Kong’s struggle with the mainland.

Matthews, Ma, and Lui’s comprehensive review of Hong Kong’s changing national identity further expounds on national symbols with which Hong Kong identifies. Their study of the post-handover period is significant in viewing national symbols, which would potentially bridge the differences between the PRC and Hong Kong, through a shared cultural history. By analyzing people’s feelings towards Chinese icons like the Great Wall of China, compared to their feelings of modern symbols of the PRC like the People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese national flag, and the national anthem, they found a diverse range of responses that corresponded to their respondent’s demography. Notably, nativist Hong Kong residents only identified with ancient symbols like the Great Wall, while their receptivity to modern Chinese icons was much more muted. This theme of selective Chinese identification is further emphasized in Shan Lau Chui’s essay on Chinese education in Hong Kong. Shan finds that the British actually employed Chinese education to legitimize its rule and to assuage claims of cultural dissolution. Consequently, Hong Kong residents maintained their affinity with classical China and its historical richness, while disassociating all ties with the new regime that inherited the mainland.

Michael Billig’s study “Remembering Banal Nationalism,” discusses how “national identity in established nations is remembered because it is embedded in routines of life, which constantly remind or ‘flag’ nationhood.” He cites the national flag as one of many national symbols that serve as “reminders of nationhood” to a citizenry. States use symbols to reinforce a particular view of nationhood, and citizens’ national identification can be determined by what symbols they identify with. Matthews, Ma, and Lui’s analysis of Hong Kong’s national icons can be viewed within this framework, especially because the national symbols they discuss represent similarities and differences between Hong Kong and the mainland. Some symbols are shared, while many others are mutually exclusive; their presence is repre-

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7. Chou, “Building national identity in Hong Kong and Macao,” 76.
8. Ibid., 76.
13. Ibid., 38.
sentative of a particular national identification. To align with the SAR flag or
the national flag of the PRC? The revered Great Wall of China or Beijing’s
Great Hall of the People? These are all debates prevalent in Hong Kong’s
society. Consequently, their analysis reveal a complexity in Hong Kong’s
national identity, a concurrent acceptance and rejection of specific aspects
of the Chinese nation-aligning with the greatness of Chinese antiquity but
simultaneously antipathetic towards the PRC as a modern nation state.

Malte Kaeding’s study on identity formation in Hong Kong and Taiwan
further elaborates on this duality, conceiving of Hong Kong a “Chineseness-
plus.” He recounts how Hong Kong is rooted in China through its shared
traditions, culture, and ethnicity. Yet, Hong Kong’s social culture is based
upon “Western” values like press freedom, freedoms of speech, and a global
capitalist culture that contributes to Hong Kong’s notions of global citi-
zenry. Therefore, the local cultural identity of Hong Kong and its actively
independent civic elements “coexist with an abstract identification with a
historic and cultural vision of the Chinese nation and Chinese identity.”
This identity is clearly at odds with Beijing’s definition of Chinese culture,
a “hybrid of Communist state culture and a perceived monolithic national
culture,” which tolerates but purportedly stifles Hong Kong’s democratic-
leaning forces.

Considering this notion of a “state-sanctioned nationalism,” it is useful to
apply Benedict Anderson’s analysis of “Official Nationalism and Imperial-
ism.” Originally formulated to understand Europe’s absolutist dynastic poli-
ties, Anderson’s work also provides a framework to view the current Hong
Kong-China predicament. “Official nationalism,” which he refers to as a
“willed merger of nation and dynastic empire,” understands how nations
were created in response to and despite other national movements within
the territories of empires. Anderson argues that the rise of official nation-
alisms is due to the aristocracy’s threat of “exclusion from, or marginaliza-
tion in, popular imagined communities.” Therefore, an official narrative
of nationhood is necessary to ensure that popular movements which came
before them would not alienate the ruling classes. Kaeding’s discussion
of the Chinese central government’s definition of identification with the
Chinese state can therefore be focused on such official, top-down, national-
ism. As shown through recent protests, significant tensions emerge when
spontaneously emergent alternatives confront the government’s official,

14. Malt Kaeding, “Identity Formation in Taiwan and Hong Kong – How Much Difference,
15. Ibid., 4.
16. Ibid., 10.
17. Ibid., 10.
18. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 86.
19. Ibid., 86.
21. Ibid., 110.
scripted definitions of nationhood.

My study aims to analyze Hong Kong’s recent protest movement as a contest between two antagonistic versions of nationalism: a top-down, state sanctioned model pitted against the nativist Hong Kong alternative. In analyzing the central government’s response to the protests alongside analysis of how protestors in Hong Kong have rallied around localized icons and symbols to galvanize support for their cause, I will apply Anderson’s notion of official nationalism. Additionally, I will peruse media coverage of the protest movements, both in China and in the Western press, to identify points of contention between the Hong Kong protestors and authorities in a contemporary context. Can Hong Kong remain within China under “one country, two systems” without participating in its imagined community? What are the implications of autonomy within the nation, and how should sovereignty be exercised in this context? Finally, I ask, why autonomy and not independence?

National Day on the Nation’s Periphery

October First is celebrated in the PRC as National Day, the anniversary of its declaration of independence from decades of subjugation and imperialist domination. The flag raising ceremony conducted nationwide is a ritual undertaken with pride and with a sense of achievement at the nation’s manifold accomplishments. However, this year, the official proceedings taking place at Hong Kong’s Golden Bauhinia Square projected a palpable unease. The presence of large numbers of protestors who “silently turned their backs to the flag and raised their arms in crosses as the Chinese flag and the flag of Hong Kong were raised,” significantly altered the otherwise ceremonious, patriotic moment. Amidst the pomp and circumstance, they ensured that dissent and protest against the government did not go unnoticed.22

In an interview with CNN, student pro-democracy leader Joshua Wong said the purpose of this public act of defiance was to

express our dissatisfaction toward the government, to reflect mistrust towards the central Chinese government, and to object to the National People’s Congress decision (of allowing only candidates approved by a nominating committee to run for the position of Hong-Kong’s chief executive),23

Separately, Wong also recounted to The New York Times his intense frustration and resentment of the Chinese national anthem, which was forged in

23. Ibid.
the context of China’s revolutionary war but now symbolizes an oppressive, overbearing regime. He said, “When I heard the national anthem starting to play, I certainly did not feel moved so much as angry… when it tells you ‘Arise! All those who refuse to be slaves!’ – how is our treatment today any different from the slaves?”

The national flag is a “symbol of modern statehood;” its ubiquity in society serves as a reminder of this statehood and constantly reinforces the presence of nationhood. These “passionately waved flags”- flags that are revered and saluted ceremoniously- are symbols of the “sacred character of the nation” in its displays of national unity and social cohesion. Michael Billig illustrates the relationship between the flag and nationhood: the majority of individuals who identify with the nation salute the flag and fully participate in this ritual, whereas in communities where national identification is more muted, “the ceremony can be somewhat perfunctory” with less emotional outpouring. For Wong and the student protestors at the ceremony, the flag and national anthem were principally symbols of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. Therefore, their refusal to participate in the ritual revealed an unwillingness to be a part of the Chinese nation and a rejection of these symbols of nationhood. Theirs was not a banal nationalism inculcated by state mechanisms, but rather a deliberate, conscious effort to extract themselves from the national mainstream. In seeking to identify outside of China’s national consciousness, student protestors withheld consent from the imposition of the flag-raising ceremony and immediately charged the ordinarily ritualistic ceremony with passionate dissidence. This firm conviction in Hong Kong’s independent identity and rejection of the mainland and its symbols of nationhood featured prominently in the mass protests leading up to national day of 2014.

Hong Kong’s Imagined Community

This overt rejection of the PRC’s national flag exemplifies Hong Kong’s turbulent relationship with the new Chinese regime since its inception in 1949. In discussing the formation of Hong Kong’s collective identity, Chinese author Lynn Pan conceptualizes Hong Kong as a “classic immigrant city.” It was founded upon the droves of immigrants fleeing the Communist regime, who provided the labor and industrial expertise necessary for economic progress. With Hong Kong’s wealth of opportunity, free-market capitalism, and thriving cultural scene, this southern metropolis consequently developed

26. Ibid., 50.
27. Ibid., 50.
itself antithetically to the PRC. Additionally, Hong Kongers have internalized a sense of intellectual sophistication, political liberalism and economic success, claiming to be set apart from the mainland as the “Hollywood of the Greater Chinese world,” the “largest node of the Greater Chinese network” where overseas Chinese look to “satisfy their cultural tastes.”

While this identity was consolidated largely from the 1960s to the turn of the 21st century, in a period of economic and cultural flourishing alongside China’s socialist development, Hong Kong’s younger generation still preserves this distinct Hong Kong identity. Memories of political persecution under the Communist regime are preserved through familial ties, the importance of which cannot be overstated as “the influence from the family overshadows that of the school in shaping students conception of national identity.” Therefore, many of the youth born after the handover in 1997 and educated under the Chinese system, have not become the “patriotic Chinese citizens” that the government would have envisioned. Instead, this new generation of Hong Kongers- like Joshua Wong and other student activists- have continued to join the protest against the central government and its perceived encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy. As one protestor recounted, “we are an international city. We have a younger generation who have been taught about civil rights, political rights,” compared to a Chinese political system that is “more or less like North Korea.” The younger generation of Hong Kong residents are no strangers to political activism. In September 2012, they managed to rally 120,000 protestors, including 13 hunger strikers, to occupy the Hong Kong government headquarters and compel a withdrawal of a proposed mandatory “national education” curriculum. Clearly, these Chinese citizens would only identify with the Chinese nation in a legalistic sense- through their Hong Kong SAR passport- while identifying principally as Hong Kongers when discussing notions of patriotism or “a sense of belonging and responsibility towards a group.”

The Protests

Hong Kong’s protest culture can be focused on as one of many social features that differentiate it from the mainland. Public protests are protected

29. Ibid., 372.
30. Ibid., 369.
35. Yim, “Civic Education in Hong Kong,” 37.
by the basic law, which allows for “a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs” for 50 years, with additional concessions for Hong Kong’s independent legal system, freedom of assembly and speech. Unsurprisingly, Hong Kong’s history of activism, especially since 1997, is intimately linked to grievances with the central government and “the perception that the Hong Kong way of life is under threat.” These demonstrations, like the annual 1 July mass demonstrations for universal suffrage, “marked a strong rejection of government attitudes that were associated with mainland Chinese politics, and also functioned as a reassurance of the Hong Kong identity.” Such political activism confirmed “the civic Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis the Chinese understanding of national identity,” and gradually became part of Hong Kong’s collective memory, a source of pride and a resource for the long-term cultivation of local identification for Hong Kongers. That these protests are almost always in opposition to central government policies further demonstrates how Hong Kong’s separate, imagined community is firmly grounded in Hong Kong’s own version of Chinese nationalism. In this regard, Beijing’s claims about Hong Kong are not entirely inaccurate. Hong Kong hosts a “repository of opposition to the regime in Peking, a place where China’s fugitive student leaders have become popular heroes” and where activists in exile voice their demands for democracy. They seek an independent leadership, a “government that truly represents the Hong Kong people’s interests and concerns,” rather than colluding with Beijing and private actors for economic benefit.

Given this delicate political balance, Hong Kong’s chief executive is a particularly sensitive office that needs to balance the policies of the central government with the increasingly divergent views of Hong Kong’s public. Hong Kong welcomed the PRC’s landmark decision to allow for direct elections after 2017 as a sign of greater relaxation of controls. Yet, an August ruling that a presumably pro-Beijing committee will screen electoral candidates stifled hopes for a truly independent candidate unshackled from the party’s reigns. This ruling precipitated an outpouring of student protest, beginning with class boycotts and growing into city-wide demonstrations in opposition to the Chinese central government. An existing “Occupy Central” movement, led by Hong Kong University academic Benny Tai, quickly endorsed the student protests and came together in the “largest occupation of Civic Square” and a number of other locations in Hong Kong. Professor Tai

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38. Ibid., 9.
40. Pan, Sons of the Yellow Emperor, 372.
41. Mak, “Why Nationalism and Hong Kong Identity Matter in Hong Kong’s Protests.”
planned for a sit-in on China’s national day to “occupy” Hong Kong’s downtown Central district if the government did not give Hong Kongers full universal suffrage. However, the spontaneity of the student movement and its large following provided a welcome source of support that triggered his initiative a few days before it was intended. As Tai recounted in an interview with the Foreign Policy magazine, student protestors “shared the same goals and methods; it was impossible for Occupy Central not to support the students.” “Occupy Central” quickly assumed an inter-generational face, spearheaded by its new vanguard, student groups banding together to form a formidable force of dissent.

**China’s “Official Nationalism”**

In an editorial on the eve of China’s national day, the New York Times’ Louisa Lim expressed support for Hong Kong’s claims for autonomy. She wrote, “such an assertion of a separate and distinct identity is anathema to President Xi, whose xenophobic nationalism can accept only one state-approved version of what it means to be Chinese.” Lim’s indictment of this narrowly construed definition of Chinese identity contrasted the Chinese government’s assertion of their legal rights and jurisdiction over Hong Kong and how “one country” necessarily comes before “two systems.”

Responding to the protests, Chinese state-newspaper Xinhua news also published an editorial on China’s national day. They described the protests as disruptive to the social stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and the Chinese people. Projecting the views of the central government’s state council, this editorial emphasized that “Occupy Central” was the work of minority extremists, who were employing lawless methods in order to achieve their goals incited by overseas supporters in the West. Therefore, the Chinese government’s refusal to acquiesce to the student’s demands was a way of maintaining commitment to national stability, prosperity, and sovereignty. The column concluded with a reminder that Hong Kong constituted a part of China and that Hong Kongers had to “love the country while loving Hong Kong” to achieve a prosperous and successful future.

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44. Tsoi, “Benny Tai: Hong Kong Protests Beyond What I Imagined.”
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
Claims that Hong Kong’s prosperity is completely contingent on its relationship with China have been widespread, given Hong Kong’s economic dependency on the mainland. Many of the most vocal protestors against mainland Chinese political encroachment have been young, unemployed workers who perceive the mainland as a source of economic rivalry and believe that the PRC have unjustifiably taken their jobs. The protests have also seen fiercely competitive rhetoric coming to the fore, for example, popular notions like “China [is] better able to perform some of the services that Hong Kong has performed, and can do them for less.” In this context, it is notable that many of Hong Kong’s prominent business leaders have withheld overt support for the protests, acknowledging its adverse effects on the economy. As academic Jacques DeLisle cites, the success of Hong Kong’s capitalism is contingent on its preservation of the rule of law and stability. Echoes of the central government’s rhetoric are heard, and the economic progress that has characterized Hong Kong’s rapid development is, now more than ever, intimately linked with its ability to form a conciliatory relationship with Beijing.

Nonetheless, efforts by the central government to inculcate patriotism, national education, and Chinese identity are predicated on an assumption that “identification with the Chinese nation [is] equal to identification with the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party.” Patriotism is consequently defined by allegiance to the party and the state, through a blend of “Communist state culture and a perceived monolithic national culture.” Additionally, this definition of nationalism holds a distinctly anti-Western imperialist element, undoubtedly influenced by its legacy of subordination and isolation by the West. Xinhua news lauded the views of British academic John Ross, in indicting the Western media for superficially criticizing China’s policies in Hong Kong, when they were undisputedly grounded in legality. Since the Chinese inherited the “basic law” from the British, which provided no illusions of democratic governance, the central government was not liable to accede to the protestors demands. The western media was therefore chastised for opportunistically denouncing the Chinese government’s policies when it had remained silent the entire colonial period.

This “official” definition of being part of the Chinese nation has generated

50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
53. Ibid., 10.
much tension between the two parties in conflict. In Benedict Anderson’s discussion of “official nationalisms,” he cites this phenomenon as a reactionary response by groups in power, “threatened with exclusion from, or marginalization in popular imagined communities.” In this case, the central government and its subsidiary Hong Kong authorities are the dominant group, excluded from the popular imagined community that the mass of Hong Kong protestors participate in.

However, the Chinese governing elite is not faced with any impending threat, given that the majority of its constituents are relatively satisfied with its governance. The uniqueness of Hong Kong’s status as a Special Administrative Region renders its imagined community a minority within a much larger Chinese nation that the central government presides over. Consequently, Hong Kong’s claims against the government do not resound throughout the larger nation and are oftentimes even met with oblivion and ridicule in the mainland.

A comprehensive survey of citizen satisfaction with government performance in six Asian countries ranked China very commendably, on par with Japan and much better than India. The study cited “individual-level satisfaction with public issues, such as healthcare and education,” alongside steady economic growth as factors which contributed to this response. While these results are certainly not reflective of every subcategory of China’s citizens, the findings are consistent with the sentiment observed in mainland Chinese attitudes toward the protests. There has even been steady support within the mainland for Beijing’s policies toward the protests and a popular disdain for Hong Kong’s rallies for democracy and autonomy from the PRC. News reports emerging from neighboring Shenzhen province in China revealed popular indifference to the protests in Hong Kong, dismissing the student protestors and their demands as naïve. For the general public, China’s “burgeoning middle class” is more preoccupied with “consumerism’s creature comforts,” perhaps an endorsement of the central party’s priorities: prosperity and stability.

Regardless, the central government is continually active in scripting an official nationalism, with its emphasis on national unity and economic prosperity. Since 1997, Beijing has advocated the policy of using “national education to cultivate a sense of belonging to Chinese history and culture,”

55. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 110.
56. Ibid., 101.
58. Ibid, 72
60. Ibid.
through rituals such as the “national anthem and national flag to cultivate allegiance to China” and increased civic and patriotic education.61 Ironically, due to perceived stifling of Hong Kong’s autonomy and its local identity, this “new Chinese moral and national education curriculum” prompted student activists like Joshua Wong to oppose this PRC-imposed version of nationalism.62 The increasing competition between these differing ideas of nationhood have only fueled tensions and compelled people to express their protests publicly.

Hong Kong’s Alternative

Largely, the voices of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement were broadcast and publicized by Western media, drawing attention to the Chinese government’s allegedly repressive policies. International news agencies were almost unanimous in endorsing “Occupy Central” and its pro-democracy demands. At the same time, this outpouring of Western media support has inadvertently lent credence to the CCP’s claims that protestors were influenced by Western agencies acting to undermine Chinese sovereignty. Undeniably, Hong Kong relishes its strong financial, cultural, and political ties to the West. The culture of protest, “press freedom and freedom of speech,” are all factors that seek to “Westernize” Hong Kong and its residents, who seek to align themselves with Western values and differentiates them from the mainland.63 Furthermore, Hong Kong’s role as a regional economic and cultural capital has been grounded in “global capitalist culture,” which has become a “protector of local identity against national intervention from the mainland Chinese side.”64

While Hong Kong’s localized identity rejects the canon of newer icons invented by the Communist party to characterize “New China,” it concurrently embraces a cultural tradition deeply connected with the mainland, ironically one that it perceives the Communist party as destroying.65 Hong Kong has claims on Chinese tradition; its Cantonese language is arguably much closer to its ancient predecessor, and its population is fiercely protective of this cultural inheritance.66 The Communist party’s state-defined version of Chinese-ness is therefore unacceptable to these custodians of Chinese culture. In preserving this role, Hong Kong must be content to remain part of the PRC, at least to some extent. Claims for independence would be contradictory to its affinity with the ancestral homeland, and this role might be best served by maintaining some connection to the Chinese nation.

As the protests have shown, however, there is little love for their counterparts on the mainland. In fact, beyond its claims for democracy and suffrage, the protests

64. Ibid., 4.
65. Ibid., 11.
have had an unambiguously anti-mainland element. Recent developments in Hong Kong have seen a significant upsurge in “racism, nativism, and xenophobia” towards Mainland Chinese tourists, students, and new immigrants, forming a depressing backdrop to the political grievances it has against the PRC government. As such, the Chinese government’s attempts to prioritize national unity have been clearly rejected in the recent protests. Fears of becoming “just another Chinese city” are rampant in popular literature, becoming a rallying point against not just the Chinese government but also their fellow Chinese citizens from the mainland. With these social tensions underlying the fragile political balance, Hong Kong’s protestors surged to the fore in defense of their exceptionalism. Their protest was against the central government’s notion of “one Chinese family” with a stable and prosperous rise together. It underlines a deeply held belief that Hong Kong would have to preserve its autonomy and independence in order to maintain its unique identity and way of life. It is bitterly ironic that the “one country, two systems” was intended to facilitate Hong Kong’s return to the PRC. Presently, this system’s presence has only served to amplify the uncertainty and tension in Hong Kong’s differences from the rest of the nation.

Another Rejection of “Flagging”

Amidst the ongoing “Occupy Central” protests, Hong Kong’s Lee Kau Yan Memorial School came into the media spotlight for its controversial decision to cancel the school’s flag-raising ceremony. According to school Principal Jonathan Lai who sanctioned the vote, “the main purpose [of the] flag-raising ceremony is to let the students revisit the concept of national identity.” In a show of solidarity with their counterparts at the protest sites, high school students questioned the morality of participating in such a ritual at a moment when the central government was perceived as oppressing and stifling the voices of Hong Kong’s bravest advocates. Eventually, the students were permitted to vote on this issue; they decided against undertaking the ceremony that week. With the grievances of the protestors still unresolved and Hong Kong’s collective identity and pride at a climax, singing the national anthem seemed unacceptable to those students. It is still uncertain at present if the central government will censure the school, as schools are mandated to hold national flag-raising ceremonies six times yearly during

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67. Mak, “Why Nationalism and Hong Kong Identity Matter.”
68. Ibid.
important events. However, the actions and attitudes of the louder voices against the central government suggest that local sentiment is only growing farther from where official policy stands.

An Inevitable Integration?

The central government’s proposition to Hong Kong has always been the participation in a “new national state” and opportunities to engage in a “new nationalized discourse to their own advantages,” especially in the social and economic realms. In a recent People’s Daily editorial entitled “Apart from economic losses, what else has Hong Kong lost?” the central government ridiculed Hong Kong’s protestors for acting in a way which was deeply unprofitable and counterproductive to their interests. The article cited the lawlessness, lack of social cohesion, and the oppressive actions of an activist minority against a largely conciliatory majority as problems that the recent protest movements inflicted on Hong Kong. This view therefore deemed the protest movement entirely unjustified, especially given the ample opportunities for a prosperous rise and even appropriate constitutional reform under Chinese legality.

It is unclear how the Hong Kong populace has received these overtures. Numbers at protest sites have been dwindling, evidence of popular recognition of the need to return to normalcy and the importance of other, less contentious commitments. Yet, the remaining protestors have been ardent in their persistence for reform. Some of the most direct confrontations between protestors and police ensued as the protest sites were eventually cleared under government mandate.

Epilogue

Have the “silent-majority” of Hong Kong’s populace really acquiesced to the central government’s rhetoric of stability and unity in “one China”? Or have they simply pent-up their frustrations and deferred them for the next protest movement, whenever that might be? Mainland immigrants still enter Hong Kong in increasing numbers, even as Hong Kong experiences a growing economic integration and dependence on markets in the mainland. Additionally, continued government-sponsored national education in Hong Kong’s public schools demonstrates an increasing exercise of central government authority on its SAR. Concurrently, however, numerous studies

74. Ibid.
and surveys and especially the recent protests suggest that Hong Kong residents reject these attempts at national unity and instead identify principally as Hong Kongers. Despite all these encroachments, they have sustained a unique collective identity. The central government is undoubtedly hopeful that inculcation and practice of banal nationalism would draw the identities of young Hong Kongers closer to the mainland, yet recent evidence has shown that these overtures have only exacerbated tensions and evoked a defensive, reactionary movement in the Hong Kong collective. This response was witnessed through the actions of students at the aforementioned public school and the rising prominence of numerous student activist groups. The notion that “it is far easier to love the nation as an abstract entity than it is to love the state, the ruling body that claims to be the nation but that may be illegitimate in many people’s eyes,” illuminates the unique features of Hong Kong’s turbulent relationship with its central government. 76 Hong Kongers are Chinese, but only in their particular definition that includes the cultural and historical aspects but excludes the modern political and military aspects of the nation state. 77 This struggle to navigate their relationship with the central government and the Chinese Communist Party, which obviously claims a more puritanical version of what it means to be Chinese, will undoubtedly be a protracted one. Nonetheless, its outcome must ultimately be determined by interactions between state actors and the Hong Kong people, hopefully in the formation of a Chinese identity broad enough to accommodate co-ethnics on both sides.

76. Matthews, et. Al, “Hong Kong people’s changing comprehensions of national identity,” 114
77. Matthews, et. Al, “Hong Kong people’s changing comprehensions of national identity,” 114
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The Education of a King: The Scottish Court and the Coursework of James I & VI

JONATHAN XU


Mary became the leader of the Catholic nobility when she married her Catholic cousin and James VI’s future father, Lord Darnley. Protestant leaders were amicable however, until Mary drove them south of Scotland in a raid in the August of 1565, after which her allegiance became clear. When Darnley, who had come to the aid of the Protestants, was mysteriously found dead—strangled and naked in the garden—Protestant lords retaliated, forcing her abdication and granting regency to her half-brother and leader of the Protestant factions, the Earl of Moray. As Mary fled to England, James was crowned on July 19th, 1567, at the age of thirteen months. For the next sixteen years, Scotland would be the stage of a vicious power struggle for the jurisdiction of a fledgling ruler and the powers of regency that came with him.

It remarkable that James survived the fray; he was juggled from regent to regent (three of four who were murdered amidst the power struggle). Even more surprising is that James emerged with an unparalleled education, to become one of the most educated men in Scotland. In 1570, when James was not yet four years old, the Scottish privy council appointed the “most renowned scholar in Scotland,” humanist George Buchanan, as James’s preceptor. The English Ambassador to Scotland once wrote of Buchanan: “I thought the Kinge your Maister more happie that had Buchanan to his Mais-

ter, then Alexander the Great, that had Aristotel his instructor”, suggesting that the intellectual stature of Buchanan would surely produce a prodigy through his mentorship, as did Aristotle for his princely pupil.4

Current scholarship on the royal curriculum of the period argues that it was tailored by humanist scholars to gain favor in the court—suggesting that schoolmasters would have tutored princes to perform great feats of erudition for courtly display (such as reciting lengthy texts, demonstrating his command of classical literary styles, or conducting extemporaneous double-translations) to brownnose the king whose chivalric education heavily involved spectacle and display, in order that they might receive elevations in court. The recognition that Buchanan ultimately played the role of a courtier in the Stuart Court is highly significant in this investigation—though the circumstances surrounding James’s upbringing requires one to look past the influence of the self-promoting politics of humanist scholars in obeisance to a king, to the direct influence of aristocratic politics in Scotland on the formal education of young James.

I have therefore divided my treatment of the question “what is the political nature of Buchanan’s educational program for King James?” into three sections: the validity of an inventory of James’s personal library titled the Index Librorum Regis as a source, the religious and political motivations of the court in James’s education, and the nature of the political philosophy Buchanan sought to inculcate in James. I argue that the presence and absence of select authors and their works in the Index indicates that the powerful Protestant nobles who appointed Buchanan as James’s preceptor had a certain form of political philosophy that they wanted to cultivate in James; and that this political philosophy rejected experiential knowledge and natural aptitude as being the basis for ultimate political authority, and the idea of ruling a state altogether—in favor of the concept that the purpose of politics and a king was to ensure the freedom of individuals to follow one’s free will towards the common good of society.

An inventory of the transactions made for James’s library from 1573 to 1583, titled the Index Librorum Regis, is central to determining what Buchanan had intended James to learn. It is difficult to determine the validity of the document for this purpose because the sixteenth-century royal library commonly held a large number of books the monarch did not read in order to round out the royal collection. Historian T.W. Baldwin demonstrates that the purchases in the Index detail which books and in what general order James received them. He establishes that the opening purchases of the Index, designated by the Latin Achepté (gifts were designated Ex Dono), once taken

together form a rough outline of the humanist grammar school curriculum in its first two years. Further into the Index, he groups a larger section as the first three years of the grammar school curriculum up to when the pupil turns ten and prepares for the study of Greek. At both points he discovers that the purchases are entirely “actual working school texts and closely subsidiary materials” of the bare “necessary minimum to carry on.” He further argues that the following purchases of November 1575 and January 1576, appear as part of James’s coursework in an account of the pupil’s study regimen produced in 1576, suggesting that orders were submitted piecemeal for books that were for immediate use in the classroom. On following Baldwin’s account of the Index alongside the Index itself, Baldwin left few stones unturned in categorizing and describing the purposes of each purchase for James’s study.

II

George Buchanan was a courtier who, in a court devoid of a king, aligned himself with the most powerful nobles: the Protestants that had engineered the purge of Mary Stuart. Current scholarship on the nature of the royal humanist curriculum has far-reaching implications for humanists like Buchanan in the Stuart court of Scotland. Historian Aysha Pollnitz suggests that major elements in the humanist curriculum were vestiges of a concerted attempt by renaissance humanists to gain favor in the court. She argues that Humanists were “frequently self-interested types,” like most courtiers, who were constantly watching of ways to win powerful friends. Furthermore, Historian Michael Heath suggests that the inclusion of certain texts, in humanist curricula such as Erasmus’ *The Education of a Christian Prince* and Elyot’s *The Governor*, texts falling under the “mirror of princes” genre, tended to be for “more political than pedagogic” reasons. In light of Pollnitz and Heath’s arguments, it is clear that Buchanan was not only a humanist scholar that sought to devise a curriculum to best equip a prince to rule effectively, but a member of the Stuart court with his own political objectives. Just years prior to condemning Mary in the schoolroom, Buchanan was intimate with her—he wrote her and her friends’ little complimentary poems in Latin” and even read Livy together with her. Yet during the first two years of his preceptorship of James, Buchanan came to call Mary the “bloody woman and poisoning witch,” his denunciations becoming “the stock-in-trade of Buchanan’s teaching method”. Mary was never proven to be Darnley’s murderer, however, and historians such as David Matthew maintain their doubts, holding it more likely that Darnley’s death was an opportunity

5. Thomas Baldwin, “Textbooks of King James VI of Scotland,” in William Shakespeare’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke (University of Illinois Press, 1944), 536.
7. Which involves jumping back and forth between lists, and leading him to make several omissions.
for Protestant noblemen to launch an attack on their Catholic enemies. Buchanan, like any courtier, found himself on the side that possessed young King James and the powers of regency.

Buchanan was appointed by James’s privy council to rear the infant king “to be the enemy of the religion and the regime they had swept away”; he ensured that James studied Protestant texts. Historian Caroline Bingham makes sense of the situation: the Protestant lords who engineered the purge of Mary found it important that James be brought up “to be the enemy of both Catholicism and his mother”. They appointed Buchanan, the Principal of St. Leonard’s College, who “in religion and in politics”, was the most “eminently suited” to producing the “desired result” in James. In the *Index*, we find few biblical works, true to the privy council’s plans for “the little king’s secular education to be in the full renaissance style”: the *Latin Bible of Castalia* (A translation by French theologian and humanist, Sebatian Castellio) appears among James’s grammar school texts, the *New Testament of Beza* in a group of purchases made in April 1577, and Buchanan’s *Psalms* among the gifts of New Year’s of 1578. Beza was the successor to John Calvin, and Beza’s *New Testament* was a Calvinist work published in the year before James’s birth; Buchanan’s *Psalms* were a Protestant translation and versification of the ancient Hebrew text. According to Baldwin, James studied the Bible in Greek as well as in English, French, and Latin. We find that the privy council had been strategic in appointing Peter Young, a scholar of twenty-nine, as joint-preceptor to Buchanan — often described as “a nobody” or someone who fortuitously received the appointment. Peter Young in fact, studied at Geneva under Beza himself, and was a man “close to Calvin.”

III

It is rather difficult to make a statement on the coursework listed in the *Index* without a point of contrast. To this end, the curricula of humanist scholars in the Tudor court, namely those of Desiderius Erasmus and Sir Thomas Elyot, provide a useful comparison.

When compared with the curricula of Erasmus and Elyot, aspects of Buchanan’s program for James become clear. Firstly, there is a definite focus on moral philosophy and history from classical Roman authors and secondly, the absence of the Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato. Erasmus’ curriculum for the prince advocates the study of virtue, “moral responsibly” and “maintaining moral purity” through ancient Hebrew texts such as Solomon’s *Proverbs*, *Ecclesiasticus*, the *Book of Wisdom*, and the *gospels*, “all the time having those points particularly appropriate to the offices

of the prince explained” by the pedagogue. These ancient Hebrew texts are not found in the Index, though the same subject of moral philosophy is found to be heavily represented through Cato, Plutarch and Cicero, for moral philosophy and Florus, Livy, Valerius Maximus, and Sallust in their moralized histories of the classical world. The prominence of moralized history in the Index is apparent once more, when compared with Elyot’s curriculum which shares several authors. Elyot recommended studying history by reading the works of Livy, Xenophon, Quintus Curtius, Julius Caesar, Sallust and Tacitus noting that “the instructor should point out the… form and manner of government, the good and evil qualities of the rulers, and the results of virtue and vice.” The most striking difference between the Index and the curricula of Erasmus and Elyot is the presence of Aristotle and Plato — Erasmus recommends Aristotle shortly after reading the Bible, and Elyot states “he will study Aristotle… and above all, Plato” on beginning the study of philosophy. James’s curriculum, by contrast, is devoid of all Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy. In its place, we find Buchanan’s works on contemporary political theory.

Buchanan omits Plato for Plato’s argument that an effective ruler should be above the law and the “ultimate authority” of statecraft. In Book VI of Republic, Plato presents a parable of the state as a ship, and the people as the shipmaster “who is larger and stronger than his shipmates, but who does not see or hear well and whose knowledge of seamanship is similarly defective.” Politicians and orators are sailors on the ship who “persuade the master to turn over the helm” so that they may take control and have access to the crops and goods produced by the labor of the people. But the true master of seamanship is one who attends to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to the art—only the kings possessed the experience necessary, for his life and his craft were the practice of statesmanship. Like a physician, who prescribes to a patient “a set of rules to follow as part of his treatment”, informed by years of experience that “no collection of precepts set down in books” can capture, a king practices the “political art” and “should rule autocratically,” being able not only to “legislate but to recognize exceptional cases where the law fails to achieve its end” and modify them according to his assessment of the circumstances. This semblance of autocracy is the antithesis of the stance Buchanan’s takes in his De Jure Regni Apud Scotos listed in the Index, and of which was part of James’ curriculum. He effectively argues for a constitutional monarchy where “the people decide to delegate their authority to a ruler” and that if the king should fail to “keep the terms of

the contract” with the people “even tyrannicide was justifiable.” Plato’s philosophy changes towards the end of his life to that of a “mixture of monarchy and democracy” argued in his Law, but it is justifiable how portions of his works could be taken by Buchanan as support for the divine right of kings.

Though Aristotle’s conclusions do not necessarily veer towards supporting absolutism, and indeed substantial portions of his Politics support the likeness of constitutional monarchy, it is best not to give the pupil the materials sufficient to come to his own conclusions. Aristotle writes in dialogue with Plato on several points: on Plato’s idea of the ideal constitution, on Plato’s concept of the three classes in a state, and on Plato’s concept of knowledge and expertise. Though the conclusion of the two latter inquiries do not necessarily support autocracy, they indeed bring up certain elements of Plato. Being that the three classes of Aristotle’s ideal state (farmer and artisans, the armed forces and “those who govern the state”) emerge from Plato’s, the Republic and the Statesman are implicated when Aristotle distinguishes his conception of the kind of knowledge needed to rule effectively from Plato’s. It is in direct dialogue with Plato that Aristotle merges the two upper classes into one ruling class. Aristotle “rejects” the Republic’s conception that “metaphysical knowledge”, or the experiential mastery of statecraft of the king is necessary for effective rule — “practical wisdom” that could be acquired by the two upper classes and would be superior in effectiveness. The last point where Aristotle engages with Plato is in developing Plato’s initial concept of the ideal constitution for a city-state, normalized for “location, size of population, general characteristics of inhabitants.” Towards the end of his Politics, Aristotle concludes that the order of efficacy by type of constitution would be: first aristocracy, followed by a polity (a mix of aristocracy and democracy) and next and last, a democracy. He reaches this conclusion by reasoning that only in a small community is it likely that there is one individual whose “virtue/wisdom is greater than the combined virtue and wisdom of the rest of the population,” it being increasingly unlikely as the population increases in size. The collective judgment becomes better than that of the few who are individually superior in “character and intelligence,” and it becomes that the best decisions are made by the collective. He makes the admission that a king has the right to rule so long as his virtue and wisdom is greater than the combined judgment of the people. Buchanan’s view that “a king should be the most learned man in his dominions” taken in concert with Aristotle’s postulate forms the likeness of testament for the absolute authority of James.

Apart from the ample number of Latin, English, French and Greek grammar texts and technical training in dialectic, rhetoric and oration in

19. Debereux argues that this is an argument for aristocracy and not democracy.
James’s early curriculum, serious study was devoted to moral philosophy, which served as an introduction to moralized history and, in particular, the works of Sallust. James begins his study of history in November 1575 with the purchase of *Sallustius castigatus*, an introductory work to Sallust, the most pronounced historian in his curriculum. In the same list dating November 1575, two general historical treatments served as “background information on the Rome of Sallust” and after, in a list dated January 18, 1576, a complete collection of Sallust appears along with Justin. In a list dating after July 1576, we find the bulk of historical works purchased covering the lifeblood of Roman history to A.D. 20”, first beginning with Florus as a prologue to Livy, followed by Quintus Curtius who “presented his hero Alexander the Great,” and subsequently Julius Caesar who “spoke for himself in the heroic period of Rome, when Cicero was overflowing voluminously”. Following these new historians, another volume of Sallust was purchased, this time in English. Perhaps the greatest indication of the importance Buchanan assigned to Sallust is in Buchanan’s dedication of his *Baptistes* to James, which reads: “apud tuum Sallustium”, meaning that he “expected James to draw guidance for himself as a ruler from Sallust moralized historically.”

Buchanan’s “proposition” in *De Jure Regni apud Scotos* that “human societies are not created by God but by the people who compose them” and who “delegate their authority to a ruler... under strict conditions and on the understanding that the grant is revocable” is a direct embodiment of Sallust’s political philosophy. A “champion of the Senate and a critic of autocracy,” Sallust’s critique of tyranny came through his concept of freedom. Sallust saw a free state as one where individuals were “independent of the will of another, and to follow one’s own will in one’s actions,” defining freedom as consisting in an absence of domination by others though not necessarily in an “absence of interference’ by others. “To be dominated,” in Sallust’s terms, “is, literally and figuratively, to be like a slave — subject to a dominus, and to live ‘at the beck and call’ of another.” In an unfree society, or under tyranny, the will of the slave is subject to the will of the master who has the power to mobilize physical force against the slave. In the absence of tyranny, and in Sallust’s concept of freedom in the truest sense, all individuals are free to follow their will so long as possible within the laws of nature — though by implication, the individual is now subject not to the domination of a dominus but to arbitrary domination under the free will of other individuals possessing the same freedom.

“After all,” says Kapust, “one was not a slave insofar as one always was interfered with arbitrarily; rather, one was a slave insofar as one always could be interfered with arbitrarily.” Paradoxically, to maintain “individual and

22. Lockyer, James I, 37.
24. Kapust, Republicanism, Rhetoric, and Roman Political Thought, 7.
collective liberty,” society requires that “the ideal of the common good” is placed “above all consideration of individual advantage,” for an individual to be free and remain free, involved not exercising one’s free will to its fullest degree in pursuit of the common good. To Buchanan, Sallust’s conception of freedom would mean that no one individual, particularly the king, was rightfully the master of another, championing the free will of all individuals, which were not to be used for dominating the weak, but for the prosperity of society. By this, Buchanan compelled James to tread softly and rule within the stipulations of the “contract that the people had made with him.”

**IV**

Buchanan’s educational program for James, like that of Erasmus and Elyot’s, was less about how James, or the children of Henry VIII were to rule effectively than about what the political ideology of the most powerful members of the Scottish court were; portions of James’s curriculum, such as training in Latin, English, French, Greek grammar, technical training in dialectic, rhetoric and oratory were vestiges of recommended reading that according to scholarship, had previously been incorporated into the royal curriculum through numerous tracts which were in essence, self-help books written to curry favor with powerful members of the court. Buchanan proved to be more Machiavellian, having secretly plotted with a faction of Protestant nobles to orchestrate a coup against Mary while he simultaneously charmed Mary with his poems—and after her deposition, emerged on the side that possessed James and the powers of regency.

The *Index Librorum Regis* is valuable because it accurately outlines the individual books the king read as part of his formal education. It shows that, apart from the standard grammar textbooks found in humanist curricula, the educational program Buchanan touted differed from those of previous humanist scholars in the Tudor court—the most striking change being the omissions of Plato and Aristotle from Buchanan’s educational program. In their place, we find Buchanan’s own works of contemporary, pro-aristocratic political theory. Where Plato presented parables that portrayed the king as the master seaman of a ship and as the physician of the state, suggesting that a king must be above the law, Buchanan argued that a king must operate within the laws agreed upon by the people. Where Aristotle took Plato’s concept of the ideal constitution to develop further, going as far as to conclude that aristocracy was the most virtuous, Buchanan contended that Aristotle’s proof retained strong elements of Platonic thought and was therefore founded upon fundamentally different principles than his Sallustian concept of republican freedom; Aristotle’s form of aristocracy was founded upon Plato’s concept of the ideal constitution and how to most effectively rule, while Buchanan’s form of aristocracy...

25. Kapust, Republicanism, Rhetoric, and Roman Political Thought, 12.
was founded upon Sallust’s vision that the free will of individuals, when aligned with the common good, would serve to perpetuate society and freedom.

In the end, Buchanan had put forth an admirable effort. He had tailored a curriculum that championed Protestantism and constitutional monarchy from the fabric of those laid out by the great humanist scholars, and had set James down a careful intellectual path for the next sixteen years. James was to avoid ideological corruption at all costs. These ideas would appear in James’ writing fifteen years later, in 1598. He wrote: “if the laws were not working satisfactorily,” the king “had the right to suspend or alter them”—signaling the final triumph of Plato’s concept of absolute monarchy over Sallust’s republican democracy in James’s ideology. James had rejected Buchanan’s politics; Buchanan had succeeded in raising a Protestant king, but he had failed in raising a republican one.
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