Ars oblivionalis, ars inveniendi: The Cherub Figure and the Arts of Memory*

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Abstract

To serve their purpose well, many so-called mnemonic images in the Middle Ages facilitated meditation and invention by presenting many rich materials in a highly abbreviated form, which could be expanded and recombined for a variety of compositions. To abbreviate fruitfully requires rigorous compression and selection, a kind of forgetting that was distinguished both in theory and practice from rote recitation or learning by heart. The twelfth- and thirteenth-century diagram called the Cherub offers an excellent example of how such an image was used in study and composition. Focusing on six versions of it, this essay demonstrates that the medieval cherub image is not an illustration tied to any particular text but functioned independently as an analytical tool, an art for inventing arguments, which incorporated the methods of medieval dialectic and rhetoric.

It may seem odd to begin an essay on the arts of memory by talking about forgetting, indeed, about an *art* for doing so. Surely, one would suppose, the purpose of an art of memory is exactly to forestall forgetting, to ensure that one had every single experience and bit of knowledge accumulated in a lifetime at one's immediate call, that one can in fact make of one's mind a universal encyclopedia of all that has ever been said or thought, rather as matters put on the Internet today are said to be incapable of erasure. People sometimes say to me, when I tell them that I work on arts of memory, "Well, I am more concerned about forgetting." They say this as though they were saying something clever and original. They aren't: Themistocles, the great Athenian admiral, supposedly asked to be taught an art of forgetting because his memory was already so crowded that it needed refreshing. The emphasis in the ancient accounts is on Themistocles' remarkably complete and immediate *recollection*; the admiral's playful wish to learn forgetting, in other words, directly attests to the copiousness and security of his mnemonic inventory.[1] Forgetting has always been a necessary part of the craft of remembering. Failing to recognize this elementary condition indicates a basic misunderstanding about the purpose and function of mnemonic craft and about the nature of the mental techniques involved, including most famously the making of elaborate mental images placed in multichambered constructions. From antiquity, the arts of memory in Europe were conceived of as investigative tools for recollective reconstruction and selection, serving what we now call creative thinking. The need for structured memory storage was understood as a support for making new thought and composition, not for simply preserving all the past. I will soon return to this point, but I state it clearly now as well: the rote reiteration of a memory store is not what was intended when medieval writers spoke of *ars memorativa*. In both dialectic and rhetoric, memory craft was practiced as a tool of invention, rationally discovering and selectively recombining things one had previously learned for a particular purpose. In that sense, recollecting must always also involve some forgetting.

During his elegant, eloquent encomium on the extraordinary depth and power of his memory, St. Augustine writes:

> I arrive in the fields and vast mansions of memory, where are treasured innumerable images brought in there from objects of every conceivable kind perceived by the senses. There too are hidden away the modified images we produce when by our thinking we magnify or diminish or in any way alter the information our senses have reported. There too is everything else that has been consigned and stored away and not yet engulfed and buried in oblivion. . . . The huge repository of the memory, with its secret and unimaginable caverns, welcomes and keeps all these things, to be recalled and brought out for use when needed; and as all of them have their particular ways into it, so all are put back again in their proper places. . . . This I do within myself in the immense court of my memory, for there sky and earth and sea are readily available to me, together with everything I have ever been able to perceive in them, apart from what I have forgotten.[2]

"Apart from what I have forgotten.". . . In the cheerful admission of that phrase lies an essential divide between a modern and a medieval understanding of the cognitive function of memory. To have forgotten things is seen by us now as a failure of knowledge, however ordinary a failure it may be, and therefore a reason to distrust the power of memory altogether. Yet to have forgotten some things was understood in Augustine's culture as a necessary condition for remembering others.

It is helpful to distinguish two sorts of forgetting, resulting from different causes. There is the kind that happens because one failed to record something in the first place, the sort of thing Augustine is talking about here. This should not even be called

forgetting because, as Aristotle makes clear in his treatise *On Memory and Recollection*, one cannot properly be said to remember anything until one has a mental image of it impressed in memory, which one can then later recall.[3] The other kind is deliberate and selective forgetting, the sort of forgetting that itself results from an activity of memory. One can demonstrate this from the so-called *artes oblivionales* found in a few late humanist treatises on memory art.[4] The oblivion discussed has to do with how to refresh one's search networks, not with worries about the accuracy or partialness of one's memories. As Lina Bolzoni has commented, "The techniques for forgetting handed down by the treatises are testimony to the persistence and power of the images," for they address tasks of sorting out and reducing the number of memory cues rather than suppressing or otherwise editing content one has previously learned.[5] As the story is told, Themistocles was motivated by this same need, to simplify his memory store and refresh his recollection by reducing its "crowdedness." In memory technique, crowding—either by cramming so many memories into stored places that one can no longer "see" them clearly or (even better) by deliberately covering one set of memories with others so as to rearrange their links and pathways—is always presented as the best way of forgetting something. The underlying assumption is that human memories, once constructed, cannot ever really be obliterated. They are best forgotten by being repositioned and relocated in other networks of associations.[6]

In the passage above, Augustine is certainly speaking of a consciously trained memory, one whose denizens, like prey (for he often speaks of memories as being like animals to be tracked from their lairs, whose tracks or vestiges are to be followed through their familiar pathways in the forest),[7] can be rationally sought out via their particular routes when needed for use, then returned to their proper places when finished with. But this edifice, this vast treasury, is chosen and constructed. It is a work of art, using the materials of nature as all arts do, but consciously crafted for some human use and purpose.

In his *History, Memory, Forgetting*, the late, great French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, himself a profound student of Augustine, complained that arts of memory are "an outrageous denial of forgetfulness and . . . of the weaknesses inherent in both the preservation of [memory] traces and their evocation."[8] In a similar vein, Harald Weinrich in *Lethe*, a book that sweeps engagingly over the theme of forgetting in canonical Western literature, states that *ars memorativa* represents itself as "an art that can serve to overcome forgetting." He archly observes that in its celebrated advice on making multicompartmental structures for a rich trove of remembered matters, "only forgetting has no place."[9] Yet, as Augustine makes abundantly clear, Weinrich is wrong in saying that. Not only does forgetting have its honored place in an examination of *memoria*—after all, Augustine devotes a whole section of his discussion to the paradox that he can remember that he has forgotten something—for forgetting, of a sort, is essential to constructing an art of memory in the first place.

But how can this be? Here, I must return to what is meant by rote memory. Memorizing by rote or mechanically is a human capacity that certainly has its uses, even life-saving ones, as when machine operators are trained to act so habitually that the steps in a safety procedure come to them without thinking. Those valuable uses, however, are often mistakenly conflated with accuracy of reproduction, as though rote memory and accurate memory were necessarily linked. This is an easy error to make. I have done so several times myself, but I have concluded that it is a seriously misleading error.[10]

By the phenomenon of rote memory we mean iteration, the ability to repeat things without fail in the same order over and over. The virtue of rote—in a life-threatening situation, for example—lies precisely in its mindlessness. Because there is only one way to do it, something can be done with great reliability, like a tool that can perform only one task. But this is because it can be done only in one way. In other words, what is most distinctive about rote is not its accuracy but its iterability. We might say it can be accessed only along one line, and, once the procedure is started, it will unfold in the same direction in the same steps until it stops, over and over. To use an analogy from computer programming, rote memory provides a read-only memory, vital, to be sure, for a great many tasks, but neither editable nor inventive. One also requires a random access memory; this task is particularly addressed by the structures and itineraries of *ars memorativa*.

In his lectures on Aristotle's discussion of memory and recollection, dated 1254–57, Albertus Magnus distinguishes recollective investigation from rote solely in terms of mnemonic access.[11] Recollection is a rational procedure, involving associated conceptual sequences, with a variety of starting points from which one can find (invent) what one is attempting to retrieve from memory. There are three basic categories of such starting points: from exact likeness; from opposition; or from some similarity—in Aristotle's term, "neighborliness" (*súneggus*).[12] So in any recollection procedure, one can start off from at least three different access gates instead of just one. "This," Albertus says, "is how recollecting differs from rote learning [*iterato addiscere*], since recollection can be set in motion by any" of several means, whether by the logic of the subject matter or by our own habitual associations. Rote, though, is not an investigative procedure (and is therefore not properly recollection) because it has no such navigational systems. Someone who knows only by rote, Albertus points out, has no resources if his memory fails. He simply "will not recall or recollect" what he wants.[13]

Thus, the distinction between rote recitation and recollective reconstruction hinges on the issue of mnemonic access. Discussing rote memories, Hugh of St. Victor says that people who have memorized by rote have only one point of access to what they know. Essentially, they are like people trying to find something in a book without any supporting structures: no chapters, no page numbers, no headings, no punctuation, and certainly no index. One is doomed to start at the beginning

and search through the book linearly and sequentially until one finds what one wants.[14] And if, on another occasion, one wanted to find it again, one would have to go through the same laborious process—unless, of course, one had marked it in some way for quicker retrieval. What the structuring procedures learned in *ars memorativa* support is the mind's own ability, when augmented in such a way, to retrieve quickly and securely by looking for something using a good mental map. Of the Homeric rhapsodists of the ancient world—those men who were said to be able to recite all of Homer with great precision from start to finish—Xenophon commented, invoking a common ancient example of this principle, "your rhapsodists are consummate as reciters, but they are very silly fellows themselves."[15] It is not the accuracy of their recitation that is criticized but their general idiocy, their foolishness in being unable to put their knowledge to productive use. They recite only Homer and only by rote. By contrast, the structures of mnemonic art were intended to provide multiple access routes to the contents of memory, supporting the mind's unaided computational abilities with a random-access scheme.

Recollective accuracy is a separate issue. Neither the method of rote memorization nor the method of making mental retrieval structures will in itself much affect the accuracy of one's memory. A person can inaccurately memorize items in a series by rote as readily as she can accurately recall them within a retrieval scheme structured by markers and cues. Faithful accuracy depends more on a well-developed talent for attentive observation, continuing practice, craft mastery, and, especially, concentration and repetition during the initial stages of memory storing (neuroscience recognizes the value of repetition, normatively three times at ten-minute intervals; "sleeping on it" measurably aids the secure storage of memories).[16]

The ancient art of memory was conceived to serve recollection, not retention per se. This is evident from where it is discussed both in manuals of rhetoric and in the scholastic commentaries on Aristotle's brief treatise *On Memory and Reminiscence*, appended to his work *On the Soul*. Commenting on this work, both Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas discuss *ars memorativa* as a tool of recollection, for memory access and retrieval of matters previously stored. In the words of Albertus, "recollection is nothing other than the investigation by memory of what has been forgotten."[17] Recollection is a rational activity, it is investigation, and it seeks to retrieve "what has been forgotten." An art of recollection is not an art to *overcome* forgetting or one that denies forgetfulness, as one might deny the existence of or obliterate an enemy. Recollection begins with what is forgotten and seeks to reconstitute the ways to recover it. This description assumes that a memory, once laid down, is always in the brain, and so can be uncovered by reconstructing its tracks (*vestigia*). To make a coarse analogy, a forgotten memory is like the man in the *oubliette*, that mythical narrow chamber to which a prisoner might be consigned and left "forgotten" because no one would or could investigate his whereabouts.[18] He was not annihilated, he was still where he had been put, and still alive (so long as he was fed), but no one had the way to find him again. This conception of forgetting is found anciently, notably in Plato, but its even greater significance in the Middle Ages comes from the fact that it is fundamentally biblical, wherein forgetting and remembering both are conceived as resulting from paying attention, that is, from whether one is in God's sight (*in conspectu Dei*) or not.[19]

In rhetoric and dialectic alike, *ars memorativa* was presented as an art essential to the making of new composition. As invention, it was considered equally a part of dialectic and of rhetoric.[20] In his logical work on the topics of argument, Aristotle associated it with finding rational arguments, as did Boethius.[21] In ancient rhetoric, it is associated with both invention and disposition, as a means for an orator to keep his main subject matters in mind in their best persuasive order while speaking extempore in forum or law court. It came as well to be a craft most useful for preaching. It might be helpful now to set the arts of memory within a historical frame and to review how practical *memoria* adapted to changed circumstances during the thousand-plus years it was considered essential for any educated and devout person to acquire, at least in some degree.

The surviving pre-Ciceronian accounts of mnemonic practices tell some significant stories about their pedagogical function, but none is connected specifically to rhetoric. There are accounts from antiquity of children playing memory games, and many more of prodigious memory feats involving reciting the texts of the poets (the *Aeneid* backwards, for example). But none of these involve the *memoria* of rhetoric. The essential exercise in ancient and medieval education was to memorize quantities of the Poets (or of Scripture, or of both), the foundational literary texts upon which all further education depended. Begun as a child learned to read, exercise in such verbatim memorization was an aspect of the pedagogy of grammar. It is called *recitatio* in antiquity and indeed still is ("recitation"), the word-for-word memorization and recollection of text.[22] Such elementary memory work, however, should not simply be conflated with the image making counseled in connection with rhetorical *memoria verborum* such as that described in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. That is presented specifically as an exercise for orators to strengthen their memories, and it is in that context that we must seek to understand it.

The earliest account of memory techniques we now possess is found in a fragmentary Stoic text called *Dissoi logoi* (literally "Double Arguments," a Greek version of the curriculum exercise of arguing positive and negative sides of a question, or *argumentum in utramque partem*), in which a student is advised to make rebuslike associations to remember names and unfamiliar or difficult words.[23] Thus, to remember the name Chrysippus, one may link the syllables to an image—perhaps a golden horse (*chrysos* and *hippos*). The exercise embodied by *dissoi logoi* was practiced and taught as a device of composition. It is significant, I think, that the other Greek text in which an art of memory is mentioned is Aristotle's *Topikōn*, where the method of analysis and composition based upon *topoi* of argu-

ment is likened specifically to the topoi of an art of memory, in that arguments are situated in orderly memory places (*topoi*), whence they can be called forth by recollection as needed. To investigate exactly what Aristotle meant by such "topics," and how what he may have meant differed from what Cicero meant when he in turn wrote on the "topics," and then Boethius in his turn, is not my task here. But it is clear in both these Greek texts that the work of mnemonic *techne* was associated even this early with tasks of *invention*, "finding" hard words or rational arguments.[24] It is also clearly associated with school subjects, especially (perhaps) the arts of the *trivium*, but by no means confined to these, for *memoria* was regarded as a discipline essential to them all.[25]

The continuing influence of the version of *memoria artificialis* uniquely described in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* has been overstated by modern historians.[26] It has even been plausibly doubted that Cicero ever actually practiced it. Quintilian describes a simplified, practical mnemonic use of images, mentally placing a vivid image at strategic locations in a room to recall the matters of one's speech (*memoria rerum*), for example, an anchor if one's topics include ships, and so on. He also suggests annotating specific hard words and important names with an image that would help one to remember them (the matter of the memory advice given in *Dissoi logoi*).[27] As Ruth Taylor-Briggs has demonstrated in a set of important articles, immediately after it was composed the influence of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* appears to have been slight in classical antiquity and through the earliest Middle Ages, until the ninth century; it acquired a full commentary only in the eleventh century.[28] Yet there is abundant evidence that trained *memoria* continued to be thought essential to compositional meditation throughout this same period. What can be the source of such ongoing prestige?

It is not the rhetoricians of the late classical schools. Cicero's *De inventione*, his most important rhetorical work for most of the Middle Ages, does not discuss rhetorical *memoria*. The rhetoricians of the late Roman Empire do sometimes discuss *memoria* as important in rhetoric, though what they say bears little resemblance to the exemplary techniques described in the *Ad Herennium*. The fourth-century rhetorician Julius Victor, an important source for Alcuin and the Carolingian-Ottonian courts, conflates *memoria* in rhetoric with elementary *recitatio* (recitation), advising that "memory should be trained in learning by heart and word for word as many writings as possible, both your own and those of others."[29] Although Julius Victor defines *memoria* as "the firm mental grasp of matters and words for the purpose of invention," the benefit of such training to an orator is that we "will always have with us something to imitate," on which to model our style and establish our compositional abilities. He dismisses "many people [who] offer precepts on places and images, which seem to me not to be effective."[30]

It is in early monasticism, not in the formal teaching of rhetoric, that the recollecting activity of memory assumed its privileged medieval position as the engine of invention. Monasticism developed the craft of meditation upon written, memorized texts (*sacra pagina*) as a self-conscious practical art of invention for individual prayer but also, importantly, for homilies, colloquies, meditations, and prayers that were made publicly.[31] Within this general craft, a specific art concerned with penitential meditation developed, using the topics of sin and virtue to arrange one's thoughts and dispose one's composition. This meditation involved visualizing scenes, events, and the buildings described in the Bible mentally. One was admonished to "paint" in one's mind the pictures which the texts raise up: *enargeia* ("bringing-before-the-eyes" or "vividness") was an especially valued characteristic of style. I have written extensively on this "monastic rhetoric" elsewhere, and it is not my task to replicate my arguments and evidence here.[32] One conclusion seems to me inescapable: in the monks' meditational craft—which they speak of as *memoria* or *memoria spiritualis* ("pious memory" of divine texts)—the arts of memory described by the *auctor ad Herennium* and by Quintilian played no discernible direct role at all.

The late classical source that is truer to the spirit of Ciceronian *memoria* than the late rhetoricians themselves is Augustine, not the work on rhetoric falsely attributed to him, but his work on teaching converts, *De catechizandis rudibus* (*Instructing Beginners in the Faith*). In this work, Augustine uses two technical terms for recollection, *ad uerbum* and *summatim*, but distinguishes them clearly from one other in respect to their tasks, associating *memorandi summatim* (which is the rhetoricians' *memoria rerum*) specifically with the task of composition:

> Even if we have memorized [many books of the Bible] verbatim, [when we teach] we should neither just recite . . . the entire books, nor, by retelling in our own words [through paraphrase], explicate every single matter contained in these volumes . . . but having grasped them all [in summary fashion] by their main topics . . . certain things can be joined together [by the speaker] which are more worthy to be examined closely, more pleasantly listened to and arranged in their constituent parts, . . . dwelling on each for a time as though to loosen it up and expand it, offering it for inspection and admiration by the minds of the audience.[33]

Subject memory is the essential device of composition, the preacher choosing to dilate upon certain matters in the text that he has selected for particular inspection by his audience, while having the entire text at his disposal in order, learned both verbatim—which is what Augustine means here by *ad uerbum edidicimus*—and by its subject matters or *summatim*, in topical fashion.[34] Verbatim recitation, then as now, meant memorizing and reciting texts by rote (*ad verbum ediscere*, *memoriter reddere*)—this is clear from what Augustine says in the passage quoted above.

Monasticism was fundamentally text-based. Augustine called memory "a kind of stomach of the mind,"[35] and in monastic writing, chewing and digestion are favored tropes for reading. Yet the conventions of monastic meditation also included vivid imagining, of buildings and other artifacts described in the Bible, for the purpose of composing additional meditation. These were sometimes called *picturae*, as in the elaborately imagined verbal *pictura* (as he calls it) of the tabernacle in Book 2 of the treatise *On the Tripartite Tabernacle* by Adam of Dryburgh, composed sometime about 1180.[36] Adam introduces his project (which was commissioned by his abbot, John of Kelso) as a task of painting a picture of the Exodus Tabernacle in order to organize—to dispose—the themes of his meditation on the body of Christ, the Church, which forms the second major division of his composition (i.e., the second "Tabernacle"):

> according to your command, holy father, that I should depict the oft-spoken tabernacle in a schematic plan as well, so far as I might understand and be able: now I put my hand to its visualization, insofar as may be seen in some fashion with a bodily sight; both what can be understood through faith concerning the general Church of the elect, and through meditation be devised about particular ones of the elect.[37]

It is impossible to determine from the text alone whether Adam was referring to an actual drawing or to a mental picture: the words he uses are indeterminate, and if there ever was a picture accompanying this treatise, it has not survived in any manuscript. In meditational writing, the process of imagining these structures is commonly referred to with the verbs *pingo* and *depingo*, as well as *fingo* and its derivatives. There are many examples from the fifth century through the twelfth, and even later. Richart de Fournival (act. 1240–60), a canon of Amiens, said that all vivid text had *peinture* ("picture") as well as *parole* ("speech"), these two being the roads to the portals of memory.[38] The exact source of this recurrent medieval emphasis on mental picture-making while reading and meditating is not at all clear. Something is surely owed to the cultivation in Late Antique rhetoric of *ekphrasis* and of stylistic *enargeia* more generally as being cognitively and persuasively valuable, an emphasis that is strong as well in the rhetorical teaching of Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero. But the importance of imagining buildings and their furniture as a meditation device—specifically those various avatars of the Temple that one finds in the Bible (Noah's Ark, the Exodus Tabernacle, Solomon's Temple, the visionary Temple Mount in Ezekiel, St. John's Heavenly City)—is directly owed to traditions of meditation and contemplative composition that were adapted into earliest Christianity from classical Judaism.[39]

I will discuss just one of these devices in detail, the picture called the Cherub or the Seraph. The alternatives reflect a naming problem, arising because the text of Isaiah 6:2 stipulates that the six-winged creatures accompanying the Divine Throne are seraphs, yet the figure in the medieval manuscripts is regularly labeled a Cherub. For the sake of consistency in this essay, I will call the figure a Cherub, even though it has six wings and so is, exegetically, a seraph. There is also a Latin text called *De sex alis [cherubim]* with which it seems to be closely associated, though the nature of that link is more problematic than once thought, as I will soon discuss.[40] The text dates from about the time of the first extant versions of the drawing, but the two are frequently not found together, even in the earliest manuscripts. *De sex alis* has been ascribed wrongly to Alan of Lille (as it is in Migne, *PL*), but the earliest attributions (1190–1200) are to Clement of Llanthony, a priory near Gloucester, and its earliest provenance would seem to be English.

The examples of the Cherub drawing still extant are in manuscripts made after about 1190, though the device itself is based on earlier practices which we know about only indirectly, through intriguing hints in much earlier texts from the desert fathers and through the genre of pedagogical allegory popular in Late Antiquity—for instance, the complex allegorical scene that opens Martianus Capella's fifth-century treatise on the elements of an education called *The Marriage of Mercury and Philology*.[41] There are other, later medieval composition devices of this sort, including the various diagrams of the *Speculum theologie*, some of which, like the Cherub, also are commonly found separately.[42]

Six different versions of the Cherub image are illustrated in Figures 1–6. They are quite different from one another, though evidently the same basic design. The texts written out on their wings are recognizably the same as well, though often differently arranged and articulated, one to another. Their differences make clear how this type of picture served a mainly investigative function rather than a representational or exegetical one. These drawings are highly variable: that is the crux for comprehending their genre. Proper investigation proceeds rationally as one item cues the next in orderly sequence, but those sequences are flexible and plastic and can vary from one user to the next as their elements are recombined. That is what makes for creative analysis. So also with these particular six images of the Cherub.

Each depicted creature has six wings, two covering its body, and two interlaced rising above its head (to hide God's face), and two outstretched for flying. Most often, naked legs and/or feet of the cherubim are prominently drawn, a detail that does not accord with the biblical text in Isaiah 6:2, which describes the feet of the seraphim as covered by two of their wings. Hands are also displayed in many but not all of the versions, a detail taken from the description of the cherubim in Ezekiel 10:21—but the cherubim of Ezekiel have four wings (those guarding the ark are described as having just two). All are pictured with human faces, a detail not given in Isaiah, and in Ezekiel, the cherubim are described as having four faces, those of a man, a bull, an eagle, and a lion. Medieval exegesis consistently makes clear that the seraphs of Isaiah and the

cherubs of Ezekiel were distinct (if complementary) orders of angels, so to name a six-winged angel a Cherub is a deliberate anomaly.

The Cherub figure is not the exegetical illustration of a particular text but follows independent iconographic traditions. Indeed, independence from any particular text is a fundamental quality of the medieval Cherub, evident well before it came to be associated with the other *Speculum theologie* diagrams. The fact that the two earliest versions extant (Figs. 1 and 2) are linked with two completely different texts (*Historia scholastica* and *De sex alis*), though both were drawn in England only a couple of decades apart, suggests that Clement of Llanthony's text derives from a picture already in circulation and not the other way around. The early occurrence of Clement of Llanthony's text without the drawing, as a meditation aid introducing a Psalter, points to the same conclusion. There are three manifestations of the Cherub in English manuscripts from about 1190–1200, but one has Clement's text without the drawing (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Auct. D. 2. 1), one has the drawing but with Peter Comestor's text (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 29), and one has both the drawing and Clement's text copied together (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 66). What links Peter Comestor's and Clement's texts is their purpose: both are important sources for meditation—studious reading and composition—*meditatio* being the initial stage in planning all sorts of composition, including prayer, colloquy, and homily.[43]

From a purely mnemotechnical standpoint, the texts on the Cherub's wings could have been written onto *any* clearly organized, rational plan, such as a ladder (one thinks of John Climacus and Benedict's *Rule*), a tree (the *lignum vitae* or tree of life device used by Bonaventura and many much earlier writers), or the Tabernacle (used by Adam of Dryburgh and various Victorines). But the winged figure has evident appropriateness as a device for composing meditations on penance and for the preparation of sermons and other pastoral materials. The medieval Cherub figure conflates commentary on the four-winged *animalia* of Ezekiel 1 (called cherubim in Ezekiel 10:5–22) with the seraphim of Isaiah; with descriptions of the two-winged angels, also called cherubim, that guard the Ark in Exodus (Exodus 25) and in the Temple of Solomon (I Kings 6); and with the *animalia* that attend the Divine Throne in Revelation 4, which are adopted from Ezekiel. The cherubim-*animalia* conflation was already made in Ezekiel; Revelation 4 conflates these further with Isaiah, as the *animalia*-cherubim sing a doxology, as do the seraphim in Isaiah 6:2.[44] Jerome glosses *seraphim* as meaning "ardor, burning" and *cherubim* as "wisdom." A seraph touches a burning coal to the prophet's lips to cleanse them (Isaiah 6:6) and purify him before he can speak God's words to Israel. Thus, to call a six-winged figure a Cherub is no mistake but declares plainly the intimate links among penitential purification, ardor, wisdom, and pastoral speaking.

The Cherub's wings lay out the ways of penance by enabling a particular method of analytical thought that divides a general subject into its constituent topics. In scholastic terms, the Cherub presents a formal *divisio* of penitence, each statement of the main subject's topics being arranged in an abbreviated yet clear form, which allows each one to be readily expanded by a speaker as suits a particular occasion. The figure has the basic qualities of any mnemotechnical structure: its places (topics) are *rarus*, *clarus*, and *solempnis*.[45] The Cherub demonstrates the logical relations of the subject and its several subtopics (and sub-subtopics) but in a picture rather than solely in words. So, while the figure is, in medieval terms, mnemonic in its purpose, its intention is not simply to recall some specific words but to invent from them, to elaborate and expand the topics in the analytical manner of topical argumentation taught in both dialectic and rhetoric.

The Cherub figure is intended to help its users think and compose. To use the device, a person would need to internalize the picture, remembering the divisions of the subject in an orderly way, as headings of "wings" and "feathers." With the figure in mind (literally), one would readily have the basic topics for as many as thirty-six sermon-meditations, nearly a whole season's worth, on the general subject of penitence. Each preacher would be able to adapt the scheme to the specific occasions of his own speaking, and indeed they did. Bolzoni has demonstrated that Bernardino of Siena, the great Italian preacher of the fifteenth century, did just this, mentally adding two more feathers to each of the Cherub's six wings to make the total number of topics better suit his Lenten cycle (that is, forty-two rather than thirty-six), and since he began in midweek, on Ash Wednesday, he started with the fourth feather of the first wing.[46]

Examination of the differences among the versions of the Cherub shown in Figures 1–6 indicates how particularly each has been adapted. The earliest surviving version (Fig. 1) accords fully with the text of *De sex alis*. It is in an English manuscript, formerly in the library of the Cistercian abbey of Sawley in Yorkshire, though likely made in the scriptorium at Durham about 1190.[47] Each wing is clearly labeled on the coverts with its main topic: *confessio*, *satisfaccio*, *munditia* (or *puritas*) *carnis*, *munditia* (or *puritas*) *mentis*, *dilectio proximi*, *dilectio Dei* (confession, satisfaction, purity of body, purity of mind, love of neighbors, love of God). The number of each wing in the treatise accords with those in this version of the drawing. The subtopics depend from these wings as feathers and are so described in Clement's treatise. In this manuscript, the diagram occurs in the middle of a text on confession, "De confessionem in ultimo," a letter from Theobald d'Étampes to Bishop Robert Bloet of Lincoln.[48] The letter takes up pages 99–101: the Cherub is drawn in the middle of this text, on page 100. Right after Theobald's letter (on 102) begins the text of *De sex alis*, entitled "Incipit descriptio prime ale cherubin." It ends (108), "Explicit descriptio Magistri Clementis prioris canonicorum regularum sancte marie ciuitatis claudiocestrie [= Gloucester] de sex alis et xxxta pennis cherubin." Note that the text is identified as *descriptio*, that is, an *ekphrasis*, called

FIGURE 1. *Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 66, p. 100, English, ca. 1190, from Sawley Abbey (Cistercian), but probably made in Durham (photo: reproduced with kind permission of the Master and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge).*



FIGURE 2. *Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 29, fol. 8v, English, early 13th cent. (photo: reproduced with kind permission of the Master and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge).*

in Latin *descriptio* or *pictura*, a verbal figure that was regarded as particularly productive of *enargeia*. It was understood that the details of an *ekphrasis* could be realized quite differently in each person's imagination, for its purposes were affective and cognitive, not scientific description. The line between *descriptio* (or *pictura*) as *ekphrasis* and *descriptio* (or *pictura*) as an actual painting is thin and highly variable in medieval usage. In the rubrics in MS CCC 66, the word *descriptio* refers to both the text and the picture.[49]

For convenience sake, in the rest of this discussion, I will use the numbering of the wings in *De sex alis*, even though, as will soon be apparent, the wings in other versions do not often follow the order. As I argued earlier, all the evidence we still have indicates that a mental composition device based on a Cherub figure preceded the composition of *De sex alis*. There are more manuscripts containing only the text of *De sex alis* than ones that have the diagram, too. A copy of the text made in the early thirteenth century and likely housed in the library of Llanthony itself does not have the drawing, though it begins "Incipit explanatio Clementis Lantoniensis super alas cherubin & seraphin." Presumably the scribe thought the picture was familiar enough that it was not necessary to draw it for its *explanatio*.[50]

In Figure 1, on wing one (*confessio*) the subtopics are *veritas*, *integritas*, *firmitas*, *humilitas*, *simplicitas* (truth, integrity, steadfastness, humility, simplicity). However, as one looks more closely at the device, one is made aware that as a static object it is rather confusing. To clarify its relationships, the wings need to be imagined as moving. For instance, wings one and two are interlaced in such a way that the words are crowded into one another. (This confusion is compounded because the blue ink in which the words on alternate feathers were written has now badly faded.) To read them easily, one needs to imagine the wings unfolding so that their feathers are separated and their topics can be read. But when unfolded, they will obscure wings three and four. And so to read three and four one would need mentally to refold one and two downward and reinterlace them. In the case of wings five and six, at the very top, the topics of wing five (*dilectio proximi*) are written upside down. To read them, one needs in imagination to rotate the wing as well as unfolding it from wing six, and a user of the manuscript page would have to turn the manuscript physically, as the scribe must also have done. Given the mental gymnastics implied in this picture, one might conclude that many users, imagining compositions from the diagram, would be inclined to think of each wing as a separate topic of the general subject. In other words, the figure invites mental mobility and recombination. It should be noted that the treatise *De sex alis* does exactly this: it does not attempt to make a overarching argument about penance, nor does it contain transitions taking a reader coherently from one topic to the next but treats each wing and feather discretely and rather briefly (with the exception of wing one, *confessio*). It is a practical manual with some examples, not a developed philosophical treatise.

The version of the Cherub shown in Figure 2 was made for an English manuscript of Peter Comestor's *Historia scholastica*, dating to the early thirteenth century.[51] The drawing is the last in a series of mostly genealogical diagrams that introduce the *Historia*: it is on the verso of fol. 8 and the *Historia* begins on fol. 9. The text of *De sex alis* is not in this manuscript at all. Yet the Cherub's wings are numbered and the texts written as they are described in *De sex alis*. A user of this book, then, did not have the *explanatio*; evidently the Cherub figure was familiar enough to be useful without it. Peter Comestor's work was mined for all kinds of compositions; it would seem that the general virtue of the Cherub for study and recollection (of thoughts and matters) was not tied even at this early date to *De sex alis*.

The pairs of interlaced wings in Figure 2 (one and two and five and six) are not so crowded as in Figure 1, but the writing is more abbreviated. That on wings one and three must be read by moving those wings to the left, and those on wings two and four by moving them to the right. The upside-down *titulus*, *confessio*, on wing one reveals that the scribe had turned the page horizontally to write out the texts and neglected to return it to the vertical when he copied this *titulus*; he, of course, was bound by his vellum in a way that a user's imagination is not. What is significant is that by these motions the scribe assumes that his readers also will be able to move the image. It has certain specific actions implied within it, which—absent holding the physical book at all times—a viewer must perform mentally in order to use it well.

Just how elaborate these implied actions could become is exemplified by the Cherub shown in Figure 3, which is from an Italian manuscript of the early fifteenth century and probably Dominican in provenance.[52] In this version of the device, the six wings are attached around the face of the Cherub (red because it is inflamed by divine love), pinwheel-like, but with legs and feet. Notice the movement implied in this arrangement: to read the subjects of each wing, the figure must rotate. When this is done, each wing in turn can be read right-side up. This suggests to me that the users of this device were more concerned about the separate topics than about overall coherence, just as one would suppose to be the case for someone using the device to compose many different sermons over a period of time. This Cherub stands on a wheel (Ezekiel 10:9), labeled "the works of mercy" (*opera misericordie*), on which are written seven additional topics. (The Cherub in Fig. 1 is standing above the golden cloud of the heavens, while that in Fig. 2 stands on nothing.) The text box on the right explains that the wheel has seven spokes, which are the seven acts of mercy that God will take into account at the day of judgment; the box on the left explains the picture: "this Cherub is depicted in human likeness; it has six wings which represent the six ethical actions" by which a faithful soul may be redeemed.[53] In this manuscript, the Cherub is not associated specifically with penance but more generally with good conduct and virtuous life, topics suitable for the eclectic audiences of the preaching friars.

Something even more important is shown by the *tituli* of this picture's feathers. In this version, the wings have no numbers. The two wings covering the body are labeled *munditia carnis* and *munditia mentis*, not *confessio* and *satisfactio* as in Figures 1 and 2, and in the *De sex alis* text. The wings of Confession and Satisfaction are moved into the flying position, the pair with which the seraph moves. The subtopics of the *confessio* wing are "effusion of tears" (*lacrymarum effusio*), "holy meditation" (*sancta premeditatio*), "straightforward speech" (*simplex locutio*), "truthful thought" (*verecunda cognitio*), and "prompt obedience" (*obediencie promptitudo*). These subtopics are different from those of the *confessio* in Figures 1 and 2, culled in part from topics that in those versions appear under Satisfaction and Purity of Mind. Here is another example of this same phenomenon. The legends on the wing called Purity of Body (*munditia carnis*) accord in the earliest versions with the divisions recorded in *De sex alis* and relate to the senses: "decorous looking" (*visus pudicitia*), "chaste hearing" (*auditus castimonia*), "modest scent" (*olfactus modestia*),[54] "temperate eating" (*gustus temperantia*), "holy touching" (*tactus sanctimonia*), but in Figure 3, these categories are placed under the Satisfaction wing. The topics of Purity of Body (*mundicia carnis)* include generous almsgiving, devout prayers, participation in vigils (*vigilarum actio*), devotional exercises (*disciplinarum usus*), and observing fast days (*ieiunium*). Two of these *tituli* (prayers and almsgiving) are under *Satisfactio* in *De sex alis*, but the other three—vigils, spiritual exercises, and fasts—are not mentioned there at all. Yet these are all topics that might be appropriate to the lay and secular audience that friars were used to addressing, more than they would be to contemplative monks, who would observe such things as part of their rule.

Major changes like these were made not from ignorance or carelessness by a scribe copying some prototype. Rather, the *divisiones* of penitence have been differently analyzed, evidently to suit the preferences of those using this manuscript for the purposes of preaching and counseling. The subtopics appearing under Confession in this manuscript are just as rational as the five in the Sawley version (which were *veritas*, *integritas*, *firmitas*, *humilitas*, *simplicitas*), but they are not those found in the text of *De sex alis*. This observation indicates that the Cherub figure is no longer thought of (if it ever was) as the illustration to a treatise on which it is dependent but instead as a fully independent investigative and composition device. It also suggests that each wing, or major topic, is conceived of as independent of the others, not as part of a coherently related single analysis of penitence but rather as separate topics or *distinctiones*—like a collection of essays on penitence rather than a monograph, and thus eminently suitable for development in a series of sermons prepared over a period of time. Conceptually, one could detach each wing from the figure and examine it as one wished, turning it about, treating its subject matters at length as the various occasions for sermons might require.[55]

This detachable aspect of the wings is even more pronounced in the fourteenth-century English version of the Cherub found in the Howard Psalter (Fig. 4).[56] The wings in this version also have no numbers; each, however, is distinctly labeled by a text band.[57] The texts on the wings and feathers are nearly the same as those of the Cherub in Figure 3. Those in the text boxes to either side of the angel and on the wheel on which the Cherub stands are the same as the ones used in Figure 3, but this Cherub has been imagined very differently from the Laurenziana example. The figure is more vertical, the wings that cover the body drawn so that one simply overlaps the other, rather than interlacing the feathers (as in Fig. 1)—a design that makes the words written on them much easier to read. The two upper wings also have been simplified in this fashion. But the texts of the upper right wing are upside down (as in Fig. 3); a reader would have to manipulate the book or conceptually detach this wing from its context in order to read it. The design of this Cherub, like that in Figure 3, encourages the separate development of the topics—one does not have to proceed in a predetermined order. The Howard Cherub is found with several other of the diagrams in the so-called *Speculum theologie*, at the beginning of a richly decorated Psalter, made for an aristocratic household. The *Speculum* diagrams occur in varying combinations in manuscripts containing study and homiletic materials, often made for preaching and teaching clerics, though notably also for the libraries of lay aristocrats. Such households had many chaplains and other clerics who served the family. One should not assume, I think, that a book like this would be used only by the lay lord who commissioned it, nor that a diagram like the Cherub, as I have described it, would be too difficult for any in such a household to comprehend and use.[58]

The diagram for a Cherub in an English manuscript made after 1235 for a Dominican friar (Fig. 5) not only does not number the wings but moves each one's main *titulus* to an adjacent circle, evidently to simplify and make less crowded the writing on each feather.[59] This figure is dressed in chain mail visible in the area of its upper legs and appears thus as a militant angel of the Apocalypse (Michael?), standing on the seven-headed beast. The conflation of the Cherub device with Apocalypse subjects is, as I noted previously, another variation within the trope. The matters in this book were all written by three scribes during the mid-thirteenth century: Michael Evans described it rightly as "an anthology of works that would have served as a *vade mecum* in pulpit, confessional and private study"[60] (though it should be noted that, at 278 by 170 mm, Harley 3244 is not pocket-sized). A vade mecum is a familiar study book, intended for use by individuals within a "family," whether a secular household or a religious community.

In this manuscript, the Cherub figure is closely associated with two popular works on penance and examination of conscience, Alan of Lille's *Liber penitentialis*[61] and the *Liber de vitiis* (*Book of Vices*) by a French Dominican, William Peraldus (Peyraut). The manuscript contains various homiletic materials besides these, including Honorius' *Elucidarium*, an illustrated bestiary, an *ars predicandi* by Raymond of Thetford, and Grosseteste's *Templum Domini*. Evans has described the interesting



FIGURE 3. *Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, MS Plut. 30. 24, fol. 3v, Italian, ca. 1410, probably Dominican (photo: reproduced with permission of the Ministero per i Bene e le Attività Culturali).*

FIGURE 4. *London, British Library, MS Arundel 83-I, The Howard Psalter, fol. 5v, East Anglian, ca. 1310–20, made for the family of John Fitton(?) (photo: © The British Library Board).*

structural features of the manuscript. The *Liber penitentialis* is written in fols. 19–26v, and, with the *Elucidarium*, takes up the first two quires as the book is presently put together (it is not now in its thirteenth-century order, as the original quire numbers, still mostly visible, indicate that, before the early fifteenth century, these two quires were moved from the end of the book to its beginning). On fol. 27 is a full-page picture of a Dominican kneeling before Christ seated on a throne, and carrying a banderole, which states, "Son, entering the service of God, prepare against temptation."[62] Fols. 27v–28 contain the picture of the Knight against the Vices, which occupies the full opening: it is titled "the life of man upon the earth is a struggle,"[63] a theme that accords well with the Peraldus text but also looks to the subject of penance and temptation emphasized in the *Liber penitentialis* and the picture of the kneeling friar. The paintings are on a separate bifolium, which originally was at the beginning of the book, with the painting of the kneeling friar its frontispiece. The text of the *Liber de vitiis* begins on fol. 29; opposite it, on fol. 28v, immediately following the Knight against the Vices opening, is painted the Cherub (Fig. 5). *Liber de vitiis* ends in column b of fol. 33v; immediately following it in column b is the text of *De sex alis*, beginning "De prima ala que dicitur Confessio & eiusdem i[a] penna. que dicitur Veritas." This text is almost complete, following the numbered textual order through wing six, feather four, and ends on fol. 35v with some penwork. Thus the whole sequence in the present book, from fol. 19 through fol. 35v including the pictures in fols. 27 through 28v, makes a thematic unit. Most important for any preacher, it provides rich materials for study and composition on many pastoral subjects. Whoever moved the gatherings containing the *Liber penitentialis* to the front of the book understood and emphasized the thematic progression, which the first maker had clearly intended, and adapted it further to his own uses.

The great variation among the drawings found in these examples indicates how widely the figure was adapted for practical use. It was treated, not like a picture illustrating or commenting on a particular text passage, but like a tool. Scholars found the picture useful without a written explanation of it and also determined that the verbal *ekphrasis* was useful without its being materially realized; both situations are common in the manuscripts. A final example will reinforce this point. Figure 6 displays yet another conformation of the seraph. The manuscript in which this drawing is found was in the library of the Cistercian monastery at Kempen in the Rhineland.[64] It is only a booklet, of eight bifolia, evidently left unbound for quite some time, for its outer pages are badly rubbed and faded. It consists of the diagrams of the *Speculum theologie*, but there is a curiosity about it. The first seven folios contain the diagrams (not all, to be sure, for the selection is particular to each manuscript, as Lucy Sandler has documented), one to a page, all written in the same hand of the fourteenth century. The Cherub was drawn later by someone else and painted on the recto side of the last leaf (8), which had previously been blank. At some point in the (early?) fifteenth century, a half leaf was sewn in between fols. 7 and 8, onto which are copied abbreviated materials on confession and on the seven deadly sins and their derivatives. The scribe of the Cherub is not the same one as that for the other diagrams; its exact date is disputed,[65] but there is no dispute that it was a different scribe who made it—likely "Hermanus custos," the abbot identified below the angel figure. The text of *De sex alis* begins on this page and continues on the verso side, in a highly abbreviated and variant version (compared with that, for example, in MS CCC 66).

In this book, the Cherub addresses the compositional needs of contemplative monks, not preaching friars (Kempen was the home of Thomas à Kempis). But it is not odd to find the diagram in a Cistercian book—Sawley Abbey, which housed the Cherub shown in Figure 1, was a Cistercian foundation as well. As presented on the page, the Kempen version is more complex and more inclusive of chains of other texts and subjects than some of the other versions, and it includes psalm verses especially associated with contemplative life. Herman the abbot is painted under the angel's feet—the book he holds has written on it the text of Psalm 16 (17):8, one especially related to contemplative life and to the Cherub.[66] Notice how the angel appears to spring up out of his head, as indeed was the intended case. Yet the most startling feature of this drawing is how the feathers of wing two have been rotated outward from behind wing one, so that they can be easily perceived and read in their proper order, depicting graphically one important mental task the picture required. Whenever my students look at this drawing for the first time, at least one will judge that the painter was simply incompetent to render this wing normally—whatever a seraph's wing normally looks like.[67] Competence in drawing is not the issue here, however, for Hermanus has deliberately exploded this wing outward and backward at the wrist to make it clear and easy to read and thus to recollect its topics or *loci* in the investigative, rational manner described by Albertus zMagnus. It is a picture that was *used* in difficult mental work, as were the other diagrams in this booklet, some of which have additional texts and citations written onto them by later users.

In all these versions of the Cherub figure, the matters of penitence are recorded in summary form, as is appropriate to an instrument for invention, following the advice of Augustine to focus on abbreviated highlights rather than trying to speak about everything equally. The *tituli* are given *summatim*, a set of shorthand notes for later development in a full-fledged composition. Scholars are inclined to think a device like this was used to teach: well, yes, but only as it was useful to the chaplain/confessor/preacher in inventing his own composition—these are not aphorisms dumbed down to satisfy minds too novice to learn anything better. In other words, the pithy subtopic written on each feather is not "content" as modern audiences understand it, but a clue that leads to much greater and fuller content stored in other places in the preacher's mind (and even the layperson's mind). Abbreviation is necessary to

FIGURE 5. *London, British Library, MS Harley 3244, fol. 28v, made in England after 1235, for a Dominican friar (photo: © The British Library Board).*

FIGURE 6. *New Haven, Beinecke Library, MS 416, fol. 8, Rhineland, Cistercian monastery of Kempen, ca. 1425 (photo: Yale University, Beinecke Library).*

any expansion; it is necessary to contract before one can dilate creatively, as Augustine makes clear, following ancient advice that became standard in the Middle Ages. The fundamental pulse beat from abbreviation to amplification, repeated through endless variations, drives virtually all medieval compositions. And to abbreviate one must condense and leave out—one must forget many things in order to recollect more, distill more fruits of study more nourishingly, more originally. Forgetting is necessary to the rhythm of remembering.

Albertus Magnus described recollection as a rational search, following the steps of an orderly series to matters that are forgotten (in the sense of that prisoner in the *oubliette*). The wings and feathers of the Cherub map out precisely such a search. But this is not the only, or even the most powerful, cognitive virtue of the figure. It presents multiple points of access—thirty-six at least, grouped for easy recollection in six groups of six topics. Any one of these can be found and accessed independently and immediately. The device is a powerful finding tool. It is precisely because one does not have to start at the beginning and go through it in one way, over and over again, that it proved so useful and so popular. Redactions of this figure can be found in preaching and devotional materials well into the seventeenth century.

Through these examples, I hope I have been able to demonstrate that the craft of memory, like its successor investigative art, systematic logic, is not fundamentally an overly complicated procedure for preparing to pass examinations or for memorizing random facts or for reciting hundreds of verses by heart. It is in fact ill-suited to rote repetition, as people who have written about it have been pointing out for more than two thousand years. Perhaps it is time we paid attention to what they said. For them, it was a craft for the creation of new knowledge, thinking new thoughts, and for investigating difficult subjects in the forums of debate and commentary, preaching, counseling, and contemplative prayer.

NOTES

* I have been greatly helped by the careful editorial comments of Clark Maines and Anne D. Hedeman during the preparation of this essay, which would be much poorer without their advice. It was first presented at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Center for Medieval Studies in September 2005. I am deeply grateful to my colleagues at Illinois for arranging this meeting, a singular honor, and for their generous hospitality during my two visits to the university as a Mellon Distinguished Scholar in 2005, in particular to Anne D. Hedeman, Stephen Jaeger, Martin Camargo, Danuta Shanzer, Karen Fresco, and Herbert Kellman. I also want to thank my excellent colleague, Lucy Freeman Sandler, for teaching me so much over the years about the Cherub.

1. The story is recounted by Cicero, *De oratore* 2.299–300, and cf. 2.351. Cf. also Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 11.2.50, who praises Themistocles' unheard-of feat in acquiring fluent Persian within a year.
2. Augustine, *Confessiones* 10.8.12–14: "Transibo ergo et istam naturae meae, gradibus ascendens ad eum, qui fecit me, et uenio in campos et lata praetoria memoriae, ubi sunt thesauri innumerabilium imaginum de cuiuscemodi rebus sensis inuectarum. Ibi reconditum est, quidquid etiam cogitamus, uel augendo uel minuendo uel utcumque uariando ea quae sensus attigerit, et si quid aliud commendatum et repositum est, quod nondum absorbuit et sepeliuit obliuio. . . . Haec omnia recipit recolenda, cum opus est, et retractanda grandis memoriae recessus et nescio qui secreti atque ineffabiles sinus eius: quae omnia suis quaeque foribus intrant ad eam et reponuntur in ea. . . . Intus haec ago, in aula ingenti memoriae meae. Ibi enim mihi caelum et terra et mare praesto sunt cum omnibus, quae in eis sentire potui, praeter illa, quae oblitus sum." Translated by M. Boulding (Hyde Park, NY, 1997), from the Latin text of L. Verhejien, *CCS*L 27, revised in 1990 (Turnhout, 1996), which is quoted above.
3. Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia* 1.450a–b, discussing why people vary in their abilities to remember; see also his comments at 453a. I have used the Loeb Classical Library edition, translated by W. S. Hett from the 1898 text of W. Biehl (Cambridge, 1936).
4. For example, Lambert Schenkel, *Gazophylacium artis memoria*e (1595; Strasbourg, 1610), counsels imagining that a great wind has blown through the chambers of your memory places and carried all their images away, or that a servant has swept all the rooms entirely clean. Similar advice occurs in a late-sixteenth-century memory treatise by the Dominican friar Cosmo Rosselli, *Thesaurus artificiosae memoriae*. These and other sixteenth-century examples are discussed by L. Bolzoni, *The Gallery of Memor*y (Toronto, 2001), 139–45. It should be noted in all this advice that, although the particular images are cleared away, the basic structure of the memory places remains secure and intact. Erasure of images from the memory places is assumed in the ancient model of the memory places as being like wax tablets and the images like the stylus-incised letters erased from the tablet when they are no longer needed; see *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 3.18.31.
5. Bolzoni, *The Gallery of Memory*, 144.
6. The way in which the monumental map of Late Antique Antioch was "relocated" by the Christians during the struggle between the bones of blessed Babylas and the spring of Apollo in Daphne is a good case in point; see M. Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought: Rhetoric, Meditation, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (Cambridge, 1998), chap. 1, esp. 24–59. The seminal study by M. Halbwachs of "communal memories" based on the holy places in Jerusalem is also relevant: *La topographie légendaire des Evangiles en Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1941; rpt. Paris, 1971).
7. On the trope of recollection as hunting for prey, see M. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2008), 78, 323–24. All further references to *The Book of Memor*y are to the second edition.
8. P. Ricoeur, *History, Memory, Forgetting* (Chicago, 2004), 67.
9. H. Weinrich, *Lethe: The Art and Critique of Forgetting* (Ithaca, NY, 2004), 10.
10. I have argued the case against such a conflation in Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, xii–xiv, 100–106.

11. Albertus Magnus, *Commentary on Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia*; trans. J. Ziolkowski from Albertus Magnus, *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), 9:97–118, in *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures*, ed. M. Carruthers and J. Ziolkowski (Philadelphia, 2002), 118–52.

12. Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia* 451b. 20; see also R. Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory* (Providence, RI, 1972), 42–46.

13. Albertus Magnus, *Commentary on Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia*, tractatus 2, capitulum 3 (ed. Borgnet, 112); trans. Ziolkowski, 143: "Et ista est differentia in qua reminisci differt ab eo quod est iterato addiscere, cum reminiscentia possit moveri quodam praedictorum modorum in id principium quod est ante quaesitum jam in memoria, sive ex parte rei, sive ex parte consuetudinis. Iterato autem addiscens talibus non movetur. Cum vero non investigat et movetur per aliquod principium, tunc non recordabitur vel reminiscetur."

14. Hugh of St. Victor, *De tribus maximis circumstantiis historiae* (with tables and a diagram); trans. M. Carruthers in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, 32–40 (reprinted as Appendix A in Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 339–44), from the edition of W. M. Green, *Speculum*, 18 (1943), 484–93.

15. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.10; trans. E. C. Marchant, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1923). They are called *akribountas*, "precise in speaking." The comment is made by the young man Euthydemos, in response to a query by Socrates, who asks if he wishes to become a rhapsodist since he possesses a complete copy of Homer. This is one of several specialized professions that Socrates suggests to him as a goal for his education; no, he says. Socrates offers him instead an education that makes good governors and judges as well as a persuasive speakers. The distinction being made is between skill and wisdom (or, as we would now say, between a technical and a liberal education). On this ancient debate in the fourth century BCE, see D. S. Hutchinson, "Doctrine of the Mean and the Debate Concerning Skills in Fourth-Century Medicine, Rhetoric and Ethics," *Apeiron*, 21 (1988), 17–52. See also Plato, *Gorgias* 463B; and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1, on the distinction between "a knack" (*empeiron*) and "an art" (*techne*), or *experimentum* and *ars* in the Latin translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by James of Venice (the earliest medieval translation, ca. mid-twelfth century).

16. See Y. Dudai, *Memory from A to Z* (Oxford, 2002), s.v. "Acquisition, Consolidation"; and see also the observation of Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 11.2.43.

17. Albertus Magnus, *Commentarium in De memoria et reminiscentia*, tractatus 2, capitulum 1 (ed. Borgnet, 107); trans. Ziolkowski, 136: "reminiscentia nihil aliud est nisi investigatio obliti per memoriam." See also Thomas Aquinas, *Sentencia libri . . . de memoria et reminiscentia*, lectio 6, in *Opera omnia* 45.2 of the Leonine edition of Aquinas (Rome, 1985). Aquinas' commentary has been newly translated from this edition by K. White and E. M. Macierowski, *Commentaries on Aristotle's "On Sense and What Is Sensed" and "On Memory and Recollection"* (Washington, DC, 2005). A translation of the Marietti edition of this commentary (ed. R. M. Spiazzi, Turin, 1973) is in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, 153–88 (the differences between the editions are slight).

18. The *oubliette* as an instrument of torture belongs to the fevered "Gothick" imagination of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe. The earliest attestation of the word's use in English is 1777, in an account of a visit to sites in France and Spain. Unsurprisingly, the French and other tourists found *oubliettes* in England at about the same time, and Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe* (1819) irrevocably brought them into popular consciousness. The narrow-mouthed, subterranean or semisubterranean structures to which the term is applied in tourist brochures were mostly cellars for cool storage, though a few actually seem to have been used as prisons, as is evidenced by their grafitti.

19. *In conspectu Dei/Domini* is a common biblical phrase indicating that God witnesses and so remembers. An example of the trope occurs in the story of Cornelius the pious centurion, whom an angel directs to St. Peter because his good deeds are seen and remembered by God (Acts 10:4; also Acts 10:31; Douay-Reims translation): "orationes tuae et elemosynae tuae ascenderunt in memoriam in conspectu Dei" (Thy prayers and thy alms are ascended for a memorial in the sight of God). A variation of the trope involves God turning his face toward or away from something, to remember or forget; cf. Psalm 33 (34):16–17, Psalm 9B (10):11, Psalm 108 (109):14–15.

20. I discussed this curricular situation in M. Carruthers, "Rhetorical *memoria* in Commentary and Practice," in *The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval and Renaissance Commentary*, ed. V. Cox and J. O. Ward (Leiden, 2006), 205–33.

21. See the preface by Eleonore Stump to her edition of Boethius's *De topicis differentiis* (Ithaca, NY, 1978), 15–17, 165, referencing in particular what Boethius says at the start of Book 1. Aristotle's advice is in *Topikōn* 8.14 (163b), a text taught commonly in the medieval *Organon* just after the *Sophistical Arguments* (*Sophistici Elenchi*); see Stump, *Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic* (Ithaca, NY, 1989), esp. 11–30. Aristotle also describes the recombinative virtues of a topical memory scheme in *De memoria et reminiscentia* 2.452a; it should be noted that both these discussions relate to discovering materials (arguments, examples) for compositions.

22. These various exercises are described in Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 20–23, and in eadem, "Rhetorical *memoria.*" Aspects of childhood memory training in Hellenistic antiquity are described by R. Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind* (Princeton, 2001), 164–67; and see also J. P. Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Memory and Literacy in Classical Antiquity* (London, 1997), esp. 126–31.

23. Traditionally thought to have been composed in the fourth century BCE, the dating of the *Dissoi logoi* is now unsettled and may be considerably later than previously thought; see M. Burnyeat, "Dissoi Logoi," in *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London, 1998), 3:106–7. The treatise has been translated by R. K. Sprague in *Mind*, 77 (1968), 155–67. The exercise of *argumentum in utramque partem* continued through the Middle Ages; see M. C. Woods, "The Teaching of Poetic Composition in the Later Middle Ages," in *A Short History of Writing Instruction*, ed. J. J. Murphy, 2nd ed. (Mahwah, NJ, 2001), 123–43.

24. Aristotle, *Topikōn* 8.14 (as in n. 21 above). See Stump, *Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic*.

25. Discussed in the general introduction to Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, esp. 9–17.

26. See Carruthers, "Rhetorical *memoria*." The memory craft developed in monastic meditation is, for the Middle Ages, of far greater importance, as I demonstrated in *The Craft of Thought*.

27. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 11.2.18–31; a new translation in five volumes (Cambridge, MA, 2001) by D. A. Russell is available in the Loeb Classical Library, based on the edition of M. Winterbottom, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1970).

28. The conclusions of these essays are brought together in R. Taylor-Briggs, "Reading between the Lines: The Textual History and Manuscript Transmission of Cicero's Rhetorical Works," in Cox and Ward, *The Rhetoric of Cicero*, 77–108. The text seems to have been edited in north Africa in the fourth century and thence brought perhaps to Milan and the circle around Ambrose, though its circulation was restricted. Medieval manuscripts of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* are known from the ninth century (representing at least two different *stemmae*), and glosses are a feature of many of these, some of which may derive from Late Antiquity; a complete commentary certainly existed by the later eleventh century, attributed to a "magister menegaldus," possibly Manegold of Lautenbach: see Taylor-Briggs; and also J. O. Ward, "The Medieval and Early Renaissance Study of Cicero's *De inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: Commentaries and Contexts," in Cox and Ward, esp. 25–29.

29. “Exercenda est memoria ediscendis ad verbum quam plurimis et tuis scriptis et al.ienis”; Julius Victor, “On Memory” (*Ars rhetorica*, cap. 23; ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores* [Leipzig, 1863], 440); trans. J. Ziolkowski, in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, 298.

30. Julius Victor, capitulum 23 (ed. Halm, 440); trans. Ziolkowski, 297–98: “Memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum ad inventionem perceptio. . . . Ad hanc obtinendam tradunt plerique locorum et simulacrorum quasdam observationes, quae mihi non videntur habere effectum. . . . Ita enim confirmabimus memoriam et adsuescimus optimis, semperque habebimus intra nos quod imitemur.”

31. J. Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God* (New York, 1961). Others have discussed these practices since, but Leclercq’s study remains the best place to begin. See also, on Hugh of St. Victor, I. Illich, *In the Vineyard of the Text* (Chicago, 1993) and, particularly, B. Stock, *Augustine the Reader* (Cambridge, MA, 1996).

32. Discussed at length in Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, chaps. 2–4.

33. Augustine, *Instructing Beginners in Faith* (*De catechizandis rudibus*) 3.5; ed. J. B. Bauer, *CCSL*, 46 (Turnhout, 1969); trans. R. Canning (Hyde Park, NY, 2006): “non tamen propterea debemus totum pentateuchum, totos que iudicum et regnorum et esdrae libros, totum que euangelium et actus apostolorum, uel, si ad uerbum edidicimus, memoriter reddere, uel nostris uerbis omnia quae his uoluminibus continentur narrando euoluere et explicare; . . . sed cuncta summatim generatim que complecti, ita ut eligantur quaedam mirabiliora, quae suauius audiuntur atque in ipsis articulis constituta sunt, . . . aliquantum immorando quasi resoluere atque expandere, et inspicienda atque miranda offerre animis auditorum.” My changes are indicated in brackets. See also Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 62–66. Topical invention, the focus of many studies of oral vernacular composition, is a different phenomenon from this learned meditational tradition, at least in the earlier part of the Middle Ages, though, since it also involves controlled recollection, it is not wholly unrelated; see D. F. Kelly, “Topical Invention in Medieval French literature” in *Medieval Eloquence*, ed. J. J. Murphy (Berkeley, 1978), 231–51.

34. As this passage clarifies, the Ciceronians’ *memoria verborum* is not the same as the verbatim rote memory that Augustine mentions here: in rhetoric, *memoria verborum* is applied to remembering a few difficult words, names, and phrases by associating their syllables with punning images. One should not suppose that Augustine had learned the Bible by heart (verbatim) by associating every word in it with a punning image. It should be noted, as the quotation in n. 29 above shows, that Julius Victor uses the same phrase, “ediscendis ad verbum,” for learning by heart, that is, memorizing texts by rote. Learning by heart, though, did not require making images for each syllable of text memorized, only for the particular few an individual might have trouble with. It was, however, a lurking confusion in discussions of *memoria verborum* in later rhetorics as it is for modern histories.

35. Augustine, *Confessiones* 10.14.21: “quasi uenter est animi.”

36. See Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 246–54, for a full discussion of the nature of the *pictura* referenced in Adam of Dryburgh’s text. *De tripartito taburnaculi* is in Migne, *PL* 198, 609–796; all translations from it are mine.

37. Adam of Dryburgh, *De tripartito tabernaculi* 2.1.77 (Migne, *PL* 198, 683C): “[J]uxta vestram, pater sancte, jussionem, ut saepe dictum tabernaculum in plano quoque, quantum sciero et potero, depingam; jam manum appono, quatenus per corporalem etiam aliquatenus cerni possit; quod et de communi electorum Ecclesia intelligi debet per fidem, et in singulis electis construi per meditationem.” *Corporalis* simply means sense-based and could refer either to a drawing or to a mental image created through verbal *ekphrasis*, even some combination of the two, like a simple drawing meant to be enlarged on in meditation. But no extant manuscripts contain such a drawing.

38. This now-famous passage in the preface to Richard de Fournival’s *Bestiaire d’amour*, has been often discussed; see esp. V. A. Kolve, *Chaucer and the Imagery of Narrative* (Stanford, 1984); S. Huot, *From Song to Book* (Ithaca, NY, 1987); and E. Sears, “Sensory Perception and Its Metaphors in the Time of Richard of Fournival,” in *Medicine and the Five Senses*, ed. W. F. Bynum and R. Porter (Cambridge, 1993), 17–39.

39. *Pictura* can refer equally to both *ekphrasis* and to paintings; so can *descriptio*. The many plans and sketches in Richard of St. Victor’s literal exegesis of the Temple compound in Ezekiel are fully copied in all the manuscripts. This work contains several schematics of the sort Adam seems to have in mind. Hugh of St. Victor’s “picture” of the ark, a work found in many manuscripts, never contains drawings, nor does Adam of Dryburgh’s tabernacle. Both Hugh’s and Adam’s works are presented as ordering schemes for ethical and theological meditation. See Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, esp. 241–54. A different interpretation of Hugh’s ark, as instructions for making a fully drawn and colored chart from which Hugh taught, has been put forward by C. Rudolph, *First, I Find the Center Point: Reading the Text of Hugh of Saint Victor’s “The mystic ark*,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 94 (Philadelphia, 2004). W. Cahn has studied examples of exegetical as well as meditational *picturae*; see “Architecture and Exegesis: Richard of St. Victor’s Ezekiel Commentary and Its Illustrations,” *AB*, 76 (1994), 26–49; and “The Allegorical Menorah,” in *Tributes in Honor of James M. Marrow*, ed. J. F. Hamburger and A. S. Korteweg (Turnhout, 2006), 117–26. The latter is a meditational diagram that focuses on the menorah candlestick, one of the temple furnishings that commonly served as an organizing device for meditation and study, as in Bede’s *De templo Salomonis liber* (Migne, *PL* 91).

40. A translation by B. Balint of both the diagram and the treatise of which it forms part is in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*; 83–102; see also the accompanying preface and bibliography. As edited in Migne, *PL* 210, 269–80, the treatise begins with a long section copied from Hugh of St. Victor’s *De archa Noe* (formerly *De arca Noe moralia*) and then turns to demonstrating the use of the Cherub diagram as a device for meditation and composition. This version is rarely found in the manuscripts, however, which usually copy only the *expositio* or *descriptio* (both words are regularly used in the title) of the Cherub’s wings and feathers.

41. The wheel commonly shown below the Cherub’s feet is the chariot wheel described in Ezekiel 10, which moves with the cherubim. Meditation on the seraphs and cherubs was a feature of desert monasticism: a Syriac version is extant of a meditation on the angels’ wings ascribed to Evagrius, but its subject is not penitence. There is evidence of Carolingian meditation using such a figure in Hrabanus Maurus’ *In laude crucis*, a devotional poem that remained popular for a long time.

42. An important discussion of these and related diagrams in medieval Italian devotional works is L. Bolzoni, *The Web of Images* (Aldershot, 2004), 41–81. Bolzoni has identified a clear path of transmission from the devices common in twelfth-century monastic meditations to thirteenth-century and later vernacular devotional works mainly by friars, including Jacopone da Todi and Simone da Cascina (with links to the circle of Catherine of Siena). On the Tower of Wisdom itself, see L. F. Sandler, *The Psalter of Robert de Lille* (London, 1983), and her separate demonstration of the *turris sapientia* diagram in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, 215–25. A number of other diagrams used for meditation are translated and demonstrated in *The Medieval Craft of Memory*. See also M. Evans, “An Illustrated Fragment of Peraldus’s Summa of Vice: Harleian MS 3244,” *JWCI*, 45 (1982), 14–68.

43. Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 7–30, 198–209; and eadem, *The Book of Memory*, 202–17. The Cherub diagram was discussed with several others in the seminal article by F. Saxl, “A Spiritual Encyclopedia of the Late Middle Ages,” *JWCI*, 5 (1942), 82–139. Saxl regarded them as pedagogical simplifications of complex theology made for novice students, an assumption with which few would now agree.

44. The liturgical significance of the conflation is important too: in Isaiah the seraphim sing the Sanctus, and in Revelation the cherubim sing the Gloria; patristic exegesis had introduced both as singers on each occasion. More evidence of the conflation can be found in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, 84–86.

45. See ibid., 1–23.

46. In *The Web of Images*, 117– 35, Bolzoni discusses the use Bernardino made of the Cherub diagram during a set of Lenten sermons he preached in 1424. The topics are appropriate to penitence, in keeping with the liturgical season, but their content is quite different from those in the Cherub drawings we still have.

47. Note that the manuscript has been numbered by pages rather than folios. On this manuscript, see the catalogue description of C. M. Kauffmann, *Romanesque Manuscripts, 1066–1190*, A Survey of Manuscripts Illuminated in the British Isles, 3 (London, 1975), no. 102. On the Durham origin of the manuscript (which initially included what is now Cambridge University Library, MS Ff.1.27), see C. Norton, "History, Wisdom and Illumination," in *Symeon of Durham*, ed. D. Rollason (Stamford, 1998), 61–105; and P. Binski, *Becket's Crown* (New Haven, 2004), 54–62.

48. The text is in Migne, *PL* 163, 759–763, there dated ca. 1108. A Norman cleric from Caen, Theobald d'Étampes is the earliest named *magister* (whatever that may mean at this time) in Oxford. Robert Bloet was bishop of Lincoln from 1094. See R. W. Southern, "From Schools to University," in *The Early Oxford Schools*, ed. J. I. Catto, vol. 1, *The History of the University of Oxford*, ed. T. H. Aston (Oxford, 1984), 5–6.

49. On this point, see M. Carruthers, "Moving Images in the Mind's Eye," in *The Mind's Eye: Art and Theological Argument in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Hamburger and A.-M. Bouché (Princeton, 2006), 287–305; and Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 116–70.

50. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Auct. D. 2. 1, dated to about 1200 and described as "possibly" from the library of Llanthony; see O. Pacht and J. J. G. Alexander, *Illuminated Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Oxford*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1973), 3: no. 226. The text occupies fols. 2–6, the rest of the book being a Psalter with the (abbreviated) commentary of Gilbert de la Porrée—material helpful in study and preaching.

51. Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 29. Many thanks to Grover Zinn for giving me this reference.

52. Florence, Bibliotheca Medicea Laurenziana, MS plut. 30. 24. In *The Web of Images*, Bolzoni discusses the figures in this manuscript at length, the Cherub and also several trees, including Bonaventura's *Lignum vitae*, and many of Joachim of Fiore's apocalyptic images. An apocalyptic theme runs through many of these meditation devices, unsurprisingly, since the Apocalypse was such a major site in monastic and later devotions for meditational image-making.

53. On the left, "Cherub iste in humana / depictus effigie. / Sex habet alas / que sex actus morum re / presentant. Quibus debet / fidelis anima redimiri. / Si ad Deum per incrimenta uir / tutum uoluerit peruenire." On the right, "Rota sub pedibus che/rub. Septem habens / radios. Septem opera/ misericordie. designat / Que dominus commina/tur se improperaturum/ in die Iudicii negglige/ntibus remissis." Except for minor spelling variations, these are the same texts as those occupying the same positions in the Howard Psalter Cherub (Fig. 4). But the Howard and Laurenziana Cherubs are not otherwise related. The Latin texts are identical also to the Cherub figure of the DeLisle Psalter, transcribed and translated by L. F. Sandler, *The Psalter of Robert de Lisle in the British Library* (London, 1999), 82, 106.

54. The text makes clear that this virtue refers to moderate and decorous use of perfumes; it is interesting that all of the sensory virtues described here have to do with giving an appropriately modest and controlled social impression.

55. As is the case with the Lenten sermons of friar Giordano of Pisa; he did not appear to use the Cherub figure, but he evidently used some such device because his sermons (he preached as many as five a day) are filled with remarks that indicate firm control over the order and placement of his main topics; see Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 255–57.

56. The Howard Psalter is London, British Library, MS Arundel 83-I, an East Anglian manuscript made about 1310–20, for an aristocratic household; see the catalogue description of L. F. Sandler, *Gothic Manuscripts, 1285–1385*, A Survey of Manuscripts Illuminated in the British Isles, 5 (London, 1986), no. 51.

57. Clark Maines suggested to me that these textual bands are in fact "abstracted" from the separation between the shorter and longer feathers of a bird's wings, an area that was used as a field for the *titulus* in other Cherub drawings, as, for example, in Figure 3. I thank him for this excellent observation.

58. L. F. Sandler discussed the possible uses of the *Speculum theologie* diagrams in *The Psalter of Robert de Lisle*, see esp. 32–34, 82. Though apparently collected up in the late thirteenth century by John of Metz, a Franciscan friar working in Paris, and often incorporating favored Franciscan material like the *Lignum vitae* of St. Bonaventure, complex diagrams, some to be imagined even with moving parts, are rather common invention devices; see Carruthers, "Moving Images in the Mind's Eye" for several examples from the twelfth–thirteenth centuries especially, some drawn, some presented as only verbal *ekphrasis*.

59. On this interesting manuscript, see the catalogue description of N. Morgan, *Early Gothic Manuscripts, 1190–1250,* A Survey of Manuscripts Illuminated in the British Isles, 4 (London, 1975), 1: no. 80. As well as the Cherub, it contains the Knight against the Vices figure, discussed at length in the context of this manuscript by Evans, "An Illustrated Fragment of Peraldus's Summa of Vice." Evans dates the manuscript to about 1255. Peraldus' text was popular for pastoral care of the laity; it is one source of Chaucer's "The Parson's Tale."

60. Evans, "An Illustrated Fragment of Peraldus," 38. The structure of the present manuscript is described in detail by Evans, 43–45; its original order is discussed, 38–41. A list of the contents in their present order on fol. 1, is in an early-fifteenth-century hand.

61. The text of *De sex alis* is found often with Alanus' *Liber penitentialis*, especially as it came to be attributed in the thirteenth century to Alan of Lille; see especially M-T. d'Alverny, "Alain de Lille: Problèmes d'attribution," in *Alain de Lille, Gautier de Châtillon, Jakemart Giélée et leur temps*, ed. H. Roussel and F. Suard (Lille, 1980), 27–46. It is, however, associated in a few manuscripts with a section of Hugh of St. Victor's *De archa Noe*. See Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, 83; this is the version published in Migne, *PL*.

62. "Fili accedens ad seruitutem dei. preparate ad temptacionem."

63. "militia est uita hominis super terram." The miniatures in this manuscript are available on the British Library's online catalogue.

64. All the images in this manuscript are available online through the The Beinecke Library's site.

65. L. F. Sandler identified the script as early fifteenth century in *The Psalter of Robert de Lisle*, Appendix 3, no. 15, p. 136. R. Rouse has argued it could be a fourteenth-century hand contemporaneous with that of the diagrams in fols. 1–7, but less formal. For both, see B. Shailor, *A Catalogue of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University* (Binghamton, NY, 1987), 2:329– 30.

66. "Sub umbra alarum tuarum protege me," a text that is often included in the explicit of *De sex alis*, though not in the text in this manuscript. Instead, it has been "displaced" to the *titulus* of Hermanus' meditational source, the book he holds in his hands.

67. I discussed this image at greater length in my essay "Moving Images in the Mind's Eye," in particular stressing how, as the visualization of a complex concept, it implies movements that must be realized in the viewer's imagination.