Commutative, Distributive, and Estimative Justice in Adam Smith

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Abstract: In Smith there is something of a contrariety, or double doctrine, on justice: Much of his writing leaves us with the impression that we should use justice and its cognates to mean commutative justice, and only that. But much also authorizes the conclusion that we should embrace and talk of three different senses of justice. I expost the three senses of justice, but leave aside Smith’s intentions in leaving us with such diverging impressions. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he distinguishes and describes commutative justice, distributive justice, and a third justice a name for which he does not give but is here called estimative. Smith shows that commutative justice is very special, yet he affirmed and abundantly practiced justice talk beyond commutative justice. On my interpretation, estimative justice looms large in matters determined by the jural “superior,” that is, the governor. I suggest that Smith would denominate such matters, not in terms of distributive justice, but rather in terms of estimative justice (as well as commutative justice).

Keywords: Commutative justice, distributive justice, estimative justice, social justice, Adam Smith

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This paper interprets Adam Smith on justice. It treats the justices beyond commutative justice—namely, distributive justice and a third a name for which he does not give but is here called *estimative*.

In Smith, there is a something of a contrariety, or double doctrine, on justice:

- **Doctrine 1:** We should not talk justice beyond commutative justice. Smith’s chief indication of Doctrine 1 in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (TMS) is how he discourses about commutative justice as “justice” *simpliciter*, withholding exposition of the three senses of justice until Part VII (269-270.10).1,2

- **Doctrine 2:** We should embrace and talk all three senses of justice.

Scholars have variously suggested that Smith confined his justice talk to commutative justice,3 talked both commutative and distributive justice,4 and recognized and embraced the three senses of justice (e.g., Minowitz 1993, 49-50; Griswold 1999, 232; see also Mitchell 1987, 417). I contend that, while providing plenty of sentences that would seem to support Doctrine 1, and while clearly emphasizing the special nature and the special importance of commutative justice, Smith’s works, on fuller understanding, affirm talking all three senses of justice. As I show with copious citations, Smith abundantly practiced distributive and estimative justice talk. Here I confine myself to expositing the three justices in Smith and to

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1 The notation 269-270.10 means pages 269-270 of the standard edition, paragraph 10.
2 Other indications of doctrine (1) include Smith’s unpublished words: “which can alone properly be called Justice” (Frag, TMS 390) and “not in a proper but a metaphorical sense” (LJ, 9).
4 Works that seem to portray Smith as recognizing and embracing commutative and distributive justice but give no notice to estimative justice include Young and Gordon 1996; Witztum 1997.
making some observations on how Smith talked the three justices, and leave to future consideration why he would generate such a contrariety, that is, why he would leave us with a paradoxical presentation of seemingly contrary doctrines on justice.

I employ the following abbreviations:

CJ = commutative justice
DJ = distributive justice
EJ = estimative justice

**Commutative justice: Not messing with other people’s stuff**

In TMS, commutative justice is one of those virtues you should practice. You practice it by “abstaining from what is another’s” (269.10, 297.11). I prefer to formulate it as *not messing with other people’s stuff*. The formulation has within it factors specific to the moment in time and place, factors that play a role in delineating, in that moment, “stuff,” “other people’s,” and “messing with.” Whether the plot of land is property, whether it is Jim’s, whether picking its flowers is stealing, whether certain terms are implicit in an agreement—all depend on factors specific to the moment. Here we have uniformity amidst variety—uniformity in the broad formulation, and variety in the specifics of “stuff,” “other people’s,” and “messing with.”

But the veins of variety, of historicity, matter within elements of the general formulation, and matter only within limits. For example, in all moments in time and place, a soul owns the person it controls and comes with; one’s hand is one’s hand.
The soul of Frederick Douglass owned, even in slavery to 1838, the person it controlled and came with; the fact of Douglass’s slavery is the fact that other people messed with Douglass’s stuff. CJ “is neither free from historicity nor reducible to it” (Griswold 2006, 185).

The guts of CJ are most fully described in TMS as follows:

The most sacred laws of justice, therefore, those whose violation seems to call loudest for vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and possessions; and last of all come those which guard what are called his personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others. (84.2)

The “most sacred laws” description does not include reputation (nor does 339.32), but elsewhere Smith does include reputation as something that is covered by CJ. Perhaps Smith’s inclusions were less than whole-hearted. Besides the inconstancy, there is the more important point that, short of inciting arrest etc. by tarnishing another’s “simple esteem” (Pufendorf 2009, 94), reputation does not fit what Smith says about CJ (Bonica 2013). I downgrade the standing of reputation as part of CJ.

The “most sacred laws” description communicates the idea that the chief concern in CJ is the injunction against initiating any messing with someone else’s stuff. What CJ says about just response to messing is secondary, and is not treated in the present paper.
The equal-equal jural relationship (E-E) and the superior-inferior jural relationship (S-i)

The concept of CJ affords us the distinction between two kinds of jural relationships. By “jural relationships,” I mean uncloaked, publicly displayed, conventional relations in which the initiation of physical force (or threat thereof) is potentially exercised. Following Hume, Smith insisted on accepting two fundamental and distinct kinds of jural relationships:

1. The equal-equal jural relationship, denoted E-E.
2. The superior-inferior jural relationship, denoted S-i.

In expositing CJ, Smith signals E-E by saying “among equals” or “for equals” or “from equals” (notably at TMS 80-82.7-9). Here, “equals” means jural equals. Within E-E, all are equal as regards CJ. Each is expected to practice that virtue, and each expects it from fellow equals. The criminal acts of ordinary criminals also occur in E-E. In robbing or burglarizing, the ordinary criminal does not step outside of E-E. Acting within E-E, he simply fails in the duty of CJ.

Amid his exposition of CJ in the context of E-E, Smith pauses to turn out from E-E. He averts the reader from any misapprehension that what he says about conduct within E-E also goes for conduct within S-i. The paragraph begins: “A superior may, indeed, sometimes, with universal approbation, oblige those under his jurisdiction to behave...with a certain degree of propriety to one another” (81.8).

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5 Hume’s conventionalist interpretation of the jural superior and political authority is nicely developed by Hardin (2007) and Sabl (2012).
Smith signifies the meaning of “a superior” by methodically varying terms throughout the paragraph, starting with “A superior” and then substituting in turn “The laws,” “The civil magistrate,” “the sovereign,” and “a law-giver.” Smith apprehends a special player, a jural superior, one who is special in regards to jural relationships, as opposed to someone who happens, within E-E, to be a merely comparative superior: Sir Isaac Newton was a comparative superior but not a jural superior (Diesel 2017a). A jural superior is a player whose actions may overtly traverse the lines of CJ, as well as affect the locations of those lines in the historical context. Such a superior is not bound by the rules of CJ in the same way that people in E-E are. Another way to put S-i would be the governor-governed relationship. The distinction between E-E and S-i allows us to formulate a principle that perhaps illuminates why the historicity inside of “stuff,” “other people’s,” and “messing with” does not render CJ amorphous and thoroughly malleable: We understand our formulations such that the following holds: A sort of action is a CJ violation in S-i if and only if is it a CJ violation in E-E.

The specialness of commutative justice

Smith speaks of “that remarkable distinction” between CJ and all the other virtues. CJ’s specialness may be enumerated in six points:

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6 Smith speaks of “that remarkable distinction” at 80.5; he also points out CJ’s specialness at 79.5, 175.10 (juxtapose the opening of that paragraph with the opening of 174.9), 175.11, 327.1, 329.7. Smith is less direct when it comes to the crucial role of CJ in many of the book’s important ideas.
1. Unlike the rules of all the other virtues, the rules of CJ are “precise and accurate” (TMS 327.1).

Items (2) through (6) depend on (or are co-extensive with) the “precise and accurate” feature, and therefore are, also, among the virtues, unique to CJ:

2. The “messing” actions it treats are mostly aptly seen as ones we are not to do; as a corollary, doing nothing (passiveness) is often sufficient to fulfilling CJ (TMS 82.9).

3. Feedback on one’s performance of CJ is only negative (or neutral); one does not receive positive feedback on fulfilling CJ (TMS 82.9, 330.8).

4. In E-E, an observance of the rules of CJ is “indispensable,” in that otherwise society stagnates or degenerates (TMS 175.11, 86.4, 211.16).

5. In E-E, we feel a stricter obligation (and a higher presumption) to observe CJ than we do for other virtues; indeed, the duties associated with CJ’s rules may be forced (TMS 79-80.5, 175.10, 269.10).

6. The formulation of CJ admits of a flipside: You practice CJ by not messing with other people’s stuff. The flipside is others not messing with your stuff. That flipside is by Smith usually signified by either of

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7 On points 2 and 3, see Weinstein 2001, 83-85; on points 1 through 5 see Forman-Barzilai 2010, 221-237.

The Justices Table (Figure 1)

Smith’s major paragraph on justice (TMS 269-270.10) I call the Justices Paragraph. In it Smith distinguishes and describes the three senses of justice. In all of its senses, justice pertains to an action, but the “action” may be non-muscular, such as an act of deciding to do something, and even quite notional or hypothetical, such as an act of maintaining a certain attitude or sentiment in regard to some object. An action implies an actor.

Figure 1 has columns CJ, DJ, and EJ. But what it is that is categorized by, for example, the CJ column is matters of CJ. Using the word jurisprudence playfully, we may understand the columns as: commutative jurisprudence, distributive jurisprudence, and estimative jurisprudence. Indeed, the abbreviations CJ, DJ, and EJ are often best understood with those significations.

The rows correspond to different types of actors. The first row speaks of the ordinary, non-government person, an “equal,” acting in E-E. The second row also speaks of an equal, and again acting in a sort of E-E, but a special sort, namely, as an employee, officer, or owner of a governmental organization, such as a school, a facility, a department, or an agency. The third row is an actor qua superior, the capital S in S-i. The fourth row represents the actor qua inferior, the little i in S-i. Such inferiority would seem to be primarily or even exclusively passive.
Justices characterized in terms of someone's own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The actor acts as ...</th>
<th>Commutative Justice</th>
<th>&quot;Beyond-CJ&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>An Equal</strong></td>
<td>(A1)</td>
<td>(B1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other's Own:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian stuff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(However, Smith frequently included reputation.)</td>
<td>Actor's Own:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive Justice</td>
<td>Social resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimative Justice</td>
<td>available for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>distributing.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Includes:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>libertarian stuff;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social capital;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>approbation;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>assistance; etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government actor as a sort of Equal, not qua Superior</strong></td>
<td>(A2)</td>
<td>(B2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other's Own:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Libertarian stuff</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Actor's Own:</td>
<td>Social resources</td>
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<td></td>
<td>available for</td>
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<td></td>
<td>libertarian stuff;</td>
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<td>social capital;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>approbation;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>assistance; etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Superior</strong></td>
<td>(A3)</td>
<td>(B3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferior's Own:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Libertarian stuff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>An inferior</strong></td>
<td>(A4)</td>
<td>(B4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Actor's Own:</td>
<td>Social resources</td>
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<td></td>
<td>available for</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>assistance; etc.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Actor's Own:** Estimations (esteem, valuations, regard, appreciation, etc.) of:

1. Objects external to his/her self
2. Objects internal to his/her self: one's own judgments, habits, sentiments, purposes, estimations, intentions, and interests.

EJ recursivity: The estimation of an object can be treated as another object of estimation.
**Commutative justice among equals** (cell A1)

In the Justices Paragraph, Smith writes: “The first sense of the word coincides with what Aristotle and the Schoolmen call commutative justice, and with what Grotius calls the *justitia expletrix*, which consists in abstaining from what is another’s, and in doing voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be forced to do” (269.10). Of this sense of justice, Smith, in the same paragraph, says: “This is that justice which I have treated of above...,” meaning especially in Part II, Section II, “Of Justice and Beneficence” (78-92).

**Distributive justice among equals** (cell B1)

Smith says that DJ consists “in the becoming use of what is our own” (270.10). In the Justices Paragraph, Smith writes that DJ consists in proper beneficence, in the becoming use of what is our own, and in the applying it to those purposes either of charity or generosity, to which it is most suitable, in our situation, that it should be applied. In this sense justice comprehends all the social virtues. (269-270.10)

The elaboration that Smith gives to the noun “use” helps to authorize us, when talking of DJ, to think of the use in question as a sort of *distributing*. We have “what is our own,” that is, a set of resource, and, Smith says, we are to *apply it* to purposes that, in our situation, it is most suitable that it should be applied. Your conformance to DJ consists in how you *distribute* your resources.
As for “what is our own,” as perceived through the lens of DJ, we step toward the loose, vague, and indeterminate, and toward the metaphorical. Whereas the “stuff” of CJ consists in the tangibles of property, person, and promises due, the stuff of our own of DJ includes that stuff, but also other resources, such as your energy, attention, assistance, approbation, love, privacy, influence, and so on, so long as we understand them to include a performative social element, a distributing of social resources. These things may not qualify as “stuff” through the CJ lenses, but we may regard them as one’s own through the DJ lenses.

DJ, Smith says, “comprehends all the social virtues.” DJ tends to view your act of distributing as an act that is social in that you are distributing resources to people (or their interests). It might be the case that you fall short in DJ when you fail to serve or assist or applaud some praiseworthy person; or when you fail to shun, reprimand, or blame some blameworthy person. The personalization of the ones to whom DJ is done often becomes vague and indeterminate. But the tendency of DJ is to see DJ as something done to a person or persons (including, possibly, to the actor him- or herself).

Here is another passage, from the Justices Paragraph, describing DJ:

In another sense we are said not to do justice to our neighbour unless we conceive for him all that love, respect, and esteem, which his character, his situation, and his connexion with ourselves, render suitable and proper for us to feel, and unless we act accordingly. It is in this sense that we are said to do injustice to a man of merit who is connected with us, though we abstain from hurting him in every respect, if we do not exert ourselves to serve him and to place him in that situation in which the impartial spectator would be pleased to see him. (269.10, italics added)
I italicize “and unless we act accordingly” and “exert ourselves” to emphasize that DJ entails acting, and is done to persons.

The justice that is due is due not upon any grammar-like rules, but upon the rules of what is pleasing to the impartial spectator. Such rules for what is due, or duties, are aesthetic: The rules for what is pleasing to the impartial spectator are like rules for what is beautiful. Fulfilling such duties is becoming. And the adjective *becoming* itself suggests personal development confirmed in the reaction of others, confirmed in sympathy. Becoming is a social affair. Figure 2 indicates 36 samples of Smith’s “just” talk that may aptly be understood as distributive justice.

Figure 2: Thirty-six samples of Smith’s “just” talk that may aptly be understood as distributive justice

| TMS: equitable justice 62.2; so unjust are mankind 98.2; no just pretensions 115.4; justly merited the blame 116.5; act of justice 117.8; injustice of unmerited censure 121.15; justest eulogy 123.19; has so unjustly been bestowed 131.32; the deformity of injustice 137.4; unjust preference 142.13; what is just and unjust in human conduct 160.11; with exact justness 162.1; magnanimity, generosity, and justice 167.9; justly complain 172.4; justly refuse to lend 174.9; just magnanimity 176.11; from his humanity or his justice 184.10; perfectly just and proper 228.2; is justly condemned 244.16; is justly blamed 246.21; what he thinks, justice 255.35; unjust superiority 257.41; injustice which he does to himself 261.52; injustice of popular clamour 283.29; That other species of justice 297.11; exposed to unjust censure 311.10; the general rules of justice 330.8; just reason 336.26; justly condemned him 339.30; do them justice 339.31. |
| WN: justly complained of 726.9. |
| EPS: justly renowned 62.14; justly indeed 70.25; justly exposed 77.35; just occasion of suspicion 247.7; just panegyric 254.16. |

**The parallel between writing rules and moral rules**

Smith draws a parallel between writing rules and moral rules:

The rules of [commutative] justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules of the other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant in composition. The one, are precise, accurate, and indispensible. The other, are loose, vague, and indeterminate, and present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible directions for acquiring it. A man may learn to write grammatically by rule, with the most
absolute infallibility; and so, perhaps, he may be taught to act justly. But there are no rules whose observance will infallibly lead us to the attainment of elegance or sublimity in writing; though there are some which may help us, in some measure, to correct and ascertain the vague ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those perfections. And there are no rules by the knowledge of which we can infallibly be taught to act upon all occasions with prudence, with just magnanimity, or proper beneficence: though there are some which may enable us to correct and ascertain, in several respects, the imperfect ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those virtues. (175-76.11)

Figure 3 depicts the parallel. The parallel is reiterated by Smith at the start of the final section of TMS (327.1-2).

Figure 3: The Parallel between the Rules of Writing and those of Morals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;precise and accurate&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grammar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commutative justice (CJ)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Only negative (or neutral)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Feedback on how well your performance accords with the rules
Suppose you are a student with an assignment to turn in. If you turn in a blank piece of paper, though it commits no grammatical errors, you get an F. You must show regard not merely for the rules of grammar but also other rules of good writing.

Likewise, in sitting still and doing nothing, you might fulfill CJ. But the rules of prudence, magnanimity, beneficence, friendship, and so on are not grammatical, but organized around propriety. Propriety is the “OK” region within your reference group; performance above propriety is praiseworthy (positive) and below blameworthy (negative) (TMS 26.9, 80.6). Sitting still and doing nothing, you must eventually flunk prudence and the other non-grammatical virtues, even if you satisfy CJ.

**Estimative justice, in E-E, for objects external to the estimator**

In the Justices Paragraph, after treating CJ and DJ, Smith continues on to a third sense of the word justice, a sense that he does not name, and that I call estimative justice (EJ): 8

There is yet another sense in which the word justice is sometimes taken, still more extensive than either of the former, though very much a–kin to the last; and which runs too, so far as I know, through all languages. It is in this last sense that we are said to be unjust, when we do not seem to value any particular object with that degree of esteem, or to pursue it with that degree of ardour which to the impartial spectator it may appear to deserve or to be naturally fitted for exciting. Thus we are said to do injustice to a poem or a picture, when we do not admire them enough, and we are said to do them more than justice when we admire them too much. (270.10)

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8 I had been using “esteem justice,” and around 2011 Austin Middleton suggested “estimative justice” to me, which I subsequently adopted. I feel that running a very close second to “estimative” is “evaluative,” a term that would in some respects be better, and in some respects worse.
Notice, first, that EJ is said to be “very much a-kin to the last,” that is, to DJ. The kinship, I believe, is, at least in part, that EJ is like DJ in having rules that are loose, vague, and indeterminate; in often finding expression in figurative language; in very often entailing difficult and complex knowledge problems; and in being susceptible to both positive and negative feedback.

Smith says that EJ is “still more extensive” than CJ or DJ. But its extreme extensibility does not render it totally amorphous. Estimative jurisprudence has the following logic:

1. Jim, the estimator, estimates an object;
2. Mary, the estimative jurisprude, estimates the justness of Jim’s estimation.

Like commutative jurisprudence and distributive jurisprudence, estimative jurisprudence is still about a person, Jim, taking an action, if only in a loose, figurative sense of “taking” and a broad sense of “action.” The action is that of estimating the object. Smith uses the EJ logic quite pervasively. One indication of such pervasiveness is that the noun object(s) occurs 228 times in the final 1790 edition of TMS. In the preceding block quotation, Smith gives two examples of an object for estimation: “a poem or a picture.” Smith says that Jim “does injustice” to them when he values or pursues them too little, and “more than justice” when he admires them too much. In either case we may say he estimates them unjustly.
Estimative justice, in E-E, for objects internal to the estimator

In the Justices Paragraph, following the mention of a poem or a picture, Smith turns to objects internal to our own self. He writes: “In the same manner we are said to do injustice to ourselves when we appear not to give sufficient attention to any particular object of self-interest” (270.10). An object of self-interest might be one of Jim’s own actions, interpretations, judgments, beliefs, habits, sentiments, purposes, or intentions.

Jim estimates the forest. But the estimation may be turned into an object of estimation: Jim estimates Jim’s estimation of the forest. And then, at yet another moment, there is the Jim who estimates Jim’s estimation of Jim’s estimation of the forest. Earlier in TMS Smith writes: “The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion.” (113.6) Of these Jims, Smith says: “But that the judge should, in every respect, be the same with the person judged of, is as impossible, as that the cause should, in every respect, be the same with the effect” (113.6). Think of the Jims corresponding to the loops of a spiral, with a distinct subscript on each Jim. Such iteration can also be applied to Smith’s analogy of cause and effect: We can inquire after the cause of the cause of the effect. Some say both spirals lead to God.

Treating an idea as the object of estimation, and applying EJ to such estimation, resembles the pragmatist idea that to say an idea is “true” is to say that it
is worth holding or believing or giving weight or consideration to. For any action, such as buying toothpaste, it is natural for us to look for the knowing that inheres in the action: We understand that people buy toothpaste because they know of its utility to them in cleaning teeth and freshening breath. But EJ invites us to turn the matter around, to see action or choice in knowing. Knowing entails interpretations, but, moreover, judgment regarding many things. We roll up the manifold responsibilities of judgment into an assessment as to how responsibly one estimates some idea X, how responsibly one forms and keeps associated beliefs. Jim’s believing X entails not only an estimation on Jim’s part of idea X; it also points to another object for estimation: Jim’s responsibility or scruple in believing X.

**EJ blankets DJ, which blankets CJ**

One might contend that Jim’s esteem is a sort of resource, a part of Jim’s “own,” and that EJ consists in Jim’s distributing his esteem to various objects. It might be said, then, that EJ, too, is “the becoming use of what is our own.” In this view, DJ swallows up EJ. But I incline against such a view.

In the three places in which Smith explicitly writes of “distributive justice,” it is associated with: “proper beneficence,” “charity or generosity,” “the social virtues” (269.10), “the social and beneficent Virtues” (Fragment on justice, TMS, 390), giving praise that is due, and again giving charity (in examples in LJ(A), 9). It seems that the objects of DJ attach to a set of persons; DJ would not apply to a poem, a picture, or an idea abstracted from any particular set of persons.
Moreover, to say that we have a supply of esteem points to distribute to the objects of the world usually works poorly, even as loose metaphor. Such a metaphor would need some notion of the budget constraint on esteem points, as well as some sense of the relevant objects over which such points are to be distributed. But, for EJ, we are talking about all manner of objects, including ideas. But ideas are not merely large in number, they are innumerable. As interpretative creatures, we create ideas as we go, such that one idea soon gives rise to others.

Ideas and sentiments form concatenations, and a single tweak or addition might render the larger concatenation deserving of much different estimation. The tweak or addition makes for a new and distinct concatenation. Whereas DJ has a sense of confronting a robust set of objects—people, particularly those “connected” to us—over which one is to distribute one’s social resources, with EJ we do not have much sense of a complete set of objects.

EJ is a more elementary operator than DJ; the minimal elements of EJ do not of themselves make for a distributing of one set of things (resources) to another set of things (objects). The minimal nature of EJ makes the requirements of its operation weaker and hence makes EJ “still more extensive” than DJ. In discussing the authority of the general rules of morality, Smith says that moral faculties, though a set of sensibilities, “bestow censure and applause upon all the other principles of our nature... It belongs to our moral faculties, in the same manner to determine when the ear ought to be soothed, when the eye ought to be indulged, when the taste ought to be gratified, when and how far every other principle of our nature ought either to be indulged or restrained” (165.5).
If one justice swallows another, it is EJ that swallows up both DJ and CJ. EJ is like a whale that swallows up all objects presented to its view. But DJ and CJ do not disappear inside the whale of EJ, because we too are inside the whale. There, within the whale, we perceive a rather clearly formed CJ and a vaguely formed DJ. The relationship might be diagrammed as in Figure 4:

Figure 4: CJ within DJ within EJ

The outer dashed EJ line delineates that vast space that envelopes us, and within which we perceive DJ and CJ. As many scholars have noted, Smith’s approach is non-foundationalist. Figure 5 indicates 57 samples of Smith’s “just” talk that may aptly be understood as estimative justice in E-E.

Figure 5: Fifty-seven samples of Smith’s “just” talk that may aptly be understood as estimative justice in E-E.

**TMS:** just and proper, and suitable to their objects 16.1; the extent and superior justness 20.3; as just, as delicate and as precisely suited to its objects 20.4; nothing can be more just 90.11; Its self-evident justice 93.4; a more just sense 96.5; with some justice 97.2; the justest, the noblest, and most generous sentiments 106.3; most unjust resentment 107.4; just and equitable maxim 108.6; a just comparison 135.2; sense of propriety and justice 136.3; the just standard 139.8; applied with

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As for the relationship between the DJ and CJ: Any matter of CJ can occasion the applying of the DJ lenses. When Jim messes with (or does not mess with) Albert’s stuff, Jim is necessarily making a decision about the use of some of his own stuff (his hands, time, energy, attention, reputation, etc.); any matter that a commutative jurisprudence takes up can also be taken up by a distributive jurisprudence: Is Jim, in stealing bread from Albert, making a becoming use of his own? But the converse is not true, at least not in a significant way. Suppose Jim glimpses Albert flailing in a river, and leaps to his aid. That action can be treated as DJ, but CJ does not pertain in an important way. As far as CJ goes, Jim is simply and obviously satisfying the background default of not messing with anyone’s stuff. Every social act we take is making a use, a distribution, of our own, and, since we are under a perpetual duty to make a becoming use of our own, we may ask how we are doing, DJ-wise. But few of our social acts raise any issue as to whether we are messing with someone else’s stuff. Yes, we are under perpetual duty to mind CJ, but that duty is of a very different nature, and usually is satisfied so simply, completely, and obviously that it isn’t an issue at all. Your inner distributive jurisprudence continually has eyes on
what you are doing, and is constantly expressing to you approval or disapproval, if only of slight weightiness, as you negotiate the misty lines of propriety. But your inner commutative jurisprudence is merely on-call, and gets called in only when there arises hazards to the precise and accurate lines of CJ, hazards that trigger our violation-detector to emit alarm noises and flash red lights.

**The topsy-turvy of justice paramountcy**

In one sense CJ is paramount, because of its manifold specialness, its pillar-like importance, and its immanence in E-E; it is the justice that most often most immediately calls loudly against violations. But in another sense it is lowliest because it is always dependent on DJ and EJ, and it is answerable to them; they are higher than CJ in that they provide the warrants for the presumption we give to CJ and can override CJ (that is, it is they that authorize exceptions to CJ). The dependence of CJ on DJ and EJ throws an interesting light on Smith’s remark that CJ is “what is peculiarly called justice” (TMS 82.9): Is it not peculiar that we call “justice” something which is some instances is unjust in a larger sense?

**A comprehensive perfection of EJ would be yet something else again**

The operations of estimative jurisprudence can be applied to Jim’s estimation of a poem, a picture, or any object whatever. I see Smith’s discussion of EJ as consisting of, first, his expositing of the basic operation, and then, second, his saying that, according to Plato, as EJ may be applied to any of Jim’s estimations, if Jim made
an A+ in what seemed to be for practical purposes every application of EJ, Jim’s conduct would be perfect. Smith explains that in the EJ sense “we are said to do injustice to ourselves when we appear not to give sufficient attention to any particular object of self-interest” (270.10, italics added), and then proceeds to speak of “the perfection of every sort of virtue,” which, might be termed Platonic justice. I see EJ as an operation pervasively applicable and indeed pointing toward unfathomed depths. But in itself the operation of EJ is minimal: It may be applied to some of Jim’s estimations without treating the entirety of Jim’s conduct. Even a quite imperfect person might estimate an object quite justly (cf. Griswold 1999, 232; C. Smith 2013, 785; Raphael 2001, 115, 123).

**A jural equal who is of the governmental sector** (cells A2, B2, C)

We proceed to the second row of the Justices Table. The row is labeled: Government actor as a sort of Equal, *not qua* Superior. This row accommodates governmental actors as owners or agents of owners of specific government resources, such as a street, a park, a university, or a prison. In such capacity, the government-sector actors act as an equal among equals. Thus this row basically follows the grooves of the previous row, for non-governmental equals.

Consider George Mason University, the state university in Virginia at which I am employed. I would be inclined to say that the university and its resources are owned (as opposed to being unowned), and I would be inclined to say that the owners are the residents (“the people”) of Virginia. An alternative would be to say
that the university is owned by the government of Virginia. But do the people own the government? Perhaps that makes sense.

It is obvious that government-sector ownership is usually quite different from normal private-sector ownership; that is one reason for breaking out a separate row. But it is the similar “equal-ness” that is important here: I suggest that such actors—such as the Provost of the university—do not act as jural superiors. As owners or the agents of the owners of George Mason University, such actors make rules for the use of resources that they own. Yes, they may be huge players with tremendous economic and cultural influence; yes, they subsist greatly on tax-dollars, which are garnered by the initiation of coercion, but that, as it were, is outside their sphere of action as contained in the second row of the Justices Table.

As an employee of George Mason University, I subsist in part on such tax-dollars, but I hardly think that that makes me either a jural superior or an initiator of coercion. In the narrow jural sense that concerns us here, *such government-sector actors do not mess with other people’s stuff* (unless, of course, they do, like a burglar).  

**The actions of a jural superior, in terms of CJ, DJ, and EJ** (cells A3, B3, C)

The contrast to the equal-equal relationship (E-E) is the superior-inferior relationship (S-i). By definition, any actor that did not ever practice the open initiation of the violation of CJ would not be a jural superior. Thus, not only does a

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10 At WN, 866.7 Smith talks justice (“a just proportion”) aptly interpreted as DJ in a government-sector-equal context.
superior pursue rules that are beyond the grammar of CJ, he violates that grammar. A superior does things, often with authority, often with a legitimacy, and sometimes with the approval of the impartial spectator, that would be criminal of an equal or neighbor.

In S-i relations, the CJ-flipside, that is, others not messing with your stuff, Smith generally called “liberty” (sometimes, “natural liberty”). Smith expressed the flipside relationship between CJ and liberty quite clearly when he wrote of two government interventions: “Both laws were evident violations of natural liberty, and therefore unjust…” (WN, 530.16, italics added). Likewise, Smith acknowledges that government requirements to build a firewall and restrictions on the issuance of small-denomination bank notes are, in each case, “a violation of natural liberty,” while he endorses them (WN, 324.94). Edwin Cannan affirmed the flipside relationship when he introduced the following entry to the index of WN: “Natural liberty, violations of, unjust.”¹¹

One might ask: But if the boss at work has powers and prerogatives, and a superior authority, and yet does not violate CJ, why can we not say the same for the magistrate? The magistrate also enjoys a superior authority. His authority also resides within an organization of sorts, the polity, the rules of which, like those of the private organization, people are free to exit from and submit to voluntarily.

The suggestion, it seems to me, implies a configuration of ownership wherein the collectivity of the polity owns some kind of substratum upon which all privately

¹¹ For that entry, Cannan cited pages that translate in the Glasgow/OUP/Liberty Fund edition to 157, 324, 530; see page 1057 of the latter. Incidentally, there on page 1057 of the latter, there should be an open-bracket in before “Natural liberty.”
owned property within the polity depends. Up from the collectively-owned
substratum stems a complex of contract, a complex that envelopes those existing
within the boundaries of the polity. If we accept such configuration of ownership,
the reasoning has force; the polity would be organizational in that sense, and duly
made laws that do things like, say, restrict the rate of interest that a lender can
charge would not be violations of CJ. CJ “consists in abstaining from what is
another’s” (269.10), and, on the collectivist configuration, the owners of the vast
club (e.g., the United States of America) would be satisfying that requirement. The
club rules are their stuff, not some separate affairs of others.

I submit, however, that Smith tended to reject any such collectivist
configuration. We may detect Smith’s rejection of the collectivist configuration for
example where he writes in WN of “the violence of law,” “the violence of
government” (525-526.4-5), “violence and artifice” (248.9), “the violence of their
superiors” (285.31), “this violent and forced encroachment” (342.30), “without any
constraint or violence” (372.32), “the most violent regulations of law” (422.16),
“more than ordinary violence” (586.52), and “[t]he violence of these regulations”
(653.28), and in TMS of “fortunate violence” (253.30). Knud Haakonssen (1981, 96)
notes that Smith recognized that taxation “involved forcible infringement of liberty,
privacy, and property of individuals.” Smith often declares duly enacted laws to be
violation of the simple rules of CJ—as in many of the passages indicated in Figure
6—and violation of CJ’s flipside in S-i, liberty. In this connection Smith even grows
sarcastic, as when he writes about Englishmen’s “boasted liberty” and how they
“pretended to be free” (WN 660.47; 326.100).
Figure 6: Twelve samples of Smith’s “just” talk that may aptly be understood as commutative justice in S-i.

Following Hume, Smith rejected social contract (LJ 315-324, 402-404, 434-435), instead understanding political authority on Hume’s conventionalist ideas. Perhaps relevant here is Smith’s footnote in the Justices Paragraph regarding distributive justice: “The distributive justice of Aristotle is somewhat different. It consists in the proper distribution of rewards from the public stock of a community” (TMS 269.10n*). Peter Minowitz (1993, 50) comments: “Smith’s decision here to employ a footnote, especially given the paucity of footnotes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, suggest the distance he wishes to put between his own position and a more political approach to justice.”¹² The configuration Smith subscribed to is non-collectivist. On the Smithian configuration, usury restrictions initiate coercion against people who have not themselves coerced anyone. Usury restrictions do not abstain from what is another’s.

¹² Incidentally, that is the last substantive footnote of TMS, and the last note of Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality (1997, 221-222) also concerned distributive justice and affirmed a collectivist approach.
The affairs of the usurer and his trading partner are, CJ-wise, separate from the community, but they are not separate in other terms. The atomism of CJ does not imply atomism in the other justices; it does not imply an ethical atomism. As numerous scholars have noted,\textsuperscript{13} Smith taught a presumption against violation of CJ by superiors, a presumption of liberty, but the presumption admits of exceptions. In fact, Smith endorsed (at least, exoterically\textsuperscript{14}) the usury restrictions of his society.

In pondering an exception to the principle, Smith is sometimes found talking of the polity in organizational terms:

> The expence of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expence of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim consists, what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. (WN 825.3)\textsuperscript{15}

But such talk is figurative. Smith uses such figures, not to trace out the lines of CJ, but to explore the vague rules of estimative justice, which may indeed trump CJ. Indeed, on the page preceding the “great estate” passage, Smith speaks of “the people contributing a part of their own private revenue in order to make up a public revenue to the sovereign or commonwealth.” (WN 824.21, italics mine). Smith’s talk

\textsuperscript{13} That Smith affirmed a presumption of liberty is stated explicitly by Viner (1927, 219); Hollander (1973, 256); Young and Gordon (1996, 22); Griswold (1999, 295); C. Smith (2013, 790, 796); and Otteson (2016, 508).

\textsuperscript{14} For an esoteric reading of Smith on usury, see Diesel 2017b.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf Fleischacker 2004, 194, who also quotes the “great estate” passage and tends rather to ascribe the collectivist configuration to Smith.
of the polity as a great estate is metaphorical in a manner rather like when he suggests, in espousing “the liberal system,” that the different states of Europe “so far resemble the different provinces of a great empire” (WN 538.39). Figure 7 indicates eleven samples of Smith’s "just" talk that may aptly be understood as estimative justice in S-i.

Figure 7: Eleven samples of Smith’s “just” talk that may aptly be understood as estimative justice in S-i.

| WN: the just liberty 138.12; a just proportion 620.71; as just as it is generous and liberal 678.38; It is unjust that 815.3; without any injustice 815.4; without injustice 815.5; The evident justice and utility 827.7; equally just and equitable 834.20; most unjust and unequal 893.55; not contrary to justice 944.88; ought justly to be charged 946.92. |

Above I quoted Smith referring to two laws that “were evident violations of natural liberty, and therefore unjust.” Smith then adds directly: “and they were both too as impolitick as they were unjust. It is the interest of every society, that things of this kind should never either be forced or obstructed” (WN 530.16). I propose that we read this as Smith saying: Both laws violated CJ, and, moreover, were estimatively unjust. Again, Smith allows that EJ can trump CJ. He is pointing out that in the matter of the two laws referred to, that is not the case.

Likewise, when Smith allows that taxes may be used to defray the expenses of roads or schools “without any injustice” (WN 815.4; and “without injustice” in 815.5), that is not a CJ commentary on either taxation or such spending, but an EJ commentary on such spending (or perhaps on the DJ of a government-sector equal). Just prior, Smith writes of related matters in terms of propriety (“There is no impropriety” 814-815.2): Propriety is a feature of the aesthetic sort of rules that are beyond CJ; it is not an important feature of CJ’s grammatical sort of rules. And
directly following the second "without injustice," in his final words on schooling, he says that the expense might perhaps be left “with equal propriety” entirely to voluntary action (WN 815.5; on this matter see Drylie 2016). Smith’s bracketing of the two without-injustice remarks with two propriety remarks signals that he was talking justice beyond CJ.

In the Justices Table, in the superior row, for the DJ column I write “Not applicable.” I propose that we see Jim as not owning anything in his capacity as a jural superior, and therefore DJ not applying to the jural superior. I think that such a suggestion can be made to work with some creative expounding of the multiple facets of Jim and his world, using the other rows, notably the government-sector equal row.

The following passage illustrates policy as an object of EJ: "[T]he praises which have been bestowed upon the law which establishes the bounty upon the exportation of corn, and upon that system of regulations which is connected with it, are altogether unmerited" (WN, 524.1). Smith says “unmerited,” but he might just as well had said unjust: People unjustly praise, or estimate, the bounty. There are two ways to talk about a jural superior’s policy in terms of justice: (1) CJ, that is, does the policy initiate messing with other people’s stuff?; and (2) EJ, that is, would a belief in it or a habit of affirming and espousing it be estimatively just?

Incidentally, in my own discourse I embrace the formulations and practices I see in Smith. Thus I agree with, for example, Chandran Kukathas (1989) and John Tomasi (2012, Ch. 5) that we should embrace justice talk beyond CJ. But where Kukathas (174) writes, “What [Hayek] refuses to recognize is that he is dealing with
the question of social justice,” I would swap in “estimative justice.” I deem Tomasi’s philosophy of free-market fairness to be just in the sense that I think that just estimation of it inspires agreement with it and favor for it. I avoid “social justice” altogether.

**Calling loudly vs. proffering coolly**

In the “most sacred laws” passage Smith says violations of three categories of stuff (person, property, and promises due) “call loudest for vengeance and punishment” (TMS 84.2). Smith repeatedly speaks relatedly of “loud” calls and objections (TMS 71.5, 73.2, 74.4, 84.2, 105.2, and 131.33). Early in TMS he writes: “If we hear a person loudly lamenting his misfortunes, which, however, upon bringing the case home to ourselves, we feel, can produce no such violent effect upon us, we are shocked at his grief; and, because we cannot enter into it, call it pusillanimity and weakness” (TMS 16.6). Loudness constitutes a demand on other people’s attention. Are the demand’s tacit estimations estimatively just?

Fonna Forman-Barzilai (2010, 159) writes: “understanding requires proximity, and impartiality requires a sort of cool distance.” When it comes to how we discourse, we might make a distinction between calling loudly and proffering coolly. In talking justice in S-i, Smith sometimes calls loudly, as when he writes of “an evident violation of natural liberty and justice” (WN 157.59), “an act of such violent injustice” (WN 326.100), “evident violations of natural liberty, and therefore unjust” (WN 530.16), and “contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice” (WN 826.6). All of these cases are CJ. When Smith talks EJ in treating S-i issues, he only
proffers coolly. Smith seems to quietly suggest that when we talk EJ in S-i, we should try hard to avoid calling loudly, keeping instead to proffering coolly.

Justice talk and liberty talk: An asymmetry

I have argued that Smith talks justice beyond CJ. I have also argued that in S-i CJ has a flipside, called liberty. It is natural to ask: Well, if Smith practices beyond-grammatical justice talk, does he also practice beyond-grammatical liberty talk?

The question makes perfect sense insofar as, beyond CJ, we consider DJ. Justice, of any of the three sorts, concerns duties. In the cases of CJ and DJ, duties involve obligations to particular sets of people. A duty on Jim’s side implies a kind of right on their side, however loose or vague that right might be. And rights can be fashioned, however vaguely, into a kind of liberty. As Richard Tuck (1979, 7) puts it: “if active rights are paradigmatic, then to attribute rights to someone is to attribute some kind of liberty to them.” If we imagine a God-like beholder of all the rules of all the virtues, for whom the rules of even our becoming virtues were precise and accurate, then, that beholder would, as it were, be able to extend the grammar of CJ into all social matters, and for her there would be, as Francis Bacon (1605/2002, 190) put it, “a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice.”16 To such a beholder, even “imperfect” rights would appear “perfect.”

16 On the ideal correlative relationship between the justices in the thought of Samuel von Cocceji (as well as his father Heinrich), and a comparison to Smith, see Haakonssen 1996, 143-148.
Such a logic is reflected in the idiom, *I take the liberty*, an idiom that Smith used often in correspondence (*Corr.* 21, 23, 52, 218, 258, 267, 272, 414). The logic works as follows: Smith presumes that, were his correspondent to know as much about the situation as Smith knows, the correspondent would recognize his duty to serve the interest in question, and hence Smith presumes to exercises the rights, or liberty, correlative to such duty. But Smith’s use of the idiom is an exception that proves the rule against talking liberty in that extended sense. The idiom is a sort of apology for presuming to know the “imperfect” rights so well. In his published works, Smith in fact did not much talk liberty in matters of DJ.

In the matter of EJ, one’s duty is, as it were, to the object estimated, which might be a poem or a picture. Here it would certainly be awkward to speak of a poem or a picture having rights and an associated liberty. But the duties of EJ, even in the matter of a poem or a picture, are not entirely unattached to persons and “the whole” at its various moments; such attachment is rather abstract or general. So perhaps, even here, our super-knowledgeable beholder could see rights and liberty. But here too Smith refrains from such extended use of liberty. He does not, in his published works, practice such talk even in a cool way. Figure 8 expresses the asymmetry in Smith’s semantic practice: On the duties side, he talks justice beyond the grammatical but he keeps it cool. On the rights side, he does not talk liberty beyond the grammatical. In the natural jurisprudence tradition, say Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (1983, 43), “liberty was defined primarily in the passive sense, as

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17 It is interesting that since Smith’s time usage of the “take the liberty” idiom has declined vastly, as one can see at Google’s Ngram Viewer.
the perfect right to enjoy and improve one’s property free from the encroachments of others.”

Figure 8: An asymmetry in talking justice/liberty beyond the grammatical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JUSTICE TALK</th>
<th>LIBERTY TALK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avoid all justice talk</td>
<td>Avoid all liberty talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A1)</td>
<td>(A2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow yourself only the precise and accurate concept</td>
<td>(B1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C1)</td>
<td>(C2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow yourself calling loudly (and proffering coolly)</td>
<td>Allow yourself only proffering coolly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D1)</td>
<td>(D2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D3)</td>
<td>(D4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond precise and accurate:
Perhaps the reason for the asymmetry—that is, Smith being in cell B3, rather than either B2 or C3—is that Smith’s justice talk necessarily entails identification of the actor—whether the action concerns messing with other people’s stuff (CJ), distributing one’s social resources (DJ), or estimating some object (EJ). Justice talk then speaks of that actor’s duties. Mindfulness of one’s duties is something to be promoted. But on the rights side of things, the actor with whom the correlative duty resides is not necessarily so clear. The right of property is a claim against the world, not against someone in particular. If we proceed to talk rights and liberty beyond the grammatical, the result is extensive assertions of entitlements but without clear responsibility in the correlative duties and on whom they bear. Since we tend to overstate our rights and understate our duties, perhaps it is wise to refrain from talking liberty beyond the grammatical.

**Why the double doctrine?**

Whereas T.D. Campbell (1971, 187-188) says Smith “rejects” distributive justice and estimative justice, I say quite the opposite. Yet Smith seems at times to do as Campbell holds, that is, to affirm the doctrine that justice talk should be confined to commutative justice (and hence there would be no need for the modifier “commutative”). I say, rather, that Smith affirms the doctrine that justice talk should not be so confined. If I am right, then it is appropriate to ask: Why the double doctrine? If Smith holds and quietly affirms the latter, richer doctrine, why would he ever give off the impression of affirming the former doctrine? Why does Smith
generate a contrariety on justice? Here I only raise the question; in future work I hope to address the question, as well as Smith’s footnote (EPS 121-123n*) on the double-doctrine reading of Plato (see Minowitz 1993, 6-7; Melzer 2014, 28-29, 372n44, 45). I wish to add only that the question pertains not only to Smith: In some of Smith’s predecessors and contemporaries, too, we detect similar signs of such justice double doctrine.

“a poem, or a picture, or a system of philosophy”

In the early pages of TMS Smith explains that our judging of Jim’s sentiments regarding some objects can be considered upon two different sorts of occasions: (1) “when the objects...are considered without any particular relation, either to ourselves or to [Jim];” and (2) “when they are considered as peculiarly affecting one or other of us” (TMS 19.1). In the latter case, “it is at once more difficult to preserve this harmony and correspondence, and at the same time, vastly more important. ... We do not view them from the same station, as we do a picture, or a poem, or a system of philosophy, and are, therefore, apt to be very differently affected by them” (20-21.5). Smith’s words on those early pages quietly speak to our political discourse:

But it is quite otherwise with regard to those objects by which either you or I are particularly affected. ... [I]f you have either no fellow-feeling for the misfortunes I have met with, or none that bears any proportion to the grief
which distracts me; or if you have either no indignation at the injuries I have suffered, or none that bears any proportion to the resentment which transports me, we can no longer converse upon these subjects. We become intolerable to one another. I can neither support your company, nor you mine. (TMS 21.5)

I find it striking that Smith here uses the same examples, namely, a picture and a poem, that appear in the EJ discussion in the Justices Paragraph (270.10). Also remarkable is that he suggests that “a system of philosophy” ought likewise to be a matter of such cool and distant sentiment. In fact, Smith brings these together twice, as he then soon says: “Though you despise that picture, or that poem, or even that system of philosophy, which I admire, there is little danger of our quarrelling upon that account” (21.5). The remarkable connection between the two moments (that is, 21.5 and 270.10) supports the EJ interpretation I have given to political discourse. After all, Smith’s science of a legislator is a system of philosophy, one that Smith presumably deems “just, and reasonable, and practicable” (TMS 187.11). And perhaps the connection supports the contention that Smith quietly calls for reluctance in calling loudly in matters beyond CJ.

Besides inspiring civility in our discoursing about politics, the connection might speak to the kinds of government and government policies that are estimatively just, in that certain kinds conduce to greater distance and coolness, and better harmony.
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Link


