PART IV

Intergroup Relations, Social Structure, and Politics
The rising prominence of populist movements and new political parties around the world in recent years has roiled democratic countries. Some of the more dramatic examples—Brexit, the election of Donald Trump in the United States, and the growing electoral viability of anti-immigrant parties in many countries—are threatening to shift the global political landscape and with it longstanding social and political cleavages in democratic polities. The possibility that the class divide has flipped on its head, with growing numbers of educated middle-class citizens favoring new or traditional left parties and the new right parties attracting significant blocs of poor and working- and lower-middle class citizens has reanimated interest in the question of how socioeconomic divisions shape citizens' policy preferences and social attitudes. A new generation of scholarship is struggling to analyze the diverse ways in which the social class location of individuals shapes their dispositions and preferences, and how whether and how they have shifted over time. Attitudes toward topics such as globalization, immigration, the environment, and “new” social issues of identity and rights are among the many challenges to the traditional left–right continuum in the polities of rich democratic countries.

These investigations and rethinkings about the role of class are also taking place in the context of rising income and wealth inequalities in many countries. Since the 1980s, all of the Anglo-American democracies have seen mammoth increases in economic inequality, and many continental European countries are experiencing similar, if less dramatic, trends (Brandolini & Smeeding, 2009; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). In particular, high-end inequality, in which a small group at the very top (the “1%” or a “global elite”) is monopolizing most or all of the benefits of economic growth, while people in working- or middle-class jobs are experiencing stagnating real wages (in some cases, over multiple decades) is a central driver of rising global and within-country inequality (cf. Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). But growing divisions can be found in other ways, as well: declining work opportunities for those without college degrees or other kinds of advanced training, slippage in welfare state protections for the most disadvantaged, and the growing willingness of educated middle-class parents to invest heavily in their own children’s educations and development to secure advantage over less-endowed families (Garfinkel, Smeeding, & Rainwater, 2010; Reeves, 2017).

In principle, rising inequality should be associated with a sharpening of socioeconomic differences in policy attitudes, at least with respect to redistributive questions that are most commonly linked to class location (Andersen & Curtis, 2012). Yet there is considerable disagreement about whether rising inequality is in fact associated with increasing class divisions. A large literature has asserted what is sometimes referred to as “the death of class” (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Kingston, 2000). The idea, broadly speaking, is that the social class location of individuals no longer has as much impact on their attitudes
Jeff Manza and Ned Crowley

and political behavior as it once did. This idea has found support among both social scientists (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Clark & Lipset, 2001) and post-Marxists who see alternative sources of anticapitalist energy in nonclass groups (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Balibar, 1993).

The complex debates over the alignment of classes and social and political attitudes has given rise to a wide variety of investigations, from the laboratory, qualitative in-depth interviews, national surveys employing different modes of data collection (and increasingly with embedded experiments), to cross-national surveys with identical items. While no single conclusion captures the range of findings, one of the over-riding conclusions of this chapter is that the expectation of a significant increase in the class divide on key policy and political questions in an era of rising inequality has yet to materialize (cf. Evans & de Graaf, 2013). On the other hand, however, meaningful and persistent differences between class groups, once carefully measured, that belie the strong version of the “death of class” thesis (Svallfors, 2006; McCall, 2013).

In this chapter, we present an overview of the classical and contemporary social science models of impact of class on social and political attitudes and some of the recent challenges (theoretical and empirical) and developments that have raised doubts about the traditional alignment of classes. One of the central goals of the chapter is to unpack the diverse ways in which analysts have conceptualized “class” in their work and to try to show how they can produce different images of class impacts. Indeed, much of the literature has been plagued by multiple and overlapping specifications of class, producing results that often speak past one another. Finally, to give some evidence of the magnitude of class divisions, we present some illustrative empirical evidence on representative issues in the United States (using data from the American National Election Study) and in comparative perspective (with data from the International Social Survey Program).

What Is Class and What Attitudes Might It Predict?

The Problem of Class Analysis

To start with some basics, and in order to avoid common confusions, it is important to specify what we mean by class and sort out some of the complexities of how social scientists think about and operationalize the concept of class. More than anyone else, Karl Marx invented the concept of class, and his fingerprints remain on many contemporary models. In the Marxian sense, classes are made up of groups of people (1) sharing a similar economic situation; (2) who have conflicting economic interests with other classes (for example, workers want more pay, while business owners want to hold down workers’ pay to increase profits); (3) have similar attitudes arising out of these conflicts (whatever else class members may or may not share); and (4) have the potential, at least, to engage in collective action on a class basis (such as when workers organize a union) (Wright, 1997; Weeden & Grusky, 2005). Max Weber’s emphasis on “life chances” in creating class divisions provided a further classical impetus to contemporary theories of class, which arguably builds upon the Marxist foundation in a useful and important way (Marshall, Rose, Newby, & Vogler, 1988; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992).

For as long as social science researchers have used the concept of class, however, there have been fundamental disagreements about how to define it and how to operationalize it in research. Further, the question of how many different classes there are and whether those classes are divided into coherent categories or are instead arrayed along a broad continuum has often bedeviled research studies and frustrated the effort to reach firm conclusions. Marx generally held that any society’s dominant economic system could generate just two significant classes (master/slave, lord/serf, capitalist/worker). But the “embarrassment of the middle class,” as one leading class analyst put it (Wright, 1986), has required vastly more sophistication than classical Marxism could provide.

The difficulties inherent in how social scientists conceptualize class are even truer in everyday language and popular discourse. We have a vast number of “class”-like terms to describe groups
and meaningful differences between them. For example, one journalist writing in 2008 offers an (abbreviated) list of more than 60 terms people have used to describe economically significant groups: “rich, poor, white trash, ghetto, snob, WASP, hipster, redneck, good ole boy, gangsta, self-made, outer borough, trailer trash, elitist,” and so forth (Hodge, 2008, ellipses not shown; see also Conley, 2008).

To even have a discussion about the impact of class on attitudes, then, we need first to identify what we mean by “class” in the first place. As a first approximation, looking across the most important social science scholarship of the past few decades, four distinct ways of defining classes can be found: (1) class as the subjective identification of individuals; (2) class as a gradational concept based purely on income differences between individuals (or households); (3) class as a gradational concept based on a bundle of individual characteristics centered around income and education (usually called “socio-economic status,” or SES); and (4) classes as distinct categorical groupings rooted in occupational career and/or life chances. The limitations of available survey items containing suitable measures of class often constrain these choices; researchers are often limited in terms of sociodemographic characteristics available, especially in relation to occupation. Sometimes current income or education is the only available option. That said, it is important to note the principle logics of each of these approaches briefly before proceeding.

Class as a subjective identity has some initial appeal. Like other kinds of social identities, if class identification is subjectively meaningful to individuals, it should impact on attitudes and behavior. When class identities are not strongly held, on the other hand, and individuals do not perceive themselves as members of an economically distinct group or cannot link personal or household situation to a relevant class identity, its potential impact is dulled. For Marx, this suggests a distinction between “class in itself” (classes that exist in any society based on the dominant economic system) versus “class for itself” (when class becomes meaningful and the basis of collective action). In the oft-quoted preface to his famous study, The Making of the English Working Class, for example, the historian E.P. Thompson (1963) argues that there is today an ever-present temptation to suppose that class is a thing . . . “It,” the working class, is assumed to have a real existence, which can be defined almost mathematically . . . once this is assumed it becomes possible to deduce the class-consciousness which “it” ought to have (but seldom does have) if “it” was properly aware of its own position and real interests.

For Thompson, the process through classes become coherent entities with both recognition of themselves as a class potentially in conflict with other classes—what is sometimes called class formation—is a critical task for researchers (see also Przeworski, 1985; Katzenstein & Zolberg, 1986; Fantasia, 1988).

Thompson would surely recoil at the idea that a small battery of survey items (whether open- or closed-ended) can properly capture individuals’ subjective identities (which he and others would argue change in the context of class mobilization such as a strike or union drive). But there is nevertheless some evidence of the power of subjective class identification as measured in surveys for predicting social and political attitudes net of more “objective” measures of class (key works on significance of class identification would include Jackman & Jackman, 1983; Vanneman & Cannon, 1987; Hout, 2008). One interesting finding, for example, is that people who identify as middle class (versus working class) are more likely to express a sense of political efficacy and engage in politics, net of income and other indicators of class location (Walsh, Jennings, & Stoker, 2004). However, the power and consistency of subjective class identification is strongest at the extremes of the distribution, for example when survey respondents are given choices such as “poor” or “lower class” and “upper class,” while those in the middle categories exhibit far greater heterogeneity (Jackman & Jackman, 1983; Hout, 2008). In the United States, in particular, the “middle class” has become an exceptionally broad category of identification. Many people employed in manual labor occupations with modest
incomes, as well as others in in professional and managerial occupations with substantial incomes, typically identify themselves as “middle class.” In this way, class identification may be robbed of much of its significance when it becomes a catch-all identification category.

Moving from subjective identification to using objective measures of individuals’ class location, we find a range of different approaches. The most common strategy for operationalizing the class location of individuals is a simple indicator of current income (usually measured at the household level). Money, or the lack thereof, has many implications for individuals and households, and in this sense income should capture much of what we mean by “class.” Further, in an age of rising inequality within occupations, where some top performers receive far more than everyone else (Frank & Cook, 1996), it may be that income captures an important source of socioeconomic distinction not available in the occupation-based approaches that tend to be favored by sociologists (as discussed in what follows).

That most polls and academic surveys contain measures of self-reported income facilitates the use of this particular measure of class. When tested separately against alternative specifications of class, the income divide often produces the largest differences, at least in the United States (McCall & Manza, 2011). There is, however, some arbitrariness in the way income measures of class are typically handled by many analysts. One problem with using income to define distinct classes is that there are no meaningful and clear-cut boundaries (does having an annual income of $79,000 place a person in the middle class, while an income of $80,000 places another person in the upper class?). Yet the gradational alternative, to treat income classes as continuous, takes us quite far away from the classic conception of class as meaningful categories that differentiate groups of citizens.

There is another issue with conflating class and income. Sociologists have long argued that more important than the amount of income is the source of income. The echo of Max Weber’s life chances is key here. How people earn gives us a better way of predicting who their friends are, what types of political conversations they are likely to have, and whether they are likely to perceive themselves as members of a group vulnerable to social and economic change. For example, a part-time college instructor may have the same current income as the unionized janitor who cleans up her office at the end of the day. The medical school resident works long hours at modest pay that is similar to what many skilled blue-collar workers receive. But, having earned advanced degrees and possessing much more marketable skill sets than the janitor or blue-collar worker, the college instructor or medical student are likely to have very different friends and social networks, ideas about what is just and fair, and perhaps most importantly the potential to earn far more income over her life than the janitor, irrespective of their current (similar) incomes. In this way, occupation (and education) tells us something much more than simple income about the real lives of the individuals.

A third approach to class moves in the entirely opposite direction from simple income to produce a much broader definition of class based on indices derived from educational attainment, current income, and occupation status (with the latter generally scored according to an occupation’s human capital requirements and monetary rewards; see Ganzeboom & Treiman, 2003). Using a version of this approach, researchers can construct a score for an individual’s socioeconomic status (SES). The basic premise and indeed virtue of the SES approach over simple income approaches is that by combining a number of different attributes of any individual, we can better place her in relation to others. While different weights can be assigned to each of the metrics used to construct SES, one basic decision rule is that someone scoring high on all three dimensions (income, education, occupation) is “high SES,” someone scoring low on all three is “low SES,” and everyone else is somewhere in the middle (or “middle SES”).

SES is useful for many research purposes and generally does a better job empirically than simple income measures in accounting for many outcomes of interest (on health outcomes, for example, see Link, Northridge, Phelan, & Ganz, 1998; more generally, see Halaby & Weakliem, 1993). Its utility as a tool for analyzing class impacts on social and political attitudes, however, is less clear. A key aspect
of the classical model of class is that members of the same class should have at least some context for recognition of their situation in relation to others and ultimately that collective action might arise from their location. People in the same SES location have no tools to recognize others in the same position and are not plausibly ever likely to act together on that basis ("Low-SES people unite" does not, we suspect, offer a very compelling slogan). Further, as researchers unpack the impacts of SES on attitudes, it is frequently income or education that drives whatever correlations are found. The interaction effect between them has not proved very effective in social research, and the resulting conceptual muddle may confuse more than it illuminates (Goldthorpe, 2008).

The fourth approach to class, based on a person's occupation and the characteristics of the work they perform, probably comes closest to capturing the classical Marx-Weber understanding of class (Wright, 1997; Grusky & Sørensen, 1998). Unlike income or SES, there are many examples of occupational groups having similar political views and acting together to push for higher wages or to change government policies (e.g., in unions or professional associations like the American Bar Association or the American Medical Association, and for the capitalist class, there is the Chamber of Commerce and other business associations). Occupation-based approaches also better capture the Weberian notion of life chances than simple income measures as the contrast between the careers of many professional and managerial occupations, as we noted. It is at the workplace that many people are most likely to have conversations about politics (Weeden & Grusky, 2005).

There are two general approaches to identifying classes on the basis of occupation: in large clusters of occupations sharing similar characteristics or at the unit level of occupation itself. The most popular of the former “big-class” schemes is that of Erikson and Goldthorpe (EG; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992) and Wright (1985, 1997). In the EG class scheme, the more popular and easier to operationalize of the two, 3 to 11 core classes (in "restricted" to "expansive" versions depending on information available in the dataset) are derived. These are based on the nature of the typical employment contract underlying the occupation, and coded accordingly. The employment contract, EG argue, signifies a combination of factors such as work content (routine/nonroutine), working conditions (office/factory), and especially employment relations (e.g., owner/nonowner, supervisor/nonsupervisor, secure/insecure job; see also Goldthorpe, 2006, chapter 5). The EG scheme also makes a distinction between those individuals who own their own businesses (or are self-employed) and those who work for someone else. Self-employment, steadily rising around the world, exposes people to market forces and state regulations safely ignored by their peers employed in the same occupation. Among those who are employed, distinctions are made between those who have jobs that either entail supervising others or require employer trust (what they call “the salariat”) and those that do not; between those involving manual work or not; and, among manual workers, those that require special skills and training versus those that do not.

Grusky, Weeden, and their colleagues (see, e.g., Grusky & Sørensen, 1998; Weeden & Grusky, 2005; Weeden & Grusky, 2012) propose to disaggregate these “big” class schemes. They do so essentially by redefining “class” as occupation. They argue, and have produced supportive evidence across a wide range of social and political attitudes, that it is at the level of an individual’s occupation that class attitudes are formed or reinforced, and it is at the occupation level that forms of collective action are most common (e.g., strikes, demands for governing licensing requirements to hold down competition, and in sharing common economic interests in response to social and economic change. There are some very striking results in this and other occupation-based studies. For example, college professors are very liberal, and perhaps become more so over time in the profession, in spite of their autonomy, employment security, and above-average wages (Gross, 2012). However, closer inspection of the Weeden-Grusky results suggests that only a minority of occupations—those with heavy union representation or strong occupational closure—drive the overall impact of occupation. Most occupations, by contrast, exert much less influence on incumbents, especially in the majority of occupations that are not career oriented where occupational boundaries are loosest. In the 21st-century labor
market, long-term careers in a single occupation are becoming increasingly less common and thus perhaps less meaningful for many individuals.

If one of the virtues of occupations is that they combine education and earnings in a parsimonious way, like SES it too may tend to confuse truly “class” effects with educational effects on attitudes (see, e.g., Houtman, 2003a; van der Waal, Achtenberg, & Houtman, 2007). This is a long-standing and complicated issue in research on class. When assessing class differences in social attitudes, a long line of research suggests that the role of education is driving much of the association. A classical example can be seen in Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1981 [1960], chap. 8) “working-class authoritarianism” thesis. Lipset built upon research on the social and political tolerance following the collapse of fascism and right after the McCarthy era in the United States. He claimed that working-class and downwardly mobile middle-class people were drawn to authoritarian movements and parties of the left and the right. But a plethora of later scholarship demonstrated that it was education, not class as Lipset conceived it, driving the association (e.g., Lipsitz, 1965; Davis, 1982; Houtman, 2003a, 2003b). Statistically controlling for education is one approach to the problem, but theoretically virtually all conceptions of class except simple income measures contain education attainment and/or skill credentials as a key conceptual element (e.g. many occupational titles have specific credentials attached to them. It is an issue that all class analysts need to attend to in their work, and consider appropriate interpretation of regression results.

A similar issue arises with respect to race, ethnicity, and perhaps gender and region. All measures of class contain large subgroups, necessitating attention to how those factors interact—and either reinforce or hinder the expression of class interests (McCall, 2005). For example, a growing proportion of blue-collar skilled and nonskilled workers in many rich countries are racial and ethnic minorities. Where we see strong and persisting class effects, are those primarily due to the preferences of minorities who experience forms of discrimination not shared by their White peers, or are they fully class effects? Conversely, are class differences among important population subgroups impacting the ways those group differences are expressed? The issue of how to measure and study what has come to be known as intersectionality goes beyond the scope of the chapter, but as with education, it raises issues for understanding and interpreting the association between "class" and attitudes more difficult than it might at first appear.

**Where and When Does Class Matter?**

Class differences in attitudes, as explored in most research, quite naturally settle on issues and topics that have the most direct distributional content: for example, policy attitudes concerning the welfare state, taxes, and other mechanisms of redistribution. It is on these questions that class interests are expected to be most relevant and for which the theoretical logic and expectation of class differences are most direct. There are, broadly speaking, two types of distributional questions that have significant repeated survey items available: policy-specific questions (e.g., such as spending on social programs or government responsibility for reducing inequality) and items about inequality principles (e.g., whether inequality is too large or whether there are still opportunities for upward social mobility). McCall (2013) provides a comprehensive analysis of all of the inequality items available in standard cross-sectional surveys for the United States, while Svallfors (2006) provides a good introduction and analysis of the cross-national data (see also Evans and de Graaf (2013) on class and vote choice in cross-national election studies).

When it comes to issues and topics that have little or no distributional content, however, things become more complicated. There is typically a large educational gradient on many social issues such as race/gender, same-sex relationships, environmental concerns, and civil liberties (as we noted earlier). On the other hand, some of these issues have occupational-specific interests in play. For example, many professional occupations have class interests on topics such as protecting free speech.
Class Divisions and Political Attitudes

or opposing prioritizing religion over science (for example, in the elevation of intelligent design to coequal status with evolutionary biology in high school science courses). Attacks on the legitimacy of science in relation to important topics such as climate change provide particularly sharp contemporary examples. At a more refined occupation level, specific occupations can have material interests at stake in seemingly social controversies (e.g., physicians favoring women's right to abortion, professors and college administrators opposing challenges to institutional autonomy in challenges to affirmative-action rules, professional journalists frustrated by conceptions of their work as "fake news"). Similarly, albeit more contentiously, blue-collar workers may have material interests in holding down competition from immigrants, or White workers may perceive or express class interests in opposing policies they perceive as favoring racial and ethnic minorities (see Hochschild, 2016, for a recent ethnographic exploration of how racial and anti-immigrant sentiment may arise out of class-based sentiments).

Finally, it is important to note the impact of social contexts on the mobilization and variation of class divides in attitudes. Three such contexts are especially important (and logically related): the topic/issue at hand; variation in the organizational forces that map onto class divides to reinforce (or weaken) them; and evidence of significant cross-national variation in the class divide across issues. On the first point, it should hardly be surprising that we often find significant variation in the size of the class gap depending on the issue in question (Svallfors, 2006; Gilens, 2012). On the latter two, there is broad evidence of significant cross-national differences in class impacts on attitudes (e.g., Svallfors, 2006; Brooks & Manza, 2007), and the most logical explanation is influence of organizational forces such as parties and unions to strengthen class-linked attitudes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Piven, 1991; Hicks, 1999; Huber & Stephens, 2001).

It is perhaps somewhat paradoxical that the comparative research on class and attitudes consistently finds that countries that have the most equality tend to have the highest levels of class division (see also Wright, 1997; Evans, 1999; Kelly & Enns, 2010). This long-standing conclusion underscores the power of organizations that mobilize along class lines, which can both hold down within-country inequality and help to mobilize class-based interests. In countries where union density is higher, and/or strong Social Democratic or Labor parties can provide consistent sources of information and advocacy to their members, the reinforcement of leftist attitudes and voting behavior and higher levels of support for reduced inequality is significant among the poor and middle class (Huber & Stephens, 2001). The United States stands out as unusually weak on both dimensions, an important reason why the class divide in attitudes often appears weaker than in other countries (see, for example, the recent discussions of working-class conservatism by Gest [2016]; Hochschild [2016]; and Williams [2017]).

The Class Thesis in Public Opinion Research: History and Current Controversies

Class analysis of individual attitudes has a long history. Consider the debate over extending the franchise to unpropertied citizens in the 19th century. On the one hand, Engels (1978 [1895]) and the early socialist movement believed that once workers were extended the franchise, the much larger poor and working class would use it to translate their economic interests into political power (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986). Interestingly, their conservative opponents often shared some of the same assumptions (and fears) about the unity of working-class attitudes (McKenzie & Silver, 1968). The fight for universal suffrage might have ended much earlier than it did if a more realistic political sociology of class and attitudes had prevailed!

A major landmark in these early debates was the instantly famous work of the German sociologist Werner Sombart on Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? (1976 [1906]). For Sombart, the relative affluence of American workers meant that “all socialist utopias come to nothing on roast beef and apple pie.” For Sombart, the relative lack of hardship faced by American workers compared to
their European peers made them less attracted to redistributive ideas and public policies. Selig Perlman (1970 [1928]) famously extended the Sombart thesis in arguing that class consciousness among American workers never took hold because of the absence of feudal legacies, the early extension of the franchise, and successive waves of immigration, which undermined the forms of classwide solidarity found in Europe. Generations of scholarship on “American exceptionalism” have periodically revisited and reiterated varieties of these claims (see, e.g., Hartz, 1955; Bell, 1960; Lipset & Marks, 2000).

Although it suggests the absence of strong class divides, the American exceptionalism thesis stimulated considerable debates about class divisions in public opinion, both in the United States and elsewhere. Indeed, some of the earliest efforts at systematic research on class divisions in attitudes, generally using voting behavior as a proxy for “public opinion” before the advent of opinion surveys, sought to explore the link between class location and political preferences and test the lack-of-class-influence thesis. For example, early ecological analyses by W.F. Ogburn (Ogburn & Peterson, 1916) and Stuart Rice (1928) used voting data as a proxy to analyze the underlying beliefs of different class segments (see also Ogburn and Coombs [1940] and Anderson and Davidson [1943] on class differences in the New Deal era).

In the post–World War II era, Seymour Martin Lipset probably did as much as anyone to focus attention on the role of class divisions in structuring political preferences in the United States and cross-nationally (see especially Lipset, 1981 [1960], 1963; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; see also the work of Lipset’s student Robert Alford [1963]). In the essays gathered together in his widely read 1960 book, Political Man, for example, Lipset developed what he would later characterize—in the 1981 postscript to the reissue of the book—as an “apolitical Marxist” approach to explaining the social origins of democracy, fascism, communism, and the social bases of modern political parties. The values that sustain democratic societies were said to be more prevalent in societies with a large and stable bloc of middle-class citizens, especially where education levels were relatively high. Authoritarian preferences, by contrast, could be traced to marginalized groups or classes, including workers (Lipset’s famous formulation of the thesis of “working-class authoritarianism” noted earlier), small business owners and other economically vulnerable class segments.

Lipset’s early work implied both a rational foundation to class-based public opinion, in which class location and interests provides an orientation toward social and political issues, and an “irrational” attraction to left- or right-wing extremism lurking in the background for working-class and economically vulnerable middle-class people (see also Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Paul, & Linz, 1954). Anthony Downs’s (1957) landmark work proposing an economic model of political behavior pushed even further in developing a rational model of class-based preferences. For Downs, “groups” of voters are simply aggregates of self-interested actors (albeit with similar calculations of utility), and group-based voting or attitudes can be explained in terms of calculations of individuals within the group. Influential examples can be seen in Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) model of the conditions under which the median voter’s support for redistribution increases (proposing formally that as mean and median incomes diverge, demands for governmental redistribution should grow), and Hibbs’s (1982, 1987) work on vote choice and class preferences (finding evidence that in periods of substantial inflation-unemployment trade-offs, workers prefer low unemployment and middle-class citizens favor low inflation).

The interest-based account of class preferences was long predominant, and indeed essentially remains the default model of class influence on public opinion. But it presumes a relatively high level of information on the part of citizens; they have to be able to reliably connect their economic situation to other social and political attitudes. This assumption is problematic on a number of levels (Bartels, 2008; Lupia, 2015; Achen & Bartels, 2016; see also Stern & Ondish in this volume). Most citizens, especially those with less education, may not be able to tie their own material self-interest to concrete public policies. Bartels (2008, chap. 6) argues that the support of working-class people for the elimination of the estate tax, even though the benefits flow overwhelmingly to families at the
very top of the wealth distribution, is a good example of how low information can misdirect citizens and lead them toward views that are clearly and unambiguously not in their material interest. More recently, Kuziemko, Norton, Saez, and Stantcheva (2015) find, in online survey experiments, that priming respondents with information about who receives the benefits of estate tax elimination yields no significant impact on policy preferences.

These constraints on attitudes for low-education and low-information citizens have long prompted alternative and less demanding models of the links between class and attitudes developed in the post-war era. The most influential work in what was sometimes referred to as “electoral sociology” was that of Paul Lazarsfeld and Bernard Berelson and their students (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). In their panel survey of voters in the 1940 and 1948 elections, for example, the “Columbia School” found that voters’ electoral preferences were surprisingly stable during the election. They identified a simple “index of political predisposition” rooted in socio-economic status and attributed both stability and class bias to the importance of social networks of friends, family members, and coworkers in reinforcing the political preferences of voters (even in the face of the noise of the campaign; see, e.g., Berelson et al., 1954, pp. 88–109). After a flurry of interest, however, network-based models fell out of fashion; their relatively recent rediscovery as a source of class influence on attitudes remains very much a work in process (cf. Zuckerman, 2005; Mutz, 2006; Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007).

The landmark social psychological approach of the “Michigan School” of Angus Campbell and his colleagues provided yet another possible source of understanding how class membership may emerge. The critical finding, amply reinforced in later studies, highlights the power of partisan identity to shape social and political attitudes (Campbell, Converse, Stokes, & Miller, 1960; see also Green, Palmquist, & Shickler, 2002). The idea is that citizens become partisans from their families; at the “back end” of the causal funnel, partisan and socioeconomic influences from individual families create enduring partisanship that in turn shapes attitudes and behaviors in adulthood. Evidence of the importance of childhood inheritance has also come from studies of the impact of social mobility on individual political preferences. Mobile individuals often retain preferences as close to their class of origin as to their class destination (i.e., adult class location); and the shift toward the views of the destination class only slowly accords with their new situation (e.g., De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, & Heath, 1995; Kohler, 2006). The social mobility thesis remains one of the more powerful sources of evidence of the relevance of class as a background factor in shaping citizens’ attitudes.

In spite of these theoretical insights, however, it is fair to say that the inheritance from the classical tradition produced no consensus about why social attitudes should be linked to class (cf. Svalfors, 2006, p. 7; Kohler, 2006, p. 117). The leading contenders—partisanship (own and parental), social networks, social mobility, material interests—have rarely been tested alongside one another, in large measure because few datasets contain adequate measures of each. Where these mechanisms have been systematically tested, it has primarily been voting behavior—not attitudes—that has been the primary dependent variable of interest (cf. Evans, 1999; Gelman, 2008 Evans & de Graaf, 2013).

Recent Controversies

If class divisions in public opinion were for a long time a staple of debate and investigation in research in public opinion and political behavior, a new set of questions has arisen in recent decades. The two most important of these controversies and revisions to the traditional model of class politics they suggest involve (1) a possible shift of some middle- (and upper-middle-) class groups to more leftist positions; (2) the rising strength of right-wing populism, particularly among poor and working-class citizens. A number of analysts have asserted that while class identities might once have been a key influence on social and political attitudes and behavior, they have declined significantly in influence in the recent four decades. For example, while Lipset was once associated with a strong view of the
Jeff Manza and Ned Crowley

enduring importance of class, toward the end of his long scholarly career, he came to adopt the view that class divisions were of declining importance (see, e.g., Clark & Lipset, 1991, Lipset, 2001). A flurry of other works published in the 1990s asserted “the death of class politics” along a variety of manifestations, including class differences in public opinion (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Pakulski & Waters, 1996; Kingston, 2000).

These arguments raise a variety of issues. First, they have most widely been advanced, and have the firmest empirical evidence, in relation to voting behavior (cf. Evans & de Graaf, 2013). But changes in class alignment at the ballot box do not necessarily mean changing class attitudes. Parties and political actors can sometimes change the salience of different kinds of issues to alter voter preferences rather than changing the underlying attitudes. A good example can be seen in the controversy over Thomas Frank’s best-selling (2004) book, *What’s the Matter With Kansas?* Frank asserted that traditional patterns of class politics in the United States have declined as White working-class voters, increasingly influenced by the conservative framing of electoral contests around social issues such as abortion, gun control, and family values, have been encouraged to overlook (or misunderstand) their own economic interests (see also Roemer, 1998; Stonecash & Brewer, 2006).

Second, studies of attitudes toward rising inequality, for example, do not appear to have generated the expected class divisions in response (Manza & Brooks, 2017). Understandings of the magnitude of income and wealth inequality in the United States, for example, are at best limited. Survey and lab respondents estimate existing inequality as much lower than it actually is, even as they desire greater equality (Norton & Ariely, 2011; McCall, 2013). Experimental efforts to manipulate respondents by increasing their understanding of the level of wealth and income inequality or to register higher levels of disagreement in the face of the stark trends have not proved very successful to date (Davidai & Gilovich 2015; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Manza & Brooks, 2017). Interestingly, in contrast to many other topics where different measures of class move together (with higher and lower groups arrayed in more or less the same way), on questions about rising inequality, there is evidence of diverging impacts between income and education effects (van der Waal, Achterberg, & Houtman, 2007; Page & Jacobs, 2009).

How Large Is the Class Divide in Public Opinion?

It is relatively rare for studies of social and political attitudes to include a number of the different measures of class alongside one another, but given our goal in this chapter to highlight the importance of understanding the implications of different measures of class, we provide two sets of illustrative analyses that will also highlight over-time trends and cross-national differences. The first set of analyses come from the American National Election Study (ANES) data, the standard biennial election survey, and the second comparative analyses uses data from the inequality topic module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which was carried out in 2009 and 2010 in more than 50 countries. To highlight comparative variation within the limits of this chapter, we focus on four countries: Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These four countries represent an interesting range of rich democratic countries—in the classical division of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990), Sweden is a prototype of the “social democratic” welfare states of Northern Europe, Germany is the leading “Christian democratic” welfare state, and the UK and the U.S. represent two different versions of “liberal” democratic welfare states (with the former having relatively stronger unions and a left party that has governed extensively since World War II, in contrast with the U.S., which has had neither).

Although the two datasets do not provide identical measures of the different components analysts use in studying class impacts, they do allow for relatively similar measures of aspects of class that we have highlighted in the chapter. The four class indicators we explore are all categorical variables with between three and five categories: household income recoded into terciles (high, middle, low);
education recoded as closely as possible into four categories (less than high school, high school only or equivalent, some college/vocational education, college degree or more), class identification in three categories (in the NES, lower class/working class, middle class, and upper-middle/upper-class), and occupation. For the latter, we replicate versions of the EGP scheme, limited significantly by the information available on the ANES (occupational information stopped being included in the ANES data file after 2004). We provide more detail about the data, our measures, and the attitudinal items we use in the chapter’s appendix.

Analyses of Class Divide in the United States

Our first set of analyses considers class differences across a number of economic and noneconomic issues over time, using repeated items in the ANES that are generally available from 1980 onward. We have broken out trends in each of eight items, four related to government spending and four to social policy, in separate graphs for each major class divide. We plot the proportion of respondents in each class group that supports increased spending or the more liberal social policy option (e.g., favoring more liberal abortion law or a law against discrimination against gays and lesbians).

Consider first preferences toward government spending in four policy areas: Social Security, welfare, public education, and defense. Each of our four class measures (depicted respectively in Figures 12.1a, 12.1b, 12.1c, and 12.1d) shows significant differences on many items, and in some cases these differences are quite large. Overall, the income class identification gaps are the most consistent in the expected direction on the redistribution spending items (welfare, social security, and education), with the size of the class gap between the highest income levels of support for greater spending at around 20 to 25% on the welfare and social security items and a more modest 10 to 15% on public education (Figure 12.1a). Class identification shows a similar profile, with a very large (up to 35%) gap on social security, but smaller gaps on public education and a significantly narrowing gap on welfare to less than 10% between the lower/working class and the upper-middle/upper class by 2016 (Figure 12.1d). The education gap between the lowest and highest group is large on the social security and welfare items, but is muddled and modest when it comes to spending on public education (albeit with the least educated group moving from less support to more support over time) (Figure 12.1b).

Two points stand out with respect to the spending attitudes. First, social spending preferences are significantly different than support for more defense spending. The income and class identification measures show no real differences between the groups, while the education measure shows that those with the most education are the least supportive of increasing defense spending, and in some years (including in the most recent surveys since 2002), the gap approaches 20% between the college educated and everyone else.

Next, let’s examine the four social-issue items (abortion, opposition to discrimination against gays and lesbians, immigration, and government aid to minorities). Here (Figures 12.2a, 12.2b, 12.2c, and 12.2d) we see the reversal of class ordering, with the better-endowed groups on income and especially education taking the most liberal positions. In some cases, the educational class gap is very large, approaching or in some cases exceeding 20% between the highest and lowest groups, while smaller
Figure 12.1a  Government Spending Preferences Income. ANES 1980–2016
Figure 12.1b  Government Spending Preferences Education. ANES 1980–2016
Figure 12.1c  Government Spending Preferences Occupation. ANES 1980–2016
Figure 12.1d  Government Spending Preferences and Class Self-Identification. ANES 1980–2016
Social policy preference by income tercile

Abortion

Gay antidiscrimination law

Number of immigrants allowed

Government aid to minorities

Figure 12.2a  Social Policy Preferences and Income. ANES 1980–2016
Figure 12.2c Social Policy Preferences and Occupation. ANES 1980–2016
Figure 12.2d  Social Policy Preferences and Class Self-Identification. ANES 1980–2016
gaps (and sometimes no meaningful gap at all) can be found on income. Class identification shows virtually no difference on any of these items (Figure 12.2d). The strength of education on the social issue items is consistent with what we have seen in other work and underscores a point made earlier in the chapter about its importance in thinking about overall class impacts.

**Comparative Analyses**

Our comparative analysis from the 2009 ISSP inequality module is displayed in the four bar graphs (Figures 12.3a, 12.3b, 12.3c, and 12.3d), with each graph showing class divisions across each measure of class on the three items (taxing the rich more, governmental responsibility to guarantee a standard of living, and spending more on the poor). Each graph moves from the most to least generous welfare state across the x-axis (Sweden–Germany–UK–U.S.). Although not exactly linear, we do see in these graphs higher levels of support for government generosity among all groups in the predicted national order, and the gaps between class categories tend to be larger in the already–more–egalitarian Sweden and Germany than in the UK or the United States.

Drilling down to each of the three items, we find varying levels of class inequality but in most cases in the expected direction. Starting with the tax-the-rich item (the first bar in each graph), we see very little difference between the bottom two income groups in all countries but a significant gap between the highest income group and everyone else (Figure 12.3a). In each country, the highest income group exhibits a sense of threat to material well-being, and members express much more opposition than other groups. Education shows a more varied pattern; in the U.S., it is the
Figure 12.3b Redistributive Preference and Education. ISSP 2009

Figure 12.3c Redistributive Preference and Occupation. ISSP 2009
least educated group that is most opposed to increased taxes, in the UK there are no significant differences between education groups; in Sweden and Germany, by contrast, the education groups line up as expected and the differences are quite large (more than 20% difference between highest and lowest groups in both countries; Figure 12.3b). Class identification works in the expected direction in all four countries, with Sweden standing out with an especially large (nearly 40%) gap between the lower-/working-class respondents and upper-/upper-middle-class respondents (Figure 12.3d). Finally, on occupation, in Germany and Sweden support increases across the occupational classes (with the least-privileged occupational groups expressing more support than the most privileged, with the gaps generally smaller in those countries than for income). By contrast, the UK and the United States show more uneven patterns. One interesting difference is that U.S. professionals are the most liberal, while in the UK professionals are the least liberal on the tax item. In general, there is little evidence of an occupational divide in the U.S., while the UK looks more like its European neighbors (Figure 12.3c).

Turning next to the item on increasing spending on the poor, the income measure shows the expected pattern and occasionally large differences (with the U.S. surprisingly standing out with the largest income class differences and Sweden showing the least difference). Class identification is similarly arrayed as expected, although the gaps are smaller than for income. On this item, the educational class divide is muted (although again, the U.S. exhibits the strongest difference), and the occupational class divide is undermined by the relatively strong support among professionals in all four countries for higher spending. In Sweden and the U.S., professionals are either as (U.S.) or more (Sweden) generous than unskilled workers.

Figure 12.3d  Redistributive Preference and Class Self-Identification, ISSP 2009
The third and final item asks about governmental responsibility to guarantee a reasonable standard of living. The income gap looks similar in Germany, Great Britain, and the U.S., with the size of the gap varying from about 20% in Germany to nearly 40% in the U.S.; Sweden shows a more modest gap between the highest income group and the other two. Interestingly, there are little or no educational group differences in Germany, Sweden, and the UK; only in the U.S. does a significant educational gradient appear. Class identification impacts attitudes in a more expected direction in all four countries, with a modest 10 to 15% gap between the highest and lowest groups. The occupational divide is fairly murky in all four countries, but professionals again stand out for their liberalism.

Discussion

These results, while largey illustrative, nevertheless highlight a few important issues that the previous scholarly literature on class-linked attitudes calls attention to. An obvious question that arises is how large are these differences? We’ve seen, depending on the item and time period or country, class differences that are generally in the range of 10 to 20%, and only occasionally more than 30%, between the highest and lowest class categories. To calibrate the “how large is large” question, we would probably most usefully compare these results to other large sociodemographic cleavages, such as race/ethnicity or gender. While a systematic comparison would take us far beyond what we can accomplish in this chapter, a quick comparison would suggest the following. Gender differences in opinion have been found on many topics, but the differences on domestic policy questions are frequently on the order of 3 to 5% (Huddy & Cassese, 2011). Surprisingly, gender-specific issues—for example, policies that specifically aim at reducing gender inequalities, the Equal Rights Amendment in the United States (in the 1970s and 1980s when it was a major topic), the right to an abortion, or gender traditionalism—there are generally few gender differences to be found, and sometimes men are more supportive of equality (Sapiro, 2003; Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). The latter is especially surprising if we think of sociodemographic cleavages such as race, class, and gender being strongest in relation to topics that directly invoke the cleavage.

When it comes to race, by contrast, there are a number of topics on which Black Americans express significantly different views than White Americans that are larger in many cases than the class divide. At the top of the list of racial differences in attitudes would be criminal justice topics (Weldon, 2015, provides a useful overview). Another area of growing disagreement in recent decades has been attitudes toward the degree and importance of racism in American life (Pew Center, 2016). On these critical issues where the racial divide is in question, the attitudinal gap between Whites and Blacks can exceed 30% depending on the issue in question). So at least for the United States, a plausible conclusion would be that the size of the class gap sits somewhere between the gender and race gaps in attitudes. Given the mostly larger class divides in other rich democracies, the strength of that conclusion is likely to remain robust for the foreseeable future.

A few other points are worth noting. First off, our ANES analyses highlight the ways in which class divisions work in a traditional left–right way on redistributive policy questions—with the least economically endowed groups expressing the most liberal positions—and reverses direction when it comes to social attitudes (where the educational gap drives more liberal positions for those with the most schooling). This two-lefts scenario is visible in the ISSP data as well. But there is an interesting twist in the willingness of professionals to support left positions not only on social issues but also on some redistributive questions that are arguably not obviously in their material (or traditional) class interests is opened up by separating out professionals from managers and business executives.

A related implication is that analysts should pay more attention to is how class-linked opinion differences are closely tied to the overall social and political contexts. Class differences in attitudes tend to move together, as our ANES analyses suggest and a few other scholars have noted as well (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). Poor and working-class respondents are responding to rising inequality in ways
to date that are similar to those of more affluent voters, even though there remains a significant gap between them. This does not mean that issues of class inequality are declining in importance, but it does suggest, as Przeworski and Sprague (1986) concluded in their analytical history of social democracy, that only conditions in which multiple classes can move together toward support for reducing class inequality can produce durable realignment on these critical issues.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have endeavored to present both an overview of classical and contemporary theoretical debates about the meaning of class and how diverse conceptions of class impacts on social and political attitudes and an empirical investigation of class effects across multiple specifications. Analysts have deployed multiple specifications of class in their work, producing results that often speak past one another. We think it is important for class analysts to parse out the different meanings and implications of different ways of thinking about class rather than defining a single measure of class and stopping there. We are not completely in agreement with Conley’s (2008, p. 367) claim that attempts to clarify what we mean by class is like “trying to sweep dust or sand into neat little piles.” But we take his point about the problem and urge future researchers to be careful about sweeping generalizations about “class” effects without considering the diverse components that make up social classes.

Two sets of debates have dominated more recent research on class and public opinion: (1) how large are class differences in public opinion? and (2) what are the trends? Are “classes dying,” as some have suggested, or does class remain a robust force in contemporary public opinion? Our dissection of the scholarly literature on class and public opinion strongly suggests that this continues to be a vexing set of questions.

The analyses we have presented in this chapter are, to be sure, primarily illustrative. Nevertheless, we are confident that the results we have presented, alongside other scholarship discussed in the chapter, suggest that when it comes to social and political attitudes, the death of the class divide is premature.
Appendix

American National Election Study (ANES) Data

We use the ANES cumulative data file available from electionstudies.org. We dropped all observations before 1980. The cumulative data file includes surveys fielded biennially until 2004, after which are data from 2008 and 2012. We merged in corresponding variables from the 2016 ANES time-series survey. Only pre-election survey items are used from the 2016 time-series data. This creates a combined dataset with 35,797 observations across 16 versions of the ANES survey. Because the ANES started including items at different points in time, the number of nonmissing observations varies across items. Most questions of interest were not asked in the year 2002.

All dependent variables were dichotomized so that “agree/increase spending” and “strongly agree/greatly increase spending” were set equal to 1. In the case of immigration, those who wanted to keep immigration numbers constant were also assigned a value of 1. Figures 12.1a–12.1d and 12.2a–12.2d plot the proportion of respondents assigned a value of 1 on each dependent variable. The plots are smoothed using the local polynomial smooth plot command for Stata (lpoly).

Independent variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>ANES</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Our Coding</th>
<th>Nonmissing Observations</th>
<th>Years Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>VCF0114</td>
<td>Respondent family income group</td>
<td>Terciles based on within data distribution</td>
<td>31,527</td>
<td>1980–2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>VCF0140</td>
<td>Education, 6-category</td>
<td>Less than HS, HS, some college or vocational school, college or more</td>
<td>35,428</td>
<td>1980–2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class-identity</td>
<td>VCF0148</td>
<td>Self-identified class category</td>
<td>Lower/working class; middle/lower-middle class; upper-middle/upper class</td>
<td>28,006</td>
<td>1980–2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>VCF0115</td>
<td>Occupation group, 6-category</td>
<td>Professional/managerial; clerical/sales; skilled/semiskilled workers; laborers. Excluded farmers, farm labor, armed forces, and homemakers.</td>
<td>17,928</td>
<td>1980–2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dependent variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>ANES Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Our Coding</th>
<th>Nonmissing Observations</th>
<th>Years Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Social security | VCF9049 | Should federal spending on [ITEM] be increased, decreased or kept about the same? | Increase = 1  
Kept same and decrease = 0  
NK or NA = missing | 30,520 | 1984–2016 |
| Public education | VCF0890 | See above | See above | 27,810 | 1984–2016 |
| Defense | VCF9118 | See above | Greatly increase, increase, and slightly increase = 1  
Greatly decrease, decrease, slightly decrease, and keep same = 0 | 26,797 | 1980–2016 |
| Abortion | VCF0838 | By law, when should abortion be allowed | For any reason = 1  
All others = 0  
DK = missing | 32,139 | 1980–2016 |
| Gay antidiscrimination law | VCF0876 | Law to protect homosexuals/gays against discrimination | Favor = 1  
Oppose = 0  
NA = missing | 16,942 | 1988–2016 |
| Aid to minorities | VCF0830 | Government should help minority groups | Government should help minority groups = 1  
Minority groups/Blacks should help themselves = 0  
Neutral = 0 | 29,314 | 1980–2016 |
| Immigration | VCF0879a | Increase of decrease number of immigrants to U.S. | Increase = 1  
Same as now = 1  
Decrease = 0 | 20,504 | 1992–2016 |

International Social Survey Project (ISSP) Data

We use the 2009 social inequality module to the ISSP. Although the survey was fielded in some 50 countries, we include only Sweden (n = 1,137), Germany (n = 1,395), the United Kingdom (n = 958), and the United States (n = 1,581) in the analysis, leaving us with a sample size of 5,071. Like with the ANES data, all dependent variables were dichotomized so that a value of 1 reflects a preference in favor of the redistributive policy. The bar graphs plot the proportion of respondents (y-axis) assigned a value of 1, that is, who supported the redistributive policy in question. Respondents are grouped by class indicator group within country. The independent variables, our class indicators, were coded into groups consonant with the groupings we created in the ANES data.
### Independent variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>ISSP Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Our Coding</th>
<th>Nonmissing Observations</th>
<th>Years Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>DE_INC</td>
<td>Respondent family income group</td>
<td>Terciles based on within data distribution for each country, respectively.</td>
<td>4,472</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE_INC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GB_INC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US_INC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>DE_DEGR</td>
<td>Country-specific education</td>
<td>Country specific equivalents to: less than secondary diploma; secondary diploma; some higher education; university degree or higher</td>
<td>4,974</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE_DEGR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GB_DEGR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US_DEGR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class-identity</td>
<td>V66</td>
<td>What social class would you say you belong to?</td>
<td>Lower/working class; middle/lower-middle class; upper-middle/upper class</td>
<td>4,971</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>ISCO88</td>
<td>ILO-ISCO 1988 4-digit occupational categories</td>
<td>Managers; professionals; routing white-collar; skilled workers; unskilled workers</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Dependent variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>ISSP Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Our Coding</th>
<th>Nonmissing Observations</th>
<th>Years Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxes on rich</td>
<td>V37</td>
<td>How would you describe taxes in your country for those with high incomes?</td>
<td>Much too low and too low = 1 About right, too much, and much too high = 0</td>
<td>4,707</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaranteed standard of living</td>
<td>V34</td>
<td>The government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed</td>
<td>Strong agree and agree = 1 Neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree = 0 Can't choose = missing</td>
<td>5,071</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce inequality</td>
<td>V33</td>
<td>It is the responsibility of government to reduce difference in income</td>
<td>Strong agree and agree = 1 Neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree = 0 Can't choose = missing</td>
<td>4,866</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on poor</td>
<td>V35</td>
<td>The government should spend less on benefits for the poor</td>
<td>Strongly disagree and disagree = 1 Neutral, agree, and strongly agree = 0</td>
<td>5,071</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Class Divisions and Political Attitudes


