Emotions and the Self:

A Theory of Personhood
and Political Order
among Pintupi Aborigines

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A great deal has been written, over time, about the Aborigines of Australia, yet for the most part this work has concentrated on Aboriginal kinship systems and has said little about the way in which the Aboriginal world is structured from the point of view of the individual. In research with Pintupi-speaking Aborigines of the Western Desert, it became clear that understanding what I call their “concepts of the emotions” and their concept of the self was critical to understanding what it means to be Pintupi. It is to the question of how we are to understand these concepts and their use in Pintupi life that this paper is directed.

Pintupi explanations of various actions are frequently couched in terms of concepts such as “happiness,” “compassion,” “grief,” “melancholy,” and “shame” (among others)—concepts that are theoretically translatable in terms of descriptions of universal inner states but that have a particular salience in terms of Pintupi culture. This paper, then, has obvious affinities with Hildred Geertz’s “The Vocabulary of Emotion” (1974), which argued that the range and quality of emotional experience is potentially the same for all human beings, although socialization selects, elaborates, and emphasizes certain qualitative aspects from within this range. It is also important to remember that Pintupi culture selects and interprets them in ways that make sense given the technological and ecological conditions of hunter-gatherer social life.

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I will argue that Pintupi talk about emotions provides them with a way of making sense of other people's motivations, as well as their own, and that these concepts should be viewed as an essential part of the self-awareness that is "the prerequisite psychological condition for the functioning of any social order" (Hallowell 1955). However, one should keep in mind that as cultural concepts those explanations do not necessarily represent the inner states of participants in social life accurately. Here as elsewhere individuals may consciously interpret their acts or even feelings as "compassionate" while in fact the true motivation is egotism or something else.

CULTURAL SYSTEMS AND PSYCHOLOGY

Characterizing a "feeling" is not as easy as it first appears. As Ryle noted:

A flutter may be a flutter of anticipation or it may be a flutter of bodily exhaustion . . . A child sometimes does not know whether the lump he feels in his throat is a sign of misery, or a sign that he is sickening for something (1949:101).

One might decide that whenever one feels "low," the feeling is not one of "depression" but instead of "fatigue" or perhaps of "sickness." Such an interpretation has significant implications for how one might react to and regard his or her sensations. How, indeed, do we Westerners come to love? to experience romantic love? to interpret our "feelings" as those of "love"?

It seems that in understanding the use of such concepts, we are beset with two difficulties: (1) the place of these concepts in a cultural system, and (2) their relevance to actual psychological states or feelings. We need to distinguish these concepts as "words" from the "feeling-states" they seem intended to describe, both because word-use ("I'm sorry") does not guarantee feeling and, relatedly, because "feelings" are notably complex and ambivalent. Rarely can we be said to feel only "love" or only "compassion" at some instant. The description of some "feeling" as this or that seems unlikely to account fully for its ambiguity. Perhaps a song, a poem, or a painting can express "feeling," but not a single word.

Like our concept of "love," these concepts—"shame," "grief"—are part of a cultural tradition, suggesting to individuals how they should or might feel, what they might expect. They become part of
self-awareness and awareness of other selves. Persons look to experience these emotions in the right situations—"Do I love him/her? How do I know?" I do not mean to say that these are nothing but "intellectual constructs" or just a "way of thinking." The fact remains that Pintupi are—or seem to be—comfortable with understanding themselves in the way I will describe, a way that leaves me feeling blank spots or gaps in myself. I think that there are both sociological and psychological reasons why concepts such as these become important experience-near concepts (cf. C. Geertz 1975) in Pintupi society. I would suggest that in the Pintupi use of such concepts, we might look for something akin to what LeVine (after Freud) calls "compromise formations": "institutionalized forms of adaptation between personality and sociocultural systems" (LeVine 1973:132). These "compromises" are a resolution of norm and motivation, satisfying the individual's motivation in an acceptable form.

In the study of Aborigines, as with many other peoples, there has been much confusion of the "psychological" with the "cultural" in construing their behavior. What Stanner (1956) described as The Dreaming, a cultural concept (a way of looking at the world in which the mythological past is seen as the precedent for current activity), does not necessarily imply any personality trait; many individuals who accept this view are neither "passive" nor of weak ego-definition. A cultural concept may permit a variety of motivations and may fulfill a variety of psychological functions. Consequently, Pintupi concepts of the emotions should be seen as an ideology, as models of and models for how one should feel and behave. They constitute a moral and cultural system that articulates and informs a particular view of social life and the self for the Pintupi, an official representation of what is going on.

While the Pintupi do explain motivation in terms of emotional concepts, the main question I want to ask is not whether or how these correspond to their real motivations. Rather, I suggest that we see these concepts as a way of representing action and selves in light of a moral order. These concepts as a means of self-objectification, allow for the comparison of one's self to the extrinsic norms of society. I shall argue, then, that these concepts are major constructs of the Pintupi view of what it means to be a person and that they make a significant contribution to the political order of Pintupi life made up of such selves. Such an approach offers the advantage of viewing
an individual’s “compassion” or “grief” as a potentially genuine display and/or a strategy by which he or she hopes to attain some other satisfaction while conforming to the culturally appropriate form.

CONTEXT

Between 1973 and 1975 I did field work with the Pintupi at a settlement called Yayayi, 180 miles west of Alice Springs. At this time, the Pintupi were no longer living a traditional hunting-gathering life in the desert; for the past 40 years, the Pintupi have been drifting eastward from the Gibson Desert homeland, although the majority “came in” the 200–400 miles to European missions or settlements between 1954 and 1966. They were living, then, on the Australian equivalent of a “reservation” and not on their own land. A few months before I arrived, however, the Pintupi moved from a large government settlement (Papunya) comprising Aborigines of several different language groups to Yayayi, the site of a windmill-driven pump that was their own place (“all Pintupi”), and where about 300 people lived with little more than the windmill, some government-granted tents, and a few vehicles for transport. In theory, they were “governed” by a democratically elected Village Council, a notion introduced by the government.

Traditional life was based on seminomadic wanderings, in small family groups of 10–30 people, to known water and resource points and returning to a “home-base” permanent waterhole during the dry summer. Much of their lives and their customs were and still are based on adherence to what is known in pidgin as the Law or The Dreaming (tjukurrpa)—the mythological period in which the cosmos and the world were given their present and permanent order (cf. Stanner 1956). Everything that exists is thought to have its

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origin and form in the creative acts of the ancestral beings. These acts of the ancestral beings are marked and recorded in the landscape and commemorated in song and ritual. The prime moral imperative of Aborigines is "to follow up The Dreaming." This is a concept that sees the source of creativity and authority as external to any mortal self. Later, I will try to show the relationship of The Dreaming and its social use to some important concepts of personhood, arguing that we can view it as a "solution" to the problem of maintaining authority in an egalitarian, person-oriented society. One problem that I observed and wish to explain at the end of this paper is the difficulty the Pintupi had in consciously creating an effective sociopolitical order at Yayayi, namely, the inability to achieve legitimacy for new laws.

As I found them, the Pintupi were in very changed circumstances. Many now worked for salary in government projects; some drove cars and hunted with rifles; and they wore clothes and bought much of their food in a settlement store. Yet their real contact with Europeans had not been overwhelming, and was recent. They were still very much Pintupi, very much Aboriginal in their view of the world. The fact that they ran their own place at Yayayi, largely without European interference, gave me an unprecedented opportunity to see how they did things.

EMOTIONS

When I use the phrase "concepts of the emotions," I refer to the vocabulary and cultural understandings that bear on a particular sort of feeling, on "symptoms" that "convey and represent information about one's mode of relationship as a total individual to the social and nonsocial environment" (Levy 1973:271). Pain, fatigue, and the like would not be considered as "emotions." What I am arguing here is the Pintupi use of concepts of the emotions frequently does not present an introspective view of a person's feelings.

Indeed, I found it very difficult to elicit private or individual interpretations of experience, as in the matter of a parent's death. Even when the Pintupi are talking about what Levy calls the "private self"—"those aspects of an individual's experience that are related to his body, his feelings, his sense of self, his needs for personal definition and integration, his understanding of what is going
on around him as it involves himself" (Levy 1973:xix)—they seem to present it in terms that reflect more about the cultural system than about the individual. The Aboriginal autobiographies I have seen, as well as those I tried to elicit, emphasize the cultural expectations much more than they do the specific experiences and interpretations of the individual; they seem illustrations rather than self-conscious introspections. It was frequently difficult to tell whether a person was genuinely "angry" (feeling anger) or whether the display was a "cultural performance," or finally what sense it made to distinguish these. Pintupi talk of emotion, then, is not necessarily the talk of "raw experience." Just what it is I hope to explain in what follows.

ORDERING DAILY LIFE

Australian Aboriginal societies have (or had) no political organization beyond that of informal leaders. Largely, what order and cooperation there was in these low population density groups—how individuals got along and affected each other's actions—depended largely on the ties of kinship, or recognized relatedness, and its emotional considerations. I emphasize this in order to point out similarities to other hunter-gatherer groups that seem to have shared notions of emotions, especially that of embarrassment or shame when acting in the public domain. This concept is the correlative of the restraint and unassertiveness of individuals over their comrades. Marshall (1961:235) describes how the Kung fear the embarrassment of wrong, foolish, or outlandish behavior:

Their desire to avoid both hostility and rejection leads them to conform in high degree to the unspoken social law. If they do deviate they usually yield readily to expressed group opinion and reform their ways. I think that most Kung cannot bear the sense of rejection which even mild disapproval makes them feel.

Such constraints are equally important in Pintupi life. The emotions, as culturally defined, are an important medium of interpersonal activity. When one Pintupi calls another "kin" (walytja), a system of appropriate emotional responses is called up: one should be "compassionate" to the other and should help him. Kin status among the Pintupi is largely a matter of feeling, and if a person feels unkindly treated, he may complain that the other does not (in
pidgin) "like" him or her and thus is not really walytja. The intent of such action is to get the other to reflect on how he or she should feel: Is this person "close"? The emotional concepts do, in the Pintupi view, have objective referents; that is, they do describe internal states that the Pintupi may alternatively refer to as conditions of the "spirit," kurrunta (fear, for example, is having a "wet spirit"). Such responses, however, depend on the perception and definition of various kinds of situations. Levy argues that "feeling" becomes associated with cultural understandings which designate the cause of the feeling and what should be done about it" (1973:322–323), but it seems appropriate to emphasize that these "cultural understandings" may themselves give rise either to a "feeling" or to a sense of its appropriateness. The determination of when one ought to be angry, when sad, when sorry, when lonely, and how to act, is largely a cultural matter. Such a perspective shows the relative usefulness of treating Aborigines as interacting, self-aware individuals in a particular moral order.

LEARNING HOW

The cultural selection and communication of appropriate emotional states is fairly obvious, in both Pintupi theory and practice. A young child continues to sleep in camp with its parents because, as the Pintupi say, the child is "unaware," "oblivious," or "deaf" (patjarra or ramarama). Children do not know; they understand neither events nor when to be ashamed (kunta). Small children are said to be "unheeding" (ramarama) in that they literally do not comprehend the importance of social events; rather, they throw tantrums, do not listen or respond to parents, sit too close to an affinee, play with fire, and so on.

In the Pintupi view, the concepts "thinking," "understanding," and "hearing" are expressed by a single term, kulininpa, which means literally "to hear." To be patjarra (or ramarama), they say, is to have one's "ears closed." The implication is that young children do not process the available information about who is present and what is happening. Those who do are said to "know" (ninti), or "to understand" (kulininpa)—implying that one learns what responses are held to be appropriate for various situations. What one learns, then, is what Hallowell calls the "basic orientations for the self pro-
vided by a culture": self-orientation and normative orientation (Hallowell 1955:89-109). Put otherwise, one learns a folk theory of motivation (how to understand others) and morality (how to place oneself in the light of these expectations). An adult Pintupi should be aware of what is happening and who is present. There is a constant evaluation of the state of the social and physical world.

It is interesting to note that Pintupi apply the term ramarama ("deaf," "oblivious") to those whom they consider insane or "mad": the person's ears are closed. Such an individual does not hear or take note of his or her relatives, possibly injuring close kin or failing to recognize them. In other words, such a person is not in touch with the "reality" upon which everyone else agrees: he or she does not "think" (kulininpa).

The Pintupi moral order is based on a specific view of the self. Balikci (1970:171) suggested that the high rate and particular occasions of Netsilik Eskimo suicide are directly related to the way in which individuals in that society see, understand, or feel themselves to be related and identified with close kin. Precisely this point of view prevails in Pintupi ethnopsychology, which seems to view an individual's internal states as extensively connected with a "web" of significant others or with "objects" that European observers would described as external to the self. The much described Aboriginal "spiritual kinship" with the land (Berndt and Berndt 1964), the special identification of persons with "place" in Aboriginal thought, should be considered as part of this "web."

Roheim, who studied Pintupi and their neighbors 40 years ago, grasped the importance of this particular view of the self, although his polemical style tended to obscure his acute ethnographic perceptions. He argued that the "landscape" has an important psychological relationship to Central Australian Aborigines: "The emphasis on the place name in myth and ritual can only mean one thing, that both myth and ritual are an attempt to cathect environment with libido" (Roheim 1971:214). This, after all, is a culture in which songs about places predominate over songs about lovers.

In a much-neglected but very significant paper, Munn has tried to show that among other Central Australian Aborigines, important external objects—parts of the material world like the "country"—come to provide the individual with images or 'fragments' of himself" (Munn 1970:158). She goes on to say: "In the normal personality these 'images' are recognized as being outside the person
and separate from him, and yet are experiences inextricably bound up with him.” In other words, individuals come to identify places and ancestors as part of themselves, referring to them in the first person. Munn feels that the functioning of this self-related orientation, this linking of “the interior subjectivity of the person with the external world,” is a “key structure in social control.”

Roheim and Munn stress the identification of the self with parts of the physical environment, but the Pintupi notion of this relationship classifies it under a much wider rubric of identification.

**THE MORAL ORDER OF WALYTJA**

In this light, the key symbol for the Pintupi social order is the concept of *walytja*, which recognizes the relationship of the self to various others. While psychoanalysts have described how these “cathedected objects” become part of an individual’s self-orientation, the Pintupi have based their culture on the concept of *walytja* as the dominant symbol of shared identity and mutual support. “Official” Pintupi representations of their social life stress that they are “one family” (*walytja tjuta*, also “all related”). For any individual, the Pintupi social universe is divided into two categories: (1) those who are “kin,” “relations,” or “family” (*walytja*), and (2) those who are not kin, often described as “not men” or “different men” (*munuwati*), that is, those who are in the deepest sense unrelated. The term *walytja* specifies a sense of belonging together, or shared identity. It is used to refer to (1) possessions, (2) “kin,” (3) “one’s own” (my own), (4) a wider sense of belonging, and (5) “oneself” as “he did it himself” or “she is sitting by herself.” The concept asserts a relationship between oneself and persons, objects, or places; it recognizes as fundamental in Pintupi life the identity extended to persons and things beyond the physical individual. In contrast, those who are not truly “relations” are often described as “nothing to do” (a pidgin phrase), “other” (*munuka*) or “not the same,” and sometimes with a metaphor of spatial separateness as “outside.” All such explanations imply that nonrelations are those with whom one has little or no interaction. Finally, the term as applied to social space has expanding application, depending on whom the speaker is viewing in contrast with “relations.”

One’s *walytja* are not necessarily actual consanguines; they are
those with whom one grows up, those with whom one is familiar, those who have fed and cared for one, those with whom one camps frequently. Strangers, those who are unknown, are likely to be feared or suspected dangerous.

The usual domestic unit of a “camp” of husband, wife (or wives), and small children defines the closest group of walytja and the primary food-sharing unit. Beyond this are other family “camps” that may frequently co-reside as parts of the same band. The members of different “camps” may spend significant time with each other, share meat, look after small children, feed them, and lavish attention on them. During the day, infants may be handled by a variety of women and girls, and men will play with or feed a child, although it is rarely permitted out of the mother’s sight. These people, who cooperate in economic life as well as in recreation, are also seen as walytja. Some attitudes to walytja seem highly reminiscent of childhood experience. There is no attempt to discipline a small child and any discomfort perceived is met with attempts to relieve it. The breast is never denied, and the child is encouraged to respond favorably to those who play with him or her, as these are seen as the child’s walytja. To be brief, the Pintupi child’s world is one of support, generosity, familiarity, and warmth. These are precisely the qualities that ideally characterize relations among adult walytja, who help each other, do not frustrate each other’s wishes, and share food. Thus, we are likely to hear the characterization by informants, in moments of tranquility, of the Pintupi as all “one family,” a characterization not applied on occasions of dispute. Of course, jealousy, envy, dislike, and greed are enduring parts of Pintupi life, but the “official representation” of themselves is as “family,” and acts that indicate contrary feelings are not usually displayed openly.

The concepts of walytja can be said to define the moral order of Pintupi society as “family” as opposed to relations with “strangers,” which are full of fear, hostility, and suspicion. It is important to keep in mind that such a conception of society as mutual aid and care well fits the actual economic relations among Pintupi where mobility and flexibility of band composition is great and where sharing among band members is a duty. The image of Pintupi society, then, is of a group of closely cooperating kin, each no better than the rest, with all sharing some kind of identification and mutual
concern. The Pintupi view of the self and other, then, receives validation from their experience of social life in which kin should and do help each other.

"HAPPINESS"

The central themes of the Pintupi moral order revolve around the ideal of closely cooperating kin, and it is in terms of this understanding that Pintupi attempt to define when and how one should be "happy" (pukulpa). Pintupi find it unusual that one could be "happy" sitting alone; to be among kin, to be shown affection and concern, and to show it, should make one "happy." (Those who travel alone are suspect, and those who wish to be alone usually give some other reason.) While feeling "happy" is an endopsychic matter—a "rising of the spirit"—Pintupi seem to think that an individual experiences such states largely as the result of smoothly-running relations between the individual and those he or she considers walytja.\(^2\) These relations are to be valued much more highly than ordinary possessions, and one who fails to be so is considered "selfish" (man-ngu) or "greedy." One "rejoices" (pukularrinpa) when one sees relatives coming to visit. As among other ethnographically known people, satisfactory relations are achieved through activity, through exchange of food, women, sacred objects, and so on. Kin presently separated by distance send money through intermediaries to show that they are thinking of each other. Being not happy is conceived of in terms of other specific states: "lonely," "sorry," "angry," "ashamed," concepts that seem to represent different sorts of relationships with walytja.

How their cultural understanding of "happiness" works is clear in the following example. Informants frequently told me that Yayayi was "not a happy place" (pukulpa wiya ngarrin); there were fights all the time because there were "no corroborees" (a pidgin term for any ceremonies or organized singing). There should be, they said, "corroborees all the time." On a day of numerous fights and arguments, several men suggested that a "sing" be organized, in order to stop the fighting, to make everyone "happy." There is a reality to this ex-

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\(^2\) Turner (1969) and Munn (1969) and many other anthropologists have noted how inward states may be treated as subjective evaluations of the social condition.
pection. Singing functions as a "ritual process" that reduces discord and it also presents participants with a lesson about what it means to be among "kin," to be related, to be "happy." When ceremonies take place between people not usually co-resident, they are usually structured to reflect cooperation and are complementary (through exchange of functions, meat, etc.) on the model of the individual camp or smaller "close kin" groups. This presents intergroup relations as being made up of the same mutuality and sharing as other relations of walytja. Indeed, those with whom one takes part in ceremony become walytja, to a degree.

To the Pintupi, singing is a salient image of sociability. Whenever large groups would come together, in traditional times, they sang together at night. Ceremony, song and dance, was the real content of most intergroup relations. The initial approach of a visiting group was (and is) fraught with tension and excitement, and is highly ritualized. Their intentions are uncertain, undetermined. On important occasions, grievances and long standing grudges are settled before singing begins. When two men met after long separation, they fought because of old, outstanding grievances, and then sat down at the same fire and sang all night. Singing is viewed as public, community entertainment, public pleasure, in contrast to the private pleasure of sex, which occurs in a camp; men are supposed to give priority to the first. Those who prefer to remain in their camps or otherwise pursue private pleasures are teased and shamed. Ideally, in fact, Pintupi men should not be able to enjoy the private pleasures of sex until they have been initiated and oriented to the priority of the public pleasure of ceremony and singing.3 The replacement of "private" with "public" is a continuing theme in Pintupi culture. Singing makes people "happy" (pukulpə); it is the opposite of fighting and trouble. Emphasizing group ends, shared identity, and cooperation rather than individual ends and conflict, it leads individuals to experience the ideal as real. It also tells them how they should experience such occasions, what moral

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3 Ceremonies were regarded in part as entertainment, although this should not be seen to detract from their cosmological significance. Individuals occasionally remarked after a performance, "Good pictures" (i.e., like a film) or "Number one," praising its excellence. Traditionally, singing and dancing were the only forms of group entertainment, of various categories of secrecy and danger or openness. Participation in ceremonies was described by the same word used for "play" (ngalpurrinpə), although men sometimes said that it was "work."
value to give. In singing, they come to “comprehend” being walytja.

The Pintupi recognize, of course, that “happiness” may be achieved in many ways. They understand that “fighting” makes some individuals “happy,” as does “sex” or “gifts.” Nevertheless, to be “happy” at a death, at another’s suffering, or at one’s own success compared to another’s failure would be bad. One might hear these things from children, but the transition from childhood to adult is marked by the attempt to substitute the public for the private. Individuals represent their happiness as deriving from relations with “relations,” in the widest sense. The importance of the notions of public and private (terms that I apply to Pintupi implicit notions) is the capacity to maintain the official representation of co-residents as “one family,” as all walytja. This will become clearer with an analysis of other emotional concepts.

FRAGMENTS OF THE SELF

The next set of concepts have what Wittgenstein called “a family resemblance,” which the Pintupi recognize in using the term ngaltutjarra as the conventionalized expression for any of these feelings. In reference, however, they may be distinguished as indicated here. “Compassion” (ngaltu) and “grief” or “sorrow” (yalurrpa) both refer to a feeling of sorrow or concern for another, a kind of compassionate empathy, although “grief” ordinarily represents the more extremes of emotionality. The concept I translate as “melancholy” or “pining” (watjilpa) seems to convey a similar state of spirit, but one whose original source is oneself. Thus, a man might say “ngaltutjarra, ngayuku, ngurra,” meaning something like “poor me, my own country.” He points to himself, his feelings of melancholy, as one who should be “pitied.”

Underlying the concept of compassion is a recognition of “relatedness” or “closeness”—a recognition of shared identity (walytja) or empathy between the person who is compassionate and another. This is the source of the other’s legitimate claim on one’s compassion. Not to have compassion (or not to display it) is seen as “not liking” the other person, that is, not recognizing the link, and this “linking” is a matter of great concern to Pintupi.

As one might expect, such feelings are cultivated and to be a “compassionate” person (and when to be such) is the goal of con-
siderable childhood training. Typically, young children holding an item desired by another who cries for it are told “be compassionate, give it to him” (ngaltutjarra, yuwarra). Adults frequently play at this with children, who then become accustomed to sharing. Similarly, on hearing of some misfortune which befell another, Pintupi commonly bespeak their compassion: “Oh, the poor fellow” (ngaltutjarra).

Indeed, without going into too much detail, it seems that the Pintupi live up to their ideal often enough; they are moved to help at the sight of another’s pitiful condition. Food is never denied to the hungry, as the story of a prospector, Lassiter, illustrates: lost in the Gibson Desert and without food, he was fed and cared for by the Pintupi’s neighbors, the Pitjanytjatjarra. For similar reasons, one should not threaten the weak. “Poor fellow, she is harmless,” they may say of a woman whose husband had beaten her viciously.

It is on this basis that the widely-described pressure of relatives on richer kin is brought to bear. It is among kin most appropriately that such considerations are important. One who has something should share with the less fortunate. Jurally, a relative should share food, but since it cannot be shared with everyone, whether he or she does share or not is considered to be a manifestation of “affect.” One who is not given food is likely to say, “You don’t love me.” What seems clear is that concepts of affect are the idiom in which relatedness is expressed. Those who do not exhibit such feelings and come through with the goods are felt to be “hard” or “like rocks.” Like rocks, they are without emotion, without recognition of shared identity, and perhaps not quite human. I have heard Pintupi threaten those whom they considered to have responded frequently in less than human fashion; one who treats another this way, who denies relatedness, invites physical retribution: “I’m no bullock” (i.e., I’m human).

That the concept of “compassion” is best understood as the notion of being moved by another’s wishes or condition is expressed by one man’s hope that the doctors would take away his insane wife. They should not, he said, feel sorry for her (ngalturrinytja wiya), but should do what he wanted (i.e., have compassion on him).

In Pintupi life, “compassion” is both a characteristic quality of social relations and a concept commonly alluded to. It has significant implications for decision-making and consensus. Most threats
of sending away wrongdoers or sacking individuals from their jobs (no matter how well-intentioned) were followed by a subsequent decision to “give them one more chance.” The wrongdoers often prompted this by referring to kinship links or asking, “Don’t you trust me?” and thereby alluding to the link between them. They rarely failed to evoke “compassion,” as the plaintiffs reflected on the moral ideal. Such a strategy also permits the plaintiff to display publicly his or her “compassion,” his or her moral qualities. I say this because, despite their “compassion,” leaders do not seem to forget or truly forgive the offense—as private comments after such occasions revealed. “Strangers” (non-relations) are less likely to receive much concern, although the Pintupi are certainly capable of extending their compassion to anyone with a “good case” (including anthropologists).

Indeed, few of the accounts available about Aborigines illustrate cruelty or torture; many are the accounts of their kindness to unfortunate Europeans. “Compassion” or “pity” seems a highly adaptive quality among people whose resources are somewhat unreliable. Men told me they would never send visitors away from their own waterholes in time of drought. Such action was unthinkable: “We would feel compassion for them.” The concept clearly phrases the limitations on an individual’s autonomy and subjects decisions rather consistently to a shifting push-and-pull, a quality noted by Nancy Williams (n.d.) for the so-called Murningin. The possibility is always there of manipulating others’ actions toward one’s desired end, because others will feel “compassion,” or because one makes the other think that he or she should feel it.

This does not mean that Pintupi are never selfish. Individuals sometimes hide possessions to avoid sharing, and often enough they are goaded into giving by veiled taunts. With possessions such as cigarettes or extra clothing hidden, one may express “compassion” without having to give up anything. This withholding may be rationalized by commenting that the other is “not really walytja” or “nothing to do.” On the other hand, some individuals are generous in the service of building a kind of informal following. Such an informal leader must be “compassionate” with individuals or lose his following. Those leaders (in the Council) who tried to be “hard,” to stick to their decisions, also tried to seek a support base from the white boss or the white community (government employees).
To show "compassion," then, may be a strategy by which individuals hope to gain something else. Perhaps fear of retaliation by the offended party is the motivation. There are, it seems, numerous possibilities, and only knowledge of the individual's history, his or her dispositions or personality would enable us to interpret the motivational basis for his or her acts. By acting with compassion, whatever the motivations, one's act is presented in a favorable light for oneself and for others.

This emotion is a moral ideal, an emotion Pintupi say that people should have, just as it is said that one should love his or her spouse and children. Acts are interpreted in light of this theory of motivation. The cultural value placed on such emotions does permit individuals to elaborate and emphasize them, both in their self-understanding and in comprehending others.

The related concept of "grief" (yalurrpa) is seen as generated by loss or threat of loss of some related other, usually a close relative, felt as a loss of part of oneself. Such "grief" is expressed by wailing at the news of a death as well as through the expected self-injury (head-gashing, thigh-stabbing) appropriate for the kind of kin relationship—a kind of imprinting of the body social onto the individual. So is the native cat of mythology said to have split his own head open with "grief" (yalurrtu yatunu) at the sight of his dead sons. Another native cat, grief-stricken at seeing the slaughter of his relatives by another group, was moved to revenge.

"Grief" is a powerful emotion, a real shaking of the foundations, an intimation of mortality. As seen by the Pintupi, "sorrow" is a particularly human trait. "Grief" attaches to many situations surrounding death. One should not mention the names of the dead because their relatives will be too "sorry." This may last for years after the death of a close relative; some women will wail for years after a son's death. Because people are "too sorry," they may avoid the place where one of their kin died for several years. For others to approach such a site would bring anger from the deceased relatives, because of disrespect. Abandonment of a place in which death occurs is a cultural convention, a proper way to behave. It need not derive spontaneously from "feelings" of grief, but the display is clearly meant as an expression of one's relatedness to the dead. Similarly, one's claim to "land ownership" is an emotional one, through relationship to one buried at a place. Goodale (1971:100) has reported similar customs for the Tiwi, and it may be worth considering the
importance of the accretion of "sorrow" to associated things in the context of the value of sacred sites, sacred objects, and the like. The significance of place in Aboriginal thought may derive some emotional force from the displacement of emotional ties with the dead to places associated with them.

In any case, the concept of "sorrow" is clearly attached to ritual paraphernalia and to sacred places of The Dreaming, both considered of extreme value. On sight of these, older men often begin to wail, because they are "sorry." An informant explained this to me with reference to the designs incised on a spearthrower:

Dead men schooled me, gave it to me. When people see it they get sorry. Give one like this to a man and people will see it and give you a woman. Too much crying (from sorrow) for this one.

While this single context cannot make it fully clear, it seems that ritual and sacred things are associated with the memory of people now dead, who previously handled them and passed them on. This is the source, in part, of their emotional value. Charged with reminders of the dead, they may make one cry with "sorrow," remembering that which binds them to this object.

The Pintupi make this explicit in revealing rituals to the young men. The elders frequently emphasize that "this belonged to dead men, you have to hold it and pass it on." I think we cannot help but regard this theme in male ritual as drawing upon the strongest sentiments of relatedness and continuity juxtaposed with mortality to imbue that which is of universal and transcendent value—The Dreaming—with the most powerful sentiments of identity available. The significance of this binding or "cathecting" of initiates to the transcendent makes sense to us in the light of the other fundamental social implications of "sorrow."

In narrative—and other evidence supports this—"sorrow" or "compassion" was often said to be the reason that revenge expeditions turned back. If they had sufficient time to think about the identity of the one they wanted to kill, they became "sorry." In one reported case, the revenge party threw spears at the guilty man, which he repeatedly and successfully dodged. They became sorry for him and let him go.

On the other hand, it was said that a man who had recently committed a grievous ceremonial offense was recently killed by another group—"no sorrow." This identifies a clear problem for those who
want to bring sanctions to bear on offenders against moral law—that is, how to overcome the "feeling" of sorrow or compassion for "relations" that might prevent them from carrying out punishment.⁴ In some cases, this is circumvented by asking outsiders to punish relatives who had broken "the Law" (a term used to refer to the moral imperative of The Dreaming). Close relatives might be "too sorry" to carry out punishment, as I described above. (This is certainly the reason why outsiders perform ritual circumcisions.) Although the explanation for such expeditions of punishment is "sorrow," the motivation may be vastly more complex for any individual; one may go out of duty, honor, love, hate, or self-hate. "Grief" seems a convenient way to express complex feelings about a person now lost.

In reference to punishments carried out (such as past killings of wrongdoers) the Pintupi often mention that there was "no sorrow." The Pitjanytjatjarra, they said, would kill anyone who crossed the path of their travelling secret ceremonies—women, children, or whites; they were not moved by "sorrow." Great anger, as at the sight of a heinous moral crime, could move men to "spear anyway" (wapaltu wakala); that is, without recognition of the opposing party. This, they say, would be without sorrow, without consideration of the identity of the other person. Drunkenness might produce the same excuse for violence: ignorance of the identity of another. This explains the threats to get revenge "anytime, when I'm drunk."

One might argue that the importance of male initiation and male cult is the way in which a man is re-oriented to a greater value than his relatedness to kin; namely, to the Law, The Dreaming. Those who violate The Law, the Pintupi say, will be killed "without sorrow." I suggest that among other things, male initiation provides a mechanism for assuring conformity to things of transcendental value, assuring that concerns beyond the immediate feelings of relatedness will prevail when vital moral issues are at stake. Pintupi describe sacred objects, songs, and such as "Law" in pidgin, emphasizing the binding power. It seems that in Pintupi theory the binding power of Law over compassion comes from "sorrow"—the very expression of relatedness to others, just as in Freudian theory the superego derives from the id in order to oppose it. How else could

⁴ There seems to be less difficulty in cases of delict, when the aggrieved party is usually more than ready to get even.
Pintupi overcome the tendency to “compassion”? An interesting note is that the men are bound to the higher Law through the same considerations of relatedness and “sorrow” for the dead, and also that they do it as agents of a higher authority and not of their own will, so that they are not “responsible.” The Dreaming is something outside of them to which they truly must conform.

I will mention only briefly the third concept of this “family,” watjilpa. This is often rendered as “homesick,” “pinning,” “lonely,” “worry,” or “melancholy.” The core of the concept refers to separation from objects or persons of security and familiarity—family and home—places and people among which and whom one grew up and where one feels safe and comfortable. Separation from these is the source of “worrying.”

This is the Pintupi version of the sentiment Peterson (1972) referred to as an important factor in local organization. Time and again in the life histories collected, Pintupi talked of their travels and the “homesickness” (watjilpa) that made them come back to their home country. One friend (who had not seen his country for a long time) explained to me, “I close my eyes and I can see that place. It’s very green. There’s a rockhole and a hill where I used to play. My brother pushed me down—it makes me ‘homesick.’”

“SHAME”

Finally, we consider the concept of “shame” (kunta), an emotion anthropologists have frequently identified as a mechanism of social control. The Pintupi concept of kunta includes within its range the English concepts of “shame,” “embarrassment,” “shyness,” and “respect.” The concept of “shame” is usually associated with the discomfort of being observed by others in the public domain, especially at being seen to do something that is poor etiquette, ill-mannered, or wrong. It is, therefore, explained by the Pintupi as an important consideration in conduct. Small children often exhibit behavior called “shyness” (kunta) in the presence of strangers. Running behind their mothers and holding on to them, they peek at strangers from behind a shoulder. Older persons explain that the child is “getting shy” (kuntarrinpa).

For the Pintupi, “shame” (kunta) involves awareness of others; it is a representation that separates what is defined as “public” from
the “private.” It is peer group pressure that effectively socializes the young in toilet training and other matters through ridicule and “shaming.” “Shame” (kunta) is a quality of the socialized person. In this respect, as we shall see, “shame” clearly involves a growing awareness of propriety. The give and take of daily life, the intimate and informal association of people depends on activating considerations of “respect” or “shame” that make individuals reluctant to overtly impose themselves or their wishes on others.

The concept of “shame,” then, is most applicable to formal or ceremonious occasions, to the etiquette of confronting elders, to the subject of sexual relations, to meeting strangers, and to highly structured social relationships; and it is far less relevant to relations among intimates. Geertz (1973:399) has related the Balinese concept of “shame” (which he prefers to call “stage fright”) to “the cultural attempt to block the more creatural aspects of the human condition from sight.” In Bali, “shame” is attendant upon the lack of control or skill that destroys the illusion of a “play” and allows the actor to show through his or her part. The Pintupi concept of “shame” maintains a public presentation of self that is (largely) devoid of egotism, selfishness, individuality, or “animality.” It should be understood in relationship to the ideology of relatedness (walytja), which emphasizes the shared goals of egalitarian, closely-cooperative kin. By rejecting “vulgar” or “unrefined” private feelings, desires, and behavior as inappropriate for the public domain, the ideology is experienced as a “true” representation of social relations and of human nature. A few examples will illustrate this analysis.

“Embarrassment” often accompanies public occasions of speaking. Young men rarely stand up to speak on these occasions, fearing “embarrassment” (kunta). The concern is that they might seem to be making too much of themselves, pushing themselves too much above others. Like considerations are apparent in the conduct of older men who habitually begin speeches with forms of self-deprecation such as: “I’m just going to tell you a little story” (i.e., “I don’t think that you must listen to me.”). The intended message is that a person does not think he is better than the others. On public occasions, men avoid interrupting each other or even directly contradicting each other—lest they cause “embarrassment.” This gives discussion the peculiar quality of a series of discrete, disconnected speeches. The desire to avoid the impression of egotism extends to
the ritual manufacturing of ceremonial boards, the prerogative of fully initiated men. A single individual ought not to do so alone, lest he be thought conceited; he should be "ashamed." In this way, one denies being motivated by "private will"; older men speak not personally for themselves, but as representatives of the Law. This official representation is not always accepted. Young men certainly feel that there is some personal, private concern involved in ritual discipline. In so far as it is recognized, it is resented.

The "politeness" of Aborigines may be due to consideration of "embarrassment" or "shame." Often, people will not ask strangers or distant kin for food, because they are "embarrassed," afraid that such a request will be too pushy. With very close kin such considerations are less relevant, but persons may sit waiting to be offered food rather than ask for it (this certainly does not occur in one's own camp where desires are more aggressively expressed). They are "ashamed" to ask and often preface a request by saying "I am ashamed" (kuntarrinpana). A further consideration is to avoid making the desire explicit and perhaps forcing the other party to an explicit refusal that would demolish the ideology of shared identity through kinship.

Traditionally, visitors coming to a new or distant country waited outside the camp at which they arrived, waiting for those of the country to come and greet them and to invite them to come in—after which introductions would be made. Visitors waited, informants said, "to avoid embarrassment" (kuntarritjaku).

Visitors or new arrivals at Yayayi display a hesitation to speak out in meetings or discussions; they do not move as freely about the camp as do long-term residents. Rather, they tend to stay with their closest, most familiar kin, allowing the latter to speak for them or in their interests if necessary. Such circumspection is felt to be proper behavior; newcomers show "embarrassment" (kunta) if it seems that they are too forward too quickly. Full integration into the community takes time (more than a month) and some persons without close relatives always consider themselves outsiders who should defer to others in formal situations. One practical consideration, obviously, is that newcomers do not know the idiosyncrasies and current states of relations among people and could easily commit social blunders.

Pintupi attitudes to the discussion of sex with men are also guided by this concept of "embarrassment." Although considerable gossip
about sexual matters took place, I never heard any man talk or joke about sexual relations with his own wife. It is considered bad form even to refer to a man’s wife with the term “spouse” (kurri); proper etiquette replaces such a direct allusion to sexual relations with kinship terms that pair individuals in relation to the speaker, avoiding the term “spouse.” Nor would men discuss menstruation with me, because it was “shamefully embarrassing” (kuntangka).

As mentioned before, sexual relations are supposed to be private matters. The “embarrassment” related to sex is partly a fear of being observed in a private act and being laughed at. Much of the gossip about men’s sexual adventures is in the form of laughing at outrageous and apparently shameless behavior in faraway places. One older man told me that if a man gets a young girl as wife, she may be afraid or unwilling to have intercourse. He should not force her, lest she yell out or scream, and he would be “ashamed.” Sex and sexual relations, apparently, are regarded as having a great potential for creating disorder in the public realm. The Pintupi concern to control this potential—where marriage is a vital mechanism for maintaining public, social order—is understandable. Thus a number of social relationships are characterized by “shame,” which counsels avoidance or restraint in the presence of a man’s “wife’s mother,” “wife’s father,” other affines, and one’s circumcisor (a wife giver). Such relationships frequently entail use of special avoidance languages, which substitute lexemes from the avoidance language for those in the everyday one.

In another Western Desert group at Jigalong, as described by Tonkinson (n.d.), the application of the concept of kuntal to sex appears to influence the choice of “spirit-child” explanations of the cause of pregnancy over ones emphasizing intercourse or semen. Tonkinson argues that, although they do know about physiological paternity, they ideologically avoid it and the subject of biological reproduction, because (they say) “we are not like animals.” The Pintupi men also refused to talk of pregnancy and childbirth, considering them to be “shameful matters” (kuntangka), subjects for which numerous euphemisms abound. On two occasions when men did refer to the male role in procreation (saying that they “made a child appear/visible”), others nearby giggled nervously. What is being avoided, perhaps, is a human likeness to animals. These subjects are considered “shameful” (kunta) because they imply bestiality or simi-
larity to animals. One should behave in a manner unlike animals, that is, with shame. In support of this view, it seems necessary only to point out that the promiscuity of dogs is a subject of derision among the Pintupi, and that people who have intercourse with wrong categories of kin or who copulate indiscriminately (or without regard to the presence of others) are said to be “like dogs.”

Kunta as “shame” and kunta as “respect” are two sides of the same coin, in that showing “respect” for someone by consulting that person’s wishes, by not overstepping one’s bounds, or by “shyness” in stating claims, avoids embarrassment. “Respect” or “shyness” is often expressed by hesitation to speak out. Disrespect, such as refusing a person to his face without excuses, is conversely, embarrassing.

Other uses of the concept kunta emphasize its relationship to “respect” for another’s wishes, property, and rights, and concomitant restraint on personal gain or greed. For example, a number of tents were purchased for Yayayi with a government grant. Upon their arrival, it was obvious that there were not enough tents for everyone. There was much grumbling of dissatisfaction and a suspicion of greed on the part of those who had gotten tents. The head councillor, who had obtained one, explained himself: “I didn’t grab a whole lot; I have only an old one (from before) and the small one (new). I am embarrassed/respectful of theirs”—of the ones for others (kuntarrinpana tjanampa).

A MORAL ORDER

The self described in Pintupi ideology is not an aggressive, self-contained, egotistic, autonomous individual. Pintupi concepts of the emotions represent a self that recognizes a significant identity with important others, such that these others are represented as part of the self. One is malleable to these others, not “hard.” One should be moved, not stolid in willfulness. Autonomy, when it comes, comes from outside the individual and is not a product of private will. Rather, this “autonomy”—the zealousness of upholding the Law “without sorrow”—is a representation within the individual of a socially valued moral imperative.

The ideology of the emotions can be read almost as a moral text against the wrongness of private willfulness. Stanner (1966) describes the “mystery” that the Murbinbata attached to the motiva-
tion for such private will in an important myth about the "wrongful turning of life." Acceptance of these emotions as appropriate ways of "articulating experience" can be said to represent the "society's interests," although there is no self-conscious collective representation of the "community welfare." In the traditional situation, "community welfare" was achieved through individual ties or dyadic relations, through the emotional response of individuals to significant others, and through maintenance of a core of collectively accepted traditional regulations to which individuals were also emotionally bound by investing the Law with intimations of others.

Ironically, it is precisely this traditional moral solution to the problems of life in society that now constitutes an obstacle to contemporary political organization.

EMOTIONS AND POLITICAL ORDER

I have tried to show that their concepts of the emotions effectively represent for the Pintupi the phenomenological relationship of individuals to the world around them, social and physical, how they define and interpret "reality," and also how they thereby recreate the "world" that is experienced. What remains is to examine the impact of this view of the self on the maintenance of order and authority in Pintupi life. How are these "emotions" related to the inability of contemporary Pintupi to establish accepted rules regulating behavior at Yayayi in order to reduce conflict? Egalitarian societies have always the problem of justifying authority.

As the Pintupi see it, morally binding social consensus cannot be generated by human decision-making processes. It is not people who create; they are not autonomous. Rather, consensus is maintained by common adherence to a shared, external, and autonomous code: The Dreaming, a "plan of life" given once-for-all (Stanner 1966). The crucial aspects of The Dreaming were explicated for me as follows: "It is not our idea; it is a big Law. We have to sit down along it like all the dead people who went before us."

What they call the Law, then, is not the idea of any person, it is not something made by humans. Not being the creation of any person or group, it is outside human control. As such it is not the vehicle of any private interests or selfish pursuits; it is, truly, impersonal. Men who cite The Dreaming as dictating a certain course of
action are not seen as making a personal statement of preference or desire, but as offering impersonal, non-self-related precedent, divorcing themselves from interest in the outcome. Thereby they avoid "shame." Such behavior is manifest particularly among "equals."

By following this course, one presents oneself as not trying to force others to submit to one's own will; all submit to the same transcendent moral imperative, before which humans are merely passive. Besides avoiding embarrassment, this "strategy" also removes the decision from any quarrel or negotiation, from pleas for "compassion." If, for example, I say that the Law dictates that men under age twenty-five cannot drive vehicles, I am saying that no amount of wheedling or attempts to "move" me to pity will matter: it is not my will, it is the Law. Thus does The Dreaming seem to be the appropriate idiom for political authority in a Pintupi society without changing conditions necessitating rapid changes in Law.5

Human decisions can never be accorded a similar status, as Law which must be followed. Decisions of the Village Council, even though made by elders, lacked the binding moral force. This was a consequence of their perceived ontological status. Since they were not made by The Dreaming, they were seen as arbitrary and not binding. Except for very close kin, no individual simply on the basis of being an elder can tell one what to do. In the Pintupi view, a man can do so only insofar as he represents The Dreaming, insofar as his command is not his will but is only a mediation. New rules regarding consumption of liquor obviously did not come from this true ground. They were "only made by men," and since it was "only their idea," it need not be followed.

There are none who in themselves possess authority or the right to create that which others must follow. As I have explained elsewhere (Myers n.d.), authority is achieved by first identifying oneself with an external, impersonal authority—making one's authority a mediation of publicly accepted obligation rather than private will. The Law—legitimate authority—does not come from the self; it is not arbitrary or motivated by individual interests. The implications of this become clear when we examine how the Village Council

5 See Myers (n.d.) for a more thorough analysis of this problem.
operates and why they seek to have a European "boss," whom they have the right to fire.

Generally, a white boss is someone outside the community. His decisions are similarly beyond the system of kinship and persuasion through "compassion." Decisions made by the Council, even though they are considered the heads of the community, are usually taken to the white boss for ratification. If these decisions come to have unfortunate consequences, the blame is often shifted to the white boss. So, when a worker is fired from his job or his wages reduced for lack of work, it is usually the white boss who will take the blame. The Councillors themselves may want to fire the person, but they have difficulty in maintaining that decision in the face of pressure from relatives to be "compassionate." Although they cannot claim that it is Law, the Councillors may and do often claim that it is outside of their hands and of their responsibility. The law that the boss embodies is not seen as the product of the Councillors, which it really is. It is not tinged, therefore, with the air of their egotism, self-expression, or their interests. It would seem that the white boss is used as a means of projecting and transforming their own decisions into Law, which must be followed. Unfortunately, since the boss is a man and a person, he too comes to be "like a kinsman" and the system breaks down.

This analysis of how the emotions define and orient Pintupi individuals in their social world shows why the principles used by men in political interaction should have a claim to being outside the creation or subjectivity of the users, as an historical and timeless truth. Both "compassion" and "shame" demand that legitimate authority must be represented as external to the self and morally binding on all. I have tried to describe how this binding quality is itself generated out of the very emotions that emphasize relatedness and identity with others. Authority can be exercised not only without contradicting the fundamental image of Pintupi society as "relatedness" (walytja) but it even comes to represent the maintenance of that principle. This is done, however, through what I might call a "non-explicit" representation of the community.

Instead, the image and reality of relatedness is maintained through fear of shame, effectively effacing from the public domain the egotistical aspects of individuality. The strong value on egalitarianism entails that Pintupi not seem to stress their own wishes. Rather they should appear at least to be emphasizing
something external and objective to them, timeless, eternal principles: The Dreaming. Thus, the idiom of persuasion is precedent or Law, because one ought not to coerce transparently or convince others to follow one's own whims. Consequently, men oratorically belittle their contributions to discussion and decision and only in private brag about how they "turned" the discussion in their favor. This is sufficient, however, because by channeling their individual pursuits through the impersonal idiom, the emotion ensures the maintenance of both the Law and the experience of society as "egalitarian closely cooperating kin." Thus do the emotions ensure representation within the individual of the "community welfare."

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