‘Cosmopolitan Baku’

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ABSTRACT Among the many points of reflection in looking back on the last 100 years in the Caucasus, a particular pride of place for some Azerbaijanis comes in the status of Baku as a cosmopolitan city: a status claimed by historians who speak of the early twentieth-century border crossings between families and trade networks across Turkey and Iran; and more recently, a status claimed by residents of the city from the Soviet 1960s and 1970s, when these diverse urban elites were at the peak of their social capital. At the same time, however, Azerbaijan had one of the lower rates of intermarriage and out-migration of all the Soviet republics. This essay therefore asks: What does cosmopolitanism mean in this context and what does it tell us about changing Caucasus landscapes?

KEYWORDS Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Baku, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, tolerance

‘Baku – it used to be the most international city!’ This phrase is a familiar refrain for almost any visitor to the capital of the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan in the days since its independence. Sometimes Baku is described as having been the most international city, sometimes the most cosmopolitan city, sometimes ‘of the whole Caucasus’, and sometimes ‘of the whole USSR’. While the referents vary, the city’s changing public face remains a subject of abundant comment. ‘In the 1970s, especially’, as one of many versions went, ‘It was a fantastic time – you can’t imagine it. The jazz, the cinema, the parties. Mainly, we were all together, people of every possible nationality. It was our golden age’. I have heard this sentiment foremost from persons in their fifties and older who were naturally describing their youth, and I have heard it rehearsed with impressive confidence from teenagers born in the twilight of the Soviet Union. I have almost always heard it from the same kinds of families of comparable class backgrounds – from professionals,
educators, and administrators who once considered themselves part of the Soviet-era intelligentsia. I have heard it from men and women, in Baku proper, and in the distant countryside. Yet, strikingly, it is not a phrase I have ever once heard in any language but Russian. Even when the entire evenings would be spent speaking Azeri, the mention of Baku’s Brezhnevite golden age always came in a clever code-switch: ‘Baku’, followed by a pause for effect: ‘Ты не представляешь. / You can’t imagine’.

On the one hand, it is not hard to imagine a cosmopolitan air in Baku’s long-recorded mix of humanity. The city, in the sense of its status as a commercial centre and meeting ground for diverse peoples, was founded at least as far back as the ninth century along Silk Road routes. It thrived at the crossroads of numerous empires, and saw an uninterrupted burst in growth 100 years ago from the region’s expanded oil fortunes (Ashurbelî 1983, 1990). Baku was arguably just as diverse in 1900, as it was in 1970, as it is today. Positioned in a broad amphitheatre overlooking the Caspian Sea, with an ancient walled centre of winding pathways now recognised as a UNESCO heritage site, the city offers much to appreciate. Today, as a sea of cranes engulfs its two million residents in new construction, residents and journalists of all stripes debate the pace and the subjects of this enormous physical transformation. To think of Baku in human terms, however, as ‘international’, and sometimes more tellingly as ‘cosmopolitan’ – not least when indexed to the 1970s, and not least when conjured almost exclusively in Russian – tells us a good deal, I would contend, about shifting cultural politics across the Caucasus, and in Azerbaijan, specifically.

Yet, what would happen if we took the ‘unimaginability’ of Baku’s cosmopolitan quality on its own terms? Might there be something about this particular Soviet rendition of a cosmopolitan project that operates foremost through its studied resistance to complete knowing? Perhaps one hears so often, ‘You can’t imagine how different Baku used to be’, because even back in the 1970s, cosmopolitanism – as it was understood in its distinctly Caucasus variants – was about the same kind of deferred project of desired ideals that ‘advanced socialism’ promised in its route to an always elusive communism. Even when praising the idea of social pluralism in a rapidly changing, twentieth-century Baku, one was never historically far from the limits set upon this vision. In 1905, the booming oil town was rocked by ethnic riots that closely mapped on to worker-management lines across the city, leaving hundreds dead. After World War II, Stalin’s fearsome denunciation of ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ as those citizens whose fealty to the Soviet homeland was deemed to be

ETHNOS, VOL. 75:2, JUNE 2010 (PP. 123–147)
compromised by their ties abroad – be they the metropolitan Jews so commonly scapegoated for socialism’s ills or farther flung Siberian indigenous peoples linked by trade to their east Asian neighbours – left few taking up this otherworldly mantle. Today, in the rapidly nationalising climate of the newly independent states across the territory of the former USSR, kozmopolitizm is a term that government actors sometimes use to suggest peace and harmony by way of self-congratulation on open-minded policies, but the term, too, still evokes the baggage of state sponsorship.

This essay therefore joins with recent works on cosmopolitanism as a product of particular social contexts, rather than as the adoption or near-adoption of a distant European model (Clifford 1998; Mandel 2008; Werbner 2008). My goal is not to produce a social history of the time or place itself, though that has been done in a number of memoirs and studies about Baku and other former Soviet metropoles (Derluguian 2005; Humphrey & Svirskaia 2007; Manning 2008; Mamedov 1998; Richardson 2008; Risch 2005), and in interpretive studies of what nostalgia signifies across the formerly socialist world (Berdahl 1999; Boym 2001; Nadkarni & Shevchenko 2004; Oushakine 2007). Nor is it a tribute to locally derived approaches to cosmopolitanism as a desired goal, given how many have observed that a robust and diverse civil society has historically offered no guarantee against sectarian violence (Kalyvas 2006; Mazower 2004). What this tour through the registers of memory about Baku’s pluralist urban space offers us, I argue, is a study of changing social hierarchies where the many efforts to efface one’s relative privilege through a variety of egalitarian ideologies invoked a telling range of political economies and political ideals. These discourses of pluralism remind that seemingly altruistic ideals rarely come without a price. If, as Bruno Latour (2004:461) once wrote of the European cosmopolitan model, ‘It was a war plan disguised as a peace plan, and those against whom we directed it are no longer fooled’, then what I look to suggest is that the Caucasus region has long been rather well practiced in reading between the lines for war and peace. What all the leading twentieth-century ideologies of pluralism that have reigned in Baku have in common – from internationalism to cosmopolitanism to tolerance – is that they have been most often advanced by those looking to assert or assume the mantles of power. It is in more recent ideologies of tolerance, however, that the lines of difference, it would seem, are most plainly drawn.

To consider how some reflect on Baku’s perceived shift from a world of internationalism, through cosmopolitanism, and more recently, to tolerance, is to appreciate the subtle means by which each of these seemingly comparable
terms has motored very different perceptions of nationality relations over time.\(^5\) In this case, rather than fixing on the redemptive qualities that internationalism, cosmopolitanism, or tolerance might have once or now offered – in the more anodyne sense of their surface promotions of harmonious living – I argue instead that the more express paradoxes in each of these terms, particularly where tolerance is concerned, brings us closer to appreciating the long record of fraught cohabitations for which many Caucasus societies have long been known.

For all of Baku’s current status as a national capital, its position has by no means always been seen by all as central. In the early 1800s, it was only the second largest city in the khanate of Shirvan, one of the many decentralised small principalities left largely to their own devices, for better and for worse, after the mid eighteenth-century demise of Persian leader Nadir Shah and as Ottoman rulers became more erratic in their engagements across the Caucasus. By the late 1800s, the region’s newfound oil wealth transformed the city’s status. Demographically and administratively, it was a city led by Russians, Armenians, and Jews. As in the khanate of Yerevan that was once dominated by Muslims, Azerbaijani were similarly a minority in their own capital at the outset of the twentieth century, when Baku’s population was hovering between 150,000 and 200,000.\(^6\) Nevertheless, in the twentieth century’s early decades, before the installation of Soviet power, the city’s leading Muslim families, many enriched through expanded trade networks in an age of empire or as the title holders to new oil fields, equally made their mark. Their lives are classically captured in memoirs and novels of the day, where well-heeled protagonists could look to Cairo for an education, to Moscow for professional advancement, to the hill stations of Karabagh for summer holidays, to Constantinople for longer vacations, and to Isfahan for refuge with relatives in times of trouble.\(^7\) As across the rural Caucasus of that time, a world illustrated so lavishly in the films of Sergei Paradzhanov, a seasoned network of caravansarays, traders, and travelling bards demonstrated an equally remarkable level of social exchange.

Come the Soviet period, and particularly in the years following World War II, many Soviet planners saw in this deeply pluralist Caucasus setting one of the more challenging laboratories for the Marxist–Leninist trajectory for nationality. By the post-war period, it had become clear to all that not only was the ‘national question’ unlikely to be resolved any time soon, it had found ardent support in the compromises of Soviet government policy, spelling favour for
some, and trial for others. As the titled nationality in their own autonomous republic, Azeris were well entrenched in Soviet networks of influence. While elites passed through the ‘Russian sector’, indicating the language of their education, the vast majority of the then dominantly rural republic was educated in Azeri, having surrendered the Arabic and Latin scripts by 1929 and by then reading widely in a modified Cyrillic. To those schooled in the data of Sovietisation, Azerbaijanis would at first seem to be unlikely candidates for cosmopolitan futures, having (as of 1959) some of the lowest rates of out-marriage and the lowest rates of out-migration of any of the 15 Soviet republics. But in a rapidly growing Baku, comprising roughly a third of the country’s population, statistics could tell many different stories, some more kaleidoscopically charged than others.

To look back on the 1970s, in particular, as many of the accounts below do, perhaps signals most clearly what a public retrospective on Baku offers other metropoles of the former Soviet Union. To be sure, the decade is removed enough from the present day to be lionised in all manners of memory. But this period also marks the final threshold of the Soviet Union’s official passage through advanced socialism, a period of relatively unfettered calm between the years of privation before it, and the upheavals of perestroika that soon followed (Figures 1–3). In this respect, the decade suggests the surest tool at hand by which to compare a socialist past to a rapidly transforming present. This comes all the more so at a time when in Baku, as across former Soviet metropoles, nomenclatures and intelligentsias of old have departed or been reshuffled, and newly powerful, ever nationalising elites settle to take their place.

The International

A middle-aged neighbour, a doctor who has lived in Baku all of her life, suggests an exemplary portrait:

When we talk about Baku in the 1970s, what can you say? It was our childhood, it was our youth. Of course people remember it warmly. When people use the word ‘internationalism’, maybe that’s another story. I don’t know how to react, because I don’t think in those terms. But I can tell you that we were free. We were quite free, and in a sense internationalism has something to do with this. You would get together at someone’s birthday … there would be all different kinds of peoples. Someone would have just arrived from Daghestan; Armenians would sit there and remind you about why Ararat was theirs, and we would all laugh. The Russians would be
there – you didn’t even think about who was who. Someone made rice this way, rather than that way. You wouldn’t even think that it was international; it was just the way it was. You know who came from what background, and there was a physical factor, some people looked a little different. Of course. But it didn’t lead to conflict. It just wasn’t in question.
Was internationalism perhaps not the best word to describe it?

Really, it wouldn’t even occur to you that it was internationalism. Look, Moscow went on and on as they always did. No one watched those congresses, who paid attention? It wasn’t about statistics. Everyone had their own empire of friends and connections. Of course when we think about this today, natsional’nost’ has taken on a quite different connotation, of razdelennost’, of separation. The difference then was that we all had the same sense that we had a lousy government. We all stood in the same lines. We all waited for water to come in what was then the capital of a Soviet republic. We were all in the same kasha. That’s what brought us together. Natsional’nost’ was a question of ornament, it made life more interesting. But beyond that, we all had the same lives.

It is not hard to understand that a Soviet Union that was flourishing from post-war oil revenues and that had managed to relatively stabilise after decades of
tumult would have finally provided a positive landscape for lives across the Caucasus. But in a world where everyone so clearly identified who was who, did it make sense to describe things so favourably? Kashas had their own internal hierarchies, as it were, too. Most Azeris never forgot what linguistic and social Russification meant for their republic, nor did they forget who had access to goods and services more than others. Discourses on the friendship of people expressly looked to diminish these critical recognitions.

While many recalled the 1970s warmly, welcoming the chance to talk about easier times before the conflicts that had beset parts of the Caucasus after the end of the Soviet Union, I reminded my neighbour that I had also sometimes heard the proverb, *Rusun ve ermənin çörəyi dizin üstündədir.* It literally meant that Russians and Armenians ‘keep their bread on their knees’. The intended meaning was that while an Azerbaijani might offer to help a Russian or Armenian who is down on their luck, the moment they feel better and get up to go, the bread falls aside and the help is soon forgotten. Russians and Armenians were understood to portray themselves as coming from a higher social station. She replied:

Well, sure, of course. It was not a compliment when people would talk about how Jews had the most money and would go out of their way to dress more modestly than they really had to. Lezgins were not so friendly. ... Everyone knew, for example, that you could always get the best clothes from Armenians, more or less all the best things. They lived in [the desirably located] Bailovo [district], and did their trading from there. Everyone in the TsK [Central Committee of the Communist Party] knew. Listen, the whole government knew. But people somehow got around things, and people paid what they needed to pay. The point is that the prophets of nationalist doom never managed to turn it into a movement, somehow, try as they might have liked. Georgian, Udin ... everyone followed the same codes.

The owner of a pharmacy, a man in his early sixties, explained the international style through humour instead.

We all knew how to react when Armenians would say ‘bizimdir, bizimdir, bizimdir’ (ours, ours, ours). It wasn’t all that nice. And sometimes you’d just want to stop and say, ‘Look, you live here, ‘Sizindir, da!’ (Isn’t Baku what is yours?). But we would just laugh it off. Someone would be saying, ‘Ararat is ours, Karabagh is really ours’, and someone would break in, ‘And Novgorodi?’ And we would all laugh. The jokes were, of course, legendary. ... The Brezhnev period was such a time of humor because, who knows? Who could survive such nonsense? There was such an extraordinary difference between what people heard from up above
and how people actually lived, people fed off of this irony. People just understood that
talk about the genocide, Karabagh, Ararat – these things we had heard about all our
lives – was just part of some Armenian inventory, part of their repertoire. The point is
that it never came to conflict. We never came to blows over that.

A younger man in his early fifties, educated in Moscow and now a producer in a
television studio in Baku, said to me,

Really, the joking was never that aggressive. At work, for example, we were always
gathering at the end of the day. Sometimes to make a toast one of the Russian guys
would say, ‘Alright, the time has come. The older brother would like to take the
floor’. It was funny, but it was also a sign of the lives we led. . . . You knew your
place. No matter what the talk of equality might have been, whether it was
somehow our republic or not, everyone knew that Russians were at the top, Armenians
came next, because they held many key government jobs, the Jews were among the few
who could be better off, Lezgins were not to be tangled with, and so forth.

What this practiced story of internationalism tells us, to be sure, is of a city for
which one might be nostalgic, but in a place where internationalism never came
entirely by choice, and could be enjoyed by some more than others. In the
deeply plural Caucasus, where dozens of societies have long developed multiple
means of engagement and avoidance as the imperial ambitions of greater
powers wrought their influence in countless ways, here was yet another
reminder that not all forms of diversity were necessarily celebrated or chosen.
But they could sometimes be enjoyed for that very reason. One Soviet-era
proverb once went, *Vali, va valideyinleri seçmir*, which is to say, ‘one doesn’t
choose one’s parents or homeland’. The same could be said for neighbours.
By this very absence of choice (‘We were all in the same kasha’), one perennial
question of cohabitation could be, if only for a few decades, taken off the table.

The Cosmopolitan

A number of scholars have rightly pointed out that on ideological frontiers,
the Soviet Union set firm boundaries between what would conventionally be
thought of as ‘international’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ (Humphrey 2004; Yurchak
2006). At different levels, ‘international’ represented an acceptable degree of
compromise made in the purchase of a utopian Marxist–Leninist nationality
policy that envisioned the withering away of any form of affiliation beyond a
universally shared class-consciousness; in contrast, it reflected a simple use of
the term conjured by solidarity with the working-class struggles of other
countries. Cosmopolitanism, in its incarnation as the Stalinist rebuke over *kozmopolitizm*, by contrast, made clear that not all forms of universality were desirable. Marxist–Leninism might have urged proletarians of the world to unite, and to shed the fetters of false consciousness that bound them to place, race, language, and religion. But Stalinist policy made it clear that not all ties that bind (especially the territorial ones) should be shed. The perceived ‘rootlessness’ of the western European cosmopolitan ideal, associated perhaps most often with Kant, from his program for a perpetual peace guided by a free market, was not welcome in a USSR careful about its friends and increasingly precise about its enemies. The uncounted persons who went to the camps on charges of *kozmopolitizm* – variously signifying their questionable loyalties or their ties to worlds abroad – made clear that it was never a term to be taken lightly in Stalin’s day. While this ideological campaign may have been foremost launched against Jews, officials levelled it freely through to the time of Stalin’s death in 1953 against any persons whose political allegiances could be understood to extend beyond Soviet borders. This attention to the particularity of the cosmopolitan project at this juncture of time and place, reaching across the Stalinist era, resonates with a wide number of studies that make clear the need to locate cosmopolitan ideologies in their specific contexts (Cheah & Robbins 1998; Ho 2002; Pollock *et al.* 2000; Stengers 1997).

Today, long after the Stalinist age and well after the USSR itself, it must be said that the idea of Baku as ‘a cosmopolitan city’, rather than an international one, has enjoyed slightly more favour. To laud Baku as an international centre in the 1970s was to look back with a light smile on lives led in an ideology one could embrace for society as a whole. To look back on Baku as a cosmopolitan city, when I would ask friends and colleagues after the difference in meaning, seemed to suggest a less conscious effort, something to simply be taken for granted.¹⁰ ‘What is the difference between internationalism and cosmopolitanism, you mean for Baku?’ a pensioner in her eighties replied to me once over tea in her dusty apartment crammed from floor to ceiling with yellowed photographs and family heirlooms. ‘Well, I don’t know, I mean, internationalism was an ideology. We all knew it might not be entirely true, but we all benefited from it. When I think of Baku as cosmopolitan, well, that’s what it really was’. Another woman in her seventies who joined us, a former engineer, put it rather differently.

No one would praise cosmopolitanism while Stalin was still alive or even much after. But looking back, of course Baku was cosmopolitan. ‘Cosmopolitan’ meant being
genuinely international in a way that the word ‘international’ itself had lost. . . . That
so many of us could all live together more peacefully than before in a communist
setting. . . . That’s what I think when I think of cosmopolitanism. It’s more of a
genuine achievement (bolee nastoiascheye dostizhene) for Baku, that we became that
kind of city.

In these contexts, what emerged was a sense of internationalism as something
concrete, something that could be measured through the statistics regularly
offered by government offices: on marriage across lines of nationality or on
the rise in use of Russian across the USSR. Internationalism was always
presented as the product of officialdom, and could be engaged accordingly.
Cosmopolitanism, in the decades after Stalin, could be rehabilitated as one of
internationalism’s more relaxed cousins. But as such, cosmopolitanism’s relative
plasticity as a term meant that it could obscure as much as it explained, not least
when it came to the paradoxes of hierarchy in a socialist state.

Cosmopolitanism may have been recovered as a desirable goal in a slightly
less doctrinal Brezhnevite age, but it was also clear to most in Baku, as across
the USSR, that horizons of access to goods and services remained uneven,
and those who praised socialism’s pluralist achievements were traditionally
from society’s more comfortable echelons. Is such a capacity to shift attention
away from hierarchy to egalitarianism among cosmopolitanism’s conceptual
flexibilities? ‘Cosmopolitanism’, Sheldon Pollock and others have written,
‘may . . . be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character are
not only . . . unspecified but also must always escape positive and definitive
specification, precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism . . . is an uncosmo-
politan thing to do’ (2000:577). However projective the category of the cosmo-
politan might have been, as with the internationalism that came before it, it
suggested a clear hierarchy of meaning. For some, it was the gift of civilisation
offered by the benevolence of a Russian-supervised social diversity, ‘a more
genuine achievement’ because it offered it a small taste of other realms; for
others, it signalled the frustratingly apolitical ambitions of a leading stratum of
Azeri society who had more to gain from others by leaving things as they were.11

One has to look back to late nineteenth-century Arabic-script dictionaries
to find a definition for cosmopolitanism other than a Russified gloss, kozmopoli-
tizm, in Azeri. Alomparastlik was what a colleague at the Academy of
Sciences offered one day, though he conceded he had never heard it used.
‘Cosmophilia’ might be its closest approximation, coming from the combi-
nation of alom, for world or universe, and the same root as for parastis,
meaning honour, worship, or admiration. As many have pointed out, popular genealogies of cosmopolitanism in English date back only to 1848, when John Stuart Mill tellingly connected a freedom of belonging to the march of market forces. ‘Capital’, he wrote in *Principles of Political Economy*, ‘is becoming more and more cosmopolitan’ (1866[1848]:348). Yet, given that few people today believe that capital arrived in any part of the world free of religious, linguistic, or political attachments, so too should we appreciate that ‘cosmos’, a Greek word which means not simply ‘universe’, but one that signals (via *The Oxford English Dictionary*), ‘the world or universe as a well-ordered and harmonious system’. The ‘cosmos’ in cosmopolitanism, as many scholars have laboured to demonstrate, was often something of a wolf in sheep’s clothing. This is part of the fundamental set of misrecognitions built into the cosmopolitan ideal, an ideal which celebrates its own seeming lack of origins as it encourages others to do the same, while operating very much in a space of hierarchy, in a space of social control.

Immanuel Kant once made many of these origins and paradoxes clear. While he was an eloquent defender of victims of colonial exploitation, and linked his well-known project for perpetual peace to the success of a global free trade, his numerous writings on anthropology made clear who was more eligible for such freedom than others. In his 1798 work, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant followed the convention of his day by marking a horizon of possibility that was anything but unfettered. The northern Europe of England, France, and Germany suggested the first order of national character that might best appropriate the voice of cosmopolitan reason, followed by a southern Europe led by Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Despite the many ways in which Kant’s project is thought of as universalist in its political ambitions, his emphasis on national character makes clear that perpetual peace was not aimed at assimilation. ‘Thus we can judge with probability’, Kant writes, ‘that the intermixture of races (caused by large-scale conquests), which gradually extinguishes their characteristics, does not seem beneficial to the human race – all pretended philanthropy notwithstanding’ (1798[1996]:236). Close, but only by dint of entering at a lower tier – as residents of Baku many years later seemed never quite to forget – Russians, Turks, Armenians, and Greeks, according to Kant, were possessed of the kinds of national characters that had rather a further way to go (1798[1996]:235–236).

By the 1970s, in Baku, the question of cosmopolitanism’s purported European character seemed open to debate. In its declared state of advanced socialism, Soviet citizens had a good deal to recognise in the achievements of
their country, in the high levels of literacy, the extensive social services, and the real ways in which certain conflicts pitched for worsening on the eve of revolution had been set aside. Genuine solidarity and appreciation for Soviet values were in ready evidence. To look back on a Baku in the 1970s was not necessarily to reach for Europe, though some people I know have claimed this. What seems more important is that the cosmopolitan ideal more commonly appeared as an act of reaching itself, a respite from the older, more express ideologisms of the international, while still holding out for the right social mixing, the right kind of condominium agreement that the Caucasus region has long been obliged to go in search of.

The Tolerant

To speak of Baku in the 1970s from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century, rather than from the time itself, from the politically troubled 1980s, or from the chaotic 1990s, obviously takes place in the context of the considerable transformations that have taken place over 30 years’ time. With rates of urbanisation everywhere on the rise across the former USSR, Baku has nearly doubled in size since 1979, when its population was then set at just over a million. To some degree this matches rates of urbanisation around the globe. The Soviet particularity comes in the flood of arrivals from the countryside in the early 1990s, filling existing work places evacuated by conflict or the new migration patterns of independent states, and in simply taking advantage of more relaxed rules on urban residency. While census figures comment on the remarkably declining numbers of Russians, Ukrainians, and Armenians who once figured among the city’s elites – of Armenians in particular, whose numbers once reached half a million across the country before the pitched battles with Azerbaijani at the height of perestroika, and who now officially account for only 1.5% of the federal population, the pages from daily papers today showcase a number of new faces.12

At the highest profile level, a cluster of embassy communities with significant oil interests – America, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Norway – dominate the streets as they speed by on newly built roadways in the back seats of oversized vehicles. They fund a variety of high profile NGOs and philanthropic projects that aim to circulate the largesse of a rather post-Soviet civilisational order, though the gifts of civilisation they offer are reminiscent of ones that many Caucasus societies have seen before. On a more significant demographic front, influxes of Iranian second-home buyers, Chinese traders, Iraqi war refugees, a fleeing Afghan middle class, and Chechens, Lezgins, and Avars swell

ETHNOS, VOL. 75:2, JUNE 2010 (PP. 123–147)
in numbers in a reasonably peaceable setting. Conversely, beyond the republic’s borders, a sizeable Azeri diaspora is building, arguably for the very first time beyond the traditional orbit stretching from southeastern Turkey to northern Iran. And, while figures suggest that only a few hundred thousand of the eight million Azerbaijanis today have relocated to the Russian Federation for employment, casual conversational figures (of the kind more prone to round, inflated numbers) assert that the figure is closer to one or even two million Azeri citizens living away for extended periods of time. While documented xenophobia towards residents of the Caucasus may be on the rise across the Russian Federation, the former Soviet metropoles have lost little of their appeal for economic advancement, even while the Russian language itself can be heard less and less with each passing year on Baku streets (Sahadeo 2007).

If нatsional’nost’ once signalled a way station en route to a certain kind of shared community or sovetskii narod (the Soviet people rendered in the manifold political tracts of advanced socialism), recall the Baku doctor, above, who observed that today, nationality is a story of раздelenост’, or separation. I asked her what she meant by this, when one could well make the case that, at least in simple terms of visibility on the streets, Baku was more diverse than ever.

Of course, I’d say that we have an even broader number of nationalities in Baku today, all these Arabs from across the Middle East. Who used to see them before? But today it’s a different situation, of course. Back then, we didn’t think of each other as separated. Today we all are afraid that one nationality will say to another, ‘Ha, we are better than you’, and everyone will start making claims all over again. I’m not saying that so much has changed. But it’s a question of mood. I can tell you that today I am more cautious. And I think you can see it all around you. People put a lot of energy into observing tolerance. It’s like you didn’t have to put energy into it before because back then you didn’t have a choice. Today you have a choice. So you want to be tolerant, but you also want it to be the right kind of tolerance.

Another older businessmen I knew, a clothing storeowner of the newly monied elites, who had once volunteered for service on collective farms in the Soviet Far East, remarked:

In some ways it’s a point of pride, we’re the ones who can offer shelter now. If Moscow once made us their younger brother, today we have something to offer, too. Today, you know, for example, we probably have more Iranians than we ever had Armenians (I’m not sure what statistics would even tell us because the government has an uneasy relationship with Iran. But that’s my impression.) I do business with a lot of Pakistanis. A lot of Afghans, Chechens. The mix is there, but it’s very careful. Maybe they have all
come from different backgrounds and for different reasons but they will all tell you, even if they are not here forever, that their life in Baku is in some ways easier than at home. For these groups maybe that is not surprising.

In this rendering, the city emerges again as a site of transformation, but also one where transformation is intended developmentally through certain gifts: of civilisation, of respite, or simply of time away. As is so often the case in giving, however, the gift is foremost in the eye of the giver, for Russians who positioned themselves as older brothers while their colleagues smiled knowingly, or for Azeris who take pride in being able to extend a platform for business, for second homes, for steps elsewhere.

To strive for an internationalist spirit, however, or to conjure a cosmopolitan ideal to which one could aspire, appears to be of quite a different order than to observe tolerance, or perhaps even more so, as the doctor puts it, the right kind of tolerance. Like both the earlier terms under consideration here – internationalism and cosmopolitanism – tolerance bears the weight of its own paradoxes. As the political theorist Wendy Brown (2006) well observed, tolerance too is a concept that operates only by grace of a series of misrecognitions. From what began as a seventeenth-century set of discourses on religious toleration at the pens of Spinoza and Milton, late twentieth-century discourses of tolerance substantially shifted the terms of debate. In Brown's view, tolerance went from being an instrument of sovereign power to a mode of governmentality itself, meaning that discourses of tolerance have made their way into an impressive array of apolitical arenas. What began as a compromise, in the exhortation to play down differences in order to create a peaceable public sphere, has turned into a project that elaborates those differences in order to identify those who may be tolerated but not welcomed. In brief, by so vividly showcasing difference as a site of contention, tolerance can deepen it.

Tolerance does not offer resolution or transcendence, but only a strategy for coping. ... As compensation, tolerance anoints the bearer with virtue, with standing for a principled act of permitting one's principles to be affronted; it provides a gracious way of allowing one's tastes to be violated. It offers a robe of modest superiority in exchange for yielding. ... Magnanimity is always a luxury of power; in the case of tolerance, it also disguises power. (Brown 2006:25–26)

Thus, to be tolerant, to espouse an ecumenical perspective towards those different from you, does not necessarily signal an embrace. Moreover, while tolerance inevitably speaks of the political sphere from many vantage points, representing
itself in a genial register, it extends its generosities only to the extent that those tolerated refrain from political life (46).\(^{14}\)

When my neighbour observed above, ‘Today we all are afraid that one nationality will say to another, “Ha, we are better than you”, and everyone will start making claims all over again’, it was not hard to hear echoes of Baku’s sizeable Armenian community, once roughly 500,000 across the Soviet-era republic, and now at a small fraction of that. When people informally list the number of Armenians in Baku at as many as 100,000, the goal is generally to be seen as magnanimous; other figures list the number as low as 378, given the incentives to change one’s name and affiliation in a fraught environment.\(^{15}\)

By my own experience, the real question is rarely about the actual size of Baku’s Armenian community, but whether it is appropriate to recognise its presence at all. Following Azerbaijan’s early defeat in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabagh war, a conflict that has been relatively quiet since a truce was declared in 1994 but that appears ever capable of renewal, the effect would seem to be that all things Armenian are best left unsaid. Careful before a foreign researcher guest, but also evidently careful among themselves, most Azeri friends and colleagues I knew would routinely speak only of their Armenian friends and neighbours in the past tense, and even then sparingly, as if the 1970s and thereabouts were one of the few appropriate outlets for the observation of Armenians’ existence in a city where they once played a major role. If these looks-back on times of relative harmony were borne out of nostalgia, it seemed less to have been of a generalised longing for worlds gone by. Instead, it seemed to conjure the same force of naming that anthropologist Kathleen Stewart (1988:227) may have had in mind when she wrote that nostalgia creates ‘a means of dramatizing aspects of an increasingly fluid and unnamed social life’.

My occasional attempts to ask about Armenians in Baku today were always met with similar responses – statistics about tolerance, and then mild grimaces over why I would want to ask about one of the new republic’s more significant griefs. Though late-Soviet era violence towards Armenians in the city began in 1988, attacks on Armenians reached their peak in 1990 after Gorbachev sent in army troops that killed a number of Azeris protesting Armenian ambitions in Karabagh, leaving scores dead, hundreds injured, and accelerating plans for departure among Armenians who had considered Baku their home for generations.\(^{16}\) Between 1989 and 1999, some 175,000 registered Armenians left the city; in return, some 225,000 Azeris coming to Baku from Armenia and the war-torn territories of Karabagh registered in their place (Yunusov 2009:65–66), demographic substitutions that transformed the city’s social networks.
overnight, and that haunted those who witnessed the city’s much heralded cohabitations coming to such a grievous end. If anybody was to be a subject of tolerance in all the ambivalent ways suggested by that complex term – a term that seemed to be significantly more ambivalent in its embrace of difference than anything internationalism or cosmopolitanism once mustered – Armenians were the ones. ‘I was at a wedding not long ago’, the clothing storeowner remarked. He said,

For example, at our table, we all know that Faik’s aunt, who is there with him, is an Armenian. You can see how everyone goes out of their way to make sure they behave correctly, to an impeccable degree. The idea was for there not to be the slightest chance that she would be reminded of how we might be different. You have never seen such manners. It was very sweet and yet also very, very careful. I want to say that it was almost tiring to make sure you didn’t slip.

Would this also be a sign of tolerance, I asked him, as he had earlier suggested? ‘Tolerance, or maybe tact, I would say. Tact with a lot of effort’. I later asked the same question to my doctor friend, to see whether she also sensed that difference. ‘It seems to me that tolerance is about groups’, she replied. ‘Tact is about individuals’. But how could you tell the difference? She, too, offered a complicated picture of remembering and forgetting that bore no easy resolution.

You will surely hear many unkind things about Armenians, and look, remember, there was a war. Extraordinary numbers of people on both sides suffered and continue to suffer. But I can tell you that I know a number of Armenians who work in state agencies, and I know people who hired them because they felt badly for them. And in a funny way, everyone knows ‘their’ Armenians (öz ermanılar). For example, when I go to the market, of course I know who is who. I see at least twenty Armenians. We smile at each other. I go out of my way not to talk to them in Russian because I don’t want their accents to give them away. We talk only in Azeri. Everyone who walks past knows that they are Armenians, and everything is fine. Is that not tolerance? What do you want to call it? To me it’s a humanity of a certain kind, under the circumstances.

Given how difficult it was to estimate the size of a population whose very existence in the city benefited from a low profile, I did not press her on what it meant for everyone to have ‘their Armenians’ at a time when it appeared that there might not be all that many, as it were, to go around. But her insistence that ‘everyone’ in Baku participated in this studied misrecognition can remind of
what it means to appear magnanimous in the ways earlier suggested by Brown. I asked her whether there might not be a difference between this kind of public behavior, conjuring the generous giver who tolerates the Armenians whom they see but do not know, and the kinds of friendships that have been transformed by the past two decades of state enmity. Public life might be one thing, and private life another. Her response added to the roster of stories about ‘the Armenian wife’ or ‘the Armenian mother’, observing that it was predominantly (though not exclusively) women with family ties who stayed behind.

One of my closest friends growing up, her mother is Armenian. Everyone knows that her mother is Armenian, all of us who have known her for years. And yet no one today would even think of mentioning it. We don’t even use her name most of the time. I’ll say to her, ‘Don’t forget to say hello to your mother for me’. ‘Tell your mother that I found that thing she was looking for at the market’, just like we used to do in the old days when you couldn’t find anything in stores. Today I would never say, ‘Sveta, say hi to Aunt Roza for me’. Roza is her name, that’s what we always used to call her. Aunt Roza. It’s a nightmare, honestly, when you think about how things turned out. We don’t even call her by her name any more.

As these paradoxes of recognition and non-recognition became clearer, she reached back to reflect on her position.

This is when I have to tell you that today’s tolerance, whatever it offers us, is still worth more to me than yesterday’s internationalism. Because at least today we know what’s really at stake. The real price of all of this is blood.¹⁷

For this woman, for all the portent of lives foreclosed in the wake of violence, the significant thing was that tolerance was not entirely as anaesthetic in its abilities to mask power relations, as Brown and others sometimes describe it. Tolerance, in this instance, was a pivotal choice to be made – to speak or not, to welcome or not. In its rather more limited function, as here, it offered recognition with a good deal less engagement in a Caucasus world that was, for all the change of actors, still no less fundamentally plural than it ever had been.

**Rites of Recognition**

Outside of Baku, in the hills of northwest Azerbaijan where I sometimes travelled, I would ask the almost exclusively Azerophone men and women I met what it had been like for them as youth to travel to Baku, to make their way...
through a higher educational system in a Russian language that most had rarely used since, and to encounter the life of the city. This invitation to think back in time was almost always for most, a scene of how urban life and the way it exposed them to people from across the USSR (via the Soviet academy, or the army, or the tourism industry that extended them travel passes) had changed their worldviews and made them feel part of a world beyond their more distant lives. Only men would sometimes appear wistful over worlds gone by in a manner that did not take much prompting. ‘You might go to Baku to take your exams, you might go to Baku to negotiate a different placement in the army, but when you were young, you really went to Baku for one thing – the women’, two companions assured me one evening. One added, ‘Before there were all kinds of women! You can’t imagine! Today, you know, there are women too, but we are married, and I am sorry but, they all look the same to me. I miss the Jews, and I miss the Armenians too. I even miss the Russians’. For those who came and went through the city, it seemed, Baku was a place of receiving and a place of seeing. But many remembered that power lay in the hands of the capital, and was not theirs to mete out. Armenians were not ‘theirs’ to be mindful of, and Afghans were not theirs to whom they might be proud to offer shelter.

While men and women from the regions might nod their heads in the direction of the capital, shrug their shoulders and say, ‘Bakılılardır, eldeyilmi’, to remark, ‘They’re from Baku, they live in their own world, don’t they?’ things became even more telling when those from Baku who were of dissident, nationalist ambitions, or simply those without access to privilege would refer to the leading cosmopolitan strata as Bakintsy. In Russian, anyone registered in Baku could be (in the singular form) a Bakinets, but to speak knowingly of Bakintsky in the plural – then, as is often done today with some irony – conjures the image of a world apart, even if neighbours across the hall (Yunusov 2009:65).

In this context, and by some contrast, among all those in Baku who seemed to want to so often speak of a strangely lively Brezhnevian Zeitgeist, what stood out in their shifting between terms of internationalist, cosmopolitan, and tolerant were the varied strategies among those who had the power to give, among those who were in a position to extend a welcome to others. These were the textbook Bakintsy of local parlance: Once the inheritors of a Moscow-led ideology of an internationalist ideal, they saw themselves as having adopted enough of it to lead a cosmopolitan cause, however fleetingly, and to now extend a rather more recognisably precarious project of tolerance in more precarious times.
For all its well-studied limits, I would suggest, this contemporary language of tolerance bears comparison to the many mechanisms of cohabitation forged over centuries by the many peoples of the compact Caucasus region wedged in between the Black and Caspian Seas. As the Abkhaz scholar Iurii Anchabadze (1979) documented so well, almost all societies of the Caucasus could exercise a range of distancing mechanisms, from the temporary exile of the storied mountain brigand, or abrek, to the rather more severe and permanent social death found in practices of ostracism. Similarly, for all the attention given to blood vengeance as evidence of the Caucasus’ primordial drives, a number of historians have shown how varied local councils far more often resolved such grievances through payment of fines than through violence (Sandrygailo 1899; Bobrovnikov 2002). These practices hardly suggest a paradise of peoples, but they do make clear that there existed a variety of ways by which fraught circumstances could be engaged (Grant 2009:63–89, 131–134). They offered vocabularies by which a certain neighbourliness might be achieved without the hiding of struggles or the inferences of sameness. Recent talk of tolerance, in this light, may be a limited compromise, as many critics of its uses in other contexts have pointed out. But in Baku, as perhaps in the broader Caucasus as a whole, it comes closest to these earlier, franker means of suturing together neighbours in times of struggle over sovereign lands.

In the autumn of 2008, I sat with an elderly museum administrator in her office next to one of Baku’s central squares. She had earlier attempted retirement, but could not live on the modest pension that seemed to greet almost all citizens of the former Soviet Union at the end of their careers, so she returned to work in her mid-seventies to an office that had been little able to replace someone with her qualifications. Life had steadied for her after much lobbying by well-placed friends, when she finally secured a Presidential Pension, a princely sum that was roughly 20 times the national average wage.

I asked what Baku was like when she first began at the museum, about the view outside her window from years back. ‘Baku? Baku used to be the most cosmopolitan city in the entire USSR’, she began grandly. ‘Everyone raves about Tbilisi when they speak of the Caucasus, but Baku, that’s where internationalism really lived. Ty ne predstavliaesh’: You can’t imagine. Baku was a city of complete internationalism back then, there was no such thing as nationality – Russians, Jews – it was an unforgettable time. It was one of the city’s finest hours’. When I then asked if it was really so different from today, it was clear I had taken a wrong turn. She arched a brow. ‘You want me to talk about Baku today? I thought we were talking about Baku back then’. She gave me a
look of mild betrayal that suggested our visit was coming to an early close. She was, after all, part of a declining Russian minority in a rapidly transforming new republic. Hers was not the world of most men and women I had engaged on Baku’s successive social profiles, persons of Azeri, or mixed-Azeri background. While they saw themselves as having fully inhabited a Soviet world, it was also the case that, by and large, they had since moved on. So spelled the end for Bakintsy as a special caste. In the post-Soviet era, hers was a world of considerably more limited options in a contemporary Caucasus with its own troubled northern alliances, and where the Russian language, though still a part of the city’s fabric, could be heard on the streets and in shops less and less with each passing year.

This woman had been born in Baku and became one of the city’s leading culture workers. She was of the civilising cause through and through, and yet her role as a giver had ceded, perhaps for the rest of her lifetime, to that of receiver, following the position of most declared minorities who learn to expect accommodation, at best, in most contemporary states. ‘Ty menia ne slyshish?’/ ‘Didn’t you hear what I just told you?’ She looked at me with a creamy smile and asked with mild incredulity, ‘I just told you I got a Presidential Pension, and you want me to tell you what I think about nationality politics in Baku today?’ This was not a subject for casual conversation. She followed with a long pause. ‘The President recently said that he cannot imagine Baku without Russians, presumably to make us feel better’. I took this wry rehearsal of officialdom as a reminder that it was time to go. As I got up she eased slightly and extended an olive branch. For all of the recent changes that had not worked in her favour in the twilight of her career – when a buoyant language of internationalism had since given way to the qualified terms of tolerance – even a little recognition, she seemed to imply, was better than none at all. ‘You know, though, when he said that, it did make me feel better’.

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Notes
1. Quotations are taken from recorded interviews conducted in Baku in March 2005 and August–October 2008.
2. While 2005 census information listed the city’s population at just over two million, putting it at one quarter of the country’s then overall population of just over eight million, informal estimates that include the city’s unregistered populations bring the figure closer to two and a half million.
4. Though Ram (2007) is not expressly a portrait of Tbilisi life, his study of ‘genre wars on the edges of Russian empire’, maps many similar cross-national themes from early twentieth-century Georgia.
5. While I make the case that these terms have enjoyed something of a chronological sequence, their relatively free usage today reminds that one need not exclude their many proximate meanings.
6. Russians dominated in terms of population in both the 1903 census (when they numbered approximately 56,000, followed by Azeris at 44,000, and Armenians at 26,000, among others) and in the 1913 census (with Russians at 76,000, Azeris at 45,000, and Armenians at 41,000) per Altstadt (1997:112). Armenians dominated demographically in Tbilisi at this time, per Suny (1986:249), becoming primarily Georgian in population only by 1970.
7. The classic portrait of this time is most often drawn from Said (1999[1937]), though Abdullayeva (2006) and Suleimanov (1990) would be among the many other variants.
8. Among the more lucid recent studies of the many paradoxes of Soviet nationality policy are Hirsch (2005), Martin (2001), Slezkine (1994), and Suny (1993).
9. For all the difficult relations observed between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 1980s and even prior to that, the former Armenian residents of Baku I have met in Moscow, New York, and Yerevan have gone out of their way to make sure that a foreign researcher knew of their friends and neighbours mostly now lost, without whitewashing the conflicts that have kept them apart. Some insisted that the cards were already on the table after Stalin shuffled the territory of Nagorno–Karabagh back and forth between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early days of the USSR, raising the horizon of expectations for both republics; others commented that had someone told them in 1988 that they soon would no longer be living in their native city, they would have simply laughed and walked away.
10. While this relatively frequent invocation of the cosmopolitan ideal may vary from what Caroline Humphrey (2004:141) asserts about the contemporary colloquial usage of kozmopolitizm in the former Soviet Union, it resonates with her observation that cosmopolitanism ‘as a generally available idea . . . can be perceived as no longer purely toxic’.
11. Biner (2007) offers a parallel example of multiple uses of the cosmopolitan ideal to mask tensions in a contemporary Turkish urban setting.
12. The figure of 1.5% includes Armenians living on the disputed territories of Nagorno–Karabagh (Azərbaycan respublikası dövlət statistika komitəsi 2005:69).
13. It may be noted that, for all of the wide circulation of discourses of tolerance in a
variety of settings, the Azerbaijani government has actively promoted the same
vocabulary (Makhmudova 2007).

14. Zizek (2002) offers a sharper criticism of the same contemporary multicultural dis-
courses that Brown has in mind, while raising the scepticism that I do here, in a
quite different context, about tolerance’s anaesthetic capacities. See also Stengers’
(1997, vol. 7) comments on ‘the malady of tolerance’.

15. The figure of 100,000 was offered by a visiting Azeri scholar at a conference at the
University of Illinois in 2006; the Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan registered 378
Azeri passport holders of Armenian nationality in Baku in 1999. Taking into account
the number of Armenians known to have changed their surnames and passports to
remain in Baku, a recent study by Yunusov (2009:65–66) offers the more likely figure
of 3000 Armenians currently living in the city.

16. For more on the 1988 and 1990 events leading up to the Nagorno–Karabagh con-
flict, see De Waal (2004). The texture of these events has been vividly captured
on screen in the 1998 film by director Rüştəm İbrahim başyov, Aila [The Family],

17. Her comment resonates with recent studies on the political prospects for
‘antagonistic tolerance’ and ‘ethical violence’ as found in Hayden (2002) and

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