historian
2011-2012
Table of Contents

Acknowledgments 1
Faculty Advisor’s Introduction 2
Abstracts 3
1: Liquor, Labor, and the Fight for Prohibition in the 1910s
   Richard DeCesare 6
2: Morale in the Spanish Civil War
   Jordan McFadden 26
3: Iraqi-Jewish Immigration to Iran, 1941-1953
   Julian Cole Phillips 41
4: Fighting with a Lion: American Relations with Nasser’s Egypt
   Sruti Ramadugu 56
5: Something’s Gotta Give: The British Perception of the East Pakistan
   Crisis of 1971
   Anna-Maja Rappard 70
6: God’s Chosen Outcasts: Medieval Leprosy and the Nature of Charity
   Sara Roncero-Menendez 88
7: ‘Rum and Blood’: Harper’s Weekly and the Nineteenth Century
   Portrayal of Irish-Americans
   Grace E. Shay 98
8: The Appropriation of Collective Meaning: Mass Dissent and
   Participatory Democracy on the Columbia University Campus
   Sarah Stern 112
9: There…and back again?: Cultural Exchange in the Boniface Mission
   Emile Young 127
Works Cited 145
Past Historian Staff 161
Acknowledgements

Much of our funding for printing the journal this year came from the CAS Student Council, and we thank them for their support. Additional funding was procured through the efforts of Professor Maria Montoya, whose guidance has been invaluable over the course of the year.

Our sincere thanks also go to our faculty advisor, Prof. George Solt, who has encouraged every new and/or madcap idea we proposed this year; without his support the journal would not exist as it does.

Thanks also to all of the professors who have read the journal over the years and encouraged their students to submit; and finally, to the students who sent us their work and trusted us to judge and to edit it. We encourage all NYU students, not only those who are history majors, to continue to submit and display their enthusiasm for exploring the past.

With our heartfelt gratitude,

The Historian Editorial Board

Modupe Akinnawonu
Caroline Marris
Co-Editors in Chief

Aurora Barone
Christopher Fanikos
Hannah Hendler
Sarah Kolinovsky
Abigail Petterchak

Faculty Advisor’s Introduction

Academic year 2011-2012 was the first in which I had the privilege of serving as the faculty advisor to New York University’s undergraduate student history journal, Historian, and it has been a deeply gratifying experience. I took over the position from Professor Richard Hull with a strong sense of duty and reverence, as the Historian’s prize-winning volumes produced under his direction over the past decade provided me with a high standard to attempt to maintain. It was thus greatly reassuring to observe the dedication and commitment of the editorial staff led by Caroline Marris and Modupe Akinnawonu in producing this volume, and their tireless efforts in editing a history journal that bears a 52-year-old tradition of excellence.

This year’s Historian continues to be a testament to the distinguished scholarship that is produced by our Department’s best students, and their devotion to the craft of careful historical research and writing. The variation in methodology, the breadth of subject matter, the range of geographic space, and the temporal differences across each era in focus represented by the articles are all strong evidence of the remarkable diversity found in the Department’s course offerings, and the freedom contained within the disciplinary rubric of history overall. The Historian is thus a showcase of the most original, insightful, and enlightening work that the students have produced for their courses in the History Department here at NYU, and it is a most rewarding part of the end of every academic year when the journal is distributed among the faculty. I am honored to have been provided with the opportunity to take part in preserving this standard of distinction in student-directed publication at New York University.

More generally, the past year has been anything but uneventful, marked by the passing of Kim Jong-il, Vaclav Havel, and Muammar Gaddafi, the emergence of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the debt crisis in the Euro-zone. As events that will form the subject matter of future historical inquiry unfold, it is worth asking, what are the blind spots of our own times that will be identified by students of our society decades on down? How will we characterize these times when they are written as part of a larger narrative involving a grand chain of events? Using the past as a guide in deciphering the answers to such questions is perhaps the thrill and reward of the study of history.

George Solt
Assistant Professor of History
Abstracts

Richard DeCesare: Although the cultural roots of Prohibition most often evoke religious, moral or domestic debates, labor concerns governed this conversation in the 1910s and 1920s. Arguments over drunkenness in the workplace, productivity, and the health of the worker entwined with the suggestion of class warfare to ensure that Big Business and labor unions alike had a vested interest in promoting the prohibition of strong liquor. DeCesare explicates all of these strands with contemporary speeches, newspaper articles, and moral tracts to build a convincing picture of anti-alcoholism on an industrial, rather than a moral, scale.

Jordan McFadden: This paper discusses how morale was sustained during the Spanish Civil War among the American volunteers who fought in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade against General Franco. Various approaches, such as the installment of political commissars and the dispersal of propaganda, were used to promote unity among volunteers. The upkeep of morale was even more vital off the battlefield than it was on it, particularly for prisoners of war in concentration camps. Activities for prisoners allowed them to divert their attention from their detainment and encouraged them to continue believing in their cause despite the consequences of that belief. Without this persistent maintenance of morale, which continued even after the war ended, the history and memory of the volunteers’ efforts would not be what it is today.

Julian Cole Phillips: In his essay, Julian Cole Phillips addresses the often-overlooked narrative of Jewish immigration from Iraq to Iran in the years following the foundation of Israel. Phillips, using a myriad of sources that includes several firsthand accounts from Iraqi Jewish immigrants, analyzes the reasons why some Jews chose to immigrate specifically to Iran instead of to Israel. He finds that for Mizrachi Jews – Jewish communities from the Middle East or North Africa – Israel did not present an ideal location for resettlement. Phillips’s work presents unique perspective on the narrative of Jewish immigration writ large in the post-1948 period.

Sruti Ramadugu: In her article, Sruti Ramadugu analyzes the tumultuous relationship between Egyptian luminary Gamal Abdel Nasser and the United States across the leader’s colorful career. Ramadugu employs a number of sources including many that quote Nasser at length. She finds that Nasser’s personal distaste for colonial powers, forged in his youth while living under British control, influence and help define his stance against Western dominance in the region. The paper demonstrates how this relationship would impact and become a symbol for the entire Arab world.

Anna-Maja Rappard: In 1969, Edward Heath decided to steer British foreign policy in a realist direction. On the cusp of the tumultuous economic depression of the 1970s, Heath’s pragmatism dictated that domestic concerns would take precedence over foreign affairs, but the East Pakistan Crisis of 1971 tested that ambition. This paper traces pressures on conservative leadership associated with that conflict stemming from U.S. Cold War policy and post-colonial tensions. Ultimately, these concerns would not be enough to distract the British government from its efforts to join the European Economic Community. Heath’s realism would withstand the trial of the East Pakistan Crisis – but at what cost?

Sara Roncero-Menendez: The rise of charity in Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries shaped a unique, albeit brief, period for both religious and secular attitudes toward leprosy. In changing times, lepers were cared for by a society that simultaneously feared and loathed them, echoing the nature of medieval charity itself. In the hagiographies of both St. Francis of Assisi and St. Alice of Schaerbeek, the leprous became simultaneously passive and active charitable participants during this period, providing absolution through the receiving and giving of alms and prayers.

Grace E. Shay: Between 1820 and 1860 nearly two million Irish émigrés arrived in the port city of New York, with many settling into concentrated areas that gained a reputation for crime. Consequently, mainstream publications of the late nineteenth century, catering to a Protestant readership, reflected the emerging caricature of the Irish-Americans as violent, alcoholic, and savage. This paper examines five political cartoons drawn between 1867 to 1875 created by Harper’s illustrator Thomas Nast, who customarily portrayed Irish Catholics with exaggerated, animalistic features. Indeed, Nast’s tactics underscored both traditional stereotypes and the era’s socio-political problems: the perceived lifestyle of blindly-devoted ‘Papists’ and a government concern with the rise of Catholic parochial schools.

Sarah Stern: The 1968 Columbia University demonstrations of Students for a Democratic Society marked a turning point in the political agency of student-led participatory democracy. The protests arrested the typical functions of the university, leading many to regard them as destructive. In reality, this
confrontational approach allowed students to re-appropriate the campus as a forum to foster collective power. The SDS students sought change through the increasing legitimization of that collective agency, rather than working through an already-established structure of authority. Though these strategies had varying levels of success, they have continued to be emulated in movements of mass dissent.

Emile Young: Though Saint Boniface’s mission from England to the Continent during the first half of the eight century is well-documented by epistolary, literary, and biographical sources, the nature of exchange in the mission remains misrepresented by literary scholars and historians alike. While historians have largely shied away from positing a two-way exchange, literary scholars generally accept this without question. A close examination of the nature of exchange, however, can shed much-needed light on Boniface’s propaganda concerning a shared “Germanic” heritage, facilitating understanding of the cultural milieu of eight-century England. Focusing on women’s letters as a homogenous subset within Boniface’s correspondence, Young proposes that a two-way exchange can be seen therein through the transmission of both textual and extratextual evidence.

Liquor, Labor, and the Fight for Prohibition in the 1910s
RICHARD DECESARE

The legacy of Prohibition in the United States is one of dismal failure; it was a policy that infringed on personal liberties, encouraged organized crime, and proved largely unenforceable. Its repeal in 1933 ended a fourteen-year experiment, returning a legal liquor trade to a rejoicing public. Prohibition, however, was not the result of some overnight phenomenon. A visible, organized movement against liquor in the United States originated at least as early as 1789, when a contingent of Connecticut farmers formed a local temperance association. Over the course of the next century, the movement aligned with Protestantism and causes such as domestic abuse and women’s rights. Later, it became part of the Progressive Movement of the early 1900s. On the surface, the history of America’s campaign against liquor seems to be founded on moral grounds. Yet, while questions of morality are certainly a component of the narrative, the final battle for Prohibition was fought along different lines. In many ways, labor was essential to the prohibitionist cause from the outset. The relationship between labor and Prohibition came to be the defining question of the movement. Despite this, organized labor never mounted an effective, cohesive opposition to the movement, whereas Prohibition’s proponents invoked labor issues with noticeable effectiveness.

The Contours of Labor in the Prohibition Debate

In order to understand how liquor and labor became comprehensively intertwined issues, it is important to consider the context under which the fight for national Prohibition reached its height. By the 1910s, the fateful decade of the cause, America had undergone revolutionary transformation in the form of industrialization. Furthermore, the latter half of the decade saw the United States’ involvement in the First World War. As a result, the demands of the worker and the workplace itself changed drastically by the time Prohibition became a political reality. At the turn of century, an organization of scholars known as the Committee of Fifty emerged as an influential group devoted to studying the effects of alcohol consumption. It was critical of groups such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement (WCTU), which argued for Prohibition in a traditional moral context. Instead, the Committee of Fifty reflected the place of labor in the debate, stating, “... the necessity of having a clear head during the hours of labor [is] imperative, and the very conditions of modern business life necessitate sobriety on the part of the workers.”
two-pronged argument defined the place of labor in the prohibitionist narrative. In the 1910s greater efficiency was added to the rational of industrial temperance, which had initially been driven by a desire to prevent labor accidents. These prohibitionists argued that sobriety would improve the safety and quality of labor.

When Nebraska voted to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment on January 16, 1919, the decades-long effort to enshrine Prohibition in the United States Constitution was completed. Section 1 of the Amendment read as follows:

After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.²

In order to enforce the Amendment, Congress passed the National Prohibition Act in October of 1919, overriding President Woodrow Wilson’s veto of the bill. Colloquially referred to as the Volstead Act, the legislation defined “intoxicating liquors” as any beverage containing more than 0.5 percent alcohol content.³ It superseded all state-level Prohibition laws and became effective in January of 1920, as stipulated by the Eighteenth Amendment. Together, the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act concluded the dynamic campaign to rid the United States of liquor.

One cannot underestimate the significance of the inclusion of ‘big business’ on the side of Prohibition. Without its support, Prohibition likely never would have attained the requisite power to become legislatively viable, and indeed, it may have failed to become law altogether.⁴ In pitting wealthy employers against their numerous laborers, the Prohibition struggle of the 1910s displayed elements of class conflict. In the months following the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), declared before Congress that Prohibition was oppressive to the working-class and that it would foster radicalism like that of the Bolsheviks.⁵ Pierre S. du Pont, an exception amongst businessmen in that he openly opposed Prohibition, noted the class struggle, saying that the measure denied the working-class something that “their more fortunate brothers with money” could have at will.⁶ Though du Pont took a stand for the nation’s working-class, his family’s company nevertheless required total sobriety of its employees. This rule applied to workers not only while on duty, but off duty as well. Thus, even in acknowledging the class aspect of Prohibition, the du Ponts’ insistence of strictly regulating its workforce perpetuated the idea and belief that liquor was an enemy of labor.

The incompatibility of liquor and labor was not a new notion in the early twentieth century. Rather, older ideas on the matter were freshly manifested and propagated anew due to changes in the nature of labor. D. Leigh Colvin, a prominent member of the Prohibition Party, referenced the party’s 1870 platform in Massachusetts to invoke labor as central to the liquor problem. An extract from a campaign pamphlet stated: “Labor is the lifeblood of the state. The dramshop [an archaic term for an alcohol-serving bar] policy enslaves labor. It subjects wages to the will of the employer and then preys upon its earnings . . . An issue that will redeem labor from this source of degradation is incomparably more important than Republican or Democratic issues.”⁷ Nearly a century earlier, in a letter entitled “On the Results of Intemperance,” George Washington had remarked that liquor was “the source of all evil and the ruin of half the workmen in the Country . . . An aching head and trebling [sic] limbs, which are the inevitable effects of drinking, disincline the hands from work; hence begins sloth and that Lissleness, which end in idleness.”⁸ Adam Smith, the architect of modern economic thought, argued in turn that “all the labour expended producing strong drink is utterly unproductive; it adds nothing to the wealth of the community.”⁹ These beliefs would resurface in the 1910s, as the temperance movement and its industrialist allies thrust labor issues into the heart of the Prohibition battle.

Liquor in the United States in the Early Twentieth Century

By the 1910s, America had become a liquor-loving nation, at least in bare statistical terms. Annual per-capita consumption of liquor increased from 4.08 gallons in 1850 to 22.81 gallons in 1911. At its pre-Prohibition height in 1914, more than 2.25 billion gallons of liquor were consumed in total by the United States population.¹⁰ Ironically, temperance and prohibitionist passions reached a fever pitch at the same time Americans were enjoying liquor in unprecedented quantities. As a result, the dynamic liquor industry occupied a uniquely important position in the Prohibition debate. Nowhere was liquor and labor more explicitly interrelated than in the industry whose existence depended on demand for the drink. For those whose labor contributed to the manufacture and sale of liquor, Prohibition threatened their very livelihoods.

The liquor trade was no small component of the American economy in the 1910s, as suggested by the great demand for its product. A 1915 publication of the National Wholesale Liquor Dealers’ Association of America noted that the liquor industry was not only the fifth largest industry in the
nation, but also accounted for over one-third of the United States government's total tax revenue.11 Remarking on the industry's consolidation of power by the 1910s, the prohibitionist Colvin called it "one of the most gigantic trusts in existence."12 Representing the industry's interests was a plethora of trade organizations, including the National Wholesale Liquor Dealers' Association and most notably the United States Brewers' Association. The latter was formed in 1862 in response to the foundation of the Internal Revenue System, an act perceived by brewers to be an encroachment of the liquor trade in that the agency enlarged the regulatory powers of the federal government.

Foremost amongst the industry's arguments concerning labor was the objective contention that national Prohibition would cause a substantial number of workers to suddenly find themselves unemployed. In a 1912 opinion piece, a San Jose, California, newspaper invoked the implications of such in its argument against Prohibition, asserting that "if the liquor traffic...could be utterly abolished a labor panic for a long period of time would be inevitable. The workers employed in those industries would be added to the already large army of unemployed."13 In the lead-up to national Prohibition, various state-level labor organizations issued resolutions on behalf of the liquor industry's vulnerable workforce. For example, when statewide Prohibition was under consideration in Utah in 1909, the Utah Federation of Labor, in concert with the United Brewery Workers of Salt Lake and Ogden, declared, "These thousands of laborers formerly engaged in a legalized business, are deprived of the means of earning a living and therefore forced upon an already overcrowded labor market."14 Prohibitionists argued that capital invested in the liquor industry could be diverted elsewhere to more productive ends. Richard Jones, a Minnesota State Senator, went so far as to claim that nearly eight times as many wage earners could be employed if liquor money was reinvested in other industries.15 However valid these arguments might have been, they represent attempts to turn Prohibition into a pro-labor, job-creating cause, in order to quell the legitimate concerns of anti-prohibitionists.

Figures on the number of people directly employed by the liquor industry varied throughout the debate. Professions that had interests and ties in the liquor industry appear to have been deliberately included or excluded from these estimates to further the respective side's cause, partially explaining the vast differences. Wets, a popular term for anti-prohibitionists (Dries being the counterpart), argued that over one million individuals would lose their jobs if the liquor industry was totally abolished. A publication issued by the United Brewery Workers of America entitled "The Inevitable Effect of Prohibition" proclaimed the following: "Did [the temperance movement] ever consider that prohibition in our country would take away the bread from the mouths of millions of men, women and children, who would be dumped upon the labor market, or made paupers?"16 However, estimates indicate that in 1917, only about 80,000 wage earners were employed in the actual production of alcoholic beverages.17 Even so, the looming threat of national Prohibition clearly cast doubt on the futures of those whose labor skills were linked to the liquor trade.

Labor of the Liquor Interests

In "The Anti-Prohibition Manual: A Summary of Facts and Figures Dealing With Prohibition," issued by the National Wholesale Liquor Dealers' Association, the prospect of a flooded labor market and what it would mean for the victims of Prohibition were further acknowledged. It asserted that "It is not fair to expect the man who has learned a trade, served his apprenticeship and attained a position which pays him a good living wage to give all this up and begin over as a common laborer without even an assurance of receiving that kind of employment."18 Brewery workers contributed to framing the debate as class warfare, appealing not just to laborers of the liquor industry but the entirety of the American working-class. The United Brewery Workers wrote:

[Prohibition] is especially an insult to the American workingman, against whom it is principally directed. For this reason, and because no other classes would suffer so much if the prohibition cause became general, as the working class, we protest against all legislation prohibitive in its character, and we have no doubt that this sentiment is shared by the large majority of the American workingmen.19

In appealing to unite laborers from across the industrial spectrum, they then proceeded to note the hypocrisy and contradictions of the prohibitionists' arguments.

[The working-class] cannot, like the wealthy, rent or build club-houses, the doors of which are closed to police officers; they cannot stock their cellars and ice-boxes with costly wines and fine liquors, yet they have the same need of sociability and the same physical needs. And of what needs these are, the men working in the sweat of their brows, in the engine-room, or the mill, or the shop, or the mine,
or before the fiery furnace, are better able to judge than the kid-gloved or misguided temperance people, who pretend to love the working people, but have never raised a finger to help them in their various struggles for better working and living conditions.\(^{20}\)

Considering the specificity of the brewer’s labor skills, prohibitionists encountered a formidable task in attempting to argue that brewers would easily find new work.

On the other hand, public opinion suggested that bartenders would experience a different fate in the wake of Prohibition. In the opinion of a Pennsylvania newspaper, “...after a very short period of readjustment, the bartender will find himself in much higher service of society, and with a much larger degree of prosperity to himself than in the occupation of his enforced abandonment.”\(^{21}\) The reasoning behind this prediction cited the bartender’s courtesy and ability to make acquaintances, while suggesting that the soft drink trade would provide new labor opportunities. Similarly, the Morning Oregonian stated that “the very nature of the bartender’s calling has made him adaptable and alert, and he is mistakenly self-deprecatory when he says that he is ‘good for nothing.’ Chances are that he will be glad the country went dry when he adjusts himself to the new conditions.”\(^{22}\) Such counterclaims served to diminish the opposition’s argument that wiping out the liquor industry would have calamitous effects on the labor market; yet the extent of occupations deemed to be threatened by Prohibition was not limited merely to brewers and bartenders.

The National Wholesale Liquor Dealers’ Association listed 77 industries whose laborers would be adversely affected by Prohibition in its 1915 manual.\(^{23}\) These ranged from cork cutters and ice manufacturers to grape growers and pretzel makers. The extent to which the laborers of these ancillary industries responded to the growing threat of Prohibition varied. The 1908 edition of The Coopers International Journal, a publication devoted to the interests of the Coopers International Union of North America, included an article distinguishing temperance from Prohibition, with quotations on the matter from former Presidents John Quincy Adams and Abraham Lincoln. The article framed Prohibition as an enemy of personal liberty and an extension of the tyrannical hand of government.\(^{24}\)

Later, coopers demonstrated labor-related concerns similar to those of the brewery workers and their publications struck an increasingly activist tone. They issued the following message in the 1912 edition of their journal:

Each and everyone [sic] of us who are connected directly or indirectly should use our influence whenever and wherever we can, as per, united we stand, divided we fall, and when the bell has fallen to the bottom there will be no work for about three-fourths of the coopers now employed. Brother coopers who are employed on beer or whiskey work, did you ever stop to think what will become of your job and your little home if [the prohibitionist] votes you out of business and you have got to look for another job, possibly many miles from your home and family?\(^{25}\)

The American Flint Glass Workers Union of North America sought to rally laborers of the glass trade by portraying prohibitionists as an enemy of organized labor. The 1917 edition of The American Flint, in an article titled “Prohibition and Its Effect on the Glass Trade,” argued that the interests who opposed organized labor were also the backers of the Prohibition movement. In reference to the possibility of Prohibition in Ohio, the article stated that such a measure would create “a surplus of glassworkers, which will mean that we will have two glassworkers for every position.”\(^{26}\) The American Flint also added notions of class to the debate, stating that “the drinking of a glass of beer is the only social pleasure that three-fourths of the wage earners enjoy, and now they wish to take away that privilege from us so-called free men.”\(^{27}\)

While the coopers and glass workers aided in bringing the drink to the customer, industries such as tobacco had a vested interest in the enjoyment of consuming liquor. The saloon-goer was a key demographic for the success of cigar makers, collectively organized in the powerful Cigar Makers International Union of America. In fact, it was the Cigar Makers International Union through which Gompers rose to prominence as an organized labor leader, becoming its vice-president in 1896. The union’s official journal noted the urgent need for a proactive response to wartime Prohibition: “The closing of the saloon will destroy some of the avenues through which union-label cigars have found their way to the smoke. Don’t wait until that time comes; commence now to prepare for the change.”\(^{28}\) At this time, it does not appear that cigar makers felt their livelihoods to be as threatened as those of brewers or coopers. Indeed, certain railroad companies had sought to replace the saloon as their workers’ place of leisure by establishing clubhouses where cigars and tobacco were provided to workers alongside nonalcoholic beverages.\(^{29}\) That sentiment shifted by 1919, when fears of tobacco succeeding liquor as the target of prohibitionists aroused more serious concern amongst cigar makers.

Arguments about Prohibition’s potentially devastating effects on labor went so far as to include the farmer under the umbrella of would-be victims.
Farming’s connection to the liquor interests rested in the corn, barley, rye, hops and fruits that went into liquor production. In 1911, the *Dallas Morning News* published a piece arguing that Prohibition posed “a most serious aspect for the farmer.” Citing various statistics concerning the production and consumption of liquor and its ties to farming, the article stated that “liquors of all sorts are distilled from the products of the farm, and in just the proportion that manufacture of liquor decreases in just so far is the farmer deprived of a market for his produce.” In a warning to the farming profession, the National Wholesale Liquor Dealers’ Association noted that the brewers and distillers of Peoria, Illinois alone consumed the entire surplus corn crop from Iowa and Illinois, and estimated that farmers’ purchasing power would be depleted by two hundred million dollars annually if the liquor industry were to be totally abolished. Despite these instances, such attempts to draw the farmer to the side of the Wets appear to be sporadic and largely inconsequential during the Prohibition debate.

In fact, the war effort provided the Dries with an opportunity to invoke the farmer in their own arguments. In 1917, a Columbia, South Carolina, newspaper quoted Wayne Wheeler, the Anti-Saloon League’s highly influential general counsel, as saying, “The liquor interests are actually wasting 60,000,000 bushels of grain a year in the manufacture of liquor that will decrease the manpower, slow down the human energy . . . and decrease the supply of grains that are more seriously needed to feed the soldiers. We can’t feed the soldiers on beer.” Wheeler’s contention employs common features of the Dry argument: it positively correlates sobriety to human efficiency and calls for the product of labor to be more virtuous in nature. Generally, analysis of the issue suggested that Prohibition posed no grave threat to farmers’ livelihoods. The *Wilkes-Barre Times Leader* called the farmer argument “far-fetched” and noted that abolishing the liquor industry would cost the farmer on average ten dollars a year in lost revenue, if the produce was not sold for any other purpose. To the farmers themselves, the argument provoked a largely indifferent response, and the farming community generally supported state Prohibition measures.

German-Americans and the Liquor Industry

While Wets and Dries alike brought a wide range of laborers into their respective arguments, brewers remained the most obviously threatened and vilified group in the Prohibition debate. Aside from the fruit of their labor being demon liquor itself, ethnicity also affected the place of brewers in the prohibitionist cause. Nineteenth century immigration had brought waves of German and Irish immigrants, among others, into the United States, and with them the customs and traditions of their homelands. Largely, these immigrants left behind unindustrialized societies in Europe, free from the American arguments concerning liquor and labor. To them, the drink was neither sin nor economically destructive; in fact, it was quite the opposite. The liquor industry was an avenue through which these newly-arrived foreigners could advance in America. The Germans demonstrated this assimilation better than any other immigrant group.

As German communities cemented themselves in America during the latter half of the nineteenth century, their ties to brewing and the significance of beer in their culture became distinguishing traits. Such was suggested by the *New York Herald* in an 1888 article entitled “Unsere Mit-Bürger: New York as the Third Greatest German City in the World.” German brewers in the city employed “thousands of men, all Germans,” and “the German beer saloons [ran] a very close race with the liquor stores of the Irish,” an acknowledgment of that immigrant group’s significance in the industry as well. Twenty years later, a letter to the editor of a Massachusetts newspaper remarked that German-Americans were still “largely concerned in the drink business. Their capital invested in breweries [was] immense.” Indeed, the association of Germans with the liquor industry remained strong into the twentieth century, and the identity would take on a new meaning as the Prohibition fight intensified. That same 1908 letter purported that, in regard to St. Louis, Missouri, Prohibition laws would be most harmful to the quarters where the German churches stood. Inevitably, the mere linkage of Germans to liquor cast a negative light on the community in the minds of many Americans.

To characterize the German-Americans solely by their investment in liquor fails to capture the trajectory of the immigrant population. While many German workers established themselves in the United States via the liquor industry, they gradually integrated into other industries as they sought to climb America’s social ladder. In 1910, a report referred to the United States Senate Committee on Immigration recognized the liquor industry being established by German immigrants as well as the historical tendency of brewing companies to employ exclusively Germans. However, the report stated that higher wages offered by the steel mills had drawn many of these German employees out of brewing by the 1910s. An analysis of one brewing company in the report showed just three German workers out of 24 total employees, 13 of whom were classified as “American, White.” A second brewing company retained a stronger German presence with ten employees of the ethnicity, but a majority of the 42 total workers were American. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of
prohibitionists became increasingly hostile toward the German community, as some circles believed the ethnic makeup of the liquor industry made it inherently un-American.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 transformed the public narrative on America's German population and its liquor interests. The conflict pitted the German Empire against the Entente Powers of Europe (with which the United States ultimately aligned). Thus, widespread anti-German sentiment, along with a new patriotic fervor, turned working-class German-Americans into a persecuted group. Their ties to the liquor industry, both historically and in actuality, provided temperance leaders with an opportunity to capitalize on wartime sentiments. Wheeler channelized these feelings into his own influential voice, proclaiming "liquor is a menace to patriotism because it puts beer before country," playing off the sinister notion that the industry was stabbing wartime America in the back. Wheeler attacked Germans more directly in 1917, when he told the New York Times, "The liquor traffic is the strong financial supporter of the German-American Alliance. The purpose of this Alliance is to secure German solidarity . . . and oppose any restriction or prohibition of the liquor traffic." The German-American Alliance, founded in Pennsylvania in 1901, was a private group seeking to promote the preservation of German culture in the United States. Congress, with Wheeler's help, revoked the German-American Alliance's charter in 1918 and the group disbanded soon thereafter.

Correlating anti-German sentiment with the Prohibition cause persisted even after the war ended. Shortly after fighting ceased in 1918, a headline from a Texas newspaper read: "Vote for Booze is Pro-German Vote, Declares Billy Sunday." The ethnic element of the liquor industry further pervaded Congressional activity in the Overman Committee's report on "Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda." The Overman Committee, the first Congressional subcommittee charged with investigating communism in the United States, reported in June 1919 that "the organized liquor traffic of the country is a vicious interest because it has been unpatriotic, because it has been pro-German in its sympathies and its conduct." In the debate's latter stages, the ethnic nature of labor concerned with the drink was featured prominently and effectively as a weapon of the prohibitionists.

Industrial Support for Prohibition

The liquor industry was second only to drink itself as the foremost villain of the prohibitionist narrative. Its labor was engaged in a business that was damaging to society on multiple fronts, or so it was argued. Just as the various laborers whose livelihoods depended on a demand for liquor had a special interest in the Prohibition fight, so too did the soft drink manufacturers poised to significantly increase their market share in the absence of their alcoholic beverage competitors. Most notable in the soft drink industry was The Coca-Cola Company, incorporated by Asa G. Candler in 1892. Candler was a staunch prohibitionist who entered politics when he was elected mayor of Atlanta in 1916. In the early years of Prohibition, Candler was quoted as saying that "Prohibition . . . has greatly benefitted employers and employees." It can only be speculated as to whether or not this statement was based on real observation of the policy's effects. Rather, it may have been the simple projection of many leading industrialists' opinions on liquor and labor that thoroughly shaped the debate of the 1910s.

Before the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, Prohibition-like measures already affected the lives of a significant portion of the American working-class. While many state governments took up the issue prior to national Prohibition's enactment in 1920, it was private industry which propelled labor to the forefront of the liquor question. The industries aligned with the prohibitionist cause formed a loose but influential band of primarily self-interested industrialists. Brought about by the perils and demands of modern industry, employers thought elimination of the drink was the key to solving their labor problems. Their goals were to prevent work-related accidents, improve worker efficiency, and increase production. As liquor-related policies were implemented in the early 1900s, two terms entered the lexicon of the Prohibition debate: 'industrial temperament' and 'scientific management.' Whereas industrial temperance referred to the outlawing of laborers' liquor use on often off-duty as well, scientific management described a larger program taken up by industrialists in the 1910s. Its goal was to increase production and profits through greater efficiency, and because studies had shown that alcohol reduced human efficiency, it became an imperative objective for business to abolish liquor.

American industry did not project a singular voice on the liquor issue. Just as certain factions of organized labor saw self-benefit in sobriety, some businessmen were concerned about large-scale unemployment in the event that the liquor trade was to be abolished. Additionally, some saw Prohibition measures as setting new precedent for government regulation of business, a potential threat to their own political influence and self-interests. However, the economic benefits of the Dry arguments largely outweighed their downside, thus making industry's support a crucial component of the prohibitionist cause.
The Railroads Pioneer Industrial Temperance

In the decades leading up to the Prohibition debate, the railroad industry provided an excellent case study in industrial temperance. Industrialists who invested in the railroads took the lead in banning the drink from its laborers, attaining near industry-wide cohesion on the matter by the time American business was openly supporting the prohibitionists. Aiding this cause was the industry's organized labor itself, particularly the four big railroad unions – the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and the Order of Railway Conductors. Railroad workers, however, were not necessarily representative of the working-class at large. Their support for industrial temperance was due in large part to the hazardous nature of their work, their predominantly Protestant affiliations, and their relatively high wages among American laborers. Evidence of this support dated to as early as 1870, at the onset of postbellum industrialization. In a Locomotive Engineers' Monthly Journal of that year, a letter asked: "Is not a careful and sober engineer... far preferable to one whose brain is muddled and hand unsteady – and perhaps dozing on his seat". Nevertheless, the institution of Prohibition in the railroads was still very much a top-down phenomenon.

In 1899, the American Railway Association proposed that railroad employers adopt a measure called Rule G. Given that greater sobriety was imperative to prevent work-related accidents, Rule G articulated that, "The use of intoxicants by employees while on duty is prohibited. Their habitual use, or the frequenting of places where they are sold, is sufficient cause for dismissal." Within a few years, nearly every railroad in the country had adopted Rule G, with some forbidding their workers from consuming liquor even while off-duty. Some went so far as to hire private detectives to spy on their workers when they were not working; the Pennsylvania Railroad, for example, had its detectives spy on each of its 125,000 employees an average of six times per year in order to ensure its workforce was sober.

By the 1910s, when business at large began advocating for Prohibition, the railroads had already firmly established their position on the liquor issue. If they needed any further reason to promote industrial temperance and Prohibition, it was supplied by an accident on the Delaware-Lackawanna-Western Railroad in 1912. The engineer of the train had admitted to consuming alcohol the night prior to the train wreck, which killed 40 and injured 76 people. Although the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission deemed that the engineer's drinking was not the cause of the accident, public outrage over the situation merely strengthened the arguments behind the railroad industry's policies and prohibitionists nationwide. The Colorado Springs Gazette remarked on the event that "Men who drink... must hold no positions of trust in modern industry," and noted that the "human equation" cannot be wholly removed from industry through improved safety devices. On the whole, the railroads promoted their temperance measures as successes of modern industry, and continued their public assault on liquor. In 1912, a newspaper article entitled "Railway Anti-Saloon Crusade" called the saloon "the railroad's worst foe," and noted that "everywhere superintendents reported greater efficiency, sobriety and self-respect" amongst workers as a result of industrial policies.

In the 1910s, the industrial safety cause had gained considerable momentum, and inclusion of the liquor issue into its movement helped to make industrial temperance a matter of national importance. Following the railroads' lead, the United States Steel Corporation launched a safety movement in 1908 that quickly spread to other industries. It advocated industrial temperance and led to the creation of the National Safety Council in 1912. As a nongovernmental organization seeking to protect human life in industry, the Council made one of the most declarative statements on liquor and labor to date at their third annual meeting. The resolution adopted in 1914 blamed a large percentage of industrial accidents on liquor consumption, noted its negative affect on worker efficiency, and urged American industry to abolish liquor from the labor force altogether. That same year, an editorial in the American Machinist observed that the industrial safety movement "started by advocating mechanical safeguards around machinery... and is now including the temperance movement."

Eventually, some lawmakers took up industrial temperance in the railroad industry as a cause of their own. In 1913, a bill was introduced in Massachusetts that would have made liquor consumption by railroad workers illegal in the commonwealth. As the duty of instituting industrial temperance shifted from industry to government, such measures were met with some public backlash. In response to the Massachusetts bill, The Boston Journal opined that "The history of railroad accidents shows that what the more responsible employees need is reasonable working conditions to keep their nerves hard and their brains clear." Still, sentiment of this kind appeared to be in the minority by the 1910s, and the Dries of the temperance movement, businesses, and government alike were finding a common cause in the liquor and labor issue.
Influential Voices on the Economics of Prohibition

If the railroad was the industry most symbolic of labor’s place in the Prohibition debate, Henry Ford may have been the industrialist most emblematic of the same. Indeed, the Prohibition Party attempted to nominate the pioneering automaker for president in 1916. A former Prohibition Party presidential candidate called Ford the strongest candidate it could put on their ticket. Ford’s own rhetoric on the issue appeared to reflect personal business-related interests rather than the idea of liquor being an enemy of labor. In light of Michigan enacting statewide Prohibition, Ford suggested that the state’s newly defunct brewing industry could reinvent itself to manufacture denatured alcohol for use in automobile engines.

Ford, whose automobiles revolutionized the social and economic landscape of the United States in the early twentieth century, staunchly supported Prohibition throughout its existence. In the 1920s, he reflected on the abolition of the drink and its importance to labor by stating, “The speed at which we . . . operate our intricate machinery . . . would be impossible with liquor.” He later declared that he would quit manufacturing automobiles if the saloon returned, as he would rather do so than employ hundreds of thousands of laborers destined to waste their wages on liquor. Industrialists such as Ford were powerful voices in the Dry circles, but they were not alone in attributing labor problems to liquor.

Among the more influential individuals who contributed to the prohibitionists’ labor arguments was the economist Irving Fisher. A Yale professor and arguably the best-known American economist of his generation, Fisher served on the Council of National Defense during the First World War and also championed certain health issues. Fisher was often consulted by the government for his expertise on economics and public health. He contributed a highly respected voice, therefore, on the matter of liquor and labor throughout the Prohibition debate. In a statement he made before Congress in 1912, which included both verbal testimony and a subsequent written submission, Fisher outlined his purportedly unbiased conclusions on the liquor issue.

The rhetoric of his statement portrayed the issue to be a fundamentally working-class one. In his testimony Fisher stated, “I believe that every unbiased student of the subject believes, that one of the very worst enemies of the working class is alcohol. It not only is an enemy to health, but it is an enemy to thrift and economic well being.” Later, in his written submission, he referenced a former United States Commissioner of Labor as having remarked that drunkenness, not the industrial system or work environment, was the cause of working-class despair. This seemed to have been employed as a defense against accusations of the social oppressiveness of Prohibition measures, diverting blame away from the conditions of modern industry and toward the social habits of the working-class.

Fisher’s report to Congress reflected the growing Dry sentiment on the part of industrialists. He noted that “one of the great causes for the reduction of alcohol in recent years has been the fact that the employer has found it to his financial interest to require total abstinence of his workmen.” Whereas the railroad crusade against liquor consumption was founded on issues of safety, Fisher’s statement demonstrates that worker efficiency had also become part of the argument. Being a health advocate, Fisher remarked that “the fight against alcohol is only one phase of the general fight for health and efficiency,” and added that liquor incapacitates and impairs labor power. In the debate’s later stages, Fisher channeled Adam Smith’s words regarding the unproductive nature of liquor-related labor from nearly 150 years earlier. A 1918 newspaper article cited Fisher as arguing that labor was wasted on liquor production; it would be put to better use in the manufacturing of explosives and smokeless powder for the war effort.

Liquor, Strikes, and Organized Labor’s Approach to the Prohibition Debate

The Dries also occasionally tied the liquor problem to organized labor unrest. When violence erupted at strikes, it was considered to be the product of drunkenness. The foremost example of this in the years prior to Prohibition occurred in Youngstown, Ohio in 1916. In January, steel workers at the Youngstown Sheet and Tube plant took up a strike that turned chaotic. On January 8, the Tulsa Daily World described the presence of a “drunken mob,” and printed the following lead headline: “East Youngstown Is in Ashes: Drink-Crazed, Rioting Strikers Loot and Murder in Ohio.” The following year, a copper miners’ strike in Butte, Montana, strengthened this argument. In response to the strike, martial law was imposed and local saloons were closed. The Anaconda Copper Mining Company subsequently noted an increase in output, crediting the area’s new Dry conditions. Yet another example came from the coal fields of the Midwest, where an opinion article in a Minnesota newspaper called liquor a prime factor in fomenting trouble amongst miners, and advocated authorities to “prohibit the sale of liquor within five miles of any coal mine.” Though it did not control the business narrative of the Prohibition debate, the relationship between liquor and violent strikes was a significant issue nonetheless.

Organized labor recognized this problem as well, and it helped shape the early positions held by unions on liquor and Prohibition. Like their
industrialist counterparts, unions held the drunken striker responsible for acts of violence that served to distance public opinion from the goals of organized labor. Indeed, liquor was vilified by organized labor leaders in the formative years of the Prohibition movement. In the late nineteenth century, the Knights of Labor expressed the opinion that liquor impoverished the worker. Its leader, Terrence V. Powderly, eloquently assailed liquor as the worker’s enemy, in one instance stating, “Turn to the annals of every dead labor society, and you will see whole pages blurred and destroyed by the accursed foot-prints of rum.”71 While the Knights of Labor had significantly diminished in size and influence by the turn of the century, other groups such as the AFL joined in the national discourse on liquor and labor.

More moderate in its views than the Knights of Labor, the AFL promoted the argument that poverty caused intemperance and not vice versa. It concentrated its efforts on improving wages and working conditions. Despite this, a 1900 survey of the 39 constituent unions revealed that 33 of them were taking action to promote sobriety; two of the six that reported otherwise had special interests in the liquor industry, those being the Brewery Workers and the Wood Workers. In subsequent years, however, AFL members and the working class in general began to exhibit hostility toward temperance and Prohibition. Not only was the unemployment question of concern, but so too was the growing opinion that big industry’s support for Prohibition seemed to demonstrate conscious exploitation of lower classes. Many workers saw the principles of scientific management as reflecting the paternalism of modern industry in the United States. Frankly, the working-class liked to drink and frequent the saloon. Depriving them of the right to do so was increasingly considered as a violation of individual liberty.72 This opposition finally came to the forefront in June of 1919 at the AFL’s convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

In Atlantic City, the AFL delegates adopted a resolution stating “that the present mild beers... should be exempted from the provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and also from the provisions of the war prohibition measure.”73 The delegates overwhelmingly supported the resolution, with 26,476 votes in favor compared to just 3,997 against. The attempt to salvage beer for the working-class was a last-ditch effort by organized labor to oppose national Prohibition. Speaking on behalf of the AFL, Gompers declared, “I know the habits and thoughts of the working people... I know nothing that could be done by Congress one-hundredth part so prejudicial to the peace and tranquility of the masses than this attempt to take from them the opportunity to drink a glass of beer.”74 Organized labor’s opposition came too late though, as the Dry coalition had already won the battle for Prohibition.

Prohibition Collapses

When times were good in the 1920s, the prohibitionists pointed to their great cause as the source of general prosperity. Irving Fisher told Congress that “prosperity increases as the use of alcohol is reduced,” and many, including himself, believed the decade’s success to be the direct result of the Eighteenth Amendment.75 The Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression, of course, discredited this argument. On his tenth day in office, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed that Congress legalize the sale of light wines and beer with 3.2 percent alcohol content. Part appeal to populist sentiment, part economic recovery initiative, and part acknowledgment of the failure of Prohibition as national policy, the gesture was received warmly by America’s now-decimated working-class. Even Ford appeared to have been changed; at a lunch to launch his latest model automobile, beer was served to the attendees.76

It was not a mere coincidence that Prohibition was rejected at the same time that the labor movement gained strength in the United States. The Great Depression of the 1930s changed the landscape of America, and the working-class was hit hardest by the crisis. Arguments from the temperance movement and the Prohibition debate became outdated, and the American worker shouted louder than ever in the rise of the labor movement. Prohibition was more than a project of the Protestant community; it was essential to the interests of industry and a concern of the working-class. When economic crisis struck a Dry nation, the arguments for Prohibition as having positive effects on worker efficiency and safety could not withstand the reality of a troubled national policy. In December of 1933, the states ratified the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and signaled the collapse of prohibitionist sentiment.

2 U.S. Const., amend. XVIII, sec. 1.
4 Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 80.
Morale During the Spanish Civil War
JORDAN MCFADDEN

With the abdication of King Alfonso XIII in 1931 and the establishment of a Republic, Spain seemed to be heading towards a Western conception of democracy — with the right to vote open to all and a popularly-elected President. Change was imminent. Change, however, is not always welcome, and the establishment of the Republic was met with resistance from both sides of the political spectrum. Wealthy, established land owners feared the loss of their property and power because of government reforms, while parts of the radicalized working, lower classes were angered by the delayed execution of those same reforms. Much to the disadvantage of the lower classes, the wealthy quickly found an ally in the Spanish military and the Catholic Church. From here, it was only a matter of time before civil unrest would grip the country.

The Spanish Civil War began on July 17, 1936 when the head of the military, General Francisco Franco, led a coup against the Spanish Republic and ignited a war that would last three long years and result in the death of nearly 365,000 people.1 Franco not only had the advantage of a united front made up of the military, the landed aristocracy, and the Catholic Church, but he also acquired the international support of both Hitler and Mussolini shortly after the war began. Meanwhile, the supporters of the Republic were divided from the onset of the conflict. As the war progressed, they received virtually no support from fellow democracies and only minimal support from the Soviet Union. The Republican Left faced internal fragmentation among competing political groups vying for power, particularly between the Communist Party and the Anarchists. When the Republic sought help from other democracies, like the United States and France, it was faced with policies of non-intervention. The international confrontation that was taking shape in Spain — the Communist USSR against Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany — eerily resembled that which was to emerge only five months after the end of the Spanish Civil War: World War II.

At the time, it did not escape many that the Spanish Civil War could be a precursor to a conflict on a much larger, international stage. It was recognized that the Fascist powers would not stop at a Fascist Spain. To stop fascism’s expansion, it was therefore necessary to stop its spread in Spain. In their desire to fight against it, some 35,000 foreign volunteers from 53
countries around the world came to fight for the Spanish Republic in military units called the International Brigades. They broke laws, faced persecution and, in some cases, literally crossed mountains to join in the fight. They were hobbled by inadequate supplies, inferior weapons, indifference, and even scorn from those who should have been their allies. Despite all of these hardships, the volunteers never lost faith that their cause was righteous and worth fighting for. The experience of the soldiers in the International Brigades varied because of cultural differences amongst them, but they were all unified in their willingness to fight for a democratic and liberated Spain.

Though Americans made up only a small percentage of those in the International Brigades, their writings and actions are a window into the world of what life was like during the Spanish Civil War. These Americans, members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, exemplified the ways in which all members of the International Brigades sought to maintain strong morale, morale that not only applied to the averaged fighter on the front lines but that was also upheld by incarcerated prisoners of war. These men lacked resources and support but nevertheless, they never lacked spirit or commitment to their cause.

Before delving into the state of the soldiers’ morale after their arrival in Spain, it is necessary to understand why these men even went to Spain in the first place. Many soldiers explicitly described to loved ones their reasons for going in letters. James Larder, a writer and the son of American columnist Ring Lardner made a list of reasons, sixteen in total, writing that the most important were that “fascism is wrong” and “communism is right”, because joining may have affected the neutrality of America; because “after the war is over [he] shall be a more effective anti-fascist”; because he had an “ambitious quest for knowledge in all fields”; and finally because it was “good for [his] soul.”

Max Parker, a child of an immigrant Jewish family and a future POW, went for slightly different reasons: “By 1936, I was well indoctrinated in what Nazism was trying to do,” he wrote. “A good friend told me about the volunteers who were going to Spain to try to help...I left New York in February of 1937.” Another prisoner of war – Carl Geiser, who was born in Ohio and studied in the Soviet Union – wrote to his wife, “I want to do my share to prevent a second world war, which would without a doubt, draw in the United States and seriously set back our civilization...And secondly, because all of our democratic and liberty-loving training makes me anxious to fight fascism and to help the Spanish people drive out the fascist invaders sent in by Hitler and Mussolini.”

While each of these men gave very different reasons for going to Spain, most of which were influenced by their own background and heritage, each also had one common theme in their reasoning – a desire to combat fascism. All of the American volunteers, most serving in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, came to Spain with a cause in mind. They came from different regions of the United States, different socio-economic backgrounds, and with different levels of education; but these groups of men, who might not have gotten along well on American soil, were able to unite against a common enemy on Spanish soil. Nonetheless, the Republican army was still wary of the diversity of the International Brigades – thus, a mindset was consciously created specifically to keep the men informed, focused on the war, and conscious of its importance. The men charged with this duty were known as political commissars.

The idea of the political commissariat was not a new one on the part of the Spanish Republic, but one adopted from the ranks of the Soviet Union. These commissars were morale officers who “were responsible for explaining the political rationale of military decisions” because “a people’s army...required a different kind of control...and that demanded a continuing process of political education, in which the soldiers could acquire an understanding of military problems and decisions.” The men who made up the International Brigades joined on the basis of their convictions. Therefore, the best way to keep them motivated was to keep those convictions front and center in their minds. Commissars, however, were not simply unbiased and pure educators. Far from it: they did their fair share of political spin for the cause. Carl Geiser, for example, an American political commissar as well as a POW, went so far as to put his commissar spin on situations into his letters home. In his correspondence with his wife he wrote:

You may wonder how we took the news of the fall of Bilbao. Actually, it only made us more determined and serious, without any feeling or thought that this presages a fascist victory. On the contrary, there is no doubt that fascism will be smashed. But we do realize that how long it will take us, and how much it will cost us, depends very much on the action of the people outside of Spain. If US would treat Germany and Italy as aggressors, which they are, it certainly would help Great Britain make up her mind.

Here not only did Geiser shrug off a crushing defeat, but he used it to attack those who he sees as a hindrance to the fight of the Republic.
Of course, any morale type officer in any war would do the same, but it is clear that these men were not simply educators but were, in a sense, spin doctors. The most important skill needed by a commissar was not the ability to speak in public, debate well with dissenters, or even spin unfavorable situations – it was trust that was the most useful and most sought-after tool a commissar could possess. As political commissar Steve Nelson, a Croatian immigrant to America, said: “You must be one of the boys, concern yourself directly with their problems...I trusted them and they trusted me.” For morale to hold firm it had to come from within. The commissars who were not considered ‘one of the boys’ were unable to hold their positions or the trust of their men – commissars who integrated themselves into the group, on the other hand, were able to do both. Trust was the foundation of all of their work. After it was established commissars, as well as the military in general, had to maintain the morale of its soldiers.

Maintaining the morale of these American brigadistas was easy, so long as Franco was continually identified as the enemy. The soldiers were by no means idealistic youngsters seeking adventure; the median age of an American brigadista was 27. They had known hardships, having experienced the full brunt of the Great Depression. Most importantly, they were politically aware and motivated. They knew what they were fighting for and what they were fighting against. It was this political awareness and independence of mind, however, that came into juxtaposition with the typical military mind set, characterized by unquestionable loyalty to the commands of superiors. The men would not accept the commands of their superiors just because of their higher rank. In this sense, the maintenance of morale was difficult since a military can only function properly when it is a coherent unit with a defined chain of command and little room for debate. It therefore became essential to thoroughly explain the reasoning behind a military decision to the men in order to gain their support and to take effective action. This, however, was not easily done, so other morale tactics were employed, such as diffusing a variety of propaganda and sustaining the constant presence of commissars in all the brigades.

The political commissars were the main supporters of morale of the soldiers. The most common tactics utilized by the commissariat, in conjunction with the Republic, were to provide classes for the soldiers, schools for the commissars, and propaganda for both the military and general public. Carl Geiser, in his capacity as a commissar, wrote to his wife often about the morale of his men, mentioning the classes for the soldiers and his role as a political leader: “One of the tasks of the political workers is to help them become acquainted with the Spanish people and their problems, which of course, become our problems too. And attendance at Spanish class is compulsory for all new men.” The men not only had to understand the politics of the war, but they also had to understand the people behind the war who would be most affected by their fight. The rank-and-file soldiers were not the only ones who had to suffer mandatory class; the political commissars had their own lesson schedules as well. Carl Geiser himself was commissioned to help run a commissar school instead of returning to the front after being wounded. The purpose of this school was to educate incoming commissars about the war, the Republican military, and the importance of their job to the unity of the International Brigades and the Spanish Republican Army. Geiser would have preferred to be at the front, but he recognized that running the school, despite being a “very difficult job,” would be “very essential.” Another necessary skill to the commissar, as mentioned previously, was his ability to spin situations. A particularly common situation that was used to their advantage was that of soldiers who had deserted the fascist ranks in favor of the Loyalists (those who supported the Spanish Republic). In his letters home, Geiser mentioned these defections many times:

By the way, some deserters from the fascist on the Jarama front didn’t believe Bilbao had fallen for they had been fooled too often. And they reported that many were only waiting for a strong government offensive to desert the fascists...you read about 700 soldiers deserting en masse to us three days ago. This is the kind of action that helps us very much and we hope it will increase during the next few weeks...so about half of our Battalion are Spaniards and 2 of my section political delegates are Spaniards who deserted from the fascist army. And they are political leaders in our Battalion now!

This was perhaps one of the most effective spins in the commissars’ arsenal. The superiority of the Loyalists’ ideals was paramount to their propagandistic strategy, as well as their ability to integrate combatants from the other side. The International Brigades were already known for their diversity, but to add converted fascists to their ranks was considered an invaluable asset.

The political commissars were integral to the International Brigades, but they were not the only attempt at the maintenance of morale implemented by the Republic. Propaganda was another equally important method. It was
not directed solely at soldiers, but also at civilians. The most common form of propaganda was the poster, placed throughout Republican Spain and seen by all. To boost morale, one such poster read “Todos los pueblos del mundo están en las brigadas internacionales al lado del pueblo español.” It showed the faces of three men superimposed on a globe. One soldier was black, another was Asian, and the last was white in an attempt to show Spanish Republicans that they had support from all over the world. There was no need to abandon the cause; they had help, and there were men from distant countries who recognized the dangers of fascism and had left their lives behind to fight for Spain. Another poster proclaimed: “¡Ganar la Guerra. Menos palabras vanas!” On it was an image of three soldiers wearing different uniforms, which was meant to represent the diversity of the Brigades. Each is holding out-of-date weaponry, perhaps an indication of the lack of materials on the Loyalist side, and all were posed in front of a Republican flag with different leftist symbols to signify the diverse factions of the left in regard to social issues. This sort of poster expressed to the Loyalist soldiers, who were quite aware of the conflict between groups such as the Communist Party and the Anarchists, that before a discussion about social issues could even take place the Republic had to first win the war. These posters reinforced in the soldiers an idea of the Popular Front. Constantly reminding their viewers of who and what they were fighting for and against, the propagandist posters served to both increase and maintain the morale of the volunteers.

Of course, there were also challenges to this morale. Blatant challenges to the morale of the men occurred only infrequently—it is not clear if this scarcity should be attributed to the strength of the American volunteers’ morale, the censorship of outgoing and incoming mail, or the desire of the soldiers to gain support from those at home, but what is clear is that fortiﬁth challenges to the status quo were few and far between. The most common complaint was in regard to food and supplies, but even this was not enough to dissuade most from fighting on. Of this problem, Harry Fisher writes, “The men had slept in mud, and there had been very little food. Stember criticized the few men who had grumbled and praised the great majority who had accepted all this in the right spirit.” Soldiers, aware of the reputation of their brigades, were quick to criticize comrades who complained, which is why most soldiers did not often voice their ‘grumbles.’ “One of the commissars,” for example, “told Johnson that some of the fellows were complaining about the living conditions at the training base... [Johnson said] ‘While at the front

the men are sleeping in the trenches in the mud and the freezing cold.’ All of us were silent with shame.”

Hints of internal strife can also be seen in the trials during the Red Scare, through the words of the few who spoke out negatively about their involvement with the Spanish Civil War. An American soldier named Morris Maken reported that there was an “irrational promotion of officers” as well as censorship of any material that made “any unfavorable references to the [Soviet Union] and the international Communist movement.” Maken’s accusations, along with other like-minded veterans are only some of the truly negative comments about the International Brigades. They are often not given that much attention because they were dismissed as being exaggerated complaints by fellow veterans; Maken’s account was ignored because he spoke against “the former comrades who had expelled him from the party.” The dilemma centered on the fact that an angry ex-member wanted to get revenge rather than justify the actions of the Lincoln Brigade or the Communist Party. The veterans did not want their reputation, or that of the Spanish Civil War, to be slandered or for their cause to be deemed wrong. It was for this reason that they often censored themselves. If a disillusioned veteran spoke out, an immediate dismissal was issued, as in the case of aforementioned Morris Maken. However, their remarks allow us more insight into the potential challenges to morale faced by the volunteers. While the volunteers had their issues with sustaining a steady morale, they were never so demoralized as to threaten the unity of the Brigade as a whole.

Thus far, the active soldiers have been examined, yet there remains another group of soldiers who also faced obstacles in keeping up their morale—prisoners of war. Volunteers were confronted with their own problems, but they seemed relatively miniscule when compared to those of American POWs, most of whom went to the concentration camp of San Pedro. Carl Geiser describes the conditions of San Pedro thoroughly in his book Prisoners of the Good Fight. Upon his arrival, Geiser noted, “Awaiting us were guards carrying rifles, commanded by a sergeant who carried a stick he was using as a cane...He swung his stick sharply across the nearest prisoner's back...Word passed to those who had not seen the blow: 'Watch out for Sticky.'” The harshness of their welcome was followed by the harshness of their living conditions. Geiser remarks that to sleep, “On the ground or in the snow you can make small depressions for the buttocks and shoulders and a mound for the head when you lie down. You cannot do this on a stone or wooden floor, so by morning we were more than ready to get up.” According to Geiser,
food was limited, mundane, and never sufficient to curb their appetite. His most frequent complaints centered around sanitary conditions: “annoying were the fleas and the lice. Lice can suck much more blood, but flea bites are painful.” Even though these prisoners were being kept for exchange, so the threat of death was not imminent per se, San Pedro was nothing to scoff at. The men had to find a way to keep their morale up in these squalid conditions because their survival, both physical and mental, depended on their unity. All the same unity was difficult to maintain, particularly in a situation in which they were denied any power or liberty. Unity could not be maintained in the camps as it was on the front; therefore, a new type of morale maintenance had to be deployed.

Perhaps the key factor that led to a solid morale among the prisoners was the creation of an International Committee at San Pedro. This committee served to unite Americans and troops of other nationalities alike. Geiser often wrote of its efficiency as well as its general popularity among the prisoners: “We already had an informal International Committee made up of Canadian, English, French, German, and American representatives on our floor...By the fourth day we had already solved the problem of crowding around the food caldrons. We divided ourselves into seven groups, each centered on a large national section, with each group to take turns at being first in line. This was quickly accepted and enforced.” The Committee was headed by the ‘Secret Six,’ who were kept anonymous so as not to risk their identities being revealed or the possibility of punishment for conspiracy. Another important thing to note about this committee is that it was not all-powerful; sub-committees were established to discuss issues as well. One of the Committee’s most important accomplishments was that it “had managed to convince the Fascists to allow [the prisoners] to police themselves, and [the Committee] appointed people to keep order.” This allowed prisoners to feel as if they had some sort of control over their own fate. In one dispute over an alleged theft, for example, “We didn’t follow the norms of English jurisprudence too closely. The defendant represented himself, and the complainants served as the prosecution. No jury was sworn in; everyone was free to offer his opinion.” The ‘court’ allowed the prisoners to address problems internally, but it did more than that in the terms of morale. The prisoners were in an uncertain situation – they never knew if they would be exchanged, if they would even survive to the next morning, or even the true state of the war, let alone when or what their next meal would be. Death always loomed around the corner,

but tiny liberties gained through the efforts of the Committee granted them some semblance of control.

Other methods to maintain morale were more overt than the committees and the ability to self-police, entertaining diversions such as chess, organized classes, singing, and the production of their own newspaper, Daily News among them. Many recognized the importance of these sorts of activities, as Geiser observed: “The English-speaking members of our informal committee sought ways the prisoners could spend their time usefully and maintain morale...Playing chess, including the making of boards and shaping of pieces out of stone and wood, was such an activity.” Of course, as a battalion commissar, Geiser was acutely aware of morale’s importance and was quite knowledgeable in ways to maintain it. In this context, his comments on the usefulness of these activities are poignant. He realized that while chess was not an extremely useful activity, it was incredibly diverting. Later, the committee decided that a school at San Pedro would be a better way to pass the time. Prisoner Max Parker recalled classes on “chess, bridge, Spanish, archaeology, hiking (particularly appropriate in our circumstances), and several other subjects.” He also recollected a concert that was staged by fellow prisoners, remarking that it was one of the few times in which the prisoners were permitted to sing and that the line between prisoner and guard was blurred as the songs captivated them all. Aside from singing, the Daily News was a favorite among the prisoners, even though only a few issues were ever published. The newspaper reported on events around the camp, on visitors, or whatever else was of interest to the prisoners. William Carney, an American journalist from The New York Times who visited the camp, wrote a news article that inaccurately reported their living conditions, claiming that the prisoners were in relatively good health and that they even enjoyed the comfort of exercising in a “large field,” adding that the few beatings they did receive were deserved on account of their rebellious natures. Obviously displeased with this inaccurate report, the prisoners satirized his article in an issue of the Daily News. They wrote a letter, “Dear Commandant,” in which they apologized for their behavior and declared that “if you would restore to the grounds of San Pedro the flowing stream and athletic field which Mr. Carney described, we will bathe and exercise freely.” This was not a regular publication. If it had been discovered the consequences would have been quite severe, yet it served to unite the prisoners as well as keep them entertained.

Self-governance and entertainment aided morale, but hope overrode both of these as the prisoners had “always been promised an exchange.”
prisoners could cling to this hope, which motivated them to continue with life, patiently waiting for their release to become a reality. An end would come. This simple idea seemed to be enough to keep them strong and willing to work on keeping up their spirits. Of course, like the active soldiers, there were always challenges to maintaining this hope, despite their presenting themselves less frequently than at the front. There were a few minor misdemeanors here and there such as theft or lying about coming to Spain to fight out of fear of punishment, but these issues were taken care of quickly and without much conflict. One particular instance bears mentioning because of the frequency with which it was written about by most prisoners. As stated above, the *Daily News* was published by the prisoners that featured topics that were of interest to them—at some point, however, another publication emerged called the *Undercrust*. Only one issue was ever published, yet it was enough to cause quite a scandal because it named the so called 'Secret Six,' the people who formed the International Committee. It was obviously a point of contention, for a least some prisoners, that the members of this committee made the majority of the decisions yet remained anonymous. In recalling Charlie Keith, the founder of the *Undercrust*, Max Parker wrote:

> A small group of Americans refused to join the cooperative and they kept whatever they received. They were the dissidents—highly critical of the leadership, both of their actions and their philosophy. They referred to these multi-national leaders as the ‘Secret Six’ and they distributed a newspaper called ‘The Undercrust’ which was critical of the *Daily News*. Most of us felt that their behavior was divisive and dangerous, under the circumstances. We felt that it was essential to our survival that we maintain an attitude of solidarity and comradeship, whatever our personal feelings might be. For the most part, we did maintain this attitude and morale was good.

Even after the war and after the prisoners had returned, the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (VALB) were called to a hearing regarding this case. The VALB minutes include this passage:

> “After capture, during the April ’38 retreats, Keith voluntarily initiated a campaign of slander against the Republican Government; ingratiated himself with his fascist captors; denounced Republican and IB leadership; lied as to his status among his fellow prisoners to the extent that he represented himself as having attended the Lenin Institute, was a special Moscow agent in Spain, was the representative of the CPUSA (in this latter lie, he severely endangered the lives of Cuban prison comrades); that Keith set up a faction in San Pedro to carry on fight against IB prison leaders; that he actively supported the ‘Undercrust’, a prison paper opposed to the ‘Daily News.’”

Considering that most prisoners remembered this episode well and that the VALB felt the need to address it, the issue of Keith’s ‘betrayal’ loomed large after the war. Of course, it was a huge problem while they continued at San Pedro as well; any internal attack on morale and unity could lead to the death or the injury of fellow prisoners. Their soliarity kept them safe, so the revelation of the *Undercrust* could create dangerous schisms. Carl Geiser strongly considered leaving this issue out of his book *Prisoners of the Good Fight* altogether. He only decided to add it after a letter from Hy Wallach which urged:

> “I do not think we can simply forget about those who conducted themselves badly. I do not mean that there should be a full review of everyone’s conduct. But there was a group—and I'm referring to the group led by Charlie Keith-- that made things even more difficult for us and dangerous. If you recall, they circulated the names of what they termed 'the secret six,' the Party organization in San Pedro. This group was a small minority. I am not including in this group men like Bob Steck who was demoralized at the time of his capture and made some bad statements. The existence and our necessity to cope with this disruptive group was part of our experience and cannot be left out.”

Even after Wallach posited this argument, Geiser only briefly mentioned the existence of the *Undercrust* and did not address the problems that it might have created for morale in the camp. It is likely that this publication created unrest, or else Geiser would not have been so adamant about its exclusion. Veterans were very concerned with how they appeared to the American people and would often hide things that were less than honorable. For example, Carl Geiser’s letters to his wife in which he played down the defeat of the Brigade. The *Undercrust* died a quick death, so Keith was undoubtedly silenced—but how this happened is unclear. Though challenges to morale in San Pedro were not as common as at the front, they had the potential to be more devastating. After their exchange and return to the United States, the issue of morale should have been over and done with, but the VALB cared about the Keith
case because the morale and reputation of the recently returned soldiers – now veterans – were at stake.

Americans who left to fight for the Spanish Republic did so in violation of American law, as it was illegal for an American to enlist and fight for a foreign army. Upon their return, both soldiers and former prisoners were welcomed, but not without suspicion from the government. The goal of the VALB was to have as many members as possible and to present itself, along with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, to the public in the best possible light. The members of the VALB and the non-members who had served came up against the first of many troubles in World War II. Many attempted to join the war effort but were labeled "premature anti-fascists," a bad appellation to carry since it implied you were a Communist. They were initially barred from entering military service, but their Lincoln's valuable field experience meant this was soon reversed, and many were eventually recruited during WWII. In addition, the VALB and the Abraham Lincoln Brigade faced threats caused by the Red Scare and the governmental black-listing that was to ensue. When put on trial, most refused to talk about their fellow soldiers and others said as little as possible without being held in contempt of court. Those who did speak out against the Brigade were quickly denounced as deserters or as simply disillusioned because of some small wrong doing. Both the VALB and the Abraham Lincoln Brigade were eventually removed from blacklists, although members still encountered problems in workplaces and with the government. Notwithstanding these low points of treatment of the veterans, many still went on to work for anti-fascist causes as they did in Spain. Some continued to protest on a regular basis, some raised funds for Nicaragua, and most, if not all, of the veterans worked to keep the memory of Spain alive.

Regardless of the hardship and adversity that the members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade faced both during and after the war, their morale remained firm, enabling them to continue fighting against fascism long after the Spanish Civil War came to an end.

Morale among the members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade sustained itself through various approaches that were dependent on the specific circumstances of individual soldiers. Those active at the front had to be reminded of their cause. They were fed propaganda, emitted primarily through political posters, and were influenced by the spin of the political commissars. Prisoners of war, on the other hand, were simply trying to survive the concentration camps, and to do this they had to hold onto the belief that their cause was worth imprisonment. While it was necessary to keep the importance of their cause at the forefront of their minds, they also desperately needed to retreat from the misery that they lived with in the camps from day to day. A good portion of their time was spent focusing on things not related to the war in order to divert their attention from their dire situation. Even after the soldiers had returned home, morale still played a major role. If morale had not been maintained, their reputation as soldiers and their cause would have been viewed pejoratively and their sacrifice would have been deemed useless. Some veterans remained active and vocal about their cause and continued to participate in humanitarian work. Although temporarily blacklisted during the Red Scare, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and the VALB were able to regain their good name and project a good image to the public. Without this continuous maintenance of morale, the history and the memory of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade would not be what it is today. It takes just one vocal and active group of disillusioned veterans to ruin or taint the name of any army of any war. The continuous and successful preservation of morale allowed the Americans to view their cause and their actions as justifiable, allowing them to keep their name untarnished.

---

3 James Lardner, letter to mother, May 1938, Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive 067, Box 1 folder 2, NYU.
4 Max Parker, letter to Carl Geiser, undated, Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives 004, Box 3 folder 21, NYU.
5 Carl Geiser, letter to wife, April 1937, Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive 004, Box 1 folder 1, NYU.
7 Carl Geiser, letter to wife, June 1937, Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive 004, Box 1 folder 2, NYU.
8 Carroll, The Odyssey, 132.
9 Ibid., 16.
10 Carl Geiser, letter to wife, February 1938, Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive 004, Box 1 folder 10, NYU.
concert as helped to compile a list of the songs that were actually performed by the prisoners of San Pedro for the guards.

* "All the peoples of the world are in the International Brigades on the side of the Spanish people."

**1st win the war. Less empty words!**
Iraqi-Jewish Immigration to Iran, 1941-1952
JULIAN COLE PHILLIPS

In the decades following World War II, Jews in Muslim-majority countries embarked on a mass migration westward. By the mid-1970s, up to a million Mizrahi Jews had resettled in Israel, Western Europe, North America, and Australia. One of the largest groups of migrants originated from Iraq, where over 100,000 Jews left a well-integrated community that traced its local roots back roughly 2,500 years. Most Iraqi Jews resettled in the west among the other Mizrahi exiles, largely in Israel. However, between 1941 and 1953, at least 3,000 of the Jews who left Iraq resettled in eastern Iran — a stone’s throw away from their former homes in Baghdad and Basra.

This sub-migration is striking because it contradicts the dominant historical narrative of the postwar Mizrahi exodus. According to many historians, the mass-migration was relatively linear and uncomplicated: Jews left Muslim majority countries where they had universally experienced significant persecution and resettled in Israel where they imagined they would feel ‘at home.’ In order to understand the migration of Jews from Iraq to Iran, this argument must be re-evaluated in two fundamental ways: First, the Mizrahi mass-migration was far from linear: many Jewish emigrants traveled in what Ella Shohat calls “a constellation of multidirectional and palimpsestic cross-border movements” before they settled down; second, many Mizrahi Jews did not feel that the Islamic world was automatically unfriendly and a Jewish state automatically welcoming. The Iraqi Jews who resettled in Iran — and Mizrahi migrants generally — decided to leave their homes and selected their destinations for diverse reasons.

Between 1941 and 1953, the number of Jews in Iraq plummeted from perhaps 120,000 to fewer than 10,000 individuals. Jews began to feel pressure to emigrate beginning in 1941, and small numbers left at various points during the 1940s — particularly in 1941, 1946, and 1948-9. The emigrants of the 1940s set the stage for a mass emigration that began in April 1950 and continued until 1953. These waves of Jewish emigration from Iraq were distinct from migrations of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early 20th centuries. Whereas economic and social opportunities had pulled many Iraqi Jews abroad in earlier periods, conditions within Iraq itself goaded emigration in the 1940s.

On 1 April 1940, sitting Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid ‘Ali al-Kailani staged a brief coup in an attempt to prevent Britain’s wartime re-occupation of Mandate Iraq. Over the succeeding two months, the ruling al-Kailani administration oversaw an inadvertent rise in popular anti-Jewish sentiment in Iraq, for three reasons: First, Al-Kailani’s robust criticism of British imperial power drummed up anti-British sentiment that was sometimes directed at perceived British sympathizers, including Jews and other minority religious groups to which the British Mandate government assigned favored status. Second, the regime’s anti-British policy included improved relations with Nazi Germany, which began to broadcast anti-Jewish propaganda on Iraqi radio and in local newspapers. Finally, al-Kailani provided political asylum to exiled Palestinian nationalists like Haj Amin al-Hussaini, who the British had previously banned from the country. The presence of al-Hussaini and his fellows helped push the ongoing Arab-Zionist conflict to the forefront of Iraqi national consciousness. Many Iraqi Jews opposed Jewish statehood in Palestine, and some were members of a multi-sectarian organization called the Anti-Zionist League. However, discussions of the Palestine conflict tended to establish a binary between Arabs and Jews and implicitly eroded the nationalistic bonds between Jewish and other Iraqis. For Jews, al-Kailani’s Iraq felt increasingly inhospitable and in April a few Jewish families left the country because their situation seemed precarious under the new regime. Although tiny, this emigration heralded a larger dislocation in the summer of 1941.

On 31 May 1941, the British army occupied Baghdad and overthrew al-Kailani, provoking a national outpouring of anger that was channeled into a short wave of attacks on Baghdadi Jews. During this farhud (a Kurdish loanword in Iraqi Arabic meaning “riot” or “massacre”), rioters killed perhaps 145 Jews and an unknown (although significantly smaller) number of Muslims. According to one Zionist emissary campaigning in Iraq at the time, the “immediate reaction” for many Iraqi Jews was a serious consideration of emigration. The emissary reported that emigration plans generally varied based on class: The very wealthy sought to resettle in India, Iran, Europe, or North America, while “[t]he less affluent were willing to emigrate to Palestine.” However, the vast majority of Jews did not carry out their initial emigration plans, both because the government quickly executed some perpetrators of the farhud and because it was difficult to acquire visas. Altogether, only a few hundred individuals left the country; most went to
Palestine, but some traveled to Iran and India. Many returned to Iraq within a few years.\textsuperscript{13} In the months after the farhud many Iraqi Jews joined dissident political organizations, which indirectly provoked further Jewish emigration in 1946 and 1947. Some Iraqi Jews concluded that the farhud had been a manifestation of simmering anti-Jewish prejudice that would continue for the foreseeable future. Because Jewish statehood promised a measure of protection against future sectarian strife, many in this camp joined Iraq’s growing Zionist movement.\textsuperscript{16} The sectarian dimension of the farhud also spurred some Jews to join the local Communist Party. As the Iraqi-Jewish novelist Moshe Euri and Sami Michael have noted, the Communist Party campaigned for unity across ethno-religious lines and, as a result, attracted many minorities as members.\textsuperscript{17} The Communists and Zionists stood at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, but the Iraqi monarchy identified both groups as political threats. In the fall of 1946, the government arrested a number of leading political dissidents, including Communists and Zionists.\textsuperscript{18} To avoid arrest, members of both groups went into hiding and in some cases fled the country by crossing into Iran. Because the Iranian government refused to grant long-term residency to most Iraqi political refugees, many of the exiled Zionists and Jewish Communists immigrated to Palestine.\textsuperscript{19} Notably, some Jews who opposed political Zionism were forced to resettle in Palestine, a phenomenon that continued in future waves of emigration from Iraq.

On 15 May 1948, Iraq entered the First Arab-Zionist war (otherwise called the Israeli War for Independence and an-Nakba in Arabic). The war generated a string of anti-Jewish policies and increased popular sectarianism, pushing at least two thousand Jews to leave Iraq over the remainder of 1948 and 1949.\textsuperscript{20} Starting in July, wartime emergency laws placed Jewish communities under government surveillance and increased the penalties for Zionist activities and undocumented emigration. Furthermore, some branches of the civil service sacked all Jewish employees because of concerns over “infiltration.”\textsuperscript{21} Iraqi Jews vividly remembered the farhud, and many worried that the current anti-Jewish atmosphere prefigured another violent outbreak of sectarianism.

The Jews who emigrated in the months after the war broke out followed two major routes. Emigrants who departed during the summer of 1948 usually crossed Iraq’s western border in small groups and then traveled across Jordan and Syria to Israel, which the Zionist community in Palestine had declared theirs on 14 May.\textsuperscript{22} In the fall and winter, Iraqi Zionists guided a series of group emigrations across the eastern border with Iran. Emigrants would rendezvous in Basra, Amara, or Khanaqin and cross the border in large groups of up to 70 people.\textsuperscript{23} In Iran, the escapees would meet Zionist agents from Israel or local Jews, who arranged transportation to Tehran.\textsuperscript{24} In the capital, the Iraqis initially stayed in homes and a hotel owned by sympathetic Jews, many of them of Iraqi origin.\textsuperscript{25} However, in March, the number of emigrants exceeded the number of available beds, and Iraqi Jews were forced to shelter in synagogues and tents in the local Jewish cemetery.\textsuperscript{26} After a delay of weeks or months, most of the emigrants arranged transportation to Israel.\textsuperscript{27}

In the winter of 1949, the number of Jewish immigrants jumped to an average of one thousand a month after several changes to government emigration policy. In December, the government reduced the maximum punishment for illegal emigration from death (although this was never enforced) to six months in prison.\textsuperscript{28} In February, Iraq asked the Iranian government to deport undocumented Jewish migrants back to Iraq. This effort was unsuccessful: Because of ongoing strains in Iraqi-Iranian relations and significant lobbying from Israel that included a contribution of nearly half a million dollars to the Iranian state, Prime Minister Said Maragai refused to deport the recent arrivals. Rather, in February 1950, Maragai announced that, “in accordance with the tradition of tolerance, stamped deep into the Iranian nation for six thousand years, the policy of an open door to political and religious refugees will be continued.”\textsuperscript{29} The relaxation of punishment for emigration and the guarantee of temporary asylum in Iran emboldened many Iraqi Jews who were considering leaving.

Emigrants who left in the winter of 1949-1950 usually followed the same route as their predecessors of 1948 and 49; crossing the Iraqi-Iranian border with the assistance of Iraqi Zionists and eventually traveling to Israel. In March, a small number of emigrants also left by air under a temporary “Denaturalization Act” that permitted Iraqi Jews to emigrate unmolested, albeit with two important caveats: Firstly, Jews who left under the new law were only allowed to take a small amount of cash and luggage out of the country (although they could leave their other property under the control of a local custodian); secondly, they were required to renounce their Iraqi citizenship prior to departure.\textsuperscript{30} Stateless and penniless, these individuals went to Israel, which guaranteed them food, shelter, and citizenship.

On 8 April 1950, a small bomb exploded in a popular Jewish café in Baghdad. Although the number of casualties was small, the attack vindicated many Iraqi Jews’ longstanding fear that anti-Israel sentiment would generate
attacks on the local community. In the three weeks after the attack, nearly 20,000 individuals registered for emigration under the Denaturalization Act. Three more bombs exploded on heavily Jewish streets in May and June (although there were no recorded casualties) convinced almost 50,000 more individuals to register over the course of the summer. Registration for emigration slowed significantly during the fall of 1950, but accelerated after a deadly explosion outside a synagogue on 14 January 1951. When the Denaturalization Act expired in March 1951, 100,000 individuals, most of Iraq’s Jews, had renounced their citizenship and begun the emigration process.

Although the Iraqi government had designed the Denaturalization Act to streamline the emigration process, the unexpectedly large number of emigrants rapidly overwhelmed the arrangement. Most of the first Jews to depart under the law took special flights from Baghdad and Basra to Cyprus, where they transferred to flights to Israel. Those who had other destinations purchased ordinary airline tickets. However, in June, Israel abruptly reduced its monthly quota for Iraqi immigrants because of heavy immigration from eastern Europe. Iraqi Jews who had registered for immigration and therefore had waived their citizenship and right to work in Iraq faced a months-long wait for entry to Israel. However, in Iran, very few Jews had chosen to immigrate to Israel, leaving thousands of unclaimed slots in Israel’s monthly quota for immigrants from Iran. Prospective Iraqi immigrants who were unable to receive immediate permission to enter Israel often traveled to Tehran and registered for their Israeli visas as Iranians. Throughout 1951 and 1952, therefore, Iraqi Jews emigrated via Tehran alongside Baghdad and Basra.

Many of the Iraqi emigrants of 1950-53 settled in Israel for practical reasons. On 10 March 1951, the Iraqi state froze the assets of Jews who had renounced their citizenship in preparation for emigration. Emigrants had expected to remain control over their Iraqi property and bank accounts; they were only allowed to take a small amount of currency out of the country and planned to eventually transfer their holdings to their destinations. Essentially penniless, these individuals often could not afford to immigrate anywhere other than Israel, even if they had originally hoped to settle elsewhere. In other instances, individuals were unable to obtain visas or residency in their intended destinations. These individuals settled in Israel whether or not they had originally hoped to immigrate elsewhere.

Other Iraqi emigrants, particularly those who left Iraq before 1950, chose to settle in Israel although they had had sufficient time and resources to arrange resettlement in one of several countries. Some supported political Zionism and had planned to immigrate to Palestine even before Iraq became inhospitable. Others did not support Zionism on ideological grounds, but reasoned that Israel would be a safe and welcoming destination once they were compelled to emigrate. Perhaps most significantly, the exodus of Iraqi Jewry was a classic chain migration. Many individuals migrated from Iraq to Israel because the journey often enabled them to keep their families and communities somewhat intact. In some cases, entire extended families followed a single insistent Zionist relative. The diversity of the factors that drew Iraqi emigrants to Israel is extremely significant. Despite the claims of some 20th century scholars, ideological support for Zionism was not the deciding factor in the eventual resettlement of many Iraqi Jews in Israel.

Thousands of Iraqi Jews, however, did not immediately resettle in Israel and dispersed to dozens of cities in Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America. During the 1940s and 1950s, longstanding Jewish communities in Lebanon, Iran, India, France, and England swelled with new immigrants. In addition, New World cities like Great Neck, NY; Los Angeles, CA; and Montreal, Canada emerged as major centers of Iraqi Jewry. Each of these destinations had specific draws for certain individuals, notably family ties and commercial opportunities. However, many of the emigrants who resettled in these countries chose not to immigrate to Israel because of perceived problems within the Jewish State. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, many Iraqi Jews cited specific factors that deterred them from settling in Israel. For some, the low living standards in postwar Israel contrasted unfavorably with the comfortable lifestyle of many Iraqi Jews. Others felt that their community’s culture, largely urban, white collar, and cosmopolitan, was unlike that of Israel which, according to Zionist propaganda, emphasized socialist values and manual labor. Finally, many emigrants worried that Israel did not provide the economic opportunities that would permit their families to prosper. These individuals settled outside of Israel largely because of deterrents within the state itself.

By the early 1940s, it was clear to many Iraqi Jews that living conditions for new immigrants in Israel were frequently uncomfortable and often harsh. The Zionist community in Palestine struggled to remain financially solvent throughout the first half of the 20th century and depended on support from foreign philanthropists such as the Baron Edmund de Rothschild. The community was particularly strained in the 1940s and 1950s due to massive immigration from Europe and the Middle East, and often struggled to provide sufficient housing and food to impoverished arrivals.
Iraqi immigrants to Palestine who departed immediately after the farhud in 1941 wrote vivid letters to their friends and relatives in Iraq describing “the harsh conditions, lack of commercial opportunities, and compulsory army service that characterized life in Palestine”. According to Zionist emissaries who lobbied Iraqi Jews to come to Palestine in the mid-1940s, such reports were a major deterrent for potential immigrants.\textsuperscript{44} Conditions worsened during the 1948 Arab-Zionist War. Sara Sora, the fictional Egyptian Jewish immigrant to Palestine in Youssef Chahine’s 1979 film Alexandria... Why? echoed the experience of many real immigrants when she stated,

\begin{quote}
I thought I had escaped the Nazi inferno, yet in Haifa I faced another. Nazism is dead, but in Palestine battles rage and may last a hundred years. My father had promised to show me a perfect society... I saw Judaism become a nationality, full of blood and violence.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

Although Iraqi immigrants of the early 1950s did not witness such violence firsthand, they did experience severe policy upon arrival in Israel. Many spent up a few years living in tents in state-funded “transit camps” and survived on rations. Samir Naqqash, an Iraqi immigrant who arrived in Israel in 1951, compared these conditions unfavorably to life in Iraq: “We’d lived in palaces and they put us in tents. Instead of bringing us home after 3000 years, they sent us 100,000 years back.”\textsuperscript{46} Potential immigrants in Baghdad and Tehran doubtless heard stories like Naqqash’s and avoided resettling in Israel.

For other immigrants, Israeli culture was fundamentally inimical to Iraqi Jewry. Mainstream Israeli society was heavily influenced by Western European culture and valorized concepts such as socialism and agricultural self-sufficiency.\textsuperscript{47} In contrast, the Iraqi Jewish community was disproportionately employed in commerce and other white-collar fields. The number of Iraqi Jews who performed agriculture was negligible.\textsuperscript{48} In the mid-1940s, Nassim Sahayak, a Baghdadi Jew who remained in Iraq through the 1950s and then resettled in Tehran, tried to convince his brother not to immigrate to Palestine:

\begin{quote}
[T]he so-called Jewish state – if it ever becomes more than a pipe dream – will be run by Jews from Hungary, Poland, Russia, France, and Germany, not by Jews from Iraq or Egypt. Where would you fit in? What would you do? I’d like to see you trade your smart suits and your nice fitted shirts for a pair of dirty overalls and a hoe.\textsuperscript{49}
\end{quote}

Sahayak’s concern that European Ashkenazi Jews would “run” Israel to the detriment of Mizrahi immigrants was ultimately vindicated. Since the 1950s, Mizrahi Jews have complained of popular and official discrimination in Israel, including under-representation in higher education and certain professions and the disparagement of their Arabo-Islamic culture.\textsuperscript{50} This discrimination deterred some Iraqi emigrants from resettling in Israel, and pushed others to leave the Jewish state in later years.\textsuperscript{51}

Other Iraqi Jews interpreted Israeli culture differently from Sahayak, as overly – rather than insufficiently – “oriental.” A significant percentage of the community had received a western-style education in schools run by the Alliance Israelite Francaise, and many had also studied abroad in Western Europe or the United States.\textsuperscript{52} Consequently, some Iraqi Jews identified with the West and believed it to be superior to Arabo-Islamic culture.\textsuperscript{53} The anti-Semitic violence in Baghdad in 1941 and 1950 reinforced the notion that the Arab world was somehow under-civilized and increased the attraction of the “First World.”\textsuperscript{54} Many Iraqi Jews did not place Palestine in this category, as Arab Palestinians vastly outnumbered Jews in the territory until the late 1940s. One group of Jews considering emigration from Basra in 1941 disparaged immigration to Palestine as “exchanging Iraqi Arabs for Palestinian ones.”\textsuperscript{55} For such individuals, immigration to North America or Western Europe was preferable to resettlement in Palestine/Israel.

Other Iraqi emigrants questioned the economic sensibility of immigrating to Israel. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Iraqi Jews were disproportionately involved in commerce and banking and played a particularly important role in international trade. According to one report, Jews controlled 75% of import firms in 1940s Iraq.\textsuperscript{56} Prior to the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, many Iraqi Jews had immigrated to England, Iran, India, and the Far East to conduct trade, and some had become extremely wealthy as a result. Consequently, many Iraqi Jews of the 1940s and 1950s associated emigration with enrichment and hoped to resettle in countries with significant trans-national commercial opportunities.\textsuperscript{57} Palestine/Israel was a poor place to conduct international trade: The country had no valuable natural resources to speak of, its currency was extremely unstable, and its land borders were sealed after 1948 because of unresolved conflict.\textsuperscript{58} For many emigrants, immigration to Israel seemed foolish when resettlement elsewhere could prove extremely lucrative.

Iraqi Jewish emigrants arrived in Iran throughout the 1940s and early 1950s. The long Iran-Iraq border was lightly guarded and fairly close to
Baghdad and Basra. With the help of a smuggler, emigrants could cross the border without exit visas and often with more cash than they were permitted to carry onto an airplane. Iran also had a substantial Jewish community, including as many as 100,000 Persian Jews and some 3,000 Jews from Iraq. Many Iranian Jews aided the immigrants by providing temporary shelter, food, and transportation from the border to Tehran. Iraqi Jews began to arrive in Tehran in the wake of the farhud in 1941. Others crossed the border in 1946 and 1947. The largest number of emigrants entered Iran between 1951 and 1953. Altogether, tens of thousands of Iraqi Jews spent time in Iran in the 1940s and 1950s. However, for most emigrants, Iran was only the first stopover on a multi-stage migration, in part because it was extremely difficult to obtain residency permits from the Iranian government. The 3,000 Iraqi Jews who did receive Iranian residency during these years often navigated Iranian bureaucracy with assistance from fellow Iraqi Jews who had previously settled in the country. The new immigrants dispersed throughout eastern Iran, notably to the cities of Hamadan, Kermanshah (which was adjacent to the Iraqi border at an important crossing point), Isfahan, and Tehran. These individuals chose to settle in Iran for a number of reasons, including business opportunities and the longstanding Persian and Iraqi Jewish communities in Iran.

On a practical level, resettlement in Iran enabled Iraqi Jews who worked in international commerce to remain in the same lucrative industry. Many Baghdadi trade firms had established relations and even multinational companies with Iranian businesses in the late 19th century. Consequently, many Jewish Iraqis had commercial connections in Iran and some had studied Persian for business purposes. Because of their proximity, Iraq and Iran were important trading partners and Iraqi Jews in Iran were optimally positioned to co-ordinate trade between the two countries. Furthermore, because of their education at the Alliance Israélite Universelle, many Iraqi Jews spoke English, French, or Turkish. Such language skills were extremely valuable in Iran during these years: The country was industrializing rapidly under the leadership of Muhammad Reza Shah, and the state frequently contracted foreign companies to extract oil and other resources. Such business opportunities were an important draw for Iraqi emigrants who chose to resettle in Iran.

Many Iraqi Jews also felt connected to Iran’s large and well-established Jewish community. According to popular belief in both countries, the Jews of Iraq and Iran arrived in the region together during the Biblical Babylonian exile. Babylonian Jewry did not divide into distinct Arabic- and Persian-speaking communities until the Middle Ages, and Iranian Jewry remained under the jurisdiction of the Baghdad Rabbinate until the early modern period. In border cities like Kanaqin, Iraq and Kermanshah, Iran, Arabic- and Persian-speaking Jews maintained relationships and occasionally intermarried into the twentieth century. Because many Iraqi Jews proudly considered Babylon to be their ancestral homeland, resettlement within the bounds of the historic empire was certainly appealing.

Iran’s greatest draw, however, was its longstanding Diaspora community of Iraqi Jews. During the 1880s, a group of Jewish businessmen from Baghdad had settled in Kermanshah and Hamadan to co-ordinate multinational trade and had raised their families in Iran. The community grew significantly after World War I. During the war years, a significant number of military-age Iraqi Jewish men had crossed into Iran to avoid conscription into the Ottoman army. Many of these men established businesses in Iran and remained in the country after the war ended. Between first generation immigrants and their children, there were nearly 3,000 Iraqi Jews in Iran in 1940. This community retained extremely close ties to Iraqi Jewry within Iraq: Most families spoke Arabic at home, married fellow Iraqi Jews, enrolled their children in secondary schools in Baghdad, and retained Iraqi citizenship. In Tehran, Iraqi Jews had their own synagogue, primary school, and social club modeled after similar institutions in Iraq. Many residential neighborhoods in the city featured large houses built around central courtyards – a layout that was familiar to middle- and upper-class Jews from Baghdad. In many ways, the Iraqi-Iranian Jewish community represented the closest possible approximation of pre-exilic life in Iraq. For the many Iraqi Jews nostalgic for the years before mass emigration, this familiarity was extremely comforting.

Irani-Iranian Jews flourished in the decades after the mass emigration. The largely white collar community benefited financially from Muhammad Reza Shah’s industrialization and trade programs. Additionally, the regime’s propaganda included the “promulgation of minority rights as part of the cohesive Iranian nation,” a message that was especially meaningful for a community that had failed to maintain its place in modern Iraq. The community also grew: Most of Iraq’s remaining 10,000 Jews left the country in the 1960s and 70s, and some resettled in Iran. However, the situation changed drastically after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. During the 1980s and 1990s, most Iraqi-Iranian Jews left the country in response to the policies of the newly-declared Islamic Republic. A significant percentage of the
community resettled in the New York Metropolitan Area among Persian-speaking Jewish exiles. Despite the double displacement from Iraq and Iran, many Iraqi-Iranians continue to identify strongly with their Babylonian-Iraqi heritage and operate a Babylonian Jewish Center in Great Neck, New York. The center’s webpage declares its “responsibility to preserve a rich culture that is more than 2,700 years old” and notes, “[a]s a result of our long and difficult history, we, the Iraqi people are proud and adaptive [sic]”.

It is rarely productive to analyze history through the lens of what-might-have-been. However, the migration of Iraqi Jews to Iran demonstrates that the mass departure of Jews from Muslim-majority countries was not inevitable. 100,000 Jews fled Iraq in the 1940s and 1950s as a result of particular historical circumstances, not because Judaism was fundamentally incompatible with the Islamic World. Of these exiled Iraqi Jews settled in Iran, in part, because their ethno-religious culture existed comfortably in a majority-Muslim state. The Iraqi-Iranian situation is not exceptional. In Beirut, Mizrahi Jews — including many Iraqis — coexisted with Christians and Muslims until the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in the 1970s. Large, stable Jewish communities persist in the Muslim cities of Casablanca (Morocco), Istanbul and Izmir (both in Turkey), and in Tehran. Instances of Judeo-Muslim cohabitation also exist in Diaspora: In Paris, Maghrabi Jews and Muslims share the neighborhood of Bellville. These populations do not believe that Judaism is fundamentally incompatible with Muslim society and underscore the extent to which the massive postwar migration of Mizrahi Jews to the West was rooted in political factors, not irreconcilable religious difference.

1 Mizrahi is Hebrew for Oriental/Eastern.
5 Shohat, Taboo Memories, 332.
6 For the commerce-driven migration of Iraqi Jews pre-1941 see Jalil Silliman, Jewish Portraits, Indian Frames: Women’s Narratives from a Diaspora of Hope (Calcutta: Seagull Press, 2001), passim.
27 Ezrour, in discussion; "Kenesa Ettefag [Unity Synagogue]," Ledorvador: Jewish Studies Research Center of Iran, accessed 10 March 2012.
28 Gat The Jewish Exodus 41; Benjamin, Last Days, 187.
29 Ibid., 71.
30 Ibid., 70.
31 In reality, the identities and motivations of the bombers are not clear, as no group claimed credit for the attacks. The Iraqi police investigation concluded that radical Zionists conducted the bombings in an attempt to scare Iraqi Jews into immigrating to Israel – a theory that many Israeli Jews now share. The Israeli government conducted its own investigation and concluded that Zionists were not responsible for the bombings. Many years later, one Iraqi Zionist claimed to have set off one of the later bombs in order to confuse police who had arrested one of his compatriots on suspicion of committing an earlier bombing. For a detailed analysis see Gat, The Jewish Exodus, 160-191.
32 Ibid., 139 and 173.
33 Shenhav, "The Jews of Iraq," 616; Benjamin, Last Days, 202; Arlene Dallafar (scholar of Iranian Jewry, in discussion with the author, 28 April 2011.
34 Gat, The Jewish Exodus, 111.
35 Ibid., 144.
36 Dallafar, in discussion.
37 Salim Sassoon in Morad et. al., Iraq's Last Jews, 40.
38 Ben-Porat, To Baghdad and Back, passim; Haddad, Flight From Babylon, passim.
39 Louise Shohat in Benjamin, Last Days, 164.
40 Dallafar, in discussion; Morad et. al., Iraq's Last Jews, 54.
41 Haddad, Flight From Babylon, 363.
42 Dallafar, in discussion.
43 Zachary Lockman, Palestine, Zionism, and Israel (undergraduate course NYU, Fall 2010).
44 Tsimhoni, "Activity of the Yishuv," 245-246.
45 Iskandriya Li...? [Alexandria... Why?] directed by Youssef Chahine (1979), DVD.
46 Samir, Forget Baghdad.
47 Lockman, Palestine, Zionism, and Israel.
48 There were Jewish communities in Iraqi Kurdistan that engaged in agriculture. However, so-called "Kurdish Jews" had a distinct history and few links to Iraqi Jewry in Baghdad and other Arabic cities.
49 Benjamin, Last Days,162. Nissam's brother Solomon (Shlomo) did eventually immigrate to Israel and published a narrative of the experience in Iraq's Last Jews.
50 Many scholars have written about anti-Mizrachi discrimination in Israel, including Shohat, Taboo Memories, Diasporic Voices.
51 Samir Naqqash and Ella Shohat in Samir, Forget Baghdad.
52 Morad et. al., Iraq's Last Jews, 5.
53 Regina Levy in Benjamin, Last Days, 237.
54 Salim Sassoon in Morad et. al., Iraq's Last Jews, 40.
56 Gat, The Jewish Exodus, 74.
57 Mordechai's father in Ben-Porat, To Baghdad and Back, 30.
58 Gat, The Jewish Exodus, 149.
59 S. Landsfut, Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the Middle East: a Survey (London: the Anglo-Jewish Organization, 1950), 63; Rabbie, "Iraqi Jews in Iran."
60 Haddad, Flight From Babylon, 200; Ezrour, in discussion.
62 Sami Michael in Samir, Forget Baghdad.
63 Ezrour, in discussion; "Kenesa Ettefag."
64 Dallafar, in discussion.
65 Loc. cit.
66 Nassim Sayyah in Benjamin, Last Days, 285.
68 Nahid Mozaffari, History, Society, and Identity in Modern Iran (NYU undergraduate course, Spring 2011).
69 Historic Babylon encompassed much of modern-day Iraq and Iran.
70 Rabbie, "Iraqi Jews in Iran," 3.
73 Ibid., 279, 281.
75 Dallafar, "Iraqi Jews in Iran," 281.
78 Ilan Moss, "In one Paris Neighborhood, Jews and Muslims live as they did in N. Africa: together," JTA: the Global News Service of the Jewish People (22 September
Fighting with a Lion: American Relations with Nasser’s Egypt, 1952-1967
SRUTI RAMADUGU

On October 12, 1970, *Time* published an obituary for Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser titled “Nasser’s Legacy: Hope and Instability.” The lengthy article described an Arab world stricken with grief: a five-million-person funeral in Cairo, street demonstrations in Beirut, and mock funerals in tiny Arab villages. The same article likened Nasser to Arab heroes of old, including Saladin and Mohammad, and quoted Beirut’s French-language daily *Le Jour* as stating: “One hundred million human beings—the Arabs—are orphans. There is nothing greater than this man who is gone, and nothing is greater than the gap he has left behind.”1 To the United States, however, Nasser posed a significant threat to Western dominance in a region prized for its vast strategic importance. This paper will explore the intricacies of the American-Egyptian relationship from Nasser’s rise to power in 1952 to the June War in 1967—namely Nasser’s move to nationalize the Suez Canal and the subsequent Suez Crisis, his growing influence within the Arab world, and Egypt’s crushing defeat in the June War of 1967.

Gamal Abdel Nasser came to political awareness in an Egypt that had not been ruled by a native Egyptian for thousands of years.2 Born in 1918 to middle class parents, Nasser spent most of his youth being shuffled among relatives. As he grew up in Alexandria, Cairo, and the Egyptian countryside, Nasser was exposed to all walks of Egyptian life and the vast ethnic and economic diversity of the country: Egyptians were Jews, Christians, and Muslims of various socioeconomic backgrounds.3 Like many of his generation, Nasser saw the colonial British as an “alien, infidel force” to be blamed for the problems that plagued Egypt, including extreme poverty, a lack of social mobility, and a corrupt system of land ownership.4 As an eighteen-year-old, he even wrote to his friend about the British to “Oppose them with all the force you can muster.”5 The British presence was palpable to Egyptians—they had infiltrated all walks of Egyptian society, and incorporated native Egyptians into a system that they ultimately controlled. The king and the pasha class of feudal landlords were tied into a bureaucracy dominated by foreigners, which was hard for many Egyptians to stomach.6 Though the British government technically conceded independence to Egypt in a treaty signed in 1922, the treaty revealed the sham of Egyptian sovereignty in its
agreement to protect British interests in the Suez Canal and maintain the status quo of an immense military presence. Egypt was clearly a state dominated by foreign power, like many other nations in the region – a fact evident to young Egyptians like Nasser.

The first watershed moment of Nasser’s life occurred in 1939, when World War II broke out in Europe. As the British fought on the European continent, they used Egypt as their main Middle Eastern base. Winston Churchill recognized Egypt as a strategic asset, stating in a 1941 directive that “the loss of Egypt and the Middle East would be a disaster of the first magnitude to Great Britain, second only to successful invasion [of Britain] and final conquest.” From Egypt, the British secured Allied control of the Middle East and launched a counter-offensive against Axis forces in the Western desert and North Africa. Britain recognized Egypt’s importance, but viewed her leader, King Farouk, with suspicion. Though King Farouk did not sympathize ideologically with the Axis powers (like many Egyptians, Farouk was not pro-Nazi), he did believe that an alliance with the Axis powers could help Egypt gain political freedom. In 1942, the British ambassador to Egypt demanded that King Farouk dismiss his pro-Axis Prime Minister, Ali Maher, and appoint the pro-Allies Mustafa Nahhas in his place. The British Ambassador gave Farouk an ultimatum: to either install Nahhas or abdicate the throne. Farouk complied, and kept his power. This act humiliated the Egyptian people; though King Farouk was not loved, he was their king, and this act had “exposed the sham of Egyptian independence.” Nasser biographer Said Aburish described this action as one that would “haunt [Nasser] and a whole generation of fellow Egyptians.” Nasser, like many others, thought the Egyptian army should have confronted the British presence, and saw the entire affair as an embarrassment to Egyptian sovereignty.

The second watershed moment in Nasser’s political upbringing was the creation of Israel and the subsequent Arab-Israeli War of 1948. In the aftermath of World War II, Britain sought a way to end its mandatory rule over Palestine, as conflicts between Arabs and Jews in Palestine were becoming increasingly violent and uncontrollable. In 1947, the British turned the Palestinian mandate over to the United Nations. The UN subsequently adopted Resolution 181, calling for the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. The plan awarded the Jewish state 55% of historic Palestine; Jews, however, only made up about 33% of the inhabitants of Palestine and owned only 6-7% of the land at the time. Jews accepted the plan; Arabs rejected it. On May 15, 1948, Israel declared independence. Immediately after, five Arab armies crossed over Israeli borders to prevent partition and to defend Palestinians, who had largely been defeated by Jewish forces. Military units from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestinian militia forces fought a bloody war that resulted in thousands of Arab and Israeli casualties. Nasser, then a staff officer in the Egyptian army, was among those who fought in this war. Though they had been warned that the new Israeli army would pose a significant challenge, Egyptian soldiers went to the front without any idea of what to expect, little or no instruction in how to fight a battle, and inadequate arms. Ultimately, the young state of Israel was the victor, gaining more territory than it had been originally allotted under Resolution 181. This defeat embarrassed the Arab countries involved and patriots like Nasser, who returned to Egypt frustrated and angry with the Egyptian government for its failure in Palestine.

The issue of Palestine was central to Nasser’s political thought, and would impact the way he would construct his identity as an Arab. As he wrote in the Philosophy of the Revolution, published in 1959, the creation of Israel had already made Nasser well aware of his Arabness:

I remember that the first elements of Arab consciousness began to filter into my mind as a student in secondary schools, wherefrom I went out with my fellow schoolboys on strike on December 24th of every year as a protest against the Balfour Declaration whereby England gave the Jews a national home usurped unjustly from its legal owners.

The loss in Palestine was devastating to Nasser. It was not only a loss for Egypt: it had also demonstrated the inability of the Egyptian government to fight successfully for causes that he felt were central to Arabs, namely Palestine and the sovereignty of the Palestinian people.

After returning from the Palestine War, Nasser organized a secret military cell called the Free Officers, a group that aimed to seize political control of Egypt. In Philosophy of the Revolution he wrote that “We were fighting in Palestine, but our dreams were in Egypt. Our bullets were aimed at the enemy lurking in the trenches in front of us, but our hearts were hovering round our distant Mother Country, which was then prey to the wolves that ravaged it.” Without many options for social mobility, middle and lower class Egyptians also began to argue for better working conditions and lower
rents on leased land. Between 1950 and 1952, the Free Officers organized assassinations of political figures and were responsible for outbreaks of violence; on July 23, 1952, they staged a coup and took over the state. King Farouk’s government – supported and interwoven with the British colonial establishment – was overthrown, and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), comprised of Free Officers, was put in place. The RCC asked popular the (and older) military general Muhammad Naguib to serve as Prime Minister. Though both he and Nasser had significant influence over the machinations of the new Egyptian state, Nasser emerged as a leader. In an article about post-revolution Egypt in TIME, a British Embassy official was quoted as saying “Nasser not only speaks for the regime; he, more than any one man, is the regime.” This would set a precedent for Nasser’s rule: he was the Egyptian state.

Nasser’s meteoric rise to power in Egypt took place at a time when the United States was embracing its newfound role as a global superpower. Britain and France had emerged from World War II severely weakened – the colonial domination of these empires was collapsing in Algeria, Palestine, and Egypt. Meanwhile Americans were developing a new understanding of the world after World War II, and realized the vital role they could play in a rapidly changing Middle East. The need to prevent Communist expansion to the region, to secure Middle Eastern oil resources, and to support Zionism made American interaction with Egypt all the more important after the war. The need to fight Communist expansion in the region was clearly articulated by President Harry S. Truman before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, in the self-titled ‘Truman Doctrine,’ President Truman stated that it would be the policy of the United States to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Though the Truman Doctrine originally applied only to Turkey and Greece, the doctrine was committed to forming a barrier against Soviet aggression or encroachment in the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf – key assets to American oil interests. American interests were also tied up with Israel. In the years following World War II and in light of the Holocaust, Truman made clear his support for a state for the Jewish people in Palestine. US support for Israel had strong proponents in Washington, from high-level advisors to the president to powerful institutions like the American Jewish Congress.

Immediately after the Egyptian revolution American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, in an evaluation of the new regime, claimed that the Free Officers were “bound together by common disgust with their superiors” – they were disorganized and had no ulterior motives for regional and global diplomacy. The officers appeared friendly to the United States, however, and open to a greater role for the US in Egypt in coming years. It also helped that the US had little to no involvement with the coup in Egypt. During the coup King Farouk had personally called the American embassy to ask for assistance, but it was denied him. The new regime was also willing to attack corruption and social injustice, and proposed agricultural and social reforms – these were seen by the Truman Administration as methods of combating Communism. Because internal reform was a goal of the new regime, Israelis also remained hopeful that the new Egypt would not harbor aggressive designs towards it. The US considered providing extensive military aid to Egypt in exchange for a promise that equipment would not be used against the British (who had a significant presence around the Suez Canal) or against Israel. An American-Egyptian alliance, fostered by Nasser, seemed ripe for success.

But even before he officially seized power from General Naguib, Nasser was skeptical of American influence in the region. He was eager to receive military aid from the Americans in order to maintain security of the new state, but he was less willing to accept it if it meant making concessions to Israel or Britain. Nasser wanted military aid quickly, and became increasingly impatient in dealing with a Washington that was also in the midst of a regime change – Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected in 1952, and the new administration would not make a decision about granting aid until it had organized itself. It also did not help Nasser that the British government had warned Washington that any US aid for Egypt would jeopardize Anglo-American relations. With Washington dragging its feet, Nasser commented that “America was losing its prestige as a champion of liberty and self-determination through its support for imperialist powers.” This was a direct reference to Nasser’s ongoing negotiations with the British over the Suez Canal. Nasser wanted rapid removal of the British from the Canal Zone, and threatened to ally with the Soviet Union if the Americans opposed his demand. He knew that the Americans would respond to any inclination towards the Soviets, and would pressure the British to act in accordance to Egyptian demands. Though Nasser was firmly anti-Communist (he wrote a condemnation of it in *Communism As It Really Is* in 1953), he was unwilling to privilege an American alliance over Egyptian demands for freedom and self-determination, especially when it came to the all-important Suez Canal.

Thus, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was forced to play a delicate game with Cairo; though the US supported British presence in the
Suez Canal, they feared the prospect of Egypt falling under Communist influence. Washington emerged victorious in July 1954, when Nasser and the British signed a treaty in which British troops would evacuate the Suez Canal Zone within 20 months. The treaty was not a success for other parties: Israel saw the treaty as a threat to their security interests, as a British military presence on the canal proved a buffer between Egypt and Israel. Moreover, it distracted Egyptians from focusing on Israel. However, with the treaty secured, the US moved toward granting aid to Egypt—yet they could not coerce Nasser to accept any stipulation of US aid administration. To receive aid, Nasser would have to accept a US military mission, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Nasser rejected MAAG, as he feared it would be opposed domestically and be a threat to Egyptian sovereignty. Despite efforts of US officials to convince Nasser otherwise, he continued to refuse, and Egypt did not receive its desired military aid.

Nasser’s suspicions about American designs for imperialism in the Middle East were confirmed in 1955, a decisive year for Egyptian-American relations. Bolstered by the success surrounding the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1954, the US saw an opportunity to gain power and influence in the region and to counter potential Soviet encroachment. The US sponsored the Baghdad Pact, a regional security system that aimed to counter Soviet influence to countries in the northern part of the region. Signatories included Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. Washington did not anticipate Nasser’s negative response to the Pact. As Nasser biographer Robert St. John explains, Nasser took the Baghdad Pact as a personal insult. [...] All these years he had been ruled by his hatred of those who for centuries had governed and exploited Egypt, especially the British, because they were still there. [...] From his study of history he had concluded that pacts, alliances, and treaties were clever devices by which great powers manipulated small countries for their own selfish ends. [...] he saw in the Baghdad Pact a furtherance of the western practice of keeping the Arab world divided and playing one small country against another.

The Baghdad Pact also represented a confusing standard on the part of policy makers in Washington: while US policy makers feared Soviet influence in the region, it was a battle to convince Arab leaders, like Nasser, that the true ‘villain’ in the region was the USSR, not Israel. They continued to push for the Pact regardless, alienating in the process leaders like Nasser who saw Israel as the key issue in their regional power struggle. Nasser, angered by the Baghdad Pact, advocated for “positive neutralism” across the Arab world. Though he was not pro-Communist, he would accept an alliance with those nations that best served Egyptian interests. Before leaving for the Conference, Nasser had again asked the US for military aid. An Israeli attack on Gaza had assured him of the military superiority of the French-armed Israelis and he demanded supplies that would enable Egypt to retaliate appropriately. Though the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agreed with Nasser, he returned from the Bagdad Conference to disappointing news: the US would not be granting Egypt any aid.

Egyptian-American relations were at a low point. Nasser desperately wanted military aid from the United States, but due to the severe stinginess of the Americans in supplying arms, spare parts, and aircraft to Egypt, he had little choice but to go to the Soviets for help. In September of 1955, it was announced that Communist Czechoslovakia would provide Egypt with $200 million in military equipment in exchange for Egyptian cotton. Washington, though upset, refrained from judging the deal as openly hostile and continued to try and reason with Nasser. Ultimately they could not, and would not, offer Nasser what he wanted. Providing military aid to Egypt at a time of escalating tensions with Israel would be a risky move—one that the Eisenhower administration did not want to take.

At this time, Nasser was engaged in an ambitious development project—the Aswan Dam. As a direct result of this construction, it was hoped that one and one half million acres of the desert would be brought under cultivation and that Egypt would be able to produce 10 billion kilowatt hours of electricity a year, giving the nation the possibility of large-scale industrialization. To finance its building, Nasser began negotiations with the U.S. and succeeded in receiving a $70 million dollar grant from the Americans and from Britain to cover the first year of building. The dam was expected to take ten years to complete, and the United States intended to drag the project out for the full amount of time, which required Congressional approval with every round of funding: this dependence upon American processes would hopefully ensure that Nasser could not cooperate with the Soviet Union. By forcing Nasser to rely on American financial support, the threat of Egypt falling to the Soviet influence began to subside.

However, relations between the US and Nasser took a dramatic turn for the worse when Nasser gave diplomatic recognition to Communist China.
This was done with specific intentions. Nasser wanted to ensure there could be a supply of arms to Egypt in case the West and the Soviet bloc agreed to an embargo on Egypt, an idea that Nikita Khrushchev had suggested to President Eisenhower weeks before. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, already furious over the Czech arms deal, withdrew the offer to help build the Aswan Dam. Nasser, despite having played a (relatively) successful delicate balancing game with the US for years, was shocked by this move. The Americans had essentially declared war on Egypt’s economic future.

Nasser, determined to pay back the West for the damage done to his political prestige, decided to nationalize the Suez Canal and use the profits to carry out the building of the Dam. In a speech to the people of Egypt (and the Arab world), Nasser announced his intention to the wild enthusiasm of his people. As Heikal stated,

The Canal had always stood as a monument to the exploitation of Egypt. Thousands of Egyptians had died digging it. The Suez Canal Company was a state within a state. [...] We had a motto, one that said we want the Canal ‘for Egypt and not Egypt for the Canal,’ [...] And now Nasser had nationalized it. It belonged to Egypt.

This move proved an unprecedented show of force by the leader of a nation that had long been subject to the wills of foreign powers. The Suez Canal represented the best example of foreign domination of Egypt. Built by Egyptians but financed by the British and French, the Canal was central to European interests and provided a direct passage from the Mediterranean to India and the Far East. In a speech on the radio program Voice of the Arabs, Nasser told the West to “go choke on your fury.” An Arab leader had, for the first time in decades, openly challenged the power of the West. The Arab world erupted in praise of Nasser – not only as a leader of Egypt, but also as a leader of Arabs.

Nasser’s decision to nationalize had far-reaching effects. Britain and France, the owners of the Suez Canal Company, refused to acknowledge Nasser’s authority over the canal, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower froze Egyptian assets in the United States. Britain seemed poised for war against Egypt, and the United Nations was called in to mediate the dispute. Under international law, it appeared that Egypt had a legal right to nationalize the canal, effectively ending British dominance in the country. For several months after the nationalization of the canal, numerous attempts were made at diplomacy to prevent all-out war. In October of 1956, after Egypt closed the Canal to Israeli shipping, Israel launched an attack on Egyptian territory. Under the pretext of intervening in the fighting between the Egyptians and Israelis, Britain and France entered the conflict. Arab countries assisted in providing support for the Egyptian cause, but Egyptian defeat seemed imminent after British paratroopers began landing at Port Said and French at Port Fuad. The conflict came to a halt in December of 1956 when President Eisenhower pressured Israel, France, and Britain, through the UN and in direct negotiations, to withdraw from Egyptian territory. Though they were furious over Soviet offers to intervene on Egypt’s behalf, the Americans were motivated to halt the assault on Egypt due to fears that British and French military power would re-emerge in the region. In the short Suez War, however, the US had proven their diplomatic and military influence in the region; Britain and France were clearly subordinate to the demands of the United States.

Nasser emerged from the Suez War as a hero to Arabs. As described by Nasser biographer Said Aburish, “Soon his pictures were to be found in the tents of the Yemen, the souks of Marrakesh, and the posh villas of Syria.” Due to his maneuverings in the years before the war, Nasser had made Egypt the political and spiritual center of the Arab world. To Arabs who had been embarrassed by the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Nasser espoused a vision of an Arab nation that would transcend artificial, colonial borders. He was immensely popular and admired and, in 1958, would turn his fiery rhetoric into action with the creation of the United Arab Republic, a union between Syria and Egypt. Pan-Arabism had political aims as well – Nasser recognized the oil power of Arab nations, and wanted Arabs to use that power to their political advantage. He believed Arabs could use their political clout for the betterment of their own people, even at the disadvantage of Western powers. Pan-Arabism also became a useful project in uniting Arabs against common enemies. Nasser’s rhetoric was useful in framing Americans as “new colonialists” seeking to inherit the European mantle of domination in the Middle East and framing the conflicts between the separate Arab states and Israel as a global Arab-Israeli conflict.

As Nasser gained influence in the Arab world, the US became increasingly suspicious of his designs in the region. On November 4, 1958, President Eisenhower approved NSC 4820/1, a comprehensive review of US Middle Eastern policy. This document stated that since 1956, “the West and the radical pan-Arab nationalist movement [had] been arrayed against each
other. The paper stated that the most dangerous challenge was “not from Arab nationalism per se, but from the coincidence of many of its objectives with many of those of the USSR and the resultant way in which it can be manipulated to serve Soviet ends.” Washington feared that the Soviets would cement a relationship with Arab nationalists and threaten American influence in the region. Nasser had already proven his ability to reach out to the USSR, and that he was unafraid of angering the United States. The US did not want Nasser to become friendly with the USSR, and moved delicately in dealing with the Egyptian lion, as illustrated by the Suez Crisis. The US would support Nasser— if he did what they wanted. After Suez the relationship officially cooled, and the US offered Middle Eastern states the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. This new proposition stated that it would be the policy of the United States to “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.” This doctrine echoed the designs of the failed Baghdad Pact— and ignored the viewpoints of Middle Eastern leaders, who were not concerned with Communist influences, but with the “existence and the policies of the state of Israel.” The Americans and Egyptians had separate goals in the Middle East.

Nasser’s Egypt had changed dramatically. In the years following the 1952 coup, Nasser overhauled the entire Egyptian political structure and unequal system of landownership. Though he co-opted the ideas of other Egyptian reformers, Nasser enforced a 100-acre limit on a single family’s holding, ending the persistent problem of absentee ownership that had led to rich individuals owning most of the country’s land. Under this new system, millions of landless peasants received land grants and collectively ended the modern feudalism that had existed in Egypt. Nasser also maximized the nation’s public sector through the nationalization of “almost all of Egypt’s sizable businesses,” and through the implementation of large-scale projects like the Aswan Dam, the expansion of cotton weaving factories, and the creation of steel factories.

While Egypt was bogged down with a crisis in Yemen, Palestinians became increasingly concerned that their situation of statelessness would become permanent. In order to increase the potential for conflict, Palestinian Fedayeen (militants) launched a campaign against Israeli targets beginning in the early 1960s. By 1966 tensions had reached an all-time high, due to Fedayeen raids and Israeli conflict with Syria. Worse, the Soviet Union, which had been supplying limited arms to Syria, announced that Israel had been amassing troops along the Syrian border in preparation for an invasion.

Nasser, as the self-proclaimed leader of the Arabs and head of the UAR, signed a mutual defense pact with Syria, hoping that the show of unity would prevent Israel from escalating the conflict. Nasser was aware that Arab armies were severely unprepared for a war with Israel, and that he had tried to stir the conflict for as long as possible. In May 1967, after several months of escalating tensions, Egyptian troops closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and established pledges of unity with Jordan, the UAR, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Nasser hoped to avoid a war, intending instead to coerce Israel to stop their attacks on Syria and Jordan— but he had fallen victim to his own politicking. His rhetoric against the Israelis had become so heated that it could not back down from his hawkish position without appearing weak and indecisive. Finally, on June 5, 1967, Israel launched a brilliant surprise assault on Egypt and the united Arab forces. Within six short days, the war was over.

By the end of the conflict, Israel had occupied the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the formerly Jordan-controlled West Bank, the Syrian Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. Egypt had lost three-quarters of its air force and a great deal of its army. Writing years later about the War, historian Tarek Osman stated, “Nasser became mortal: Merely the president of a poor, third-world country that had been humiliatingly defeated in war.” Nasser had been held responsible for the dreams of a generation— and he had lost them. After a complex game of playing cat-and-mouse with the Americans, the benefits of a partnership with the US had become clear during the war: the US had supplied the victorious Israelis with a large supply of weapons and information that had greatly assisted their war effort. The Soviet Union did not prove to be as good of a friend to the Egyptians— though Nasser had made attempts to reach out to the USSR during the war, especially after breaking diplomatic relations with the US, the Soviet Union remained ambivalent in its support. This disappointed Nasser, who had hoped that the Soviets would match the level of support the US provided for Israel. Though the Soviets did supply Nasser with weaponry and did break off relations with Israel, they failed to follow Nasser in breaking off relations with the US, and displayed an unwillingness to assist Egypt and the Arabs with treaty efforts after the war.

US-Egyptian relations also suffered when Nasser’s trusted advisor and friend Abdel Hakim Amer, likely aided and funded by the US, planned a coup against Nasser soon after the war. As was said in a memo from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Walter Rostow to President Johnson, Nasser saw the “CIA’s hand behind everything that goes
wrong for him" and believed the CIA was working to topple him; Rostow also stated his department had a "strong pent-up desire to wash our hands of Nasser." Egypt was sliding out of Nasser's control, and the Arab world would no longer listen to their once-admired figurehead. Negotiations in Khartoum between Arab leaders after the war revealed Nasser's diminished status – he was easily undermined by a Saudi attempt to assert regional leadership and was blamed by Syrians, Iraqis, and the PLO for accepting defeat. The project of Nasserism – of uniting Arabs for Arab causes – concluded in a second embarrassing defeat to the Israelis and their American friends.

In 1955, Time Magazine published a glowing profile of post-revolution Egypt and its new Premier – Gamal Abdel Nasser. While cataloging the many problems Nasser would face, they stated, "[...] in Western capitals, Nasser is still looked upon as Egypt's best hope for decent government, a moderate among the hotheaded many who would fight Israel even at the cost of suicide, a man who perhaps some day can grow into the dominant Middle Eastern leader he aspires to be." Nasser, in many ways, became that leader for a time. For an Arab world that had become accustomed to foreign domination, Nasser stood defiant in the face of a new kind of colonialism – American domination. He was able to unite a people that had seen repeated defeat, all the while playing strategic games of diplomacy with Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

2 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 43.
4 Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 37.
6 Ibid.
8 McNamara, Britain, Nasser, 15.
9 Ibid.
10 Aburish, Nasser, 18.
11 McNamara, Britain, Nasser, 15.
12 Aburish, Nasser, 17.
13 St. John, The Boss, 62.
16 Nasser, Philosophy, 28.
17 Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 37
18 Kamrava, The Modern Middle East, 91.
23 Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution," 76.
24 Ibid., 78.
25 Ibid.
26 Aburish, Nasser, 59.
27 Heikal, Cairo Documents, 43.
28 Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution," 82.
29 Ibid., 81.
31 St. John, The Boss, 190.
32 Stivers, America's Confrontation, 14.
33 Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution," 83.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 84.
36 Aburish, Nasser, 102.
37 Heikal, Cairo Documents, 62.
38 Aburish, Nasser, 103.
39 Ibid., 107.
40 Ibid.
41 Heikal, Cairo Documents, 93.
Something's Gotta Give: The British Perception of the East Pakistan Crisis of 1971

ANNA-MAJA RAPPARD

"There will be circumstances in the future, as in the past, when independent nations which believe themselves to be threatened will appeal to their friends elsewhere in world for help. It would be foolish to claim that such appeals should always be refused as to pretend that they should always be accepted."  

- Edward Heath, 1969

In 1969, Conservative Leader Edward Heath laid out his view on British foreign policy. He wrote an article published in Foreign Affairs entitled “Realism of Foreign Policy,” in which he grappled with two conceptual frameworks: idealism and realism. Borrowing the words of Lord Palmerston from 1848, he noted that idealism was reflected in policies that presented Britain as “a champion of justice and right” around the world, while realism dictated the staunch adherence to the “eternal and perpetual” interests of the country.

Heath indicated that in the postcolonial era, idealism and realism could at times work fairly well together. However, he decisively concluded that in the future, British national interest would be the sole criterion for British foreign policy. Policy-making would shift to a realist approach and be marked by the determination to view others as neither permanent friends nor permanent allies. Heath became Prime Minister in 1970 when the Conservative party won the general election in a jolt against Harold Wilson’s two-term Labour government. From 1970-1974 Edward Heath would be in charge of leading the country in a new direction that was marked by the tenets of realism. The vision for Britain’s foreign policy he had laid out only two years prior was put to the test when the Indian subcontinent was faced with a major crisis in 1971.

The East Pakistan Crisis of 1971 refers to the armed conflict between India and East Pakistan against West Pakistan that resulted in the creation of the independent nation of Bangladesh. It marked a pivotal moment in the history of the subcontinent that not only changed the maps, but also presented Britain with a number of dilemmas. Confronted with a conflict between two
Commonwealth countries in which Britain still had substantial interests, one immediate consequence for Britain and the Heath government was Pakistan’s departure in January of 1972 from this very Commonwealth. It is also, however, set against the backdrop of the larger Cold War political climate in which the Heath government found itself increasingly at odds with the Nixon administration over the handling of the crisis, a charged political discussion about immigration at home, as well as the contemporaneous negotiations for Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community.5

Back in Britain the brewing conflict on the subcontinent did not go unnoticed. In his autobiography, Edward Heath acknowledges that the East Pakistan Crisis aroused “strong feelings” in Britain.6 The colonial relationship between the former British Empire and the subcontinent precipitated a deep-rooted relationship in the postcolonial era. After British rule ended in 1947, the economies of Britain and the subcontinent remained interdependent and the historical ties became a salient issue in the political sphere. Attracted by socio-economic prospects in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Britain was also home to a sizable community of South Asian immigrants by the 1970s.7 Heath went on to undercut his observations asserting “there was never the question, however, of outside interference in the internal affairs of an independent commonwealth country.”8 A cursory glance suggests that Heath’s account oversimplifies the crisis in South Asia as well as its implications for Britain’s foreign policy.

On the larger historical canvass, the South Asian scenario was embedded in the global Cold War. As the world’s superpowers became involved, the Soviet Union backed India and supported the Bangladesh liberation movement, while the United States and China allied themselves with the Pakistani cause.9 The “special relationship” between the United States and Britain may have prescribed a close Anglo-American cooperation, but the East Pakistan crisis proved to be sui generis. Unencumbered by the geopolitical approach to the conflict, which characterized the reaction of the Nixon administration, the Heath government produced a more nuanced response to the crisis, which demonstrated a greater appreciation of the regional dimension.10 After a brief period of neutrality, the Heath government pursued a policy divergent to that of its supposed partner, the United States, and decidedly tilted towards India.

The East Pakistan Crisis of 1971 prompted the Heath government to reassess the two strands of realism and idealism in their foreign policy towards South Asia. Conscious of the prevailing geopolitical sentiments and the historical connection to the subcontinent, Britain’s concurrent ambition to enter the European Community took precedence over British foreign policy and was a crucial influence on the approach to the East Pakistan crisis. British Foreign Office files will not only illustrate that the Heath government treated the East Pakistan Crisis with grave seriousness but also, that Britain perceived the East Pakistan Crisis as a postcolonial issue more than an episode in the Cold War. Eventually, Britain’s willingness to sacrifice its relations with Pakistan was spawned as much by Britain’s interest in India and Indira Gandhi’s diplomatic efforts, as it was galvanized by Pakistan’s conduct. As a result, the policy to abstain from outright intervention in the conflict was in line with a realist assessment of Britain’s more pressing national interests at the time. Rather than becoming entangled in a conflict that would embed Britain into a larger geopolitical crisis, the Heath government justified its pragmatic foreign policy within the terms of realism.

East Pakistan: a crisis waiting to happen?

The East Pakistan Crisis as a historical event is noticeably underrepresented in non-South-Asian historiography yet its implications for the subcontinent can hardly be overemphasized. The successful struggle for the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh in 1971 was ultimately brought to fruition by Indian intervention and marked the end of the “experiment of Pakistan.”11

![Figure 1: the two wings of Pakistan, 1947-1971.](image-url)
The state of Pakistan was ostensibly a true experiment in nation-making from the beginning. When the partition of India in 1947 produced the two successor states, India and Pakistan, the latter was split to constitute a two-winged state. A mere look at what the division of Pakistan meant in geographical terms lends credence to the terminology of "experiment of Pakistan": 1, 500 km of hostile Indian territory lay between East and West Pakistan (figure 1). The chief unifying feature, the glue to hold the two territories together, was understood to be a common religious identity. It is widely understood that the point of the partition was to create a homeland for Muslims, and therefore Islam was heralded as the paramount feature of Pakistani unity. Most of this religious demographic lived in the northwest region of India (later Islamic Republic of Pakistan) and in the northeast of former British India, known as the Bengal delta (later Bangladesh). The borders where thus almost surgically drawn to fit Muslims into the Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs into India.

As Willem Van Schendel, one of the premier scholars of the history of Bangladesh, has pointed out, there are three reasons why Pakistan was a special state: religion was supposed to cement a new national identity, Pakistan was faced with the challenge of administering two discrete territories, and Pakistan lost its administrative hub as a result of the partition in 1947. India inherited not only the capital of New Delhi and most of the civil bureaucracy, armed forces and police, but most of the colony's commercial resources and industries. Hence, from its inception as an independent nation-state, Pakistan faced peculiar challenges in establishing itself.

In the midst of these bleak preconditions, East Pakistan felt the artificiality of the unity of Pakistan in a far more tangible way than the West did. The dissimilarity between the two parts of the country was striking. Much like the territorial divide, the linguistic and cultural division between East and West Pakistan gave the initial impetus to what later evolved into the Bangladesh liberation movement. When the state of Pakistan was formed, the government ordained Urdu as the common national language. The linguistic homogenization turned violent in early 1952 when West Pakistan attempted to impose Urdu on the Bengali-speaking Eastern territory. Resisting the hegemonic approach of Urdu-speaking ruling class, protestors in the East were met by bullets and tear gas, which resulted in the killing of several Bengalis with hundreds more injured. These events propelled the East's struggle to celebrate its unique language and ethnicity and marked the beginning "of the struggle for independence." In fact, at this instance, the linguistic nationalism almost trumped a religious nationhood.

The Pakistani government had little understanding of the significance of these events however, and continued the repression of its Eastern territory. A striking imbalance in economic prosperity between the two areas further promoted the growing demand in the East for regional autonomy. To some extent, the relative prosperity was attributable to the financial support from outside. In the wake of the partition in 1947, Pakistan was a recipient of large amounts of foreign aid. According to a report by Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee publicized on the eve of 1971, the distribution of foreign aid across the two territories was subject to a tremendous imbalance. Western Pakistan had benefited at the expense of the East and the "income per head in East Pakistan was only two-thirds that of the West Wing, whereas at the inception of Pakistan the difference had been no more than 10 per cent." Economic prospects in East Pakistan were dire and this type of economic gerrymandering translated into a further disproportionate representation in the administrative branch of government.

The glimmer of national unity in 1947 had progressively become extinct in the two decades prior to the East Pakistan Crisis in 1971. Thus, the events immediately leading up to the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh were of little surprise. Stationed in Islamabad, the British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sir Cyril Pickard commented in 1971: "Over 24 years Pakistan has failed to find a national identity or a social purpose; and the whole basis and wisdom of the 1947 settlement is now in doubt." From national elections under military dictatorship to full-scale war

By the late-1960s, the experiment of Pakistan was in its final hours. Pakistan had been ruled under a military dictatorship since 1958. In that year, the Pakistani army staged a coup d'état and installed Ayub Khan as the new leader. Although a constitution was formally adopted in 1962, it unmistakably followed the mantra of an authoritarian regime: the constitution promulgated a distrust of the backbones of a functioning democracy, such as a representative government and popular power, and gave extraordinary power to the president. Struggling to define a unitary national identity that would transcend the territorial divide, the hostilities grew more entrenched and the attitude between the East and the West became increasingly uncompromising.
The repression of genuine democratic representation of East Pakistan’s electorate as well as firmly paternalistic policies towards the East flourished under the Ayub regime from 1968 onwards. When army men began running the government apparatus, power slipped away from the hands of East Pakistan’s elite. It had previously wielded power mainly through political mobilization, not through the army or bureaucracy. In fact, there appeared to be a perennial fear among Pakistani leaders in the West that there would be a disruption of national unity if East Pakistan obtained its democratic share of power. Feeling more like an internal colony of the West, the prospects of gaining influence at the national center was effectively unattainable for East Pakistan’s elite.

Ayub Khan was eventually forced to concede to mass unrest and hand over power to Yahya Khan in 1969. In order to address the acute tension brewing between the military and civilian political elite, one of Yahya’s first duties was to schedule Pakistan’s first national elections for December 1970. In a fateful stroke of power, the new president proclaimed that elections “were to take place on the basis of universal suffrage with a common vote in both wings.” This meant that East Pakistan was to be restored to the majority, which it had enjoyed in the Constituent Assembly from 1947 to 1955. The political elites in both wings of Pakistan initially perceived this as a promising gesture to bring the politicians back into the power equation. Even the British Minister for Overseas Development, Mr. Richard Wood, emphasized in an address to the House of Commons in May 1971 that, “the declared aim of President Yahya Khan has been the early transfer of power to a civilian democratic regime... I remain convinced today that the President was wholly sincere in his desire to establish a civilian democratic government.” When elections finally took place at the end of 1970, however, the effects were quite the contrary and the results merely exacerbated the country’s internal divisions.

The elections resulted in a victory for Bengali nationalism. As the economic disparity and political repression continued, Bengali nationalism had organized most potently through the Awami League. Established as the alternative to the dominating Muslim League of West Pakistan, it was headed by the prolific Bengali nationalist Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. In the elections of 1970 the Awami League won 162 out of 300 seats in the National Assembly. It captured all but two seats in East Pakistan but none in the West. Ali Bhutto’s influential Pakistan People’s Party, captured 81 seats, all of which were in the West with none in the East. Sheikh Mujib and the League had long campaigned on the basis of a program calling, among other things, for a large degree of autonomy in East Pakistan, with a relatively weak central government controlling only the defense and foreign affairs. President Yahya Khan suddenly faced Bengali nationalism as a force to be reckoned with. Although the power was still in the hands of the army, the two majority parties were pitted against each other in an unlikely match. Meanwhile, in the eyes of East Pakistan’s elite, it seemed as though the dream of gaining control of the autonomous state was within immediate reach. As Mujib and the Awami League assumed that they would soon head a new majority government and set out to work on a more democratic constitution. Bhutto and other West Pakistani politicians, however, demanded a share of power.

Britain’s Foreign Office monitored the situation in Pakistan closely as preliminary talks between the two majority parties stalled. Sir Cyril Pickard recalled: “The elections solved nothing. The very success of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman... made him a prisoner of his own extremists, and the lesser success of Bhutto in the West confronted him with an opponent less interested in a constitutional settlement than power through the ruin of Mujib.” The elections results only galvanized the tension between the two majority parties. In an unprecedented power play, Ali Bhutto announced that he would boycott the first session of the National Assembly, which was scheduled to take place on March 2, 1971 in Dhaka. Yahya Khan subsequently decided to suspend it altogether, which amplified the call for independence in East Pakistan. March 1971 became fateful month for the Bengal delta.

When Yahya Khan flew to Dhaka in a last-ditch effort to reach a political agreement, Mujib had successfully launched a non-violent movement of non-cooperation and Yahya’s efforts were to no avail. Earlier that month, reports had indicated Yahya’s determination to use the army in the event of an impending break-up of Pakistan. On March 25, he made true on his plan and ordered the army to launch a brutal crackdown to crush Bengali nationalism. According to Willem Van Schendel, “[i]t was a punitive operation to eliminate Bengali nationalism and reassert West Pakistan’s dominance over East Pakistan.” Despite the ardent resistance all over the Bengal delta, the death toll in East Pakistan rose dramatically and vast numbers of panic-stricken refugees flocked to neighboring India. Although the numbers are impossible to verify, Indian authorities reported that by May 1971 more than 1,500,000 refugees had arrived and that 60,000 new ones were coming in every day. By the end of the war these numbers inflated dramatically: a figure of 10 million refugees is usually quoted.
Meanwhile in Britain: initial reaction

While a conflict was brewing in South Asia, Britain was subject to palpable episodes of monetary crisis and industrial unrest. Besides the "outlandish fashions, cozy sitcoms, long-haired footballers and women in dungarees," the economic and political landscape of the 1970s is often cited as a particularly depressing, dreary period in British history.\textsuperscript{38} In 1971, one year into his premiership, Edward Heath had established himself as an unambiguous enthusiast for joining the European Community. In order to alleviate Britain from its economic constraints, the Heath government was eyeing the Common Market as a promising institution for a stable and prosperous economic future. Britain’s relative economic position had deteriorated badly after World War II and by the 1970s severe inflation and a dismal rate of economic growth, that left Britain falling by the waste line compared to its European counterparts, pressed the British government to consider drastic measures. With prevailing economic circumstances and Edward Heath’s long-standing determination, the application for entry into the EC was put on the top of the foreign policy agenda. Nonetheless, entering a European monetary union was a fiercely contested and controversial affair.

In the political realm, the project of joining the EC divided not only the British political landscape but also proved controversial among the six European members of the community. The notorious veto to Britain’s entry in 1963 by French President, Charles DeGaulle, had been a devastating blow to euro-enthusiasts in Britain. As a result, fostering a genuine, stable relationship with France and convincing the members of Britain’s commitment to the cause of European unity became a certain necessity from the outset of Heath’s premiership. Lord Douglas Hurd, Heath’s political secretary, summarized the government’s view in the following terms: “It was to the French that we should pay attention […] We must gain friends in France and outmaneuver our enemies.”\textsuperscript{31} This kind of determination did not resonate with the public. A Gallup poll in April 1970 found that just 19% of voters supported British entry, with more than 50% rejecting the idea of holding talks with continental Europe. At a time of socio-economic upheaval and despite the government’s pronounced ambition, it was clear that the British electorate did not agree on the need for Britain’s entry.\textsuperscript{32}

Nevertheless, despite this divisive atmosphere, formal talks with the members of the EC opened at the end of October 1970. The negotiations constituted a long, arduous process. Several months in, the prospect of a successful application becoming more defined and Heath declared in a television broadcast: “For twenty-five years we’ve been looking for something to get us going again […] Now here it is… We have the chance of new greatness. Now we must take it.”\textsuperscript{33} The mood in the ranks of the British government was deeply affected by the progress made on the European front. While EC negotiations unfolded in favor for Britain, the East Pakistan crisis was beginning to take shape. During this time, it appears as though the British foreign policy interests did not extend beyond continental Europe. However, Britain did not shut its eyes to the developments in South Asia.

When war clouds hung over Pakistan, Britain found itself scrambling to make sense of the developments on the subcontinent. Britain became more and more disconcerted over the situation. The British Minister for Overseas Development, Richard Wood, addressed the House Commons and commented on Britain’s foreign policy. He emphasized that, “the basis of our deep concern (is) at the loss of live and suffering in all sections of the East Pakistan community, in a country with which Britain and many people who live here have a great many ties, a country which is a fellow member of the Commonwealth and a country from which a great many people have come to live in Britain. It is because of these close ties, both past and present that we tend to be more concerned with a country such as Pakistan than with other parts of the world.”\textsuperscript{34} To a large extent, it was because of these deep-rooted ties and frenzied reports of the British news media that the Heath government acted swiftly in outlining its position regarding the situation in East Pakistan.

The British position was announced early on. On April 5, 1971, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home told the House of Commons: “Her Majesty’s Government has no intention of interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs and I wish to emphasize that this is our position. It is the people of Pakistan themselves who must decide their own destinies, and intervention from outside will only complicate a very difficult and distressing situation.”\textsuperscript{35} Given Britain’s efforts with regards to the EC, intervention in East Pakistan was the least favorable option from the outset – if an option at all.

Especially in the first stages of the armed conflict, reports by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) repeatedly painted a grim picture of what was happening on the subcontinent. As the violence intensified, the conduct of Yahya Khan’s army became a source of worry. In a report from the end of March 1971, Sir Cyril Pickard described that the Pakistani army “is acting with callous disregard for life and is adopting terror
tactics to cow the Bengalis. Political leaders are being hunted down and shot and I expect to find that much of the Awami League leadership has been eliminated.” In Pickard’s opinion, this rupture of violence paved the way towards an inevitable succession of Bangladesh: “I find it difficult to believe that the Army action and the response of the Bengali rebels will not create such bitterness that in the long run the two parts of the country will separate.” The Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca, F.C.S. Sargeant, later added to this observation. In an urgent report, Sargeant wrote: “the Army is acting in unrestrained fashion, wantonly killing and destroying and generally comporting itself like an Army of conquest … In the circumstances, any talk of a political settlement must be discarded as willful nonsense.” In keeping a close watch on the conduct of the Pakistani army, the involvement of India (and subsequent major powers) eventually prompted a sense of urgency in responding to the crisis.

August: enter India

By August, the crisis had moved to another stage. India began to put pressure on the Heath government as the consequences of the crisis became more perceptible. The refugees fleeing East Pakistan began to constitute an acute problem, putting a strain on India’s economy and relief capabilities. The Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, brought the refugee problem to the attention of the international community, which resulted in a tremendous outpour in international aid to India. Britain weighed in as well and “contributed £14 million of relief aid to India, the second largest donation after the United States.”9 In addition to the financial support, Gandhi reached out to Heath expressing her hope that “the power and prestige of the United Kingdom will be used to persuade the military rulers of Pakistan to recognize that the solution they have chosen for their problem with East Pakistan is unwise and untenable.” It was during this time that a shift in the British position towards India and away from Pakistan began to take shape.

News of the Yahya regime’s “ruthless conduct of was in Bangla Desh” were making headlines in Britain.41 Pakistani forces showed no sign of easing the crackdown on East Pakistan. Although the regime gave accounts that the situation in East Pakistan was under control, the British Foreign Office quickly dismissed those accounts as “wishful thinking.”42 The conduct of the Pakistani regime proved increasingly debilitating to Britain’s diplomatic efforts. The stakes of the crisis had also risen: India had become entangled in the conflict and Britain as well as other key players such as the United States had become financially involved in the conflict. Subsequently, there were more incentives for the Heath government to review its hitherto neutral approach.

Given the sentiments on the subcontinent, the possibility of a third military showdown between India and Pakistan was not unlikely. The two countries had a history of hostile engagements and full-blown armed conflict (i.e. the violent partition in 1947 and the war over Kashmir in 1965). India began to position its troops on its frontiers with Pakistan, allegedly as defense mechanism to fend off any provocation by the Pakistani army. There were also media reports that India was engaging in East Pakistan covertly, giving training to so-called “freedom fighters” (“mukhti bahini”), who engaged in guerrilla warfare against (West) Pakistani troops in Bangladesh.43 In an interview with a Reuters reporter in London, Gandhi was reluctant at first to answer whether she considered engaging in the East Pakistan on the basis of humanitarian intervention. When she was asked about the severity of tensions at India’s frontiers with Pakistan, she responded: “It’s very serious indeed. The two armies are confronting each other and of course shelling has been going on for quite some time […] when there is this sort of chaos which they (Pakistanis) obviously have, they may take desperate action and may feel that an external enemy may unite some of the people there.”

The new High Commissioner in Islamabad, J.L. Pumphrey, addressed the apparent impasse of the conflict and the heightened tension between India and Pakistan in a report to Douglas-Home in August 1971. “Four months later, four months indeed since the first claims that ‘normalcy’ has been restored, East Pakistan remains in disarray […] Pinned between humiliation and disaster, the President and his generals may prefer to go down fighting than admit defeat.”45 Informed by Pumphrey's analysis and thinking about the possible military showdown between India and Pakistan, the Assistant Head of the FCO’s South Asian Department offered a poignant assessment to Douglas-Home: “It may well be that we are approaching a new situation in which we have to evaluate where our future interests lie. We may conclude that our interest above all is to emerge from the present situation with a workable relationship with India intact.” In keeping with this, the Heath government decided to put tangible pressure on Yahya’s regime to end the violence. Hoping to avert further tension on the subcontinent, Britain restricted its arms sales to Pakistan to “non-lethal” weapons and curbed its supply of new aid until there was a “political framework into which to inject it.” This action
was not well received in Pakistan and in August 1971 there were initial signs of a growing Pakistani resentment towards Britain. While the FCO praised India’s conduct and restraint in the conflict, it reported that the Pakistani government warned to review its association with the Commonwealth. 48

The Indo-Soviet Treaty: enter the United States

“The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation” propelled the East Pakistan crisis onto the world stage. It was a treaty signed by India and the Soviet Union to formally acknowledge their “friendship, cooperation and peaceful co-existence.” 49 India moved quickly to enter this relationship, considering the mounting concern over East Pakistan and the threat of war that the situation entailed. According to a report by the FCO, India’s decision to turn towards the Soviet Union was a consequence of the warming relations between United States and China at the time. Since the Sino-Indian war in 1962, which had resulted in a military victory for China, India viewed its powerful neighbor on the northern frontier with great anxiety. Signing a formal treaty with the Soviet Union gave Indira Gandhi’s government a sense of security and strength, bolstering India to be among the powerful players in the region. From New Delhi, Britain’s Acting High Commissioner P.J.E. Male explained: “the Indian Government has convinced itself that no reliance can be placed on the United States, either to moderate Pakistani actions or to give support in any form to India if a war were started by Pakistan.” 50 When the treaty was formally acknowledged on 9 August 1971, the Cold War paradigm dominated the international atmosphere. As India and the Soviet Union drew closer together, the United States (now building its coalition with China) kept with its Cold War policy and strategically sided with Pakistan in order to counterbalance “the other” great power.

Unlike the Nixon administration, the Heath government reacted patiently to India’s decision to sign a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Instead of alleging an overarching ideological motive, the FCO interpreted the treaty within the terms of the “non-alignment” doctrine. 51 After all, Britain did not believe India to have “cut herself off from her friends and to be wholly committed to the Soviet Government.” 52 Scholars have argued that the Indo-Soviet treaty was to a large extent the result of the reappraisal of India’s foreign policy under Indira Gandhi; a foreign policy in which the improvement of India’s relation with the Soviet Union was bound to be an important element. 53 Britain’s judgment reflected this notion: in the eyes of the Heath government, the treaty was a logical progression of India’s positioning in the region. 54 President Nixon and his assertive Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, did not view India’s decision in such pragmatic terms. The Nixon administration rather pushed the view that the Soviet Union was stirring up trouble in the region.

The British government realized the growing seriousness to the East Pakistan crisis and knew that the United States would attempt to impress upon British foreign policy invoking the “special relationship.” Expecting further pressure from Parliament as well as the public, Heath requested “to see a paper canvassing, with the arguments for and against, the possible initiatives” open to Britain. 55 Acting High Commissioner Male gave a realistic assessment of Britain’s options and bluntly suggested: “We should...recognise that our ability to influence either the Indian or the Pakistan government is limited; and in any such action as we may take we should avoid taking sides with either part while recognizing the relative importance and strength of India.” 56

The White House was displeased with Britain’s handling of the crisis. The divergent policies of the two countries were addressed in hindsight at meeting between Nixon and Heath in Bermuda on 20 – 21 December 1971. When Nixon asked Kissinger to account for US policy towards the crisis, Kissinger explained that the conflict constituted a situation in which two weaker states, Pakistan and China, were pitted against two stronger ones, India and the Soviet Union. Challenging Heath, he went on to assert: “In that war [...] we supported the two weaker nations so as to restore the balance and prevent them being overwhelmed, which would have been against our own interests. That, if I may say so,” he added, “has been British policy throughout the ages.” Resisting the pressure from the National Security Advisor, Heath replied: “Henry [...] is of course historically correct, with one exception. We never supported the weaker partner if we thought that all three of us would lose. That is what would have happened in this last Indo-Pakistan War.” 57

Fourteen-day War

At the end of 1971, the tensions had escalated and India and Pakistan engaged in a full-scale war for the third time since the partition in 1947. On 3 December 1971, Pakistan’s army conducted strikes targeted at airfields in northeast India. Although Pakistan had gotten grants of licenses for arms purchases from several western countries and benefitted from the limited
resumption of military aid by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, the military balance in the sub-continent between 1965 and 1971 had shifted against Pakistan and in favor of India.\textsuperscript{35} The two forces were unequally matched in terms of their military capabilities and India quickly gained the upper hand. On 16 December 1971, the Pakistani administration crumbled and the army was forced to surrender at the hands of India’s sustained exercise of will. At the conclusion of the war, the new state of Bangladesh with seventy-five million citizens came into existence.

While relations between India and Britain experienced a marked improvement during the East Pakistan crisis of 1971, those between Pakistan and Britain were blighted. Defeated by its antagonistic neighbor, the Pakistani government announced that in the framework of the Commonwealth, Britain had adopted an approach of preferential treatment towards India. In Pakistan’s view the decision to recognize Bangladesh was an unfriendly act, which struck at the very root of the principles of the Commonwealth association and the respect for the sovereignty of its members on which it was founded.\textsuperscript{59} As a result Pakistan terminated its membership of the Commonwealth on 30 January 1972 and thus broke off one of its oldest international ties.

**Conclusion: international context**

When a new nation comes into existence, in a region that is of strategic interest, it does not go unnoticed by the world’s largest powers. The implications for the subcontinent were tremendous and far-reaching: Bangladesh was officially recognized by Britain on 4 February 1972.\textsuperscript{60} It was a victory not only for Bangladesh and India, but also for Britain. India’s ability to prevail in the conflict underscored the success of Britain’s pragmatic approach to the crisis. The Heath government had viewed the brewing crisis on the subcontinent within the framework of a postcolonial struggle. After all, the underpinning tensions between Pakistan and India largely stemmed from the legacy of British rule.

At the end of December 1971, the international community was faced with the reality of three independent countries in South Asia. In accordance with this development, the FCO prepared a draft outlining British foreign policy towards the subcontinent. The report addressed the repeated efforts by the United States to influence and alter Britain’s policy towards Pakistan: “It would be in British interests to resist this pressure, not only because the President’s [Nixon] policies seem inherently misguided, but because our compliance could easily be followed by another sudden switch in American policy which would leave us holding the baby.”\textsuperscript{61} Britain in the early 1970s had long departed from the ideal of being the chief perennial power in South Asia, leaving behind its legacy of empire. The Heath government recognized that its international responsibilities needed to be in line with its national capabilities. The country was in no position to insert itself overtly into the dealings between the two Commonwealth countries, nor was Britain capable given the prevailing economic circumstances. Despite the question of capabilities, Britain’s real interest lay in Europe.

The central foreign policy question for the British government in the early 1970s was one of how the wider canvass of Britain’s external relations would be related to its imminent membership of the EC.\textsuperscript{62} Britain’s resources were stretched and joining the European Community was seen as a more pressing ambition in order to restore some of the leverage Britain had lost after 1945. The FCO report went on to assess that adhering to the divergent policy of the US “would also damage a partnership with France which will be of great importance to us in other connections. Last and not least it would mean the sacrifice of our influence on India.”\textsuperscript{63} Successful application to the EC was contingent on a solid relationship with France. Damaging the relationship with France was therefore not an option. Edward Heath’s official biographer asserted that entry into the European Community took over almost all other foreign policy decisions made by the Heath government: “Ever since the wounding rebuff of 1963 he [Heath] had been unwavering in his insistence that for the sake of Europe’s future as well as Britain’s, it was essential that Britain should enter the European Community.” In 1973, Britain successfully joined the EC, a move Heath later identified as his “proudest hour.”

At the time of the East Pakistan crisis of 1971, the ambition to tie Britain to the European community was the raison d’être of a realistic foreign policy. Rather than an episode of passiveness, as the limited historiography may suggest, British foreign policy towards South Asia during the crisis in 1971 was clouded by the assertive policy towards Europe. The departure of Pakistan from the Commonwealth was indeed a major blow to the British-Pakistani relationship but it did not constitute an immediate threat to Britain’s national interests. In an attempt to manage a battered economy, uncompetitive with Britain’s European partners, and guided by Edward Heath’s enthusiasm for European integration, the project of joining the EC took precedence over an active engagement in the South Asian crisis and a concerted effort to keep
Pakistan in the Commonwealth. Given the concurrent national interests and the array of real concerns Britain had in the early 1970s, the East Pakistan Crisis of 1971 appears to fall into the logic of "something had to give."

2 Ibid., 39.
3 Ibid., 40.
4 Pakistan rejoined the Commonwealth in 1989.
8 Heath, *Course of My Life*, 528-62.
10 Simon Smith argues that the nuanced response of the Heath government "placed the British firmly on the winning side" of the East Pakistan crisis; Smith, *Coming Down on the Winning Side*, 463.
13 Ibid., 99-103.
14 The only other modern example of a religion-based nation-state is Israel, which was founded in 1948, a year after Pakistan; Even though West Pakistan was much larger territorially, 55% of the population lived in East Pakistan.
16 Smith, *Coming Down on the Winning Side*, 453.
18 Smith, *Coming Down on the Winning Side*, 453.
21 Ibid., 117-121.
29 Ibid., 163-164.
31 Ibid., 148-149.
36 Smith, *Coming Down on the Winning Side*, 454.
38 Letter from Seargent to Sutherland, 14 April 1971, FCO 37-883.
40 Smith, "Coming Down on the Winning Side", 454.
42 FCO 37/887, 1971.
47 Smith, *Coming Down on the Winning Side*, 455.
50 FCO 37/819, 1971.
51 The non-alignment movement was a group of states that considered themselves not to be aligned for or against one of the major powers during the Cold War. The notion was formalized at the Bandung conference in 1955. 52 Minute by Tomlinson, 23 August 1971, FCO 37/820.
53 Jackson, *South Asian Crisis*, 71.
God’s Chosen Outcasts: Medieval Leprosy and the Nature of Charity
SARA RONCERO-MENENDEZ

“Sweetest Sister, be not so afflicted! Do not imagine that it is for sins of my own that I am prey to these torments. Rather it is for the deceased, subject to long, excruciating detention in regions of penalty, and for the sinners of the world... Yes, while this penalty, as you see, is rapidly consuming me, it is also having the happy effect of releasing the living, of freeing the deceased...”

St. Alice of Schaerbeek, a young Cistercian nun diagnosed with leprosy in thirteenth-century Belgium, comforted her grieving sister with the words of this epigraph. Alice exemplified the isolated life of a leper and the redemptive suffering which kept her connected to her community. She and countless others afflicted with the disease chose to become involved with charity, which directly resulted in an increasingly benevolent societal attitude toward the leprous.

The rise of charity in Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries shaped both religious and secular attitudes toward leprosy. Although still marginalized in society due to longstanding beliefs concerning their disease, lepers were now regularly given alms as a result of this newfound philanthropy. They were a product of the changing times; lepers were now loved by the same society that had banished them in previous centuries. This duality of medieval communities’ attitude towards the leprous is echoed in the nature of the charity itself, in which the afflicted were both passive and active participants. They received charity so that others might gain absolution, and they were also believed to suffer the sins of those same individuals who were so generous towards them. The writings of Saint Francis of Assisi, hagiographers, and monastic orders show how lepers were portrayed in dual manners, both as the sinner and the benevolent, the despised wretcheds and the favored of God. Both of these roles were given and supported by their religious communities.

Lepers were exiled both because they were feared due to their contagious disease and despised because their presence threatened the social stability of Christian society. The leprous of medieval times were not considered human; rather, they were degraded into representing the worst in humanity, deepening their status as God’s chosen sufferers. When people were
diagnosed with the disease, they often completed their last rites from their local church and were given a figurative funeral before being banished by their community. Once ousted from their city walls, even lepers who managed to retain monetary wealth were powerless, often only being able to pay for residency in a leper house. They were considered dead, both spiritually and legally.

These attitudes were well rooted in religious and secular thought by the sixth-century, as shown in the *Moralia* in *Job*. Written by Pope Gregory the Great, the text discusses the biblical tale of *Job*, a wealthy, prosperous man who is put through a series of trials to test his faith, one of which is the contraction of leprosy. In Gregory’s analysis of the story of *Job*, he writes, “Lepers [are] a figure of heretics, for that they blend evil with good, they cover the complexion of health with spots.” Both the longevity of negative connotation surrounding lepers, and the long-standing belief that the disease corrupts the good, or rather, that the sins the disease stems from corrupt the soul, are the popular beliefs that would become imbedded in the medieval social structure.

Not all those who were regarded as lepers had actually contracted leprosy; many presented a range of symptoms, most notably skin rashes and sores, though they suffered other symptoms like black globs in the blood, fat or misshapen eyes, and difficulty breathing. It is probable that many who were diagnosed in fact had other ailments and diseases. Likewise, those who had contracted leprosy were not always publicly diagnosed as lepers, such as with King Baldwin IV of Jerusalem, also known as the “Leper King.” Baldwin IV’s doctors identified the signs of leprosy in the young prince, but under such immense pressure to find him healthy rather than bring shame to the crown, they diagnosed him with elephantiasis. It wasn’t until several years in to his reign that the symptoms were apparent enough for his health to be called in to question and ultimately he had to leave his throne.

Leprosy was commonly believed to have been contracted through sinning; the disease was a bodily manifestation of the corruption of the soul. Bernard of Gordon, a professor of medicine in Montpellier, France, wrote a detailed text concerning the diagnoses, symptoms, and cures for many major medieval illnesses. According to his account, leprosy could be contracted if the victim had sex with a menstruating woman, or was conceived while his mother was menstruating. A person could also become infected by breathing in pestilence, being near other lepers, or eating “melancholic food,” such as lentils, legumes, or the meat of game animals, such as hare or porcupine.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, lepers became recognized as deserving of charity, despite the prevalence of aforementioned beliefs. This significant change in popular opinion may have come from an era of prosperity in many areas in Europe, as well as an emphasis on the suffering of Christ in religious writing. One of the earliest indications of this charity towards lepers was in the Third Lateran Council, which occurred in 1179. Records of the council decreed that lepers should be provided with their own church and graveyard wherever there happened to be a significant number of them. The section discusses the idea of “Christian piety,” and “paying honor to our weaker members,” which could be interpreted as reform aimed in a more charitable direction, recognizing the giving nature of Christ in the Bible. However, at the end of the document, there is a line reads: “[However] we do not wish that what is granted [to the lepers] on the score of piety should result in harm for others.” From this additional wording, it is clear that the papacy still had the wellbeing of the majority of Christians in mind, and was not willing to expose the healthy to the extremely ill. It also shows how the fear concerning lepers had not disappeared, but was instead more subdued in comparison to the petition for charity.

It was also during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that the most leper houses and hospitals were built across Europe. Leper houses grew out of a similar movement as the leper churches and graveyards decreed by the Third Lateran Council, in that they were meant to give lepers places to live away from the general – and healthy – population. Most lepers who could not afford to stay in a leper house lived in autonomous communities outside of major urban areas, taking care of one another as well as relying on alms. By remaining outside of Christian mainstream society, lepers were able to live their lives without the stigma of fear and disgust. The hospitals were strategically placed along major roads or near cities, with an alms collection box on the side to attract any travelers. Lepers were ideal targets for spiritual charity from both individuals and monastic orders for several other reasons. Lepers, who were considered Christian sinners, were part of the “deserving poor,” a term that refers to an unwritten hierarchical structure specifying those beggars worthy of alms. This is what separated lepers from other outsider groups in the eyes of major Christian societies in Europe, such as Jews, Muslims, and heretics, whose beliefs were the roots of their alienation. The importance of spiritual charity towards the leprous was emphasized by their segregation from society as a whole. Their forbidden and diseased nature, along with their unique...
relationship to God, contributed to why they were considered worthy of spiritual and monetary alms. As such, those who chose to be charitable to lepers thought that their alms would help them in their own religious pursuits. The charity from saints and monastic orders would not have been so important and noteworthy had lepers been an integrated part of Christian society. This can be seen through various religious documents, including the biographies of St. Francis of Assisi and St. Alice of Schaarbeek, who used leprosy to emphasize their religious and spiritual charity, though they never dealt directly with the growing leper epidemic or their poor living conditions.

St. Francis of Assisi was a thirteenth-century saint who began a mendicant order known as the Franciscans after having an unexpected encounter with a leper. Despite the gruesome appearance of the inflicted man, Francis found unknown strength, discovering that “...when I left them that which seemed bitter to me was changed into sweetness of soul and body.”13 Francis describes the incident as the beginning of his “penance” in his Testament, which he dictated shortly before his death. By referring to it as such, St. Francis makes it clear to his followers that the encounter with the leper had brought him joy, as well as closer to God. But, in the same manner as his hagiographer, St. Francis never discusses the suffering of lepers, only the personal religious and spiritual benefits one receives for showing charity to them.

Francis’s hagiographer, a friar named Thomas of Celano, wrote about St. Francis’ work with the leprous, including the abovementioned encounter, with several additional details. One such detail was the fact that St. Francis kisses the leper, an aspect the saint may have chosen to disregard in his own Testament. Another described the mystical aspect of the leper disappearing in plain sight.14 The act of kissing a leper not only shows charity, but is also a sign of intimacy and respect and was a common form of spiritual altruism, performed by key figures including Queen Matilda and St. Catherine of Siena.15 After the kiss, the leper is said to have disappeared completely, proof of the miraculous powers of humility and charity.

But unlike Francis’s own works, Celano’s goal is not to highlight the lepers themselves or a need for humility when interacting with them, but rather to emphasize the holiness of the saint. This was not an uncommon practice during this period; several tales of religious figures, or miraculous events included lepers as the central figures, though only as stand-ins for a person spiritually connected with God. In this case, the lepers were portrayed as the symbols of sin, as well as those who were connected to God through their suffering, and could help the charitable achieve salvation.16 One example of this is in the Dialogus Miraculorum, where a fictional, nameless bishop attempts to act charitably towards a leper, but the leper will only accept the bishop’s tongue to remove the putrefaction from a dangling piece of his nose.17 The bishop reluctantly agrees, and once the deed is done, the leper transforms in to Jesus Christ. This fable shows not only the lengths which people would go for salvation, but also that there was an understanding by the leprous of their position within this model of absolution and spiritual charity. Lepers had the option to deny the charitable, or to manipulate them into performing deeds or giving them alms.

Towards the end of St. Francis’ life, he expressed the desire to “return to the service of lepers and be despised by the world as he had once been.”18 This comes at a point when he yearned to return to his humility, and to begin again on a quest of virtue, “for a reward in the eternal.”19 It is implied by Thomas of Celano that working with lepers was considered a despicable job, even for the religious, though whether this is a reflection of medieval Italy or a way to stress St. Francis’s selflessness is unclear.

The common theme in both of these texts concerning St. Francis is the emphasis on salvation for those who are charitable towards lepers. St. Francis believed avidly in humility towards the poor and ill, writing in his Early Rule for the Franciscans, “[Monks] must rejoice when they live among people [who are considered to be] of little worth and who are looked down upon...the sick and the lepers.”20 Thomas of Celano writes that St. Francis begins his career as a monk living in a leper colony, “serving them all with the most loving care for God's sake, washing all the filth from them and even wiping the pus from their sores.”21 The diction chosen, including, “filth,” and “even wiping the pus,” shows contempt for the lepers and emphasizes what repulsive conditions the saint had to work in, stressing his great humility rather than the illness itself. Thus, the importance of the leper in this context is not because of their unique suffering, but because meekness meant a place in heaven for the charitable.

St. Francis spoke in great detail of the physical human body and its relationship to the soul, a theme also present in the hagiography of St. Alice. He wrote about the sinful nature of the human body, and how it should be despised: “We must hate our bodies with [their] vices and sins...”22 In one of the works he presented to his monks, entitled How To Discern Whether One Has The Spirit Of The Lord, he writes that is it impossible to know this by looking at a person’s body “since the flesh is always opposed to every good.”
The discussion of the physical body is especially important with the subject of lepers, because it is believed that leprosy was a physical manifestation of the corrupted, sinful soul. The body is thought to be the perpetrator of sin, an entity that is imperfect until the day of final judgment, though it is the soul that is sullied by these wrongdoings. The emphasis placed on this detestation by both St. Francis and Villers stresses the idea of the body as sinful, and therefore portrays both St. Francis and St. Alice as holy because of their rejection of the physical.

It is because of St. Alice’s rejection of the body and its pleasures that God gives her leprosy. With this endowment she chooses to serve as an active participant in spiritual charity, rather than merely accept it passively from others. St. Alice, occasionally referred to as St. Alice the Leper, joined the Cistercians at the age of seven when she entered a convent in the Belgian town of Schaarbeek. Arnold II of Villers, her hagiographer, describes her as an intelligent, humble young woman who joined the convent to escape the superfluous secular world. She was given leprosy by God, not as a punishment but rather because God loved her, and wanted her to ascend to a high seat in heaven through suffering. She exemplifies the charity and suffering of the leper, but also the sanctity and sacrifice of the saint, blending the two roles into a new Christian entity: the ailing and suffering figure, reminiscent of the afflicted Christ.

St. Alice is resigned to a life of solitude, condemned to live in a hut behind the church with her blood sister, Ida. It grieves her to be separated from society in this manner, despite having a close personal connection with God. But, in time, she discovers a way to remain connected with the society that shunned her: redemptive suffering. Redemptive suffering is defined as a spiritual service, in which one person suffers for the sins of another to absolve the latter, whether dead or alive. This practice was not unique to St. Alice; there are several other female saints who used redemptive suffering to bring themselves closer to God and to aid others, including Lutgard of Aywières, who fasted for seven years, and Christina of Stommeln who claimed to be tormented by demons.

Through redemptive suffering, St. Alice was able to maintain ties with her religious community, and appear as a charitable nun performing a specialized service for her church rather than a victim. Villers notes several different occasions when she suffers for the sins of others for a predetermined period of time, such as when she gives a year of suffering for a dead man who is defined as an “oppressive nobleman.” By doing so, she becomes a charitable figure who people respect and pray to, rather than loathe and detest from afar. Through this newfound purpose, Villers writes, “...if left to her to choose to have her former health, she would have refused it...even if opting for her health would allow her the same sublime glory [of God’s love].” St. Alice would rather suffer through the impure body to achieve salvation, using her pain as a connection to God, than live as a healthy, charitable nun.

By portraying lepers as the charitable rather than the victims, St. Alice, and to an extent Arnold II of Villers, redefines the utility and experience of the leper as redemptive suffering rather than punishment. Though not all lepers suffered for the sins of several different people during their illness like St. Alice, nonetheless her life acts as a microcosm of how societal views toward the afflicted evolved from disgust to ideas of personal salvation. They were still considered corrupted by the disease; a woman in the local church claims she saw St. Alice burning in the fires of Hell, a physical manifestation of the suffering she was going through because of her leprosy. But it is through this redefinition that lepers are able to gain somewhat of a position of respect, to become passive (by receiving charity so that the charitable may be saved) or active (redemptive suffering) participants in religious charity.

By the fourteenth-century, charity towards the leprous disappeared from medieval texts, returning them to the status of villains, sinners irredeemably punished by God. Many leper houses were shut down, and the Order of Saint Lazarus either disbanded or became inactive, shown by a lack of evidence of any further records concerning the group, financial or religious. The reason for this regression is mostly unknown and it occurred over a small number of years. One of the earliest examples of the return negative views of lepers involved a conspiracy in the summer of 1321. It was believed that lepers, Jews, and foreign Muslims were planning to poison the water of the kingdom of France in order to kill or infect the entire population. The widespread belief of this obviously groundless conspiracy would not have been possible had it not been exploiting some underlying fear, as well as various natural misfortunes that plagued the area in the years prior. While it is true that the same outlook on lepers had remained the norm during the era of increased charity, this false account would have been much less believable among all the charity which had been done for and by lepers.

This return to the shunning of lepers continued into the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. “The Testament of Cresseid,” a fifteenth-century Scottish narrative poem written about the character Cressida and the fate that befell
her, from Geoffrey Chaucer’s poem “Troilus and Cressida,” by Robert Henryson, proves the existence of this continuing trend. In it, Cressida commits an adulterous act and is sentenced by the ancient gods to become a leper, a punishment she will suffer unto death, and when she awakens, she is immediately taken to a leper house.33 “The Testament of Cresseid” presents a realistic scenario in fifteenth-century Scotland and proceeds to explain Cressida’s fate, like that of every leper, is one of isolation and solitude, and the prejudices she faces due to her new status, reminiscent of those suffered by lepers in the tenth-century.

Living as a leper in medieval Europe was a difficult burden to bear. Lepers were social outcasts, abandoned by their family and friends, devoid of power, and detested not only by Christian society, but also by the civilized world at large. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, lepers became an object of salvation and redemption through a surge of charity; lepers were God’s chosen sinners, cared for by the society that despised and feared them. Some participated in charity passively, such as receiving alms and other charitable actions in order to allow the donor salvation, as seen in the texts of St. Francis and Thomas of Celano. Others were more active – notably St. Alice – using leprosy to become the charitable, rather than the victims, and to reconnect with their religious communities. Though this change was brief, ending between the late thirteenth century and the early fourteenth, it provides a unique look at the nature of both the medieval leper and structure of charity.

---


10 Ibid, 40.
11 Elma Brenner, "Recent Perspectives on Leprosy in Medieval Western Europe," History Compass 8, no. 5 (2010): 397.
12 Sharon A. Farmer, Surviving Poverty in Medieval Paris: Gender, Ideology, and the Daily Lives of the Poor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 34. Also, it should be noted that while religious influence did play a part in who was considered deserving of charity, there was also the question of how believable the beggar was, and how likely it was that the affliction was actually real.
14 Thomas of Celano and Christopher Stace, Thomas of Celano’s First Life of St. Francis of Assisi (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2000), 22.
16 Ibid, 183.
17 Ibid, 184.
18 Thomas of Celano and Christopher Stace, Thomas of Celano’s First Life of St. Francis of Assisi (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2000), 104.
20 Ibid, 117.
21 Ibid, 21.
22 Ibid, 70.
23 Ibid, 31.
25 Ibid, 10.
‘Rum and Blood’: Harper’s Weekly and the Nineteenth-Century Portrayal of Irish-Americans
GRACE E. SHAY

Squeezed in between rows of figures detailing household income and ethnic demographics, the number of Irish-Americans in New York City at the turn of the new millennium could easily be overlooked: out of the eight million or so City residents in the year 2000, a respectable but hardly staggering 420,810 residents claimed Irish ancestry, or roughly five percent of the City’s whole population (see Figure 1). Yet 150 years earlier, the percentage of Irish in New York was much, much higher: in 1850, with New York City’s total population at 515,547 persons, the Irish made up nearly 26 percent of that number. Of course, only five years before that 1850 census, the onslaught of the Great Famine had caused a massive exodus from the Irish homeland; by 1851, the Irish influx reached a high of 163,000 arrivals. In total, from 1820 to 1860, nearly two million Irish arrived in the United States, with 75 percent arriving after the potato famine. In New York, in particular, “the immigrants were soon predominantly Catholic and, reflecting worsening conditions in their homeland, drawn more and more from the laboring classes.” As social demographics changed and the principally Irish- and African-American area of Five Points gained a reputation for notoriety, crime, and underhand deals, mainstream publications catering to a middle-to-upper-class Protestant readership reflected the emerging caricature of the Irish in America as violent, alcoholic, and even animalistic. Led by the New York-based Harper’s Weekly, the magazine and newspaper culture of the late nineteenth century implemented a compelling visual method to attract readers—the combination of lurid text and captions with equally striking illustrations and political cartoons. This strategy, new to American journalism in the 1800s, bolstered competition among publications while boosting audience engagement with their content. As a result, cartoonists like Thomas Nast increasingly portrayed Irish Catholics with exaggerated, animalistic features to boldly underscore both traditional stereotypes and the socio-political problems of the era: namely, the perceived lifestyle of blindly-devoted, violent “Papists,” and the governmental concern with the rise of Catholic parochial schools.

Harper’s Weekly, which ran from 1857 until 1916, had long been regarded as the preeminent nineteenth-century American illustrated news...
magazine of the period. From a methodological standpoint, then, in which illustration becomes a reflective tool of history, Harper's and its images aimed to both create and reflect public values and sentiments of the mid-1800s; therefore that magazine's portrayal of Irish Catholics must reveal a microcosm of some common perceptions of the American literate classes.

One popular image of Irish Catholics in New York revolved around an exaggerated trifecta of mob violence, animalism, and alcohol; while alcohol had commonly been "an explanation for social problems during the nineteenth century," there is "no satisfactory explanation of [its] alleged association" to the Irish. Nonetheless, in Thomas Nast's image entitled "The Day We Celebrate," from the April 6, 1867 issue of Harper's Weekly, Nast, himself a staunch German Protestant, utilized striking images of drunken, heavy-jawed, square-jawed Irishmen (including several Irish children, who appear to be mere shrunken versions of the adults) fighting the nattily-uniformed New York police officers (see Figure 2).
The Irish, all of whom were depicted with pronounced underbites that accentuate phonoelological facial differences from the apparently “white” policemen, wield broken bits of wood and spear-like metal and literally stomp on their opponents; the outnumbered police officers are equipped with useless wooden batons. Various objects – including several potatoes, in a tongue-in-cheek reference to the staple of Irish food – are thrown around in the air. Nast captioned this scene of primal violence with these phrases: “St. Patrick’s Day 1867. Brutal attack on the police. Irish riot.” And on the outer edges of the image’s frame, Nast wrote in stark capital letters: “RUM. BLOOD.” In this scene, it appears that the Irish were the perpetrators of the violence, and in this context, Nast tied together several stereotypes of the Irish: in the midst of nationalistic festivity, the drunken Irish turn bloodthirsty, unable to celebrate peacefully or humanely.

A similar portrayal of Irish Catholics from May 7, 1870, entitled “Roman Catholics Disgracing Themselves,” ran alongside a brief news article describing the “severe violence” directed towards a former nun who turned against the Church (see Figure 3). The woman, a “Miss Edith O’Gorman,” was likely herself Irish, but “has renounced the faith, and now lectures on her experience.” Interestingly, the text itself was simply a reprint of a news item from the New York Sun, but Nast’s image, created expressly for Harper’s, features an imagined scene of violence unfolding in front of the terrified woman, Miss O’Gorman, who peers out her carriage. Four square-jawed Irishmen are at the front of a dark, massive mob; a squatting Irishman peers up at the carriage; another man holds an exploding pistol, while ancillary figures wield long, sharp knives resembling those of a butcher. The tone of the article itself is agitated, as “the crowd yelled madly, and were [sic] about to tear the lecturer from her carriage... Curses, disgraceful language, and all kinds of abuse found authors in the mob.” When paired with Nast’s cartoon, the intent of this piece is undeniable, especially as it presented the archetypical scene of a vulnerable, defenseless female attacked by an imprudent and unreasonable male mob: the Catholics (who were essentially interchangeable with the Irish) were again viewed as violent, unthinking, and inhumane, and deadly serious about anyone who attempted to “expose” their faith.

From the 1870s until the end of that century, another “Irish problem” arose, one that perhaps overshadowed the aforementioned perception of the violent Irishman: the rise of Catholic parochial schools and seemingly unrestrained “papalism.” Historically, Protestant lawmakers such as former Governor of New York John Jay had “unsuccessfully fought to deny civil rights to Catholics until they renounced the authority of the Pope and declared ‘false and wicked, the dangerous and damnable doctrine that the pope, or any other earthly authority, have [sic] the power to absolve men from sins.” As a result, Catholic schools appeared to be an extension of such absolute devotion to the Holy See; while such concerns were national issues, Protestant New Yorkers especially criticized Catholic schools as the parochial movement first began with the Irish-born archbishop of New York, John Joseph Hughes. Hughes “recognized that Irish immigrants came to New York relatively unchurched, and... the array of Catholic institutions that Hughes and other clergy created, particularly parochial schools, cemented the bonds between the laity and the church.” Hughes particularly tried to assert the development of parochial schools, which later became “significant community institutions in the 1860s and 1870s, as they nurtured both Catholic piety and Irish ethnic
identity.” Indeed, in an attempt to shelter impressionable Catholic schoolchildren from the “secular” public school system, parochial education was often race-exclusive.

Of course, Thomas Nast and Harper’s Weekly covered this issue, reflecting the contentions between Protestants and Catholics as they argued over funding, theological direction, and control in schools. In one of Nast’s most widely reproduced cartoons from 1871 (which was later reprinted in Harper’s in 1875), “The American River Ganges,” Nast depicted a corrupted clergy in the form of vestment-clad crocodiles, slowly crawling out of the water towards groups of innocent Anglo-Saxon children, who clutch the Bible or pray on their knees, eyes lifted towards the heavens (see Figure 4). Nast’s attention to detail and symbolism is exquisite: in the background, the façade of New York’s notorious Tammany Hall appears to mimic the architecture of the Vatican, complete with vaulted domes, the papal pennant, and a skull-and-crossbones flag; to its left, it is connected to a building with the sign “THE POLITICAL CATHOLIC SCHOOL.” In the image’s middle ground is a decrepit, decaying building marked “U.S. Public School,” flying a tattered, upside-down American flag. At the far right, at the edge of a cliff, two men, representing the corrupted Tammany Hall politicians, lead a handcuffed Columbia, representing freedom, to the gallows to be hanged. Several other Tammany Hall politicians appear to be dropping schoolchildren off the side of the cliff to be fed to the clergy-crocodiles approaching the shoreline. Of particular note are the faces of the Protestant children—they have realistic, emotion-filled visages with distinctive features, whereas the crocodiles are all uniform and foreboding.

As a comparison, another Nast cartoon also from 1871, “Don’t Believe in That,” portrays a beady-eyed, cassocked bishop hovering over a group of scowling, square-jawed Catholic children as they kick and desecrate a book entitled “The Holy Bible in Our Public School” (see Figure 5). The children’s faces here are all similarly drawn, and male and female faces are virtually indistinguishable save for their clothing; a working-class Catholic girl wearing a skirt and a cross necklace brandishes a flag and rosary beads. Nast’s caption reads, “What the Irish Roman Catholic Children will be told to do next. ‘Kick it out peaceably!’” This cartoon suggests that the Catholic clergy is manipulative and sneaky, and conjures up no sympathetic emotions for any of the persons portrayed. With both “River Ganges” and this cartoon, Nast masterfully used each image to reinforce stereotypes and a particular message by simultaneously demonizing and humorizing the Catholics. By portraying the Catholics as so animal-like and identical, Nast suggested the possibility of the foreboding image of numerous, nameless “papists” attempting to overtake the American education system. Yet at the same time, the images are so absurdly ridiculous that the Catholic threat seems trivial and even puerile.

A parallel issue in New York at this time was the concern, based in misinterpreted Catholic doctrine, that the Pope orchestrated all Catholic efforts and could potentially harm the cherished American institution of democracy. In fact, while reinforcing this Protestant fear, “in the debates over religious freedom,” Republican politicians often fought, however unsuccessfully, “to deny civil rights to Catholics until they renounced the authority of the Pope.” As detailed in “The American River Ganges,” the idea of the Pope as a central authority was an affront to the American value of liberty, and Nast explored this idea in his 1872 illustration, “Our Foreign Ruler (?)” In this
image (see Figure 6), the second-generation Irishman Francis Kernan kneels at the feet of a pot-bellied Pope, stating that “I will do your bidding, as you are infallible.” Kernan’s top hat, on the floor next to him, contains a paper titled “Orders from the Pope.” Kernan, a Catholic Democrat and a former New York state senator, was running for governor of New York at the time of the illustration’s publishing. Nast cleverly invoked Catholic theology (that is, “infallible”) to suggest Kernan’s blind loyalty to the Pope in the possibility of his successful election. As an added detail, in the background of the image, the Pope’s secretary holds a sheaf of papers, which state some pressing concerns of the period: “Down with the U.S. public school. Vote as Catholic. The Bible must be out of the public school.” Yet Nast’s image did offer his readers a sense of redemption, however, with the deliberate question mark placed in a set of parentheses as his illustration’s titular caption: this move suggests that voting Americans had the powerful choice, the possibility, to prevent the perceived blatant Papism and foreignness. Needless to say, Kernan’s bid for governor was unsuccessful.

Nonetheless, while Nast’s illustrations were often filled with propagandistic iconography and politically-motivated symbolism, not all of Harper’s Weekly’s content, particularly that of the later nineteenth century, was quite as politically-charged, and satirized instead the typical occupations of a New York Irishman. For example, throughout the mid-1800s, the Irish established themselves in New York City by taking on municipal jobs as policemen and firefighters; by the end of the American Civil War in 1865, they “held firmer control on the machinery of the municipal government” and “came to be even more prominent” in the police force. Despite this prevalence, the Irish Catholic immigrants of the nineteenth century also
became as a source of humor because, in addition to their homeland accents, they “were for the most part socially and economically handicapped. Many were illiterate...and some were more fluent in Irish than English.” To that end, in a recurrent section of Harper’s entitled “Humors of the Day,” a joke from 1875 acknowledged the craftiness of a stereotypical illiterate Irishman, one “Patrick Murphy,” who attempts to join the New York City police force. The police commissioner asks the applicant to demonstrate his writing skills, so Murphy writes down the only thing he can – his name, in a practiced “coarse hand.” When some of Murphy’s “Irish competitors” for the job cunningly urge the commissioner to request another written phrase, this exchange occurs:

“Pat, write my name.”

Here was a dilemma, but Pat was equal to it.

“Me write yer honor’s name!” exclaimed he, with a well-dissembled holy horror – “me commit forgery, and I a-goin’ on the pelisse! I can’t do it, yer honor.”

And there the joke ends, although it is revealing on several levels. The pronounced Irish inflections stand in contrast to the more-educated commissioner’s English, especially in terms of former’s garbled syntax. On a meta-level, the audience of Harper’s Weekly must have felt some sense of superiority for being a part of the educated reading class, as they were quite literally reading a code that many immigrant Irish could never truly crack. Furthermore, the Irishman here is equally incompetent and savvy; the anonymous humorist perhaps suggests a sense of tempered respect for Murphy’s off-the-cuff response. In a historical context, interestingly, this joke appeared in Harper’s only eight years after the publication of Nast’s image of the brutal St. Patrick’s Day riot, and only five years after the “Disgracing Themselves” article. In the earliest cartoon, the Irish are pitted directly against the police, yet this joke demonstrates the shift in Irish occupations, and demonstrates how “the neighborhood cop was one of the most visible ‘Irish’ occupations in late-nineteenth-century New York.” As the Irish began to permanently settle their families in New York City, the formerly-common portrayal of mobs and violence began to reconcile themselves with the undeniable Irish ties to the police force.

In the late nineteenth century, as the Irish stereotype began to shift away from the negative, Harper’s too underwent a shift in illustrative and editorial style, as William A. Rogers assumed Thomas Nast’s role as the magazine’s resident cartoonist in 1877. With Nast’s departure, Rogers began a quarter-century-long association with Harper’s, illustrating cartoons that “never quite approached Nast’s in power,” but offered ideas more “strongly presented and [with] his drawing somewhat more skillful.” One of Rogers’ images of the Irish appeared alongside David A. Curtis’ 1889 article “A Stroll through South Street,” in which the author describes a visit to “the very foci of material civilization,” the famous Fulton Market and the South Street Seaport (see Figure 7). Curtis reflects upon “the puff and snort of steamers along the wharf line, in the weather-beaten inadequate wharves piled high with the treasures of commerce – in all these are to be recognized the grandeur of man’s activity, the very spirit of civilization itself.” Along the way, he comes across “picturesque characters around the markets,” from the “Chinamen” to the “longshoremen,” from the “professor of tattooing” to “a modern Ruth.” Curtis takes care to point out an amusing conversation he has with “a burly Celt, whose whiskers look pickled and whose garments betray his calling.” Interestingly, Curtis not once refers to this particular fisherman as an “Irishman,” or a “Catholic,” or a “Papist” – Curtis instead calls him “our Mileisian friend,” in reference to the mythological Irish-Celtic people. Curtis’ description is all together genial: “a twinkle in his eye invites a question,” the author notes, and while he transcribes the Irishman’s speech as pronounced with a typical brogue, the words are more or less comprehensible: “Oi’m hukkin’ fur the lobster’s name, sorr,” says the Celt, who searches for “a few indistinct marks resembling badly blurred printed letters” on the inside of each lobster’s leg. “They have the quarest names – Pat an’ Pete an’ Jim, an’ ah sarts. Luk!”

Rogers’ accompanying cartoon of the burly Irishman demonstrated a marked difference in portrayal: instead of exemplifying violence or exaggerated humor, the Celt wears a shabby seaman’s jacket while holding up a giant lobster, as if in the process of searching for its name. He sports a full, white beard and moustache, and his Santa-Claus-like face, although kind, reveals the ridges of age. Rogers’ Irishman is portrayed as an individual enjoying the quotidian pleasures of his trade: for once, the image of the Irishman is not confined to a riot within the dramatic scenes of a news item, but rather, is turned to gaze directly upon the reader, almost invitingly.

Indeed, with the departure of Thomas Nast from its pages, Harper’s later representation of the Irish resorted less to overwhelmingly-negative generalizations, no doubt precipitated by the socio-political assimilation of the
Irish in New York City’s municipal government. While Curtis’ article and Rogers’ corresponding cartoon still reinforced nineteenth-century stereotypes of Irish accent, dress, and manner, the angle of this article’s packaging did not disapprove of these stereotypes, but rather accepted the Celt’s eccentricities as part of the cultural vibrancy of the port. In particular, Rogers’ detailed, humanized illustration underscored the singularity of Curtis’ Irish subject, a distinct contrast to the mobs Nast had so vibrantly depicted. Furthermore, the portrayal of Curtis’ “burly Celt” is emphatic in its report of the quirks of a single Irishman; perhaps it was because the author looked at

this Irishman in the context of the port’s “endless series of such oddities” that the Irishman suddenly did not seem so jarring or primeval. The waterfront environment of this article seems to facilitate in Curtis’ acceptance of the different types of persons he encounters; the waterfront itself is “a haughty triumph of human skill over the conditions of nature,” and from the earliest days of the Port of New York, has served as a welcoming and gathering place for countless races and classes of people.

3 Ibid., 91.
5 Bayor and Meagher, The New York Irish, 61.
7 Ibid., 81.
8 Ibid., 82.
10 Thomas Nast, “The Day We Celebrate,” cartoon, Harper’s Weekly, April 6, 1867, 212.
11 For more on the racial “science” of phrenology in the Irish, see Bayor and Meagher, The New York Irish, 141.
13 Loc. cit.
15 Ibid., 103.
16 Loc. cit.
A little before noon on April 23, 1968, around four hundred students gathered at the south end of Columbia University’s Low Plaza, waiting for members of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to kick off a rally that was predicted to culminate with a demonstration in the school’s Low Library. The Student Afro-American Society (SAS) – the black student radical group on campus – was for the first time officially allying itself with SDS, and its members stood close by, ready to lead the action. On the higher levels of the plaza, around three hundred counter-demonstrators watched and waited. Forty-five of them formed a picket line carrying signs with slogans such as “Order is Peace.”

At the same time as the rally was going on, David Truman, vice president of the university, offered SDS leader Mark Rudd a letter stating that the target site of the protest – Low Library – had been locked. The letter appealed to Rudd to end the demonstration and have the entire group meet with him to discuss its issues in McMillin Theatre, the largest auditorium on campus. Rudd read the letter aloud to the waiting crowd and laid out the demonstrators’ options: the students could agree to talk to the administration, they could hold a demonstration inside McMillin “with chanting and picketing,” or they could move to take over Low Library anyway. It was decided that the demonstration would continue and the rallying students surged towards the library, though they discovered it was in fact locked when they arrive, its doors reinforced by security guards. Rudd lead another deliberative session and it was decided that the students would move to occupy the construction site for the university’s new gym. While three hundred students headed to the construction site, two hundred remained on campus, congregating once again by the Sundial. Students at the construction site were met by police, and a few scuffles broke out.

Again the demonstrators were deterred, and headed back towards campus. They united with the other students, and finally decided to occupy Hamilton Hall, a building that held several administrators’ offices. Once inside students settled in and turned the building into their political, educational, and cultural base. They collectively developed a list of six
demands to lay the groundwork for the protest, decorated the walls, and in the days ahead went on to give speeches, perform live music, and exchange food and ideas. When Dean Henry Coleman entered the hall, students decided to seize upon an opportunity for leverage against the administration. Rudd said “now we’ve got the Man where we want him...he can’t leave unless he gives in to some of our demands,” and declared Dean Coleman a hostage.

The student occupation of Hamilton Hall would last for the next seven days, with students, faculty, and community members drifting in and out throughout the week. By the second day over a thousand students and their allies were camping out in university buildings. Police had been congregating outside of the buildings since the protest began, but the “bust” did not come until a week later, when they stormed the campus at two-thirty in the morning. Michael T. Kauffman, a New York Times reporter who was covering the confrontation, reported in a later synopsis of these events that despite witnessing no initial resistance from the students, the police began punching, kicking, and beating students and faculty members with clubs. He wrote that by dawn, 148 people were taken to emergency rooms with injuries, 720 students had been arrested, and that 120 charges of police brutality were subsequently filed.

Six years prior to this, in 1962, a group of 59 young intellectuals had gathered in Port Huron, Michigan to collaboratively draft a manifesto for the Students for a Democratic Society. By April 23, 1968 students on Columbia University’s campus were rallying with a new energy; they were vocally criticizing administration policy, barricading themselves in buildings, holding the assistant dean hostage, and refusing discussion with the university administration. For SDS members, these newly militant protest tactics offered new possibilities. A slogan was circulated: “Create two, three many Columbias.” But to some, SDS’s new art of confrontation seemed to have strayed far from its foundations in participatory democracy. Herbert A. Deane, a professor of government at Columbia University at the time of the April 23 protest, wrote in his reflections on student radicalism:

Again and again one is struck by the posture of complete self-righteousness and of unyielding moral absolutism in the attitudes and actions of the radical leaders (...) Radical students, who, not so long ago, were among the strongest supporters of civil liberties and freedom of expression for all (...) have on some recent occasions abandoned these libertarian principles and resorted to the use of force to prevent those with whom they disagree from exercising their freedom to act and to speak.

In the wake of the Columbia uprisings, some journalists and analysts argued that the collective spirit that was born with “The Port Huron Statement” ended when violence and confrontation were adopted as the means to change. Historians too lay out SDS’s development through the 1960s as a transition from protest to resistance to revolution, with each period being marked by new tactics as well as new ideologies. Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz argues that the student radical movement offered youth an opportunity for “a radical community with a sense of collective meaning and purposeful action,” but that this sense of power through collectivity was part of an optimism of the early sixties which came to an end as “the new left turned angry.” However, to chart the rise of SDS’s guerrilla tactics at the death of its ‘libertarian principles’ is to create too linear a story. The initial democratic ideals of the SDS manifesto propelled some students towards deliberation as it drove others towards revolutionary aspirations. The notion of participatory democracy had an enduring value. As James Miller argues, there was something pervasive about the political activism and counterculture of the 1960s — “a shared spirit: fluid and amorphous, impatient and impassioned, obsessed with the new, the unprecedented the unthinkable, and willing to try almost anything to realize it.” Miller argues that it was this collective spirit that signified the decade, and it was this spirit that survived when the decade came to a close. It is this collective spirit that took on a more tangible form in SDS activity of the late 1960s. As Horowitz describes, during those years SDS participated in great violence, confrontation, and redeﬁnition — but in contrast to her claim that participatory mentality was lost, it seems that mass protest in the late 1960s demonstrated great promise for the persistence of this ‘collective meaning.’

So what, in the end, was the fate of participatory democracy in the final years of the student radical movement? The interactions and changes occurring on Columbia University’s campus during the April 1968 student uprising offer a look into the perseverance of this collective meaning. The protest at Columbia University was a deﬁning point in the formation of SDS’s new revolutionary tactics, but it was also a time of great democratic participation. The Columbia protest saw a new eﬃcacy of the student radical movement in bringing this spirit of collectivity into reality. At Columbia, SDS organized the potential for change on a very accessible level, enabling the movement to gain broad campus support, and sucessfully stirring students out
of the complacency that SDS founders worried the student body had fallen prey to. By arresting the typical function of the university, the demonstration provided for an open forum upon which new voices could lay down their own aspirations and list their own demands, and where students could re-appropriate the campus as a mean to their own ends. Rather than seeking reform through negotiating the current structure of authority, SDS members sought change through the legitimization of collective agency. The Columbia demonstration saw a performance of the cooperative ideals of participatory democracy, which roused students out of apathy and instituted an environment in which students could live democratically, and where political agency was acted out through the power of participation rather than identification with a particular political issue. Though the protest was disruptive to standard university operation, it did not have destructive potential. The protest illustrated that confrontational protest tactics could achieve status for collective meaning, and that the organization of mass dissent could be responsible for positive initiatives and new agency.

The list of SDS complaints at the start of the Columbia demonstration was significant and stretched in scope from the university’s construction of a gym on community land to the administration’s cooperation with the Institute for Defense Analysis. These issues, however, worked mainly as rallying points for mass support. From SDS’s point of view, the most significant item on the agenda was the students’ “right to protest,” and amnesty for students punished for prior protests. The right to protest actually signified a few different rights: the right to dissent, the right to disagreement with the status quo, and most importantly, the means by which students would make their voices heard and thus achieve power. When SDS demanded the right to protest it both publicized the manipulative tactics of the university administration and established the notion that student dissent could no longer be silenced through any means.

In the weeks prior to the April demonstration, SDS’s protest tactics had been heating up. The organization – following the initiative of its new leader, Mark Rudd – had been putting into play a new set of confrontational protest tactics. As Rudd described them, confrontational politics “puts the enemy up against the wall and forces him to define himself.” On March 27 of the same year, some radical SDS students had staged a protest in Columbia’s Low Library employing these disruptive politics. The protest was centered around SDS members presenting the administration with a petition signed by more than fifteen hundred students and faculty demanding the school break its ties with the Institute of Defense Analysis, a non-profit that provided weapons evaluation and conducted research for the Department of Defense. Because of widespread anti-war sentiment on campus this issue had been a strong rallying point for SDS, and had been an ongoing point of contention between radical students and the university administration. Though the issue was not new on March 27, the students’ protest tactics were. The protest itself consisted of about a hundred students roaming the corridors of the building for an hour, chanting, using bullhorns and being intentionally disruptive to office activity. Though the tactics had become the approach of only the more bullish students on campus, the protest itself represented an issue that was of concern to the majority of the student body (a student referendum showed that of 5,500 polled, 3,500 favored an end to ties with IDA). While the administration failed to legitimately address the students’ concern, it did use its authority to put the six student leaders of the protest on probation, and defined protest inside university buildings as legitimate grounds for punishment. For SDS members, this disciplinary action looked like repression.

As SDS saw it, the administration had no right to judge student dissent. Further, the administration was in the wrong for its refusal to offer students open hearings, as it preferred to keep disciplinary matters clandestine. In SDS’s earlier years – before it adopted tactics of resistance – students often made appeals for representative power in the decision-making processes of the university, but gained little acknowledgment from the administration. The students’ powerlessness seemed inescapable: they lacked sufficient representation in the governing bodies of the university, and though SDS appealed for greater student representation in the decision-making processes of the university, they had little leverage and thus achieved little success. SDS members were exasperated by their inability to respond to the needs of the student body. It saw university policy as designed to suppress student dissent, and the lack of publicity on these issues further perpetuated feelings of student powerlessness. Until the spring of 1968, a weight of political seriousness had existed among students, but SDS’s aspirations had lacked agency and visibility.

During the Columbia demonstration SDS’s rhetoric no longer conveyed this sense of inadequacy. The demand for the right to protest became a question of legitimizing students as a political body with an agency separate from that of the administration. Radicals wanted to be recognized as a legitimate political body so that they could affect university functions in a
meaningful way. The protests of April 1968 signified a leveling of the planes between the administration and the students. SDS was saying that the university had no right to judge or punish students, and students, by joining in the demonstration, were showing that their voices could no longer be controlled. SDS declared that it refused to be restrained by punishment, which utilized fear to achieve cooperation, discourage dissent, and keep students feeling powerless. The campus was open to a free reign of criticism from all bodies. Students were achieving power through the publicity of their collective spirit.

Penalties for student organizing also hindered the legitimacy of collective organization as a political weight. SDS was well aware that mass struggle was necessary to advance their objectives. A proposal put forward in collaboration between SDS and the Student Afro-American Society stated that only the first demand on their list—the demand that disciplinary action be lifted and amnesty granted—was non-negotiable because, as the leaflet says, “we only say, ‘stop threatening us [demonstrators] and we’ll talk to you’.” Student radicals wanted to confirm that their collective status offered them a new power to negotiate. The administration’s failure to grant amnesty or recognize the student need for it was in part a failure to recognize that the question of amnesty was inextricably tied to the occupation of the buildings. Both the building occupation and the demand for amnesty asserted the power of the collective student struggle, and implied that the agency of the students could no longer be manipulated or controlled. While earlier SDS appeals to the administration—signed petitions and student reports—had gone unacknowledged by the administration, the April 23 strike could not be ignored. By collectivizing themselves, students had already demonstrated their own agency, and opened up the campus to debate between equal powers.

While SDS’s rhetoric had unique potency, it was not the only voice on campus during the Columbia protest. A significant aspect of the demonstration was that it was not characterized by a uniform rhetoric. The demonstration threw the campus into such a precarious position that it inclined students of different political persuasions to speak up about what they valued most. In the wake of the protest, students who criticized SDS’s guerrilla tactics expressed resentment of SDS’s suppression of other student voices on campus. However evidence indicates that, to the contrary, the function of SDS’s demonstration was to effectively open up the campus to voices and forms of dialogue that would not have been heard had campus life gone on as usual. Students demonstrated a refusal to be apathetic. A group called Students for Columbia University (SCU) expressed opposition to SDS actions. SCU thought of the demonstration as a tragedy that marked the transition of Columbia’s campus from rationality to chaos. In a flier it circulated around campus, SCU asserted its disapproval of the breakdown of campus function, but also went further to acknowledge their aspirations for what the campus could be: a place where the university community could engage in rational discussion while acknowledging other students’ varying objectives.

Though students disagreed with SDS’s confrontational modes of communication, it is important to acknowledge the equal assertiveness with which groups stepped up to defend their own hopes for the institution. Columbia students were far from the apathetic student body SDS lamented in “The Port Huron Statement” as they stepped up to represent themselves. While criticizing SDS’s methods, their actions promoted the participatory democracy that SDS’s manifesto described through their refusal to be idle at a time of change. Student constituencies circulated fliers expressing specific aspirations and demands. Some supported SDS’s objectives but framed the struggle using their own terms. The Columbia University Student Council issued a disparagement of the university administration for its “desecration of the spiritual and moral bonds that constitute this university, and consider that, by this action, the present administration has forfeited its legitimate authority within this institution.” The Student Afro-American Society (SAS) printed a leaflet in collaboration with SDS declaring, “Want we want,” which went on to define the nature of the administration’s racism as they saw it, to detail specific acts of university violence towards the surrounding community, and to criticize the hypocrisy of the administration in its response to militant student protest. Students opposed to the strike protested the demonstration from outside the occupied buildings. The majority of black radical students sought their own methods of protest, and occupied a separate building from SDS members.

Even SDS split into factions—those in favor of politicization versus those in favor of confrontation. There were many divisions of the student body, but each constituency acted as its own body and carried its own political weight. The campus was filled with different voices, each with their own list of demands, and each acting according to their own specific agency and beliefs about what the university could be. The writers of “The Port Huron Statement” had feared that students were being kept quiet by powerlessness, but during the Columbia demonstration student voices were released in a shower of discourse, marking a new reign of student presence. SDS’s refusal
to cooperate with the normative power structure opened the campus as a forum for dissent, and to new student voices coming up from below.

As student groups on campus gained new political power, individuals also arrived at new agency. Individual students saw the opportunity to discover their own political presence, feel part of a democratic society in which they had a role, and educate themselves on issues relevant to the society in which they lived. Some students caught on the outside of the SDS-occupied buildings during the demonstration found ways to scamper inside while the occupations were underway. In Paul Cronin's film A Time to Stir, which shows documentary footage and audio recordings of the Columbia protest, one student explains, “students would enter the buildings and become political.” While what was happening inside the buildings ranged from “political education” to “bullshit,” the essence of what was happening was that students were implicating themselves as political entities, as people who were both part of and affected by the politics and function of university life. What James Miller describes as “a shared spirit,” 38 may have been produced through what students at Columbia called “a sort of electric awakening” that occurred during the demonstration. SDS had criticized university classes for their lack of relevance to “America in crisis,” and, to right this wrong, SDS members organized what they called “liberation classes” to be taught on campus during the demonstration. Such classes put to rest the standard university class structure of paternalistic intercourse for a more open, democratic and participatory form of dialogue. Students played a role in organizing discussions, and chose the subject matter of their education. The New York Times portrayed Columbia radicals’ objectives as an attack on the university, but the liberation classes showed that students were opposed to the system and policy of the university, not to the creation of an educated public body. Liberation classes and the “becoming political” of students were further proof that radicalism was responsible for more than destruction. Students demonstrated that, left to their own devices and their own agency, they had the potential to produce a progressive and inclusive network of social and political education and engagement, owned and operated by the students themselves.

In the midst of this participatory spirit, students presented the notion that large constituencies could be effective in bringing about specific forms of change. The existence of the demonstration indicated that even a system as resistant to change as the university had the potential to be seriously reckoned with. It was an ideology of alternative, in combination with the acquisition of broad student support, which worked to characterize the spirit of the demonstration and legitimize the mobilization of student radicals on Columbia’s campus. SDS not only disrupted the function of “business as usual,” but also established a prolonged use for the energy of radical mobilization as a continuous critical presence on campus. The Columbia protest aided the notion that a massive body of proactive individuals could mobilize their own means to change. Further, dissenters were not confined to working towards change from within the current system, but could take free reign in constructing a new route towards their objectives. For SDS, part of the importance of achieving amnesty was to prove that radicalism did not deserve punishment. By demanding the right to protest, SDS legitimized an alternative to the status quo through the notion that radicalism was a fair and just force, and was not wrong or destructive simply because it was opposed to the prevailing system. SDS implicated criticism as a necessary force in a democratic forum. Members worked to provide alternative vocabulary for the student movement in order to provide it with self-determination. Students adopted the phrase, “Up against the wall, motherfucker,” because, as SDS chairman Mark Rudd described it, “when young people start calling those in power, the people whose places we’re being trained to fill, ‘Motherfucker’ you now the structure of authority is breaking down...finally we could say in public what we had been saying among ourselves.” There was a new sense of liberation, and a new public expression of private aspirations, drawn out through the potential of an alternative way of life on campus.

In the spirit of the alternative, SDS held its own “counter-commencement” ceremony at the end of the academic year in May 1968, which offered a more meaningful departure for the radical student body. Attached to the back of the invitation to this ceremony was a leaflet that posed reflections on the demonstrations and critical questions to the university administration:

Last month several thousand Columbia students stopped their business as usual and joined in a nationwide strike of high schools and universities. Yet now, look around...the walls are scrubbed clean and the baby blue banners of Alma Mater have covered the signs of last month’s demonstrations. Are you trying to show our parents that nothing happened in May? WHY?

...And now – even as we leave the university – Columbia continues to ignore our requests. If there is to be commencement at all, then that commencement must be meaningful...and it will be meaningful, if we as students act together.
The counter-commencement brought concrete vision to the theory of “collective meaning.” In the wake of the April demonstration, SDS saw the potential for meaningful change coming not from the university, but from the collective agency of students. The counter-commencement stood as an illustration that the radical student body had taken on a function of its own. The administration, which had brought an end to the April demonstration by calling in the police in a desperate and violent final resignation, had re-appropriated the campus with the probable hope of also re-appropriating ownership of campus rhetoric. But the radical movement refused to be controlled by the return to the status quo, even if all physical traces of the demonstration had been covered up or removed.

SDS President Carl Davidson wrote in 1966 that “Participatory democracy is often like a chronic and contagious disease. Once caught, it permeates one’s whole life and the lives of those around (...) It is my hope that those exposed to it...will never quite be the same.” Participatory democracy proved to be as pervasive as Davidson had hoped. What remained amongst radical students was a new affinity for participatory action and mass dissent. At Columbia, SDS continued to put the pressure on the administration through the fall of 1968 and into 1969, following the call for “two, three, many Columbias,” and – in the organization’s words – continuing “to put the ruling class up against the wall.” This new radical spirit was no longer hindered by the threat of punishment, as student radicals understood that part of their struggle was to change the system responsible for issuing such punishments. SDS rhetoric remained in the spirit of revolution and demands for amnesty also continued, signifying the relentless importance that student agency be recognized. In the months following the demonstration, Grayson Kirk, university president, resigned, and construction of the gym was suspended. Although there were few significant administrative policy changes in the wake of the demonstration, members of the press and parents began to recognize the student body as a crucial and powerful sector of society.

In the midst of revolutionary resistance tactics, there had been a loosening of campus rigidity that enabled the cultivation of an enduring critical perspective from the outside. While prior student rebellion had worked from within the system seeking reform, or from an underground status where it kept to its own constituency, this new student radicalism achieved visibility, challenged the system head on, broke down the status quo, and provided alternatives for individuals who disagreed with the prevailing authority. By acquiring political agency, individuals escaped apathy and alienation and kept alive the notion of power through participation.

In part, what the Columbia protest demonstrated was the endurance of participatory democracy as a social and political ideology. Some historians, such as Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, argue that the endurance of the student movement was also the movement’s death. She writes that by the 1970s, protest was seen as normal and “the 1960s became banal.” But in the case of SDS, persistence did not signify failure. Although radicalism may have quieted on college campuses following the end of the 1960s, the power of grassroots dissent did not decline, even as it became more commonplace. Andrew Hunt argues that the 1970s saw the dawn of new dynamics of resistance, which became more decentralized and tapped into new local constituencies. He writes that “radicalism in action and philosophy supplanted liberalism” and describes the way groups such as Vietnam Veterans Against the War took on the role of radical mobilization in the 1970s: “The organization could boast everything that SDS claimed” – including chapters across the country, broad social programs, and powerful critiques of capitalism. Radicalism in the form of mass protest remained influential as a means of social and political critique, and as a base for participatory democracy to live on in ideology and in action. While in 1962 those who drafted “The Port Huron Statement” worried that Americans were in “withdrawal from public life,” the forms of protest undertaken by SDS and other participants of “the Movement” in the 1960s, worked to bring a public conscience to a more personal level, stimulating voices of dissent and implicating political agency. Though these voices of dissent have changed rhetoric, constituency, and subject matter, they have never gone back underground.

2 The gym’s construction had been a controversial issue on campus, often dubbed “Gym Crow” to signify students’ feelings that the gym was unjust – to be built on community land while unlikely to benefit the residents of Morningside Heights, the majority of whom were black. The gym issue had been one of several ongoing controversies between student radicals and the university administration that paved the way for the April 23 rally.
3 Avorn, Up Against the Ivy Wall, 52.
4 Cronin, A Time to Stir.
5 Avorn, Up Against the Ivy Wall, 49.
13 “Want We Want,” 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.
14 “Defend the Right to Demonstrate,” 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.
15 Avorn, Up Against the Ivy Wall, 33.
16 Ibid., 17.
17 Ibid., 18.
18 Ibid., 21.
20 Avorn, Up Against the Ivy Wall, 11-12.
22 Cronin, A Time to Stir.
24 “The Columbia Statement,” September 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.
25 “Want We Want,” Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection, Tamiment Library, NYU.
26 Cronin, A Time to Stir.
28 Avorn, Up Against the Ivy Wall, 12.
29 “Why SDS?” October 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.
30 “Students for Columbia University,” 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.
32 “Columbia University Student Council,” 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.
33 “Want We Want,” Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection, Tamiment Library, NYU.
34 Cronin, A Time to Stir.
35 Avorn, Up Against the Ivy Wall, 30-32.
36 “The Port Huron Statement.”
37 Cronin, A Time to Stir.
38 Ibid.
39 Miller, Democracy in the Streets, 6.
40 Cronin, A Time to Stir.
41 “SDS Committee of Correspondence,” undated; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.
42 Cronin, A Time to Stir.

“The Port Huron Statement.”
There…and back again?: Cultural Exchange in the Boniface Mission
EMILE YOUNG

"Miseremini illorum, quia et ipsi solent dicere: 'De uno sanguine et de uno osse sumus.'"1 With this phrase from a letter dated to 732-741 A.D., Saint Boniface exhorted the English people to take interest in the conversion of the Continental Saxons. Yet this was more than a simple call for missionary support – this was Boniface at his best, attempting to re-script the kinship between Anglo-Saxons and (according to Boniface) their Continental “brethren”. This ideological creation of a Germanic identity had previously been employed by Bede and Ecgbert – the former authored the Ecclesiastical History of the English People, thus creating an “English” identity, and the latter attempted to lead a mission to the Continent in 689 – yet the recognition of this campaign in Boniface’s correspondence is essential to an understanding of the mid-eighth century Anglo-Saxon mission to the Continent.3 In 716, Boniface participated in an abortive mission to convert the Frisians along the North German shore. Political turmoil in the region, however, hindered the missionary effort. Following this failure, Boniface launched his most prolonged missionary attempt in 723, this time focusing on previously converted parts of Bavaria, the goal being to reinforce ecclesiastical authority and to eliminate the unorthodox, non-Benedictine elements which had slipped into the Christian Bavarians’ worship. During this time, he established a firm relationship with Frankish rulers and founded the see of Mainz. In 754, Boniface again attempted a mission to Frisia and, once again, the mission failed as Boniface and his party were attacked and killed by the as-yet-unconverted Frisians. These facts of Boniface’s life can be gleaned from the proliferation and preservation of primary sources from this period. Indeed, due to this wonderful array of sources, much scholarship has been content to look no further to determine the impact of the mission than what Boniface explicitly states in his letters or what the authors of his Vitae promoted.

The first crux in understanding the Boniface mission is the concept of an “Anglo-Saxon mission to convert Germanic pagans” – an idea propagated by Boniface himself in his letters (as in the excerpt cited above) and taken up by the anonymous author of the Vita Altera Bonifatii, possibly writing prior to the 830s.4 Curiously enough, this missionary angle is not as emphasized in other renditions of Boniface’s Vita by Willibald and Liudger, as both hagiographers choose instead to highlight Boniface’s role in monasticism, particularly his establishment of the see of Mainz. Indeed, Boniface’s contemporary Alcuin touches on the saint in passing within the Vita Willibrordi only to mention his role as an administrator rather than as a missionary martyr.5 From the disparate approaches to Boniface’s life even within a generation of his activities, we can see that the narrative of the Boniface mission to “Germania” is much more complicated than is suggested by Boniface’s correspondence.

In fact, despite this proliferation of epistolary, literary, and biographical sources, the nature of exchange in the Boniface mission to the Continent remains largely misrepresented by both literary scholars and historians alike – matter which must be clarified to further understand the cultural milieu of both eighth century Anglo-Saxon England and Francia prior to pinning historical events and literary works to this period. On this subject, historians have, as a general whole, shied away from positing a two-way exchange. Writing on manuscript transmission between England and the Continent, Rosamund McKitterick focuses on the exchange of ideas between nun’s scriptoria in England and Francia, ostensibly through the connection from insular Whitby to Continental Chelles to Jouarre. She proposes, however, that the similar “insular” hands in the manuscripts of these three convents derive not from a common teacher but from exemplars being passed around to start new convents. Since the “new convents” would invariably have been in Francia, McKitterick delineates a one-way transmission of exemplars from England to Francia.6 In her other articles examining insular and Continental manuscripts, McKitterick has focused mainly on insular modes of transmission in the Frankish empire.7 Here, again, her focus is one-way. This is not meant to belittle McKitterick’s achievements in any way, for she has done much to open up the dialogue for insular transmission to the Continent. But the question remains: is there evidence of materials or ideology being brought back from the Continent to Anglo-Saxon England? James T. Palmer does not think so. He writes that “the Anglo-Saxons ‘back home’ were not much interested in their exports—there were, for example, no vitae written in Britain about the missions.”8 While this statement primarily concerns Anglo-Saxon interest in the mission, Palmer’s remark on the lack of vitae written relates to my question regarding the exchange of physical materials in implying that there was no exchange.

Yet while Palmer and McKitterick seem hesitant to posit that there was a two-way transmission, the existence of this exchange seems almost
taken for granted in literary circles. Though Wilhelm Levison states that "the continental mission was regarded as a national undertaking of the whole English people," a seemingly neutral statement, he is elsewhere attributed with favoring an exchange based on the shared Germanic heritage. Writing a few decades after Levison in 1967, Larry D. Benson demonstrated how the sympathy for Germanic pagans evident in Beowulf is the same sympathy that inspired - and was produced by - the continental mission. He noted that the mission was prompted in part by recognition of the kinship between the Anglo-Saxons and the continental Germanic peoples, who were considered gens nostra, 'our race.'

Though this statement is circular in logic, it serves here to illustrate that a two-way exchange has been posited and accepted by scholars on some level: certainly literary scholars wishing to fix Beowulf to an early date have taken this reciprocal Germanic kinship idea in stride, accepting that it is a result of the Anglo-Saxon missionary activities in Germany. Indeed, this conjecture is widely accepted enough to even flavor some historians' views in the past few decades: in addressing the cultural milieu which produced the Bonifatian missions, Frank Barlow enlists the aid of Beowulf, stating that "In a similar way, the religious heroes, the missionaries, men like Columba, Augustine, and Boniface, went out to slay dragons, although of a different kind: they went to overturn the heathen idols in the temples and destroy the pagan gods [...] Britain of the seventh and eighth centuries was a land it for heroes to live in." These views have been most recently restated by literary scholar Leonard Neidorf in his forthcoming paper. It is true that the mission might have captured the Anglo-Saxon imagination - the wealth of manuscripts and missionaries (both men and women) sent abroad attest to an Anglo-Saxon interest - yet how much of this was motivated by sympathy for their "pagan brethren"? And even if materials and manpower were sent abroad, is there evidence that the missionaries brought back a sympathetic attitude towards pagan culture? As we can see from the circular logic through which Benson arrived at his conclusion that the Anglo-Saxon mission produced a cultural milieu in England receptive to pagan customs, the problem of taking a two-way exchange for granted is quite troubling - more so, in fact, when juxtaposed to the seemingly ironclad claims of a one-way transmission.

For this reason, I wish to re-examine the nature of exchange between Anglo-Saxons and the Continent, for the Boniface mission plays a central part in the development of both Frankish and Anglo-Saxon cultures in the eighth century. Despite the dissenting scholarly opinions on the nature of exchange in the Boniface mission, I believe a two-way transmission can be proven if extratextual evidence is taken into account. Especially of interest is evidence of this exchange in the writings of women who aided and remembered the missions. My choice to focus on women is no accident or whim, for they constitute a clear subgroup in the Boniface mission. Though it would be best to examine the question of exchange from all possible angles, this is not possible based on the scope of this paper. Instead, I will perform a case study using women as a subgroup in the Boniface mission.

My first reason for focusing upon women lies in my choice of primary sources: the letter corpus known as the Boniface correspondence. Despite the proliferation and preservation of primary sources I mentioned above, most of those sources circulated only on the Continent. Since this paper examines insular-Continental exchange, it would make sense to start with a source that was circulated both in England and on the Continent during the eighth century. The only source which fits this criterion is the letter corpus, which by the nature of its genre was sent from Continental writers to insular recipients and vice versa. Within this corpus, which exists in six separate manuscripts, are letters from Boniface to both men and women and associated letters sent by Boniface's disciples. Though Boniface's letters to men outnumber his letters to women, the men he addressed range from Anglo-Saxon kings to abbots to popes—hardly a homogenous set of characters. On the other hand, all of the women correspondents were abbesses, acquainted with Boniface, and live within a generation of one another. Furthermore, as Christine E. Fell points out, "Of the letters written by women that do survive from the Anglo-Saxon period, by far the most illuminating and informative are the much earlier ones that form part of the corpus known as the Boniface correspondence." Indeed, much of Boniface's "personal communication" is to these women. While women may seem the least of all contributors to the mission—all the women were not present in the field converting pagans but rather in monasteries located in previously converted areas—they were, in fact, personally invited by Boniface to join him in Germania. Indeed, he names them among the "soldiers of Christ of either sex." A second reason for my focus, however, is slightly more abstract: as Elizabeth van Houts proposed, women play a role in safeguarding memory.

For instance, in focusing on "women preserving the past" rather than just being informants or witnesses for hagiographies, Van Houts cites ninth century laywoman Dhuoda and Empress Judith (b. 805-d. 843), both of whom impress the patrilineal lineage upon their sons with the hopes that through
preserving the memory of their ancestors, their sons can prove their legitimacy when contending for inheritance.\textsuperscript{20} Van Houts also mentions women who commissioned histories and had historical works dedicated to them as evidence of women’s role in preserving memory. Writing farther back in time than the period covered by van Houts, Barbara Yorke discusses Anglo-Saxon origin legends, noting that, “Female costume may have encoded the myth of a common origin that helped to enforce group identities within these broad provinces.”\textsuperscript{21} In this case, Yorke demonstrates how women implicitly preserve, create, and cultivate memory in an Anglo-Saxon context.

Even more pertinent to this current paper is the dedication of Rudolf’s \textit{Vita Leobae}, which reads, “The small book which I have written about the life and virtues of the holy and revered virgin Leoba has been dedicated to you, O Hadamout, virgin of Christ, in order that you may have something to read with pleasure and imitate with profit.”\textsuperscript{22} While this dedication makes no specific mention of “memory,” the imperative to Hadamout to “imitate” indicates the physical action of perpetuating the memory of Leoba. Also worthy of note is that in their correspondence with Boniface, the women are asked time and again to remember or pray for Boniface.\textsuperscript{23} Though these injunctions may be built into the rhetoric of epistolary style, this fact makes them no less significant. In fact, these injunctions take on more significance in this case, for their integration into letter-writing vocabulary indicates that the interplay of women and memory is a fixed idea in the minds of medieval correspondents. As such, women are not only recipients of Boniface’s letters but also active caretakers of the memories of his missions. Though only a few chosen women participated alongside Boniface in his missionary efforts, they maintained his connection to his insular home.

Returning now to the nature of exchange, it is of interest to note the manuscripts which circulated on the Continent containing parchment prepared in a Continental manner bearing insular script or vice versa. After all, such artifacts tantalizingly suggest the existence of a viable dialogue between England and the Continent. In his 1943 Ford Lectures, Levison presented some of the earliest scholarship in English concerning such manuscripts.\textsuperscript{24} While Levison posited Anglo-Saxon centers of production, Rosamund McKitterick has disputed this in her more recent work. As McKitterick has conducted several close studies of this subject, I will only summarize her findings in passing: McKitterick concludes that while she can group insular-Continental texts by their similarities, she cannot establish any definitive categories since even in insular centers of production there were a plurality of hands. Rather, she would define these as “religious communities where individuals made their distinctive contribution according to their original education and training.”\textsuperscript{25} In short, we should not be quick to surmise that an insular hand means an Anglo-Saxon center of production or even an Anglo-Saxon scribe. This relates closely to McKitterick’s argument cited above concerning nun scriptoria sharing a common exemplar. Though we cannot prove without a doubt that there were Anglo-Saxons at these scriptoria, we can still see these as centers of general insular-Continental conflation of manuscript writing at this time as techniques from both regions were in use simultaneously. As can be seen from the influence of Anglo-Saxon hands in Continental scriptoria, there is at least one-way transmission. Indeed, these scriptoria seem like the melting pot needed to produce two-way transmission. Yet none of the manuscripts – so far as we know – made their way back to England. Or, short of whole manuscripts, there is no evidence that Continental manuscript production methods were practiced at this time in England. The evidence for manuscripts sent from England to the Continent, however, is far more promising.\textsuperscript{26}

For, not only did Boniface request his female correspondents to pray for him, but he also requested from them various materials ranging from vestments to manuscripts. In his letter to Eadburga, abbess of Minster in Thanet, Boniface writes, “I beg you further to add to what you have done already by making a copy written in gold of the Epistles of my master, St. Peter the Apostle, to impress honor and reverence for the Sacred Scriptures visibly upon the carnally minded to whom I preach.”\textsuperscript{27} A cursory reading indicates that Boniface requests a manuscript from Eadburga. A closer reading reveals that this is not the first time Eadburga has copied out a text for Boniface, and that he considers her to be competent enough to carry out this task. In fact, to support this supposition, Boniface writes a few lines later, “Deal, then, my dear sister, with this my request as you have so generously dealt with them in the past, so that here on earth your deeds may shine in letters of gold to the glory of our Father who is in heaven.”\textsuperscript{28} Through referring to his past requests in the plural, Boniface cements Eadburga’s reputation as a competent scribe and reveals that this is neither the first nor second time Eadburga has sent a text she copied out to Boniface.

Though in the extant letter corpus, Boniface does not make another request outright, there are traces of gifts being sent abroad to him by his female correspondents. In two separate letters to abbesses in England – one to the previously mentioned Eadburga of Minster in Thanet and another to
Abbess Bugga - Boniface thanks the abbes for their gift of books and vestments. In another letter, this time listing Boniface as recipient not sender, Bugga writes of a book which Boniface had requested, saying, "Know also that the Sufferings of the Martyrs which you asked me to send you I have not yet been able to get, but that as soon as I can I shall send it." Though Boniface's request to Eadburga concerning the epistles of Saint Peter asked her to copy them out herself, it is evident that his request to Bugga (though a transcript of this request has not been preserved) asked her to obtain a copy of the Sufferings. That these women played a role not only as creators but as procurers is significant in that as such, they involve the Anglo-Saxon world outside of their monastery. The involvement of the entire Anglo-Saxon world, however, may be a bit too optimistic - likely this "involvement" was largely limited to other monasteries, as these ecclesiastical places would be more likely to hold the volumes Boniface requested. As such, though I have only discussed evidence of Anglo-Saxon women sending books and vestments abroad, this can perhaps be taken as an indication of more widespread, non-female Anglo-Saxon interest in sending items abroad.

Here is where things turn slightly problematic. Though we have evidence that Boniface's female correspondents requested texts to be sent to them from abroad, nothing in the extent corpus confirms receipt of such items: as far as we know, no manuscripts were copied out on the Continent per Boniface's orders and sent back to England. However, this is not to say that manuscripts associated with the mission were not created on the Continent at this time: the first Vita of Boniface was written by Willibald within a few years of his martyrdom. In fact, though there is no trace of vitae written in England about the missions, this is far from true on the continent: the following centuries produce no fewer than four vitae of Boniface, one of Boniface's fellow missionary Leoba, one of Willibrord, and one of Willibald. While it could be true that the disparity between the number of vitae written on the Continent and in England could stem from accidents of time in preserving such manuscripts, two reasons caution against putting too much emphasis on this line of thought. First, if there were vitae about the missionaries written in England, it would stand to reason that there are references to such vitae. Thus, even if the vitae themselves do not survive, the references should attest to their existence. Unfortunately, neither vitae nor references survive in England to our knowledge. Of course, the purge of monastic holdings conducted as part of Henry VIII's 1536 Dissolution of the Monasteries or any number of accidents could have very thorough in erasing the necessary references and vitae, but it seems too perfect for not a single trace from between the eighth to eleventh centuries to have survived. After all, both on the Continent and in England, the missions were still remembered even in the eleventh century — in England, William of Malmesbury quoted from one of Boniface's letters and, on the Continent, Otloh of St. Emmeram wrote yet another vita for the saint. It is almost inconceivable to have no references to vitae written in England from Continental or insular sources during the intervening years.

The second reason for discounting accidents in preservation lies in a statement made by Leoba's hagiographer, Rudolf of Fulda. Writing the Translatio s. Alexandri, Rudolf stated, "The Saxons people, according to ancient tradition, came from the Angles living in Britain, and sailed across the ocean to the German shores, intending by necessity to find a place to settle in a place called Hadeln." A mere generation before, Boniface and the Anglo-Saxon missionaries had aggressively promoted the concept of gens nostra — their descent and shared heritage with Continental Saxons. It is highly unlikely Rudolf would have been unfamiliar with this ideology or have not known that it was believed by insular audiences. But would such an ideology have appealed to a Bavarian audience who had neither invited the Anglo-Saxons into their country nor sought any ties to England in the first place? Palmer thinks not, writing that those in Bavaria or Gaul who read the vitae "were not related to the same gentes and so were unlikely to be inspired by that particular aspect of the Anglo-Saxons' work." To account for this, perhaps Rudolf had to fabricate a different origin story to appeal to his Continental audience. In fact, Palmer interpreted Rudolf's statement as proof that the Translatio as well as Rudolf's other writings to have been intended for a Continental audience. The Vita Leobae and other vitae written on the Continent concerning the missionaries, he concludes, were not intended for those back home. Since these texts seem intended for a Continental audience, their lack of circulation in eighth century England does not come as a surprise. Doubtless, these texts were meant to teach the recent Continental "converts" and inspire them with tales to which they could relate.

These examples of one-way (England to Continent) textual transmission seem to provide opportunities for a transmission of texts the other way (from the Continent to England). For, just as Boniface requested texts from the nuns so too did they request texts from Boniface. In the aforementioned letter describing a book Boniface has requested from her, Bugga also asks of Boniface, "And you, my best beloved, comfort my
insignificance by sending me, as you promised in your dear letter, some collection of the sacred writings.37 Furthermore, scriptoria in which insular and Continental styles were mixed should have facilitated exchange of texts as well. Lastly, a Continental interest in the vitae of Anglo-Saxon saints should imply that there was a matching Anglo-Saxon interest in their fellow countrymen. Despite these possibilities, none of these avenues seem to provide evidence of textual transmission back to England. At this point, I once again suggest the possibility of taking extratextual evidence into account. To explore this possibility, I will re-examine the primary sources discussed thus far in the next part of my paper and reread them from another angle to determine evidence of transmission from the Continent to England.

Thus far, I have been primarily concerned with the transmission of textual materials, be it manuscripts copied out or the vitae of Anglo-Saxon missionaries. Yet such evidence was, as Palmer suggested, scarce and, as such, does not bode well for demonstrating that there was an established two-way exchange. Here I would like to point out a possible flaw in the logic of scholars looking for textual exchange between the Anglo-Saxons and the Bavarians and Frisians. Though the main export and form of England-to-Continent transmission were textual materials, could it be possible that the materials brought back were not texts? After all, the goal of the Anglo-Saxons, a people who have been Christian for approximately 150 years at the time of the missions and who have had a continuous Latin literacy for the same amount of time, was to spread Christianity through the missions. What better way to export their faith and ideology than through texts? On the other hand, the Bavarians the missionaries first tried to “convert” were both wayward in their Christian ideology and Latin learning.38 Would the missionaries have thought to send back such misinformed teachings to England? Similarly, the Frisians to whom Boniface lost his life were unconverted pagans—in other words, ignorant of the Roman alphabet.39 Would they have possessed any texts that the missionaries would have deemed important enough to ecclesiastical learning to send back to their country? I think not. Even if no texts back to England from Frisia and Bavaria, I believe that the Boniface letter corpus hints at the exchange of other materials—both physical and ideological.

My earlier reading of Boniface's letter to Eadburga focused on its evidence for textual transmission from England to the Continent.40 A close reading of this letter indicates that physical materials were sent by Boniface to England to facilitate this textual transmission. (Recall that Boniface specified “a copy written in gold of the Epistles of my master, St. Peter the Apostle.”41) Boniface states explicitly the materials—gold, in this case—he sends back and the method of transportation, writing, “The materials [gold] needed for the copy I am sending by the priest Eoban.”42 Important to note here is that Boniface does not send Eadburga materials from another monastery in England but from the Continent. We know this because, even though Eoban's point of departure is not mentioned in Tantil 35, Boniface names this same Eoban as the “bearer of [his] letters,” in another letter to Abbot Dudo, thus implying that Eoban is returning to England from the Continent.43 In this case, the substance transmitted back is not as important as the way in which we determined materials were sent from the Continent to England through this close reading of Boniface's letters—after all, gold is not an exotic substance unavailable in England. In fact, similar exchanges are evident in other letters of the Boniface corpus.

For instance, in a previously mentioned letter from Egburg to Boniface, she asks for “some little remembrance, perhaps a holy relic or at least a few written words.”44 Though we do not have confirmation of the receipt of these items, this indicates that those back in England were not solely interested in textual materials (as seems to be the case of Boniface who asks for manuscripts to be sent to him abroad), but also in other tangible items. A clearer example of the transmission from the Continent to England of tangible material is found in a letter from Lul, Burchard, and Denhard to the abbess Cuneberg when they list turris (translated as frankincense), pepper, and cinnamon among the gifts they send from the Continent to England along with their letter.45 Besides listing these spices foreign and exotic to England, however, this letter also covers another form of exchange I briefly glossed over above: the exchange of peoples. The missionary effort required Anglo-Saxons to transplant themselves to the Continent, but there was no need for the Bavarians or Frisians to set foot in England. Of course, Anglo-Saxon messengers were sent home, yet this letter indicates persons being sent to England more as foreign visitors than Anglo-Saxons returning home.

Writing to Cuneberg, the three monks state, “We also wish it known to your care and your wisdom that if any one of us should happen to visit Britain we should not prefer the obedience and government of any man to subjection under your good-will; for we place the greatest confidence of our hearts in you.”46 While not much is known of Denhard and Burchard, Lul is thought to be West-Saxon and originally educated at Malmesbury before following Boniface to the Continent.47 Yet though these men may be Anglo-
Saxon in origin, their injunction here that they prefer Cuneberg’s authority to that of any man—and so, by a stretch, their respective former abbots and king(s)—makes it appear as if they have renounced all ties to their previous English monasteries and even their country. As they have distanced themselves from their homeland, their return seems to be not so much a homecoming but a visit by foreigners. Any who receive them in England would then be recipients of “Continental” culture.

Moreover, not only do the three monks indicate their own wish to visit England, but they also entrust two freedmen into Cuneberg’s care, writing, “And if any one shall unlawfully try to prevent their journey we beg you to protect them.” Thus analyzed, however, it is only a tenuous example of exchange: though Lul, Denehard, and Burchard assume that they will be welcomed in England, no reply from Cuneberg has been preserved to demonstrate that she, an Anglo-Saxon abbess, welcomed these men. On this note, Christine Fell provides an additional dimension to this exchange between the monks and Cuneberg by reading into it the Anglo-Saxon and Continental Saxon concept of hlaford-ship—the “Germanic” law that a foreigner must be sponsored by a native when visiting England. She uses as her basis the laws of Ine of Wessex, which have as their latest possible date 726 and are likely dated to the early eighth century. Fell understands Ine’s law to state that “If anyone kills a man from abroad who has no kin, the fine for his death, the wergild, is divided between the king and the one who took this person under his or her protection. If the protector abbod sie ðode abbodesse ‘is either an abbot or an abess’, he or she has full rights to half the wergild.” In fact, Fell believes this to be the situation described by Lul, Denehard, and Burchard in their letter to Cuneberg. To further corroborate her reading is the men’s injunction to Cuneberg to “protect” the freedmen they send to her, since this appears to be written consent giving Cuneberg legal authority to protect the freedmen. With this added invocation of legal authority, this exchange seems more formal and far less tenuous than a simple wish from Continental monks to visit England.

Though this is the only letter from Continental factors expressing a wish to visit England, there is a similar invitation from Cena, a German abbess, extending hospitality to Boniface. In this letter, Cena writes, “If any of your people should ever come to this country, I beg him to inform me, and if I can be of service in any way by supplying bodily comforts or spiritual support to you or any of yours, pray let me know.” Although this is not exactly the same as the hlaford-clause in Ine’s laws, it indicates an interest in exchange of peoples, especially in the spirit of hosting foreigners. In short, a reexamination of the textual evidence provides a tantalizing glimpse at an underlying social custom or ideology, thus demonstrating that Saxon ideas of hospitality do not differ by far from the ones outlined by Lul, Denehard, and Burchard when they addressed Abbess Cuneberg. Though this evidence is preserved in the texts written during the missionary period, the evidence itself is not textual in nature—in solely looking for a transmission of texts, we would miss this subtle exchange of persons implicit in the correspondence.

Aside from this evidence for the Continent-to-England “transmission” of persons, however, another form of exchange is that of ideology, particularly the “Germanic” gens nostra identity Boniface and his fellow missionaries so busily promoted. In the introduction to this paper, we examined the construction of a “Germanic” identity as evidence that the Boniface mission is more complicated than can be deduced from a literal reading of the letter corpus. Here, I propose that the construction of such an identity can also be understood as a product of the mission later brought back to England. After all, this ideology was promoted by Boniface when he called upon the gens Anglorum to remember that they and the Saxons are “of one blood and of one bone.” One complication to understanding this as an example of exchange, however, is that though this idea came out of the missions: it is very much an Anglo-Saxon, not Continental Saxon, idea. This is evident in the multiple names used to describe Anglo-Saxons in the Vita Alcuini, such as Angli, Engelsaxoni, Britti, and Scotti. Palmer believes this demonstrates that “Frankish writers were not even sure what to call the Anglo-Saxons” and that “The ethnic identities and missionary programmes promoted by Bede and Boniface seem to have been little understood outside their close circles.” Furthermore, Palmer notes that though there is reference to the gens Anglorum in the Vita Leobae, no effort is made to make Germanic kinship a relevant factor in the story. Again, this hints at a purely Anglo-Saxon rather than Continental concern with a “Germanic people”. Though this “Germanic identity” seems to be primarily an Anglo-Saxon construction not clearly understood by Continental counterparts, it is clearly a product of the Boniface mission. As such, insular Anglo-Saxon interest in a “Germanic” identity would indicate direct interest in the missions themselves, constituting the transmission of ideology from the Continent to England.

Related to the concept of exchange via the circulation of ideology, one final way to look for exchange between England and the Continent is Anglo-Saxon interest in the mission as indicated by the circulation within England of
texts relating to the missions. Since no *Vita* of Boniface to my knowledge was written in England and no copy survives to prove that the *Vita* was brought back to England from the Continent, my search for circulation of his *Vita* has turned out fruitless. Though many scholars have speculated for this lack of surviving insular *Vita*, Kenneth Sisam perhaps puts it the best, stating that “[p]erhaps because his great work was done abroad, and no influential religious house at home was interested in the glory of his name by reason of local associations or the possession of relics, Boniface was not ranked among the chief saints of England.” Sisam continues by noting that Boniface’s feast was never of the highest importance and that he makes no appearance in the *Old English Martyrology* and the poetical *Menology*. Though Sisam’s focus was on Boniface, the same can be said of Boniface’s fellow missionaries. None of the most prominent missionary figures, such as Leoba, Lul, Willibrord, or Willibald have *Vitae* written about them in England. Conversely, Boniface’s correspondence fares slightly better: his letter to Eadburga was copied out and translated in an eleventh century manuscript and two other letters survive, one of which was referenced by William of Malmesbury.

Boniface’s letter to Eadburga is his only piece of correspondence to a man or woman translated from Latin to Old English, and Christine Fell posits this was more for the rhetorical style of the letter and the novelty of its content than any lasting impression Boniface made as a saint or martyr. In fact, the Old English translation was written side by side with the Latin text in the eleventh century manuscript in which it is preserved. Nevertheless, Sisam states that “the translation [into Old English] gives slight indications that the lost MS. from which it was made was independent of the four Continental MSS. used by the *Monumenta* editors to establish the text of this letter.” This would seem to indicate that the Old English derived not from the copy Boniface kept for his own records but from the copy he sent to Eadburga. Returning to my second reason for selecting women as a subgroup to focus on within the Boniface mission, here we see that women preserved the letters they received and, as such guardians of memory, helped to perpetuate memory of the missions.

Incidentally, one of the other two letters from the Boniface corpus which circulated in England could very well have been preserved through the efforts of a woman—through the efforts of Cuneberg to be exact. The letter in question is Tangl 73, a letter referenced and quoted by William of Malmesbury in the eleventh century. At this early date, no continental collections had circulated to England, therefore there must have been another copy of this letter circulating exclusively in England to which William had access. This copy, it would stand to reason, was preserved by the receiver in England and not a copy Boniface made for his own records on the Continent. Corroborating this line of thought is the fact that William’s version contains content which is not present in the Continental copies. As to how he managed to obtain a copy of Boniface’s letter, my conjecture is merely hypothetical, yet it is a possibility nonetheless. The key lies in Cuneberg’s numerous ties to Malmesbury, a theory which Yorke elaborates first by pointing out Lui’s Malmesbury education—indicating that a shared tie to Malmesbury would have facilitated his communication with Cuneberg. Furthermore, Yorke postulates that the Begiloc mentioned as one of the two freedmen in Lull’s letter to Cuneberg might be “the priest Begiloc who attested the charter granting land at Tockenham to Abbot Eenbert of Malmesbury referred to above. We do not know if Begiloc ever went to Germany in response to Lull’s request, but whether he remained in Wessex or had returned from abroad, or had come from Germany, his presence in this charter would seem to confirm a close connection between Cuneberg’s monastery and Malmesbury.” As such, Cuneberg is a known recipient of letters from Boniface’s closest circle and she is also associated with Malmesbury. Three centuries later, William of this same Malmesbury quoted a passage from an insular version of Boniface’s letter. Perhaps Cuneberg had a hand in preserving this very letter. Through the preservation of Boniface’s letter to Eadburga and the letter William of Malmesbury copied out, we can see despite Palmer’s assertion that “the Anglo-Saxons ’back home’ were not much interested in their exports,” the Anglo-Saxons back home were interested. The only question is to what extent.

As the evidence stands, proof indicating a two-way transmission appears tenuous if only evidence for textual (i.e. manuscript) transmission is taken into account. Nevertheless, through perusing the same epistolary sources for indications of extratextual evidence, other indicators of transmission can be seen. Both the one-way England-to-Continental transmission and the two-way exchange model have their faults, but the meager evidence we have swings the debate towards two-way exchange. Yet no matter which way historians and literary scholars would like to understand the nature of transmission, one thing is clear: the nature of exchange in the Boniface mission is highly intricate, and any conclusions drawn about other literary
sources based on the assumption of one-way or two-way exchange must be understood in light of these complexities.

1 Boniface, Archbishop of Mainz, Die Briefe des Heiligen Bonifatius und Lullius: Epistolae Selectae, trans. Michael Tangl (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1916), no. 46; [Have pity on them, because they themselves are accustomed to say: “We are of one blood and of one bone”], Translation mine.
2 This date range is attributed to David Wilkins in Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents Relating to Great Britain and Ireland. While this is a conservative range, most later scholars, including C.H. Talbot (Anglo-Saxon Missionaries in Germany) and Dorothy Whitelock (English Historical Documents, vol. 1) favor a date of 738. The 738 date is significant in that it situates this letter during Boniface’s visit to Rome when he was made the papal legate for Germany. In short, this letter is dated to one of the heights of Boniface’s administrative duties rather than any fieldwork activity in converting “pagans”.
8 Palmer, Anglo-Saxons, 8.
11 Benson, “The Pagan Coloring of Beowulf,” 40; see also Levison, England and the Continent, 92.
13 For more recent scholarship on the dating of Beowulf, see also the cultural impact of Boniface’s mission in the mid-eighth century, refer to Leonard Neidorf’s “Cultural Change in Anglo-Saxon England: A Circulatory Approach to Dating Beowulf,” forthcoming.
17 Rudolf of Fulda, Vita Leobae in Talbot, Anglo-Saxon Missionaries. Likewise, (Boniface) sent messengers with letters to the abbot Tetta, of whom we have already spoken, asking her to send Leoba to accompany him on this journey and to take part in this embassy.
18 [milites Christi utrisque sexus], Latin from Boniface, Die Briefe, 94, Translated in Boniface, The Letters of Saint Boniface, 148-50.
19 For a full discussion of the topic of women and memory, consult Elizabeth M. C. Van Houts, Memory and Gender in Medieval Europe, 900-1200 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999).
20 van Houts, Memory and Gender, 66.
23 Boniface, Die Briefe, no. 27, 30, 65, 67, 94.
24 See Levison, England and the Continent, 170 for more.
26 See Levison, England and the Continent, 132 for more on manuscript circulation on the Continent by Anglo-Saxons in the eighth century.
[Et si aliquis eis prohibere vellet iter pergendi sine iustitia, deprecamur, ut eos defendere digneris.] Latin from Boniface, *Die Briefe*, no. 49.


Ibid., 33. See Lisi Oliver, *The Beginnings of English Law*, for a facing page edition and discussion of the Early Kentish Laws and the Laws of Ine of Wessex. A short explanation of *wergild*: in Anglo-Saxon and most Germanic societies, each person had a price attached to him or her based on gender, status, occupation, and other value-determinants. This price or a portion of it would be the base used to calculate fines for offenses ranging from minor injuries to the killing of said person. The law referred to here is Ine’s Law, Section 23.2, as numbered by Oliver and Attenborough.

[Et rogo, ut, si umquam aliquis tuorum ad hanc provinciam veniat, ut mean pax que pertatem interpellat et, si in aliqua re vel carnalis commodi vel spiritualis omniniciui vel tibi vel aliqui tuorum possim adiuvere, ut mihi indicet.] Latin from Boniface, *Die Briefe*, no. 97.; Translated in Boniface, *The Letters of Saint Boniface*, 151.

[de uno sanguine et de uno osse sumus]. Latin from Boniface, *Die Briefe*, no. 46.


Sisam, “Letter from Wynfrith to Eadburga,” 258.


For the quoted text, see Palmer, *Anglo-Saxons*, 8.
Works Cited

Richard DeCesare

Primary Sources


Cox, J.D. "Prohibition and Farmers." Dallas Morning News (Texas), July 18, 1911.

Dr. Dietz. "Liquor and Labor: Charles Stelzle Answered." The Evening News (San Jose, California), November 2, 1912.


E.G., "German-Americans and Beer." Springfield Daily Republican (Massachusetts), July 19, 1908.


Lee Slater Overman, "Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda." S. Doc. No. 66-61 (1919), 3.

H.M.P. in a letter dated January 24, 1870 from LaCrosse, The Locomotive Engineers’ Monthly Journal Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1870), 114.


"As to the Bartender - What About Him?" Wilkes-Barre Times Leader (Pennsylvania), July 1, 1919.

"Assail Liquor as Enemy of Labor." The Duluth News Tribune (Minnesota), November 21, 1915.

"The Bartender's Future." Morning Oregonian (Portland, Oregon), October 10, 1918.

"Coal Problem Must be Solved without Delay." The Duluth News Tribune (Minnesota), October 24, 1917.

"The Constitution of the United States," Amendment XVIII.

"East Youngstown is in Ashes." Tulsa Daily World (Oklahoma), January 8, 1916.


"He Was Drunk." Colorado Springs Gazette (Colorado), January 13, 1913.

The Hobart Daily Republican (Oklahoma), November 15, 1916.

"Labor Federation Raps Prohibition." The Evening Telegram (Salt Lake City, Utah), March 3, 1909.

"Labor Protests Beer Ban." The Kansas City Star (Missouri), June 12, 1919.


"Liquor and the Railroad Man." The Boston Journal (Massachusetts), February 6, 1913.

"Manufacturers Discuss Prohibition as an Economic and Moral Issue and Its Influence for Safety in Factories and for Efficiency in Work." Manufacturers Record Vol. 81, No. 20. May 18, 1922.

"Mr. Powderly’s Liquor Views." Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, Wisconsin), April 16, 1886.

"National Prohibition Act." U.S. Statutes at Large 41 (1920).


"Railway Anti-Saloon Crusade." Dallas Morning News (Texas), November 29, 1912.


"Says Labor Making Liquor is Wasted." The Evening Times (Pawtucket, Rhode Island), March 2, 1918.


"Use Much Grain to Make Whiskey." *The State* (Columbia, South Carolina), December 3, 1917.

"Vote for Booze is Pro-German Vote, Declares Billy Sunday." *Fort-Worth Star Telegram* (Texas), December 16, 1918.

**Secondary Sources**


**Jordan McFadden**


**Julian Cole Phillips**


Dallal'a, Arlene. Interview by author, New York, NY, 28 April 2011.


Iskandria Li...? [Alexandria... Why?]. Directed by Youssef Chahine. Produced by Youssef Chahine. Starring Ahmed Zakri and Naglaa Fathy. 1979. DVD.


Anna-Maja Rappard


Primary Sources


Secondary Sources

Brodman, James W. "Shelter and Segregation: Lepers in Medieval Catalonia."


**Grace E. Shay**


**Sarah Stern**

“The Columbia Statement,” September 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection, PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner

Sarah Stern

“Columbia University Student Council,” 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.

“Counter-Commencement Exercises,” 1968. Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.


“Death of a University -- Columbia,” 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter: Event Flyers; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.

“Defend the Right to Demonstrate,” 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter: Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.

“Free the Panther 21!” undated; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter: Event Flyers; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.


“SDS Committee of Correspondence,” undated; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter: Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.

“Want We Want,” 1968; Students for a Democratic Society Printed Ephemera Collection; PE 035; Box 1; Columbia University/Barnard Chapter: Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries, New York City.
Emile Young

Primary Sources


Vita Willibrordi by Alcuin

Vita Leobae by Rudolf of Fulda

Secondary Sources


van Houts, Elisabeth M.C. Memory and Gender in Medieval Europe, 900-1200. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999.


Past Historian Staff

SPRING 2011
Editors-in-Chief: Francesca Eick and Angela Lelo
Assistant Editors: Modupe Akinnwunmi, Adrian Legaspi, Caroline Marris, Adam Mechanic, Amy Nemetz, Kristine Palmieri, Andrew Tepper, Tamara Whitehouse
Faculty Advisor: Professor Richard W. Hull

SPRING 2008
Editor-in-Chief: Jennifer Linsley
Assistant Editors: Richard Davidson, Rebeccas Geraghty, Sara Puls, Dustin Robinson, Eliad Shapiro
Faculty Advisor: Professor Richard W. Hull

SPRING 2007
Editor-in-Chief: Jacob Croke
Assistant Editors: Pantea Ilbeigi, Jennifer Linsley, Lisa Marie Valletutti, Michael Wood
Faculty Advisor: Professor Richard W. Hull

SPRING 2006
Editor-in-Chief: Clara Brenner
Assistant Editors: Haley Plourde-Cole, Jacob Croke, Pantea Ilbeigi, Dana Love
Faculty Advisor: Professor Richard W. Hull

SPRING 2005
Editor-in-Chief: Igor Fasman
Assistant Editors: Clare Brenner, Joel Brooks, Megan Kirby, Dana Love, Philip Wolgin
Layout Editor: Clara Brenner

Faculty Advisor: Professor Richard W. Hull

SPRING 2004
Editor-in-Chief: Igor Fasman
Assistant Editors: Joel Brooks, Megan Kirby, Kathryn Seitz
Layout Editor: Vivienne Edwards
Faculty Advisor: Professor Richard W. Hull

SPRING 2003
Editor-in-Chief: Kelsey A. Lee
Production and Layout Editor: Jason R. Jahn
Editorial Board: Nick P. Repsher, Igor Fasman, David L. Menninger
Faculty Advisor: Professor Richard W. Hull

FALL 2001
Editor-in-Chief: Alexandra R. Harrington
Faculty Advisor: Professor Hasia Diner

MAY 1992
Editor-in-Chief: Garnett T. Verage
Assistant Editor: Moran M. Schuesslet, Jr.
Selection Committee: Thomas Beckley, Matthew DeSilva, Alfredo Ignacio, Melissa

Schwartz, Robert Scott, Amy Stier, Craig Weiner
Faculty Advisor: Professor Frederick Schult

MAY 1989
Editor-in-Chief: David J. Palmer
Editor: Fiona Crowe
Faculty Advisor: Professor Frederick Schult

JUNE 1988
Editor-in-Chief: Betsy Reese
Editor: Kala Shah
Faculty Advisor: Professor Frederick Schult

SPRING 1983
Editor-in-Chief: Richard M. Lagani
Editors: Brett Block, Merie Bloch, Thomas Leigh
Faculty Advisor: Professor Frederick Schult

SPRING 1981
Editor-in-Chief: Nancy Strohmeyer
Assistant Editors: Peter M. Itak, Anna-Maria Marshall, Jayne Blumberg
Faculty Advisor: Professor Frederick Schult
MAY 1980
Editors: Brian Optiz, Christa Matty, Don DeLorenz, Alan Spater

MAY 1979
Editor-in-Chief: Lourdes Rodriguez
Associate Editor: Candida Korman
Editors: Spencer Levine and Brian Optiz

SPRING 1978
Editor-in-Chief: Candida B. Korman
Editors: Joseph M. Bianci, Robyn Campbell, Spencer Levine, Lourdes Rodriguez
Cover Design: Susan Handman
Special Copy Editor: Joseph M. Bianci

MAY 1977
Editor-in-Chief: Elizabeth O'Connell
Editors: Paul S. Gettler, Beverly R. Bassoff, Spencer Levine, Candida B. Korman, Lee Forlenza, James Gettler, Terry Collins
Faculty Advisor: Richard W. Hull

SPRING 1976
Editor-in-Chief: Robert A. Wyly
Editors: Elizabeth O'Connell, Paul S. Gettler, Abraham Avi Friedman, Barbara A. Levin, Beverly R. Bassoff, Ellen Dinaz, Robert H. Zadra
Art Director: Joanne Manos
Staff: James Moore, Richard Munro, Christopher Trench, Donald Pachner
Faculty Advisors: Professors John W. Wilkes and Richard W. Hull

SPRING 1975
Editor-in-Chief: Robert H. Zadra
Assistant Editors: Elizabeth O'Connell, Leo Weinberger, Robert A. Wyly, Paul Gettler, Avi Friedman

MARCH 1974 (Washington Square Campus)
Editorial Board: Frank D. Arcuri, Ilene Ringel, Fred A. Smith, Barry Heller
Staff: Dana Gruppan, Everett Chasen, Howard Milbert, Lisa Kagan

SPRING 1973
Editorial Board: Bernie Plum, Martin Gdanski, Frank D. Arcuri, Ilene Ringel
Staff: Adam J. Hirsch, Lisa Kagan

DECEMBER 1972
Editorial Board: Bernie Plum, Martin Gdanski, Frank D. Arcuri, Ilene Ringel
Staff: Adam J. Hirsch, Lisa Kagan

MAY 1971
Editor-in-Chief: Regina M. Snow
Assistant Editor: Victor Gerstein
Assistant Editor: Inez D'Arcangelo
Layout Editor: Zebulon Kantrowitz
Staff: Mary Barbanes, John De Luca, Jon Singer, George Foote

MAY 1970
Editor-in-Chief: David A. Bronner
Assistant Editor: Lisa Tunick
Assistant Editor: Regina Snow
Faculty Advisor: Professor Joseph Reither

MAY 1969
Editor-in-Chief: James Allen Cohen
Associate Editor: Gladys B. Roth
Assistant Editor: David Bronner
Assistant Editor: Clement Landanno
Assistant Editor: Fred Schiff
Faculty Advisor: Professor Joseph Reither

MAY 1968
Editor-in-Chief: David Konig
Associate Editor: Philip J. Reynolds
Assistant Editor: James Cohen
Assistant Editor: Fred Schiff
Faculty Advisor: Professor Joseph Reither

APRIL 1967
Editors-in-Chief: David Konig and James K. Burger
Assistant Editor: Nicolas Zoogman
Assistant Editor: Gary Gerstenblith
Assistant Editor: Ira S. Sanders
Faculty Advisor: Professor Joseph Reither

APRIL 1966
Editors-in-Chief: Richard M. Brick and Laurence M. Hauptman
Associate Editor: James M. Burger
Assistant Editor: Gary Gerstenblith
Assistant Editor: David Konig
Assistant Editor: Mark Lubowe
Assistant Editor: Bernhard Meyer
Assistant Editor: Ira S. Sanders
Assistant Editor: Nicholas J. Zoogman
Consulting Editor: Philip V. Cannistraro
Faculty Advisor: Professor Joseph Reither