Deep Disagreements
Philosophical and Legal Perspectives

People are frequently at odds over issues that equally concern them. Many disagreements that are central to political, social, ideological or religious conflicts are deep in the sense that they can neither be resolved through a compelling argument nor by gathering further information, nor do they arise from readily discernible misunderstandings.

The phenomenon of deep disagreement raises issues for many areas, especially within philosophy and law. Deep disagreements often have an extremely complex structure, in which different sources of disagreement intersect and in which it is difficult to trace the real source of dissent.

Epistemological aspects of disagreements have been tackled in the philosophical debate on peer disagreement, which focuses on the question of whether or not it is rational to stick to one’s belief if someone of equal competence and well-informedness holds a contrary one.

In legal theory, the debate about the right answer thesis centers around the question whether all legal disputes have a single right answer. If we do not presuppose a right answer, Ronald Dworkin’s famous argument of the semantic sting seems to force us into an implausible conclusion: that disagreements in law are merely based on linguistic misunderstandings and that it cannot be explained what we argue about in law.

One advantage of focusing on legal disagreements in so-called hard cases is that these come with built-in social significance. Supreme Court split verdicts are of particular interest: There is much at stake, they are based on elaborate argumentation, and they constitute disagreements among peers.

Conference Venue
New York University
Department of Philosophy
5 Washington Place
Seminar Room 202

Scientific Organization
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Attendance is free, but places are limited.
Please register under: www.deepdisagreements.de
If you have any question, contact Amy Moore (akm411@nyu.edu)

www.deepdisagreements.de
Friday | October 6 2017
---|---
09:30 – 09:40 | Paul Boghossian (NYU)
Welcome
09:40 – 10:00 | Geert Keil (HU Berlin),
Ralf Poscher (Freiburg University)
Introduction
10:00 – 11:15 | Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
Experts and Disagreement
11:30 – 12:45 | Daniel Viehoff (NYU)
Authority and Disagreement
Lunch Break

Friday | October 6 2017
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14:30 – 15:45 | Liam Murphy (NYU)
Deep Disagreement: Comparing Law and Morality
16:00 – 17:15 | Michele Moody-Adams (Columbia)
Constructive Disagreement: A Prelude
17:30 – 18:45 | Philipp Pettit (Princeton)
Disagreements in Conceptual Choice, not Conceptual Analysis
Conference Dinner

Saturday | October 7 2017
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09:30 – 10:45 | Joseph Raz (Columbia)
Responding to Disagreement
11:00 – 12:15 | Jeremy Waldron (NYU)
Deep Disagreement and Civility
12:30 – 13:45 | Isabell Villanueva (HU Berlin)
To the Nines: Finding the Perfect Peer
Lunch Break
15:30 – 16:45 | Ralf Poscher (Freiburg University)
Legal Disagreements in Hard Cases
17:00 – 18:15 | Joseph Raz (Columbia)
Responding to Disagreement