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THE LIBIDINAL CONSTITUTION 
OF A HIGH-RISK SOCIAL MOVEMENT: 
AFFECTUAL TIES AND SOLIDARITY IN THE HUK REBELLION, 
1946 TO 1954

Jeff Goodwin  
New York University

The dominant theoretical paradigms in social-movement research usually neglect the influence of affectual and sexual relationships on collective action. Drawing on the psychoanalytic social theory of Philip Slater (1963, 1977), I employ a "libidinal-economy" perspective to explore the effects of such relationships on the Communist-led Huk rebellion in the Philippines (1946–1954). I argue that affectual relationships eroded the solidarity of this exclusive and high-risk social movement. The libidinal constitution (i.e., the structure and "economy" of the affectual ties) of the Huk movement’s predominantly male activists—including cadres of the Communist Party of the Philippines—undermined their collective identity and discipline. The "libidinal opportunity structure" created by these activists' affectual and sexual ties allowed emotional or "libidinal withdrawal" from, and weakened identification with, this insurgency, thereby contributing to its eventual disintegration. I call for a "return of the repressed" within social-movement theory, that is, for the incorporation of sexual and affectual ties into our theoretical perspectives and empirical research.

If the modern era is characterized by "a veritable discursive explosion" (Foucault 1978:17) about sexuality, then social-movement theory remains deeply embedded in the ancien régime. Judging from the dominant theoretical paradigms in social-movement research, neither sexual relationships nor affectual ties more generally would appear to have much influence on participants in social movements; the indexes of several recent volumes on collective action—Morris and Mueller (1992); Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield (1994); Tarrow (1994); and McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996)—reveal not a single reference to, let alone an extended discussion of, "emotion," "affect," "sex," or "sexuality."1

The neglect of what I call, following Freud ([1921] 1959), the "libidinal constitution" of social movements (i.e., the structure and "economy" of their members' affectual and sexual ties) is both surprising and unnecessary. After all, the rapid growth of social-movement research since the 1960s has coincided with a growing interest in the social construction of both emotions and sexualities (Harré 1986; Stein 1990). What might be described as the sexually and emotionally repressed character of the dominant paradigms

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* Direct correspondence to Jeff Goodwin, Department of Sociology, New York University, 269 Mercer Street, Room 446, New York, NY 10003 (goodwin@soe.gate.unc.edu). This research was supported by a grant from the University Research Grants Committee of Northwestern University. For their helpful suggestions, I thank Edwin Amenta, Benedict Anderson, Nancy Cauthen, Mustafa Emrak, Walter Goldfrank, Wolf Heydebrand, Jim Jasper, Benedict Kerkvliet, Ed Lehman, Sunita Parikh, Celia Mariano Pomeroy, William J. Pomeroy, James Scott, Theda Skocpol, Renée Steinheagen, Charles Tilly, Dennis Wrong, Marilyn Young, Gilda Zwerman, the previous ASR Editor (Paula England), and anonymous ASR referees.

in social-movement research—including the political-process, resource-mobilization, and rational-choice perspectives—is undoubtedly a reaction against the tendency of “classical” collective-behavior theory to view social-movement participants as irrational, expressive, and highly manipulable. Contemporary scholars of social movements usually avoid issues of emotion and sexual passion in particular because their goal is to establish the rational character and political goals of social movements. They seriously err, however, in implying that affect is necessarily irrational or simply epiphenomenal.

Recently, many scholars have criticized theoretical approaches that conceptualize participation in social movements (often implicitly) in purely instrumental or “utilitarian” terms, thereby neglecting the role of collective beliefs, normative commitments, and interpretive “frames” (Fireman and Gamson 1979; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1994; Jasper forthcoming). Still other scholars, including analysts of the so-called “new social movements,” have stressed the importance of collective identities—including sexual “orientations”—for group solidarity and collective action (Pizzorno 1978; Cohen 1985; Melucci 1989; Gamson 1992). And some analysts have begun to examine the relational or network bases of movement identities and ideologies (Gould 1991; Bearman 1993).

However, even these attempts to introduce cognitive psychology, culture, and social networks into the study of collective action fail to consider the implications of affectual and sexual attachments for social movements. Studies of social movements are saturated with emotion and passion, yet emotion and passion are rarely analyzed or even discussed. Even collective identities tend to be conceptualized in strictly cognitive and categorical terms—for example, as the achievements of “frames” (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994)—instead of (at the same time) reflecting potentially powerful feelings of kinship and belonging. And network analysts “have generally failed to specify . . . the precise dimensions of social ties that seem to account for their effects” (McAdam and Paulsen 1993:640; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).

In this study I emphasize the corrosive effects of affectual and sexual relationships on the solidarity, collective identity, and discipline of individuals who have been previously recruited into a high-risk social movement. Using the Huk rebellion in the Philippines (1946–1954) as a case study, I argue that certain (hetero)sexual relationships, as well as the strong kinship ties that were characteristic of Philippine rural society, eroded the solidarity of the predominantly male guerrilla soldiers and cadres of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP). More generally, I propose that the affectual networks of any given population create a more favorable or less favorable “libidinal opportunity structure” for collective action; these networks may strongly shape the collective identity, solidarity, and discipline of participants in social movements.

A LIBIDINAL-ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE

My “libidinal-economy” approach (Freud [1930] 1961:25–31) draws selectively on psychoanalytic social theory, especially Slater’s (1963, 1977, chap. 11) analysis of emotional or “libidinal withdrawal” from groups and Coser’s (1974) study of “greedy institutions” which attempt to prevent such withdrawal (also see Bittner 1963). The psychoanalytic tradition posits that group solidarity rests in part upon sublimated or “aim-inhibited” (i.e., not overtly sexual) libidinal ties of collective identification among group members. Libidinal relations encompass “all that may be comprised under the word ‘love,’” including “sexual love with sexual union as its aim,” self-love, and “love for parents and children, friendship and love for

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2 I define libidinal opportunity structure as those collective properties of the affectual and sexual relations of a group or population that facilitate or hinder collective action. The general notion of “opportunity structure” was elaborated by Merton (1959); social-movement analysts have recently emphasized the importance of “political opportunity structures” (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1994).

3 Although my focus is on a social movement, psychoanalytic theory suggests that all groups and organizations can confront problems associated with libidinal withdrawal. I believe that a libidinal-economy perspective also has important implications for the study of organizations, the family, social mobility, and migration.
humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas” (Freud [1921] 1959:22). Such libidinal ties or “object relations” (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983), which can only be understood at a supraindividual level, are analytically distinct from both the structure of social ties (or “mobilizing structures”) and the cultural symbols (or “frames”) that also enable and constrain collective action. Transpersonal networks of object relations form a social-psychological “context of action” that shapes collective behavior by channeling flows and investments of emotional energy (i.e., “cathexes”) (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1996).

Freud ([1921] 1959:61–2, 32) argues that all solidaristic groups are characterized by a “double type” of libidinal tie. On the one hand, group members internalize “the group ideal as embodied in the leader” or the “leading idea” of the group; this idea or ideal displaces or reconfigures each member’s “ego ideal” or “superego,” that is, one’s moral conscience. On the other hand, and partly as a result of this shared internalization, group members simultaneously identify with one another; they form a collective identity on the basis of their common attachment—emotional as well as cognitive—to a project, leader, or ideal. Freud ([1921] 1959) concludes that “the formula for the libidinal constitution of groups . . . is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego” (p. 48).

Freud ([1921] 1959) realizes that shared material or ideal interests can play an important role in group formation, especially in the initial mobilization of previously unattached people behind a particular goal or leader; but he emphasizes that “experience has shown that in cases of collaboration libidinal ties are regularly formed between the fellow-workers which prolong and solidify the relation between them to a point beyond what is merely profitable” (pp. 34–35). Thus, group members do not cohere for purely instrumental reasons; an emotional or affectual solidarity can also gradually emerge from their collaborative work, including their everyday “interaction rituals” (Goffman 1967; Collins 1975:90–160). As a result of these emergent libidinal ties, Freud ([1921] 1959) suggests, members of a genuinely solidaristic group “tolerate the peculiarities of its other members, equate themselves with them, and have no feeling of aversion towards them” (p. 34). Groups, in short, may be held together not only (or primarily) by shared interests, social positions, ideologies, and “frames,” but also by powerful affectual ties of empathy, friendship, and camaraderie that spring from, and are reinforced by, face-to-face interactions.4

Of course, group identities and solidarities are never established once and for all; the formal rites and everyday interactions of group members strengthen their shared identity and maintain or expand their emotional energy (Collins 1993). And yet in certain social and organizational contexts, including those in which Huk activists were embedded, some libidinal ties can hinder the formation of group identities and solidarity. This is so for two reasons.

First, preexisting emotional attachments may simply limit the time that individuals are willing or able to allocate to certain groups. The scarcity of time, in other words, imposes an “economy” on emotional or libidinal investments.

Second, certain affectual relationships can corrode the strong solidarity and strict discipline that some collective endeavors demand, even when individuals allocate time to them and are ostensibly involved in them. In fact, a fundamental premise of a libidinal-economy analysis is that individuals cannot make unlimited emotional investments in even a relatively small number of object-choices; the distribution of cathexes is always a potential source of social conflict because, as Coser (1974) notes, “human beings possess only finite libidinal energies for cathecting social objects” (p. 1). Wrong (1994) points out that one need not accept Freud’s “hydraulic” conception of a fixed quantum of individual psychic energy to appreciate “the

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4 This psychoanalytic view of group solidarity resembles certain ideas about social solidarity in the symbolic-interactionist tradition. For example, Blumer (1951) argues that the “solidity and persistency” of social movements requires what he terms “esprit de corps,” that is, “the sense which people have of belonging together and of being identified with one another in a common undertaking” (pp. 205–206).
inherent limits to our sympathies” (p. 140). Moreover, a libidinal-economy perspective need not presume, as did Freud, that sex is the ultimate or “natural” aim of all affectual relationships. In certain contexts, so-called “aim-inhibited” ties to friends, children, and groups can limit emotional investments in sexual relationships.

Slater (1963, 1977) identifies three libidinal “threats” to group solidarity: “dyadic,” “familial,” and “narcissistic withdrawal.” In each instance, individuals “withdraw” or disinvest their emotional or libidinal attachment to groups. Dyadic withdrawal refers to affectual disinvestment from groups by sexually intimate couples. Here, Slater follows Freud’s ([1921] 1959) argument that, other things being equal, “directly sexual impulses are unfavourable to the formation of groups”:

Two people coming together for the purpose of sexual satisfaction, in so far as they seek for solitude, are making a demonstration against . . . the group feeling. The more they are in love, the more completely they suffice for one another . . . If [sexual impulses] become too strong they disintegrate every group formation. (Pp. 72–73)\(^5\)

“An intimate dyadic relationship always threatens to short-circuit the libidinal network of the community and drain off its source of sustenance” (Slater 1963:348).\(^6\)

From the perspective of organizational discipline, members involved in intense sexual relationships “are likely to be less controllable, less devoted to the exclusive service of the organization, hence, less reliable” (Coser 1974:106). Even tightly knit groups that successfully insulate themselves from the larger society may still be threatened by dyadic intimacy among their members (Kanter 1968).

In fact, Slater (1963) argues, “the more totalitarian the collectivity, in terms of making demands upon the individual to involve every area of his life in the collectivity, the stronger will be the prohibition against dyadic intimacy” (p. 349; also see Bittner 1963). This prohibition is motivated not by a puritanical fear of sexuality per se, but by fear of libidinal withdrawal from the group.

The second type of libidinal disinvestment from groups that Slater (1963) analyzes is familial withdrawal, that is, the “withdrawal of cathexis from larger aggregates to . . . the confines of the nuclear family” (p. 343). Familial withdrawal “occurs whenever a nuclear family becomes emotionally or libidinally sufficient unto itself” (Slater 1977:137; also see Barrett and McIntosh 1991, chap. 2, on the “anti-social family”). In my analysis of the Huk rebellion, I assume that individuals can also affectually “withdraw” into strong kinship networks that extend beyond the nuclear family.

Finally, Slater argues that narcissism, or self-love, inhibits group solidarity. Group cohesion is threatened whenever emotionally unattached individuals invest their libido mainly in their own selves, “refusing to share it or to transfer it to any [other] object” (Moscovici [1981] 1985:247). The narcissist makes no affectual or emotional investment in others and consequently is motivated solely by self-interest. Even individuals who are ostensibly involved in groups may actually “have no emotional commitment to them” (Slater 1963:345).

Self-interested social action, in this view, is not some natural psychological predisposition, but is a consequence of the “libidinal opportunity structure” associated with particular positions in social networks. More specifically, it is the structural possibility of libidinal withdrawal from all groups and dyads that allows for “the complete ‘economic man,’ motivated solely by rational self-interest” (Slater 1963:345; also see Collins 1993:222).

The Huk rebellion provides a compelling case study of the importance of affectual and sexual ties in a social movement. In fact, libidinal withdrawal was “politicized” and explicitly discussed among movement activists (although not, of course, in strictly psychoanalytic terms). This occurred for several
reasons, including the “exclusive” (Zald and Garner [1966] 1987) and “high-risk” (McAdam 1986) nature of the Huk movement, which placed unusually onerous demands on guerrilla soldiers and Communist Party cadres. However, libidinal withdrawal might have been avoided had there not existed structural opportunities for activists to establish or retain strong affectual ties to kin, wives, and lovers. This particular libidinal constitution was reinforced by widespread (albeit contested) sexist attitudes among Huk activists that prevented the integration of women into the movement on an equal footing with men. As a result, the affectual relations of many activists “short-circuited” their libidinal ties of collective identification with other activists.

The Huk movement’s internal conflicts and debates about libidinal withdrawal resulted in the production of several documents that examined members’ affectual and sexual ties (see Appendix A). These documents, which provide the primary data for this study, were captured by the Philippine government in October 1950, when the Huk insurgency was faring extremely well and top PKP leaders anticipated a relatively rapid seizure of state power. My data sources also include the memoirs of Huk activists Luis Taruc and William J. Pomeroy (see Appendix A), as well as the secondary literature on the rebellion. Before examining the PKP’s solidarity problems, however, I provide an overview of the Huk rebellion and Huk activists in order to establish the specific social and organizational context in which problems of libidinal withdrawal arose.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE HUK REBELLION AND HUK ACTIVISTS

The Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, or People’s Liberation Army (HMB), that spearheaded the Huk rebellion developed out of the wartime Hukbalahap (People’s Anti-Japanese Army). The Hukbalahap was founded in March 1942 by the Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, or PKP) following the Japanese invasion the previous year. Both the Hukbalahap movement and the postwar Huk rebellion were based primarily in rural areas of central and, to a lesser extent, southern Luzon, the largest and most heavily populated island in the Philippine archipelago. In these areas during the 1930s, Socialists and Communists had organized large movements of sharecropping peasants who sought larger crop shares and easier credit from wealthy and politically powerful landlords. The Hukbalahap was directed by a military committee composed of PKP cadres, and the Huk commander-in-chief was Party member Luis Taruc. The People’s Liberation Army, similarly, was directed by the Military Department of the PKP (Pomeroy 1978:514; Saulo 1990:176).

The PKP and Huk guerrillas looked forward to returning to a “normal,” legal existence following the war. However, U.S. authorities and the landed oligarchy in the Philippines sought to dismember the Hukbalahap and the larger peasant movement in Luzon. Even before the Japanese surrendered, U.S. forces and their Philippine allies harassed, arrested, and even killed Huk leaders and soldiers. In addition, several victorious Huk-supported candidates in the first postwar elections (April 1946) were not allowed to take their seats in the Philippine Congress on the spurious charge that they had used terror and intimidation to be elected.

Attacks on Huk veterans and the peasant movement increased in the months after the war, and it was in this context that veterans of the anti-Japanese resistance reorganized themselves, spontaneously at first, as the People’s Liberation Army (HMB). The HMB and the Communist-led National Peasants’

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7 A Foucauldian analysis would analyze the movement’s own discourse about sexuality as an important factor in its own right (Foucault 1978). However, this study brackets this issue.

8 Most of these documents were written in 1950, the high water mark of the rebellion. Thus, the problems of solidarity and discipline addressed in them cannot be dismissed as symptoms of the movement’s subsequent decline.

9 This overview draws on the principal monographs on the Huk rebellion, namely, Taruc (1953), Lachica (1971), Kerkvliet (1977), and Saulo (1990).

10 In one incident, 109 Huk guerrillas were disarmed, ordered to dig a mass grave, and summarily executed “with the knowledge and consent of American CIC [Counter Intelligence Corps] officers” (Kerkvliet 1977:113).
Union (PKM) were outlawed by the government in March 1948, and shortly thereafter the PKP “decided that armed struggle should be the main form of struggle” (Pomeroy 1978:513). Finally, at its January 1950 Politburo Conference, following what has been called the “dirtiest and bloodiest” election in Philippine history in November 1949, the PKP declared that a “revolutionary situation” existed in the Philippines and openly called for the overthrow of the government. In adopting this high-risk strategy, the PKP also imposed a strict regime of “military discipline” on Huk soldiers and Party cadres (Pomeroy 1963a:142). Thus, the movement became increasingly “exclusive,” demanding ever-greater commitments from participants.

The PKP believed that U.S. imperialism had entered a period of crisis and, as the triumph of Communism in China seemed to confirm, would be unable to assist the Philippines. "A period of two years was projected as 'preparation for the seizure of power,' during which Huk expansion would be pushed to all provinces. . . . [G]uerrilla forces would be converted to a regular army, and a provisional revolutionary government would be organized" (Maravilla 1968:239). The Party was convinced that nearly 90 percent of the Philippine population was potentially sympathetic to its cause (Politburo Exh. O 271).

The seriousness of the Huk rebellion was undeniable in 1950. The Philippine Army estimated that the Huks had approximately 100,000 active supporters and 12,000 armed guerrillas (Saff 1955:28). The Huks did not control large "liberated areas," but they operated freely in many areas of central and southern Luzon and launched coordinated military operations from relatively secure camps in the isolated and sparsely populated areas of the Sierra Madre. (These camps, importantly, were far from the homes and barrios of the Huks and their supporters.)

Although there was a significant number of women in the Huk camps, including the wives of a few Huk soldiers and Party members, virtually all Huk soldiers and most PKP cadres were men.11 While the PKP was mally committed to sexual equality, widespread sexist attitudes among the men of the Huk movement (including some PKP leaders) undoubtedly prevented women from assuming a larger role in the rebellion. Although two women became military commanders (albeit with unusually limited authority), most women in the Huk movement were restricted to subsidiary, noncombatant roles such as nurses, secretaries, and especially couriers (Lanzona 1995).

Not only were most soldiers and PKP cadres men, but many of the Party’s most important activists were settled residents of central and southern Luzon who were married and had children. Most “middle-level” leaders of the rebellion “were veteran local peasant leaders who had become well-known among peasants” for their participation in peasant struggles dating back to the 1930s, and most would have been over 30 years old in 1950 (Kerkvliet 1977, table 9:84–5, 263). These men, moreover, had “lived in the villages and market towns, maintained close ties to the peasantry, and usually were of peasant background themselves” (Kerkvliet 1977:263). Thus, these cadres were hardly the sort of young, unattached intellectuals or students who have led other guerrilla movements in recent decades (e.g., in Latin America; see Wickham-Crowley 1992, chaps. 2, 9).

As long-settled residents of particular barrios, these men were embedded in strong kinship networks that imposed a whole series of particularistic claims and obligations. Students of Filipino rural society have emphasized the primacy of kinship (including ritual kinship or compadrinazgo) for understanding peasant communities (Hart 1977; Morais 1981). Kin were the principal and often the only source of social support and security in rural areas during the frequent times of hardship for poor peasants and sharecroppers. “Denying assistance to a kinsman,” in this context, is viewed as “an offense against the moral standards of group relations—an insult to one’s parents and a token of disrespect for the entire kin group” (Jocano 1989:22). Stoodley (1957) notes that “cathetic bonds” among adult siblings in the Philippines are remarkably strong and that “consciousness of kin” extends to far-removed cousins (pp. 240–41). The claims of parents on their children are particularly formidable, and children

11 This was noted in a letter from William J. Pomeroy to author, February 15, 1993 (see Appendix A).
are expected to care for their parents in old age (Kaut 1961:270; Jocano 1989:22–23).

In sum, the sort of married peasant men who seem to have predominated among the PKP’s middle-level cadres had strong ties not only to their wives and children, but also to their surviving parents, siblings, and wider circles of kin, real and ritualistic. Moreover, at least some of these men also had ties and obligations to mistresses or even “second” wives and families—relationships that were encouraged in part because divorce was illegal in the Philippines. Of course, these ties had to be carefully managed since polygamy was also illegal, and the powerful Catholic Church strongly opposed extramarital sexual relations.

In early 1950, the Huk rebellion seemed very strong and popular. In March, the Huk launched simultaneous raids on 15 targets to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the founding of the Hukbalahap. “The raids were described as the first ‘dress rehearsal’ for bigger things to come” (Saulo 1990:180). In August, a second “dress rehearsal” saw simultaneous raids on 11 towns in central and southern Luzon, including Santa Cruz, capital of Laguna province. PKP leaders concluded, “Politically, we are now on the strategic offensive to accumulate more main forces and...to hasten maturity of revolutionary situation into a revolutionary crisis” (Politburo Exh. O 126).

However, following the surprise arrest (described later) of many high-ranking PKP leaders in Manila in October 1950 (when the documents on which this study is based were also captured), the Huk movement was put on the defensive by government forces. By the end of 1954, the rebellion had virtually disintegrated. Following the surrender of former military commander-in-chief Luis Taruc in May 1954, a “surrender epidemic” ensued (Saulo 1990: 181). All told, more than 6,000 Hues were killed, 4,700 arrested, and another 9,500 took advantage of amnesty offers (Kerkvliet 1977: 245).

The Huk rebellion ultimately failed because of the “general weariness” of the rebels, government reforms (and promised reforms), and the government’s increasingly effective (and discriminate) use of force, made possible in part by substantial U.S. aid, training, and oversight (Kerkvliet 1977:236–45). Kerkvliet (1977:181–83, 227–30) also notes that the lack of discipline and the organizational weaknesses of the Hues and the PKP contributed to the movement’s decline, but he does not probe these issues deeply. The following sections of this study employ a libidinal-economy approach to illuminate some of the sources of the movement’s internal weaknesses and eventual disintegration.

PROBLEMS OF SOLIDARITY AMONG HUK ACTIVISTS

Communist Party documents of 1950 reflect an optimism that the Huk movement had the capacity to seize state power in the Philippines within a relatively short period—perhaps two years. However, these documents also reveal conflicts and debates within the movement about the discipline and solidarity of the People’s Liberation Army and of the cadres of the Communist Party itself. In this section, I review several of these conflicts as well as the Party’s proposed solutions to them. I suggest that problems of solidarity resulted in part from “dyadic” and “familial withdrawal” from the Huk movement (although “narcissistic withdrawal” may also have played a role). These forms of libidinal withdrawal inhibited the formation of a strong collective identity and discipline among Huk soldiers and PKP cadres and thereby contributed to the rebellion’s demise.

**Dyadic Relations and the “Sex Problem”**

The most fascinating disciplinary problem discussed in PKP documents is “sex opportunism” (Politburo Exh. O 180). Often described as the “sex problem,” sex opportunism was a result of what Huk activist Pomeroy (1963a) describes as “the unhappy problem of men without women” (p. 142). Specifically, a substantial number of married men within the Huk movement and PKP cadres, men who had left their wives behind in the barrios, engaged in extramarital sexual relations with women in the Huk camps in the Sierra Madre. Although little is known

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12 These relations not only generated emotionally charged conflicts within the movement, but also created a potential public relations problem with the general (Catholic) population.
about these women (Lanzona 1995), they seem to have been young single women who served as couriers, nurses, and the like; relatively few were PKP cadres.

Sexual relations raised the possibility of divided emotional commitments that could weaken the Huk movement. Accordingly, the PKP felt obliged to oversee and regulate the sexual relations of Huk activists, particularly after it had adopted a strategy of armed struggle and had placed its cadres, as well as ordinary Huk soldiers, under strict military discipline (Pomeroy 1963a:142).

Huk leaders were aware, for example, that marriages could create divided loyalties for cadres and soldiers, and so they encouraged and were authorized by the PKP to perform special “Huk marriages,” a practice that dated back to the war. The movement recast the marriage ceremony into a ritual affirmation not only of the couple’s loyalty to one another, but also of their joint commitment to the struggle. Huk marriages were “elaborate” affairs, “with the whole camp attending”:

The soldier comrades prefer to swear fidelity with their hands and those of their brides joined upon a pistol, and to take their vows under an arch of rifles held by their comrades. The marrying leader swears them not only to loyalty to each other, but also to loyalty to the movement, above their relationship, and to loyalty to the principle of the equality of men and women, about which he gives a lecture that is the core of the ceremony. (Pomeroy 1963a:143, italics added)

As Taruc (1953) puts it,

In our ceremonies we tried to bring forth the idea that the family must be a bulwark of democracy, and that the devotion of the couple to each other must be matched by the devotion of the couple to their fellow men. (P. 124)

These ceremonies, however, did not always produce the intended effect. “Ete” was a security soldier and a veteran of the anti-Japanese resistance; he was a “popular” man, according to Pomeroy, who had married, in a Huk ceremony, a young woman who served as a courier. Ete was court martialed in July 1950 for “desertion in the face of the enemy”:

When the enemy entered the forest a few days ago he was in the unit sent to ambush them. He left the firing line without permission, merely telling the man next to him that he had a headache, and returned to camp. He said the headache made him dizzy and that he was afraid of committing a blunder if a fight occurred. But everyone believes that he went back to be at the side of his wife, Anita, in a time of danger. (Pomeroy 1963a:60–61)

Ete was sentenced to death by firing squad for this transgression:

The natural impulse of a man and a wife is to protect each other. But . . . in this movement it is not the individual that counts, but the cause of all . . . If one cadre is wounded or captured, shall we risk the lives of two for a personal attachment, and thereby injure the whole? (Pomeroy 1963a:62)

The “sex problem” that most worried PKP leaders was the practice of married men informally taking a second wife in the Huk camps. Pomeroy (1963a) records that these extramarital relationships, which were known as kualingking cases, “were the source of much bitter criticism within the movement, and from families in the barrios” (p. 143). In an attempt to come up with a consistent and principled policy toward extramarital relationships—to “settle this problem on a moral plane,” as Pomeroy (1963a:143) put it—the PKP leadership drew up a remarkable policy statement entitled “Revolutionary Solution of the Sex Problem” (Poliburo Exh. I 15). This document begins with a brief history of the sex problem, noting that it first arose during the Japanese occupation. During this period, “[f]or lack of a revolutionary orientation on this problem, the Party lost some valuable cadres who were ordered liquidated even for such flimsy cases of married men flirting with female cadres. . . . On the other extreme,” the document notes, “some cadres were talented in sustaining all forms of abnormal sex relationships on the flimsy ground of ‘biological necessity.’” 13 The sex problem “again projected itself . . . with the resumption of the armed struggle” after the war, “until now it has developed into a political question of importance.”

“Sex opportunism,” the document concludes, had become “rampant, especially be-

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13 “Abnormal sex relationships,” which may have implied homosexuality in a predominantly Catholic society, seems to refer only to extramarital heterosexual relations. None of the documents, memoirs, or other sources that I have examined refers explicitly to homosexual practices.
cause of the failure of the Party leadership to formulate and decide upon a scientific and a revolutionary solution to the sex problems of married cadres long separated from their families” (Politburo Exh. O 180). To make matters worse, “it must be observed that the excitement produced by being in the firing line intensifies sex appetites.” (This argument was a common refrain in discussions of the sex problem.) What, then, was to be done? The sex problem, the document maintains, could not be approached with “feudal” or “bourgeois” notions of morality, but had to be resolved “with the interest of the revolution as the sole criterion, and with a view to laying the foundations of future communist sex morality.”

In other words, the purely “private” interests and desires of the individuals involved in extramarital sexual relationships had to be subordinated to the collective interests of the revolutionary movement. In addition, a “scientific” solution of the sex problem had to recognize that although “sex desires can be sublimated, . . . [they] cannot be completely eliminated short of actual removal of the organs from which the desire is generated.” The document then notes, “it is also demonstrated scientifically that removal of such organs produces abnormal results not conducive to the full development of one’s faculties” (Politburo Exh. I 15). Neither celibacy nor eunuchism, then, were judged to be “scientifically” correct solutions to the Huk movement’s sex problem.14

Given the preceding arguments and assumptions, it is hardly surprising that the Party’s “revolutionary solution” of the sex problem allowed married men to take a second wife in the Huk camps. However, the Party emphasized that such relationships were permissible only “with the observance of strict regulations” and only if they served “the interests of the movement.” Pomeroy (1963a), who participated in the formulation of the “revolutionary solution,” summarized the requirements that had to be met before a Huk activist would be allowed to take a second wife:

Firstly, a married man cannot take a forest wife unless he can convince the leading committee in the Reco [Regional Command] to which he belongs that either his health or his work are being adversely affected by absence from his wife.

Secondly, he must write to or otherwise communicate with his wife in the lowland and inform her of his intention and need to take a forest wife. He must, at the same time, under the principle of equality, give his wife the freedom to enter into a similar relationship in the barrio or city if she, too, finds herself unable to withstand the frustration.

Thirdly, the forest wife must be clearly informed that the man is already married and that their relationship will terminate when he is able to return to his regular wife. In other words, there must be no deception of the regular wife and no deception of the forest wife. If, at the end of the struggle, a man should decide that he prefers a permanent relation with the forest wife, he must completely separate from the previous wife. (Pp. 143–44)

In determining whether an extramarital relationship actually served “the interests of the movement,” the Party listed a number of factors that “should be inquired into”:

. . . effect of sex or emotional frustration on the health and efficiency of the cadre; possibilities of sublimating sex or emotional desire which will make unnecessary the entering into abnormal sex relationships . . . ; possibilities of malingered by the frustrated cadre to convince the members of the [Party] organ of the adverse effects of sex or emotional frustration. (Politburo Exh. I 15)

According to Pomeroy, the revolutionary solution of the sex problem “was not adopted without acrimonious debate.” Some cadres insisted that “lowland” wives not only ought to be informed, but ought also to give their consent to their husbands’ extramarital relationships before they could be allowed. Others argued (albeit “unscientifically”) for strict self-control and sublimation (i.e., celibacy). For their part, Pomeroy and his wife, Celia Mariano, insisted “that many men would have no problem if they had overcome their feudal outlooks and had involved their wives in the struggle beside them” (Pomeroy 1963a:144).15

14 However, celibacy and eunuchism have been used in other contexts to ensure organizational commitment and discipline (Kanter 1968; Coser 1974, chaps. 2, 10).

15 The Party later adopted a policy along these lines. Mariano, it should be noted, was the only
Indeed, although (or perhaps because) the Party did not challenge the “ideal” of heterosexual monogamy, not everyone was pleased with its “revolutionary solution of the sex problem.” According to Pomeroy, there were cadres “who thought that they could apply for a ‘revolutionary solution’ every time they had a vagrant desire, on the grounds of being ‘oversexed,’ but they have been sharply criticized and turned down.” He also notes, “A national leader of the movement from Nueva Ecija was removed from his position of leadership and reduced to the rank and file for violating the procedures of the revolutionary solution of the sex problem” (Pomeroy 1963a:144).

Taruc (1967) later wrote that the “revolutionary solution” of the sex problem was actually used to “justify” the “immoral extramarital affairs” and “transient sex relationships common among the Communist leadership” that “became a major problem in the Communist Party and the Huk movement”:

Thus, despite our favorite claim that, to use Stalin’s words, “Communists are people of a different mold,” we were no different from our “class enemy.” Indeed, in a sense, we were worse; we exploited our own class sisters and comrades, taking advantage of their hero-worshiping loyalty, their trusting simplicity and credulity. (P. 64)

Taruc (1967) immediately adds,

I, too, had a loveless sex affair with a Communist girl. I was single, a widower, and a healthy man. . . . [M]y desires were altogether human. And our way of life, with its daily excitement, suspense, and the ever present danger of sudden death, kept our senses alert and our nerves taut. . . . [Subsequently, however,] our deeply rooted Christian upbringing, our conscience and sense of decency compelled us to put an end to our unedifying relationship. (Pp. 64–65)

**Family and Baby Problems: “Finance Opportunism” and “Awaitism”**

Another problem that reflected Huk activists’ weak identification with the movement was “finance opportunism,” the embezzlement or misuse of the movement’s monetary resources by Huk soldiers and Party cadres. “Because of the difficulties of underground activities, which prevented close supervision and frequent check-up, finance opportunism became rampant within the Party and the HMB” (Politburo Exh. O 180). Dyadic relationships again were part of the problem. For example, according to Taruc (1967), Commander Bakal of Bulacan Province

. . . received from an aunt 100 pesos as a contribution to the Huk and 20 pesos for himself. He spent the combined sum on himself and his bride-to-be. He was charged with “financial opportunism” and shot. He had been a loyal soldier of the Huk since 1942 and had reached the rank of battalion commander with a clean record. (P. 152)

Based on past experience, Huk leaders feared that activists would embezzle resources in order to improve the situation of their families and kin. This concern is evident in a long document entitled “Finance Opportunism: Its Basic Causes and Remedies,” issued by the Party Secretariat on October 10, 1950 (Politburo Exh. O 757). This document begins by illustrating finance opportunism with the example of a cadre who used movement funds to purchase jewelry for his “family.” The document then lists several “corrupt non-proletarian ideologies and attitudes” that allegedly account for finance opportunism, including the belief that the “display of jewelry” or “fine or costly clothes” is “an effective way of commanding respect of others, both within the Party and outside.” Some Hucks, “especially . . . male cadres of the armed forces,” apparently sought “to dazzle young girls with gifts.” The document calls special attention to “[t]he perverted concept that it is disgraceful for a comrade working full time in the revolution to have his family standard of living not improved or even lowered.” Thus, the Party clearly perceived that finance opportunism was rooted in the family and sexual relationships of Huk activists.

The Party’s discussion of “remedies” for finance opportunism concludes that “we should by example and by education project the communist virtues of selflessness, self-sacrifice, including sacrifice of families, and frugality in living” (Politburo Exh. O 757, italics added). The Party even suggested that

woman among the approximately 40 Politburo members during this period (from an interview with Mariano, Twickenham, England, August 8, 1991).
the temptation of finance opportunism could be mitigated by adopting “ways and means of distributing to their relatives and friends the small children of Party cadres, while making the wives and older children of our cadres, particularly those without visible means of livelihood, work for the revolution.” Thus, the problems engendered by family ties could be resolved by breaking up—in effect, “socializing”—the nuclear families of Party cadres, integrating their productive members into the revolutionary movement and entrusting the care of dependents to kin or others who were presumably not directly involved in the movement. Although these policies apparently were never implemented on a significant scale, in principle they would have mitigated not only the problem of finance opportunism, but also the problem of sex opportunism through the integration of cadres’ wives into the movement.

As troubling as sex and finance opportunism were for the Huks, the primary disciplinary problem of the movement was described by one Party document as “awaitism.”Awaitism is defined as the conscious or unconscious “evasion of sharp struggle against the enemy [which] . . . is manifested in various degrees, from total non-participation to non-total participation in struggle” (Politburo Exh. O 180, N 1022; also see Kerkvliet 1977: 228–29). In other words, the Huk movement, and the PKP in particular, suffered from a “free-rider problem” *within their own ranks.* Rather than commit themselves to the struggle in a disciplined way, many cadres preferred to wait passively for the revolution to triumph, “free riding” on the efforts of other cadres in a self-interested or, so to speak, “family-interested” manner. The “struggle against awaitism” (“a non-communist, non-proletarian ideology having its roots from petty bourgeoisie [sic] individualism”) was described as nothing less than “the foremost political task confronting the Party” (Politburo Exh. N 236, N 1022).

The problem of awaitism is discussed in a PKP document titled “Struggle against Awaitism” (Politburo Exh. N 1022). As this document emphasizes, “Awaitism is not only a disease affecting the unorganized masses, but it also affects the organized struggle for national liberation and even the Party lead-

ing such struggle.” In fact, awaitism among both the unorganized and organized masses, according to this document, is fundamentally a result of awaitism among Party cadres themselves:

> Within the Party . . . awaitism manifests itself in evasion of leading sharp struggles with the enemy for individual self-preservation; adoption of inflexible underground techniques to the point of ineffectiveness, to prevent individual exposure in order to prolong the relatively comfortable mode of legal existence; the non-readiness to abandon everything, employment, family and comforts, in order to devote full time to the revolution; and among full-time professional revolutionaries, the absence of single-mindedness in their devotion to the revolution. (Politburo Exh. N 1022, italics added)

The Party was particularly troubled by the slow pace of recruiting new guerrilla fighters and by its failure to expand operations outside the traditional Huk strongholds in Luzon. As for cadres’ “reluctance to accept expansion assignment . . . it was a fact we had to face,” notes Taruc (1953), “that the majority of our soldiers and organizers were reluctant, even in the face of extreme hardship, to leave the vicinity of their homes in Central Luzon” (p. 248).

In a fascinating passage, the document analyzes several “screens” that supposedly masked, consciously or unconsciously, the true motivation behind awaitism. The principal screen is described as the “family problem”—the reluctance of cadres to accept an expansion assignment because the families they would leave behind would “have to shift for themselves.” There could be no better example of “the non-readiness to abandon everything, employment, family and comforts” for the revolution. The document suggests that some cadres who made this complaint were unemployed at the time and were actually a *burden* on their families. “Honest” cadres were said to recognize that their families would have to fend for themselves in any event if they were killed or pursued by the enemy; these cadres allegedly accepted that awaitism was the “real” reason for their reluctance to accept expansion work and other dangerous assignments and that “their family problem was merely secondary.”

PKP leader Casto Alejandro later suggested that the “family problem” directly in-
fluenced the Huks’ decision to attempt to seize state power rapidly in the first place:

While agreeing on the basic principle of protracted war, Casto Alejandro pointed out that one reason advanced for the two year timetable [for seizing power] was that many of the HMB’s were family men and were already fighting during the Japanese resistance. It is doubtful whether they would endure a prolonged armed struggle [of] let us say 10 to 15 years. Many of them would want to see the fighting war over and return to their families. (Bueser 1971:155)

The Party, in fact, called for an intensification of the armed struggle not only (or primarily) “to give the enemy no rest, but more important still, to counteract any tendencies towards awaitism” among its cadres and Huk soldiers (Politicburo Exh. N 1022, italics added).

Another PKP document links awaitism to what it calls the “baby problem.” It notes that the Party Secretariat “[r]ejected [the] request of Com. [Comrade] Elsie to be relieved of her post as chief of communications, on the ground of baby problem” (Politicburo Exh. O 321). This is the only reference to the “baby problem” I found among the Party documents I examined, although there is reason to believe that it was a more general problem. According to Pomeroy, “many women in this country, we were told, have been drawn to the movement and have had their contribution ended by marriage and by the having of children too soon.”

Pomeroy and Mariano themselves “decided, advisedly, to postpone the having of children until the struggle is won” (Pomeroy 1963a:31).

Perhaps the best indicator of Huk activists’ emotional withdrawal from the movement is the apparent ease with which soldiers and even leading cadres were induced to surrender and even to betray for money their comrades still in the field. This was a problem especially after the prospects for a quick victory began to fade after late 1950, but money could reverse allegiances even when the movement was faring well. In fact, the docu-

ments I examined were captured in October 1950 (along with many top PKP leaders) because of “the opportunist surrender of the head of a Huk armed unit in Manila who informed on his comrades for money” (Pomeroy 1963b:248–49).

It is difficult to determine if the many activists who subsequently surrendered did so for the sake of lovers or families or for more narrowly self-interested reasons (or some combination of the three). Pomeroy (1963a) suggests, however, that at least some surrendered because “they worry about a family back in the barrio without a breadwinner” (p. 157). Pomeroy (1963a) also claims that some Huks gave up “because they violate[d] discipline in the HMB and surrender[ed] to avoid revolutionary punishment” (p. 157). Thus, emotional disinvestment from the movement was for some activists a means of resisting or escaping the movement’s strict disciplinary regime.

DISCUSSION

I argue that the problems of solidarity and discipline that contributed to the disintegration of the Huk movement resulted in part from the “dyadic” and “familial withdrawal” of important cadres (although narrow self-interest or “narcissistic withdrawal’ may also account for various forms of “awaitism” and for some surrenders). In psychoanalytic terms, the libidinal object relations of Huk activists were not sufficiently monopolized by aim-inhibited ties of collective identification with other activists so as to produce the high levels of solidarity and discipline that the movement demanded. The libidinal opportunity structure created by these activists’ affectual networks hindered the constitution of cadres who would strongly identify with a high-risk rebellion or commit themselves to it.

Part of the problem for the Huks was that many individuals outside the movement presumably did not want their partners or kin within the movement to assume the high risks of the insurgency. (Activists who had strong external ties and obligations, moreover, were no doubt more likely to perceive the rebellion as especially risky in the first place.) External relations also provided a convenient “escape valve” for those cadres
who had not previously formed a particularly strong identification with the movement or who simply found its disciplinary regime too burdensome. For whatever reason, these cadres were generally not cut off from the sort of outgroup ties or countervailing networks that inhibit the development of “esprit de corps” and strong commitment to groups (Blumer 1951; Bittner 1963; Kanter 1968; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Turner and Killian 1987). Huk activists, in Selznick’s ([1952] 1979, chap. 1) terms, were insufficiently “absorbed” by the Party or “insulated” from outgroups, and thus the PKP did not much resemble the “organizational weapon” of the stereotypical vanguard party.

And yet in an attempt to preempt the libidinal withdrawal of its cadres, the Party clearly attempted to become what Coser (1974) terms a “greedy institution”—an organization that strives “to monopolize the commitments of its members by cutting them off from all personal ties and obligations that might distract them from complete dedication to the tasks at hand” (p. 1). This goal is reflected in the Party’s perception that its cadres’ families, babies, lovers, and self-interestedness were in fact, “problems”; it is also evident from the Party’s proposed solutions to these problems.

For example, the Party’s “revolutionary solution of the sex problem” is typical of the way in which communities have often regulated extramarital affairs. Such affairs “are usually governed by a variety of restrictive conventions which tend to forestall the kind of dyadic intimacy which leads to cathectic withdrawal” (Slater 1963:358). These conventions include the expectation that extramarital relationships should be restricted to certain times and places. The elaborate rules and regulations that the PKP established for those who would enter into such relationships are examples of such conventions.

The Huk wedding ceremonies were another attempt to prevent or at least control dyadic withdrawal within the movement. In fact, these Durkheimian rituals resembled conventional weddings insofar as they too were intended to wed the individuals involved to some larger community (in this case, the Huk movement) as well as to one another. The marriage ceremony “has the effect of concentrating the attention of both individuals on every other affectional tie either one has ever contracted [and] serves to emphasize the dependence of the dyadic partners on other collectivities” (Slater 1963: 354), particularly their families and friends. Huk wedding ceremonies also emphasized the couple’s dependence on their fellow cadres and the fate of the revolution. As ceremonial rituals that brought together entire Huk camps, weddings were also intended to revivify the elan and commitment, both emotional and moral, of all the celebrants, not just the bride and groom.

What then accounts for the disciplinary problems confronted by the Communist Party, given its “greedy” intentions? And how might it have elicited a stronger collective identity among its activists? The sexist or “feudal outlook” of many Party cadres that Pomeroy and Mariano noted is relevant for understanding the problem of dyadic withdrawal, especially the taking of “forest wives.” The movement might well have proven more solidaristic if from the beginning it had integrated more women into its ranks, especially the wives of Party cadres and Huk soldiers. Of course, these women would need to identify strongly with the movement or else the problem of dyadic withdrawal could worsen.17 The mere presence of women in the Huk camps would not improve the movement’s solidarity or morale, as the “forest wives” themselves demonstrate, if they were simply in the camps for the men’s sexual satisfaction.

Problems of solidarity were also aggravaed by the exclusive and high-risk character of the Huk movement, which placed onerous demands on activists. It is hardly coincidental that the movement’s solidarity became an issue only after the turn to armed struggle and “military discipline” in 1948. The movement might have cohered better had it been more inclusive and adopted a more defensive political strategy—slowly and surreptitiously organizing a part-time guerrilla militia, for example, instead of making a bold bid for a quick seizure of power.

17 Couples would also need to be childless or have their children cared for by nonparticipants in the rebellion, or else familial withdrawal could occur.
Yet such a high-risk, male-dominated movement might still have proven cohesive were it not for its peculiar libidinal opportunity structure: the affectual networks of many Huk cadres extended to "objects" beyond their comrades and their political cause. These cadres may have been "biographically available" for some forms of activism, but their sexual and familial ties hardly made them the best candidates for a high-risk insurgency. In principle, then, a male-dominated movement would also have been more solidaristic had more of its leading cadres been libidinally unattached. Weber ([1922] 1978) once proposed, in fact, that the ideal "communist warrior is the perfect counterpart to the monk, whose garrisoned and communist life in the monastery serves the purpose of disciplining him... The communist military organization... requires warriors without home and family" (vol. 2, p. 1153).

CONCLUSION

I began by noting that the dominant paradigms in social-movement research usually neglect affectual and sexual relationships. Yet this study suggests that the libidinal constitution of a social movement may strongly affect the collective identity and solidarity of its members. A libidinal-economy perspective is especially useful for understanding the discipline and commitment (or lack thereof) of activists who are involved in exclusive or high-risk movements or who are embedded in strong affectual networks or dyadic sexual relationships. Like certain so-called political opportunity structures, some libidinal opportunity structures can significantly hinder the effectiveness of a social movement or (perhaps) prevent it from emerging in the first place. Conversely, certain libidinal opportunity structures can strongly facilitate the organization and/or effectiveness of social movements. Aho's (1990) study of rightwing "Christian patriotism," for example, found that "a major interest in joining the patriot crusade [was]... preserving, establishing, and expanding love relationships and family ties" (p. 191).

Of course, one must be extremely cautious in attempting to generalize from a single case study, and I do not suggest that sexuality or affectual networks are "naturally" corrosive of group solidarity under all conditions, as Freud sometimes suggested. I have emphasized that libidinal relations became problematic for the Huk movement because of its high-risk strategy of armed struggle combined with certain facts about PKP cadres, especially their marital status, embeddedness in strong kinship networks, and views about gender roles. Presumably, many other guerrilla armies, social movements, and political groups have also engaged in a contentious tug-of-war with other institutions and networks (including kith and kin) for the inherently limited emotional energies of their participants.

Reliable generalizations about the influence of sexual and affectual relationships on collective action must be based on many more empirical studies of this nexus than we currently possess. Still, we know from accounts of other social movements—including the civil rights, Black Power, New Left, feminist, and gay rights movements in the United States—that affectual ties and sexual relationships can be divisive as well as cohesive (Evans 1979; McAdam 1988, chap. 3; Echols 1989, chap. 5; Brown 1992; Kramer 1994). The challenge now is to accumulate more systematic information about affectual networks—which are currently treated anecdotally—and to integrate this knowledge into social-movement theory. This task requires nothing less than a "return of the repressed" to the social-movement field—the incorporation of sexualities and affectual relations into our theoretical perspectives and empirical research.

Jeff Goodwin is Assistant Professor of Sociology at New York University. His interests include social movements, revolutions, nationalism, and social theory. He is the author of a book titled State and Revolution, 1945–1991 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). He is currently working on a book (with Mustafa Emirbayer of the New School for Social Research) titled Positions, Symbols, Objects: A Relational Theory of Social Action and Historical Change.

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18 The Huk movement clearly confronted unfavorable political and libidinal opportunity structures; it would be misleading to attribute its failure entirely to one or the other.
Appendix A. A Note on Sources

This study is based primarily on PKP documents captured by the Philippine government and on the memoirs of Luis Taruc (1953, 1967) and William J. Pomeroy (1963a). The captured documents are available on microfilm in the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Quezon City. Following Kerkvliet (1977), the only scholar to make extensive use of these documents, I refer to these documents as the "Politburo Exhibits," because the trials in which they were introduced were known as the "Politburo trials." They are identified in the bibliography by the letter and (initial) page number by which they were rather haphazardly ordered by the so-called Court of First Instance in Manila. Most of the documents have been retyped and are in English or English translation from the Visayan.

Taruc's first "autobiography" (1953) was completed in June 1949, and according to him was ghost-written by William J. Pomeroy and edited by Jose Lava, the Communist Party's General Secretary at the time, before it was sent on to the United States for publication (Pomeroy 1963a:102; Taruc 1967:7; also see Saff 1955:152n52). Taruc's (1967) second "autobiography," by contrast, was written in prison after he had left the Communist Party, with the assistance of Douglas Hyde, a passionate anti-Communist. Pomeroy was a member of the Communist Party of the United States who participated in the Huk rebellion.

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