How Lies Induced Cooperation in “Golden Balls:”
A Game-Theoretic Analysis

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Abstract

We analyze a well-known episode of a popular British TV game show, “Golden Balls,” in which one of the two contestants lied about what he intended to do, which had the salutary effect of inducing both contestants to cooperate in what is normally a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD), wherein one or both contestants usually defected. This “solution” to PD assumes that the liar desired to be honorable in fulfilling his pledge to split the jackpot if he won but, surprisingly, he achieved this end without having to do so, astonishing the audience and receiving its acclaim. We note that this action has a biblical precedent in King Solomon’s decision to cut a baby in two and, more generally, in resolving international conflicts, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
Introduction

Beginning in June 2007 and running for more than two years, a popular British daytime game show called “Golden Balls” led to substantial frustration for many contestants, who were lied to and often betrayed by the other contestants. This is not surprising, because in the final round of Golden Balls two contestants play a game called “Split or Steal,” which, we argue, is a Prisoners’ Dilemma.

What is surprising is that in one episode, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8 one of the contestants announced in advance how he would play and then reneged on both his promises (in fact, we never learn whether he would have kept his second promise). Paradoxically, these lies led both players to cooperate in the original game.

In this note, we show that the player who made the announcement, whom we’ll call A, complicated the game by pledging that he would choose a particular option in the original game and, if feasible, then make a later choice outside the original game. If the payoff to this player depends only on money and status—how did I do in comparison to my opponent?—we show in the next section that (i) the original game is a $2 \times 2$ Prisoners’ Dilemma, in which cooperation is strongly dominated for both players; and (ii) A’s announcement induces a $3 \times 2$ game, in which cooperation is weakly dominated for one player and thus of no help in fostering cooperation. But if A’s payoffs also depend on his honor in fulfilling his second promise, the game is transformed into another $3 \times 2$

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1 Van den Assem, van Dolder, and Thaler (2012) analyzed 287 episodes, finding that in 69% either one (44%) or both (25%) players chose Steal, leaving only 31% in which there was no defection from Split so the jackpot was split.
game, but one of incomplete information in which there was misperception by one player of the other player’s preferences.

How did this happen if the players’ strategies do not change in the second $3 \times 2$ game? First, $A$’s announcement signaled that his goal might not be only to maximize his monetary payoff. Instead, it suggested that he might wish to honor his pledge about what he said he would do (split his winnings) after play of the original game.

But to get to this point, $A$ had to prevent his adversary ($B$) from choosing noncooperation, which $A$ did by credibly promising not to cooperate himself. Then $A$, correctly surmising that $B$ would be forced to cooperate, could afford to act honorably and cooperate himself.

We begin our analysis by describing the rules of Golden Balls and then what usually happens in play of the game. Although $A$’s announcement in the aforementioned episode was only cheap talk, it had a salutary effect.

In fact, $A$’s announcement and his failure to keep one of his promises was rational. It laid the groundwork for cooperation in a game of incomplete information, whereby $B$ incorrectly perceived $A$’s preferences which, fortunately for both players, redounded to their benefit.

**Rules of Golden Balls**

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2 The TV show has attracted some scholarly attention, because in the experimental study of PD, it is thought to simulate “real life” situations more validly than laboratory settings. See, for example, Hart (2010), van den Assem, van Dolder, and Thaler (2012), Burton-Chellew and West (2012), and Turmunkh, van den Assem, and van Dolder (2019).
After a series of preliminary rounds, four contestants are reduced to two. We focus on this final stage of the game (called “Split or Steal”), which is governed by the following rules:

• Each contestant is given two balls. When opened, one indicates Split and the other Steal.

• Each contestant secretly opens his or her ball—to determine which is Split and which is Steal—and chooses one. Before making a choice, however, the contestants may speak to each other and also ask for advice from the host.

• If both choose Split, they each receive half the jackpot.

• If both choose Steal, neither contestant wins anything.

• If one contestant chooses Steal and the other Split, the Steal contestant wins the entire jackpot and the Split contestant nothing.

We assume that the best outcome for A and the other contestant, B, is to win everything (payoff of 4), next best to win half (payoff of 3), next worst to win nothing when the opponent also wins nothing (payoff of 2), and worst to win nothing when the opponent wins everything (payoff of 1). We rank the last outcome worst because of the anger, humiliation, or shame a player would feel if he or she were betrayed into thinking an opponent would Split—but chose instead Steal—when he or she Split.  

Later in the paper, we provide evidence for this preference in a post-game quote from B. In extant studies of “Split or Steal,” where this assumption is not made, the game is referred to as a variant of PD or “weak” PD, because if only monetary payoffs underlie players’ preferences, then being betrayed when choosing Split is as bad as mutual defection. In this case, unlike PD, the Steal strategy is weakly dominant, and there are three Nash equilibria.
These payoffs indicate only an ordinal ranking of outcomes from best to worst. As in Prisoners’ Dilemma, the noncooperative strategy of Steal for each player strongly dominates the cooperative strategy of Split, rendering (2,2) the unique Nash-equilibrium outcome (starred in Game 1), at which both players obtain nothing.

**Game 1**

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<td>Split</td>
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<tr>
<td>Split</td>
<td>(3,3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Steal</td>
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In the actual play of Golden Balls on TV, each contestant usually tries to persuade his or her opponent to Split, promising to reciprocate so that both obtain half the jackpot. But this strategy is not convincing, often leading one or both players to Steal and forgoing the cooperative (3,3) outcome.

**A’s Announcement**

In the aforementioned episode of the game, which was between two men, A emphatically said that that he would choose Steal. B chose Split, presumably because A had said that upon completion of the original game, he would give B half the jackpot if he had won, keeping the other half for himself.

This, of course, is cheap talk, because B has no assurance that A will keep his promise and give him half the jackpot. Because it is possible that A will do so, however,
we give him a choice of keeping or not keeping his word after he Steals (as he said he would do) and B Splits, which yields the $3 \times 2$ game shown in Game 2.

**Game 2**

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<td>Split</td>
<td>Steal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Split</td>
<td>(3,3)</td>
<td>(1,4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Steal, then Split (if possible)</td>
<td>(3,3)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steal, then don’t Split (if possible)</td>
<td>(4,1)</td>
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This game could also be written in extensive form (i.e., as a game tree), whereby A makes a decision after learning the outcome of the $2 \times 2$ game. But the normal form (i.e., as a payoff matrix) makes it easier to compare with the earlier $2 \times 2$ game and the final game we discuss in the next section. Notice that, as in Game 1, each player does best when he wins the entire jackpot (4), next best (3) when there is a split, next worst (2) when both players Steal and there is nothing to split, and worst (1) when one wins the entire jackpot and the other nothing.

Observe that A has a weakly dominant strategy of “Steal, then don’t Split (if possible),” whereas both of B’s strategies are undominated. But given A’s weakly dominant strategy, (2,2) in the lower right is the unique Nash-equilibrium outcome (starred) in Game 2, echoing the Nash-equilibrium outcome in the $2 \times 2$ game in which both players Steal and, consequently, walk away empty-handed.

* “If possible” becomes possible when A Steals and B Splits in the original game, in which case A can then either keep his promise and Steal or Split instead. We know of no other game-theoretic treatments that recognize that A, after his announcement, has three, not two, strategies. For other game-theoretic models of this specific episode of Golden Balls, see Nikolaev (2014), Talwalkar (2012), and Cornell University Course Blog (2012).
These strategies, however, were not the choices of the players in the TV game—quite the opposite: both Split—suggesting that the payoffs in Game 2 are not an accurate reflection of the players’ preferences. Instead, we believe, A had another goal in mind besides maximizing his winnings.

The Players’ Preferences

We suggest that the effect of A’s announcement was not only to increase A’s strategies in Game 1 from two to three in Game 2. A also wanted to alter B’s perception of the game first by appearing to be sincere in declaring his intention to Steal in the original game, then also saying that if B Split—so A would win the entire jackpot—A would honor his pledge to split the jackpot later.

But being honorable for A, we think, does not simply mean that he privately takes pride in “doing the right thing” by keeping his pledge to Split. He also wants to demonstrates publicly—in front of the studio audience as well as 2 million TV viewers—that he acted honorably. We postulate that A cared about the public perception of his honorability, which was immediately manifest in the astonished reactions of the host and the studio audience. Viewers at that time, and later on YouTube, generally applauded his daring choice (there have been some 10 million views of the video and 10 thousand comments on it).

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5 Thereby we do not prescribe what the players should do but work backwards from their actual choices to infer what their goals must have been to act in the way that they did. In effect, we reconstruct a game in order to try to offer a coherent explanation, through “revealed preference,” of why the players’ choices are consistent with their actions (i.e., are rational). While this reasoning may appear tautologous, it is the foundation of all science, including mathematics, in which nonobvious theorems are derived from assumptions. Here the rational choices of A and B in a game provide an explanation of their behavior that, on first blush, seems inexplicable.
It was daring because it was risky and might well have backfired. So how did $A$ prevent this when $B$ has a strong incentive to Steal and possibly win the entire jackpot? He accomplished this by (i) promising that he would Steal so that $B$ does not think that he can Steal himself and win everything, and (ii) credibly promising to Split after play of the original game, giving $B$ the hope that he might obtain half the jackpot, even though $A$’s promise to Split later is cheap talk.

If $A$ is able to dissuade $B$ from choosing Steal at the outset, then he will be in a position to honor his promise to Split if he wins the jackpot. But rather than Splitting privately after play of the original game, $A$ can choose Split at the outset and gain acclaim not only for his beneficence but also for his brilliance in telling a forgivable lie to undermine the dominance of his strategy of Steal in Game 2, which induces $B$ to choose Steal himself.

We assume that $B$’s preferences remain the same as in Game 2, evidenced by $B$’s (actually, “Ibrahim’s” in the episode) response

https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/segments/golden-rule

in a Radiolab interview to a question about whether he would have chosen to Split knowing that $A$ (“Nick”) was also going to Split: “No, never.” Indeed, “it was Steal or nothing, because he would rather that both of them walk away without money than be duped into choosing Split, only to have all the money taken by the other contestant:”


Clearly, Ibrahim’s status as well as money counted for him.
How does A’s interest in keeping his promise and acting honorably—especially publicly—change his preferences in Game 2 (see Game 3)? First, the Split-Split outcome becomes (4,3) rather than (3,3), making it better for A than the other (3,3) outcome in Game 2, because A demonstrates his willingness to Split at the outset rather than privately after play of the original game.

**Game 3**

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The second change in A’s preferences is more dramatic: (4,1) in Game 2 becomes (1,1) in Game 3, because A thoroughly dishonors himself by breaking his promise to Split when B does. To be sure, A wins the entire jackpot, but he evinced no interest in doing so at the price of reneging on his promise, which he never had to do by choosing Split at the outset.

How do these two changes in A’s preferences affect the strategy choices of the players in Game 3? First, because A was able to credibly promise to Steal, he could surmise that B would not choose Steal himself, which would leave both players with nothing. But if Steal is no longer viable for B in a game of incomplete information (it would be an undominated strategy in a game of complete information), A’s optimal choice is to choose the best of his three strategies associated with B’s choice of Split,
which is his own strategy of Split that yields the outcome (4,3). Indeed, these are exactly the choices the players made in the TV game.

Anomously, A upholds his honor by breaking his promise to Steal and Splitting instead. This choice relieved him of the need to keep his pledge to Split later if B also Split, which would not have been immediately visible to the audience whose approbation he sought.

Our analysis shows that B never really understood A’s desire to behave honorably and was duped by A’s announcement into believing that A would Steal, giving him little choice but to Split to try to salvage something for himself. Although we implicitly assumed at the outset that Golden Balls was a game of complete information, it was not for B in the episode we have analyzed. But to reach the mutual choice of Split turned out to be tortuous for B, so it’s little wonder that he asked A, plaintively, at the end of play: “Why did you do that to me?”

A’s announcement succeeded not only in persuading B to Split but also, by choosing Split himself, providing a public display that his promise was not just cheap talk. Indeed, A’s choice of Split spoke louder than his words, making him appear even more honorable—publicly rather than just privately (if he had Split later)—while achieving the same outcome.

Our game-theoretic explanation of what happened can be summarized as follows:

1. B, believing that A will do what he says he will do —choose Steal, then Split (if possible)—prefers Split (3) to Steal (2) and so Splits.

2. Anticipating B’s choice of Split, A’s best choice (4) in Game 3 is to Split himself, which he chooses.
Note that if A had believed the game to be Game 2, he would have been torn between choosing his first two strategies, both of which give him 3. But Splitting breaks this tie in Game 3 and gives A 4 instead—demonstrating his honorability—so A chooses it.

**Conclusions**

Game 3 shows A’s astuteness in using a lie to escape the Prisoners’ Dilemma inherent in Golden Balls and turn it into a game that he could exploit. It helps to explain why he announced he would Steal in the original game: It enabled him credibly to cow B into “submission,” after adding the sop that he would Split the jackpot he won after the show (this promise was not so credible).

But by Splitting at the outset, A could honor his promise to Split the jackpot publicly, without actually having to do so privately, so we never learn whether or not A was lying that he would have Split the jackpot in the end. Clearly, A’s announcement was not only brilliantly devious, but it also worked.

Game 3 also explains how A overcame his credibility problem, given that his pledge to Split was cheap talk. When the shell-shocked moderator did not object to A’s announcement—presumably, he could have declared, “No private deals of any kind!”—B’s perception of the game changed to one in which Steal was no longer viable: It was rational for him to Split in a game of incomplete information to try to win half the jackpot, as A had promised he could do if he Split.

It is worth noting that A’s announcement has a precedent in the famous Bible story in which two women claimed maternity of a baby. When King Solomon announced

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Talwalkar (2012) reaches a similar conclusion, based on a different model.
that he would split the disputed baby in two if both women refused to give up their claims, he elicited from them responses that revealed who the true mother was, so there was no need to split the baby—just as A’s announcement in Golden Balls enabled both contestants to escape the dilemma in Prisoners’ Dilemma and not leave empty-handed if they had both chosen Steal.

To be sure, Solomon’s edict was not by one of the women but instead set the stage for one of the women (the mother) to speak up and offer the baby to the other woman. The other woman was somewhat akin to B, who was also deceived: She incorrectly thought that Solomon would stick to his edict and that she would win his favor. Little did she know that Solomon preferred a different outcome once he deduced who the true mother was, just as A preferred not to postpone his choice of Split but to do so in the game itself.

Other precedents include the naval blockade of Cuba by the United States during the October 1962 missile crisis with the Soviet Union. At the end of the crisis, which lasted 13 days, President Kennedy secretly pledged to eventually remove American missiles from Turkey, provided Premier Khrushchev immediately withdrew his missiles from Cuba. Khrushchev could not know for sure that Kennedy would honor his word, but a pledge by the American president was credible enough. The alternative—maintaining missiles on the island—was bound to lead to a confrontation in which both sides would lose.

* See Brams (2018, ch. 10) for a more robust action that Solomon might have taken to settle the women's dispute which, unlike the threat he reneged on, could be repeated in future disputes.
* See O’Neill (1999) for cases in international relations in which honor, as in Golden Balls, played a key role.
Other choices by actors—sometimes threatened, other times carried out—have prevented conflicts, in a variety of situations, from escalating and being disastrous for both sides. We intend to look more closely at some of these in future work.

References


