


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From The Editors

We are so grateful for the supporters of the fifty-fifth edition of *Historian*. Thanks to the generous funding of the NYU Department of History and the CAS Student Council, we are able to share this year's journal with you.

We extend a special thank you to our sponsors and advisors in the History department: Professor George Solt, Professor Guy Ortolano, Chelsea Rhodes, and the department's administrative staff. Their encouragement and support have allowed the editorial board to continue our tradition of developing and publishing excellent undergraduate historical research.

As students, we are proud to be able to present articles of such quality on a variety of topics with pressing historical and contemporary relevance. As editors, we are proud of the contributions our colleagues have made to historical scholarship.

Finally, to the professors, writers, and readers of our journal: thank you for reading *Historian* over the years, for encouraging students to submit, and for sharing your ideas and work with us. We look forward to many more years of this historical tradition at NYU.

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With gratitude,

The *Historian* Editorial Board

From The Faculty Adviser

54 years ago, New York University's undergraduate leaders in the study of history launched this journal in order to disseminate and preserve their scholarship. As one of the oldest and most distinguished student-directed undergraduate journals in the country, the *Historian* is a source of pride for all of us who teach in the History Department. Its publication every spring is a particularly gratifying event that allows us to see the result of all the work that our student editors and writers contributed to its production throughout the course of the year.

Grace Shay, our editor-in-chief this year, and Ben Miller, our managing editor, provided exceptional leadership for the group of history students who put this volume together. The collection of essays in this year's *Historian* continues the journal's tradition of excellence in undergraduate research and scholarship. There is a significant range in terms of the geographic scope, temporal breadth, and scale of the unit of analysis in the essays that, together, provide a sense of the richness of our students' research interests, and the variety of our Department's course offerings. This year's *Historian* includes essays ranging from the 12th Century *Lais* of Marie de France to a study of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers' strike in 1981; from 19th Century coffee plantations in Brazil to early 20th Century Ottoman land laws in Palestine—the collection is a reflection of the independence of scholarship and open-endedness of historical inquiry conducted by NYU's undergraduates.

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The academic year 2013-2014 has also been full of epoch-making events that will perhaps be the subject of future historical analyses to be published in this journal. The US government shutdown, the tragic typhoon in the Philippines, the nuclear pact with Iran, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the heightening of tensions around the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu, are some of the historical events for which our past academic year will likely be remembered in the ensuing decades. Equally important, however, are the current events that have the potential to drastically unsettle our social organization, but have yet to register on our radars as "history."

I am deeply thankful to have been provided with the opportunity to take part in preserving this standard of distinction in student-directed publication at New York University.

George Solt
Assistant Professor of History

Land Acquisition in Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period

MICHAEL EWING

The late Ottoman period from 1800 to its demise at the end of World War I was a time of Western encroachment, attempts at reformation, and land and population decline. Notably, the Ottoman Empire went through a reformation and reorganization known as the *Tanzimat* that sought to modernize the Ottoman state and society through sustained legislation.¹ The laundry list of reforms and legislation was heavily influenced by Western states and society and included the establishment of post offices, railways, telegraph networks, as well as administrative and procedural reforms that centralized power such as the reorganization of the army, the establishment of health and education ministries, and an overhaul of the land system.² The *ayan*, wealthy notables that lived in coastal cities in the Levant, acquired massive amounts of land and subsequent power over the *fellahin*, or peasants that worked and lived on the land. This paper will explore the socioeconomic history of the *ayan* and *fellahin* in the Palestine region of the Ottoman Empire. The paper will also consider the motivation of foreigners to buy land in Palestine, which served as a contributing factor in the desire for *ayan* to buy and sell land at the expense of the *fellahin*. The changes in the land system, specifically, redefined landownership and created a divide between those that owned the land and those that lived on it.

A NOTE ON METRICS AND MEASUREMENTS

Given the influence of larger states – the Ottoman Empire, France, and Britain – over Palestine, the systems of measurements and currency have changed several times throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. This has been taken into account and all numbers and figures will be presented in one system throughout the paper.

The basic unit of land measurement in territories formerly part of the Ottoman Empire is the *dunam*, in which a *dunam* is approximately 0.25 acres or an acre is approximately four *dunams*.³ Broadly speaking, Palestine comprises of about 6,581,250 acres of which 3,000,000 acres are located in Beersheba, the dry and arid desert in southern Palestine.⁴ It is further important to acknowledge that the 3,500,000 acres north of Beersheba were held as either *miri* or *mushaa*, two

¹ Stanford J. Shaw, and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey*, (Cambridge University Press, 1976), 55.

² Sultan Abdülmecid “İlklerin Padişahı.” NTV Tarih, July 2011, 46-50. [Turkish]

³ Kenneth Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939*, (University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 12.

⁴ Ibid, 12. The desert is known as the Negev Desert today.

land categories that will be discussed in detail soon.⁵

The most common currency presented is the piaster. The piaster was technically a part of the Ottoman Turkish currency. Palestine established its own currency in November 1921, the Palestinian pound, abbreviated as LP.⁶ A Palestinian pound is equivalent to both 97.5 piasters and one British pound. The paper will present all monetary values in the British pound.

RISE OF THE AYAN CLASS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Ottoman Land Law of 1858, in conjunction with tax reformations, replaced the previous Islamic-based land system with a system of distinctive categories and allowed for wealthy urban families to capitalize on the classifications and system. Four of these categories – *mulk*, *miri*, *waqf* and *matruka* – constituted land for houses, shops, religious buildings and structures, as well as communal land for roads and gardens. Gershon Shafrir noted that the quantity of these categories was “relatively small in Palestine and they played almost no role in the story to be told there.”⁷ The two that were the most relevant in the Palestine region were *miri* and *mushaa*.

Miri was the most common one in both the Ottoman Empire and within Palestine. It is important to understand that *miri* land is technically state owned, but the extent of its ownership served as the right to collect taxes and regulate transactions regarding the land. Limitations on transactions will be discussed in detail soon, but the land was essentially private property. The owner of *miri* held the land by usufruct, which gave them the legal right to the land and to the profits from it.⁴ The owner could neither sell nor mortgage the property without the consent of the Ottoman state, which worked through the Land Office.⁵ The rights of the state over the land were simply in place to “assure the productive nature of the land,” which ultimately provided a stream of tax revenue for the state.⁶ *Miri* held a subdivision called *mahlul*, which was a technical term for land that was “left uncultivated because of persistent neglect or absence of heirs.”⁷ The general rule was three years of neglect led to revision, but in fear that the peasants in Palestine would become landless because of poor economic conditions, the Palestine administration “did not enforce the

¹ Ibid.

² Tony Jacques. *Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: A Guide to 8,500 Battles from Antiquity Through the Twenty-First Century*, Volume 1, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 183.

³ Gershon Shafrir. *Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914*. Updated ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, 33.

⁴ The Ottoman Land Code. Translated from the Turkish by F. Ongley, of the Receiver-General's Office, Cyprus.

⁵ Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine*, 11.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid, 13.

provision for reversion of land to the state.¹¹ A report by the Land Settlement Commission in the early 1920s further noted that *mahlul* land consisted of approximately 380,000 acres and nearly all of which were cultivatable.²

Mushaa land was another popular land category in the region. Land considered *mushaa* was based on the idea of collective village ownership or "collective tenure of a land area, with each qualified participant in a village or other designated area entitled to shares [...] in a particular area."³ The structure, based on historical tribal organization, aimed to promote communal ownership and village cooperation.⁴ However, despite its aspirations, the structure of *mushaa* made it difficult to obtain capital investments and even in the uncommon occurrence of receiving a mortgage, the interest rate (or usury) limited development. The hardship is exemplified in the circumstances of *fellabin* who owned *mushaa* shares did not own the title deed to the property and could not produce collateral on a mortgage.⁵ Even in the event that a mortgage or loan was obtained, local landowners, moneylenders, and merchants charged upward of 10 to 50 percent per annum in interest.⁶ The crushing interest rates made it difficult for the *fellabin* to make payments on their debt and sometimes led them further indebted themselves by taking out larger loans to pay for the initial loans.⁷ The cycle of indebtedness made it easy for credits of the *fellabin* to acquire the debtor's land as compensation for the outstanding loan.⁸ These cycles would later change bank policies and in 1923, the Anglo-Persian Bank resorted to ceasing agricultural loans on the basis that "a larger number of loans were used to pay off moneylenders."⁹ Even when the land was taken from the *fellabin*, they would continue to work on the land as tenants.¹⁰ By the end of the late Ottoman period, the process had stripped most of the *fellabin* ownership of *mushaa* shares and nearly 75 percent of *mushaa* land were not by *fellabin* or people that lived on the land, but by people in distant towns.¹¹ The amount of land owned by landowners that lived outside of the *mushaa* community reached upward of 650,000 to 825,000 acres of land.¹² The hardships faced by the *fellabin* made the land system the most "debilitating factor affecting economic better-

ment of Palestinian *fellabin*."¹³

The power of the *ayan* capitalized the fears of the peasants that were scared of the financial obligation of taxes on legally registered land. The *fellabin* also associated land registration with military conscription and believed that having official documentation of their existence would potentially subject them to leave their land and community.² Stein notes that the *fellabin* had a "lifelong personal and ancestral attachment to his land and was philosophically opposed to selling it [...] but oppressive taxes, enormous debt, inefficient land usage, and climate vicissitudes were the burdensome pressures that forced the [*fellabin*] to relinquish his independence as an owner."³ *Fellabin*, indebted and scared of a growing state power, preferred the protection under an urban notable whose name they consented to have their land registered.⁴ Geographically, the land owned by large estate owners tended to lie in the lowlands and plains regions and less in the mountainous regions of Judea and Samaria.⁵ The *ayan* owned the land that was considered to be the most fertile and cultivatable land in Palestine.⁶ The landowners held their primary residences, and consequently rarely ventured to their land in Palestine, in coastal cities in the Greater Syria and Egyptian region including Beirut, Damascus, Alexandria, and Cairo.⁷ Even the ones that did remain in Palestine often lived within Jerusalem and owned land that stretched as far as Gaza, Transjordan, and Jaffa.⁸ The Saad family from Haifa owned areas in the Nazareth and near Ras al-Naqra, an area of land in around the modern day border between Israel and Lebanon.⁹ The Tayans of Haifa, another notable family, owned land as far as Rehovoth and Wadi Hawarith.¹⁰

The *ayan* coupled taking advantage of *fellabin* fears with administrative loopholes and workarounds. Philip Khoury studied the landowners in Damascus and noted that in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, urban leaders and their families were to "successfully transform their traditional type of influence to a stabler [sic] type of power based on landowning."¹¹ Khoury asserts that this

1 Ibid. 11-13.

2 Land Settlement Commission Report, May 1921, Great Britain Public Record Office, CO 733/18/9614. [English]

3 Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine*, 14.

4 Ibid. 11.

5 Mr. J. N. Stubbs, Director of Lands, to the Director of the Development Department, February 10, 1932, Israel State Archives, M3390/3.

6 Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine*, 19.

7 Ibid. 15.

8 Ibid.

9 Albert Abramson to Acting Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government, May 12, 1931, Great Britain Public Record Office, CO 733/207/87275.

10 Stein *The Land Question in Palestine*, 15.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

2 Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins*, 34.

3 Stein *The Land Question in Palestine*, 19. This was also the case in Syria where land was "often registered under a pseudonym or the name of an influential person or notable who promised protection against oppression from the state, tax farmers, and moneylenders" (21).

4 Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins*, 34.

5 Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine*, 26. As a reference: Peasants owned approximately 20 percent of land in the Galilee and about 50 percent of the land in Judea, displaying that the *ayan* owned most of the desirable land.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid. 26-27.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Philip Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 3.

power made the *ayan* "virtually unassailable from below for nearly a century."¹ The families held the upper hand over those that lived on its land and within towns whose land was largely owned by a select few. Land ownership did not come without manipulation and the *ayan* would further misrepresent land and report smaller figures for land size. If and when the land was properly registered with the Ottoman state, the land was usually registered as a fraction, or as one-third to one-fourth of the true land area.² A clear case of misrepresentation was a land transaction in April 1929 in which the land was registered as 1,359 acres but in fact measured 7,500 acres.³ The falsification and manipulation of land registration would work in favor for the *ayan* which were able to assert their rights and increase their power over the *fellahin* that depended on the agricultural land to live, work, and feed their families.

PROSPECTS OF LANDOWNERS IN PALESTINE

10 The Ottoman Empire had traditionally banned the selling of land to foreign individuals and organizations but reforms during the later half of the *Tanzimat* period loosened the bylines of the land laws. Prior to 1858, a foreign citizen had to acquire a special *firman* from the sultan to purchase and register land in their name.⁴ The prohibition of foreign sales continued legally until 1856 but in practice until 1867.⁵ It wasn't until 10 June 1867 when the Ottoman central government published a law that permitted foreign citizens to "acquire urban and rural land in areas of the empire."⁶ Though some Europeans had managed to purchase land before 1867 through non-official means such as large bribes, the law led way for Europeans to purchase land in the Palestine region.⁷ The relaxed laws heightened the desire of land in the region and subsequently led to landowners, the *ayan*, to cash out and sell their land.

The landowners that sold their land generally fell into one of three categories: owners that lived outside of Palestine but owned large tracts of land that was leased to peasants (the *ayan*), owners that lived in Palestine and owned small tracts of land, and then the *fellahin* who owned and cultivated the land.⁸ The time period between the early reformation efforts and the ability of foreigners to acquire land was critical in that the *fellahin* sold their holdings to the *ayan*. The *ayan* would see the economic conditions in Palestine change as a result of

¹ Ibid, 5.

² Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine*, 21.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ruth Kark, "Changing Patterns of Land Ownership in Nineteenth-Century Palestine" *Journal of Historical Geography* 10, no. 4 (1984), 359.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. Permission also stipulated that foreigners "accepted equality with Turkish citizen and were subjects to the jurisdiction of Turkish institutions and courts on all questions relating to property."

⁷ Kark, "Changing Patterns of Land Ownership," 359.

⁸ Yossi Katz and Shoshana Neuman, "Agricultural Land Transactions in Palestine, 1900-1914." *Explorations in Economic History* 27 (1990), 31.

foreign interest, and many concluded that they could maximize their profits by selling the land they owned.¹ Granovsky notes two types of land speculation in the region: simple and commercial speculation. Simple speculation was the ownership of land, either through inheritance or acquisition through other means, and the personal dissatisfaction of its yield leads the owner to sell the property, often having an insignificant effect on price levels.² Commercial speculation, on the other hand, had an influence on market conditions and price levels as such speculation exists when, as Granovsky writes, "a piece of land is bought from the very beginning with the purpose of reselling in the future after an anticipated rise in prices."³

Yossi Katz and Shoshana Neuman, professors at Bar-Ilan University in the geography and economics departments, respectively, applied a historical quantitative analysis between land sellers and buyers in Palestine from 1900 to 1914. The data, drawn from 104 transactions, held attributes that noted quality of land, size of the plot, geographic location, and the Ottoman classification of land ownership.⁴ The included lands were sold as either *miri*, noted earlier as technically state land but held privately, or *mushaa*, noted as land under joint ownership of all *fellahin*.⁵ Upon consideration, *mafruz* land consisted of 95 percent of the transactions, showing a clear buyer's preference for private property, and received 44 percent higher prices than *mushaa* land.⁶ Katz and Neuman further concluded that land suitable for irrigated orchards received 151 percent higher prices than other areas of land.⁷ It comes as little surprise that the transactions describe transactions of a similar portfolio to those owned by the *ayan*. The *ayan* held cultivatable land that would be further lived and worked on to *fellahin*, who either had leased the land or even had previously owned and it sold it to the *ayan*. Another account of land purchases, whose data extends through 1945, notes that 9.4 percent of the purchases originated in *fellahin* and over three quarters of the transactions were with big landowners whom had acquired their land in the last half of the 19th century following the land reformation laws.⁸ The Sursuk family, considered the richest landowners in Palestine, is a token example of such turnover. In 1872, the Sursuk family purchased 57,500 acres in the Valley of Jezreel at a rate of 0.32 British pounds per acre. The family held onto the land until 1921 when it sold the land for forty to eighty times the

¹ Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine*, 19.

² Abraham Granovsky, *The Land System in Palestine*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1940, 17.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Yossi Katz and Shoshana Neuman, "Agricultural Land Transactions in Palestine, 1900-1914." *Explorations in Economic History* 27 (1990), 1.

⁵ Ibid, 33. Further classification and methodology can be found here.

⁶ Ibid. Technically, the report is listed as *mafruz* which is a subdivision of *miri*.

⁷ Ibid, 41.

⁸ Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins*, 41. The disparity between the two studies can be explained in that *fellahin* land accounted for most of the purchases after World War I in the Mandate period.

price originally paid.¹ Land in Rehovoth was purchased in 1890 and was left uncultivated until it was sold again twenty years later for five times the price paid.² A French expert on the economic conditions of Syria and Palestine noted in a study near the end of the 19th century that "very good" land was worth 14.35 British pounds per acre, "medium" was 7.17 British pounds per acre, and "non-irrigable" land was worth a mere 3 pounds per acre.³ There were no limitations on the price of land and the market experienced "unrestricted competition which could scarcely be restrained by either national or moral considerations."⁴

MOTIVATION FOR LAND ACQUISITION BY EUROPEANS

The area of Palestine holds religious importance for several of the most followed religions in the world. In the nineteenth century, many communities throughout Europe were intrigued of the area of returning to the Holy Land and establishing missionaries around Jerusalem. Churches of Christian, Catholic, and Greek Orthodox denominations made efforts to purchase land in the region.⁵ Their settlements in the area were considered simple and often consisted of a church and a small missionary around Jerusalem and other large cities.⁶ The efforts of the church, while sizable, were overshadowed by larger settlements, such as the Templers, a German sect, that established urban neighborhoods and agricultural land in Haifa, Jerusalem, and Jaffa.⁷ By 1898, the Templers had purchased nearly 10,000 acres of land that was valued at over 400,000 British pounds.⁸

Several Jewish communities and organizations sought land in the area as well. The Jews that moved to Palestine attempted to parallel the Christian settlements by promoting religious investments in the Holy Land to European Jewish philanthropists.⁹ Land purchases were scarce until the 1880s when the general committee of the *Hovevei Zion*, Lovers of Zion, convened and sought to establish the "first modern agricultural settlement."¹⁰ The *Hovevei Zion* movement was largely a result of Russian pogroms in which millions of Jews left Russia in favor of Western countries with a small number finding their way to Palestine. This migration movement, spanning from the early 1880s to the early years of the 1900s, was known as the first *aliyah* and depended heavily on donations from Baron Edmond de Rothschild, a wealthy banker in Europe.¹¹ Be-

1 Granovsky, *The Land System in Palestine*, 31.

2 Ibid.

3 Vital Guinet, "Syrie, Liban, et Palestine," Paris, 1898, Ernest Leroux, Editeur. 334. [French]

4 Granovsky, *The Land System in Palestine*, 50.

5 Kark, *Changing Patterns of Land Ownership*, 362-364.

6 Ibid, 365.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid, 364.

9 Ibid, 367.

10 Ibid, 364.

11 Ibid, 368.

tween 1882 and 1900, Rothshild individually funded 1,600,000 British pounds into the region.¹

Theodor Herzl would later spring up another movement with his *Der Judenstaat* in 1896. The text noted a plan for sovereignty over a "portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation" that he would define as a nation of and for Jews.² Herzl did not specifically name Palestine as the desired location for a Jewish nation, but in December 1901, on the eve of the Fifth Zionist Congress, the Jewish National Fund was established to facilitate land acquisition in Palestine on behalf of Jewish people.³ Countless other funds had been established at the time, but the Jewish National Fund was the most effective of the organizations, including Christian groups and the Templers. In 1907, the Ottoman governor of Palestine, a fervent Ottoman nationalist, went as far as to say that "most of the success and activity related to property and lands which the Jews were able to acquire until now is derived from their financial ability."⁴ The total purchases of Jewish entities totaled 112,000 acres and are easily identified as belonging to one of three groups: Rothshild owned 64,000 acres, the Jewish National Fund held 5,250 acres, and the culmination of private sector owned the remaining 42,750 acres.⁵

OVERCOMING HARDSHIPS IN LAND ACQUISITION

Each of the communities and organizations that aspired to build settlements in Palestine faced hardships in purchasing and living on the land. The success and sustenance of the developers were not only hinged on their financial and legal ability to purchase land as foreigners, but on the ability for landowners to sell the land. As noted earlier, the Ottoman Empire limited foreigners from purchasing land but the organizations were often unfazed by the hurdles. Jewish organizations, specifically, circumvented the obstacle by purchasing land under "borrowed" names of Jews that had Ottoman citizenship.⁶ Misreported land ownership to the Ottoman government was of concern for the *ayan* and the *fellahin*. The *ayan* would often underreport the amount but held it under one name or family. The *fellahin*, which largely owned shares of *mushaa* land, faced difficulty in selling their land. *Mushaa* land purchases were considered to be the timeliest and most intensive transactions. A 1923 lawsuit from the District Court of Samaria shows the complexity of purchasing *mushaa* land. The land code recorded that twenty-three people were registered as owners of the land in question in 1873, but further investigation discovered that there

1 Ibid, 367. The 1.6 million is the equivalent of 40 million francs.

2 Herzl, Theodor, *The Jewish State*. New York: Dover Publications, 1988.

3 Zvi Shiloni, *Ideology and settlement: the Jewish National Fund, 1897-1914*. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1998, 57.

4 Kark 1984, 367.

5 Ibid.

6 Katz and Neuman 1990, 32. The Ottoman state reluctantly accepted these deals, but there were "only a few reported instances where permission was not finally granted."

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1 Ibid.

2 Vital Cuinet, "Syrie, Liban, et Palestine," Paris, 1898, Ernest Leroux, Editeur. 334. [French]

3 Granovsky 1940, 50.

4 Kark 1984, 362-364.

5 Ibid, 365.

6 Kark 1984, 365.

7 Ibid, 364.

8 Ibid, 367.

9 Ibid, 364.

10 Ibid, 368.

1 Ibid, 367. The 1.6 million is the equivalent of 40 million francs.

2 Herzl, Theodor, *Der Judenstaat*, 1896. [German]

3 Zvi Shiloni, *Ideology and settlement: the Jewish National Fund, 1897-1914*. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1998, 57.

4 Kark 1984, 367.

5 Ibid.

6 Katz and Neuman 1990, 32. The Ottoman state reluctantly accepted these deals, but there were "only a few reported instances where permission was not finally granted."

were over 900 claims to the land.¹ Such entanglements discouraged buyers and contributed to the hardship faced by the *fellabin*.

In some parts of Palestine, conflicts arose from the *fellabin* belief that the land that they lived on was theirs despite not owning the deed or rights to the land. The rights to the land were owned by the *ayan* or the rights were never properly registered. One bitter dispute occurred in the Abu Shusha region where the peasants fought against German settlers until the Jewish Colonization Association, an organization that was established to help migrate Jews from Russia, bought the land in the early 1910s and offered the *fellabin* a third of the land in order reach an understanding with them.² The *fellabin* that were fortunate enough to own *mushaa* land were affected financially as foreigners turned away from purchasing *mushaa* land because of the complications. The other groups within *fellabin* were forced to relocate as the land they lived on was sold by the *ayan* that owned it.

CONCLUSION

16 The Ottoman Empire, once known as the one of the leading empires in the world, was decaying from the early 1800s as it fought off Western societal, cultural, and geographical encroachments through laws and war. Changes at the highest level of the empire as the sultan gave into Western pressures affected societal structure through changing class relations and land ownership. This had profound effects on the citizens, especially those on the upper and lower end of social classes. Social classes had always existed, but the Land Code of 1858 enabled wealthy urbanites - the *ayan* - to acquire expanses of land in the Levant. The *ayan* had very little interest in ever living on the land or tilling the fields. They leased parcels out to the *fellabin*, the peasants that lived and worked on the land for generations and were too poor to buy it themselves. Growing interest from foreigners in the second half of the century led the *ayan* to sell the land that they have collected over the years. The critical difference between the *ayan* and the foreigners as land owners was that unlike the *ayan* who held the land as investments the foreigners intended to live on and work the land not interested in the land as investments. The *fellabin*, who had lineage through labor and physical connection to the land, were forced to move from it.

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¹ Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine*, 15.

² Kark, "Changing Patterns of Land Ownership," 371. This tension speaks volumes about what is to come in Palestine, namely the Arab Revolt from 1936 to 1939.

The Perfect Storm: Identities and Incentives of First and Second Generation Koreans in the United States during WWII

DANIEL (YONG WOO) KIM

18 On the fourth of December, 1943, nearly a half-century since their arrival on the Hawaiian Islands as migrant laborers, Korean-Americans in the United States finally discovered what Emma Lazarus deems to be the "lamp beside the golden door." The United States government ceremoniously removed the "enemy alien" label from people of Korean descent. The Ilsae (first generation) and the Isae (second-generation) Korean Americans fought in the battlefields overseas, purchased war bonds, planted their Victory Gardens, and joined the wartime industry, as they slowly shed their labels as "enemy aliens," and earned their stay in the eyes of fellow Americans. However, these contributions were not a collective, unified action. Rather, first and second generation Korean Americans each had its distinct motives for joining the United States war effort, resulting from their unique experiences, ideologies, and identities that developed long before the war. The Ilsae had developed a policy of merit-seeking and had maintained strong nationalist connections to their Korean identities. When the United States entered into the Second World War, the Ilsae discovered a singular entity through which they could concentrate their traditional merit-seeking policy and Korean nationalism; they believed that active participation in the US war effort would allow them to prove their worth to the United States, who would then help the Ilsae realize their dreams of Korean independence. On the other hand, the Isae, had a much weaker connection to their ancestral homeland and had vastly assimilated into mainstream American society, because of their deeper and much more extensive interaction with the other groups in the United States; therefore, the Isae saw their participation in the war effort as their civic duty as Americans.

When the first generation Korean-immigrants initially arrived into Honolulu Harbor on board the S.S. Gaelic in 1903, they arrived to a country ripe with xenophobic and racist attitudes. Mary Paik Lee recalled as she arrived in San Francisco on December 3rd, 1906, "a group of young white men were standing around waiting to see what kind of creatures were disembarking. They laughed at us and spit in our faces; one man kicked up Mother's skirt and called us names we didn't understand. Of course their actions and attitudes left no doubt about their feelings toward us."¹ These racist sentiments that the Ilsae experienced at their ports of arrival followed them as they settled in the United

States, and pervasively loomed over nearly every aspect of their daily lives. A manager at the American Mining Company asserted that the Korean "laborers in Hawaii are drafted from seaport scum."² Furthermore, Judge William J. Robinson further reveals the widespread racism towards the Korean immigrants by defining the Koreans as "social pariahs, moral lepers, and religious fanatics in the country from which they hail...possessing no intellectuality and but little intelligence, furnish a poor foundation for an intelligent American citizenship during the present generation and offer but little hope for many generations to come."³ Furthermore, these racist attitudes were not limited to American civilians; the United States government also shared such racist attitudes and translated them into widespread discriminatory legislation and action against the Korean immigrants. In 1906, the San Francisco Board of Education specifically included "Koreans" in its segregationist directive that excluded children of Korean descent from attending San Francisco's public schools.⁴ In 1912, the Democratic Party in California called for "immediate federal legislation for the exclusion of Japanese, Korean, and Hindu laborers." In a further attempt to limit the opportunities of non-citizens, the United States federal government also passed the Alien Land Act of 1913, which prohibited the Korean immigrants from owning land and limited leases in California because they had been denied naturalized citizenship.⁵ Thus, the Ilsae arrived in a nation that harbored top-to-bottom racist sentiments towards them, at both the societal and at the governmental levels, revealing their immense hardships upon settling in the United States.

19

These intolerant sentiments against the first generation Korean immigrants transgressed into racial discrimination against the Ilsae throughout the United States. Discrimination against the Korean immigrants occurred mainly as a result of the different ethnic groups in the United States misidentifying the Koreans as Japanese immigrants, with whom these various ethnic groups had shown high levels of antagonism due to the tense US-Japanese relations at the time. The misnomer of "Jap" was ubiquitously placed on Korean immigrants during nearly every aspect of their daily lives. A Korean woman reported in 1924 that "no matter where I appeared—whether the library, on the street car, or downtown, I perceived that their [white peoples'] attention was fixed upon me and soon there was a followed faint but audible whisper, "oh, she is a Jap!"⁶ Similarly, first generation immigrant, J. Lim, complained that "during the first days of school life, children would call me 'Jap.' I would protest and sometimes resort to fists..."⁷ One Korean immigrant recalled going to a barbershop in Los

¹ Pacific Commercial Advertiser, July 28th, 1906.

² Pacific Commercial Advertiser, August 13, 1906.

³ Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), 272.

⁴ Ibid. 272.

⁵ Adelaide Kim, "The Place of the Korean in the Industrial Life of Los Angeles," circa 1924, pp.2,3,

⁶ "Life History of J. Lim," 1924-1925, p.3, Survey of Race Relations, Stanford University, Hoover Institution Archives.

¹ Mary Paik Lee, *Quiet Odyssey*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990), 12.

Angeles, he was turned away from the establishment and was told that the barber "did not want the Japanese trade."¹ Furthermore, Do-Yun Yoon recalled that his family could only find housing in "Mexican town or Black town; none in the nicer areas in the white town."² Koreans were also refused service in public recreational facilities and restaurants. While Chang Lee-Wook recalled being told by a waiter, "we can't serve you lunch, because if we start serving lunch to the Orientals, white Americans will not come here."³ Do-Yun Yoon recalled how "the Americans would not let us sit anywhere in the theater. They permitted us to sit one corner with the Mexicans but not with the Americans."⁴ Korea immigrants also experienced occupational discrimination, in which employment opportunities were restricted for Korean men: they resorted to working as restaurant workers, gardeners, janitors, and domestic workers."⁵ Whang Sa Sun recalled how he "felt discrimination and realized that America was not a free country. Everybody did not enjoy liberty. The American people saw the Asian people as a different race. I wanted some postal or factory work but they didn't give it to me."⁶ Thus, misidentification as "Japanese", as well as discrimination from the other ethnic groups of the United States not only prevented first generation Korean immigrants from enjoying access to public facilities and establishments, but also impacted where they lived and which jobs they found.

20 In response to the prevalent physical and legal discrimination against them at the time, first generation Korean immigrants developed a policy of merit-seeking, through which they sought not only to disassociate themselves from other Asian groups and the negative consequences of such associations, but also to prove to the other ethnic groups and the American government, that they were hardworking, trustworthy, and loyal people. They believed that economic success in the United States was the key to overcoming racial discrimination.⁷ Community leaders therefore encouraged Korean immigrants to learn English, work hard, and be "accepted and invited again and again to work by the whites," in order to prove that Koreans were trustworthy, hardworking, and worthy of much equal treatment.⁸ The Ilsae also pursued merit-seeking in order to disassociate themselves from the Chinese and Japanese immigrants, because they believed that the hostile treatment that they experienced was the result of their association with these other Asian groups. Korean newspapers asserted that Chinese immigrants "came to this country without abandoning their filthy habits and customs. Everywhere they go they create disorders. The

1 Interview, in Sunoo, *Korean Kaleidoscope*, p. 69.

2 "Life History of Mr. Hong, Korean." Circa 1924, p.2. Survey of Race Relations, Stanford University, Hoover Institution Archives.

3 Bong Youn Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago, 1979), 109-110.

4 Interview, in Sunoo, *Korea Kaleidoscope*, p. 69.

5 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, 273.

6 Interview, in Brenda Sunoo, *Korean American Writings: Selected Material from Insight*, Korean American Bimonthly p. 25.

7 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, 277.

8 Hyung June Moon, "The Korean Immigrants in America: The Quest for Identity in the Formative Years, 1903-1918," p. 199.

Japanese, who have entirely different habits from white society... are becoming a target of hatred from white workers."¹ The Ilsae believed that the Chinese and Japanese immigrants before them had angered Americans because of their adamant unwillingness to adopt American customs, so they sought to portray themselves as non-threatening to American conservative traditions by adopting mainstream American customs. Korean newspapers brandished Koreans' willingness to embrace American culture by stating that "Americans love Koreans and help us, while they hate the Japanese more than ever," because Koreans "gave up old baseness, thought and behavior, and became more westernized."²

Despite the widespread racist sentiments against them at the time, Korean immigrants took a non-confrontation stance in order to gain favor in the eyes of other ethnic groups, and to eliminate the ubiquitous identification of Koreans as barbaric, violent, and radical. Korean newspapers explicitly displayed this non-confrontational policy by ironically flattering Americans for showing Koreans "goodwill and friendship" and that the Koreans were "very grateful to America."³ These policies were disseminated into Korean households, in which Korean parents openly displayed their merit-seeking attitudes in the hopes that their children would also behave similarly in their own lives. Mary Paik Lee recalled her father instructing her that in order to overcome racial discrimination, Koreans were to lower "their heads and (pay) no attention to their tormenters." Rather, they were to prove that "they were just as good as or even better than those who laughed at them" by "studying hard and learning to show Americans that we were just as good as they are."⁴ In this way, the Ilsae sought to gain the favor from the other ethnic groups in the United States and to alleviate the pervasive discrimination against them.

Alongside these policies through which they sought to alleviate discrimination against them, the first generation Korean immigrants also maintained strong connections to their native Korean homeland and harbored a deep sense of Korean nationalism. Since the 1910 Japanese annexation of the Korean peninsula, Koreans agonized over the loss of their homeland, as they witnessed Japanese troops marching into their cities, and Imperial officers forcing them to not only learn their conqueror's language, but also become Japanese citizens. Thus, the Ilsae left Korea for better opportunities and treatment in countries, such as the United States. Peter Hyun recalls how he "gladly left behind the cruel world of Japanese rulers. No longer would I have to bow to the emperor of Japan each morning in school. No longer would I be jeered at and called vulgar names by the Japanese children of Seoul." However, upon leaving their homeland, the Ilsae perceived themselves as exiles and political refugees than as immigrants, and believed that they would someday return to their ancestral nation upon Korea's liberation. Jean Park recalls that her Ilsae

1 Shinhan Minbo, editorial, in Moon, "Korean Immigrants in America," p. 157.

2 Moon, "Korean Immigrants in America," pp. 157-159.

3 Ibid. 157-159.

4 Lee, *Quiet Odyssey*, 12.

mother's "life-long ambition was to return to a free Korea."¹ Thus, these immigrants maintained strong connections to Korea, where they had left behind not only all their family treasures, such as priceless scrolls, screens, and silverware, but more importantly, precious friends and family members. Peter Hyun recalled leaving behind his "beloved grandfather and grandmother, our dear aunts and uncles, and my childhood playmates."² Koreans maintained ties to their homeland by singing traditional songs, by telling old folk tales, and by adhering to their predominantly Christian faith. Korea, famously nicknamed the "Jerusalem of the East", sent many Christian immigrants to the United States, where they continued their devout practices.³ Korean churches served not only as a place for religious practice, but also a forum for political discussion, and a center for sharing recent news from Korea. Peter Hyun recalled at his church, where his father served as pastor, "were speeches expounding the proud history of the Korean people, decrying their sufferings under the Japanese ruler, extolling their undying commitment to achieve freedom and national independence."⁴ A community leader stated that "a people without a country must have something to believe in and to hold on to."⁵ The Korean immigrants chose to hold on to their memories and dreams of an independent Korean nation. They saw themselves as a stranded people; their home country no longer existed and their adoptive country alienated them through discrimination.

- 22 After hearing of the March 1st Movement back in their home country, in which Koreans engaged in widespread demonstrations against their Japanese rulers, the Ilsae in the United States channeled their strong Korean nationalism into their own independence movement. An Ch'angho, one of the most renowned leaders in the Korean independence movement, wrote a poignant letter to the Koreans of the United States, calling for them to unite under a common banner against the Japanese, to build an independence army, to elicit aid from foreign powers, and to engage in physical and spiritual training in order to die for their country's independence.⁶ These encouragements seemed to reverberate amongst the Korean immigrants in the United States as Korean newspapers declared that "we shall overcome this crisis by resorting to arms and blood...in order to kill all traitors and crush the Japanese."⁷ Consequently, in preparation for an armed struggle against the Japanese, the Ilsae in Hawaii formed a military corps comprised of three hundred soldiers, and began operating a Pilot Train-

1 Interview with Jean Park (pseudonym), Prologue of "The Autobiography of a Second Generation Korean American," in Kim, "Three Generations of Koreans in America," Asian American Studies 199 paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1976, pp. 42.

2 Hyun, *In the New World: The Making of a Korean American*, 4.

3 Young Hoon Lee, "Korean Pentecost: The Great Revival of 1907," *American Journal of Political Science* 4.1 (2001), 73-83.

4 Hyun, *In the New World: The Making of a Korean American*, 14.

5 Moon, "Korean Immigrants in America, 1903-1945," 139.

6 An, Ch'angho, "Grand Strategy for Independence for Korea," 1920. Page 174-178.

7 Moon, "Korean Immigrants in America," 316.

ing School in California.¹ Fervent passion for Korean independence dominated nearly all aspects of the lives of the Ilsae, as their lives were organized around the movement for Korean independence.² Gloria Hahn recalls her mother "being a charter member of the Korean Women's Patriotic League, writing for Korean newspapers, and working actively in her church."³ Similarly, more than three hundred Korean women in Hawaii organized a Red Cross society to provide assistance to those who were wounded or needed aid in Korea.⁴ They printed out copies of the Korean Declaration of Independence, which were sold to collect funds for the movement. Many members also skipped meals to save rice, which they made into Korean rice cakes to be sold at fundraisers.⁵ The Korean immigrants also participated in the independent movement by financially supporting the movement as well: the *Shinhan Minbo* reported that as of 1919, a sum of \$35,034 had been raised from 2,907 individuals, meaning that each person contributed about \$20 (more than their monthly living expenses).⁶ Thus, the Korean independence movement, as well as merit-seeking policies, dominated the lives of the Ilsae prior to the war.

These preeminent attitudes of nationalism and passion for Korean independence directly contributed to the Korean immigrants' disassociation from and hostility towards people of Japanese descent in the United States. When An Ch'angho advocated for a general mobilization of all Koreans in the United States towards the independence movement, he also called for Koreans to "stop dealing with Japanese government agencies."⁷ Thus, the Korean immigrants adopted a policy of disassociating themselves not only from the Japanese government but also from any member of Japanese ancestry in the United States. The Korean National Association (KNA) called for a "complete cessation of any association with the Japanese because normally one does not associate with the murderer of one's parents, and Japan had murdered our fatherland."⁸ Mary Paik Lee recalled from her childhood that her Ilsae parents taught her to avoid any contact with the Japanese and stated that "whenever we saw them coming, we'd cross the street or start walking the other way."⁹ The Korean National Association sent a telegram to US Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, pleading "please regard (us) not as Japanese in the time of peace and war."¹⁰ The Korean immigrants also demonstrated their hostility towards the Japanese by

1 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, 281.

2 Ibid, 280.

3 Gloria Hahn, interview, in Choy, *Koreans in America*, p. 310.

4 Hawaii Hochi, March 17, 1919.

5 Kim Do-Hyung, and Yong-Ho Choe, "The March First Movement of 1919 and Koreans in Hawaii." From the *Land of Hibiscus: Koreans in Hawaii, 1903-1950*, Yong-Ho Cho'e, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006)

6 *Shinhan Minbo*, December 16, 1919.

7 Ch'angho An, "Grand Strategy for Independence for Korea, 1920," 174-178.

8 Adelaide Kim, "The Place of the Korean in the Industrial Life of Los Angeles," circa 1924, pp. 2,3.

9 Lee, *Quiet Odyssey*, 104.

10 H. Brett Melendy, *Asians in America: Filipinos, Koreans, and East Indians* (Boston, 1977), pp. 133-134.

boycotting Japanese goods; in Hawaii, Koreans called for a general boycott of Japanese soy sauce and began their own with \$20,000.¹ The boycott was taken to a new level when the KNA urged Koreans not to work for any factory that was Japanese owned.² Throughout the 1930s, the KNA urged the United States government to implement an embargo against the Japanese and staged demonstrations against the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles and elsewhere.³ An observer revealingly noted that "singly and collectively, they hate the Japanese."⁴

The Ilsae's anti-Japanese sentiments were also displayed through the actions of certain Korean criminals, such as Yee-Yo-Keuk, who philosophized that the "Japanese were the enemies of the Koreans" and therefore, singled out the Japanese as their victims.⁵ Because of their strong nationalism and zeal for Korean independence, the Ilsae harbored a deep anti-Japanese sentiment, and waited for the opportune moment to exact its revenge on those whom they believed were responsible for their occupied homeland.

24 Unlike the Ilsae, who identified with their Korean homeland, second generation Korean-Americans (the Isae) did not share the same strong identification with their parents' ancestral nation. While the first generation was able to maintain strong connections to Korea by remembering the beloved friends and family that they had left behind, the Isae were either born in the United States, or came to the United States at such a young age that they barely had any recollections of Korea. Peter Hyun explicitly recalls that "the scenes of Seoul were receding and becoming fainter and fainter" as he spent more time in the United States.⁶ As they did not share the same nationalistic zeal as the Ilsae, the second generation Isae generally did not take part in the Korean independence movement. Jean Park, describes how "she and most of her fellow Isae stayed on the sidelines" because "they had not even been to Korea."⁷ An Isae youth depicted the second generation detachment from their ancestral land by asserting that "by law, I am American and by heart I am American. I have read very little about my parent's native land but I have never felt a sense of pride in knowing about my parent's native land."⁸ The Isae also often had very limited knowledge of the Korean language.⁹ Therefore, while the Korean churches in the United States served as important forums for political and independence activities for the Ilsae, they did not serve such important purposes for the Isae; the Isae felt strange and somewhat alienated when they were taken to church by their parents, who spoke only Korean to their contemporaries. Because of their limited

1 Pacific Commercial Advertiser, April 23, 1919.

2 Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 25, 1919.

3 New York Times, Feb. 18, 1932, p. 16.

4 Sinhan Minbo, editorial, in Moon, "Korean Immigrants in America," p. 283.

5 Yong-Ho Cho'e, *From the Land of Hibiscus: Koreans in Hawaii, 1903-1950*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006.

6 Hyun, *In the New World: The Making of a Korean American*, 28.

7 Interview with Jean Park (pseudonym)

8 William C. Smith, *The Second Generation Oriental in America* (Honolulu, 1927), p. 7.

9 Lee, *Quiet Odyssey*, 80.

memory of Korea, their limited knowledge of the Korean language, as well as the insignificance of Korean churches, the Isae did not develop the same strong Korean identities that the Ilsae had done.

While the Ilsae maintained strong connections to Korea because of the memories that they had made there, the Isae developed strong connections to the United States because they were making such memories in America. While the Ilsae attempted to assimilate into mainstream American society, they were largely prevented from doing so by their inability to speak English. In 1919, only 18.2 percent of Korean immigrants over the age of ten could speak English; by 1920, close to half were able.¹ Their inability to speak English proved to be a major obstacle in finding jobs outside of plantations and acculturation to the American legal system—crucial steps in order to assimilate into mainstream American society. In contrast, the Isae were educated in the American education system speaking predominantly English, and were able to interact more intimately with other ethnic groups and assimilate to a much larger degree into mainstream American society. Jean Park recalls, despite her mother's insistence that she date only Korean boys, her sister had Japanese boyfriends and she "dated an Italian boy...and she also went out with a Mexican boy," while Peter Hyun informs that his sister, an Isae, married an American of German descent.² The Isae children developed friendships with Italian, Portuguese, Mexican and even Japanese children.³ Furthermore, Peter Hyun claims that he enjoyed "being accepted as one of them in the high school of Hawaii-born Americans."⁴ Due to their ability to speak English and their American education, the Isae also gained access to a wider variety of jobs, where they worked alongside people of other ethnicities. Mary Paik Lee claims that "most people became friendly after they got to know us better, perhaps we spoke good English."⁵ Also, while the Isae often felt alienated at their parents' Korean churches, they often became members in churches with multi-ethnic "American" congregations as seen through Mary Paik Lee's recollection of how she "became a member of the Hollister Presbyterian Church" in 1916. While the Ilsae maintained strong Korean ties by recollecting their pleasant childhood, relationships, and experiences with other Koreans, the Isae developed their own such experiences with the people of various different ethnic groups in the United States. 25

Because of their high level of assimilation, the Isae developed strong American identities and they took up a wide range of "American" customs. Peter Hyun recalls that "I ate different kinds of foods—no more rice gruel for breakfast. Now, instead I drank fresh orange juice and ate ham, and toast with butter and jam. I also ate enormous chunks of meat called steak; and raw vegetables." He

1 Cho'e, *From the Land of Hibiscus: Koreans in Hawaii, 1903-1950*, 112.

2 Interview with Jean Park (pseudonym)

3 Hyun, *In the New World: The Making of a Korean American*, 176.

4 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, 287.

5 Hyun, *In the New World: The Making of a Korean American*, Page 31.

6 Lee, *Quiet Odyssey*, Page. 78.

also notes how his lifestyle changed from one that was strictly Korean to one that was more Americanized. He "wore newer and better clothes, wore a different kind of haircut and had luxurious personal possessions."¹ Jean Park similarly recalls how she and other young Koreans sometimes "just stayed at home and listened to the radio programs such as Amos and Andy...Fibber McGee and Molly, and others...we enjoyed ourselves and laughed throughout every funny radio program."² Through their vast assimilation into mainstream American society, the Isae developed distinctively American identities.

Furthermore, their lack of Korean nationalism, their assimilation, and their positive interactions with other ethnic groups explained how the Isae did not develop the same hostile sentiments towards the Japanese in the United States as the Isae did. Rather, the Isae viewed them as fellow Americans. Peter Hyun recalls that his "first date was with a...Japanese-American," and that should his Isae friends discover this, they would "not have forgiven me...and branded me a traitor."³ Because, they either had never been to Korea or had forgotten memories of their ancestral lands, the Isae had difficulty feeling the same pain and indignity of Japanese imperialism. Rather, in school and on the playground, they even had close Japanese friends.⁴ Jean Park recalls that the Japanese children were "very nice and we got along well."⁵ As adults, the second generation Korean Americans also often found themselves working alongside Japanese Americans. Therefore, the Isae's integration into mainstream American society, their lack of Korean nationalism, and constant interaction with other ethnic groups, prevented them from developing the Isae's hostile sentiments towards the Japanese in the United States. Rather, they viewed themselves, as well as the Japanese Americans as same members of the same American society.

On December 7th, 1941, the Japanese Empire launched a surprise attack on the United States Naval base in Pearl Harbor, or what President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared as the "Day of Infamy." The Isae welcomed the war as an opportunity for Koreans to support the United States in its war against Japan and saw that an American victory would help realize their long-time dreams of Korean independence.⁶ Bong-Young Choy recalls how when the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor spread to a rehearsal of the play, everyone exploded with "Long Live Korean Independence!" and that, "no Korean could control his emotions. Every Korean felt that the long dream for national independence would soon become a reality."⁷ Therefore, in order to help the United States achieve victory, the KNA resolved that "Koreans shall work for the defense of the country

where they reside, volunteer for national guard duty, and purchase war bonds."¹ Won Soon Lee, chairman of the United Korean Committee similarly declared that, "to help win this war with America is our task," and an editorial further reminded the Korean immigrants that "it is the duty of every Korean residing beneath the Stars and Stripes...to cooperate with the American war efforts."² Hence, the Isae felt compelled to join the United States war effort, as doing so coincided with their nationalist ideals and independence movement that they had cultivated prior to the war; through victory, they believed that they could achieve their nationalist dreams of liberating their homeland.

The United States' entrance to the Second World War allowed the first generations' two dominant pre-war ideologies, merit-seeking and Korean nationalism, to converge into a singular, more well-defined objective. Two developments shaped the Isae's wartime merit-seeking policy. First, one of the Isae's major concerns was that they would not be taken into consideration by the United States in its postwar decisions in respects to Korea. Therefore, the Isae formed a merit-seeking policy that was designed to convince the American government that Koreans were worthy of an independent nation and were able to rule themselves as able American allies.⁴ Secondly, the United States government insulted the Koreans in America, by neglecting to differentiate them from the Japanese enemies, and including them into the not only the "enemy alien" classification, but also the "Japanese" classification.⁵ Therefore, the United States' war with Japan combined the Isae's pre-war nationalism with its merit-seeking tradition; the Isae could now adopt a merit-seeking policy with their nationalist goal of the utmost importance hanging at stake: an independent Korean nation. They were no longer merit-seeking merely for themselves. They were now fighting for their Korea.

The United States entrance into the Second World War also allowed the Isae to transform its pre-war anti-Japanese sentiments into aggressive and hostile actions against the Japanese in America. Koreans joined the anti-Japanese war propaganda with great fervor by declaring themselves to be the "champion of Jap-haters of the world."⁶ The Isae also vehemently supported Executive Order 9033, calling for the internment of Japanese-Americans.⁷ The Isae's arousal of anti-Japanese sentiments amongst their fellow Americans is poignantly conveyed through the actions of Kilsoo K. Han, of whom a staff member of Congressman Tolan said "succeeded in inflaming the citizens almost to the

1 Hyung-chan Kim and Wayne Patterson, *The Koreans in America, 1882-1974* (Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1974), p. 45.

2 "The Editorial." *Korean National Herald*, November 8, 1944, I.

3 Linda Shin. "Koreans in America, 1903-1945." *Amerasia Journal* 1.3 (1971): 32-39.

4 Linda Shin. "Koreans in America, 1903-1945." *Amerasia Journal* 1.3 (1971): 32-39.

5 Robert C. Richardson Jr., Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Record Group 319, Army-Intelligence Decimal File, 1941-1948, Box 394, Folder 291.2 Koreans, National Archives II, College Park, Md.

6 *New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1942, p. 33.

7 *New York Times*, April 28, 1943, p. 6.

1 Hyun, In the New World: The Making of a Korean American, 28.

2 Interview with Jean Park (pseudonym) pp. 37

3 Hyun, In the New World: The Making of a Korean American, 29.

4 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, 292.

5 Interview with Jean Park (pseudonym) pp. 39.

6 Warren Y. Kim *Koreans in America*. South Korea: Po Chin Chai, 1971. 138.

7 Bong-Youn Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago, 1979), p. 172.

danger point...once or twice I have feared violence against the Japanese.”¹ In their newspapers, the Ilsae portrayed the Japanese as “barbaric, blood-thirsty imperialists, and Koreans were innocent, peace-loving victims, with clam nerve and hidden courage.”² The strong anti-Japanese sentiments that the Ilsae had cultivated prior to the war, nurtured by their passionate Korean nationalism and their anguish over Japanese imperial rule, continued even after the American entrance into the Second World War, as the Ilsae took full advantage of the opportunity to display these ideas.

28 The Ilsae were incentivized to join the American war effort by their Korean identity and the belief that an Allied victory would achieve their pre-war nationalistic dreams for an independent Korea. The Isae, because they had developed American identities, therefore joined the war effort because they believed that it was its American civic duty. Peter Hyun displayed American patriotism by stating that he enlisted because “I could no longer remain a civilian, driving around in a station wagon, pushing a transit and earning a fat wage” while there were American soldiers being killed overseas.³ Allison Varzally argues that fighting for the United States abroad encouraged new understandings among Asian soldiers and new articulations of their identities as ethnic Americans.⁴ Thus, the Isae, who had largely developed American identities, viewed joining the war effort as an articulation of this American identity. Varzally further argues that Japanese-Americans and perhaps the Isae as well, eagerly enlisted in the armed forces because they believed in fighting for democracy overseas and that by serving their country, their country would serve them.⁵ Furthermore, because their high levels of assimilation to the other ethnic groups, the Isae willingly served the United States alongside their compatriots of Japanese descent in the armed forces, something that the Ilsae, who fostered hostile sentiments towards anyone of Japanese ancestry wouldn’t dare do. When Lieutenant Colonel Farrant Turner suggested that Captain Young-Oak Kim, a Korean-American born and raised in California, should transfer out of the 100th Infantry Battalion, a unit of Japanese-Americans from Hawaii, Kim responded “they’re Americans and I’m an American, and we’re going to go fight for America, so I want to stay.”⁶ This reveals how the Isae, such as Captain Kim, joined the war effort to fight for America whereas the Ilsae fought for Korea. Due to their high levels of assimilation and development of American identities prior to war, the Isae joined the war effort because they believed it to be their American responsibility to answer their call of duty.

1 Morton Grodzins. *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

2 “The Editorials,” *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly*, September 30, 1942, I.

3 Hyun, In the New World: The Making of a Korean American, 29.

4 Allison Varzally, *Making a non-White America: Californians coloring outside ethnic lines, 1925-1955*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 173.

5 Ibid, 161.

6 Personal Interview of Colonel Young Oak Kim, conducted by Go For Broke: National Education Center

Young-Oak Kim’s eagerness to fight alongside Japanese Americans revealed how the Isae’s pre-war friendly relations with Japanese-Americans persisted after Pearl Harbor as they continued to identify them as fellow Americans. After hearing of the attacks on Pearl Harbor, a young Isae state that “it didn’t make me feel differently toward the Japanese...we’ve lived with them all along and know them well and it didn’t occur to me that they were responsible.”¹ Mary Paik Lee recalls how when her Japanese neighbors were interned, they asked if she could look after their things to prevent “white people intending to take away all kinds of belongings.” Lee responded that she “would look after their things as much as possible.”² Peter Hyun refers to the Executive Order 9066 as a “shameful blemish on the history of American that will never be wiped off America’s conscience” and “an unforgivable blunder.”³ The Isae sympathized with the Japanese during their internment, as Jean Park recalls feeling “sad to hear that their land was taken away from them.”⁴ Due to their large levels of assimilation in which they enjoyed a long history of coexistence with the Japanese-Americans, the Isae maintained friendly and sympathetic attitudes towards their Japanese compatriots during the Second World War.

Uniquely incentivized by their vastly differing prewar values, identities, and experiences, the Ilsae and the Isae collectively mustered extraordinary support for the American war effort through various means. They joined the armed forces. Because many of the Korean immigrants remembered the Japanese they had been forced to learn in Occupied Korea, they joined the armed forces as interpreters.⁵ One fifth of Los Angeles’ Korean population joined the California National Guard in a Korean unit called the Tiger Brigade. Elderly women served in the Red Cross, while old Korean men volunteered as emergency fire wardens. Between 1942 and 1943, Koreans purchased more than \$239,000 worth of defense bonds: a sum extraordinary for a population of only ten thousand.⁶ Koreans also organized many American Red Cross fundraisers and benefit shows that featured Korean performances.⁷ 29

The contributions of the Koreans in the United States to the American war effort were not that of a singular group of people with a collective motivation. Rather, the war reflected the two distinct generations, the Ilsae and the Isae, and each with its own unique identity, values, and experiences that predate the Second World War. While the Ilsae maintained strong connections to their

1 Interview of Jean Park, in Kim “Three Generations of Koreans in America,” section on Park, p. 46.

2 Lee, *Quiet Odyssey*, 94.

3 Hyun, In the New World: The Making of a Korean American, 189.

4 Interview of Jean Park, in Kim “Three Generations of Koreans in America,” section on Park, p. 46.

5 Bong-Young Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1979), 326.

6 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, 367.

7 Lili M. Kim “How Koreans Repealed their “Enemy Alien” Status: Korean Americans’ Identity, Culture, and National Pride in Wartime Hawaii.” *From the Land of Hibiscus: Koreans in Hawaii, 1903-1950*. 211.

Korean identities and developed merit-seeking policies, the Isae assimilated with the other ethnic groups in the United States, leading to their development of American identities. Upon the United States Congress' declaration of war and the nation's consequent entrance into the Second World War following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, these distinct identities prevailed, as they caused each generation to procure unique incentives for contributing to the war effort. While the Isae maintained their merit-seeking policies and joined the American war effort in the hopes that an Allied victory will realize their dreams of an independent Korea, the Isae's identity as Americans caused them to view the war effort as their American call of duty. With their unique motives and incentives, the two generations of Koreans fought in the battlefields overseas, bought war bonds, and served the United States with a fervent passion. Thus, the "Day of Infamy" proved to be the watershed in the dark history of Koreans; as the Isae and Isae both rushed to America's defense, they ran towards eventual Allied victory and Korean independence, as well as the removal of Koreans from the "enemy alien" categorization; December 7th, 1941, provided the Isae with Korea's liberation, and allowed the Isae to take a giant leap towards eventually enjoying the liberties of American citizenship. The Day of Infamy was a day of liberation and a day of hope. To the Koreans in the United States, December 7th, 1941 was the perfect storm.

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PATCO's Indelible Legacy on the American Worker

RAJ MATHUR

On the morning of August 5, 1981, a group of workers gathered in Long Island's Eisenhower Park, ignored a Federal Marshal who told them to return to work, and were soon after fired from their jobs. Rather than despair, the men were empowered to raise their fists in the air and perform what one columnist called, in reference to a militant Black Panther, a "Stokely Carmichael salute."¹ But to the shock of the columnist, Jimmy Breslin, the men were far from militants or anarchists. Rather, they were middle-class "members of suburban white America" and predominantly military veterans.² Specifically, they were air traffic controllers—and they were on strike. Two days earlier, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) had crippled global air traffic by declaring a strike. Just hours after the strike began, President Ronald Reagan issued an ultimatum: any air traffic controller who did not return to work within 48 hours would be fired and permanently banned from federal employment. The threat failed to bring the controllers back to work. On August 5, 1981 President Reagan invoked the Taft-Hartley Act's ban on strikes by federal employees, fired all 11,385 striking air traffic controllers and banned them permanently from federal employment.³

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The PATCO strike was the culmination of more than fifteen years of negotiations between air traffic controllers and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).⁴ The impetus to create an air traffic controllers union came after a 1960 midair collision over New York City, which killed all 128 people onboard the two flights and caused a deadly fire in Park Slope, Brooklyn. The crash was 1 Joseph McCartin, *Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, The Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike That Changed America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 298.

2 Ibid.

3 PATCO's strike was unequivocally illegal under the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act (more commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.) However, it is necessary to note that numerous government unions engaged in strike action between 1947 and 1981 without being penalized. Perhaps the most notable example is the 1970 postal workers strike, in which more than 210,000 workers participated. See Aaron Brenner, "Postal Workers' Strike," in *The Encyclopedia of Strikes in American History*, ed. Aaron Brenner, Benjamin Day and Immanuel Ness (New York: ME Sharp Inc., 2009), 266-277 for a more comprehensive discussion.

4 The Federal Aviation Administration was known as the Federal Aviation Agency until 1967. The name was changed when the organization came under the purview of the Department of Transportation. Before 1967, it was a separate entity that reported directly to the president. For a detailed discussion, see Theresa L. Kraus, *The Federal Aviation Administration: A Historical Perspective, 1903-2008* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, 2011), Chapter 3: From Agency to Administration. Many controllers felt that the incorporation of the FAA into the Department of Transportation was harmful to their interests, as the Administration faced a great deal of pressure to bring controllers' wages and benefits in line with other federal transportation employees.

attributed in part to a lack of national air traffic coordination and antiquated technology.¹ Air traffic controllers attempted to organize several times after the incident, but the efforts were short-lived because the controllers felt that FAA officials, who were allowed to participate, had too much influence. The company unionism that had so troubled private sector workers before the passage of the Wagner Act was also problematic for these public sector employees.²

Therefore, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) was founded in late 1967 solely for controllers. The name of the organization is emblematic of the middle class, professional values that many air traffic controllers aspired to, even though the job required nothing more than a high school education. PATCO strived to ameliorate the exceedingly stressful working conditions of air traffic controllers, which caused "high blood pressure, heart disease, nervous breakdowns, [and] the highest rate of ulcers of any occupation in the United States," increase the controllers' stagnant wages, and create public recognition and appreciation for a profession that many controllers felt was taken for granted.³

Within a year of its founding, PATCO initiated the first collective action against the United States government in history: Operation Air Safety. The operation consisted of a slowdown that snarled transatlantic travel and caused significant delays. The FAA and President Lyndon Johnson quickly conceded to PATCO's demands: a dues checkoff system, so that PATCO dues were automatically deducted from members' paychecks each month, and an exemption for controllers from some federal overtime restrictions.⁴ Over the following years, PATCO locals—which had sprung up across the nations and were espe-

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1 McCartin, *Collision Course*, 15.

2 Nelson Lichtenstein, *State of the Union: A Century of American Labor* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 37.

3 McCartin, *Collision Course*, 92. The government was aware of the health dangers involved with the profession. In 1970, Secretary of Transportation John Volpe created the Air Traffic Controller Career Committee and gave it the broad mandate to inquire into the profession. With respect to the dangers of the job, the Committee found that "there is compelling evidence that many controllers work for varying periods of times under great stress. Also they are confronted with the necessity of making life and death decisions within very short time frames – decisions which require constant standards of perfection. Additionally, the operation schedule in most facilities requires that the personnel work on a 24-hour, multi-shift basis, 365 days a year. This schedule adds to the day-in-and-day-out wear and tear on the individual and to the disruption of normal family and social relationships. The controller is convinced that the job is unique in that he will 'burn out' between ages 40-50 and will not be able to continue controlling traffic." John J. Corson, "Air Traffic Controller Career Committee Report" (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 1970), 3. The sense that the federal government had little interest in solving or even acknowledging these problems, even though it was clearly aware of them, went on to play a significant role in PATCO's eventual decision to call a strike.

4 John J. Seddon, "PATCO – A Perspective – Who Were They? What Were They, And What Could Have or Should Have Been Done?" (MA Thesis, Empire State College, 1990), 24.

cially powerful in travel hubs like New York, Chicago and Atlanta—launched several other successful collective action attempts. The air traffic controllers were well aware that even a local strike could have a global impact, and they used this unique leverage during PATCO's early years to produce quick and fruitful resolutions to disputes with the FAA.

However, the 1970s proved to be a much more challenging decade for the controllers. Stagflation, a simultaneous increase in inflation and decline in growth, created the first economic crisis “since collective bargaining came to the public sector in the 1960s.”¹ Even though inflation eroded workers’ purchasing power, decreasing tax revenues and growing budget deficits meant that the FAA was increasingly unwilling to concede to the fledgling union’s demands. Presented with these challenges, PATCO “emerged as the most militant, most densely organized union” among those that bargained with the federal government.² However, the controllers found that their old tactics were not nearly as effective. For example, in 1976 PATCO demanded that the government reclassify controllers higher on the Civil Service’s General Schedule (GS) salary scale. PATCO co-founder Jack Maher tasked an “army of slowdowners” with conducting “guerilla warfare” to achieve this. The results of the militant tactics were not satisfactory for many controllers—numerous facilities were not upgraded on the GS scale, and one was even downgraded.³ Coinciding with stagflation, deregulation of the industry by President Carter allowed airlines to create a hub-and-spoke system of air traffic that greatly increased pressure on the most powerful PATCO locals. As the decade went on, there emerged a normative sentiment that the dramatic pressure air traffic controllers faced entitled them to higher pay, better benefits, and more suitable working conditions.⁴

On October 20, 1980, then Republican nominee for president Ronald Reagan wrote what is in retrospect a deeply ironic letter asking PATCO for its endorsement. In the letter, he stated that he deplored controllers “working unreasonable hours,” promised to “take whatever steps are necessary to provide our air traffic controllers with the most modern equipment available,” and pledged to “adjust staff levels and work days so that they are consummate with achieving a maximum degree of public safety.”⁵ Thoroughly unhappy with President Carter’s economic performance and impressed by Reagan’s union background, PATCO gave the former president of the Screen Actors Guild its unequivocal endorsement.⁶

¹ McCartin, *Collision Course*, 146.

² *Ibid.*, 145.

³ *Ibid.*, 165-173.

⁴ Arthur Shostak and David Skocik, *The Air Controllers’ Controversy: Lessons from the PATCO Strike* (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 1986), 22.

⁵ Strike Letters, 1980-1981.” PATCO V_13_01, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization Records (electronic version), L1986-45, Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta.

⁶ Reagan’s advisers had attempted to court PATCO’s endorsements for several months before the organization agreed. During this time, the advisers “did not denounce PAT-

PATCO began contract negotiations with the FAA upon Reagan’s election. The air traffic controllers’ primary demands were an across the board \$10,000 pay increase, a \$15,000 increase in their maximum potential salary, a cost of living increase 1.5 times the rate of inflation, and a 8 hour reduction in their work week (from 40 to 32 hours).¹ The FAA was frustrated with PATCO’s increasing demands over the past years, and they were particularly incensed by these significant stipulations. Other government officials agreed with the FAA—one Office of Management and Budget report called air traffic controllers “the most overpaid, pampered employees in the Nation.”² Still, the FAA did not want a strike, and therefore offered the controllers a significant and unheard of concession: a 5% across the board salary increase, along with several other “sweeteners” such as total exemption from overtime pay and paid lunch.³ Such a proposal was unprecedented in negotiations with the federal government, and PATCO President Robert Poli discussed it with the union’s leadership. The air traffic controllers, angered by what they perceived as Reagan reneging on his earlier promises as a candidate and emboldened by both their generally positive track record with militant action and ability to disrupt global air traffic, voted to initiate a nationwide strike. On the morning of August 5, 1981, just as Poli had once memorably threatened, American skies fell silent.

Numerous academics, politicians and activists have anecdotally related that the PATCO strike represents a seminal moment in the history of U.S. labor relations. During his time as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan referred to President Reagan’s handling of the event as his “most important... [economic] initiative.”⁴ It is difficult to dispute that the decision to fire more than ten thousand federal employees for striking has had long-term, structural implications for both the private and public sectors. However, the historical analysis of the event has been limited to the events leading up to and during the 1981 strike. To the extent that historians have considered events beyond 1981, discussion has been limited to how the former controllers fared after the strike. There have been few attempts to explicate in any specificity the influence the event has had on unions, capital, and labor relations. This is precisely the lacuna I attempt to fill with my research.

In my analysis, I hope to detail the specific effects of the strike. I begin with a bifurcated study, in which I consider the effects the event had on both organized labor and on corporate America. I emphasize how each side’s normative perceptions of its own power – and influence – were impacted by the strike. CO’s aggressive and explicitly stated” demands—the very same demands that they later balked at as senior officials in the Administration. See McCartin, *Collision Course*, 329.

¹ Seddon, “PATCO – A Perspective,” 45.

² As quoted in McCartin, *Collision Course*, 257.

³ Stanley Aronowitz, *Working Class Hero: A New Strategy for Labor* (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1983), 68.

⁴ “Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan: The Reagan Legacy,” The Federal Reserve Board, last modified April 3, 2003, accessed December 7, 2013, <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/200304092/default.htm>.

Following this, I analyze three specific labor and capital disputes during the 1980s and 1990s and attempt to tease out the impact of the strike on labor relations. I argue that the PATCO strike redefined the manner in which capital and labor viewed labor relations, and significantly shifted the balance of power towards a newly empowered corporate America. These new understandings have had discernible impacts on labor relations in the United States over the past thirty years. Corporations have consistently relied on permanent replacement workers to undermine the power of strike action, and unions have subsequently greatly decreased the use of such militant behavior.

THE PATCO STRIKE'S IMPACT ON CORPORATE AMERICA

Historian and labor activist Stanley Aronowitz has argued that PATCO's inability to "contest, let alone command, the public discourse" allowed President Reagan "to set the discursive agenda for the conduct of the strike."¹ These discourses influenced corporate America far beyond 1981, and changed the way in which it understood its relationship with labor. I posit that the conclusion of the PATCO strike created and perpetuated notions of labor as a commodity that can easily be replaced in corporate America. Specifically, President Reagan implicitly endorsed and normalized the use of permanent replacement workers—which allow an employer to terminate the employment of its entire workforce and hire new workers if it pleases. This process circumvents contract negotiations entirely, as the old contracts are voided once the workers are fired and the employer is not required to negotiate a new agreement. Indeed, Reagan did exactly this during the PATCO strike: he fired approximately 80% of all civilian air traffic controllers in the United States, banned them from federal employment, and initiated the process to replace them. Jeremy Brecher has argued that the practice of employing permanently replaceable workers was "virtually unknown in the U.S. [between] the institutionalization of labor law in the 1940" and the 1980s.² The effect of the President of the United States himself indiscriminately replacing union workers, irrespective of their skills, cannot be understated. It encouraged corporate America to accept the notion that permanent replacement was an acceptable recourse when workers initiated a strike.

Donald J. Devine, a Reagan Administration official who at the time of the strike was the director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, has argued emphatically that the PATCO strike gave "American business leaders...a lesson in

¹ Aronowitz, *Working Class Hero*, 70.

² Jeremy Brecher, "World Crisis and Worker Response" (1999), 6.
<http://depts.washington.edu/pcls/documents/research/Brecher_WorldCrisis.pdf>

In 1939, the Supreme Court interpreted the National Labor Relations Act as permitting employers to permanently replace striking workers. The ruling became known as the Mackay Doctrine. As noted, however, management rarely invoked the doctrine until the 1980s because of the "strength of the labor movement" during this period. See Joe Burns, *Reviving the Strike: How Working People Can Regain Power and Transform America* (New York: IG Publishing, 2011), 59-69.

managerial leadership that they could not and did not ignore."³ He also stated that private sector executives personally informed him that "they were able to cut the fat from their organizations and adopt more competitive work practices because of what the government did [during the strike]."⁴ Devine does not detail these practices, but it can be inferred by tracing the broader trends in labor relations at the time that he is at least in part referring to the use of permanent replacement. Clinton Secretary of Labor Robert Reich noted in Congressional testimony "that employer willingness to hire permanent striker replacements seriously hampered cooperation between labor and management." He specifically pointed to the practice of corporations advertising for permanent replacements even before negotiations begin, which he likened to the "stockpiling [of]...raw materials"—a clear reference to the commoditization of labor.⁵

Labor leaders also believe that the PATCO strike empowered corporate America. In 2000, George Becker, who at the time was president of the United Steelworkers and a Vice President of the AFL-CIO, penned an article entitled "Restoring Respect After the PATCO Strike." The article was written in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 Stand Up for Steel movement, which lobbied U.S. Congress to protect the increasingly endangered American steel industry by placing quotas on all foreign producers. Ultimately, while the House of Representatives voted in favor of the bill, the White House expressed limited support and the Senate rejected it. In his article, Becker reflects that the "busting [of the PATCO strike by Reagan] sent a message to some corporate leaders that the parameters of acceptable behavior had changed."⁶ Like Devine and Reich, Becker believes that the PATCO strike normalized anti-labor policies in corporate America. Even the federal government noted the rise of permanent replacements after PATCO. The General Accounting Office found in 1991 that "seven out of eight union representatives and two out of three employer representatives believed that permanent replacements were used 'more often' or 'far more often' in the late 1980s than the late 1970s. In 1985 and 1989, one-quarter of employers said they would use permanent replacements and fifteen percent had actually used permanent replacements in economic strikes."⁷

Beyond these anecdotal interpretations, there is quantitative data that proves the prevalence of permanent replacement workers as a weapon for companies during a strike. Researcher Michael LeRoy has analyzed the use of striker replacements by American firms from the 1950s through the 1990s. In the 1950s, there was one documented use of permanent replacements per 80 major work

¹ Donald J. Devine, *Reagan's Terrible Swift Sword* (Ottawa, IL: Jameson Books, 1991), 84.

² Ibid.

³ Statement of Robert B. Reich, Secretary of Labor Before the Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, March 30, 1993.

⁴ George Becker, "Restoring Respect After the PATCO Strike," *New Steel* (August 2000).

⁵ As quoted in Burns, *Reviving the Strike*, 64.

stoppages by American companies. In the following decade, the rate declined to one per 83 major work stoppages. In the 1970s, there was a slight increase in employers' tendency to use permanent replacement workers, and the rate rose to one per 66 major work stoppages. However, in the aftermath of the PATCO strike firms began to normatively use the striker replacement tactic. In the ten years after 1981, employers used permanent replacements in roughly one out of seven major work stoppages—a dramatic shift indicative of a new approach to labor relations. The rate remained approximately the same through 1996, in which LeRoy published his work. Moreover, he is careful to note that his quantitative analysis cannot indicate what affect the prevalence of replacement had on labor's willingness to use strikes as a bargaining tactic. Therefore, there could be many more cases in which unions chose not to strike because they could be replaced—thereby making the practice even more widespread than LeRoy's analysis would indicate.¹

38 y the 1990s, permanent replacement workers were so often used by corporate America that the Democratic Party's attempts to outlaw the policy—essentially unheard of a decade earlier—were met with fierce and organized resistance. In the aftermath of several major corporations replacing strikers, Democratic Senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced the Striker Replacement Act in early 1993.² The act would have amended the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 to make it an “unfair labor practice” to hire a permanent replacement worker for a worker who at “the commencement of a labor dispute was [a member of]...a labor organization [that] was the certified or recognized exclusive representative.”³ The Clinton Administration pledged support for banning the use of permanent replacement workers, but it was strongly opposed by conservative groups like the Heritage Foundation and a wide range of corporate leaders.⁴ The Chamber of Commerce argued that the bill “would unwisely tilt the balance of power in contract negotiations to the unions' favor.”⁵ Although

¹ Michael H. LeRoy, “The Changing Character of Strikes Involving Permanent Striker Replacements,” *Journal of Labor Research* (XVI:4) 1995.

² Charles Thomas Kimmitt notes that the 1992 replacement of striking Greyhound bus drivers particularly captured national attention. Incredibly, “replacement bus drivers and bus riders became the targets of sniper fire” after Greyhound replaced the strikers! Naturally, customers stopped using Greyhound buses in the areas targeted, and the replacements became unwilling to drive those routes. The event received national media coverage. See Charles Thomas Kimmitt, “Permanent Replacements, Presidential Power, and Politics: Judicial Overreaching in *Chamber of Commerce v. Reich*,” *The Yale Law Journal* 106:3 (1996): 811. Such violence also accompanied the 1985 Hormel strike, discussed at greater length in Section IV, and several other attempts by firms to replace strikers, although the Greyhound strike is unique in its intensity.

³ S. 55, 103rd Congress (1993).

⁴ William G. Laffer III, “How the Anti-Striker Replacement Bill Would Hurt American Workers,” Executive Memorandum #298 on Jobs and Jobs and Labor Policy: The Heritage Foundation, March 12, 1991. <<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1991/03/em298-the-anti-striker-replacement-bill>>

⁵ Clifford Krauss, “House Passes Bill to Ban Replacement of Strikers,” *New York Times*, June 16, 1993, accessed December 1, 2013, <<http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/16/us/house-passes-bill-to-ban-replacement-of-strikers.html>>.

the bill passed in the Democratically-controlled House of Representatives, a Republican filibuster prevented cloture in the Senate. The 1994 midterm elections, which gave Republicans control of both chambers of Congress, ended all hope for the bill's passage.

The fight to create regulations against permanent replacement was not finished. In 1995, President Clinton chose to act unilaterally by issuing Executive Order 12954, which instructed federal agencies to cease contracting with employers who permanently replaced lawfully striking workers. This order did not address the fact that it was still illegal for federal employees to strike. Nonetheless, the Executive Order was seen as a victory for private sector unions. On the other hand, it was met with fierce opposition from corporate America. The former's celebration was short-lived, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the Executive Order on the basis that it “preempted” the National Labor Relations Act and exceeded presidential authority.¹ The Chamber of Commerce was the leading plaintiff in the suit.² There were no further attempts at the federal level to illegalize the use of permanent replacement workers. The two major political attempts to outlaw permanent replacement inform our analysis with respect to how normative the practice had become by the 1990s. Indeed, it is from their failure that we discern the immense value of permanent replacement to American capital, and conversely its devastating impact on American labor.

THE PATCO STRIKE'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN UNIONISM

The demise of PATCO left an indelible mark on American unionism. Joseph McCartin has noted that the air traffic controllers strike “was unprecedented for its geographic reach, unfolding in every state and territory of the U.S....the highly visible busting of the union sent ripples through every community large enough to have an airport” and indeed any household with a television tuned into the unfolding drama.³ The handling of the air traffic controllers changed how labor unions perceived their own ability to successfully engage in collective action. Since the strike, union leaders have lamented their diminished bargaining power with respect to capital. This normative sentiment—that there has been in a paradigm shift in U.S. labor relations in favor of management—is evident not just in labor discourse, but has actually been reflected in union

¹ Michael H. LeRoy, “Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality of Executive Order 12954 Debarment of Contractors Who Hire Permanent Strike Replacements,” *Boston College Law Review* 37 (March 1996): 229.

² Peter T. Kilborn, “Clinton Order Discouraging Striker Replacement Is Voided,” *New York Times*, February 3, 1996, accessed December 1, 2013, <<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/03/us/clinton-order-discouraging-striker-replacement-is-voided.html>>.

³ Joseph A. McCartin, “Approaching Extinction? The Declining Use of the Strike Weapon in the United States, 1945–2000,” in *Strikes Around the World, 1968–2005: Case Studies of Fifteen Countries*, ed. Sjaak van der Velden, Heiner Dribbusch, Dave Lyddon, and Kurt Vandaele (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2007): 145.

strategy. It has most clearly manifested itself in the considerable decline of what was once the central tool of union militancy: strike action. Both private and public sector unions have been highly reluctant to resort to strike action since 1981—in large part because the threat of permanent replacement workers has made such activity an “empty gun.”¹ As a result, union strategy has shifted to protracted litigation battles with capital.

Analysis of post-1981 union documents and testimony reveals a discursive shift in how organized labor perceived its own bargaining power. Just four years after Reagan replaced the controllers with scabs—the term many in the labor movement derisively use to refer to permanent replacement workers—the AFL-CIO published a highly distributed treatise on labor relations entitled “The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions.” At the outset, the authors of the document argued that even though “it is difficult to quantify [the] change in employer attitudes and actions” since 1980, “we [union leaders and members] all know it is there.”² The AFL-CIO also noted that the Reagan Administration “[encouraged] hostile employer actions by providing less and less protection to workers who exercise their right to organize and by setting an example for the most virulently anti-union employers” through its “handling of the air traffic controllers.”³ The authors implored unions to increase “efforts...to better publicize organized labor’s accomplishments, train their ‘spokesperson...in media techniques,’ and ‘inform reporters [at every level] about unions and trade unionism.’”⁴ The rationale behind this newfound emphasis on public relations was the perception among the movement’s leaders that unionism was on the downturn.

The most significant aspect of the document is the discussion of the future of American unionism. The primary method by which the AFL-CIO proposed to advance labor’s interests was through “[union experimentation] with new approaches to represent workers.” Specifically, the study recommended that unions move past their “traditional...adversarial collective bargaining relationship” with capital and embrace “arbitration or mediation rather than...[the] ultimate recourse to economic weapons.”⁵ The AFL-CIO actively discouraged the use of strike action in labor disputes, on the basis that such militancy was unlikely to succeed against permanent replacement. Implicit in this is the recognition of a paradigm shift in American labor relations that empowered capital and forced labor into a fundamentally conciliatory position.

¹ Timothy J. Minchin, “Labor’s Empty Gun: Permanent Replacements and the International Paper Company Strike of 1987–88,” *Labor History* 47:1 (February 2006): 21.

² “The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions: A Report by the AFL-CIO Committee on the Evolution of Work,” (1985): 10. H. John Heinz III Collection, Speech Work Files, Labor Series, Carnegie Mellon University Digital Collections.

<<http://doi.library.cmu.edu/10.1184/pmc/heinz/box00036/fld00003/bdl0005/doc0001>>

³ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

This understanding of the increasing power of the firm was not limited to union leadership, however, and was present among the rank and file membership as well. A union organizer who testified before the House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor in 1993 explained what caused this sentiment to develop. He stated that the “vicious practice [of the use of permanent replacement workers]” had created immense “financial and emotional distress” among union workers. He implored Congress to outlaw the practice, emphatically arguing that “[the] permanent replacement of strikers is not some economic equation dreamt up by some company official who is only interested in the bottom line [or] simply this debate in the halls of Congress...rather it is real life that often carries devastating consequences.”¹ Joe Burns, a labor lawyer and activist in Minneapolis, lamented in 2011 that strike action has become “ineffectual” because workers in effect “[sit] on picket lines [and wait] for scabs to take their jobs.”² The sudden convenience of scabs placed union workers on the defensive. One of union membership’s most significant benefits—job security—was fundamentally eroded overnight.

The growing bargaining power of capital is not solely reflected in labor discourse and can be discerned also from the precipitous decline of strike action by both public and private sector unions. With respect to the federal government, strike action has remained illegal and there has not been a federal workers strike since Reagan’s dismissal of PATCO in 1981.³ This is in contrast to the decades before PATCO, in which federal strikes were rare but certainly not unheard of. A similar effect has been observed on the state and local levels. During the 1960s and 1970s, public sector employees dramatically increased the use of strike action. The busting of PATCO in August of 1981 quickly reversed this trend, however, and just by the end of the year public sector strikes had fallen by 46% as compared to 1980. Teachers’ strikes, which were the most “common form of public-sector work stoppage in the 1970s,” fell by 56% between 1979 and 1982.⁴ The reason for this decline is well captured in a 1993 leaflet distributed to Chicago teachers by their union. The union’s leadership agreed to a concessionary contract that froze pay, upsetting many teachers who then threatened to vote it down. In response, the leadership distributed a leaflet titled “Remember PATCO?” The leaflet continued, “Their union was destroyed and they all lost their jobs. Don’t let that happen to us.”⁵ This tactic was successful and the teachers voted in favor of pay freeze. Unfortunately, the Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped recording separate data on public sector strikes after 1982. However, Joseph McCartin argues that public sector strikes continued to decline in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s—no doubt in large part due to the threat of permanent replacement.

¹ House Report 103-116, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. 27 (1993).

² Joe Burns, *Reviving the Strike: How Working People Can Regain Power and Transform America* (New York: IG Publishing, 2011), 157.

³ Brenner, 267.

⁴ McCartin, “Approaching Extinction?” 140-143.

⁵ As quoted in McCartin, *Collision Course*, 361-362.

Joseph McCartin also carefully traced the decline of the strike in the private sector. Strike activity peaked in the 1950s, hitting a high in 1952 at 470 work stoppages involving 2,746,000 workers. The overall major work stoppage rate (stoppages involving greater than 1000 workers) "held fairly steady" over the following two decades. However, since 1980 strike action has declined "rapidly and continuously." The average number of major work stoppages plummeted in the 1980s to 83, and fell further in the 1990s to 34. The rate has continued to fall since then, and in 2002 the United States had only 19 major work stoppages involving 46,000 workers—a figure that McCartin points is 1/60th the number of workers involved in major work stoppages in 1952.¹ In 2009, there were only five major work stoppages involving 13,000 workers—just slightly greater than the amount of air traffic controllers involved in PATCO strike! McCartin also notes that smaller unions have not been immune from this trend, writing that "there is little reason to believe that smaller-scale work stoppages defied the downward trend in major work stoppages."² Indeed, the threat of permanent replacement looms particularly large for workers participating in small strikes. In addition, activist Joe Burns has noted that strikes have progressively become shorter. Whereas in 1952 upwards of 49 million days were lost to work stoppages—.38% of all work time—in 2008 that number was less than 2 million—less than .01% of all work time.³ Both the occurrence and longevity of strike action have seen a dramatic downturn since 1981.

- ⁴² Strike action has declined so precipitously in public and private sector unions in large part due to the constant threat of replacement. As the air traffic controllers and so many others have learned, permanent replacement devastates union leverage in negotiations with management. Once they are replaced, workers have found that neither the government nor the firm has any incentive to continue negotiations and seek an amenable resolution. Permanent replacement—a tactic unheard of before the PATCO strike—has turned strike action, the defining tool of American unionism for decades, into an empty gun.

The removal of strike action as a viable tool for American unions has left a serious vacuum. Stephen A. Yokich, labor lawyer and associate general counsel for the United Automobile Workers, has written extensively on how the increasing use of striker replacements after 1981 changed the nature of collective bargaining. Specifically, he notes that the prospect of replacement has "[made] the process of bargaining a contract longer and more arduous...[a] union will go to great lengths [to] discover, document and litigate unfair labor practice (ULP) charges" before the National Labor Relations Board.

These wars of attrition occur until "one party is too exhausted to continue," and are devastating for union workers who in the interim see stagnating wages

¹ McCartin, "Approaching Extinction?," 140-142.

² Ibid, 143.

³ Burns, *Reviving the Strike*, 18.

and fewer benefits.⁴ The reason for this shift is that unions must now make all efforts to avoid impasses during negotiations. Once a workers' issue becomes irreconcilable, the only option is strike action—and that will invariably lead to replacement. More broadly, Joe Burns notes that "labor [has] learned to bargain without the weapon of a strike by accepting concessions, moderating bargaining demands and using limited, and less effective" activity such as pursuing litigation at length.² After a century and a half, unions have essentially abandoned the strike, resulting in a weaker labor movement unable to effectively extract policy concessions from corporations.

Joseph McCartin has written that "just as the infamous Homestead strike set the tone for labor-capital conflict at the end of the nineteenth century, the PATCO strike helped establish the pattern for labor relations in the late twentieth century."³ The two most defining aspects of this pattern—the rise of permanent replacement and the decline of strike action—and their prevalence has been established. However, it is also analytically fruitful to observe how these aspects have played out in actual labor disputes since the demise of PATCO. The 1983 Phelps-Dodge Arizona Copper Mine strike, the 1985 Hormel Strike and the 1987 International Paper Strike are particularly characteristic of the broader trends in American labor since 1981. These strikes have been selected for analysis because they are indicative of the macro-historical trends in labor relations explicated in the earlier two sections. An extensive focus on these three strikes does not belie the sweeping normativity of those trends; rather, it is simply helpful in understanding how those trends have actually manifested themselves in labor-capital disputes. ⁴³

By 1983, the American copper industry was responding to a rapidly globalizing market and the most significant economic downturn since the Great Depression. Cognizant of this as well as the always-present possibility of replacement, Arizona copper unions—all members of the United Steelworkers of America—jointly proposed a three-year wage freeze with cost-of-living increases tied to inflation in contract negotiations. Several industry giants accepted the proposal, including Kennecott, Asarco, Inspiration Consolidated Copper and Magma Copper. Phelps Dodge, however, "came into the negotiations spoiling for a fight [and] convinced [they] could beat the union by employing new, aggressive bargaining tactics."⁴ Indeed, the company refused the pattern agreement and argued for further wage and healthcare cuts, as well as an end to the cost-of-living adjustments.

The mineworkers at the Phelps Dodge copper mine in Morenci, Arizona re-

¹ Stephen A. Yokich, "The Striker Replacement Doctrine as Seen by a Union Attorney," *Perspectives on Work: The Magazine of the LERA*, Online Companion (Fall 2006). <
<http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/Fall06-Yokich.htm>>

² Burns, *Reviving the Strike*, 69.

³ McCartin, *Collision Course*, 291.

⁴ Burns, *Reviving the Strike*, 66.

fused and went on strike in July of 1983. Just one month later, Phelps Dodge began to hire permanent replacements.¹ The company took out large employment ads for new workers in Tucson and Phoenix newspapers—a signal that the stigma once associated with the practice was gone.² When workers threatened to storm the mine to halt production, Democratic Governor Bruce Babbitt called the National Guard to escort the scabs to the mine and bust the strike. The strike was soon defeated, and “to add insult to injury” the scabs voted out the union.³ This dispute contains many components of the post-PATCO paradigm—a newly empowered corporation proposing an anti-labor contract and then quickly and openly permanently replacing strikers. The greatest fear of unions was also realized in the Phelps Dodge dispute—permanent replacement led to the complete deunionization of the company’s Arizona mines. This frightening prospect was one more consideration dissuading unions from strike action in the following decades.

44 The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) was quick to heed the aforementioned warnings of the AFL-CIO vis-à-vis the declining utility of strike action. The union, which represented more than one million workers in agricultural, meatpacking and food processing industries, followed a strategy of “controlled retreat” during the 1980s, “advising...workers to keep their heads down until the storm blew over.”⁴ However, many workers felt that the storm was only being exacerbated by conciliatory labor practices. In this spirit, when members of the UFCW’s Local P-9 in Austin, Minnesota were informed that their employer George A. Hormel & Company was seeking a 23% pay cut, they declared a strike and aggressively rallied public support. The P-9 meatpackers initiated a “corporate campaign that tried to bring consumer pressure against Hormel’s main bank, a consumer boycott of Hormel meat products, and [sent roving pickets] to other Hormel plants.”⁵

These tactics, which successfully captured national attention and brought support from unions around the country, may have succeeded had it not been for permanent replacement. In January of 1986, five months after the strike began, Hormel announced that it would hire scabs—and job applicants immediately “appeared on the scene.”⁶ When the strikers attempted to block the entrance to the meatpacking plant, Democratic Governor Rudy Perpich sent the National Guard to escort the replacements through the lines. Perpich’s actions

1 Barbara Kingsolver, “Holding the Line: Women in the Great Arizona Mine Strike of 1983” (Ithaca: ILR Press Books, 1996), 7.

2 Jonathan Rosenblum, “Copper Crucible: How the Arizona Miners’ Strike of 1983 Recast Labor-Management Relations in America” (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1998), 165.

3 Burns, *Reviving the Strike*, 67.

4 Peter Rachleff, “They Say Give Back, We Say Fight Back The Legacy of the Hormel Strike: Fifteen Years Later,” *Dollars & Sense: Real World Economics* 231 (September 2000), 3.

5 Steve Boyce, Jake Edwards and Tom Wetzal, “Slaughterhouse Fight: A Look at the Hormel Strike,” *Ideas & Action* 7 (Summer 1986): 4.

6 Rachleff, “They Say Give Back,” 4.

broke the strike, and soon after approximately 500 Hormel workers crossed their own picket lines to reclaim their jobs and work alongside the replacements. This was a humiliating outcome for these workers, and union members around the country soon became aware of it due to the national coverage of the strike. The remaining 1300 strikers were either forced to retire, fired, or take a place on the extensive recall list. The Hormel strike is indicative of permanent replacement’s power in removing union leverage. The Local P-9 workers were indeed successful in creating union solidarity and public sympathy. However, once they were replaced there was simply no other recourse that could advance the union’s goals, whether through negotiation or militant action.

The International Paper (IP) strike in July of 1987 followed a similar pattern. International Paper, both empowered by recent trends in labor relations and facing an increasingly competitive industry, offered a Maine local of the United Paperworkers International Union a contract that cut Sunday overtime pay, eliminated the union’s last remaining holiday (Christmas) and cut about 500 jobs.¹ The workers rejected the offer and declared a strike. Much like the Minnesota meatpackers, the workers were well-organized, drew national attention, and even followed the AFL-CIO’s advice in emphasizing the role of public relations. This did not stop IP from firing the strikers and permanently replacing them. The company’s president, Wayne Glenn, cited Reagan’s handling of PATCO as justification for his decision. He argued that “if it’s all right for the President of the United States to do it, well it’s all right for us CEOs to order 45 it done.”²

Timony J. Minchin has written that “the dispute graphically highlights how difficult it is for unions to win strikes in the contemporary US, confirming union leaders’ complaints that the hiring of permanent strike replacements has left them with an ‘empty gun.’”³ After losing their jobs, the workers sued International Paper for damages. Although a federal labor judge initially sided with the workers and stated IP was liable for up to \$55 million in damages for hiring replacements, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1992 overruled his decision and relieved IP from damages. The case set a lasting precedent, and left workers with no legal options when permanently replaced by their employer. After the IP rulings, unions had neither a militant recourse through which they could combat pro-capital contracts nor a legal recourse against permanent replacement. Since 1992, American corporations have leveraged this power to implement sweepingly pro-capital contracts—and American unions have had little

1 Sara Donnelly, “After the strike | In June 1987, Local 14 walked out of International Paper’s Jay mill. Twenty years later, the legacy of Maine’s most notorious labor fight lives on,” *MaineBiz: Maine’s Business News Source*, May 28, 2007, accessed December 1, 2013. <<http://www.mainebiz.biz/article/20070528/CURRENTEDITION/305289991/after-the-strike-in-june-1987-local-14-walked-out-of-international-paper%27s-jay-mill-twenty-years-later-the-legacy-of-maine%27s-most-notorious-labor-fight-lives-on>>

2 Minchin, “Labor’s Empty Gun,” 33.

3 Minchin, “Labor’s Empty Gun,” 21.

choice but to acquiesce.¹

CONCLUSION

Three months after Ronald Reagan fired the striking air traffic controllers, the Federal Labor Relations Authority took away PATCO's right to represent federal workers through decertification. Soon thereafter, Robert Poli resigned his position as president of PATCO.² After doing so, he wrote in the New York Times that he had been caricaturized by the media and public as a "bearded Jim Jones and an Ayatollah who was holding the flying public hostage."³ It was not until 1994 under President Bill Clinton that the controllers were once again allowed to work as federal employees. By then, however, many who had participated in the strike had either found new careers or passed retirement age. Just five years after PATCO's precipitous demise, the controllers who had replaced the strikers organized themselves by creating the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCO). They too grew frustrated with stagnant wages and the health dangers of the profession, and eventually demanded many of the same concessions as their predecessors in contract negotiations with the FAA.⁴ Without the threat of strike action as leverage, however, NATCO has faced an uphill battle.

46 The air traffic controllers strike of 1981 has to some extent disappeared from modern labor and capital discourses. However, the new understandings and practices it fostered have remained firmly entrenched over the past three decades. Permanent replacement continues to be the normative corporate response to strike action. However, labor disputes often do not reach that point—unions are well aware that strike action will lead to replacement, and so rely on less successful litigious means to advance their goals. Reagan's confrontation with PATCO undermined the bargaining power of American labor unions and empowered firms in contract negotiations. PATCO has played an unequivocal role in today's continuing stagnation of incomes despite rising corporate profits and worker productivity—an indelible legacy on the American economy and worker.

¹ Astute readers may point out that although I suggest the macro-historical trends of permanent replacement and declining strike action have persisted since 1981, the three examples I give in this section occurred in the eight years immediately following Reagan's decision. However, the very threat of permanent replacement has dissuaded strike action over the past three decades. This effect has been noted anecdotally, but is difficult to trace out quantitatively or through specific case studies because it is often implicit general knowledge. Still, additional study of union discussions of strike action since 1981 would be useful.

² "Poli Resigns Post With Controllers," New York Times, January 1, 1982, accessed December 1, 2013. <<http://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/01/us/poli-resigns-post-with-controllers.html>>

³ As quoted in McCartin, *Collision Course*, 330.

⁴ Stanley Aronowitz, *From the Ashes of the Old: American Labor and America's Future* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 8.

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Marie Beyond the Lais

CECILIA PELLEGRINI

Sometime between 1160 and 1170, a series of Breton Lais began to circulate in the royal court of England. These narrative poems were likely written for the Court of King Henry II and Eleanor of Aquitaine and became quite popular in twelfth century England.¹ They told of birds becoming knights and knights becoming wolves, of marriages broken by adultery, and others created by it. Sex and fertility were discussed freely; some women became pregnant, while others remained abstinent. The prolific author of these lais is the first known female French writer, who in the sixteenth century became known as Marie de France, a name that scholar Claude Fauchet assigned based on her own self identification.² Virtually nothing is known of Marie other than what can be gleaned from her writings; speculation concerning Marie de France's identity comes largely from her use of Anglo-Norman – a dialect of old French used in England at the time – to write the Lais.³ She is however, credited with four major works: the *Lais of Marie de France*, the *Fables*, the *Espurgatorie seint Patriz*, and *La Vie seinte Audrée*, a work only recently attributed to her. Through her works – particularly her *Lais* – Marie de France constructed a series of female characters, situations, and narratives that influenced medieval literature and challenged social and religious convictions of the twelfth century. Her fantastical stories of love, adultery, betrayal, and spirituality contain a broader commentary on medieval English and French society that indicates Marie's own controversial opinions on these subjects. Her works, rather than serving simply as entertainment, were a socio-cultural, political, and literary commentary on twelfth-century England and France at the time of their writing.

¹ The commonly accepted approximate dating for Marie's works are: *Lais* (1160–1170), *Fables* (1167–1189), *Espurgatoire* (1189–1215). See: Matilda Tomaryn Bruckner, "Marie de France," in *Medieval France: An Encyclopedia*, ed. William W. Kibler and Grover A. Zinn (New York and London, 1995), 589. For discussion of possible audience for the Lais see: Rothschild, Judith Rice. "Literary and Socio-Cultural Aspects of the Lais of Marie De France" and Karen M. Broadhurst, "Henry II of England and Eleanor of Aquitaine: Patrons of Literature in French?" *Viator* 27 (1996), 53–84.

² "Marie ai num, si sui de France," which translates as "My name is Marie, and I am from France." See Brucker's "Marie de France and the Fable Tradition" for autobiographical aspects of Marie's "Fables."

³ Speculations on Marie de France's identity range from abbess to a relative of King Henry II. Her works however, whatever her religious or secular inclinations may have been, still yield important information of the socio-cultural climate of the twelfth century. For further information on the identity of Marie de France see and discussion of anonymity: McCash, June Hall. "Was Marie de France a Nun?" *Le Cygne: Journal of the International Marie de France Society* 4, n.s. (2006), 7–26. For discussion of possible religious identities of Marie de France. Alternatively, discussing the possibility of a non-religious identity: Grillo, Peter R. (1988). "Was Marie de France the Daughter of Waleran II, Count of Meulan?" *Medium Aevum* 57: 269–273. Also see Rossi, Carla (2007). *Marie, ki en sun tens pas ne s'oblie; Maria di Francia: la Storia oltre l'enigma*. Rome: Bagatto Libri.

The Lais of Marie de France, arguably Marie's most famous work, is a collection of twelve Breton lais, common forms of medieval English and French poetic literature. The *Lais* are often noted for their celebration of love, wide range of narratives, vivid characters, and for addressing a variety of contemporary social interests. Superficially, the *Lais* are rather straightforward, composed in relatively simple French, and easily accessible to members of the court for whom they were likely written. Yet these same short poems reveal themselves to be complex narratives charting Marie's involvement in the popular discourse of the time. In addition to diving into discussions of the human body as both a sexual object and an asexual one, the *Lais* contain a measure of speculation into the nature of narrative writing itself. *The Lais of Marie de France* is divided into thirteen sections appearing in this order in the Harley 978 Manuscript: The General Prologue, "Guigemar," "Equitan," "Le Fresne," "Bisclavret," "Lanval," "Les Deux Amants," "Yonec," "Laüstic," "Milun," "Chaitivel," "Chevrefoil," and "Eliduc." Within the General Prologue (an introduction Marie wrote to the entire collection) and within the prologues of each individual lai, Marie's broader commentary on the court and literature is prevalent. While the lais themselves offer significant insight into Marie's possible opinions of her contemporary society, the inclusion of social commentary in the prologues suggests a purposeful attempt on her part to let the *Lais* develop into a communicative act towards the society surrounding her.

The General Prologue and the following individual lai prologues (and epilogues) strike a repetitive pattern in the composition of the collection, acting as indicators as to what may have been Marie's motivations and intentions for writing a commentary within the *Lais*. In the original Anglo-Norman French, three words that occur most often within these prologues are "la aventure," "la remembrance," and "la vérité."⁴ The first two words appear in the General Prologue (in English), providing evidence for Marie's primary motive in writing the Lais; in her own words, to "...perpetuate the memory of adventure they had heard."⁵ The continued restating of these words throughout the subsequent prologues and epilogues serves as an unceasing reminder to the reader – quite in line with Marie's "remembrance" – that these stories should not be forgotten. Why Marie chooses to emphasize this is indicated in the General Prologue where she writes, "I [Marie] myself have heard a number of them and do not wish to overlook or neglect them."⁶ Given the content of the Lais, it is not un-

¹ The only surviving collection that contains the Lais in its entirety is at the British Library, dated 1261–1265. Transcription of *Fables* and *Lais* of Marie de France appearing ff. 40–67v, 118–160.

² While these three are the most relevant for the topic at hand, for discussion of roles of the prologues and epilogues (as well as analysis of other themes present) see: Whalen, Logan E. "The Prologues and Epilogues of Marie De France." In *A Companion to Marie de France*, edited by Logan E. Whalen, 1–30. Boston: Brill, 2011.

³ Marie de France, *The Lais of Marie de France*. Trans. Glyn S. Burgess and Keith Busby. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2003.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 41

reasonable to think that while the explicit intent was to preserve tales of "aventure," what Marie de France was trying to preserve went beyond simple tales of knights and fantastic happenings. This indicates that "la vérité" – the truth – Marie alludes to in her prologues is a large component of what she wanted to preserve. Yet to understand what Marie may have been trying to communicate to her audience, "la aventure" is to be considered not only as the tale, but a significant component of a story. "Aventure" is defined in several ways: as "the material of the tale," a "story of experience," something that "relates prospectively to that which will come or happen," and finally connoting "chance, fortune, risk."¹ A subtle, transitory thread through the *Lais*, "la aventure" is the backbone upon which Marie de France builds her *Lais* and exploration of the third major theme, "la vérité."

Perhaps one of the most defining features of the *Lais of Marie de France* is exactly this assembly of the twelve poems to create a network of overlapping themes and motifs within which protagonists deftly defy traditional categories while giving rise to Marie's "vérité." In *Bisclavret* the line between beast and man is scrutinized and blurred; in *Yonec*, *Les Deux Amants*, and several other *lais*, the division between male and female is questioned. Her writing suggests a subtle disregard for categorical definitions. However, while human-to-animal relationships and connections were common, appearing in some of the very fables Marie translated into Anglo-Norman French, her treatment of the female characters is of special interest, not only for the value of the literary movement, but as a reflection and discourse on twelfth-century English society. In Marie's writing, the female figure is not portrayed solely as a helpless character, associated with the damning figure of Eve, nor is she idolized as a pure courtly woman, as was often the case in courtly literature. It is somewhat difficult to believe that such diverse and complex characterizations of women and sex, so different from Marie's contemporary poets, were created for entertainment value only. Marie's careful crafting of characters and situations point to a constructed commentary, or at least insight, into the society of the *Lais*.

Marie de France's depiction of women in the *Lais* is in many ways a response to the societal backdrop against which she wrote. In twelfth-century France and England, aristocratic men and women lived lives very different from those depicted in the *Lais*. Marriages were often orchestrated for political gain to ensure the continuation of a lineage and inheritance. Chastity and virginity were highly valued in women; a woman's fidelity in marriage was almost sacrosanct. Paternal approval was required for any marriage. Adultery was a severe crime and a husband could be exonerated for the murder of his disloyal wife and her lover.² As one of the very few medieval writers to identify herself as a woman,

¹ Bloch, R. Howard. *The Anonymous Marie de France*. London: University of Chicago Press Ltd, 2003.

² Krueger, Roberta L. "The Wound, the Knot, and the Book: Marie de France and Literary Traditions of Love in the *Lais*." In *A Companion to Marie de France*, edited by

Marie wrote within this social framework in a literary culture dominated largely by men. She reflected these topics and anxieties in her writing, sometimes by the telling of their exact opposite. Marie's meticulous crafting of events, such as the careful reunion of the knight Guigemar and his lover, force the reader to see the text as more than a simple observation of the narrative.¹ What Marie's audience begins to see in the *Lais* are female figures with agency: capable of taking power, initiative, and instigating events.² Though the woman figure may be manipulative and cruel, such as in "Bisclavret," she is never the passive, helpless character often found in the literature of the time. Marie immerses the female figures of her *Lais* into circumstances and situations that require action on their part. The structure she gives the literary setting of the *Lais* results in women gaining a voice equal in standing to men. Women give voices to their desires, motivations, lamentations, and situations, each achieving in their *lai* – for however brief a period of time – a degree of control over their own fate, if not success and happiness.³ A central idea to Marie's *Lais* is the ability of women, their actions, and their speech to affect the world around them. In "Bisclavret," she condemns a man to years in an animal form; in "Yonec" and "Le Fresne," mothers reveal life-altering truths; in "Lanval," a queen adopts a manipulative voice, trying to bend the eponymous knight, Lanval, to her will.

Not only do the *Lais* introduce a strong female voice in medieval literature, but the interactions between men and women are not limited to the negative reactions and subsequent silencing of the woman that are found in "Bisclavret" and "Lanval." Notably in "Yonec" and "Le Fresne," female and male figures interact in cooperation, the male often lending support to the female. In "Yonec," the female figure is supported both by her deceased lover and later by her son as she is restored to her place in society. Some historians have suggested that *lais* such as "Yonec" and "Guigemar" were based off Henry II's fifteen-year imprisonment of Eleanor of Aquitaine, and so perhaps those *lais* were a veiled commentary on this particular treatment of a woman.⁴ In her writing of women's roles, Marie indicates a challenge to women's traditional roles in literature and society: female figures, though still stereotyped, begin to emerge as independent figures capable of action and agency outside their scripted role in French and English society during the twelfth century as figures existing solely to benefit the masculine narrative.

Clearly, Marie de France presented the female figure unconventionally in her

Logan E. Whalen, 55-87. Boston: Brill, 2011.

¹ Marie de France, *Lais*, 52-54.

² For analysis of women and gender in two of Marie's other major works see McCash, June Hall. "Gendered Sanctity in Marie de France's *l'Espurgatoire Seint Patriz* and *La Vie Seinte Audree*." In *A Companion to Marie de France*, edited by Logan E. Whalen, 237-266. Boston: Brill, 2011.

³ Mickel, Jr., Emanuel J. (1974). *Marie de France*. New York, NY: Twayne.

⁴ Margaret Aziza Pappano, "Marie de France, Aliénor d'Aquitaine, and the Alien Queen," in *Eleanor of Aquitaine: Lord and Lady*, ed. Bonnie Wheeler and John Carmi Parsons (New York, 2002), pp. 337-67, here 361, n. 17.

writing. Contrary to the passive figure seen in most medieval tales, Marie had women and female sexuality take a more active role within her *lais*. Most tales of adventure, knights, and love involve sex in some shape or form; the *Lais of Marie de France* is no exception. For the majority of women in the twelfth century, pregnancy was an almost certain result of intercourse. And yet, in most courtly tales of romance, fertility and pregnancy almost never made an appearance.¹ It is instead only amongst Marie's tales of werewolves, shape shifting, fairies, and impossible feats, that the inevitable connection between sex and pregnancy makes its appearance in courtly literature. The juxtaposition of the fantastic with the often-ignored reality of childbearing may have very well been intentional, providing an intriguing contrast to the contemporary treatment of the topics. Rather than detract from the importance of the realities of sex for women, the inclusion of fertility in tales removed from reality provides a way to make the topic discussable. Presenting these topics alongside fantastical elements allows them to enter the literary and cultural society without causing too much controversy, a similar idea to the presentation of "la vérité" within "la aventure." Yet the representations and repercussions of sex in Marie de France's *Lais* are not simply reflections of the relationship between sex and pregnancy. Depictions of sex in the *Lais* vary from abstinence, to enforced monogamy, to adulterous affairs, and to children born out of wedlock. Her portrayal of sex, fertility, and by extension, women, is varied and addresses every possible aspect of female sexuality. Of the twelve *lais*, eight contain explicit references to sexual acts ("Yonec," "Milun," "Lanval," "Bisclavret," "Fresne," "Equitan," "Guigemar," and "Chevrefoil"), and the other four do not explicitly or implicitly reference sex.² Of the eight *lais* that openly reference sexual relations, four ("Fresne," "Yonec," "Bisclavret," and "Milun") include the birth of a child.

The diverse treatment of sexuality Marie employs within the *Lais* sets her apart from the generalizations she challenges in her works. The various depictions of sex within the *Lais* further suggest an effort on her part to remove sex from the literary stereotype it had fallen into as a carefree act for the benefit of the male character and force her readers to consider its reality. Apart from simply different sexual relationships being described in Marie's texts, generalizations are difficult to draw by the diverse depictions of sex. In "Equitan" and "Bisclavret," adulterous relationships lead to ruin and are negatively portrayed. Yet in "Guigemar," "Milun," "Yonec," and "Chevrefoil" adulterous relationships are viewed in a positive light. Likewise "Yonec" and "Milun" portray children resulting from the sexual union positively, while "Bisclavret" presents a negative view. Sterile relationships suffer the same dichotomy, as "Equitan" portrays a negative relationship while "Guigemar," "Fresne," "Lanval," and "Chevrefoil"

¹ For instance, relations between Lancelot and Guinevere, Guinevere and Arthur, Tristan and Iseut, and Iseut and Mark, never resulted in a child.

² "They lay down together" (Guigemar), "granted him possession of her body" (Equitan). Chevrefoil is the only *lais* to implicitly refer to sex through the relationship between the well-known characters.

depict a positive one.³ What an analysis of all these different types of relationships within the *Lais* ultimately reveals is the expressiveness of sexuality without traditional condemnation of certain sexual relationships, which is often portrayed androgynously.⁴ Molly Robinson Kelly's analysis of sexuality within each individual *lai*, along with the reoccurring structure of Marie's writing itself, suggest an intimate connection between the characters' sexualities and their motivations.⁵ For instance, in "Yonec" the woman's sexual relationship in an adulterous affair reflects her desire to escape her marriage to a man who keeps her locked away.⁶ The representation of sexuality as a mode of expression of the self is a remarkably modern concept for a twelfth century manuscript, even if it is put into context with fantasy-based romance narratives riddled with fantastical and unrealistic creatures. Also curious is the representation of the children themselves in Marie's stories. Single offspring are always depicted positively, as in "Yonec," "their son was born and well brought up, well protected and well loved", and "Milun," "now my life is whole again. In truth, friend, you are my son."⁷ Otherwise, multiple offspring are always seen in a negative light, as in "Fresne": "It has never occurred that a woman gave birth to two sons at once, nor ever will, unless two men are the cause of it".⁸ The offspring within the *Lais* often end up partially becoming a device of change – sometimes for better, sometimes for worse – in the narrative of the parent. While Marie's intent in writing such diverse accounts of expressive sexuality remains uncertain, the fact she chose to do so suggests a challenge of contemporary socio-cultural restrictions imposed on sexuality and women, hinting perhaps at "la vérité" ⁵⁵ of her prologue. It is entirely possible that Marie designed the *Lais* to contain such diversity in order to invite her audience to analyze the concept of love (and other motifs that appear in her work) outside of conventional beliefs.

In discussing socio-cultural undertones in The *Lais* of Marie de France, it would be erroneous to completely exclude discussion of religion from the consideration of a text written in the twelfth century. There are in fact several curious instances of religious manifestations within the *Lais*. Apart from the appearance of a religious figure in "Guigemar" who opposes the extramarital affair, which is hardly surprising considering Church tradition towards marriage and

¹ For individual analysis of sexual relationships within each individual *lai* see: Kelly, Molly Robinson. "Sex and Fertility in Marie de France's *Lais*." In *Sexuality in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times: New Approaches to a Fundamental Cultural-Historical and Literary-Anthropological Theme*, edited by Albrecht Classen, 241-256. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008.

² Further discussion of androgynous sexuality and of communal ties of love that transcend individual *lais* see: Rupert T. Pickens, "The Poetics of Androgyny in the *Lais* of Marie de France: Yonec, Milun, and The General Prologue," in *Literary Aspects of Courtly Culture*, ed. Donald Maddox and Sara Sturm Maddox (Rochester, NY, 1994), pp. 211-19.

³ See Kelly, "Sex and Fertility in Marie de France's *Lais*," for more on links between sexuality and motivation within each individual *lai*.

⁴ The *Lais* of Marie de France. Trans. Glyn S. Burgess and Keith Busby, pp. 86-94.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 61.

fidelity, the only significant discussion of religion occurs in "Yonéc." The adulterous affair the unnamed woman has with the knight Muldumarec is heavily connected to religion; in fact the entire lai is heavily Christianized.¹ Religion, specifically Christianity, is explicitly brought into play in the lai by the woman, who "answered the knight, saying she would make him her lover, provided he believed in God".² The knight replies:

I do believe in the Creator who set us free from the sorrow in which our ancestor Adam put us by biting the bitter apple. He is, will be and always has been life and light to sinners. If you do not believe this of me...I shall assume your appearance, receive the body of Christ, and recite all of my credo for you.³

56 The combination of sexuality with Christianity and of the sacred with the pagan divulges a dynamic equilibrium throughout the lai. It is particularly interesting that the lady in the lai should make this request the primary criterion for the instigation of an adulterous affair. As Molly Robinson Kelly asserts, the resemblance between this scene in the lai and Biblical stories is rather striking. The first description of the shape-shifting Muldumarec's appearance – "the shadow of a large bird through a narrow window," and "the bird flew into the room" – bears a remarkable resemblance to contemporary and past depictions of the Holy Spirit, by which Mary is believed to have conceived Jesus.⁴ The resemblance to the Biblical narrative is only reinforced by Muldumarec's almost prophetic declaration concerning their son shortly before his death, in which he predicts will be "grown up and become a worthy and valiant knight."⁵ When his son Yonéc, after whom the lai is named, grows into an adult, his mother reveals the identity of his true father, prompting Yonéc to act in his true father's name. It is, however, possible to presume a clever construction of religious tradition to present sex and fertility as mysterious and in some ways, sacred and grand; something that is not often done outside of the conception of Christ during the twelfth century. Again Marie seems to be posing a challenge to her audience to reconsider common beliefs surrounding fertility and sexuality by comparing natural childbirth to conception by the Holy Spirit. If not a direct commentary on her society, the lai at least extends an invitation to reinterpret facets of the socio-cultural environment of the readers.

The wealth of information, themes, motifs, and characters in *The Lais of Marie de France* make it hard to take the text and the author simply at face value. Though next to nothing is known about Marie de France, her literary influence stretched far across England and France, beginning in, what was presumed

¹ Molly Robinson Kelly, "Sex and Fertility in Marie de France's Lais." In *Sexuality in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times: New Approaches to a Fundamental Cultural-Historical and Literary-Anthropological Theme*, edited by Albrecht Classen, 241-256. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008.

² Marie de France, *Lais*, 87-88.

³ *Ibid.*, 88.


⁴ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 91.

to be, the court of King Henry II of England. What differentiated Marie de France from her contemporaries was not only her gender and anonymity, but the subjects she chose to deal with and the manner in which she chose to do so. What, in turn, makes *The Lais of Marie de France* different from her other writings and translations is its complexity and removal from conventional secular literature or simple retelling of the saints' lives. Where her other works dealt with translations or traditional religious writing of the lives of holy figures, her *Lais* moves into the realm of social commentary. Each individual lai merits an in-depth study of its own, yet an analysis of the collection as a whole and the literature surrounding it ultimately gives rise to the conclusion that this series of poems must hold a meaning beyond stories of "aventure". The socio-cultural, religious, and political commentary the *Lais* provide provoke questions in the minds of her readers and make the work an insightful exploration into twelfth century England and France. Embedded within stories of knights, fairies, and werewolves, Marie de France constructs an easily accessible commentary on her contemporary society to present to the royal court, putting her "vérité" in a prominent position in literary and social circles.

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"Brazil is Coffee, and Coffee is the Negro:" Coffee & its Role in Changing The Brazilian Labor Force in the 19th Century

WILLIAM SULLIVAN

60 Gabriel Mathieu de Clieu, a French naval officer, managed to transport a coffee plant from the *Jardin des Plantes* in Paris to Martinique in 1723. This successful transportation of one coffee plant was the introduction of coffee to the Americas.¹ Four years later, Francisco de Melo Palheta planted the first coffee beans in Brazil in the northern state of Pará.² At this time, there were border disputes between the governments of the European colonies north of modern-day Brazil and so, a system of exporting coffee beans from Dutch Guiana to Portuguese Brazil could not be negotiated. Francisco de Melo Palheta was sent to arbitrate. He did so successfully, but in the process, he also seduced the wife of the French governor. As Palheta departed for his home state of Pará, she handed him a bouquet of flowers, in which coffee berries were hidden. This parting gift between lovers changed the course of history for Brazil. Since Palheta's time, coffee has become an important force in Brazil's economic, cultural, and political development.

By the turn of the nineteenth century, coffee began to challenge sugar's status as Brazil's top export. After 1900, coffee became the most important crop produced in Brazil. Today, Brazil is the largest producer of coffee by a significant margin, producing more than twice as much as the second largest producer of coffee, Vietnam.³ Since the nineteenth century, coffee has been a major component of the Brazilian economy and by extension, its political schema and economic history.

As is the case with any product of such vital economic importance, the labor used to produce coffee is an integral component of the story of coffee's increasing significance to Brazil. So, as coffee became an increasingly important crop over the course of the nineteenth century, how did labor on *fazendas* (the Brazilian Portuguese term for plantations) develop and change? What role did the coffee industry play in the timing of abolition in Brazil and how did it continue to thrive after slavery was abolished?

¹ Mark Pendergrast, *Uncommon Grounds: The History of Coffee and How It Transformed Our World*, Revised ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 15.

² Boris Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, trans. Arthur Brakel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 103.

³ United States of America, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, *Coffee: World Markets and Trade*, June 2013, Table 02 Coffee Summary, <http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/coffee.pdf>.

In the wake of independence, *fazendeiros* in the newly autonomous Brazil relied more heavily on slave labor to produce larger quantities of coffee. The subsequent shift, triggered both by the desire amongst coffee elites for a Europeanization of Brazil and by international pressure to abolish the slave trade, was one from an industry (and a nation) heavily dependent on slave labor to one in which *fazendeiros* were finding a new labor source amongst Europeans and becoming increasingly opposed to slavery in Brazil.

It is unknown exactly when African slaves first arrived in Brazil. However, historians believe that Martim Afonso de Sousa, a Portuguese *fidalgos* (a man of noble birth), brought slaves with him, when he arrived in Brazil in 1531. This is significantly earlier than the arrival of African slaves to North America in 1619. Despite the fact that historians can not be confident about the precise date of the arrival of African slaves in Brazil, there are trustworthy estimates of how many slaves were brought in subsequently. These figures show that before 1800, Brazil imported more than eight and a quarter times the number of slaves that were imported by European colonists in mainland North America and more than thirty-six percent of all slaves brought to the Americas. These figures demonstrate how Brazil imported African slaves on an enormous scale and were a major fixture of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.¹

Exporters by nationality	Spain / Uruguay	Portugal / Brazil	Great Britain	Nether lands	U.S.A.	France	Denmark / Baltic	Totals
Disembarkation 1612-1800								
Mainland North America	510	0	297,548	1,478	69,034	9,670	562	378,801
British Caribbean	0	244	2,441,748	7,806	73,868	20,041	1,230	2,544,936
French Caribbean	0	608	94,635	15,721	5,951	1,108,233	3,726	1,228,874
Dutch America	0	0	15,619	451,181	11,031	1,519	6,189	485,539
Danish West Indies	0	0	18,157	6,261	2,439	0	77,555	104,411
Spanish America	275,990	258,754	98,056	28,876	29,523	34,320	5,136	730,656
Brazil	386	3,114,919	4,652	33,565	795	1,511	150	3,155,978
Totals	276,886	3,374,526	2,970,414	544,888	192,639	1,175,294	94,548	8,629,195

Over the course of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, more than one-third of African slaves came to Brazil. After 1800, the proportion of African slaves sent to Brazil as opposed to other places in the Americas almost doubled. Out of all the slaves taken from Africa and sent to the Americas in the nineteenth century, sixty percent went to Brazil. The upsurge after 1800 is due to Brazil's growing economy, various economic factors in other colonies, and the mentality of

¹ Estimates, <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces>.

Brazilian slave-owners, who often believed that it was more efficient to import new slaves rather than to encourage slave populations to become self-sustaining.¹ This last factor is of particular note; Brazilian slave-owners subjected their slaves to such horrendous conditions that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, slaves brought to Brazil only survived for an average of seven years.² Furthermore, there were only two female slaves to every eight male slaves and when those few slave women did become pregnant and give birth, infant mortality rates were staggering.³ This meant that slave-owners needed to constantly replenish their labor force and that meant importing more and more slaves, causing the slave market to boom.

At the same time that Brazil was importing slaves at unprecedented rates, coffee *fazendas* were springing up in great numbers. By the nineteenth century, the mines had depleted Brazil's accessible subterranean resources and Brazilian sugar production lagged far behind that of its Caribbean competitors.⁴ So, Brazilians turned to coffee. In Areias, a city in the state of São Paulo, there were 176 households producing coffee in 1817, but by 1836, there were 236. Areias was producing ninety-five metric tons of coffee in 1817, but that number jumped to 699 metric tons in 1836.⁵ This growth in coffee production was due to the increased number of *fazendas* across the area.

62 This boom in coffee farming was central to the high rate of slave importation from Africa. If Brazilians were going to pursue coffee cultivation, they were going to need a massive labor force, since coffee is a rather labor-intensive crop. As Brazilian economic historian Boris Fausto wrote, in order to open a functional *fazenda*, one had to "make significant investments which included felling trees, preparing the ground, planting, building slave quarters, and buying slaves."⁶ Once the *fazendas* began to produce the crop, it was imperative to maintain the perennial plants and keep weeds out. Once the berries on a coffee plant became ripe, all the plants were then stripped of the berries, which were then dried. The drying process involved laying out thousands of these berries, turning them several times each day, and protecting them overnight from the dew. Dried berries were then pounded to remove the husks, leaving the bean behind. For the most part, Brazilians stripped all coffee berries, ripe or not, instead of selectively harvesting berries that were ripe, which creates coffee that is often poor in quality.⁷ So, if a *fazendeiro* wanted to produce a high-quality product, he would need an even larger labor force to selectively pick

1 Robert M. Levine, *The History of Brazil* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1999), 66.

2 Pendergrast, 22.

3 Leslie Bethell, "The Independence of Brazil and the Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Anglo-Brazilian Relations, 1822-1826," *Journal of Latin American Studies* Vol. 1, no. 2 (1969): 115, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/156386>.

4 Pendergrast, 22.

5 Francisco Vidal Luna and Herbert S. Klein, *Slavery and the Economy of São Paulo: 1750-1850* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 71.

6 Fausto, 104.

7 Pendergrast, 25-26.

ripe coffee berries. According to Fausto, a slave on a Fluminense *fazenda*, was responsible for anywhere from 4,000 to 7,000 coffee plants, on average, which demonstrates how the land area that many *fazendas* cultivated was quite large.¹

Another concern of the *fazendeiros* was transporting their product. Historian Warren Dean, in his monograph concerning *fazendas* in Rio Claro (a town in the Oeste Paulista region in the state of São Paulo) discusses how coffee was transported to Santos, a port city, over a period of ten days by mule because the roads could not accommodate vehicles. He estimates that between 1858 and 1860, *fazendeiros* in Rio Claro spent almost one-third of the sale price of their coffee on transportation alone.² *Fazendeiros*, in order to maintain a healthy profit margin, needed to exploit a massive slave labor force. Accordingly, the rate of slave ownership grew exponentially during this period. Slave-owning *fazendeiros* in the state of São Paulo in 1836 generated three thousand kilograms of coffee per worker, whereas their counterparts who did not own slaves only produced five hundred kilograms per worker.³ As one Brazilian parliamentarian said, "Brazil is coffee and coffee is the negro."⁴ Owning slaves was crucial to increasing coffee production and therefore, capital.

That economic progress and capital would become very important in the years following Brazil's separation from Portugal. Since the turn of the nineteenth century, Brazil had been slowly inching closer to independence. Historian E. 63 Bradford Burns attributed Brazil's independence to the following: improvements in infrastructure and the increasing movement of ideas, the leadership of Brazilian liberal intellectuals and the urban middle class, a growing national pride, the political objections to the Portuguese monarchy (influenced by the ideas of the American and French Revolutions), and the "economic doldrums or the late eighteenth century."⁵ In December 1822, King Dom João VI's son, Pedro, was crowned "Constitutional Emperor and Perpetual Defender of Brazil." On March 25, 1824, a new constitution was promulgated.⁶ Brazil became independent, but that independence was fueled, at least in part, by the liberal ideas that repudiated monarchical institutions and favored republicanism. Brazilian historian Caio Prado Júnior said that these ideas only put Brazil's particular situation "within the larger framework of a general European policy, whose aim was the reform leading to the realignment of European powers, and the new balance of power established in the nineteenth century."⁷ In other words, times were changing. Monarchism was giving way to liberalism, and Europe was

1 Fausto, 105.

2 Warren Dean, *Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 42.

3 Luna and Klein, 58.

4 Pendergrast, 23.

5 E. Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 101-105.

6 Ibid, 122-128.

7 Júnior, 433.

striving to create a new power dynamic between European nations with significant colonies and those with less significant claims. As Europe was redrawing the lines of political power, Brazil sought to establish itself as a sovereign nation, and an economically important one, at that.

After Brazil became independent, African slaves were imported into the country at an accelerated rate. The following table gives estimates for the numbers of African slaves who came to Brazil in the 1820s, the figures are rounded to the nearest hundred¹:

	1820	1821	1822	1823	1824	1825	1826	1827	1828	1829
Totals	45,700	47,500	53,600	37,100	39,000	43,200	61,000	60,100	58,600	73,000

Although the growth was not constant, the number of African slaves being imported yearly almost doubled between 1820 and 1829. There was a slight dip in 1823 and 1824, but that was likely a result of the political and economic turbulence following Brazil's declaration of independence. However, it is clear that there was a significant growth in the yearly importation of slaves from Africa in the years after independence from Portugal. During the first half of the 19th century, Paulistas were just beginning to recognize the geographic and ecological factors conducive to coffee cultivation that the São Paulo region offered. These region-specific figures are even more striking²:

Years →		1803		1817		1836	
Population by location and status ↓							
Paraíba Valley, Free	Paraíba Valley, Slave	30,867	8,863	39,084	11,831	52,538	25,438
Paraíba Valley, Total		39,730		50,915		77,976	
State of São Paulo, Free	State of São Paulo, Slave	144,283	44,121	171,658	54,597	236,068	91,244
State of São Paulo, Total		188,404		226,255		327,312	

In the Paraíba Valley, a fertile valley where coffee was first introduced to the state of São Paulo, the slave population went from 22.3% of the total population in 1803 to 23.2% in 1817 to 32.6% in 1836. In the state of São Paulo, as a whole, the slave population went from 23.4% of the total population in 1803 to 24.1% in 1817 to 27.8% in 1836. This data shows a relatively minor increase in slaves as a percentage of the total population between 1803 and 1817, but a much more significant surge between 1817 and 1836. In the years during and after Brazil's struggle for independence, slaves became significantly more numerous in São Paulo and across Brazil. This fact, however, caused tensions with the European powers that were trying to abolish the trans-Atlantic slave trade.

¹ Estimates, <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces>.

² Table by author, data from Luna and Klein, 108

In 1823, diplomatic correspondence between Britain and Brazil led Emperor Dom Pedro I to the conclusion that Great Britain would recognize Brazil as a sovereign nation if Brazil abolished the slave trade. Both Dom Pedro I and José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, the emperor's advisor, wanted to oblige, given their desperation for international recognition and their belief that "by the liberal and humanitarian ideas of the European Enlightenment and by the theories of classical economists, slavery had lost both its moral and its economic *raison d'être*."¹ However, the emperor's ideology and political desires were not nearly strong enough to overpower the fact that Brazilian slaves were an integral part of meeting the global dependence on plantation goods. Therefore, the number of slaves in Brazil continued to grow.

Many historians posit that slavery ceased to be economically advantageous for *fazendeiros* at this point. Yet but these historians ignore the social factors that led *fazendeiros* to maintain a slave-based labor system. Despite the harsh treatment that slaves in Brazil were subject to, Brazil saw significantly fewer slave revolts than other parts of the Americas. The Malé Uprising of 1835 was the most significant slave revolt in Brazilian history. Bahia, the state where this revolt took place, saw no significant uprisings afterwards and in Rio de Janeiro, where slaves made up over forty percent of the population, never saw an uprising as momentous. Fausto wrote, "Repression, hopes of being freed, divisions amongst slaves who were better off than others, divisions among freedmen and slaves, and differences between native-born and African slaves were several factors which contributed to the lack of uprisings."² The dominance of the *fazendeiros* over their slaves and the plethora of divisions amongst the slaves (even the African slaves were divided by the many regions that they came from) kept the slaves from forming a common identity, coming together, and revolting.³ The system worked for the slave-owning *fazendeiros* and so, a mentality of complacency developed. To develop a whole new labor system would have taken tremendous individual and collective effort on the part of the *fazendeiros*. Since they had no ideological opposition to owning slaves, slave-owning *fazendeiros* simply maintained the system.

As the Enlightenment gave way to the Industrial Revolution, the idea of innate human rights was often translated into ideas on the rights of workers. Even as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the threat posed by growing ideas of workers' rights frightened those leaders of industry (a group that, in Brazil, included the *fazendeiros*) who exploited their labor source. As *fazendeiros* perpetuated slavery in Brazil, Europe examined its own conscience on the is-

¹ Leslie Bethell, "The Independence of Brazil and the Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Anglo-Brazilian Relations, 1822-1826," *Journal of Latin American Studies* Vol. 1, no. 2 (November 1969): 131, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/156386>.

² Fausto, 109.

³ Burns, 43.

sue. At the end of the eighteenth century, European powers, particularly Great Britain and France, began to see significant abolitionist movements. These abolitionist sentiments picked up steam during the early nineteenth century. It was clear, however, that abolition would not happen immediately in Brazil. Logically, European abolitionists instead targeted the slave trade, hoping to cut off the supply of African slaves. Despite the fact that about half of the trans-Atlantic slave trade was run by the British at this point, it became illegal for any British citizens to trade slaves after May 1, 1808. English historian Leslie Bethell wrote that he believes that British abolitionists hoped to impose their moral disapproval of slavery on those nations considered "morally 'inferior'." Part of Great Britain's interest in abolishing the international slave trade may have been a result of an idea of moral superiority, but there were economic incentives for Great Britain, too. These economic incentives only became more important after slavery was totally abolished in British territories in 1833. Bethell points out that since slavery had been abolished in the British colonies, West Indian sugar planters worried that slaves in Cuba and Brazil would allow planters there to gain an advantage.¹ So, between their desire to impose their moral guidelines on Brazil and their desire to weaken their economic competition, Great Britain had a strong interest in abolishing slavery in Brazil.

66 The initial attempts of the British to intervene and to stop the flow of African slaves into Brazil, however, were hugely unsuccessful. In the centuries leading up to Brazil's independence, Portugal's relationship to Great Britain was marked by the latter often domineering the former, but Great Britain's interactions with Brazil did not fall into such a neat and tidy relationship. In the years after Brazil declared independence, Dom Pedro I found himself with few options in the arena of Anglo-Brazilian relations. On one hand, he disapproved of slavery and was desperate to have Brazil's independence recognized by European nations. On the other, Dom Pedro knew that many Brazilians favored the institution of slavery and had supported independence because they believed it would deter British attempts to abolish slavery in the colonies.² Also, there remained the obvious question: how would Brazilians fill the vacuum in the labor force that abolition of slavery would create? Failed negotiations ensued, but in 1825, Great Britain once again manipulated Portugal to do their bidding. This time, they convinced Portugal to recognize Brazil's independence and sovereignty. Despite its new leverage, Great Britain failed to secure an acceptable treaty with Brazil that would abolish the slave trade. Disagreement amongst Brazilian legislators on exactly how gradually abolition would be enacted, Dom Pedro's categorical refusal of British assertions that Brazil was still obligated to respect pre-independence agreements with the Portuguese government, and Great Britain's uncompromising negotiating tactics kept the two nations from reaching an agreement. However, on November 23, 1826, aboard a ship departing Rio de Janeiro, Dom Pedro I capitulated and signed an Anglo-Brazilian

¹ Bethell, 115.

² Bethell, 130-132.

treaty that stipulated that Brazil would cease to import slaves from Africa three years after the ratification of the treaty. The treaty came into effect on March 13, 1830, but in practice, Brazilians did not stop importing slaves from Africa. In Bethell's words:

But with the continued development of the Brazilian plantation economy during the eighteen thirties, largely as a consequence of what has been called 'the irresistible advance of the coffee bush' along the Paraíba valley, the need for fresh supplies of African field labour soon became apparent. The slave trade was reorganized on an illegal basis to serve, for the most part, the interests of the coffee planters, and for twenty years defied the determined efforts of successive British governments and the rather less determined efforts of successive Brazilian governments to suppress it.³

Bethell here places the blame for the continuation of the slave trade squarely on the shoulders of the *fazendeiros*.

However, the *fazendeiros* could not continue to import slaves forever. The Aberdeen Act of 1845, passed by the British Parliament, subjected all Brazilian ships to British law, meaning that British naval officers could board their ships, confiscate any slaves, and prosecute the slave traders aboard the ship under British law. Up until this point, British efforts to stop the trans-Atlantic slave trade had not really deterred slave traders headed for Brazil. Yet after 1850, it slowly became impossible for Brazil to continue importing slaves from Africa. The British never did get the immediate and abrupt end to the slave trade that they so vehemently insisted on in their early negotiations with the Brazilians, but the number of slaves coming into Brazil did drop drastically after 1850. Brazil imported an estimated 264,500 African slaves between 1846 and 1850, but they only imported about 6,600 slaves between 1851 and 1855.² International pressures were keeping *fazendeiros* and other slave owners from importing more slaves, but an 1853 report by the Select Committee on Slave Trade Treaties in the British House of Commons acknowledged the real problem: "He [the testifier] thinks that the British ships alone cannot stop the trade, but that if the Brazilian Government be sincere, it would certainly be put down."³ In other words, if the Brazilian government was not going to strongly enforce the international treaties and domestic laws that prohibit the importation of slaves, the British would have to resign themselves to the slow rate of change brought about by their efforts. Many historians attribute this slow change to the fact that Great Britain did not have a significant role in the Brazilian economy. The British preference for tea over coffee and the high import taxes imposed on Brazilian coffee by the British government meant that relatively little Brazil-
1 Bethell, 146-147.

² Estimates, <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces>.

³ United Kingdom, House of Commons, Report from the Select Committee on Slave Trade Treaties; Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index (London, 1853), 11, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/shcgi/pt?id=nncl-cu56214146;view=rup;seq=1>.

ian coffee was exported to Great Britain. The British were also less present in the Americas than they had been at the height of their colonial empire and the Brazilian *fazendeiros* had good customers in the United States, Germany, and Scandinavia.¹ These economic factors weakened Great Britain's influence in Brazil, but the sway that the British held with other international powers meant that the Brazilians could not ignore them.

In the years following Dom Pedro's rise to power, Brazil unsuccessfully looked inward to find a common identity and national unity. Exacerbated by racial tensions and rural disenfranchisement from the new political structure in Rio de Janeiro, several uprisings plagued the nation and discord was rampant. Brazil was in such chaos that Dom Pedro I abdicated the throne in 1831, leaving a political vacuum. A series of politicians tried to govern the country during this period, but failed to bring order.² However, in July 1840, Dom Pedro II (who was only fourteen years old) was crowned Emperor of Brazil, ushering in a new age for Brazil.³ One of the first priorities amongst the Brazilian royal court was to find the young emperor a bride. Princess Thereza of the Two Sicilies was married to Dom Pedro II shortly after her arrival in Rio de Janeiro on September 3, 1843. As the sister of Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies, the daughter of Francis I of Naples (of the Hapsburg line) and his wife Maria Isabel of Spain (the daughter of King Carlos IV of Spain and the sister of Queen Carlota Joaquina of Portugal), the new Empress became a cultural European ambassador for the Brazilians. She and her husband re-established the ties between European and Brazilian royal houses that Dom Pedro I had neglected.⁴ With her, Dona Thereza brought a European sensibility that began to catch on amongst Brazil's hierarchy. The royal marriage and the steps that Dom Pedro II took to consolidate power, which included re-instating royal advisors, increasing the power of the police, and reforming the National Guard, brought relative stability to Brazil.⁵ With order restored, a popular patron of the arts and sciences as Emperor, and a new Europeanization of the Brazilian upper class, Brazil had stepped into the international arena. As Brazil began its first period of relative peace in a long time, business boomed.

Coffee production continued to make up a larger portion of that business. In Europe and other parts of the world, coffee consumption was increasing, too.⁶

¹ United Kingdom, House of Commons, Report from the Select Committee on Slave Trade Treaties; Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index (London, 1853), 11, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/shcgi/pt?id=nncl-cu56214146;view=tup;seq=1>.

² Fausto, 85-86.

³ Fausto, 96.

⁴ Mary W. Williams, Dom Pedro the Magnanimous, Second Emperor of Brazil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 84-85, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015076719452>.

⁵ Fausto, 96.

⁶ William H. Ukers, All About Coffee (New York: Tea and Coffee Trade Journal Company, 1922), 296, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015027047979>.

By country →	Germany	France	Holland	Austria-Hungary	Totals
By year ↓					
1855	104,049,000	48,095,000	46,162,000	44,716,000	243,022,000
1865	146,969,000	87,524,000	30,299,000	44,966,000	309,758,000
1873	215,822,000	98,841,000	79,562,000	71,111,000	465,336,000
1883	251,706,000	150,468,000	130,380,000	74,145,000	606,699,000

Relations with Great Britain remained rocky (and so Anglo-Brazilian trade remained low), but other European nations had no such qualms about allowing the new Brazil to respond to the rising demand for coffee. Long having relied on an export economy and with a significant surplus, Brazil obliged. In 1854, in the state of São Paulo (where the bulk of Brazilian coffee was produced by this point), there were already 2,612 *fazendas* producing 9,634,973 mil réis worth of coffee.¹ From this point on, these number rose, but this calm before the storm did not last forever.

Of course, *fazendeiros* had to address a serious dilemma: since the supply of slaves was reduced drastically in the wake of the Aberdeen Act, how would they meet their own labor needs? Within Brazil, slaves were still being bought and sold, but slave-owners needed to make up for those slaves no longer being imported.² The incredibly harsh treatment of slaves by Brazilian slave-owners did not help. The cultural desire amongst wealthier Brazilians to make Brazil more European led former slave trader Nicolau de Campos Vergueiro to begin experimenting with a system that was half indentured service and half sharecropping, whereby Europeans paid to emigrate and work on Vergueiro's *fazendas* in exchange for accommodations and a share of the profits.³ Although these schemes were adopted by other *fazendeiros*, they almost always ended in failure. These immigrants were indebted to the *fazendeiros* and could not move off the *fazendas* until that debt was paid off. They found the living conditions barbaric and were subjected to a lack of privacy and independence and many revolted.⁴ Despite these initial failures, these immigrants paved the way for the *colonos*. These European immigrants were recruited and financially rewarded by the Brazilian provincial governments for immigrating to Brazil to work on the *fazendas*.

However, slaves remained an integral part of the Brazilian labor force. Through

¹ Luna and Klein, 60-61.

² Fausto, 116.

³ Burns, 215-216; Fausto, 118.

⁴ Pendergrast, 27; Fausto, 118.

the 1860s, slaves still were the dominant source of labor on plantations.¹ However, by 1874, the number of slaves in Brazil began to drop significantly. This is largely due to the passage of the Lei do Ventre Livre ("Law of the Free Womb") in 1871, which freed the children of slaves who were under the age of twenty-one. The slaves that were still alive and had not been freed were sold at exorbitant prices.² As a result, slavery became increasingly less common and more concentrated on *fazendas* (as opposed to urban and suburban areas) and the demand for cheap labor grew. The institution of slavery in Brazil was still under siege by foreign powers. France, a nation that, for centuries, had competed with other European powers to have the largest colonial empire, had long since outlawed slavery across the French Empire and was eager to impose abolition on other countries. In 1881, Louis Couty, a French sociologist in Brazil, sent a letter to Victor Schoelcher, a celebrated French abolitionist and statesman. In his letter, Couty celebrated how racially integrated Brazil was, but chastised Brazil for being amongst the last to fully emancipate its slaves.³ In his response, Schoelcher acknowledged that Brazilian slaves would have to be emancipated gradually, but he encouraged Couty to form an abolitionist society, by which he could impress upon Brazilians "of the enlightened classes" the urgency of abolition.⁴ Couty and Schoelcher's disapproval of Brazil's procrastination on the abolition issue was not peculiar to the French, however. In an 1885 report on coffee production commissioned by the Dutch government, C.F. Van Delden Laërne predicted that even Cuba, a country heavily dependent on slave labor, would emancipate its slaves before Brazil and went on to quote Martinho Campos, a senator, the head of the Liberal Party, and a fazendeiro, as having said, "Slavery is indispensable to Brazil as yet, nay, it must be maintained for the sake of the slaves themselves."⁵ Van Delden Laërne reasoned that the slaves were "as formerly in the Dutch Indies... well-treated", but that "the unconditional abolition of slavery can certainly not take place too soon."⁶ Despite the international opposition, Brazil still had many slaves. In 1883, each of the 707 Fluminense *fazendas* in operation had an average of 43 slaves each.⁷ As Europeans came to Brazil in larger numbers and as the coffee elite became increasingly opposed to slavery, labor dynamics continued to shift and total emancipation approached.

Having endured such horrible servitude at the hands of the *fazendeiros*, most slaves had no intention of offering their services on *fazendas* for wages.⁸ Finally, though, Europeans started to immigrate to Brazil to work on *fazendas*. Over

1 Levine, 20.

2 Fausto, 117.

3 Louis Couty, *l'Esclavage Au Brésil*, ed. Librairie De Guillaumin (Paris, 1881), 4-15, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433075939979>.

4 Couty, 15-17.


5 C. F. Van Delden Laërne, *Brazil and Java: Report on Coffee-Culture in America, Asia and Africa*, to H.E. the Minister of the Colonies (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1885), 80-82, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433006624617?urlappend=%3Bseq=1>.

6 Van Delden Laërne, 84.

7 Luna and Klein, 59.

8 Fausto, 117.

time, *fazendeiros* began to realize that it was less expensive to use salaried labor and introduce machinery.⁹ Subsequently, more *fazendas* turned to a salaried workforce. Provincial governments and citizens began to create incentives for Europeans to immigrate. One example is the *Sociedade Promotora de Imigração* ("Society for the Promotion of Immigration"), founded by Paulista elites in 1886. This organization printed and distributed pamphlets in multiple languages and even opened an office in Genoa to promote immigration. Between 1871 and 1875, Prime Minister Rio Branco also signed more and more contracts with European partners.¹⁰ With significant improvements in infrastructure and services, Brazil was becoming increasingly attractive to Europeans. Italians, in particular, made up a large percentage of those who came to Brazil. The crisis caused by the unification of Italy drove poor Italians to Brazil, where they could immigrate for free (courtesy of an immigration promotion agency) and they could possibly find subsidized housing and work.¹¹ Many immigrants to Brazil also came from Portugal, Germany, and Spain, while slightly less came from Russia, France, Great Britain, Syria, Austria, and Switzerland.¹²



Over the 1870s and 1880s, more and more Europeans came to Brazil, culminating in a massive wave of immigration in 1888, when slavery was abolished. In the state of São Paulo alone, yearly immigration rates went from about 6,500 in 1885 to nearly 92,000 in 1888. As a result, the coffee harvest that followed the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888 saw no labor shortage.¹³

Over the latter part of the nineteenth century, influential *fazendeiros* in the Paraíba Valley, a coastal area in the eastern part of the state of São Paulo that had once enjoyed tremendous prosperity due to the concentration of coffee production there, became less influential. In their wake, a "coffee bourgeoisie" was created as a result of the boom in coffee production in Oeste Paulista.¹⁴ Bradford Burns paints Paulista *fazendeiros* as being much more concerned with economic facts and much less interested in preserving a traditional labor force

9 Burns, 223.

10 Levine, 68.

11 Fausto, 119.

12 Burns, 217.

13 Fausto, 120.

14 Fausto, 115.

than the sugar barons who preceded them.¹ For a long time, however, *fazendeiros* maintained an opposition to the abolition of slavery, but to an extent, Burns is correct. When the *colono* system was introduced, *fazendeiros* realized that it was more economically advantageous for them than continuing to fight abolitionists. Under this system, *fazendeiros* provided *colonos* with land to grow coffee, a home, and land to grow food for their own sustenance (and also for additional crops that could be sold at market for additional income). These *colonos* were paid twice a year (a flat rate for tending to the coffee bushes and an amount determined by how much coffee they produced) and were, for the most part, content. This incentive-based scheme pleased *fazendeiros* and provided the *colono* with stability and surely enough, labor relations in the coffee industry improved (although they were not without occasional strikes and riots).² The *colono* system and immigration in general was made much easier by the expansion of Brazilian railway system, which had gone from 800 miles of railway track in 1874 to 6,000 miles by 1889.³ These advances also allowed for the exchanges of ideas, which led the coffee elite to become even more progressive and sophisticated. The coffee industry was finally being put in the position of having to make a decision: would they allow Brazil's shame over being one of the last sovereign nations in the world to maintain the institution of slavery to damage their economic prospects or would they turn to Europe and make a radical change? The *Partido Republicano Paulista* ("Republican Party of São Paulo"), which was most comprised of *fazendeiros*, formally chose to support total emancipation of 72 Brazil's slaves in 1887, although a number of its member has supported the idea much earlier. Members who had not done so already, also agreed to emancipate their own slaves within a period of two years.⁴ As the support that the Brazilian government relied on to maintain the institution of slavery disintegrated completely in 1887 and 1888, emancipation was fast approaching and as historian Mark Pendergrast put it, "Brazilian coffee farmers led the charge."⁵

On May 13, 1888, the Brazilian government finally emancipated all slaves, which meant that the institution of slavery in the Western Hemisphere was eradicated at long last. The Conservative politicians (amongst whom were many with ties to the coffee industry) pushed the *Lei Áurea* ("Golden Law") through the Parliament, and in the absence of Dom Pedro II, Princess-Regent Dona Isabel signed the law. The law also created an agricultural bank that would serve to minimize any financial loss that slaveholders might face.⁶ From this moment through the following year, Brazil was to undergo the biggest change since gaining independence from Portugal. In 1889, Rui Barbosa, Brazil's finance minister and a life-long abolitionist burned the Brazilian government's slave records, in

1 Burns, 151-152.

2 Fausto, 170-171.

3 Pendergrast, 27.

4 Burns, 223.

5 Pendergrast, 28.

6 Burns, 223-224.

the hopes of preventing former slave-owners from pursuing indemnification and erasing the stain that slavery left on Brazil.¹ Later that year, in a bloodless coup, the aging Dom Pedro II and his family were exiled and the monarchy was overthrown. What followed in Brazil was the country's first experiment with republicanism and a period of continued growth for Brazil's coffee industry.

Overall, the nineteenth century was a period of major growth for Brazil's coffee industry. Coffee had made up eighteen percent of total export revenue between 1821 and 1830, but between 1881 and 1890, coffee constituted sixty-one percent. Immigrants continued to flow into Brazil, the population soared, the country's infrastructure continued to improve, and power shifted politically and geographically. Economic prosperity in São Paulo's coffee industry and in the milk production in the adjacent state of Minas Gerais took power from Rio de Janeiro and put it in the hand of industry Paulista and Mineiro leaders of industry, who became known as "*café com leite*" politicians. In the more than 80 years since the fall of the *República Velha* in 1930, Brazil has gone through many changes and its coffee producers have likewise experienced many economic booms and declines. Brazil is often known as "the country of the future", a designation that conveys its economic and geo-political potential at the same time that it conveys the fact that Brazil lags behind other global super-powers in many ways. As far as slavery is concerned, this nickname certainly held true in the nineteenth century. Eventually, coffee industry leaders, other barons of industry, and abolitionists outside of the elite classes ushered Brazil into a new age and one could say that Brazil's economic interests continue to be the principal progressive, modernizing force in Brazil. As Brazil prepares for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro and as it deals with long-existing disparities in economic opportunity, education, health-care, and infrastructure, questions of labor will only continue to become more pressing. 73

1 Levine 69.


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"Now I Feed Myself With The Most Delicious Poison": Sexualizing the African American in Post-Civil Rights Pop Culture

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A NOTE TO READERS: THIS ARTICLE CONTAINS UNCENSORED RACIAL SLURS INCLUDED IN QUOTATIONS.

76 "My mother calls 'em lilies, I call 'em Piccadillies, My daddy warns me to stay away, but I say "Come out an play." These are lyrics from the song "White Boys" in the 1967 musical *Hair*, a story of the generation of hippies who rejected the conservative and sexually repressive culture of the 1950's. This wildly popular show, the fourth longest running Broadway show of the 1960's which, at one point, had seven casts touring the United States,² came out on the wings of the Supreme Court case *Loving v. Virginia* (1967) which found that "Virginia's statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications held to violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."³ Now no one could legally stop people of different races from getting married. The songs "White Boys" sung by the black women in the show, and its counterpart "Black Boys" sung by the white women celebrate miscegenation, flipping the proverbial bird to the racist fears and preconceptions of the conservative and closed minded "mothers" and "daddies" of their parents' generation. Perhaps even more significant is the "Black Boys" component which speaks (or sings) out against a long cultural and literary tradition depicting black men as violent abductors of white feminine innocence. In this song the ladies let loose proclaiming "Black boys are delicious, chocolate flavored love, Licorice lips like candy, keep my cocoa handy..."⁴ Here, the white women are the hungry beasts eager to consume the black man. They embody the image usually ascribed to black women: ones overtly desirous of sex, while "White Boys," which is more innocently complimentary, is more consistent with the traditional image of white women: shy and virginal.

America underwent a major cultural revolution in the late 1960's as the Civil Rights movement finally gained national socio-political attention and started affecting legislation. As shown by the popularity and continual revival of *Hair*, pop culture then and now recognizes this time as having "a mind to liberation."⁵ While America has seen its share of identity crises, perhaps the only other time in which such an event was so inextricably linked to the relationship between

1 "White Boys," in *Hair*, by James Rado, Gerome Ragni and music by Galt MacDermot, 1967.

2 Richard Christiansen, "Gimme a Quiz On *Hair*," *Chicago Tribune*, 1996.

3 *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

4 "Black Boys," in *Hair*, by James Rado, Gerome Ragni and music by Galt MacDermot, 1967.

5 "Aquarius," in *Hair*, by James Rado, Gerome Ragni and music by Galt MacDermot, 1967.

black and white was in the birth of the nation itself. Certainly the idea of an unyielding rejection of the past in favor of a social and political ideology in which liberty is paramount calls to mind the sentiments of the Founding Fathers. Only now, the definition of liberty with regard to race had evolved. The move towards sexualizing the other in post-civil rights popular culture recalls an aspect of the tradition of racialized Romanticism that characterized American popular culture from the start. The cultural movement that brought *Hair* and Stanley Kramer's *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, a film about a white girl introducing her parents to her black fiancé, worked to upend, among other ideas, the long cultural tradition of glorifying whiteness and vilifying blackness and above all, keeping them separate.¹ And while many young people, like those depicted in *Hair* and the young couple in *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, celebrated these new freedoms to love across racial lines, the majority of white Americans, consciously or not, were not ready to give up their position of superiority. This left American culture at an ideological crossroads: popular culture needed to be revamped so that it both promoted a bright future in light of the new socio-political developments like *Loving v. Virginia* and de-segregation laws and satisfied the white Americans who dominated the entertainment industry who refused to overturn the racial order. What emerged then, in 1970's American popular culture, was a Romantic renaissance in which traditional images and ideas of miscegenation and sexuality were reinvented in new mediums to reflect the anxieties and fears of a post-civil rights society in need of a new identity but unwilling to let go of racial hierarchies.

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In order to contain this discussion and draw clear parallels between the post-civil rights years and early America, this research will concern exclusively African Americans and their sexual relationship to white Americans as represented by popular culture. The first section will look at popular culture and its usefulness as a lens through which to look at popular sentiment. The next part will make a case for the connection between early American romanticism and post-civil rights popular culture both in their ideological motivations and stylistic qualities. In exploring this subject by putting different scholars and mediums in conversation with one another, the aim is to deepen the understanding of miscegenation in popular American culture; how it came about, and what are its role in shaping our notions of race and relationships.

It is essential to this study to impress, with a solid range of scholarly support, the influence and effects of popular culture on the public and vice versa because this is how the connection between Romanticism in early American popular culture and our perceptions of race contemporary popular culture may be drawn and made significant. Sociology professor at the University of the Aegean in Greece, Sevasti Trubeta deepens this discussion of the power of popular

1 *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*. Directed by Stanley Kramer. USA: Turner Classic Films, 1967.

culture by talking about its influence on race relations and construction.¹ In his essay about biological racism in the Nazi regime, Trubeta notes "the biological view took a populist character, becoming a subject of popular policy as result of the fact that in the Nazi era "science went hand in hand with the everyday 'knowledge.' This made easier the association of ascribing collective social behaviours to biological 'explanations.'" Like Gray, Trubeta emphasizes the 'normalizing' of racist notions through the 'everyday.' Erica Chito Childs, Sociologist and professor at Hunter College goes further to localize this discussion observing; "In reviewing America's history, an integral part of the racist framework has been the stories that are told in communities, in the media, and in popular culture to rationalize and legitimize white oppression of blacks and other racial minorities."² Childs supports the idea, fundamental to this research, that media and popular culture has had an undeniable and significant effect on race in America.

Scholars of race relations have also identified a symbiotic relationship between popular culture and the public; they both influence and are influenced by each other. Sharon Patricia Holland, an African American Studies professor at Duke University with a Phd in literature, reflects on another scholar in her work *The Erotic Life of Racism*:

In defining the directional motivations of colonialism, (Sara) Ahmed offers the following reformulation: 'The 'direction' of the social wish is for access, and this 'direction' also makes others accessible...It is not that nations have simply directed their wishes and longings toward the Orient but rather that the nation 'coheres' an effect of the repetition of this direction...Such repetition is not innocent but strategic: the direction of such wishes and longings makes others available as resources to be used, as the materials out of which collectives might 'write' themselves into existence.'³

This is to say that collective sentiment too is constructed. By continuing to create movies and songs and magazine articles where white women and men say blushingly "I want to be with a black man" or with a mischievous grin "I want to try a black girl" this wave of popular culture commodified miscegenation. Like Childs and Gray, Holland notes that individuals have power and use it to encourage our own influence through the mediums of popular culture. Finally, Toni Morrison, novelist, theorist and professor offers a literary perspective on this subject. Early in her book *Playing in the Dark*, Morrison observes that "National literatures, like writers, get along the best way they can, and with what they can. Yet they do seem to end up describing and inscribing what is really on

1 Sevasti Trubeta "Gypsiness,' Racial Discourse and Persecution: Balkan Roma during the Second World War" in Nationalities Papers Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2003, in-class reading, 503.

2 Erica Chito Childs, *Fade to Black and White: Interracial Images in Popular Culture*. USA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009, 6.

3 Sharon Patricia Holland *The Erotic Life of Racism*, e-Duke books scholarly collection Durham: Duke University Press, 2012, 50.

the national mind."⁴ This book will provide the basis for my discussion about the character of Romanticism in early American literature and culture.

In order to contextualize the argument that post-civil rights popculture is a second wave of traditional and racialized romanticism, it is first crucial to understand what this cultural tradition grew from. In *Playing in the Dark*, Morrison describes the motivation behind adopting this literary tradition as America's signature style:

Romance, an exploration of anxiety imported from the shadows of European culture, made possible the sometimes safe and other times risky embrace of quite specific, understandably human, fears: American's fear of being outcast, of failing, of powerlessness; their fear of boundarylessness, of Nature unbridled and crouched for attack; their fear of the absence of so-called civilization; their fear of loneliness, of aggression both external and internal.⁵

Early American literature including monthly periodicals and gift books was the largest and most popular source of media before film and television. Our most beloved and well-remembered authors, celebrities in their time, included Hawthorne, James, Melville, and Poe. These and many others whom our cultural and literary history remembers worked to mold the European style of Romanticism to fit American ideals. Yet what were American ideals?

People who came to settle in this nation and develop it did so for many different reasons but perhaps above all it was for the chance to have a clean slate. Of course, the endless freedom offered by the new nation was both glorious and terrifying. Without a history to draw from, the search for national identity is difficult and anxiety-ridden work. Morrison argues that in the face of this "fear of boundarylessness" and "absence of so-called civilization" the notion of the 'Africanist presence' was born.⁶ Because here, at the very least, was something the new white American was not. Identification became individual and collective validation based on differentiation. As Morrison says, "It was this Africanism, deployed as rawness and savagery, that provided the staging ground and arena for the elaboration of the quintessential American identity."⁷ These early settlers were unwilling or unable to let go of old world white supremacy and the idea that civility was exclusively bestowed by divine power upon the white race. And in response to their anxieties about who they were and what they stood for, they created a 'yang' to their 'yin.' In support of this idea, Thomas Pettigrew observes that "In the United States, the prejudiced person thus personifies...his own id sins of the flesh in the Negro."⁸ Pettigrew/Stember's referral to the Freudian 'id' brings to light a modern interpretation of the ways in which

1 Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*. New York: Vintage Books, 1992, 14.

2 Ibid, 36-37.

3 Ibid, 6.

4 Ibid, 44.

5 Thomas Pettigrew qtd in Charles Herbert Stember, *Sexual Racism: The Emotional Barrier to an Integrated Society*. New York: Elsevier, 1976, 49.

white Americans worked to define themselves in contrast to African Americans. As Morrison argues "The fabrication of an Africanist persona is reflexive; an extraordinary meditation on the self; a powerful exploration of the fears and desires that reside in the writerly conscious. It is an astonishing revelation of longing, of terror, of perplexity, of shame, of magnanimity."¹ For the writers of the time, it was their prerogative to capture and express this growing American self, both individual and collective. The black foil thus was both reflected and fully formed in popular culture.

In mentioning the 'id' depiction of the African American, Stembert also points to the distinctly sexual character of this 'Africanist' construct, which is the focus of this research. As Jason Gillmer explains in his book *Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial World*, "Interracial sex, the guardians of the social order reasoned, blurred the carefully drawn distinctions between black and white, slave and free."² Early American Romanticism was predicated on the fact that miscegenation was not only completely socially unacceptable but illegal. However, the individual sexual characters (black woman, white woman, black man, white man) were constructed largely (if not wholly) in relation to one another. This passage from Calvin C. Hernton's *Sex and Racism in America*, though lengthy, gives a concise and detailed outline of the sexual construction of the white person and black person:

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The Negro male became the object of mutilation in and through which white women as well as white men could drain themselves of guilt, fear, and inadequacy. The Negro male became the living embodiment of not only the white woman's unconscious sense of sexual poverty, but of everything that was wrong with her life and her society. Just as it became necessary for the white man to project the image of the Negro as a savage rapist to soothe his guilt, it was equally imperative that the white woman accept this image as a means of proving to herself that she was sexually attractive, if not to white men, at least to black 'savages.'³

Morrison expands this discussion to include the black woman, with whom there was "an uncontested assumption of the sexual availability of black females" and white males, who were both physically and spiritually whole and politically supreme, in her discussion of the early American novel *Sapphira and the Slave Girl*.⁴ In this story by Willa Cather, *Sapphira*, a white woman and wife of the plantation owner is crippled, perhaps as a symbol of the sexual inadequacy felt by women that Hernton refers to in the above passage. There is a beautiful, light skinned slave girl Nancy that incurs *Sapphira's* jealousy, so much that *Sapphira* invites her lecherous nephew to rape the girl in the hopes that this will render her undesirable to her husband whose desire, in reality, existed only in

1 Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*. New York: Vintage Books, 1992, 17.

2 Jason A Gillmer "Telling Stories of Love, Sex, and Race" in *Loving v Virginia in a Post Racial World* rethinking race sex and marriage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Abstract.

3 Calvin C Hernton, *Sex and Racism in America*. New York: Grove Press, 1965, 19.

4 Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*. New York: Vintage Books, 1992, 23.

the jealous *Sapphira's* mind. This part of the story shows that the use of sexuality as a tool for subjugation extended beyond the relationship between blacks and whites and into the relationship between white women and white men. As Sharon Patricia Holland points out in her discussion of female writers in the book *The Erotic Life of Racism*, "Both Beauvoir and Lorde indicate an investment in the erotic for its potential to undermine pre-existing notions of the self (woman's self) and society."¹ This is another piece of the cultural puzzle which was the reality that the only character that did not require restraint or subjugation was not white but white and male. With regard to this duality Marlon Ross observes that 'the black-white polarity enables Americans to continue to deny the polymorphous course of all human desire. Giving Americans a screen for projecting fear, this polarity prevents them from dealing directly with the unclassifiable, uncolored course of desire itself.'² This recalls the earlier notion of black as a screen from which white could be understood or derived. That screen immediately took on a powerful sexual character and was "normalized" and romanticized in the popular culture of early America.

So what about the historical moment of the 1970's was similar to the founding of America? In what way did popular culture experience a renaissance of romanticism? The period of Jim Crow Laws and other state-driven terrorism towards blacks and minorities that characterized the wake of a failed Reconstruction era marked an evil time in the nation's history. Like early America where people wanted to break free from the class limitations and intolerance of an ultra conservative old world but struggled to let go of the moral doctrines engendered there, the 1950's saw a resurgence of intense moral restriction and confining social roles. Such that when white Americans were confronted with the legislative and cultural freedoms of a post-Civil Rights America, most people wanted to accept them without the guilt of what came before. Similar too, was the way they went about creating this much needed tabula rasa. Early Americans built their culture around a poetic image of a new, free, (and white) self, and in the years following the Civil Rights movement, white Americans used popular culture to recall these romantic images.

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One of the many ways post-civil rights pop culture reflected a Romantic renaissance was in its different depictions of miscegenation. In her book *Fade to Black and White: Interracial Images in Popular Culture*, Erica Chito Childs surmises that "The varied representations can be discussed in three main conceptual frames of what stories can be told: (1) interracial relationships are deviant, especially if it includes a white woman; (2) the interracial relationships are used to privilege, protect, and illustrate the power of whiteness, particularly white men; and (3) interracial relationships are used to perpetuate racist attitudes and

1 Marlon Ross qtd in Sharon Patricia Holland *The Erotic Life of Racism*, e-Duke books scholarly collection Durham: Duke University Press, 2012, 48.

2 Sharon Patricia Holland *The Erotic Life of Racism*, e-Duke books scholarly collection Durham: Duke University Press, 2012, 43.

practice while denying race matters.” All three categories are exactly in keeping with early American images and ideas about miscegenation, except perhaps the third category clause ‘denying that race matters.’ But now the approach differed fundamentally because miscegenation was legal. Early American popular culture portrayed the black person as the Hyde to the white’s Dr. Jekyll: an evil alter ego. Post-Civil Rights culture portrayed the relationship as if white people were the biblical Eve, barely able to restrain herself from the luscious juicy apple that was black people, and finally giving into temptation (merely a coincidence that it was around the same time that black people got their rights approved by the government). This ultra-sexualization and eroticizing of the other worked both to “privilege, protect and illustrate the power of whiteness” and to “deny that race matters.”

82 One of the most highly regarded and well-known films from this time period is Martin Scorsese’s *Taxi Driver*. The only black person to appear in the forefront of the film is a prostitute with a big blond wig who jumps into the car with a drunk older white man. This is part of a long montage depicting the endless hedonism in the city which drives this young depressive taxi driver, Travis Bickle (Robert de Niro) to the brink of insanity.² Here, hedonism is epitomized by a black prostitute wearing a blond wig, posing clownishly as white, with an older white businessman who is probably married (to a white woman). At one point in the film a crazed man gets into the taxi and tells Travis to park outside an apartment where his wife can be seen in silhouette through the window. “You know who lives there? the man says to Travis, “A nigger lives there!”³ The man tells Travis his wife has been having an affair with this “nigger” and he is going to kill him. This shows the age-long fear of white women being stolen away by black men. It also alludes to the notion that these feelings are lurking within all white people, and civil rights and the progress of the 1960’s and 70’s had only pushed underneath the surface. The man is dressed well and speaks as if he has plenty of money. He has most likely never used the word ‘nigger’ before this event and is only moved to say it because he is full of rage. When this anger moves him, he forgets his civility and turns to his racist roots. Along these lines, later in the movie a white salesman comes to Travis’ apartment to sell him some guns. The sleazy salesman urges Travis saying “I could deal this to some jungle bunny in harlem for 500 bucks. But I deal high quality goods to the right people.”⁴ The ‘jungle bunny’ is a playful contemporary slang description of the classic racist image of the black male: primal, simple, savage, and sex-craved or what is remembered as the “Brute” character.⁵

The “Brute” was one of many caricatures that were reinforced and revitalized in popular culture. One of the most popular “Brutes” was *Shaft*, a novel series turned film series about a black private detective and sexual dynamo by Ernest Tidyman. One of the novels was called *Shaft Among the Jews* (1972), whose cover depicted a black man leaning back so as to emphasize his crotch, with the cover text “Big, Bold, Bold, Black, and Bad as ever.”¹ This “Brute” character and it’s black female counterpart the “Jezebel” were largely sexual stereotypes and these were the most represented in media. As Dr. David Pilgrim notes in his article discussing black images in film for the Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia, “Historically, white women, as a category, were portrayed as models of self-respect, self-control, and modesty - even sexual purity, but black women were often portrayed as innately promiscuous, even predatory.”² This was known as the “Jezebel” character and she appeared often. As Dr. David Pilgrim lists: Hazelle Goodman plays Cookie, a hooker in Woody Allen’s *Deconstructing Harry* (Doumanian & Allen, 1997). When Cookie is asked if she knows what a black hole is, she replies, “what I make my living with.” In the credits listed for *Dangerous Ground* (Gorfil, Roodt & Roodt, 1997), Tamsie Times is listed as “Black Hooker.” Cathy Tyson, the niece of actress Cicely Tyson, got her first major role as a sophisticated call girl in *Mona Lisa* (Cassavetti, Woolley & Jordan, 1986). All of these credits make up the specific role that black women were publicly placed in, one sexual and ‘lascivious.’³ As Holland argues “The pattern of representing and constructing nonwhite sexuality as deviant 83 and dangerous served a purpose of justifying the treatment of blacks... whether it was attacks, lynching, or laws to prevent members of the group from entering the United States or having full rights.”⁴ Just like the early American motivation of the white person to be distinguished from the white person reflected in its literature and art, so the post-civil rights popular culture used these sexual images of blacks to promote the idea of non-white sexuality as wrong or “other.” Beyond the cameos like “Black Hooker” came one of the largest cinema sub-genres that came out of the 70’s is what is now referred to as ‘Blaxploitation’ movies.

The Blaxploitation movies of the 1970’s based an entire movie market off of these “Jezebel” and “Brute” sexualized black stereotypes. Pilgrim explains the exploitative nature of these films which gave them their name, saying “The world depicted in blaxploitation movies included corrupt police and politicians, pimps, drug dealers, violent criminals, prostitutes, and whores. In the main, these movies were low-budget, formulaic interpretations of black life by white producers, directors, and distributors.”⁵ There were hundreds of these

1 Ernest Tidyman, *Shaft Among the Jews*. New York: Dial Press, 1972, paperback.

2 David Pilgrim, Dr., “Jezebel Caricature” in Ferris State University Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia published November 2000, edited 2012, accessed 12/10/2013.

3 Ibid.

4 Erica Chito Childs, *Fade to Black and White: Interracial Images in Popular Culture*. USA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009, 27.

5 David Pilgrim, Dr., “Jezebel Caricature” in Ferris State University Jim Crow Museum

1 Erica Chito Childs, *Fade to Black and White: Interracial Images in Popular Culture*.

USA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009, 6.

2 *Taxi Driver*. Directed by Martin Scorsese. USA: Columbia Films, 1976.

3 Ibid. 42:28.

4 Ibid, 55:24.

5 David Pilgrim, Dr., “Brute Caricature” in Ferris State University Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia published November 2000, edited 2012, accessed 12/10/2013.

movies, among them *Foxy Brown* (Feitshans & Hill 1974).¹ Foxy, played by the actress Pam Grier, is referred to as “almost classic” and “a whole lotta woman” clearly differentiating her from a white woman who would be just classic and just enough woman. The name itself “Foxy” can only be understood sexually. When Foxy goes undercover as a prostitute in order to exact justice on the white drug dealers that killed her policeman boyfriend, she is sent out to meet ‘clients’ who, the white drug lady says “have a preference for your type.”² When she arrives to a room full of gawking old white judges, one of the judges who is seated with a white topless girl on his lap calls out to his friend laughing “I see your honor likes that dark meat” to which Foxy replies “the darker the berry the sweeter the juice honey.”³ Here we see the self-awareness of exoticism, and how it was appropriated by both black and white people. In the case of these films, that appropriation was coerced. As Pilgrim notes,

Black actors and actresses, many unable to find work in mainstream movies, found work in blaxploitation movies. Black patrons supported these movies because they showed blacks fighting the “white establishment,” resisting police corruption, acting assertively, and having sex lives.⁴

Still as we see, it is the white establishment that drives these stereotypes into the cultural consciousness for it is the judges “preference” that brings Foxy there in the first place and she responds in the way to which she is referred, as an object of consumption, in this case, a juicy berry. Similarly, when Foxy seduces a drug smuggling pilot to give her a ride so that she can get to her enemies the smiley pilot, without taking his eyes off Foxy, hollers to the bartender “get this dusky young lady whatever she needs to quench her magnificent thirst.”⁵ Again she is hypersexualized and portrayed as one larger than life with “magnificent thirst” which is never without referral to her distinct “dusky”ness. Though there is a clear sexual interest from the whites to the blacks, the separation of fundamental racial character is upheld, as when the confused hitmen who work for the drug lords are trying to determine why Foxy would hurt her own brother one of them says “well maybe those people just don’t believe in family loyalty, Eddy.”⁶ This way, the white individuals can enjoy the sexual opportunities afforded by miscegenation without disrupting their racial assumptions. Instead of taking responsibility for the most intimate of changes that was occurring during this time (that a black person and a white person could and should be able to have a real romantic relationship), our popular culture reverted to its now long tradition of romanticizing as a means of denial and coping with fear.

of Racist Memorabilia published November 2000, edited 2012, accessed 12/10/2013.

¹ *Foxy Brown*. Directed by Jack Hill. USA: American International Pictures, 1974.

² *Ibid*, 53:11.

³ *Ibid*, 49:42.

⁴ David Pilgrim, Dr., “Jezebel Caricature” in Ferris State University Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia published November 2000, edited 2012, accessed 12/10/2013

⁵ *Foxy Brown*, 14.

⁶ *Ibid*, 31:03.

In Harper’s Magazine, one of the most popular and long-running American journals, a wealth of literature and images sexualizing the black being, especially in comparison to the white, can be found. In the December 1970 issue of Harper’s Monthly, John Corry, a frequent writer for the magazine, contributed the article for the ‘Television’ section.¹ Corry introduces the subject observing “We are deep into a new television season, and the most striking thing about it is the wonderful way the writers and producers and advertising men have shown they have with liberal concerns, and the wonderful way they want to be relevant...”² Corry goes on to illustrate how liberally concerned these “advertising men” etc. are by describing a couple recent episodes of popular television shows. One of the shows he describes is called *Storefront Lawyers*, an episodic crime series. Corry describes:

In *Storefront Lawyers*, a white construction worker was accused of blowing up a building and killing a man, apparently because he objected to the presence of a black on the job. The black construction worker [put on the stand to testify], who had a natural hairstyle, a pretty wife, and a full load of hostility, finally admitted that he was to blame for the explosion... ‘If a thousand of them went, you think we’d be even?’ the black man said, showing he was boiling with rage, and that he was oppressed. We already had seen that he was attractive, which was enough to make us mighty sympathetic.³

Corry lays it out clearly. The essential characteristics of this “oppressed man” that made the viewers “mighty sympathetic” were his “pretty wife” and the fact that he was “attractive.” Of course, the black man is still the perpetrator of this needless crime, “boiling with rage” and endearing to the “us” only because he and his wife are sexually attractive. Childs reflects on the representation of miscegenation in television during this time, saying, “In the early 1970’s and early 1980’s, diversity in families and households became more common with shows such as *The Jeffersons*, *Benson*, *Webster*, *Diff’rent Strokes*, and *Gimme a Break!*, yet these shows usually contained alternative family structures such as a transracial adoption, single parent families, or black caretakers/assistants as part of a white family.”⁴ Even in the relationships like these that were not sexually charged, the interracial and the “alternative” are inextricably linked.

The 1970’s was a time of major historical and change in America. Civil Rights brought a new social and legislative character to the United States, whose culture had yet to catch up. White people dominated most areas of business including those which set the tone of popular culture. As the white people were unwilling to let go of their position of power because of the same “fear of limitlessness and failure” that plagued the early American settlers, they rein-

¹ John Corry. 1970. TELEVISION. Harper’s Magazine. Dec 01, accessed December 11, 2013.

² *Ibid*.

³ *Ibid*, 44.

⁴ Erica Chito Childs, *Fade to Black and White: Interracial Images in Popular Culture*. USA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009, 34.

vigorated early Romantic notions of the sexualized, dark other through popular culture.¹ With a new twist wherein miscegenation was toyed with, laughed about and finger-wagged at American media continued to uphold notions of white normalcy and black deviance with regard to sexuality and love. This character of popular culture has improved since but is far from eradicated. Sharon Patricia Holland quotes the scholar Rosemary Hennessy who offers the following critique of Gayle Rubin's essay "Thinking Sex": "When desire is understood as lust, where lust is equated with a basic human drive, its historical production becomes invisible."² What Hennessy points to is the ability to simplify any idea in such a way as to ignore its historical and cultural construction. In this case, as Holland points out, Hennessy is arguing that "desire is historically produced" and there is great danger in equating something culturally constructed with a biological reality like the sex drive.³ Ideas that are rooted in the physical realm have always been subject to cultural construction. America has a long tradition of using science as a front for propagating racism by arguing that blacks brains are inferior and bodies are physically suited for hard labor. And in turn, media like old Harper's cartoons serves to normalize and in a way endear these purported facts. In this way, the popular culture shift in the 60's and 70's which has lasted to the present portrays miscegenation as simply an exciting sexual avenue whose "magnificent thirst" we are excited to quench. And in doing so, the 'historical production' that shows this movement and its legislation rather to be a highly consequential stage of American society to be understood very deeply if it is ever to have meaning, is rendered 'invisible.'

1 Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*. New York: Vintage Books, 1992.

2 Sharon Patricia Holland *The Erotic Life of Racism*. e-Duke books scholarly collection Durham: Duke University Press, 2012, 44.

3 Sharon Patricia Holland *The Erotic Life of Racism*. e-Duke books scholarly collection Durham: Duke University Press, 2012, 45.

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Sexuality Education & the State in Singapore

TERRENCE TING

Sexuality education represents a controversial issue in many countries, due to its intimate relationship with attitudes towards sexuality and sexual behavior. Thus, the progress of sexuality education can be seen as a barometer of social attitudinal change. Sexuality education programs, whether designed by the government or voluntary welfare organizations, aim to inform children and adolescents about aspects of sex and sexuality in a way that implicitly or explicitly reflects a set of moral and social values.¹ In democratic nations, the majority of citizens must view these values as tolerable for the sexuality education program to be successful. As a result, most programs reflect the values of a sizable segment of citizens.

88 Yet in culturally heterogeneous countries like the United States, the reality that no single program has found universal support reflects the difficulty of translating sexual attitudes into sexuality education. Indeed, Western scholars have devoted significant attention to the struggle to accurately represent a multiplicity of community values within the framework of sexuality education curricula.² However, similar controversies within non-Western countries have been less well documented.³ This paper focuses on the relationship between sexuality education and sexual attitudes in Singapore. I first present demographic information crucial in contextualizing the arguments that follow, and then provide a brief overview of sexuality education in Singapore from the 1960s to the present day. Finally, by focusing on a recent key controversy behind sexuality education in schools, I argue that despite the progressive nature of sexuality education from self-government in 1965 to the present day, it remains out of sync with 1) Ministry-imposed guidelines, 2) broader government policy, and 3) societal attitudes towards aspects of sexuality, which in themselves may be different from one another. A statist, monolithic model of sexuality education, where educators must follow official guidelines and curricula closely, makes it very hard for sexuality education in Singapore to accurately reflect the nuances present in Singaporeans' attitudes towards sexuality.

1 William Simon and John H. Gagner, "The Pedagogy of Sex," in *Sex, Schools, and Society: International Perspectives*, ed. Stewart E. Fraser. (Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, Aurora Publishers, 1972), 39-46.

2 e.g. John Kobler, "Sex Invades the Schoolhouse," in *Sex, Schools, and Society: International Perspectives*, ed. Stewart E. Fraser. Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, Aurora Publishers, 1972), 129-131.

3 Most studies involving non-Western countries are cross-cultural in nature, e.g. Cindy Davis, Lesley Hughes, Melissa Sloan, Catherine Tang, and Samuel Macmaster. "HIV/AIDS Knowledge, Sexual Activity, and Safer Sex Practices Among Female Students in Hong Kong, Australia, and the United States." *Journal of HIV/AIDS & Social Services* 8, no. 4 (December 10, 2009). doi:10.1080/15381500903455950.

Since independence from British colonial rule in 1965, the city-state has been ruled by what has been variously described by Western commentators as a "benevolent dictatorship," "soft authoritarianism," or simply a "paternalistic" government.⁴ The ruling People's Action Party (PAP) considers the political structure of Singapore a democracy, although not one built on the Western liberal democratic model.⁵ Singapore holds open and contested elections every four years, and voters have shown their support by repeatedly voting the PAP into power (defined as possessing more than a two-thirds majority of seats in Parliament) against smaller, newer opposition parties.⁶ Singapore's small size and, until fairly recently, a pliable and consenting electorate allowed the PAP to implement controversial social and economic policies by highlighting the role of these policies in engineering Singapore's macroeconomic success.⁷ The government justified repressive policies like the Internal Security Act - which allowed for detention without trial so long as one is suspected of having acted or being likely to act in a way that would threaten security - by invoking their role in maintaining social order and security.⁸ Given that most Singaporeans accepted such a draconian policy on communitarian grounds, the relatively subdued policy of state-run sexuality education would conceivably face even fewer complaints from the electorate. It would also allow the State to tailor this aspect of education to dovetail with related social and economic policies, a theme recurrent in Singapore's utilitarian approach towards education.⁹

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Yet apart from political expedience and convenience, few indicators suggest that a statist model of sexuality education is apropos for Singapore. Like the United States, Singapore is historically a nation of immigrants, resulting in a heterogeneous cultural, racial and religious composition. Four ethnic groups predominate in Singapore; as of 2012, 74.2% of Singaporeans are Chinese, 13.3% are Malay, 9.2% are Indian, and 3.3% belong to other ethnicities.¹⁰ Racial diversity may be a factor that contributes to the lack of a unitary set of "Singaporean" values.

1 Matt Miller, "What Singapore can teach us," May 2, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-02/opinions/35457593_1_global-firms-lee-kuan-yew-singapore

2 Gordon P. Means, "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 4 (1996): 103-117

3 "Under Lee Kuan Yew," Library of Congress Country Studies, December 1989, [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+sg0035\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sg0035))

4 T. Y. Nam, "Singapore's one-party system: its relationship to democracy and political stability," *Pacific Affairs* 42 (1970): 465-480.

5 "Under Lee Kuan Yew"

6 Ibid.

7 Narayanan Ganapathy, "Criminal Justice Policy: Social Order, Risk and the "Governmental Project,"" in *Social Policy in Post-Industrial Singapore*, ed. Lian Kwen Fee and Tong Chee Kiong. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 256.

8 Lawrence Leong, "Decoding Sexual Policy in Singapore," in *Social Policy in Post-Industrial Singapore*, ed. Lian Kwen Fee and Tong Chee Kiong. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 293.

9 Singapore Department of Statistics, *Population Trends 2012* (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 2012), 3-4.

ean values," but more importantly for our assessment of sexuality education, Singaporeans hold diverse religious views. There are five major religions; by descending popularity in 2010, they are Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Taoism and Hinduism.¹

Of particular interest to the analysis of sexual attitudes is the increase in Christianity documented from 1990 onwards.² From 2000 to 2010, Christians increased 3.7% to constitute 18.3% of the population, the largest growth amongst any religious group.³ In another study, 60.1% of those who professed to be Christians prayed regularly and believed in an unseen spiritual world; the highest proportion amongst all five religions mentioned above.⁴ The large proportion of Christians heavily invested in their religion is a reflection of how vocal members of the Christian community can be in promulgating socially conservative views.⁵ Often transferred through popular online media, these refrains can occupy a resounding space in the popular consciousness that is disproportionate to their actual numbers in society.⁶ The implications of this within the religiously heterogeneous community of Singapore will be discussed later. Currently it will suffice to suggest that a statist, top-down model of sexuality education which seeks to inculcate a single set of values is incompatible (or insufficient) to satisfy the plethora of different values that accompany such a heterogeneous citizenry.

- 90 The Singapore government perceives the country's historical origin as a British administrative and colonial unit, together with an influx of Western ideals, media, and culture in the past few decades, as an existential threat to a unique national identity; accordingly, the government has emphasized "Asian" values, especially as they relate to sexual behaviors and attitudes.⁷ These values are premised upon the assumption that Asian cultural and political evolution was distinct from the West, resulting in different cultural standards.⁸ For instance, Chief Justice Yung Pung How defended the criminalization of oral sex according to the preservations of "Asian" values: "This is Asia...there are certain of

1 Ibid.

2 Singapore Department of Statistics, "Census of Population 2010: Statistical Release 1 on Demographic Characteristics, Education, Language and Religion," July 12, 2012, <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/news/news/press12012011.pdf>

3 Ibid.

4 Tambyah, Tan, and Kau, Wellbeing of Singaporeans, 78-79.

5 Eugene K. B. Tan, "Who Dragged Christianity into the AWARE Saga?: Observations on the Role of Christians, Value Pluralism and Contestation in Public Discourse," in *The AWARE Saga: Civil Society and Public Morality in Singapore*, ed. Terence Chong. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), 51-54.

6 Alex Au, "Crusades are Conflicts by Another Name," *Yawning Bread*, February 18, 2012, <http://yawningbread.wordpress.com/2012/02/18/crusades-are-conflicts-by-another-name/>

7 Brooks, *Gendered Work*, 9.

8 Amartya Kumar Sen, *Human Rights and Asian Values*. (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1997), 7-8.

fences against Asian culture."¹ Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong also stressed that he did not "encourage or endorse a gay lifestyle. Singapore is still a traditional and conservative Asian society."² The tension between the perceived Westernization of society and the Government's reinforcement of Asian values as they present themselves in the social sphere results in a cultural representation that lies somewhere between the extremes of Western liberalism and Asian conservatism. However, the government's assumption that Singapore is a society with overwhelmingly conservative values, while convenient for the sake of statist policy-making, oversimplifies the issue at hand. This has led to dire consequences for the fate of state-run sexuality education.

HISTORY OF SEXUALITY EDUCATION IN SINGAPORE

Sexuality education in Singapore followed two trends across the second half of the 20th century. First, the administration of sexuality education shifted from the private social service sector to the public sector. Second, the content of sexuality education has grown more open, at least in name. These are long-term trends which appear to be interrelated: as sexuality education became more widely accepted by an increasingly liberalizing population, it became advantageous for the government to incorporate it into contemporaneous social and educational policies. Growing support for sexuality education removed any fears of an ultra-conservative political backlash, while the burgeoning liberalism that made this support possible made further authoritarian control over the scope of sexuality education even more urgent. 91

Sex education in the 1970s and 1980s was largely laissez faire and administered independently of the government. Community centers in the heartland played a vital role as locations for open lectures on sex and sexuality.³ Doctors working in the social services sector and members of the Singapore Family Planning and Population board held talks in English and Chinese.⁴ Daily broadsheets advertised the talks, although records of actual attendance numbers are scarce.

Yet these open talks, where all were welcome, do not imply that disseminated content was progressive and forward. While the content of such talks are not well documented, a speech delivered to University of Singapore students by the University Health Service gives a hint of what these talks might dwell on. In the speech, students are urged to either suppress their sexual desires or redirect them to productive activities like exercise and "constructive social and cultural activities."⁵ The tone is prescriptive and instructive, and a set of four guide-

1 Leong, "Decoding Sexual Policy," 302.

2 Goh Chok Tong, "From the Valley to the Highlands" (National Day Rally speech on August 17 2003, available at <http://www.gov.sg/nd/ND03.htm>).

3 "Sex Education," *The Straits Times*, February 22, 1978, 7.

4 Ibid, 8.

5 Z. N. Kadri, "The Student Health Service and Sex Education," in *Sex, Schools, and Society: International Perspectives*, ed. Stewart E. Fraser. (Nashville: George Peabody

lines are given for prospective parents to help their child develop "healthy sex attitudes."¹ It is likely that the community center sex education talks replicated the conservative and paternalistic nature of this speech.

It is worth noting that the University Health Service operated directly under university, not governmental, control. Indeed, sex education in the schools below tertiary level was non-existent, although there was a vocal, progressive minority in favor of school-based sexuality education. In local newspapers, citizens advocated training a group of individuals to help youths differentiate between right and "wrong ideas and meanings of sex".² Newspapers also reported the views of a "woman social scientist," Dr. Nalla Tan, who expressed her concern with how inadequate or embarrassed parents felt in teaching their children about sex and sexuality. Dr. Tan proposed that teachers shoulder the responsibility of sexuality education "because they were trained and were also held in high regard by their pupils."³ However, these views, although widely circulated in the local media, failed to find a foothold in the education system of the 1970s and 1980s. In this period, schools focused on equipping students with the knowledge and marketable skills necessary to hold down a job in rapidly industrializing Singapore.⁴ This overt focus on matching educational outcomes to employment demands focused the efforts of policymakers on inculcating skills, not values. More practicable skill sets which were directly relevant to the evolving industrial landscape of Singapore effectively sidelined the sex education curriculum.⁵

In the 1980s and 1990s, doctors, scholars and health professionals argued consistently for a system of sexuality education that not only taught students "how to copulate," but included "information on a whole range of aspects of sexuality, including love, sex, abortion and virginity."⁶ This contrasted the nascent and uncoordinated reality of sexuality education in schools. In 1989, it consisted of "one chapter in a biology textbook," in addition to "moral and religious education" classes which failed to delve into the subject in sufficient depth.⁷ Even in the late 90s, it was divided amongst disparate segments of the formal curriculum: "Health Education in the [elementary school] levels, and Science, Civic and Moral Education, and Pastoral Care curriculum" at the middle and high school level.⁸ This disorganized system was the result of the lack of formal

College for Teachers, Aurora Publishers, 1972), 251-252.

1 Ibid, 250.

2 "Importance of getting the right teachers," *The Straits Times*, October 15, 1978, 27.

3 "Where parents fail in sex teaching," *The Straits Times*, January 20, 1970, 2.

4 "Education," Library of Congress Country Studies, [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+sg0059\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sg0059))

5 Tong Chee Kiong and Lian Kwen Fee, "Social Policy Issues in a Post-Industrial Society" in *Social Policy in Post-Industrial Singapore*, ed. Lian Kwen Fee and Tong Chee Kiong. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 2.

6 "Teach sex formally in schools: Doctors," *The Straits Times*, July 17, 1978, 14.

7 Ibid.

8 Aline Wong, "Speech by Dr Aline Wong, Senior Minister of State for Education, for

guidelines at the Ministry level regarding sexuality education.

Still, schools had relative autonomy to engage external vendors to provide sexuality education classes, a policy that extends to the current day. Organizations like the Singapore Planned Parenthood Association (SPPA) provided sexuality education clinics for students and teachers, thus partially compensating for the deficiencies of state-wide sexuality education.¹ As the locus of sex education shifted from community centers to classrooms, sex educators gained direct access to a more specific and relevant group of individuals at a sensitive period in their physical and intellectual maturation. Nevertheless, this represented a continuation of earlier decades where sexuality education remained firmly in the domain of the social services sector rather than the governmental sector.

The critical turning point occurred in the early 2000s, when the Ministry of Education (MOE) developed a comprehensive Framework on Sexuality Education and the Growing Years (GY) series.² The former was a set of guidelines that set out explicitly, for the first time, the ideological and practical approach that the MOE would take to educating students about sexuality. The latter was a fully-formed sexuality education curriculum to be implemented in all schools. As a result, students from 11 to 18 would benefit from 2-5 hours of sexuality education classes each year, depending on their age.³ Of course, the GY series adhered closely to the aforementioned Framework on Sexuality Education, and it is the latter which provides an insight into the values that undergird Singapore's state-sponsored sexuality education.

I will discuss the values behind the Framework on Sexuality Education at length below, but a few points are worth noting now. First, the Framework was designed to be representative of public opinion on sexuality education, heavily emphasizing the fact that the MOE consulted various experts, psychologists, counselors and therapists, students, as well as "parents and community representatives, principals and teachers at several focus group discussions."⁴ Second, by embracing the progressive notion that "sexuality education...is no longer restricted to the narrow focus...of "sex education", on the facts, attitudes and skills related to reproductive physiology, marriage and childbirth, or sex and contraception," the MOE intended for the Framework to be seen as a more holistic, progressive approach to sexuality education.⁵ However, the Framework itself is hardly progressive: by prescribing that "sexuality education will be pre-

Launching the Growing Years Series," October 16, 2000, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/speeches/2000/sp16102000.html>.

1 "Milestones," Singapore Planned Parenthood Association, accessed April 20, 2013, <http://www.sppa.org.sg/index-1b.html>.

2 Ibid.

3 "Implementation Policies for Sexual Education," Ministry of Education, June 20, 2012, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/education/programmes/social-emotional-learning/sexuality-education/policies/>.

4 Wong, "Speech by Dr Aline Wong."

5 Ibid.

mised on the importance of the family as the basic unit of society," it excludes alternative lifestyles and those who opt not to conform to the standard nuclear family.¹ Finally, the Framework is an encompassing educational policy: schools can engage external vendors like SPPA and the Association of Women for Action, Research and Education (AWARE) to "supplement the schools' sexuality education programme," but this must be done "in strict compliance with MOE guidelines on the engagement of external providers."² In other words, vendors must align their curricula to the values behind this Framework. How does this monolithic set of guidelines on how sexuality education should be taught hold up against the heterogeneous nature of Singapore society mentioned above? By looking at how an external vendor's liberal perspective on homosexuality breached these guidelines, I suggest that we might gain a clearer understanding of how prescribing values on controversial topics like homosexuality is fundamentally incompatible with the diverse range of socio-cultural views in Singapore.

THE A.W.A.R.E. CONTROVERSY: HIGHLIGHTING SINGAPORE'S HETEROGENEITY

94 The heterogeneous composition of the population in Singapore, together with the intermingling of Western and Asian cultural elements, result in a diverse panoply of value orientations and lifestyles. Because of this, it is hard for even the government to gauge the values and attitudes of its citizens. This is underscored by a controversy which highlighted how a sex education class, conducted with implicit government consent, led to public furor over the portrayal of sexuality and sex acts. In the process, we observe the challenges in supporting a top-down, state-supervised sexuality education curriculum. In particular, the Government faces great difficulties in ensuring that the values espoused in the sexuality education curriculum correspond closely to that of society at large.

The focus of this controversy was in a sexuality education curriculum designed by AWARE, a women's group designated by the MOE to provide sexuality education programmes in schools. AWARE's Comprehensive Sexual Education (CSE) programme had been taught to girls aged 12 to 18, in schools and juvenile rehabilitation institutes, since 2006. In 2009, after the Instructor's Guide was leaked online, parents raised concerns that the CSE condoned homosexuality, anal sex, and premarital sex.³ One main objection lay in the guidelines for an ice-breaking activity which called upon students to categorize a list of words into positive, neutral and negative. The text then goes on to offer a recommended categorization, as well as an explanation of why the words should be in these particular categories. Critics took particular issue with the following

¹ Ministry of Education, "Ministry of Education Launches a Framework for Sexuality Education and the Growing Years Series," October 13, 2000, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/press/2000/pr13102000.htm>.

² "Implementation Policies."

³ Chew I-Jin et al., "AWARE's Comprehensive Sexuality Education (CSE) Programme: Report of the Review Team" (unpublished manuscript, August 2010, 2).

categorizations:

"Anal sex – can be healthy or neutral if practiced with consent and with a condom."⁴

"Pre-marital sex – people might place pre-marital sex as negative, but it is really neutral. The key is whether the couple is aware of the consequences and responsibilities and is ready for them."⁵

"Homosexual – homosexuality is perfectly normal. Just like heterosexuality, it is simply the way you are. Homosexuals also form meaningful relationships, and face the same emotional issues that heterosexuals do."⁶

The leaked Instructor's Guide led to the systematic polarization of stakeholders involved, in particular the leadership of AWARE. This polarization manifested itself in religious terms, as well as in the dichotomy between social conservatism and liberalism. Within AWARE, conservative forces mounted a surprising takeover of the executive committee during the annual general meeting (AGM), allegedly due to fears that the organization had "lost sight of its original purpose and become pro-lesbian and pro-homosexual".⁴ Thio Su Mien, a self-styled "feminist mentor" to the new leaders of AWARE, interpreted the old sexuality education curriculum as one that taught "young girls from 12 to 18...that it's okay to experiment with each other."⁵ Along with Dr. Thio, "half of the new [executive] council attend the same church," the Anglican Church of our Saviour; this inevitably led to the new leadership being characterised as elements of the "Christian right."⁶ Derek Hong, the pastor of this church spoke up in favour of the new executive committee: "It's not a crusade against 95 the people but there's a line that God has drawn for us, and we don't want our nation crossing the line."⁷

Fundamentalist Christian groups, both online and to the congregations, appealed to sexual conservatism to criticize various aspects of the programme. For example, in response to a statement in the Instructor's Guide which asserts that "foreplay increases the pleasure of sex," Christian Parenting Articles retorted that this "indirectly promotes premarital sex" and thus did not belong

¹ "A Critique: AWARE CSE – Comprehensive Sexuality Education," Alan S. L. Wong, accessed March 30, 2013, www.vtaide.com/blessing/AWARE-cse.htm.

² Ibid.

³ Sandra Davie and Tan Dawn Wei, "Why neutral stance on homosexuals," The Straits Times, April 27, 2009, 8.

⁴ Zakir Hussain, "Lawyer's key role in AWARE coup," The Straits Times, April 26, 2009, 16.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The Economist, "Taken unawares: Liberals rally to take on the Christian right," The Economist, May 7, 2009, accessed on March 30, 2013, http://www.economist.com/node/13611576?story_id=13611576.

⁷ Lawrence Leong, "Sexual Vigilantes Invade Gender Space: Religion and Sexuality in the AWARE Saga," in *Queer Singapore: Illiberal Citizenship and Mediated Cultures*, ed. Audrey Yue and Jun Zubillaga-Pow (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 65.

in the “positive” category.² Parents’ opinions of the programme also reflected a fear of exposing their children to beliefs or values they did not share. One parent shared how she was “shocked” by the “immoral lifestyle” that some speakers led: the one who talked to her daughter allegedly “told the students how she grew up on a diet of pornographic movies, having watched them together with her parents...at home.”³ These set of views broadly constitute the opposition towards the CSE, as allegedly seeking to propagate a liberal agenda through their treatment of topics like homosexuality.

That the conservative response was predominantly Christian instead of multi-faith is due to the growth of Christian fundamentalism, as well as the absence or suppression of other forms of religious fundamentalism. As mentioned earlier, Christianity is growing in strength in Singapore, both numerically and qualitatively. Not only has the proportion of Christians grown from 3.7% to 18.3% over a ten-year period, Christian churches have eagerly tapped into new media sources through the Internet to spread their faith.⁴ Mega-churches such as City Harvest Church, with the added advantage of financial backing, have successfully converted large numbers of youth and working adults to the faith.⁵ The rapid spread of Christianity has allowed the more radical strand of the religion a greater confidence and latitude in publicizing its beliefs. Further, religious fundamentalism in other religions are either actively repressed or simply absent. Ever since Singapore has joined the war on terror and several terrorist attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist organization with links to Al-Qaeda and Muslim fundamentalist ideals, have been detected and pre-empted, Muslim fundamentalism has been both self-policed by mainstream Muslims and actively suppressed by the government. Buddhists, on the other hand, do not seem to be as openly religious as Christians, despite the larger number of citizen who self-identify as Buddhist.⁶ Finally – according to the observation of the author – Hindus, who constitute 5.1 per cent of the population, do not appear to form a sufficiently large critical mass that is necessary for the spread of fundamentalist viewpoints.⁷

While a group of fundamentalist Christians attacked the values inherent within the CSE, the liberal-minded former AWARE leadership appreciated the CSE

¹ Lawrence Leong, “Sexual Vigilantes Invade Gender Space: Religion and Sexuality in the AWARE Saga,” in *Queer Singapore: Illiberal Citizenship and Mediated Cultures*, ed. Audrey Yue and Jun Zubillaga-Pow. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 65.

² “A Critique – Aware CSE.”

³ Susan Foo, “CSE: Speakers veered off-track,” May 7, 2009, accessed on April 3, 2013, http://voices.todayonline.com/letter/EDC090507-0000091/online_only_cse_speakers_veered_off_track.html#Letter.

⁴ Singapore Department of Statistics, “Census of Population 2010”

⁵ Sharon Chen, “Singapore Mega-Church Christian Faithful Invest in Malls,” September 4, 2012, accessed on May 5, 2013, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-03/singapore-mega-church-faithful-invest-in-malls-southeast-asia.html>.

⁶ Tambyah, Tan, and Kau, *Wellbeing of Singaporeans*, 79.

⁷ Singapore Department of Statistics, “Census of Population 2010,” 5.

for its progressive nature. The old leadership who spearheaded the initiation of the CSE firmly believed that the CSE “was designed to provide teens with information in a non-judgmental way.”¹ This implies a distinction between the teaching of information and the teaching of values: “We do not teach kids to impart judgment, we just give them information. Their values come from their families and their religion.”² An Old Guard review of the CSE elaborates on this as it pertains to premarital sex. Although the CSE creators emphasized that “abstinence...was the surest way to avoid pregnancy,” they opted to provide the “facts about sex and contraception rather than try to dictate that they not have sex.”³ This explains, from the point of view of the old leadership, why the aforementioned words are categorised the way they are in the Instructor’s Guide.

The new executive committee stepped down on 28 March, 2009 – just days after assuming leadership – as the result of a no-confidence vote against them.⁴ This vote may have been due to dissatisfaction over how the new leadership assumed power abruptly during the AGM as much as it may have been due to opposition towards their conservative, religious fundamentalist views. Nevertheless, this points to a group of women within AWARE who keenly disagreed with the actions of the new executive committee.

Predictably, the gay community rallied behind the CSE in endorsing a more progressive attitude to sexuality education. Gay bloggers and websites – which constituted much of gay civil rights activism in 2009 – spoke out against the new leadership of AWARE in an intelligent and vocal fashion. They countered the allegations of social conservatives that the CSE was “promoting a homosexual agenda” by questioning how a workshop that considered homosexuality a “neutral” act could be considered to promote any agenda at all.⁵ Other websites focused on what they considered the hawkish conservative stance of the new leadership to ask a rhetorical question: “Judging by its actions, and in spite of its new ‘Pro-woman, pro-family, pro-Singapore’ vision, how inclusive and secular a stance would the new team take?”⁷ This was a critical question, given that any move made by AWARE would need to take into account the multifarious religions, cultures and belief systems in Singapore.

To identify the issue as one between religious conservatives and secular liberals proves to be merely a simplistic interpretation of the issue. For example, the National Council of Churches of Singapore – a moderate Christian coalition

¹ Davis and Wei, “Why neutral stance,” 8.

² Ibid.

³ Chew et al., “Report of the Review Team,” 7.

⁴ “Josie’s new team steps down,” AsiaOne News, May 2, 2009, <http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Singapore/Story/AtStory20090502-138858.html>.

⁵ Hussain, “Lawyer’s key role,” 16.

⁶ Alex Au, “Education ministry suspends AWARE’s sexuality education programme,” Yawning Bread, May 7, 2009, http://www.yawningbread.org/arch_2009/yax-1019.htm.

⁷ “AWARE members vote out anti-gay exco,” Regina De Rozario, 4 May 2009, <http://www.fridae.asia/newsfeatures/2009/05/04/2271.aware-members-vote-out-anti-gay-exco>.

– announced in an oblique reference to Derek Hong’s proselytising that it did not “condone pulpits being used” to take sides on the controversy.¹ Still, this dichotomy provides a starting point for us to discuss the resolution of this controversy, as well as its implications for Singapore. Given the degree of polarisation and the seriousness of the issue, it was unsurprising that the Government was called to weigh in and mediate on the issue.²

MINISTRY RESPONSE TO THE CSE

What was surprising was that the economically proactive Singapore government dealt with the crucial social issue of AWARE’s CSE in an essentially reactive fashion. On the 28th of April, two days after Dr. Thio criticised the CSE for promoting homosexuality, the MOE released a press statement declaring that the schools that used AWARE deemed the program appropriate and respectful to different religious values, and that they did not receive any negative response from the students or parents.³

The press statement implicitly recognises the moral legitimacy of the CSE, since it clearly states that “values taught should not deviate from the social norms accepted by mainstream society in Singapore,” yet makes no mention about the CSE contravening these values.⁴ Yet in a subsequent press release two days later, they acknowledge investigating parental concern over the online Instructor’s Guide.⁵ And on the 6th of May, the MOE announced in yet another press release that after examining the Instructor Guide, the MOE found some suggestions that are explicit and inappropriate, and convey messages which could promote homosexuality or suggest approval of pre-marital sex. As a result, MOE would suspend AWARE sexuality education programmes, subjecting them to a new approval process.⁶

We can only speculate at the reasons for this abrupt policy. Local bloggers pointed the finger at the recently deposed new leadership, who allegedly followed up on their EGM fiasco by circulating emails “urging Singaporeans to

sign an online petition to MOE to review the CSE.”⁷ In reviewing the CSE, members of the Old Guard predictably also blamed the new leadership for persisting in “their campaign against the CSE programme” and “[encouraging] parents to write to [MOE] to complain about it.”⁸ Both sources are of questionable provenance, but there is probably some truth in their statements. Indeed, we have evidence that conservative parents were more than willing to write to local newspapers condemning the way sensitive topics like homosexuality were broached in the CSE.⁹ More parents probably wrote directly to the MOE, because it accorded them a modicum of privacy that forum letters could not. Since the inception of sexuality education in 2000, the MOE has recognized the primacy of the parent in allowing them to opt out.¹⁰ This was reinforced in 2009 by the reassertion that “teachers are guided by the principle that parents are ultimately responsible for the values education of their children.”¹¹ This implies that parental opinion is taken seriously in the construction and modification of sexuality education programmes. It also suggests that letters from conservative parents were probably the main motivation behind the sudden about-face in disallowing the CSE.

How does this abrupt policy shift bear up to close scrutiny? Insofar that the CSE did “not conform to MOE’s guidelines,” the suspension of the CSE seems justifiable.¹² However, if we juxtapose the actions of MOE against that of (a) broader government policy regarding homosexuality, and (b) social and societal attitudes towards homosexuals, we reach a very different conclusion. Let us tackle each of these cases in turn.

THE CSE VS. THE FRAMEWORK ON SEXUALITY EDUCATION

The Framework on Sexuality Education takes a dispassionate and often negative stance against homosexuality. While the only explicit mention of homosexuality is a seemingly neutral, non-judgmental sentence that states that “Sexuality Education teaches what homosexuality is, and the current legal provisions concerning homosexual acts in Singapore,” the GY curriculum acknowledges that it will integrate facts and values.¹³ The delivery of the GY series will thus be “based on respect for the individual and adherence to our core family values, without being moralistic.”¹⁴ The MOE never elaborates on how exactly it

1 Au, “Education ministry suspends AWARE’s.”

2 Chew et al., “Report of the Review Team.”

3 e.g. James Ray, “Homosexuality is not neutral,” Today, May 8, 2009, accessed on April 10, 2013, <http://wheniwayoung2.blogspot.com/2009/05/homosexuality-is-not-neutral.html>; Foo, “CSE speakers veered.”

4 Ministry of Education, “Framework for Sexuality Education.”

5 Ministry of Education, “Reply to Media Queries.”

6 Ministry of Education, “MOE Statement on Sexuality Education Programme,”

7 “Scope and Teaching Approach of Sexuality Education in Schools,” Ministry of Education, last modified June 20, 2012, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/education/programmes/social-emotional-learning/sexuality-education/scope/>.

8 Wong, “Speech by Dr. Wong,”

1 Alicia Wong, “Pastor apologises for misusing pulpit,” Today, May 2, 2009, 3.

2 Eng Hen Ng, “Remarks by Dr. Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Education and Second Minister for Defence on Sexuality Education Programmes in Schools,” May 21, 2009, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/speeches/2009/05/21/remarks-by-dr-ng-eng-hen-on-se.php>.

3 Sum Chee Wah, “Reply to Recent Comments and Claims About AWARE’s Sexuality Education Programme in Schools,” The Straits Times, April 28, 2009, accessed April 5, 2013, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/forum/2009/04/reply-to-recent-comments-and-c.php>.

4 Ibid.

5 Ministry of Education, “Reply to Media Queries on MOE’s Sexuality Education Programme,” Today, April 30, 2009, accessed April 5, 2013, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/forum/2009/04/reply-to-media-queries-on-moes.php>.

6 Ministry of Education, “MOE Statement on Sexuality Education Programme,” The Straits Times, May 6, 2009, accessed on April 5, 2013, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/press/2009/05/moes-statement-on-sexuality-ed.php>.

intends to mediate the fine line between the insistence on prescribed values on one hand, and the freedom to determine one's own morals on the other. Furthermore, the exact identity of these "values" can only be indirectly pieced together. For instance, MOE states that that a fundamental assumption driving Sexuality Education is the notion of "the family as the basic unit of society," the likes of which should be encouraged and lauded.¹

By defining the family as an institution that only married couples (who, according to Singapore law, must consist of a man and a woman) can participate in, MOE demonstrates an ideological slant towards heteronormativity. To support this view, MOE states that the content in the GY "reflects that of mainstream Singapore society."² As shown, the language used in official MOE press releases and other publicly available documents is coy in mentioning homosexuality; observers must infer much from the context. Still, it remains extremely likely that MOE guidelines require external curricula to at least compare homosexuality unfavourably to the heterosexual family unit, even if the curriculum does not disapprove of homosexuality outright.

If this is true, this reflects the infusion of values into the GY series, and indirectly, MOE's guidelines for external vendors. It is precisely this tenet of values-based sexuality education that the CSE violated. Constance Singam, former president of AWARE, put it well: "We do not teach kids to impart judgment, we just give them information. Their values come from their family and their religion."³ By promoting a non-judgmental curriculum that sought not to impose values but promote independent decision-making, the CSE ran afoul of the MOE guidelines which had a clear, entrenched system of values in place. While complaints of conservative parents may serve as a proximate cause to the suspension of the CSE, the ultimate cause was the failure of the CSE to espouse certain heteronormative viewpoints which were crucial components of the MOE guidelines for sexuality education.

THE CSE VS. GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS HOMOSEXUALITY

The CSE was thus clearly at odds with prevailing MOE guidelines regarding sexuality education, but was it also different with how the Singapore government perceived homosexuality?⁴ In comparing the key tenets of the CSE with the Government's stance on homosexuality, we need to acknowledge that although that the latter has evolved over the decades, the issue remains complex. Highly rigid, intolerant legislation aimed at sanctioning homosexuality has

¹ Wong, "Speech by Dr. Wong,"

² "MOE Framework for Sexuality Education." The accuracy of this presumption is discussed below.

³ Davis and Wei, "Why neutral stance," 8.

⁴ In this paper I accept the tenets of these guidelines a priori; my role here is not to challenge these guidelines, but to see how they are relevant to the CSE, government at large, and societal attitudes.

given way to a more tolerant legislative framework. Nevertheless, the Government persists in sending out mixed signals underscoring its reluctance to admit homosexuality and homosexual acts into mainstream Singapore society.

Historically, Singapore's laws and legislation reflect government disapproval of homosexual acts and behaviour. Punitive laws inherited from the British colonial government proscribed homosexuality; they persist today in Sections 377 and 377A of the Penal Code. Section 377 regards "carnal intercourse against the order of nature" as an offence with a penalty of up to live imprisonment; this includes any act of sodomy or oral sex between couples, gay or straight.¹ Section 377A is more gender- and orientation-specific: it prohibits "any male person... in public or private" from engaging in "any acts of gross indecency with another male person."² Since its first recorded conviction in 1979, Section 377A has been used widely to convict homosexual activity carried out in public spaces like parking lots or park benches.³ In addition, sentencing norms increased during the 1990s.⁴ During this period, it was not uncommon for young and attractive police constables to widely entrap homosexual men, leading to imprisonment for up to two years, a fine, caning, or any two of these.⁵ The local media subsequently featured their pictures to add to the stigma and shame.⁶

Apart from criminalising homosexuality, the Government has also banned certain media and art carrying homosexual themes, thereby restricting the expression of gay writers, playwrights and artists. The Ministry of Home Affairs first banned three plays with gay themes from public performances in 1988, and the then issued new regulations in 1994 to control performance art, after two activists staged controversial performance artworks in protest against police entrapment.⁷

Despite this historically pervasive antagonism towards homosexuality and the gay community, the last decade has seen great strides in Government-led tolerance and acceptance. The number of persons convicted under Section 377A has declined relatively steadily from 31 in 1999 to 7 in 2006.⁸

Even before the secular decline in numbers convicted, developments in the

¹ Russell Heng, "Tiptoe Out of the Closet: The Before and After of the Increasingly Visible Gay Community in Singapore," *Journal of Homosexuality* 40 (2001): 90-91.

² Ibid, 91.

³ Mohan Gopalan, "A heftier list of s.377A cases," *Yawning Bread*, May 2007, http://www.yawningbread.org/guest_2007/guw-136.htm.

⁴ Meredith L. Weiss, "'We know who you are. We'll employ you.': Non-discrimination and Singapore's bohemian dreams," in *Sexual Orientation Discrimination: An International Perspective*, ed. Lee Badgett and Jeff Frank. (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2007), 166.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Heng, "Tiptoe," 86.

⁷ Ibid., 87-88.

⁸ Gopalan, "A heftier list."

legal and judicial field heralded a greater lenience in the conviction of homosexual acts. The final judgment in the case of Tan Boon Hock vs. P.P., in which the accused was arrested during a gay entrapment exercise, was a \$2000 fine, reduced from the more severe penalties of imprisonment and caning after a High Court appeal. That the Chief Justice noted the consensual nature of entrapment as a mitigating factor against such a stiff punishment probably set a precedent for police to judge future entrapment cases.¹ Although Section 377A is still in force, evidence shows that the Government is willing to entertain the possibility of repealing it. A heated public debate in 2007 between Members of Parliament over whether it should be abrogated, with proponents of either side weighing in on the issue, is a strong indication that the Government has allowed the discussion of Section 377A, and the principles behind it, enter the public sphere.² Although the debate was resolved in favour of retaining Section 377A – and thus, keeping homosexuality a criminal act – the open nature of the conversation paved the way for this part of the Penal Code to be revisited in the future.

Other policy shifts by the Singapore government reflect a change in the official treatment of homosexuality. In 2003, then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong pronounced that his government would henceforth allow gay men and lesbians to hold sensitive government positions even after disclosing their orientation.³ Six years before the supposedly radical CSE proclaimed that gay men and women “also form meaningful relationships, and face the same emotional issues that heterosexuals do,” Prime Minister Goh had already phrased it similarly and candidly in an interview with *Time* magazine: “We are born this way and they are born that way, but they are like you and me.”⁴ Taken as a whole, the words and actions of policy-makers in the upper echelons of government indicate a shift towards a more liberal attitude towards homosexuality as a sexual orientation, even if the sex act itself still remains illegal. This is distinct from how homosexuality is implicitly condemned in the sexuality education guidelines drawn up by the MOE.

Still, as noted above, homosexual acts remain illegal in Singapore and the official position on homosexuality remains unclear. The ambivalent attitude towards homosexuality is justified by the government in terms of reflecting the views of the conservative majority and Singapore’s “Asian values.”⁵ Is this assumption that most Singaporeans regard homosexuality negatively an accurate one?

1 Hoe Lun, “Guilty or Not Guilty?” *People Like Us* 15 (1995).

2 Radha Basu, “Male homosexual sex to remain a crime,” *The Straits Times*, December 15, 2008, 12.

3 Weiss, “Singapore’s bohemian dreams,” 164.

4 Simon Elegant, “The Lion in Winter,” *Time*, July 7, 2003, accessed April 3, 2013, <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501030707-461897,00.html>.

5 Weiss, “Singapore’s bohemian dreams,” 165.

Contemporary studies have noted that Singaporeans, on average, possess negative attitudes towards homosexuality. This finding is robust and widely reported, although there are qualitative and quantitative differences between studies. In a 1992 *Straits Times* survey of homosexuality, 86% of Singaporeans aged 17 or older disapproved of homosexuality (compared to 4% who approved), largely for religious and moral reasons.¹ However, the sensitive questions in this survey were posed in front of family members; thus, there might be significant self-report biases that exaggerate the disapproval of respondents.² In 2001, a survey conducted by the Ministry of Community Development and Sports concluded that a majority of Singaporeans (85%) found homosexuality unacceptable.³ Yet in 2007, just six years later, an independent, nationally representative study by Detenber et al. found that 68.6% of Singaporeans possessed negative attitudes towards homosexuality.⁴ A follow-up study in 2012 by the same researchers concluded that 64.5% of respondents held negative attitudes, a drop in 4.1% over five years.⁵ In a finding that explains the virulently anti-CSE stance taken by the Christian right, this study also identified “intrinsic religiosity” as a key determinant of attitudes towards homosexuality – people who were more religious demonstrated more negative attitudes towards homosexuality.⁶ The overall reduction in negative attitudes – slightly less than one percentage point per year – is similar to other attitudinal studies done in the United States and Britain.⁷ In light of these oft-conflicting studies, we come to the tentative conclusion¹⁰³ that although a majority of Singaporeans still hold negative attitudes towards homosexuality, these attitudes have become quantitatively more positive over the years.

Apart from the quantitative differences highlighted above, there are qualitative differences in how these surveys which purport to assess homosexual attitudes are constructed. I suggest that surveys which assess the concrete experience of interacting with a gay individual are not only more relatable – and thus more relevant – than surveys which assess one’s response to abstract concepts re-

1 Lawrence Leong, “Singapore,” in *Sociolegal Control of Homosexuality: A Multi-National Comparison*, ed. D. J. West and R. Green. (New York: Plenum Press, 1997), 140.

2 Ibid.

3 Weiss, “Singapore’s bohemian dreams,” 174.

4 B. H. Detenber et al., “Singaporeans’ tolerance towards media portrayals of homosexuality and their attitudes toward lesbians and gay men,” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 19 (2007): 367–369.

5 B. H. Detenber et al., “Influence of value predispositions, interpersonal contact, and mediated exposure on public attitudes toward homosexuals in Singapore,” *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* (2012): 7–8, accessed April 4, 2013, DOI: 10.1111/ajsp.12006.

6 Ibid., 7.

7 “UK more liberal on homosexuality, says survey,” *BBC News*, January 26, 2010, accessed April 10, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8479624.stm; Frank Newport, “Half of Americans support legal gay marriage,” *Gallup Politics*, May 8, 2012, accessed April 10, 2013, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/154529/half-americans-support-legal-gay-marriage.aspx>.

lated to homosexuality. The former also assess a totally different construct, acceptance, rather than attitudes. Acceptance focuses on an outward display of favourable or unfavourable behaviour towards a homosexual personal contact, while attitude focuses on privately-held values and thoughts.¹ Research has found that more Singaporeans are willing to accept homosexuals on a personal level than hold positive attitudes towards homosexuality as an abstract concept; it may be that embodying a concept – in this case, homosexuality – in an easily imaginable form – a neighbour, friend, or acquaintance – imposes a humanizing effect that arouses greater sympathy in the respondent. A survey by the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) group People Like Us in 2000 found that a majority of Singaporeans were willing to accept a gay or lesbian sibling, child, or co-worker.² One of the more rigorous studies in 2007 found that 44.9% of respondents found homosexuals unacceptable, 14.7% were neutral, and 40.4% were accepting.³ This is in contrast to 64.5% possessing negative attitudes towards homosexuals in the same study.⁴ When expressed in terms of an abstract, isolated domain, responses to homosexuality remain largely negative as survey respondents might have simply internalized anti-homosexual values propagated by their parents and peers. However, when called upon to visualize homosexual individuals, respondents are forced to imagine how these abstract values might manifest within an actual human counterpart, engendering greater sympathy towards the homosexual individual rather than towards the concept of homosexuality.

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Given the complexity of the situation, it is difficult to make conclusive statements on how Singaporeans regard homosexuality. Singaporeans' attitudes towards homosexuality have become more positive over time, and the Government has taken this into account in deciding, over the years, to relax legal and judicial restrictions on the expression of gay behaviour and culture. But in claiming that most Singaporeans are part of the "conservative mainstream," the Government is only making reference to citizens' attitudes towards homosexuality, when taking into account their acceptance of homosexual individuals is crucial as well.⁵ After all, abstract attitudes are irrelevant without a real-life situation within which these attitudes can be contextualized. While Singaporeans, in general, may possess negative attitudes towards homosexuality, it is important for the Government to note that many citizens are willing to accept homosexuals, on an individual level, as those who are unwilling.

AFTERWORD – MOVING FORWARD?

The AWARE saga demonstrated how it is impossible for a top-down, statist sexuality education framework to gain approval from all segments of a hetero-

1 Detenber et al., "Influence of value predispositions," 2.

2 Weiss, "Singapore's bohemian dreams," 173.

3 Detenber et al., "Influence of value predispositions," 7.

4 Ibid.

5 Goh, "From The Valley."

geneous society. Although the CSE represented a liberal, progressive approach to teaching students about homosexuality, it faced opposition from religious quarters – in particular, Christian fundamentalism – which saw the CSE as a threat to their own values. Indeed, criticism of the CSE did not represent the final time sexuality education has come under fire from the Christian right. In 2011, leading Catholics in Singapore voiced their strident displeasure against the promotion of contraception in a new state-sponsored sexuality education program; particular points of discontent include a video that demonstrated how a condom should be used.¹ Lobbying for the program to place a greater emphasis on abstinence seems to have paid off; one key aim of MOE's refreshed sexuality education program is to help students "practice abstinence before marriage."² In addition, to ensure that there is no ambiguity behind these values, MOE currently only allows selected teachers with similar values to teach sexuality education.³ Nevertheless, the tension between this manifestation of religiosity and a secular, progressive approach to sexuality education highlights the unsuitability of a unitary, state-run sexuality education curriculum. On the other hand, the Framework on Sexuality Education, while espousing conservative values regarding homosexuality, is not in line with the overarching governmental approach to homosexuality, nor does it fully appreciate the complexities of Singaporeans' attitudes to homosexuals. By exercising its legalistic power to select and restrict external vendors, the MOE is sending out a clear signal that there is a single set of values which it expects sexuality educators to conform to; however, the studies on attitudes and behaviours of Singaporeans towards¹⁰⁵ homosexuals conflict with government ideals.

1 Bryna Sim, "School sexuality education program to be refreshed," The New Paper, December 28, 2011, last accessed May 5, 2013, <http://www.asiaone.com/print/News/Latest%2BNNews/Singapore/Story/School%2Bsexuality%2Beducation%2Bprogramme%2Bto%2Bbe%2Brefreshed.html>

2 "MOE Framework for Sexuality Education," Ministry of Education, last modified February 4, 2014, <http://www.moe.gov.sg/education/programmes/social-emotional-learning/sexuality-education/framework/>.

3 Ibid.

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A Man At War:

Roman Military Burial Practices During Peacetime and War, in the 1st and 2nd Centuries, C.E.

NICOLETTE VASILE

The first century CE marked the end of one hundred years of Roman civil war and the beginning of an era of internal peace and economic prosperity called the *Pax Augusta*. Despite its name, this era was anything but peaceful. Once Augustus, heir of Julius Caesar, had consolidated the various Italian states, he began to look outside Italy for new lands to conquer. Under the auspice of his vision, the Roman Empire began to take shape. In the first and second centuries CE, Rome deployed hundreds of thousands of legionnaires throughout Europe and Africa. Young, ambitious soldiers were recruited with the promise of *laus*, *gloria*, and *aeternitas* (praise, glory, and eternity), and assured that Rome's victory over the "barbarians" would be simple. As they soon discovered, however, war for the defense and expansion of the Roman Empire was a gruesome affair.

110 In the aftermath of combat, the dead and dying lay strewn on the battlefield, bleeding in the mud and dirt. The prognosis for those that survived with injuries was just as bleak. Despite the medical care provided to military personnel, many soldiers died of infection, further adding to the soaring death toll. Diseases, such as malaria and typhoid fever, ravaged the military camps in the summer, enhancing the *danse macabre* of military life.

A grisly death, of course, was not only the fate of active soldiers in the ancient world. Life expectancy in general was rather short. Malnutrition, disease, and pure happenstance all played contributing factors to the high mortality rate. Archeological analysis of graves and grave markers shows countless examples of child and infant burials alongside those of adults who died from the same malady.¹ So inundated with death in their daily lives, it is plausible that the prospect of dying on a battlefield was not a strong deterrent in comparison to the many benefits afforded to soldiers. In peacetime and war, thousands of Roman men left their natal homes and enlisted in the military in hopes of achieving glory and obtaining the perks associated with the profession.

Soldiers came from many ethnically and socially diverse backgrounds.² As any freeborn male was eligible to enlist in the army, a military career was one of the few options for societal advancement and job security available to the disadvantaged. All enlistees, even those in the lowest echelons of the military, were

1 J.E. King, "Infant Burial." *The Classical Review* 17, no. 1 (February 1903): 83-4.
2 Gabriele Wesch-Klein, "Recruits and Veterans," in *A Companion to the Roman Army*, ed. Paul Erdkamp (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 435.

promised regular income, food, lodging, medical care, and skill-based education during the term of their service. If such assurances weren't attractive enough, those that were honorably discharged at the end of their term were given full citizenship, land, and veteran's benefits such as tax exemptions.³

Although men from a single village might have been recruited together, there was no guarantee that they would be stationed in the same cohort. Instead, military units were often composed of virtual strangers who were assigned to certain legions because of their skill or the legion's need for replacement troops. These men bonded under the stress and challenges of military life. Once soldiers left their homes, chances were slim that they would ever return. By joining the military, a man effectively cut many ties with the civilian world.

Far from home and family, recruits carved out their own cultural identity as soldiers in the Imperial army and brothers in arms. Even after a soldier was discharged from the military, their status as veteran was, in many cases, their supreme identifying characteristic. Many men were awarded land near forts or in military populated colonies upon discharge and, as a result, remained entrenched in the military culture until they died. This military culture pervaded all aspects of this societal subgroup, regulating the ways in which soldiers carried out their daily routine, worshipped the gods and the imperial cult, and even honored their dead.

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The commemoration of fallen comrades and veterans by their peers provides ample evidence for the unique practices of soldiers in Roman society. By consulting literary and archaeological evidence from the first and second centuries CE, it is possible to reconstruct their burial practices. By doing this, we can place the actions of the soldiers within a context of normal Roman behavior for this specific subject.

Literary evidence dating back to the pre-Etruscan period suggests the Romans believed in the survival of the soul after death.⁴ Tacitus, Cicero, Livy, and Virgil all wrote about the soul, or manes, of the individual, affirming the existence of an afterlife and proposing an active role for spirits in the realm of the living. Cicero notably suggested that the souls of one's ancestors were worthy of veneration and "capable of aiding their descendants."⁵ "Kinless and neglected souls," he claimed, were jealous of the living and apt to do them harm.⁶ Proper funerary rights and commemoration of the deceased were, therefore, performed to avoid the ire of such spirits and to help the soul move on to the afterlife.

Roman funerals were elaborate affairs steeped in ritual. Since Romans believed

1 Ibid., 436.

2 Jocelyn Toynbee, *Death and Burial in the Roman World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 34.

3 Ibid., 35.

4 Ibid.

that the byproduct of death was pollution and putrefaction of the body, a corpse was ritually cleaned and prepared for a public viewing.¹ After a period of mourning, a funeral procession consisting of the deceased's family and friends would carry the body outside the city limits to a burial ground.²

The Romans had two acceptable forms of burying the dead - inhumation and cremation. Burial of the body in earth was considered the only definitive way to ensure that the soul was laid to rest. Cremated remains were placed in a grave or columbarium to obtain the same result as if the body had been interred. If left unburied, it was believed that the soul could not cross over the River Styx into the underworld and find peace. Instead, the soul languished in limbo for all eternity.³ At minimum, dirt had to be sprinkled over the corpse to avoid this fate.⁴

112 Commemoration of the dead through tombs, grave markers, and monuments was an important component of the burial ritual. Romans believed that they would be immortal if the memory of their character and virtue survived after their death.⁵ Often, the deceased's family would construct a monument displaying the name or names of the dead, the name or names of those who paid for the commemoration, and some writing or ornamentation indicating something notable such as the former profession of the deceased.⁶ This practice was important both for the dying and for those who had suffered the loss of a loved one. Large, extravagant tombs and shabby grave markers alike provided an opportunity for one's legacy to be honored by the living. Family and friends could, and often would, visit these tombs and pay their respects to the dead, allowing them to remain close with the spirits of the deceased.⁷

The death and burial of a Roman soldier was not nearly as structured as that of the average Roman. The unpredictability of war left very little time for funeral preparations. The family of the deceased was not, in most cases, permitted to perform the traditional rites on the body or bury the body in their family tomb or plot of land. The nature of war often prevented even the identification of fallen individuals on a battlefield. Likewise, lengthy periods of mourning were not possible in Roman military camps. Even in times of peace, a Roman soldier did not receive the same ritualized burial and commemoration as civilians.⁸

Soldiers in the imperial army made small annual contributions to funds from

1 Brian D. Turner, "Military Defeats, Casualties of War and the Success of Rome" (PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010), 31.

2 Ibid., 32.

3 Ibid.

4 Toynbee, *Death and Burial in the Roman World*, 48-9.

5 Brandon Olsen, "Commemorating the Roman Soldier" (PhD diss., University of North Dakota, 2007), 1-3.

6 Turner, "Military Defeats, Casualties of War and the Success of Rome," 32.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 33.

which they would pay for funerals.¹ Archaeological evidence, however, is inconclusive as to the specific nature of these deposits. Debate has persisted in an effort to determine whether the money placed into these accounts was for general use and available to all men in a cohort, or solely for personal use in the event of the soldier's own death.² Despite the prolific incidences of the state paying for funerals in the cases of emperors and important generals, the average soldier could not expect such an honor. They were undoubtedly responsible for paying for their own funeral in some manner.

In times of peace, a soldier's close friends performed funerary rituals similar to those practiced in the rest of the empire, although, in an abbreviated fashion as the death of a comrade did not constitute a valid excuse to be relieved from duty.³ Soldiers often had wills executed to designate heirs and to specify their wishes for commemoration.⁴ The ability for soldiers to name inheritors was vital since military law prevented combatants from marrying during their term of their service. Many soldiers left their savings to their brothers in arms or named women with whom they had had affairs and children as the recipient of their possessions. If no designation was made, the soldier's money could be absorbed into the military's treasury.⁵

A funerary memorial might be set up outside a fort if the deceased had enough funds in his personal account. Friends and comrades often chipped in to erect a monument in honor of the deceased to ensure that their brother was properly honored.⁶ There are even many examples of women setting up such memorials for their military "husbands," even though their marriages were not recognized by the state.⁷ Although these markers were more often than not modest epitaphs with the occasional relief, archaeologists have discovered more than 250,000 surviving inscriptions that date mostly from the first and second centuries CE.⁸ 113

The prevalence of funerary monuments later declined in the third century, when military forts became increasingly permanent. As archaeologists believe that the construction of monuments was largely an attempt for soldiers, far away from their homes and the people who would remember them, to cement their legacy and express military identity, status, and success, this should not be too surprising.⁹ As soldier's accrued property, possessions, and status within

1 Ibid., 33.

2 Valerie M. Hope, "Trophies and Tombstones: Commemorating the Roman Soldier," *World Archaeology* 35, no. 1 (June 2003): 85-7.

3 Ibid., 84-5.

4 Edward Champlin, *Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills*. 200 B.C. - 250 A.D. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 103-11.

5 Ibid., 69.

6 Hope, "Trophies and Tombstones: Commemorating the Roman Soldier," 84.

7 Ibid., 86-7.

8 Ibid., 84.

9 Ibid., 85.

more permanent communities, their lives became increasingly similar to that of the average Roman. Without experiencing a state of alienation akin to that of soldiers in the first and second centuries, the need to leave a physical marker of one's death in an area became less important. Instead, soldiers created manifestations of their living presence in an area in the form of homes, businesses, families, and memorialized donations to the town.¹

Tombstones appear to be standardized in design and content. Although not all memorials contained explicit military symbolism, most did.² Soldiers were often depicted in military dress with weapons and symbols of their position. The epitaphs below the reliefs often stated the name and military title of the deceased as well as information about their military career.³ The language used on these tombstones to memorialize the virtues of the deceased, however, should be considered with care. The Roman military was a complex social group with abbreviations and slang that differed from common Latin.⁴ For example, archaeologists once believed that the titles *veterani* and *emeriti* could both be translated to mean "veteran." Recent scholarship, however, has proposed that an *emeritus* was a man who completed his entire term of service while a *veteranus* died before being honorably discharged.⁵ The difference in language connoted the accomplishments of the deceased. A man who was honorably discharged would have been an established landowner, a head of household, and a member of a community. A common soldier dying on the battlefield would most likely not have had any land, extensive possessions, or legitimate children.

Analysis of the reliefs and epitaphs on the tombstones found near military forts reveals important information regarding those who lived and worked there. The famous "Rufus Sita Tombstone" shows the deceased on a horse trampling a fallen enemy. Sita has a sword at his side and a spear in his hand. The inscription below the relief states that he was a "cavalryman" in the "6th Cohort of Thracians."⁶ The fact that he only has two names rather than the traditional three of Roman citizens indicates that he had not been granted citizenship. Comparison of the tombs of other cavalrymen of the same time period suggests that the bulk of the cavalry unit in the imperial army was composed of non-citizens.

The "Cenotaph of Marcus Caelius Bonn" shows the centurion in military dress flanked by the busts of his two freedmen. He is depicted with a sword in his

hand. The epitaph specifies Bonn's legion and position in his cohort.¹ The relief and inscription, as well as others similar in design, provide information about the social status of the elite military command. Because Marcus Caelius Bonn is pictured with two freedmen, archaeologists have assumed that he was wealthy enough to purchase slaves or at least maintain a household with many people in his care. The tombstones of men in similar positions show a similar degree of personal detail.² This, as well as a more in depth look at the lives and households of military commanders, has contributed to the conclusion that there was limited upward mobility in the military. It was the commander's high social status and immense wealth that allowed them to construct such elaborate monuments. Tombstones appear to have been a phenomenon of the permanent military camp. Archaeologists have found little evidence of such markers being erected when legions were most mobile. This is not to say that such commemoration had become passé or that the soldiers' aspirations while at war differed from those during peacetime. Rather, archaeological evidence suggests that the nature of war and the occurrence of large scale, unexpected death prevented the mass erection of tombstones during these periods. This resulted in a dramatic divergence of military burial practices and funerary rites afforded to soldiers. Forced to contend with the inevitability of their own demise, soldiers found new and creative ways to immortalize themselves and their comrades within the confines of their limited means.³

While soldiers living in military forts during times of peace could expect that their remains would receive a certain measure of respect and care, those killed in battle could not presume such niceties. Roman generals had the obligation to ensure that the dead under their command were properly buried in accordance with Roman tradition. It can be assumed, however, that sometimes it may have been impossible to retrieve the bodies of the dead to perform such rites. After a military defeat and subsequent retreat or a victory with great forward progression, commanders could not often organize a party to search for and retrieve their fallen comrades. Due to the great stigma associated with leaving the dead unburied, both literary and archaeological evidence suggest that commanders made a great effort to give the dead some sort of burial, no matter how unceremonious.⁴ Mass inhumation, either by means of a full burial or a sprinkling of dirt, and cremation were most often employed.⁵

Pliny the Elder speaks of the fallen soldier's fate at length in his *Naturalis Historia*. Concerned with the cleanliness and hygiene of the camps, the Roman dead were hastily separated from those of the enemy, stripped of clothing and weapons, and interred in a mass grave.⁶ With the threat of an iron shortage

¹ Ibid., 84-6.

² Ibid., 87.

³ Alastair Scott Anderson, *Roman Military Tombstones* (Oxford: Shire Publications Limited, 1983), 2.

⁴ Ibid., 25.

⁵ Lisa M. Anderson, "The Roman Military Community as Expressed in its Burial Customs During the First to Third Centuries CE" (PhD diss., Brown University, 2009), 125-7.

⁶ Ibid., 27.

¹ Ibid., 32.

² Ibid., 33.

³ Hope, "Trophies and Tombstones: Commemorating the Roman Soldier," 87-90.

⁴ Turner, "Military Defeats, Casualties of War and Success of Rome," 35-7.

⁵ Ibid., 36.

⁶ C. Plinius Secundus. *The Historie of the World*. Book VII, trans. Philemon Holland

limiting the supply of weapons and thereby harming the war effort, no fallen soldier was permitted to retain their weapon either as grave goods or during cremation.¹

Cremation was, in fact, the most popular method of disposing of the war dead. This was both a quick and easy method of sanitarily interring a large amount of corpses that satisfied tradition.² Unlike inhumation, cremation ensured that grave robbers or enemies wishing to desecrate the grave could not disturb the bodies of the fallen. The grave into which the ashes were placed was most often left unmarked. Concerned with moving forward and unable to protect the ashes of the deceased, this was both a strategic and practical move.³

Mass internment led to anonymity in these battlefield graves that was in stark contrast with the commemoration of the dead present in fort cemeteries that included individual memorials. Memorials were sometimes erected in native cities and towns by peers and loved ones for soldiers killed in combat and, while these epitaphs were generally the same style as the tombstones constructed during peacetime burials, no corpse was actually entombed beneath the stone.⁴ Wealthy families sometimes erected monuments in cemeteries near their towns to commemorate their fallen kin.⁵ There are, however, very few archaeological examples of this phenomenon. Despite the rarity of such epitaphs, their existence demonstrates the importance of commemoration for the Romans.

116 Since Roman law prohibited the return of the bodies of fallen soldiers to their natal homes or a military cemetery, these tombstones acted as pure honorific memorials rather than actual grave markers.⁶ For the family and friends of the deceased, such epitaphs represented a way for them to remain close with their kin and take part in tradition despite their lack of participation in the prescribed funerary rites.

The state itself had relatively no role in memorializing those who had lost their life in the name of the Roman Empire. Instead, Romans commemorated battle sites as places of victory and honored their generals and emperors as military heroes. The death of a Roman soldier was largely minimized. After battles, piles of enemy weapons were displayed in places of prominence. Many generals made dedicatory offerings of these "trophies" to the gods and the emperor.⁷ Propagating their military strength in these victories, many emperors minted coins with inscriptions announcing recent military conquests and portrayed themselves as victors.⁸

(Charleston, SC: Nabu Press, 2011), 86.

1 Hope, "Trophies and Tombstones: Commemorating the Roman Soldier," 87.

2 Ibid., 86-7.

3 Ibid., 88.

4 Ibid., 85.

5 Turner, "Military Defeats, Casualties of War and the Success of Rome," 33.

6 Hope, "Trophies and Tombstones: Commemorating the Roman Soldier," 85.

7 Ibid., 80-1.

8 Ian Carradice, "Flavian Coinage," in *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman*

Victorious generals and their men were honored in extravagant processions called Triumphs. These parades presented opportunities for the marching army to display enemy captives, plunder, and their own prowess. Although Triumphs allowed the people of Rome to put a face to the war effort, the individual soldier, living or dead, was not the focus of the event. Triumphal Processions were a party not a funeral. The dead were seldom mentioned. Instead, the streets of Rome were filled with a joyous spectacle that had high entertainment value for the common people. Generals took advantage of these celebrations as an opportunity to display their own power and gain prestige among their elite peers.¹

It would be an oversight to claim that the Romans only celebrated Triumphs and ignored military defeats. Several days during the year were marked as "black" or "inauspicious" as a result of the high death toll during battle.² The emperor decreed that these were days of mourning and bereavement. The travesty of defeat and anxiety of invasion by enemy forces was stressed, however, more than the death of individual soldiers. On these days, as during Triumphs, the military was presented as a cohesive unit rather than a conglomeration of individuals with friends, families, and lives of their own.

There are only a few select cases in which an individual received special treatment after dying during battle. Dead military commanders were often buried alongside their men. Archaeological evidence suggests, however, that their bodies may have received preferential treatment and were buried in individual graves.³ When the stepson of the emperor Augustus was killed in 9 BC while serving in a cohort in Germany, his ashes were returned to Rome for burial in the imperial mausoleum.⁴ While a personal monument was also erected in Mainz to honor his sacrifice, this seems to have been an isolated event.⁵

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With the knowledge that they might die in battle and receive no postmortem commemoration, many soldiers attempted to memorialize themselves during their lifetime and preserve their memory after death.⁶ Other than their savings, which were usually utilized by funeral funds or distributed among inheritors, the most valuable property possessed by combatants at the front was their weapons and military equipment. Consistent with Roman epigraphic tradition, soldiers would inscribe their names on their gear. Of course, not all military paraphernalia was engraved. Helmets, it appears, were the most frequently etched while spears and lances were almost never written upon.⁷ Helmets were

Coinage, ed. William E. Metcalf (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 378.

1 Hope, "Trophies and Tombstones: Commemorating the Roman Soldier," 82.

2 Ibid., 84.

3 Ibid., 90.

4 Turner, "Military Defeats, Casualties of War and the Success of Rome," 41.

5 Ibid., 41.

6 Olsen, "Commemorating the Roman Soldier," 6-9.

7 Ibid., 10.

not only common to all soldiers, but the large, bare stretches of metal facilitated writing. Upon their death, ownership of helmets, swords, and any other valued equipment reverted back to the military.¹ These objects were then recycled and given to another soldier. Evidence suggests that new owners recognized the importance of the inscriptions and respected the actions of their fallen comrades.² Many helmets analyzed by archaeologists show multiple inscriptions, confirming that soldiers frequently continued the tradition by engraving their own names.

Recent studies of such commemoration have focused primarily on organizing and evaluating the inscriptions. In general, epitaphs have been organized into any of three categories: "those inscribed with the owner's name and unit, those inscribed with multiple names, and those that bear the name of the manufacturer."³ The prolific nature of these inscriptions suggests that this was a well-established practice and an acceptable form of commemoration for active soldiers. Like any Roman in the first and second centuries CE, the matter of one's legacy after death was a subject of concern for Roman soldiers. The status of the military as a subculture in Roman society and its combatants' daily proximity to death resulted in dramatic diversions from traditional funerary rites and burial rituals. The penchant for commemoration and the preservation of the deceased's memory was a necessity that took on many forms as soldiers transitioned from a peacetime lifestyle to that of regular conflict. Soldiers actively took a role in the commemoration of their comrades and adopted the role traditionally held by the family of the deceased. As new recruits were initiated into military life, they came to understand the importance of this custom and understood that if they should perish, their fellow combatants would properly memorialize them. Although commemoration of the dead was traditionally carried out in the form of memorials and tombstones, circumstances often prevented the establishment of such permanent structures. Despite such adversity it seemed as if soldiers made every effort to venerate their peers. By honoring one another in this way, cohorts took part in a communal activity that defined them as members of a unique cohort, the imperial army and more importantly as individuals. Although the burial rites and practices of Roman soldiers are clearly different in form than those of non-military Romans, they do share some important similarities. Emphases on internment and commemoration as well as the naming of heirs were common throughout the empire. Despite the challenges of military life that were only accentuated by wartime activity, it appears that soldiers went to great lengths to perform traditional funerary practices to the best of their abilities. The result, it appears, is the adaptation of these rites to best accommodate the military lifestyle. By extension, these differentiated practices only further established soldiers as a sub-group within the larger Roman culture.

1 Ibid., 11.

2 Ramsay MacMullen, "Inscriptions on Roman Armor and the Supply of Arms in the Roman Empire," *American Journal of Archaeology* 64, no. 1 (January 1960) 27-30.

3 Ibid., 23.

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