TO BE OR NOT TO HAVE:
Application of Perspective Structure to Account for
HAVE/BE Alternations

Chloe Jaclyn Rothbloom
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Department of Linguistics
New York University
Advisor: Prof. Stephanie Harves
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ABSTRACT

This project explores the cross-linguistic variation of the verbs HAVE and BE when used in three syntactic constructions that make up the Locative Paradigm (Freeze 1992): existential (eg. There is a book on the table), locative (eg. A book is on the table), and possessive (eg. John has a book). Freeze (1992) and Kayne (1993) propose that HAVE and BE are derivationally related, in that HAVE is composed of BE plus an abstract preposition. However, the relation of HAVE and BE does not fully account for a puzzling occurrence in languages such as Polish, Bulgarian, and Korean, in which negation creates an alternation of the verbs (Blaszczyk 2008; Irwin 2009). This project takes Partee and Borschev (2004)’s Perspective Structure Hypothesis, which is used to explain Genitive of Negation (Kagan 2007) in Russian, and applies it to Polish, Bulgarian, and Korean. Under Perspective Structure, presupposed information is said to determine when Genitive Case is used instead of canonical Case in negated sentences. Successful application would suggest that the presupposed information of a sentence also dictates the unexpected alternations of HAVE and BE. Research and native speaker consultations indicate that Polish and Bulgarian are sensitive to Perspective Structure, while Korean is not.
I. Introduction

1.1 Structure of this thesis

The goal of this thesis is to provide an explanation for a puzzling alternation found in languages such as Polish, in which HAVE and BE alternate in the presence of negation. These alternations are unexpected under the incorporation theory from Freeze (1992) and Kayne (1993).

I will start in section 1.2 by outlining the proposals of Freeze (1992) and Kayne (1993) that call for a unified approach to HAVE and BE, suggesting the underlying relation of the two verbs.

In section 1.3 I will present the puzzle that this paper seeks to provide an explanation for. The data will show an alternation of HAVE/BE that occurs in the presence of negation. Polish will be the primary focus, as the language has the phenomenon of Genitive of Negation (GenNeg) and, as I will argue, it is sensitive to the theoretical proposal of Perspective Structure, which is central to my analysis. In the next sections I will lay down the groundwork for discussing the alternations of interest to this paper, the switch between BE and HAVE in the presence of negation.

First, in section 2, I will discuss the phenomenon of GenNeg specifically of its occurrence in Russian and Polish. Establishing the existence of GenNeg will draw a parallel between the two languages that is necessary to lead into the discussion of Perspective Structure, since the aim of Perspective Structure is to explain Case alternations in Russian GenNeg constructions. That discussion will take place in section 3, where I will look at the work of Partee and Borschev.
(2004) on Perspective Structure in Russian, and then apply their proposal to Polish. My proposal is that HAVE/BE alternations in Polish are sensitive to Perspective Structure.

In section 4, I will present data from two more languages, Bulgarian and Korean, both of which exhibit HAVE/BE alternations. Working off of judgements from native speakers, I will evaluate whether the alternations in those languages can also be attributed to Perspective Structure.

I will give an overview of the paper in the conclusion in Section 5 and propose topics for further research.

1.2 Relating HAVE to BE

It has been argued that HAVE and BE are derivationally related. As Freeze (1992) and Kayne (1993) argue, HAVE itself is actually composed of BE plus an abstract preposition in the syntax.

Freeze (1992) puts forth that three copula-containing constructions, the predicate locative construction (The book is on the bench), the existential construction (There is a book on the bench), and the ‘Have’ construction (Lupe has a book), are all locative predcations that make up what he calls the Locative Paradigm (Freeze 1992: 553). He asserts that the three predications are all derived from the same underlying D-structure in (1) (Freeze 1992: 558).
At D-structure, a THEME argument base generates in the Spec of a Prepositional Phrase (PP) and a locative phrase, or LOCATION base generates internally. The different predications are the result of movement to Spec, IP. First separating the ‘Have’ from the other two, Freeze points out that the predicate locative and existential constructions appear to differ in only constituent ordering.

In the predicate locative construction, the LOCATION raises to Spec, IP, while contrastingly in the existential construction, the THEME raises to the Spec, IP. What determines whether the

---

1 Tree based on SVO languages. I differ from Freeze by using Determiner Phrases (DP) instead of Noun Phrases (NP), but the structure of the tree is the same.

2 Freeze maintains that the argument structure of the PP, which contains a Spec, P, is allowed under Chomsky’s (1985) notion of a complete functional complex (CFC). As a CFC, an XP can contain all of the arguments of the head. Specifically in this case, the PP can contain the THEME and LOCATION, as arguments of P. Freeze clarifies that this analysis of PP as a CFC only extends to predicate PPs (Freeze 1992: 559).

3 The LOCATION does not move by itself. Rather, the entire P’ moves to Spec, IP. Freeze states that X’ movement is allowed, as proposed many times throughout the literature in analyses of pronominalization and movement of French *en* and Italian *ne* (Kayne 1975, Belletti & Rizzi 1981) and V’ raising analyses of causatives (Rouveret & Vergnaud 1980, inter alia) among others.
THEME or LOCATION raises is the [+definite] feature on the THEME. When the THEME is [+definite], it may raise to the subject position. When it is [-definite], it may stay in situ, allowing the the LOCATION to raise instead. The [+LOC] feature on I is then satisfied by either the LOCATION filling Spec, IP, or the THEME moving out from in between I and the PP, allowing I to reach the LOCATION in situ. The constituent order alternations are exemplified in Chamorro and Finnish, among other languages.4

(2) Chamorro:

a. **Gaige gi gima si Juan.**
   be P house UMN Juan.
   *Juan is in the house.*

b. **Gudha lahi gi gima.**
   be man P house
   *There is a man in the house.*

(Freeze 1992: 556)

\[
\begin{align*}
(3a) & & (3b) \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
\end{align*}
\]

4 Freeze also uses examples from Russian, Tagalog and Hindi to demonstrate the cross-linguistic application of his claims in languages with different canonical word orders.
(4) Finnish:

a. mies on huone-ssa.
    man is room-INNESSIVE
    The man is in the room.

b. huone-ssa on mies.
    room-INNESSIVE is man
    There is a man in the room.

(Freeze 1992: 556)

Chamorro is a head initial, Spec final language. In (3a), the THEME, Juan, raises to Spec, IP, yielding the predicate locative construction in (2a), whereas in (3b), the LOCATION, gima, raises to Spec, IP, yielding the existential construction in (2b). Finnish is a head initial, Spec initial language. The sentences in (4) lack prepositions, since Finnish has INNESSIVE case, marking huonee as a locative phrase without a preposition. This is represented in (5a) as a null preposition. Thus, when huonee raises to Spec, IP in (5b), we get the existential construction in (4b) and when the THEME, mies, raises to Spec, IP, we get the predicate locative construction in (4a).

5 If we do not assume a null preposition, we would end up with a Minimal Link Condition (MLC) violation. We can avoid such a violation if we take a smuggling approach like in Collins (2005), in which case the lower DP is able to raise above the higher DP as long as it moves as part of P'.
Bringing the ‘Have’ construction back into the picture, Freeze proposes that the subject in ‘Have’ constructions is a LOCATION, patterning with the existential construction. Similarities between the two structures demonstrate this.

(6) Finnish:
   a. pöydä-llä          on kynd.
       table-ADESSIVE COP pencil
       There is a pencil on the table.

   b. Liisa-lä          on mies.
       Lisa-ADESSIVE COP man
       Lisa has a husband. (Freeze 1992: 577)

(7) Russian:
   a. na stole    byla kniga.
       on table  was book
       There was a book on the table.

   b. u menja   byla sestra.
       at me      was sister
       I had a sister. (Freeze 1992: 577)

The subjects in both of the Finnish sentences, pöydä in (6a) and Liisa in (6b), are marked by ADESSIVE Case, which is a locative Case. The subjects are explicitly locative. For both the existential (7a) and ‘Have’ (7b) predications, the subject DP is the object of a locative preposition.

The Russian examples demonstrate part of a distinction between HAVE languages and BE languages that has been made in the literature regarding how different languages express possession. In fact, it may have been more economical to refer to the ‘Have’ Predication as a possessive construction, since Russian and other languages do not use HAVE to express
possession at all. Levinson (2011) clarifies that HAVE languages usually use a form of HAVE to express predicative possession, while BE languages use BE with a locative preposition instead of HAVE. Applied cross-linguistically, this would account for differences in possession constructions from language to language. The following sentences show how a HAVE language (English) and a BE language (Ukrainian) express the same instance of possession.

(8) Peter has a car.
(9) U Petra je mašyna.

At Peter-GEN is car-NOM.
Peter has a car.
(Blaszczak 2007: 327)

What distinguishes (6b), (7b), (8) and (9) as ‘Have’ predications instead of existential predications is that the subjects in all four sentences have the [+human] feature.

Freeze (1991) asserts that when the LOCATION contains the [+human] feature, it raises Spec, IP and the null preposition incorporates with BE to form HAVE. A reviewer pointed out that [-human] DPs can also be the matrix subject in a ‘Have’ predication, as in The tree has a nest in it. Freeze (1992) admits that we can have [-human] possessors, but with restrictions. For instance, Freeze insists that an inanimate possessor can possess inalienable THEMEs, such as in (10).

(10) The tree has branches.
(11) *The tree has a nest.
(12) The tree has a nest in it.

The inanimate possessor can only possess an alienable theme if it is co-indexed with a pronoun that remains with the preposition in situ, as in (12). This poses a problem for Freeze’s (1992) analysis because if the preposition stays in situ, it cannot incorporate with BE to form HAVE, as Freeze claims. Additionally, movement of the tree in (12) out of P’ would result in a Minimal Link Condition Violation, since the tree would need to raise above a nest. This is one reason why
we should look for an alternative explanation for HAVE/BE alternations, as I do in the following sections.

Kayne (1993) adopts Freeze’s (1992) position on the relationship between HAVE and BE, that HAVE is the incorporation of BE plus an preposition. Kayne goes farther to suggest that not just possessive HAVE, but also auxiliary HAVE embodies the same incorporation. Rather than approaching HAVE/BE alternations using LOCATION, Kayne specifically looks at the distribution of HAVE in relation to the nature of clausal participles it can take as its complement. In fact, he does not consider LOCATION as a necessary factor at all. Rather, he asserts that BE incorporates with an abstract preposition to become HAVE.

Unfortunately the incorporation theories do not exhaustively cover all types of HAVE/BE alternations. In addition to the [+human] issue mentioned above, Blaszczak (2007) argues against a uniform analysis of HAVE and BE, pointing out that the movement of the possessor could result in a double Case marking problem, since the possessor should receive Case from the preposition in situ, but also receive Case in Spec, IP. Blaszack (2007) lists many counter-examples, primarily in Polish, that should not be grammatical under the incorporation theory, but are perfectly fine. She argues that the three predications of Freeze’s Locative Paradigm are derived from different base structures and should not be grouped together.

I side with Blaszack (2007) against the incorporation theory. To bolster the argument against incorporation, I will provide an explanation for some of Blaszack’s (2007) counter-examples that attributes HAVE/BE alternations to Perspective Structure rather than to incorporation.
In the next section, I will introduce the puzzle that this paper primarily seeks to solve, HAVE/BE alternations in the presence of negation.

1.3 The Puzzle

If we were to subscribe to the notion of the Locative Paradigm and accept, as Freeze and Kayne do, that HAVE and BE are derivationally related, then we can account for HAVE/BE alternations in locative constructions based on the [+human] feature on the LOCATION, or HAVE/BE auxiliary alterations based on the nature of the clausal complement of BE. However, we cannot account for the alternation from jest to ma in (13).

(13) a. W sklepie jest ser.
    in store is cheese-NOM
    There is cheese in the store.

 b. W sklepie nie ma sera / *ser.
    in store NEG has cheese-GEN/*cheese-NOM
    There is no cheese in the store. (Blaszczyk 2007:)

Aside from the element of negation, the interpretation of (13a) is the same as (13b); (13b) is simply the negated form of (13a). Yet we get a combination of negation and HAVE, nie ma, in place of the present tense BE, jest. (13) is an existential construction, so based on Freeze’s Locative Paradigm, we would expect The THEME ser, to remain in situ and the LOCATION, w sklepie, to raise to Spec, IP and check off the [+LOC] feature on I. To this point, the data follows Freeze’s predictions.

---

6 A reviewer pointed out that
The next part of the equation concerns the [-human] feature. *Sklepie* is [-human], so we should expect BE to be used in (13), as it is used in (13a). For (13b) to be felicitous under Freeze’s analysis, *sklepie* would need to suddenly pick up a [+human] feature in the negated form of the sentence. As that is not the case, (13b) currently lacks an explanation.

In Section 2, I will begin to lay the groundwork for providing such an explanation.

## 2. Genitive of Negation

Kagan (2007) defines GenNeg as the phenomenon whereby a non-oblique internal argument of the verb, which is generally assigned accusative Case, can be assigned GEN Case under negation.

(14) a. *Ja pil vodu / *vody*
  
  I drank water-ACC / *GEN
  
  *I drank water / I was drinking water*

b. *Ja ne pil vodu / vody.*
  
  I NEG drank water-ACC/ GEN
  
  *I didn’t drink water*  
  
  (Kagan 2007: 148)

In the affirmative sentence (14a), the noun *voda* can only have ACC Case, but it can receive GEN Case in the negated sentence. It is argued that the negation licenses the GEN Case, allowing for the deviation from canonical form.

Another phenomenon, Intensional Genitive, also produces a Case alternation of the direct object. The Intensional Genitive occurs when intensional verbs such as *wish, want, deserve, wait for*, and *demand*, can license both GEN and ACC Case on direct objects.
(15) a. On čdal čuđa / Dimu.  
He waited miracle-GEN/ Dima-ACC  
*He was waiting for a miracle/ for Dima.*

b. Ty zasluživaeš medali / medal.  
You deserve medal-GEN/ ACC  
*You deserve a medal.*  
(Kagan 2007: 149)

While *medal* can be marked with GEN or ACC Case, *Dimu* is obligatorily ACC as the direct object of an intensional verb. This follows falls in line with the tendencies of (15).

Kagan asserts that Intensional Genitive and GenNeg should be analyzed as the same phenomenon, since the same semantic factors seem to affect the choice of Case in both environments.

(16) Tendencies of Case in both Intensional Genitive and Genitive of Negation  
a. Abstract - abstract NPs are more likely GEN  
b. Number - plural NPs are more likely GEN  
c. Definiteness - indefinite NPs are more likely GEN  
d. Proper/common - Proper nouns are less likely GEN

Due to all the similarities between the two phenomena, Kagan groups them under a single term; Irrealis Genitive. The most important property of the Irrealis Genitive, which the tendencies in (16) allude to, is the lack of what Kagan calls the existential commitment defined in (17).

(17) **Existential Commitment**  
An NP carries existential commitment if and only if the sentence in which it appears either entails or presupposes that the NP quantifies over a non-empty set.  
(Kagan 2007: 152)
When the direct object appears in its canonical Case, it may have existential commitment, though existential commitment is not obligatory. However, when the object appears in non-canonical GEN Case, it must lack the existential commitment.

(18)  

a. **Dima ne našol sledy**
   Dima not found traces-ACC
   *Dima didn’t find the/any traces.*

b. **Dima ne našol sledov**
   Dima not found traces-GEN
   *Dima didn’t find any traces.*

(Kagan 2007: 152)

The situation depicted in (18a) is that traces exist, but Dima did not find them. In contrast, (18b) disallows the existence of the direct object. Therefore, Dima did not find any traces because there were no traces to be found at all.

The existential commitment property fits in well with the other tendencies in (16). Abstract NPs, plural NPs and indefinite NPs are more likely to receive GEN Case because they are more likely to lack the existential commitment, whereas Proper Names are more likely to carry existential commitment and less likely to receive GEN Case. For instance, it would be infelicitous to insist that *Dima* in (18) does not exist.

The idea of existential commitment is also a crucial part of Partee and Borschev’s (2004) hypothesis of Perspective Structure, which serves to account for the Case alternation of GenNeg, specifically.
3. PERSPECTIVE STRUCTURE

3.1 What is Perspective Structure?

Partee and Borschev (2004) did not specifically adopt a unified analysis for Intensional Genitive and GenNeg. Rather, they focused on the latter in regards to different environments of non-canonical GEN Case on subjects and objects of Russian sentences. Partee and Borschev take Babby (1980) as their starting point. Babby (1980) considered four types of intransitive Russian sentences to identify instances of subject GenNeg: negated declarative sentences (NDS), affirmative declarative sentences (ADS), negated existential sentences (NES), and affirmative existential sentences (AES). Examples of the four types are in (19).

(19) a. Otvet iz polka prišel. ADS
Answer-NOM from regiment arrived.
*The answer from the regiment has arrived.*

   b. Otvet iz polka ne prišel. NDS
Answer-NOM from regiment NEG arrived
*The answer from the regiment has not arrived.*

   c. Prišel otvet iz polka. AES
Arrived answer-NOM from regiment.
*There was an answer from the regiment.*

   d. Otveta iz polka ne prišlo. NES
Answer-GEN from regiment NEG arrived.
*There was no answer from the regiment.* (Partee and Borschev 2004: 1)

In the existential sentences, the addition of negation from AES to NES could be interpreted to negate the existence of the subject entire or the predicate, whereas negation in NDS suggests that the subject exists, just under different circumstances than what is laid out in the sentence. For instance, (19d) could mean that an answer hasn’t arrived yet, but it does not require that an
answer exists. Whereas in (19b) there is definitely an answer from the regiment, but it has yet to arrive. Presumably it will arrive in the future, but regardless of when it arrives, it obligatorily exists. Additionally, as seen in (19), subjects in NDS receive NOM Case while subjects in NES receive GEN Case. Likewise, objects in NDS received ACC Case while objects in NES received GEN Case.

Babby proposed that the difference between declarative and existential sentences is that declarative sentences have full Theme-Rheme structures, while existential sentences only have a Rheme. A subject in a declarative sentence under this analysis would raise to a projection above the verb and topicalize, making it part of the Theme, and thus putting it outside the scope of negation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative</th>
<th>Negated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Existential</strong></td>
<td>[Scope of Assertion VP DP]</td>
<td>[Scope of Neg VP DP-GEN]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Declarative</strong></td>
<td>DP [Scope of Assertion VP]</td>
<td>DP-NOM [Scope of Neg VP]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Partee and Borschev 2004: 3)

A subject that remains in the Rheme, in a Rheme-only existential sentence, would be within the scope negation. Negation would then be able to license GEN Case on that subject.

---

7 Theme-Rheme structure is closely related to Topic and Focus, where the Theme of a sentence is the old, already established information (the Topic) and the Rheme is the new information offered in the sentence (the Focus).
Partee and Borschev depart from Babby’s proposal, acknowledging that Babby points out a correlation between the Theme-Rheme structure and existential sentences, but not a crucial correlation for explaining GenNeg. They add to Babby’s account of NES and AES the “Existence is relative Principle” in (20).

(20) **“Existence is relative” Principle**
Existence (in the sense relevant to Affirmative Existential Sentences and Negated Existential Sentences) is always relative to a LOCation.

(Partee and Borschev 2004: 6)

They assert that in relation to GEN Case licensing, there is no correlation between the NES/NDS distinction and Theme-Rheme structure. Rather, existential sentences rely on three components: a region of existence, an existing object and an existential (or empty) verb. Put together, these components create a Perspective Structure that dictates meaning of existence in a sentence.

(21) **Perspective Structure**
An “existence/location situation” BE(THING,LOC) may be structured from the perspective of the THING or of the LOCation, where LOC is the “region of existence,” THING is the “existing object,” and BE is an existential verb. The **Perspectival Center** is the participant chosen as the point of departure for structuring the situation.

(Partee and Borschev 2004: 6)

Either the THING or the LOC can be the Perspectival Center of the sentence, making that component the presupposed information of the sentence, similar to what Babby would call the Theme of the sentence. The Perspectival Center must have Kagan’s existential commitment.

(22) a. **Ja ne zametil vodka na stole.**
I **NEG noticed vodka-ACC on table**

*I didn't notice the vodka on the table.*
b. Ja ne zametil vodki na stole.
I NEG noticed vodka-GEN on table

*I didn’t notice any vodka on the table.*

(Borschev et al 2008: 1)

In (22), the object, *vodka*, is the THING of the sentence *on table* is the LOC. In (22a), the *vodka* is definite; there is no question as to whether or not the *vodka* exists. While the speaker of the sentence did not notice the vodka, it is presumed that there is vodka on the table. Alternately in (22b), where the object is marked by GEN Case, the existence of vodka on the table is in question. (22b) could be accompanied by a sentence in which the existence of vodka on the table is disproved, such as “I didn’t notice any vodka on the table. There was no vodka on the table.” Creating the same paradigm with (22a), however, would result in a contradiction.

While objects and subjects marked with GEN Case lack the existential commitment, the Case alternation does not completely rule out the possibility of existence. GEN Case can also give a partitive reading, which would be otherwise unavailable.

(23) a. Ja ne proital dve stranicy.
I NEG read two-ACC pages-GEN

*I didn’t read (the, a certain) two pages.*

b. Ja ne proital dvux stranic.
I NEG read two-GEN pages-GEN

*I didn’t read (even) two pages. (I read less than two pages."

The English translations mark the difference between the interpretations of (18a-b) very well, since English needs definitive words to express what Russian expresses in the Case alternation. *Dve stranicy* in (18a) refers to two specific pages. It could be pages 21-22 or a book, for instance.

8 The important Case difference in this example is the ACC to GEN alternation of *two*. Since the numeral assigns GEN Case the noun that follows it, the GEN Case marking on *pages* in (18) is irrelevant. (Stephanie Harves, p.c.)
(18b) does not refer to two specific pages. When the object is in accusative Case, it is presupposed and specific. In GEN Case, it can be presupposed that at least two non-specific pages exist, but the speaker is not identifying any specific page number. It is also reasonable for (18b) to have a reading in which two pages do not exist. For instance, it could follow as, “I didn’t read two pages. There weren’t even two pages to read.”

### 3.2 Application of Perspective Structure to Polish

Blaszczak (2007) points out that in addition to having GenNeg, Polish also exhibits HAVE/BE alternations. (24a) and (24b) can follow from Freeze’s and Kayne’s hypothesis that HAVE = BE +P; (24a) uses HAVE while (24b) relays the same information using BE and a locative preposition.

\[
\begin{align*}
(24) \ a. \ & \textbf{Samochód ma silnik.} \\
& \text{car -NOM has motor-ACC} \\
& \text{A/The car has an engine.} \\
& \\
& \text{b. } \textbf{W samochodzie jest silnik.} \\
& \text{in car-LOC is motor-NOM} \\
& \text{There is an engine in the car.} \\
& \\
& \text{c. } \textbf{W samochodzie nie ma silnika.} \\
& \text{in car-LOC NEG has motor-GEN} \\
& \text{There is no engine in the car/ The car has no engine.}
\end{align*}
\]

Blaszczak (2007: 325)

However, contrary to Freeze (1992), Polish can have sentences in which a locative preposition appears in conjunction with HAVE, as in (24c). The case alternation from nominative Case in (24b) to GEN Case in (24c) is expected under GenNeg, but the HAVE/BE alternation, especially in regards to Kayne’s and Freeze’s proposals, is not.
I propose two things: first, that Polish, like Russian, is sensitive to Perspective Structure in GenNeg constructions and second, that HAVE/BE alternations in Polish GEN NEG constructions are also sensitive to Perspective Structure. After showing that, I will return to the sentences in (19) to give an explanation for the alternations.

3.3 Application of Perspective Structure to HAVE/BE Alternations in Polish

(25) a. W lodówce był ser. (Luiza Lukowicz, p.c.)
In refrigerator-LOC be cheese-NOM.
There was cheese in the refrigerator.

b. W lodówce nie było żadnego zimnego sera.
In refrigerator-LOC NEG be no cold-GEN cheese-GEN.
There was no cold cheese in the refrigerator.

c. Zimny ser nie był w lodówce.
Cold-NOM cheese-NOM NEG be in refrigerator-LOC.
W lodówce nie było sera.
In refrigerator-LOC NEG be-3rdSG.NEUTR.PST. cheese-GEN.
The cold cheese was not in the refrigerator. There was no cheese in the refrigerator.

In the sentences in (25), the LOC is w lodówce and the THING is ser. (25a) shows the AES with the THING receiving canonical subject nominative Case, and (25b) shows the NES, as would be expected under GenNeg. The subject receives non-canonical GEN Case under negation. In (25c), cold cheese has NOM Case and must be presupposed. So the cold cheese exists somewhere, it just must exist somewhere other than the refrigerator. For that reason, the first sentence in (25c) can be followed by the second, reinforcing that cheese is not in the refrigerator. Alternatively, if
the first sentence in (25c) were followed by “there was no cheese,” the pair of sentences would contradict each other, which is not allowed. The combination of the first sentence of (25c) and “there was no cheese” would produce a non-sensical interpretation in which the cheese must be somewhere besides the refrigerator while simultaneously not existing at all. Ultimately the cold cheese in (25c) has existential commitment.

(26) a. Petja był na koncercie.  
   Petja-NOM be at concert-LOC  
   *Petja was at the concert.

b. Petja nie było na koncercie.  
   Petja-GEN NEG be at concert-LOC  
   Petja was not at the concert.

c. Petja nie był na koncercie. Nie było żadnego koncertu.  
   Petja-NOM NEG be at concert. NEG be no concert-GEN  
   Petja was not at the concert. There was no concert.

   Petja-GEN NEG be at concert. NEG be no concert-GEN

In this group of sentences, (26d) is infelicitous, even though the first sentence in (26d) is identical to the grammatical sentence in (26b). This falls in line with Partee and Borschev’s Perspective Structure when we consider what the Perspectival Centers of (26c) and (26d) are. In (26c), the THING, Petja, is the Perspectival Center. As such, Petja is the presupposed information of the sentence, so whether or not the concert exists does not have a bearing on whether or not the first sentence in (26c) is felicitous. When marked with GEN Case, as in (26d), Petja lacks existential commitment and, therefore, cannot be the Perspectival Center. Instead, the Perspectival Center of (26d) is the LOC, the concert. As such, the concert is presupposed to exist,
creating a contradiction between the two sentences in (26d). Essentially, (26d) would be interpreted as “There was a concert, which Petja was not at, but there was no concert.”

This is a clear distinction that shows an alternation between when the THING is the Perspectival Center and when the LOC is. It seems that Polish GenNeg, like Russian, is sensitive to Perspective Structure.

### 3.3 Application of Perspective Structure to HAVE/BE Alternations in Polish

Using Perspective Structure, we can now go back to (24), repeated here as (27), to provide an analysis for the HAVE/BE alternation with negation. I postulate that the occurrence of HAVE is sensitive to Perspective Structure in the same way that GEN Case is. Before Perspective Structure, (27c) was entirely unexpected under the HAVE = BE+P theory, because it has HAVE and locative preposition at the same time. If HAVE was the incorporation of the preposition into BE, the preposition should not be visible.

(27) a. **Samochód ma silnik.**  
    car -NOM has motor-ACC  
    A/The car has an engine.

b. **W samochodzie jest silnik.**  
    in car-LOC is motor-NOM  
    There is an engine in the car.

c. **W samochodzie nie ma silnika.**  
    in car-LOC NEG has motor-GEN  
    There is no engine in the car/ The car has no engine.

If we consider that the LOCATION, *samochodzie*, is the Perspectival Center, then the THING, *silnika*, lacks the existential commitment and is not presupposed to exist. Only *samochodzie* is
presupposed to exist in this sentence. This assumption falls in line with the interpretation of the sentence as an existential construction.

My proposal that we see HAVE instead of canonical BE in this existential construction mirrors the GEN Case marking instead of the canonical NOM Case marking that we get in (27b). When the THING lacks existential commitment in a negated sentence, we get HAVE instead of BE. There is no incorporation, as evidenced by (27c). The LOCATION still has a preposition. It is Perspective Structure, not incorporation, that dictates the use of HAVE.

Applying this to the puzzle presented as (13) in section 1.3, repeated here as (28), we get a similar result.

(28) a. W sklepie jest ser.
    in store is cheese-NOM
    There is cheese in the store.

    b. W sklepie nie ma sera / *ser.
    in store NEG has cheese-GEN/*cheese-NOM
    There is no cheese in the store. (Blaszczak 2007: 326)

In (23a), there is no doubt that the THING, ser, exists, as that is integral to the interpretation of the sentence. In (28b), once again we have a sentence that has both a locative preposition and HAVE. Additionally, the THING is marked by GEN Case, with NOM Case not allowed at all. Applying Perspective Structure, this can be explained by the fact that, when the sentence is negated, the THING loses its existential commitment.

3.4 Concluding Remarks on Polish
Based on the data, it appears that Polish parallels Russian in both the GenNeg facts and the Perspective Structure facts. Furthermore, the alternation of HAVE and BE in negated existential sentences in Polish is linked to Perspective Structure. Then the THING of a sentence is not the Perspectival Center and lacks an existential commitment, it can receive GEN Case and BE becomes HAVE.

This does not mean that Freeze’s (1992) and Kayne’s (1993) proposals should be completely discarded, but evidence suggests that incorporation is not an adequate explanation for the HAVE/BE alternations examined in this paper.

In the following section I look at two other languages: another Slavic language, Bulgarian and an Asian language, Korean, to see if Perspective Structure can also be applied to account for HAVE/BE alternations in those languages.

4. APPLICATION OF PERSPECTIVE STRUCTURE TO BULGARIAN AND KOREAN

4.1 Bulgarian Data

The following data from Blaszczak (2007) shows a HAVE/BE alternation in Bulgarian. Bulgarian is another Slavic language, like Russian and Polish, but it differs from the other two in that it lacks the GenNeg phenomenon. The purpose of this data to determine whether Perspective
Structure impacts HAVE/BE alternations in Bulgarian. A positive result would indicate that 
Perspective Structure is not dependent on GenNeg.

(29)  
   a. Peter ima/imaše kola.  
       (Blaszczak 2007: 326)  
       Peter has/had car  
       *Peter has/had a car.
   b. Na masa-ta ima/imaše sirene.  
       on table-the has/had cheese  
       *There is/was cheese on the table.
   c. Sirene-to e na masa-ta.  
       cheese-the is on table-the  
       The cheese is on the table.
   d. Na masa-ta njama/njamaše sirene.  
       on table-the NEG has/had cheese.  
       *There is/was no cheese on the table.

First looking at the sentences with HAVE, (29a) follows as Freeze’s (1992) possessive ‘Have’ 
predication. Both (29b) and (29d), however, exhibit HAVE and a locative preposition at the same 
time, defying the incorporation theory. The difference between (29b) and (29c) pattern with the 
distinctions made within the Locative Paradigm; they differ in constituent order with (29b) as an 
existential construction and (29c) as a predicate locative construction.

If we apply Perspective Structure to these sentences, we should expect to find that the 
LOCATION, masa, is the Perspectival Center of (29b) and that the THING, sirene, is the
Perspectival Center of (29c).

(30)  
   Sirene-to ne e/*njama na masa-ta a v xladilnik-a.  
   Cheese-the NEG is /*NEG has on table-the but in refrigerator-the  
   *The cheese isn’t on the table but in the refrigerator.

   Roumyana Pancheva, p.c.
(30) forces the presupposition of *sirene*, by adding a condition that it exists in another location, the refrigerator. Since (30) states that the cheese is in the refrigerator, asserting that cheese does not exist would produce a semantic contradiction. *Sirene*, the THING, must be the Perspectival Center, and when the THING is the Perspectival Center, the use of HAVE is ungrammatical. Only BE can be used.

\[
\text{(31) Na masa-ta njama / njamaše sirene.} \quad \#\text{Njama /njamaše masa.} \\
\text{on table-the NEG-has / NEG-had cheese} \quad \text{NEG-has /NEG-had table} \\
\text{There is/was no cheese on the table.} \quad \#\text{There is/was no table.}
\]

Roumyana Pancheva, p.c.

(31) shows that the Perspectival Center in (29d) (and, thus, also (29b) since (29d) is the negated version of (24b)) is *masa*. If the Perspectival Center was *sirene* instead, or if there was no Perspectival Center in the sentence at all, the second sentence in (31) would be allowed. The fact that the second sentence is infelicitous must mean that *masa* is the presupposed information in the first sentence and therefore, the existence of *masa* can not be negated. When the LOCATION is the Perspectival Center, HAVE is allowed.

### 4.2 Concluding Remarks on Bulgarian

The data shows that Bulgarian HAVE/BE alternations are sensitive to Perspective Structure in the same way that Polish is. Similarities between Polish and Bulgarian include: (1) both are Slavic languages, (2) both exhibit HAVE/BE alternations in the presence of negation, (3) both are sensitive to Perspective Structure. The crucial difference between the two languages is that Polish has the GenNeg phenomenon and Bulgarian does not. This suggests that Perspective
Structure is not dependent on the GenNeg phenomenon and can be applied to languages that lack GenNeg.

4.3 Korean Data

Thus far I’ve talked about Perspective Structure in relation to Slavic languages. We have seen that Perspective Structure can apply to HAVE/BE alternations in Slavic languages with and without GenNeg. Now I will look at a non-Slavic language to explore the potential of applying Perspective Structure to more languages. I’ve chosen an Asian language, Korean, as a case study.

By Levinson’s (2011) standards, Korean is an example of a BE language, expressing possession using BE+P in place of HAVE. Additionally, under negation Korean has a negated existential form of BE, *eps-ta*, which parallels negative phrases such as *iss-ci anh-ta* (“exist not”). This research seeks to determine whether Perspective Structure can be used to explain when one of these forms is used over the other, or if they are restricted at all.

Drawing from Irwin (2009), I tested sentences in four categories of possession:

(32) Categories of possession in Korean
- 1. Animate Inalienable - ex. “John has legs.”
- 2. Animate Alienable - ex. “Mary has a car.”
- 3. Inanimate Inalienable - ex. “The tree has branches
- 4. Inanimate Alienable - ex. “The shirt has a grease stain.”

I tested translations of sentences that display each of these types of possession in the affirmative, and asked for judgments of their negated counter-parts. I then added a follow up sentence to
force presupposition of the possessee, similar to the forced presuppositions of the Bulgarian data
(i.e. John doesn’t have long legs. John doesn’t legs.”).

If Perspective Structure has an effect on these types of constructions, we would expect to see an
alternation of some sort depending on whether the possessor or the possessee is acting as the
Perspective Center.

4.3.1 Animate Inalienable Possession

The most promising data for my hypothesis occurs in animate inalienable possession. What
popped up in these sentences was a difference between copular negation and existential negation.
For copular negation, we see negation paired with an affirmative BE form iss-ta, and with
existential negation, we see the separate form of BE that incorporates negation into the word,
eps-ta.

(33) John-un tali-ka kil-ci anh-ta
John-TOP legs-NOM long-PART not-DECL
John does not have long legs.

(34) John-un kin tali-ka eps-ta
John-TOP long legs-NOM not exist
John does not have long legs. (Sang-Im Lee-Kim, p.c.)

The data provides a clear contrast between interpretations involving the copular negation and the
existential negation. In (33), John does not have long legs, but he still has legs. His legs might be
short, fat, fake, discolored or a number of other adjectives, but ultimately the legs exist, and the
only thing we can know for certain from this sentence is that said legs are not long.
(34), on the other hand, does not allow for a reading in which John’s legs are not long. The existential negation requires the interpretation that John does not have any legs at all. In perspective structure terms, in (33) the existence of John’s legs is presupposed, while in (34) it is not.

We see a similar distinction in sentences (4) and (5), but with a slight twist.

(35) **Imo-nun huyn meli-ka eps-ta**
    Aunt-TOP white hair-NOM not, exist-ta
    *Aunt has no white hair.*

(36) **Imo-nun huyn meli-ka iss-ci anh-ta**
    Aunt-TOP white hair-NOM not
    *Aunt has no white hair.*

(Sang-Im Lee-Kim, p.c.; Joanne Kim, p.c.)

Once again, both structures are grammatical and they share an English translation. In (36) The existence of Aunt’s hair is presupposed, and the information we get from the sentence is that her hair is not white, but it could possible be black or brown or purple. The twist with this pair is that (35) can be interpreted with Aunt having hair or with Aunt having no hair at all. This differs from John’s legs in (34) because (34) must mean John’s legs do not exist. In (35) the presupposition of the existence of Aunt’s hair appears to be optional.

This can be easily be explained when we distinguish between a “partitive” reading of (35) and a “whole” reading. For the partitive reading, the negation of existence targets the DP including the adjective, while the whole reading targets the DP without the adjective. The partitive reading of (36) is that [white hair] does not exist, and the whole reading is that [hair] does not exist. Therefore, (35) could be followed by the sentence “Aunt has no hair” or “Aunt has black hair.”
John’s legs in (34) must be excluded from having the same optionality as Aunt’s hair because we cannot get a partitive reading from John’s legs.

Based off of this data alone, we could possibly make a claim that perspective structure is at work here. There is a clear lexical alternation surrounding the presupposition of existence in these constructions. However, as we will see in the next section, the other types of possession suggest that the opposite is true.

4.3.2 Animate Alienable Possession

Starting with the sentence in (37), we see that animate alienable possession is expressed using the BE form iss-ta.

(37) Mary-nun cha-ka iss-ta  (Sang-Im Lee-Kim, p.c.)
Mary-TOP car-NOM exist-DECL
Mary has a car.

(38) Mary-nun phalan cha-ka eps-ta.
Mary-nun huyn cha-ka iss-ta.
Mary-TOP blue car-NOM not exist-DECL.
Mary-TOP white car-NOM exist-DECL
Mary doesn’t have a blue car. Mary has a white car.

(39) Mary-nun phalan cha-ka eps-ta.
Mary-nun cha-ka eps-ta.
Mary-TOP blue car-NOM not exist-DECL.
Mary-TOP car-NOM not exist-DECL.
Mary doesn’t have a blue car.

Here we do not get the same differentiation between (38) and (39) that we saw in (33) and (34). The reading we should get from (38) involves a situation in which Mary has a car, but the car is
not blue, it is white. Alternatively the reading we should get from (39) is that Mary has no car at all. Regardless of whether or not the existence of the car is presupposed, the predicate is the negated existential *eps-ta*. We do not see any alternation.

What is even more puzzling is when we do get alternation, such as in (40) and (41), when we have double possession. (40) and (41) have the same interpretations but one is with the negative existential and the other is not.

(40) **Sam-un Sally-uy chayk-ul kaci-ko iss-ci anh-ta.**
Sam-TOP Sally-POSS book-ACC have-PART exist-PART not-DECL
_Sam doesn’t have Sally’s book._

(41) **Sam-un Sally-uy chayk-ul eps-ta.**
Sam-TOP Sally-POSS book-ACC not exist-DECL.
_Sam doesn’t have Sally’s book._

(42) **Sally-nun chaykk-i eps-ta.**
Sally-TOP book-NOM not exist-DECL
_Sally doesn’t have any books._

(Sang-Im Lee-Kim, p.c.; Joanne Kim, p.c.)

Both (40) and (41) can be grammatically followed by (42). Not only does that act as a counter-example to perspective structure, since *eps-ta* and *kaci-ko iss-ci anh-ta* can both occur when the existence of Sally’s books is not presupposed, but the two options in these sentences are entirely interchangeable. There do not appear to be any other constraints at play to restrict when one can be used over the other.

Another surprising fact about this data is the presence of *kaci-ko*, which translates to “have” in English. This places Korean’s status as a HAVE-less language into question. It is curious to note
that *kaci-ko* must be followed by *iss-ci* and cannot stand alone, although sentence (40) is still mono-clausal.

According to an informant, the use of *kaci* in Korean possession is relatively new in the evolution of the language, and can possibly be attributed influence from other HAVE languages. It does not seem to be affected at all by existence.

### 4.3.3 Inanimate Inalienable and Inanimate Alienable Possession

I’ll provide two examples, one with inanimate inalienable possession and one with inanimate alienable possession, to show the lack of alternation in those constructions:

**Inanimate inalienable**

(43) Cha-nun pakhwi ney kay motwu-lul kaci-ko iss-ta anh-ta.
    Car -TOP wheel four cl all-ACC have-PART exist-PART not-DECL
    *The car does not have four full wheels.*

(44) Cha-nun pakhwi ney kay motwu-lul kaci-ko iss-ta anh-ta.
    Car -TOP wheel four cl all-ACC have-PART exist-PART not-DECL
    Cha-nun pakhwi-ka eps-ta.
    Car-TOP wheel-NOM not exist-DECL.
    *The car does not have four full wheels. The car has no wheels.*

**Inanimate alienable**

(45) Namwu-ey-nun sey mali say-uy twungci-ka eps-ta.
    Tree-LOC-TOP three cl bird-POSS nest-NOM not exist-DECL.
    *The tree doesn’t have three bird’s nests in it.*

    Namwu-ey-nun twungci-ka ney kay iss-ta
    Tree-LOC-TOP nest-NOM four cl exist-DECL.
    *The tree has four nests in it.*

(46) Namwu-ey-nun sey mali say-uy twungci-ka eps-ta.
Tree-LOC-TOP three cl bird-POSS nest-NOM not exist-DECL.

*The tree doesn't have three bird's nests in it.*

Namwu-ey-nun twungci-ka eps-ta

Tree-LOC-TOP nest-NOM not exist-DECL

*The tree doesn't have any nests.*

(Sang-Im Lee-Kim, p.c.)

Whether or not you can presuppose the existence of the wheels or the branches has no bearing on the negated sentences. The second sentence in (44) is meant to force the presupposition of the possessor by disallowing the presupposition of the possessee. However, it doesn’t matter, as (43) and (44) both use kaci-ko iss-ta anh-ta, regardless. The second sentence in (45) is meant to force presupposition of the possessee. The number of the nests is negated, not the existence of the nests. (46), on the other hand, negates the existence of nests altogether. Yet, both (45) and (46) use eps-ta. There is no alternation in the Inanimate Inalienable constructions or the Inanimate Alienable constructions.

### 4.4 Concluding Remarks on Korean

Negated possessive sentences in Korean are sensitive to partitive vs. whole readings, as we saw in (45) and (46). This has also been noted in Irwin (2009). More research can be done to test this by creating sentences with types of possession other than animate inalienable in which both partitive and whole readings are possible, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.

The negated existential BE, eps-ta can only occur when the negated object does not exist, but its copular counterpart - iss-ci anh-ta can also occur in those environments, suggesting that existence is a factor but not quite a constraint in the alternation of the two, especially because situations exist in which they appear to be entirely interchangeable. Korean is a traditionally a
HAVE-less language, but has incorporated the use of kaci HAVE most likely because of cultural influences from other languages, according to an informant.

Due to the facts presented above, I will conclude that Perspective Structure is not at play in Korean possessive sentences. I will not account for the Korean alternations here. I leave that issue for further research.

5. CONCLUSION

5.1 Overall Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I took Partee and Borschev’s proposal of Perspective Structure, which had previously been used to account for the GenNeg phenomenon in Russian, and applied it to Polish in an attempt to explain a HAVE/BE alternation in Polish that was unexpected under Freeze’s (1992) and Kayne’s (1993) incorporation theory. After determining that Polish alternations are indeed sensitive to Perspective Structure, I concluded that Perspective Structure, not incorporation, is responsible for Polish HAVE/BE alternations. I then attempted to apply Perspective Structure to Bulgarian and Korean. Application to Bulgarian was successful, suggesting that Perspective Structure impacts Slavic languages regardless of whether or not a specific Slavic language has the GenNeg Phenomenon. Application to Korean was unsuccessful, suggesting that while Perspective Structure can account for alternations in Slavic languages, there may be a separate explanation for Asian languages.

5.2 Further Research
Extensive research has been done regarding Perspective Structure in Russian (Borschev 2008; Partee and Borschev 2004), and I have proven in this paper that Perspective Structure affects Polish and Bulgarian as well, but other Slavic languages exhibit HAVE/BE alternations, and have not been tested for Perspective Structure. Further research can attempt to apply Perspective Structure to the examples from Blaszczack (2007) the way I did for Polish:

(47) a. **U Petra je mašyna.**  
    At Peter-GEN is car-NOM.  
    *Peter has a car.*

b. **U Petra nemaje mašyna.**
    at Peter-GEN NEG has car-GEN
    *Peter doesn’t have a car.*  
    (Blaszczak 2007: 327)

(48) a. **Na stolu ima sira.**
    on table-LOC has cheese-PART-GEN
    *There is some cheese on the table.*

b. **Na stolu je bilo sira.**
    on table-LOC is been cheese-PART GEN
    *There was some cheese on the table.*  
    (Blaszczak 2007: 326)

The Ukrainian data (9), repeated here as (47) with its negated counter-part, along with Croatian in (48) have interesting HAVE/BE alternations worth looking into for further research. (48) has partitive GEN.

6. REFERENCES