Is Zimbabwe on a Path towards Political Stability?

Analyzing the Current Political Situation in Zimbabwe
With a Focus on the 2008 and 2013 Elections

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Introduction

Zimbabwe has gone through cycles of political unrest since it gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1980. President Robert Mugabe became the prime minister in the country’s first elections and in 1987 he became the president, a position he has held since. He has been accused of electoral fraud and political violence numerous times. The elections in 2008 were characterized by unprecedented levels of violence and harsh criticism from the international community. This led to a coalition government between Mugabe’s political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), and the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The elections in 2013 were different. Direct violence was at a minimum and the results were generally accepted internationally.

This article seeks to analyze the two elections with the aim of explaining whether the difference in electoral violence indicates that Zimbabwe is becoming politically stable. Constructivism, peace theory, and conflict resolution theory provide a theoretical foundation for the following analysis and serve to explain why the two elections turned out so differently. The article is divided into three sections: The first section will analyze the aforementioned theories in depth. Second, conflict mapping of Zimbabwe includes the identification of historical turning points as well as an analysis of the current actors and possible triggers. Third, an analysis of the political and social environment in the 2008 and 2013 elections provides a focus on the actors and issues fueling the situation in each case. The conclusion aims to answer if Zimbabwe can be viewed as politically stable today.
**Theoretical Analysis of Political Violence**

It is important to look into numerous factors that can explain the difference between the 2008 and 2013 elections in Zimbabwe. These factors can be identified and analyzed with the help of peace theory, conflict resolution theory, and constructivism.

Johan Galtung was an early peace scholar who proposed in the late 1960s that conflict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction, attitude and behavior at its vertices. The contradiction refers to the “underlying conflict situation, including the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between the conflict parties.”\(^1\) Attitude includes the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and themselves, both positive and negative. Finally, behavior can be either “cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility.”\(^2\) Galtung’s triangle theory serves as a foundation for many conflict resolution models that have since been presented. This is the case with the ‘triangle of violence’ where direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence are the vertices.

![Triangle of violence built on Johan Galtung's conflict triangle](image)

Figure 1 - Triangle of violence built on Johan Galtung’s conflict triangle

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2 Ransbotham, Miall, Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p 11.
Direct violence refers to violence in the general use of the term, and is the most visible form of violence. Structural violence refers to contradictions and injustices within a society where social institutions and structures harm individuals by preventing them from realizing their basic needs and rights. Cultural violence refers to beliefs or ideas that make us blind to structural violence or makes us justify it.

Structural violence is similar to what Betty A. Reardon, a world-renowned peace education leader, calls a system of social and economic violence. For Reardon, violence is at the center of peace education since all violence degrades human dignity and has multiple and pervasive forms, both as a phenomenon and as a system.³ She identifies violent social structures that constitute a system of control, domination and oppression using Galtung’s triangle of violence.⁴

Reardon emphasizes the structural forms of economic, social and political violence, defining violence intentional, usually avoidable harm.⁵ Using the concept of vulnerability she evaluates the circumstances that allow for the denial of human dignity to large groups, defined as a “chronic disadvantage suffered by person or groups at the lower levels of the prevailing social, economic and political structures.”⁶ The vulnerable within a society are most likely to suffer harm as a consequence of the prevailing violent structures, as well as from periodic disturbances that interrupt society’s normal operations, e.g. war. The vulnerable are too often unaware of their human rights and can therefore be manipulated by the powerful, such as by the purchase of a vote for the price of a meal. Even when the vulnerable are aware of their rights they often seem powerless to claim them while governments rationalize various forms of economic and political

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⁴ Reardon & Snauwert, Betty A. Reardon: A Pioneer in Education for Peace and Human Rights, p ix.
⁵ Ibid, p 142.
violence as “unavoidable in the face of concerns deemed more significant to order and
stability.”

Reardon sees human rights education as a possible solution to violence within societies,
as human rights education can awake the vulnerable
not only to awareness of the structural foundations of their oppression but, also and especially,
to consciousness of themselves as the subjects of rights they may claim on the basis of universal
human dignity, the core principle and foundation of all realms of human rights. Political action
to claim human rights is the politics of justice, a potentially transformative politics of learning.

The aim is for a transformed society that de-legitimizes violence as a political tool
and will commit to non violent measures, thus creating a path toward a culture of peace.

Constructivism also looks at social structures, such as ideas, norms and language; when
analyzing conflicts, its core observation is the social construction of reality. It is a well-
established approach within international relations and is


concerned with the way agents and structures constitute each other, the socially
constructed nature of actors and their identities and interest, and the importance of
ideational, normative and discursive factors in the shaping of international political
reality. Constructivism analyzes the beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of individuals, groups and
movements in conflict, highlighting the importance of putting a conflict into historical and social
contexts. Oftentimes constructivism provides a more holistic, multidimensional understanding of
conflicts than more traditional international relations theories, as it occupies a middle ground
between rational theory and idealist theory through its claim that the “perceptions, identities and
interests of individuals and groups are socially and culturally constructed, rather than existing

7 Ibid, p 153.
outside of or prior to society.”

Constructivism can also help explain the existence of cultural violence as it argues that language and discourse have causal effects on social action. They confer political and normative authority and create actors that are authorized to speak, silence and exclude alternative forms of action. As ideas and language are historically and culturally contingent, this approach helps to explain historical and contextual differences in political practices and social realities, providing a valuable lens when analyzing both intra and inter state conflicts.

The theories highlighted above all require a thorough analysis of social factors such as actor groups, history, and current issues in order to provide a holistic picture of the conflict. Conflict mapping can be used to present a structured analysis of a particular conflict at a particular moment in time.

It is the first step in intervening to manage a conflict and gives a quick profile of a situation and is also widely used in conflict resolution workshops to elicit from participants a snapshot of their views of the conflict.

It is important to keep in mind that any particular map represents the view of its author and is indicative rather than comprehensive. The mapping should include the conflict’s background, including historical and social factors that are relevant to the conflict. It is also important to analyze the conflict’s parties and issues, including the relationship between the parties as well as possible tension within each party. The conflict map can then be used to identify the proper measures for conflict resolution. The analysis should also identify any possible changes – referred to as triggers – in the conflict’s context that could alter the current situation.

Undertaking a conflict assessment of the situation in Zimbabwe provides a proper

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11 Ibid, p 176.
12 Ransbotham, Miall, Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, p 89.
13 Ibid, p 91.
background for the analysis of the elections in 2008 and 2013. While a thorough analysis would require a longer paper, below is an analysis of historical and social issues, as well as an identification of relevant actor groups.

**Conflict Mapping**

**Historical Turning Points & Current Issues**

Zimbabwe struggled to obtain its independence from 1965 until UN sanctions and a guerrilla uprising enabled free elections in 1979 and led to the country’s independence in 1980. Robert Mugabe established himself as the country’s first, and so far only, ruler when he was elected prime minister in 1980. At the time he called for reconciliation between whites and blacks. However, at the same time, he was in a conflict with other black guerilla leaders because of a power struggle. After the violent conflict ended, Mugabe was elected president in 1987, a position he has held since.14

Agriculture is Zimbabwe’s economic mainstay and exports are dominated by agricultural commodities and mining. There exists a strong link between agriculture, manufacturing, mining and commercial sectors. In 1997 Mugabe started his land redistribution campaign that caused an exodus of white farmers. The black population that the land was given to lacked the education and experience of managing and running such big farms and this lead to a drop in agricultural production, crippling Zimbabwe’s economy.

Mugabe’s policies have led to a dire economic situation and a high poverty rate. Zimbabwe’s GDP for 2013 was US$12.80 billion dollars and GDP per capita was US$600 for

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In 2012, 72% of the population lived below the national poverty line and the numbers for unemployment vary greatly, from 10.7% - 95% depending on the source and how unemployment is measured. This portrays a drastic picture of a country where the majority of the population is outside the traditional labor force. The following maps visualize how the agricultural value of each worker in Zimbabwe has dropped significantly since the 1990s and does not follow the regional trend of growth, evident by the comparison to countries such as Zambia and Mozambique.

The agricultural value added by each worker in Zimbabwe was $270 in 1980. This was relatively good compared to other countries in the region at the time, $249 in Zambia and $648 in Botswana. Zimbabwe continued its economic growth over the next two decades, and in 2000, Zimbabwe's value per worker was $321 compared to $520 in Botswana and $240 in Zambia.

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16 See Annex 1.
However, the growth was quickly halted after Mugabe implemented the land reform policy in 2000. The value of workers within the agricultural sector quickly started to decline, from $365 in the year 2001 to $191 in 2007. In 2007 the value per worker was $467 in Botswana and $229 in Zambia.\(^{17}\)

After the 2008 electoral violence, the value of the agricultural worker collapsed in Zimbabwe. In 2008 it was $116 compared to $191 in 2007. It has recovered slightly since, and the average between 2008 and 2011 was $144. The average for the same time period was $527 in Botswana and $263 in Zambia.\(^{18}\)

Several factors contribute to Zimbabwe’s poor business climate and environment of economic instability. Furthermore, due to strong inter-linkages between the different economic sectors, the whole economy is heavily dependent upon environmental circumstances, e.g. droughts do not only affect the agricultural sector, but also have huge impacts on the overall economic performance of the country. Zimbabwe has a weak infrastructure and suffers from corruption and

\(^{17}\) See Annex 1.
\(^{18}\) See Annex 1.
years of disinvestment. These factors have not made Zimbabwe an attractive place for foreign direct investment, halting the country’s economic growth. The government’s ambitious public spending plans to improve livelihood and modernize the aging infrastructure are likely to far outstrip domestic revenue and currently seem impossible to implement. Corruption remains a serious issue and Zimbabwe is ranked 156 out of 175 countries in the Transparency Corruption Perception Index.19 During the 2008 electoral violence, youths were used as proxies and employed to carry out acts of violence in exchange for financial gains, in many cases, necessary for them make ends meet or support their families.

**Actors & Actor Groups Relationship Analysis**

Political tensions in Zimbabwe are high between the government and the opposition, as well as within both political parties.

President Mugabe is currently 91 years old and said to be in poor health. He has ruled ZANU-PF since the 1980s and has not publicly announced whom he supports as his successor. According to the Zimbabwean Constitution, should the president die or resign, the incumbent party names his successor for the remainder of the existing term.20 The next elections will be held in 2018, and it is believed that if Mugabe resigns or passes away before that time the vice-president will rule the country until the next elections. This has lead to a vicious power struggle within the party. It was long believed that possible successors would be former Vice-President Mrs. Joice Mujuru, who fought alongside Mugabe in the uprising in the 1970s. However, in 2014

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20 “Special Series:Zimbabwe’s Presidential Election Controversy” *Stratford Analysis*, 4.1.2011, p 97
Grace Mugabe, the president’s wife, entered the political scene and started a vicious campaign against the then Vice-President Mujuru with the support of state owned media. Mrs. Mugabe had been given a leading position within ZANU-PF as head of the women’s league and many believe she seeks to succeed her husband and become leader of the party. At the party’s five-yearly congress in the beginning of December 2014, Mugabe fired Mujuru as vice-president and dismissed her from her leading position within the party, claiming that she was plotting against him. Mujuru has indicated that she plans to form a new political party, called the “original ZANU-PF,” and if successful she is likely to be a key contender for the post-Mugabe presidency. However, it is impossible to know if Mujuru is able to gain enough support to have a real impact on Zimbabwean politics, as many of her key supporters have already fled the country. After Mujuru’s ejection, the current Vice-President of ZANU-PF and Justice Minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa, is considered the preferred successor. However, as Grace Mugabe gains political credibility and continues to surround herself with prominent business people, bankers and churchmen, party infighting post-Mugabe is increasingly likely.

The MDC opposition party was originally founded in 1999 as a balance against ZANU-PF when civil society leaders from numerous organizations united in preparation for the 2000 constitutional referendum. Morgan Tsvangirai was one of the original party founders and has been the most visible opposition member and leader. The MDC divided in 2005 into the MDC-T movement led by Tsvangirai and the MDC-M movement, led by Arthur Mutambara. Multiple

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factions have been formed since, most recently under the leadership of Tendai Biti. After the violent 2008 elections, Mugabe was forced to work with the MDC in a coalition government where opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai took the position of prime minister. However, he and other MDC members were not able to uphold many of their election promises and were perceived as powerless. In recent years they have become ineffective due to a leadership impasse both within and between the factions.24 During the 2013 elections Mugabe used state owned media to run a successful campaign against the former opposition. After the 2013 loss, Tendai Biti, former Minister of Finance in the coalition government and long term ally of Tsvangirai, announced that Tsvangirai had been removed from his positions within the party for resisting leadership change. This was contested by other MDC members and three days later Tsvangirai expelled Biti from the MDC along with eight other party members. Biti has since formed a new faction of the MDC, called the MDC-Renewal. This new faction seems to have the support of Western governments and businesses even though it has lost considerable power after being expelled from parliament in March 2015. It is unlikely that MDC will be able to take advantage of the division within ZANU-PF, therefore the ruling party might be able to increase its support, despite being divided.25 At the very least, it is evident that both parties are dominated by intraparty struggles.

Analysis of the 2008 & 2013 Elections

The MDC was formed in 1999, preceding the 2000 elections where ZANU-PF won a narrow victory.\textsuperscript{26} During the elections, MDC supporters were targeted, tortured and over 30 were killed for political reasons.\textsuperscript{27} During the presidential elections of 2002, national and international concerns were raised over electoral violence and rigging of the elections. Prior to the election, ZANU-PF ran torture camps where MDC supporters were to be “re-educated” and systemic violence led to dozens of deaths and disappearances.\textsuperscript{28}

In the 2005 elections, ZANU-PF polled nearly 60\% of the vote, giving them the 2/3 majority necessary to change the constitution, according to the official numbers from the Zimbabwe Election Commission. The official vote for MDC fell to 39\%. The US State Department openly accused ZANU-PF of manipulating the electoral process through corruption and intimidation.

In May 2005 the Zimbabwean government launched a campaign called Operation Restore Order which was meant to “clean up urban areas, restore order, rid the cities of criminal elements, and restore dignity to the people.”\textsuperscript{29} As poverty increased in the 1990s and early 2000s, many left the country’s rural areas and moved to illegal backyard shacks in urban areas. This trend was followed by a huge growth in informal employment, exacerbating the urban economic crisis. The operation was designed to eradicate this illegal housing and informal jobs through forcible evictions and demolitions. The humanitarian consequences of the campaign

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, 161.
were catastrophic, as around 700,000 people lost their homes, livelihood or both and 2.4 million people – 18% of the population – were either directly or indirectly affected. The reasons for the disastrous campaign are complex, but it is widely argued that a part of the reason was to punish voters in urban areas for their “almost universal tendency since 2000 to vote for the opposition.” The operation utilized both methods of direct and structural violence as people were often evacuated with force, which in turn led to increased sickness and death. Thus the state was used to punish voters for exercising their right to participate freely in their society.

The 2008 elections were the first concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe. They took place in March 2008 and the MDC-T won a narrow victory over the ZANU-PF in the race for the House of Assembly, by 100 seats to 99. The splinter movement MDC-M won another 10 constituencies while one was taken by an independent. However, President Mugabe has subordinated the legislature to the will of the executive power. The day after the elections the MDC announced Tsvangirai’s victory. However, the government did not accept the announcement and the official numbers were not released for another five weeks. In April it was announced that Tsvangirai had taken 47.9% and Mugabe 43.2%, meaning that the two leading candidates were forced into a presidential run-off since neither reached over 50%. Tsvangirai initially agreed to the run-off, unknowing of the horror soon to follow for him and his supporters. The government started a campaign of systematic violence against opposition members and supporters, leading to widespread abuses where 200 people were killed, 5,000 or

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30 Human Rights Watch, Zimbabwe: Evicted and Forsaken – Internally displaced persons in the aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina”.
31 Ibid.
more were beaten and tortured and about 26,000 people were displaced. The level of violence became so severe that Tsvangirai pulled out of the elections for the sake of his supporters on 22 June. However, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced that his withdrawal came too late and the elections would be held. The elections were held on 27 June and Mugabe, being the only contestant, went on to win with 90.2%. Yet the level of violence had not gone unnoticed and the international community criticized Mugabe harshly. Subsequently, he was forced to agree to a coalition government, negotiated by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed in September 2008, with Mugabe keeping his position as president and Tsvangirai serving as prime minister.

The elections in 2013 were very different. Mugabe won the presidential elections with 61.1% to Tsvangirai’s 33.9%, giving ZANU-PF more than the 2/3 majority needed for amending the recently agreed constitution. ZANU-PF declared that its voters had returned home and that Zimbabwe was “back on course after the confusions and compromises of the GPA coalition period.”

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manipulated the electoral machinery to secure its victory. However, the observer groups sent by the African Union (AU) and SADC declared the elections credible and fair.

It can be argued that ZANU-PF did indeed manipulate the voters poll in numerous ways. First, it increased the number of polling stations in rural areas, where voters are more easily controlled, and decreased them in urban areas, where voters are more likely to lean towards the MDC. Second, the Mugabe government had disenfranchised voters deemed likely to support the opposition, for example they blocked the 3.5 million Zimbabweans who live in exile. Finally, the voters poll had serious flaws and inaccuracies, e.g. the MDC found 838,000 entries where the same name, address and date of birth had been given at least twice but with different IDs. The MDC also pointed out that in a country where the life expectancy is 53 years, there were 350,000 people registered to vote that were more than 85 years old and 109,000 registered were over the age of 100, the oldest being a 135 year old army officer.

**When Structural Violence Does Not Suffice**

However, this does not explain the difference in the level of violence during the two elections. In the article, “When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?”, it is argued that governments use violence when they fear they might lose the elections and there is a lack of institutionalized constraints. This means that the fear of losing power alone does not suffice as a reason to incite violence. Institutionalized constraints on the incumbent’s decision-making powers make violent election strategies hard to implement and risky to undertake. Institutionalized constraints are,

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37 Ibid, p 137.
39 Ibid, p 150 & 156.
for example, legal limitations on the incumbent’s power, normally imposed by accountability groups such as legislatures, ruling parties, military and courts.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the suppressed informational environment generates uncertainty about the president’s true support, especially since reliable public opinion polls are virtually non-existent prior to elections. In 2008 there was systematic violence preceding the March elections and Tsvangirai himself was arrested and severely beaten. Nevertheless, the violence before the March elections was not significantly more than during previous elections. After losing the parliament majority and being forced to accept a round two for the presidential election, Mugabe jolted into action to ensure he won the second round.  

Domestic accountability groups did not significantly constrict Mugabe’s authority since there were very few limitations on his actions: the constitutional restrictions were ignored, the legislation had both limited power and independence, and rule by decree was often used. The second round of the 2008 elections was characterized by uncertainty about Mugabe’s popularity and the lack of institutionalized constraints, both conditions that increase the likelihood of electoral violence. Even though institutional constraints were virtually non-existent, Mugabe relied on structural violence during the first round and only used direct violence as a last resort when he deemed it absolutely necessary. His use of direct violence was a risk and indeed came with a cost since it caught the attention of the international community and Mugabe was forced to reach a power sharing agreement with Tsvangirai. However, this meant that he did not completely lose power.

In 2013 the political landscape was quite different and so was Zimbabwean civil society. The MDC had been given a junior partnership within the coalition government and failed to

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40 “Special Series: Zimbabwe’s Presidential Election Controversy”, p 97.
42 Ibid, p 159.
uphold their bold promises for change. Mugabe unilaterally chose a date for the Election Day, breaking the requirement stated in the GPA that the opposition should be consulted. The MDC complained to the SADC, but Mugabe responded that since the election date had already been declared the Constitutional Court would have to approve the postponement. The court denied the request and declared that the elections should take place. Instead of pulling out of the elections, MDC decided to participate, and in that way increased the poll’s legitimacy. Their intraparty and interparty feuds prevented them from reaching a strategic compromise to ensure that they did not split the vote in ZANU-PF’s favor. The most strategic costs were that they allowed ZANU-PF to claim credit for the improvements made during the term and were unable to refute ZANU-PF’s claim that all setbacks were a result of the MDC’s strong ties with Western countries.

Another important factor was the invisibility of civil society during the election campaign. Civil society activists had originally formed the MDC as they thought that they could have more influence through direct political participation. This meant that civil society activists became politicians, leaving the civil society movement fragile. The electoral violence that accompanied each election left the civil movement weaker, especially after the horrific 2008 elections. The constructivist lens tells us that people build their understanding of the world not only on reality, but also their expectation of reality. Many activists who protested in 2008 had simply not regained their strength and were afraid that ZANU-PF would resort to similar force as in 2008. Furthermore, the MDC had failed to hold those that committed the violence accountable and was incapable off responding to the calls of local NGOs for investigation into the abuses and

46 Interview with a NGO employee in Zimbabwe, October 2014.
to get the cases that were filed by victims through the system.\textsuperscript{47} This led to lack of faith, both in the system and in the benefits of participating in civil society to bring about change. Finally, one cannot ignore that Morgan Tsvangirai and his wife of 31 years, Susan, were in a serious car accident in March 2009. Susan died at the scene and Tsvangirai was left injured. In a statement following the crash, the MDC said they suspected that the accident was a failed assassination attempt. The accident happened less than a month after Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister.\textsuperscript{48}

Mugabe and his government have used structural violence against the people of Zimbabwe since the 2000 elections. The structural mechanisms were supposed to guarantee their victory, making direct violence on a massive scale unnecessary. However, as soon as the use of structural violence did not suffice to secure Mugabe’s power, he used direct violence against the supporters of MDC.

Governments have to be careful when using direct violence since it is much riskier and likely to bring about international attention. In 2013 it would have been counter-intuitive for Mugabe to resort to direct violence since the international community kept a close eye on the elections. However, the use of structural violence is much harder to prove and harder for other states to use as a justification for intervention. The culture of violence makes citizens immune to the corruption ingrained in the system. Furthermore, in 2013, the population was well aware that their government would not hesitate to use direct violence against them to stay in power, and therefore use of direct violence was unnecessary.

Zimbabwean society changed between 2008 and 2013. In 2008 the opposition had gained

\textsuperscript{47} Human Rights Watch, 2011. \textit{Perpetual Fear - Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe.} \\
\textsuperscript{48} The Telegraph, “Fatal Tsvangirai crash ‘was not accident, says MDC”, 7 March 2009. Accessed via website on 24 August 2015: \url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/4950623/Fatal-Tsvangirai-crash-was-not-accident-says-MDC.html}
considerable strength and was able to inspire Zimbabweans to stand up against the government and demand a change. In 2013, the social landscape was different. The former opposition had failed to bring about the radical change they promised and with a nearly invisible civil society it was enough for Mugabe to manipulate the electoral system. Pre-electoral violence would most likely have undermined his victory.49

Conclusion

This article aimed to answer if the difference between the 2008 and the 2013 elections in Zimbabwe could serve as an indicator of a more politically stable society. An analysis of the environment in each case seems to point in the opposite direction. It has been argued that leaders resort to electoral violence when they feel that their power is threatened, there is a lack of institutionalized constraints and structural violence will not suffice to gain victory. Between 2008 and 2011 there were no major changes in the economic situation that can explain the sudden strong support of President Mugabe. Rather, the 2013 results were a consequence of the electoral violence in 2008, the opposition’s failure to unite against ZANU-PF, and the structural violence in Zimbabwe during elections. Zimbabwe does not seem to be more politically stable than it was in 2008, rather the institutional constraint of having an active civil society and strong opposition seem to have vanished leaving the president in a stronger position than before.

This is especially worrisome given the likelihood of Mugabe’s disappearance from politics in the next few years. As it is unclear who will take over, Zimbabwe will likely suffer a

power vacuum. Without a strong civil society to fight for a more just and free society, Zimbabwe’s situation could deteriorate quickly. Looking back at Reardon’s theory of peace, the vulnerable often seem powerless and incapable of demanding the universal rights they are entitled to. A part of those rights is to participate in society without being subjected to violence by the government. This could suggest that Zimbabwe’s most vulnerable are likely to be used as puppets in the game of power, leading to a poorer society with higher inequality. It is therefore strongly recommended that researchers and practitioners alike keep a close eye on Zimbabwe in the coming years.
Resources:


Annex 1

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